G.R. No.

L-24732

April 30, 1968

PIO SIAN MELLIZA, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF ILOILO, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT APPEALS, respondents.
Cornelio P. Ravena for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among other properties, three parcels of residential land in Iloilo City registered in
her name under Original Certificate of Title No. 3462. Said parcels of land were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214. The total
area of Lot No. 1214 was 29,073 square meters.
On November 27, 1931 she donated to the then Municipality of Iloilo, 9,000 square meters of Lot 1214, to serve as site for
the municipal hall. 1 The donation was however revoked by the parties for the reason that the area donated was found
inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the municipality, the so-called "Arellano Plan". 2
Subsequently, Lot No. 1214 was divided by Certeza Surveying Co., Inc. into Lots 1214-A and 1214-B. And still later, Lot
1214-B was further divided into Lots 1214-B-1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot 1214-B-3. As approved by the Bureau of Lands, Lot
1214-B-1 with 4,562 square meters, became known as Lot 1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2, with 6,653 square meters, was designated
as Lot 1214-C; and Lot 1214-B-13, with 4,135 square meters, became Lot 1214-D.
On November 15, 1932 Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any caption containing the following:
Que en consideracion a la suma total de SEIS MIL CUATRO CIENTOS VEINTIDOS PESOS (P6,422.00),
moneda filipina que por la presente declaro haber recibido a mi entera satisfaccion del Gobierno Municipal de
Iloilo, cedo y traspaso en venta real y difinitiva a dicho Gobierno Municipal de Iloilo los lotes y porciones de los
mismos que a continuacion se especifican a saber: el lote No. 5 en toda su extension; una porcion de 7669
metros cuadrados del lote No. 2, cuya porcion esta designada como sub-lotes Nos. 2-B y 2-C del piano de
subdivision de dichos lotes preparado por la Certeza Surveying Co., Inc., y una porcion de 10,788 metros
cuadrados del lote No. 1214 cuya porcion esta designada como sub-lotes Nos. 1214-B-2 y 1214-B-3 del
mismo plano de subdivision.
Asimismo nago constar que la cesion y traspaso que ariba se mencionan es de venta difinitiva, y que para la
mejor identificacion de los lotes y porciones de los mismos que son objeto de la presente, hago constar que
dichos lotes y porciones son los que necesita el Gobierno Municipal de Iloilo para la construccion de avenidas,
parques y City Hall site del Municipal Government Center de iloilo, segun el plano Arellano.
On January 14, 1938 Juliana Melliza sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva who thereafter
obtained her own registered title thereto, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18178. Remedios in turn on November 4,
1946 transferred her rights to said portion of land to Pio Sian Melliza, who obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2492
thereover in his name. Annotated at the back of Pio Sian Melliza's title certificate was the following:

... (a) that a portion of 10,788 square meters of Lot 1214 now designated as Lots Nos. 1214-B-2 and 1214-B-3 of
the subdivision plan belongs to the Municipality of Iloilo as per instrument dated November 15, 1932....
On August 24, 1949 the City of Iloilo, which succeeded to the Municipality of Iloilo, donated the city hall site together with the
building thereon, to the University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site donated consisted of Lots Nos. 1214-B, 1214-C
and 1214-D, with a total area of 15,350 square meters, more or less.
Sometime in 1952, the University of the Philippines enclosed the site donated with a wire fence. Pio Sian Melliza thereupon
made representations, thru his lawyer, with the city authorities for payment of the value of the lot (Lot 1214-B). No recovery
was obtained, because as alleged by plaintiff, the City did not have funds (p. 9, Appellant's Brief.)
The University of the Philippines, meanwhile, obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7152 covering the three lots, Nos.
1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D.
On December 10, 1955 Pio Sian Melliza filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Iloilo City and the
University of the Philippines for recovery of Lot 1214-B or of its value.
The defendants answered, contending that Lot 1214-B was included in the public instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in
favor of Iloilo municipality in 1932. After stipulation of facts and trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on
August 15, 1957, dismissing the complaint. Said court ruled that the instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo
municipality included in the conveyance Lot 1214-B. In support of this conclusion, it referred to the portion of the instrument
stating:
Asimismo hago constar que la cesion y traspaso que arriba se mencionan es de venta difinitiva, y que para la
major identificacion de los lotes y porciones de los mismos que son objeto de la presente, hago constar que
dichos lotes y porciones son los que necesita el Gobierno municipal de Iloilo para la construccion de avenidas,
parques y City Hall site del Municipal Government Center de Iloilo, segun el plano Arellano.
and ruled that this meant that Juliana Melliza not only sold Lots 1214-C and 1214-D but also such other portions of lots as
were necessary for the municipal hall site, such as Lot 1214-B. And thus it held that Iloilo City had the right to donate Lot
1214-B to the U.P.
Pio Sian Melliza appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision on May 19, 1965, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
interpretation of the Court of First Instance, that the portion of Lot 1214 sold by Juliana Melliza was not limited to the 10,788
square meters specifically mentioned but included whatever was needed for the construction of avenues, parks and the city
hall site. Nonetheless, it ordered the remand of the case for reception of evidence to determine the area actually taken by
Iloilo City for the construction of avenues, parks and for city hall site.
The present appeal therefrom was then taken to Us by Pio Sian Melliza. Appellant maintains that the public instrument is
clear that only Lots Nos. 1214-C and 1214-D with a total area of 10,788 square meters were the portions of Lot 1214
included in the sale; that the purpose of the second paragraph, relied upon for a contrary interpretation, was only to better
identify the lots sold and none other; and that to follow the interpretation accorded the deed of sale by the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance would render the contract invalid because the law requires as an essential element of sale, a
"determinate" object (Art. 1445, now 1448, Civil Code).

Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the present appeal improperly raises only questions of fact. And, further, they
argue that the parties to the document in question really intended to include Lot 1214-B therein, as shown by the silence of
the vendor after Iloilo City exercised ownership thereover; that not to include it would have been absurd, because said lot is
contiguous to the others admittedly included in the conveyance, lying directly in front of the city hall, separating that building
from Lots 1214-C and 1214-D, which were included therein. And, finally, appellees argue that the sale's object was
determinate, because it could be ascertained, at the time of the execution of the contract, what lots were needed by Iloilo
municipality for avenues, parks and city hall site "according to the Arellano Plan", since the Arellano plan was then already in
existence.
The appeal before Us calls for the interpretation of the public instrument dated November 15, 1932. And interpretation of
such contract involves a question of law, since the contract is in the nature of law as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest.
At the outset, it is well to mark that the issue is whether or not the conveyance by Juliana Melliza to Iloilo municipality
included that portion of Lot 1214 known as Lot 1214-B. If not, then the same was included, in the instrument subsequently
executed by Juliana Melliza of her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva, who in turn sold what she
thereunder had acquired, to Pio Sian Melliza. It should be stressed, also, that the sale to Remedios Sian Villanueva from
which Pio Sian Melliza derived title did not specifically designate Lot 1214-B, but only such portions of Lot 1214 as were
not included in the previous sale to Iloilo municipality (Stipulation of Facts, par. 5, Record on Appeal, p. 23). And thus, if said
Lot 1214-B had been included in the prior conveyance to Iloilo municipality, then it was excluded from the sale to Remedios
Sian Villanueva and, later, to Pio Sian Melliza.
The point at issue here is then the true intention of the parties as to the object of the public instrument Exhibit "D". Said issue
revolves on the paragraph of the public instrument aforequoted and its purpose, i.e., whether it was intended merely to
further describe the lots already specifically mentioned, or whether it was intended to cover other lots not yet specifically
mentioned.
First of all, there is no question that the paramount intention of the parties was to provide Iloilo municipality with lots sufficient
or adequate in area for the construction of the Iloilo City hall site, with its avenues and parks. For this matter, a previous
donation for this purpose between the same parties was revoked by them, because of inadequacy of the area of the lot
donated.
Secondly, reading the public instrument in toto, with special reference to the paragraphs describing the lots included in the
sale, shows that said instrument describes four parcels of land by their lot numbers and area; and then it goes on to further
describe, not only those lots already mentioned, but the lots object of the sale, by stating that said lots are the ones needed
for the construction of the city hall site, avenues and parks according to the Arellano plan. If the parties intended merely to
cover the specified lots Lots 2, 5, 1214-C and 1214-D, there would scarcely have been any need for the next paragraph,
since these lots are already plainly and very clearly described by their respective lot number and area. Said next paragraph
does not really add to the clear description that was already given to them in the previous one.

Appellant however challenges this view on the ground that the description of said other lots in the aforequoted second
paragraph of the public instrument would thereby be legally insufficient, because the object would allegedly not be
determinate as required by law.
Such contention fails on several counts. The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing,
is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate
without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties (Art. 1273, old Civil Code; Art. 1460, New Civil
Code). The specific mention of some of the lots plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones needed for
city hall site, avenues and parks, according to the Arellano plan, sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution
of the contract, for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new and further agreement of the parties.
The Arellano plan was in existence as early as 1928. As stated, the previous donation of land for city hall site on November
27, 1931 was revoked on March 6, 1932 for being inadequate in area under said Arellano plan. Appellant claims that
although said plan existed, its metes and bounds were not fixed until 1935, and thus it could not be a basis for determining
the lots sold on November 15, 1932. Appellant however fails to consider that the area needed under that plan for city hall site
was then already known; that the specific mention of some of the lots covered by the sale in effect fixed the corresponding
location of the city hall site under the plan; that, therefore, considering the said lots specifically mentioned in the public
instrument Exhibit "D", and the projected city hall site, with its area, as then shown in the Arellano plan (Exhibit 2), it could be
determined which, and how much of the portions of land contiguous to those specifically named, were needed for the
construction of the city hall site.
And, moreover, there is no question either that Lot 1214-B is contiguous to Lots 1214-C and 1214-D, admittedly covered by
the public instrument. It is stipulated that, after execution of the contract Exhibit "D", the Municipality of Iloilo possessed it
together with the other lots sold. It sits practically in the heart of the city hall site. Furthermore, Pio Sian Melliza, from the
stipulation of facts, was the notary public of the public instrument. As such, he was aware of its terms. Said instrument was
also registered with the Register of Deeds and such registration was annotated at the back of the corresponding title
certificate of Juliana Melliza. From these stipulated facts, it can be inferred that Pio Sian Melliza knew of the aforesaid terms
of the instrument or is chargeable with knowledge of them; that knowing so, he should have examined the Arellano plan in
relation to the public instrument Exhibit "D"; that, furthermore, he should have taken notice of the possession first by the
Municipality of Iloilo, then by the City of Iloilo and later by the University of the Philippines of Lot 1214-B as part of the city
hall site conveyed under that public instrument, and raised proper objections thereto if it was his position that the same was
not included in the same. The fact remains that, instead, for twenty long years, Pio Sian Melliza and his predecessors-ininterest, did not object to said possession, nor exercise any act of possession over Lot 1214-B. Applying, therefore,
principles of civil law, as well as laches, estoppel, and equity, said lot must necessarily be deemed included in the
conveyance in favor of Iloilo municipality, now Iloilo City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it affirms that of the Court of First Instance, and the
complaint in this case is dismissed. No costs. So ordered.

It is therefore the more reasonable interpretation, to view it as describing those other portions of land contiguous to the lots
aforementioned that, by reference to the Arellano plan, will be found needed for the purpose at hand, the construction of the
city hall site.