913 F.

2d 174
31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 94

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Sam Edward JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-5901.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit.
Argued July 18, 1990.
Decided Sept. 10, 1990.

Lewis Alston Thompson, III, Banzet, Banzet & Thompson, Warrenton,

N.C., for defendant-appellant.
Vicki S. Marani, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Margaret P.
Currin, U.S. Atty., R. Daniel Boyce, Asst. U.S. Atty., Raleigh, N.C., on
brief, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit
Judges.
ERVIN, Chief Judge:

A jury found Sam Edward Jones guilty of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). Jones
appeals his convictions arguing (1) that evidence used against him at trial was
obtained by using a search warrant which was not supported by probable cause,
(2) that expert testimony was improperly admitted, and (3) that he should be
resentenced because he was not informed of the government's objections to the
pre-sentence report prior to his sentencing hearing. For the reasons provided
below, we affirm the convictions.

I.
2

An anonymous informant telephoned Officer Timothy Bell of the Goldsboro

An anonymous informant telephoned Officer Timothy Bell of the Goldsboro

Police Department on December 8, 1988, at approximately 11 a.m. The
informant told Bell that he had seen drugs the previous day at 519 West Pine
Street, in Goldsboro. Bell and two other officers met with the caller at a
cemetery near the police station. The informant told them that he had been to
Jones' residence on December 7, 1988, that he had seen crack cocaine inside the
house, that Jones was selling the crack cocaine, and that Jones kept the cocaine
in a brown medicine bottle and would serve it out a single rock at a time.

Bell gave the informant some money and told him to take a taxi to Jones' house
which was about a mile and a half away and to try to buy some of the crack.
The informant returned about twenty minutes later with a rock substance that
appeared to be crack. The informant told the officers that Jones had given him
the crack from a brown medicine bottle in his pocket, and that Jones had also
been carrying a small gun in his pocket.

Bell had been told that the informant had given reliable information to another
officer in the past. Bell also knew that Jones was a crack dealer. Bell had
previously searched Jones' house at 519 West Pine Street on two occasions and
had been involved in an undercover sale in which Jones sold a piece of crack to
an agent for $25. That undercover agent told Bell that Jones kept the crack in a
brown medicine bottle in his pocket.

Bell went to a magistrate and obtained a search warrant. Police searched Jones'
house and seized 10.5 grams of cocaine, $2,173.00 in cash, and a North
American Corporation .22 caliber loaded revolver.

Jones was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
Sec. 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18
U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), and maintaining a place for the distribution of narcotics, 21
U.S.C. Sec. 856. Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the
search warrant. The court denied the motion after a hearing. A jury found Jones
guilty of the distribution and firearms offenses but not guilty of maintaining a
place for the distribution of narcotics. The court sentenced Jones to two
consecutive sentences of 126 months and 60 months, and he appeals.

II.
7

A warrant affidavit must recite particular facts and circumstances sufficient to

allow a magistrate to make an independent evaluation and finding of probable
cause. Jones argues that the evidence obtained during the search of his home at
519 West Pine Street was improperly admitted because there was insufficient

information to find probable cause and because Officer Bell's warrant affidavit
contained misleading information. Officer Bell's affidavit states:The applicant
swears to the following facts to establish probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant: The affaint [sic] states that he has a confidential informant that
has proven reliable in the past by providing information to the affaint [sic] that
has led to the seizure of drugs in Wayne Co. The CI told the affaint [sic] on
12/8/88 that the CI had been to the above-mentioned residence within the last
24 hrs. and had seen a quantity of off-white rocks that was represented by Sam
Jones as crack of cocaine in the above-mentioned residence and in the
possession of Sam Jones. The CI states that the CI is a user of cocaine and
knows cocaine when the CI sees it.
8

Warrant affidavits are presumed to be valid. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). However, a defendant may
impeach the affiant by showing deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. Id. Jones argued in his motion to suppress that statements in the warrant
affidavit were recklessly made and that the affidavit fails to provide sufficient
information to allow the magistrate to find probable cause.

The trial court found that the statements were not recklessly made but that Bell
intended to convey in general terms that he could vouch for the informant. The
court found that the statement in the warrant that "the informant had proven
reliable in the past" was "a generalization subject to two different
interpretations." The court stated that the government had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that

10 warrant was issued on a solid factual basis; that the confidential informant was
the
reliable because he had been used by other officers in the past; that when he gave the
information to officer Bell on December 8, Officer Bell had reason to rely on it. And
when the informant actually purchased the drugs and returned with the drugs and
showed them to officer Bell and confirmed as a user of crack that these were--this
was cocaine base, that the reliability of the informant was further confirmed, and
that the officer had a good faith basis based on the evidence and on the confidential
informant he was reliable to make his affidavit to the magistrate, and that the
magistrate properly allowed a search warrant in this case.
11

The execution of the search warrant was in conformity with the warrant.
Officer Bell had independent knowledge that supported his belief that the
defendant was holding crack in a small brown medicine bottle and that he was
dealing in an unpackaged method, and that the search warrant was properly
executed in this case.

12

This court must uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are
clearly erroneous. United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144-46 (4th
Cir.1986); see also United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 725 (8th Cir.1986);
United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 705-06 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
927, 109 S.Ct. 312, 102 L.Ed.2d 331 (1988). Moreover, reviewing courts must
give great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984). We hold that the trial court's findings that Bell's statements were not
deliberately false or in reckless disregard of the truth are not clearly erroneous,
and that the warrant is supported by information sufficient to find probable
cause under the "totality of the circumstances" test announced in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

III.
13

Jones next argues that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony
regarding drug couriers and that this testimony prejudiced his case.

14

John C. Rea, a North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Agent, testified at

trial as an expert witness in the area of drug dealing operations. He testified that
crack dealers often sell crack in small quantities and keep the proceeds from the
sales nearby rather than in a bank. Officer Rea stated that crack dealers
normally possess firearms and that crack users can be distinguished from
dealers by the amount of the drug that each keeps on hand. Jones complains
that Agent Rea's testimony was irrelevant, and that the danger of unfair
prejudice resulting from the testimony outweighed its probative value.

15

Under Rule 403, "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." Fed.R.Evid. 403.
Trial courts have considerable discretion to determine whether to admit expert
testimony. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41
L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). A reviewing court should not disturb a trial court
determination to admit evidence unless the trial court has acted "arbitrarily or
irrationally." United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87-88 (4th Cir.1980).

16

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in this case and that it was
error to admit expert testimony of drug profiles as substantive evidence. This is
not a case in which evidence of the drug profile was used as purely background
material to explain why the defendant was stopped as in, for example, United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), or one in
which the evidence was used to rebut testimony provided by a defendant who

claims that he is not a typical drug courier as in United States v. Beltran-Rios,

878 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, it is a case in which the government
attempted to establish the defendant's guilt by showing that he has the same
characteristics as a drug courier. The use of the drug courier profile in this
manner is clearly impermissible. We agree with the Tenth Circuit which held in
United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 110 S.Ct. 1163, 107 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1990), that the use of expert testimony as
substantive evidence showing that the defendant "fits the profiles and,
therefore, must have intended to distribute the cocaine in his possession" is
error. See also United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir.1990) (any
relevance of drug courier profile in non-drug trafficking case was outweighed
by its highly prejudicial impact).1
17

After having found that the use of the expert testimony in this case was error,
we must now determine whether that error was harmless. "[U]nless there is a
reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the
conviction, reversal is not required." Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92
S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The proper inquiry is whether,
viewing the record as a whole, it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have returned a verdict of guilty" absent the testimony. Alston v.
Garrison, 720 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Hastings,
461 U.S. 499, 506, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1979, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 3589, 82 L.Ed.2d 886 (1984). "In considering the
harmlessness of the error, it is proper to consider other evidence of the
defendant's guilt." United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 640 (4th Cir.1981).
We find that the error was harmless in this case.

IV.
18

Finally, Jones argues that he should be resentenced because the government

failed to object to the pre-sentence report prior to his sentencing hearing and
thus violated Rule 50.03 of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of North
Carolina.2 He claims that his case is similar to United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d
636 (2d Cir.1989), in which the Second Circuit found that a defendant was
deprived of an opportunity to comment upon the pre-sentence report as required
by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1).3 We disagree.

19

Both Jones and the government filed objections to the presentence report
("PSR") prior to the sentencing hearing. The government objected because it
believed that Jones should have been classified as a career offender. After
discussing the matter with the probation department, however, the government

realized that Jones fell just short of career offender status and withdrew the
objection.
20

At the sentencing hearing the government argued that Jones' base level score
should be increased by two points under section 4A1.1(d)4 because Jones
committed the crimes for which he was being sentenced while on parole. This
objection had not been included in the original filing because of the
government's view that Jones was a career offender. The court accepted the
government's argument and adjusted Jones' base level score.

21

Jones' claim that he was unfairly surprised and denied the opportunity to
respond to the government's objection to the presentence report is without
merit. The PSR itself states that Jones was on parole in connection with a state
conviction. This is not like Palta, a case in which defense counsel requested an
adjournment of the sentencing hearing because there were disputes about facts
such as the defendant's level of participation in the crime and his offer to
cooperate with the government. The district court in Palta denied the
adjournment, and did not state its findings on the disputed facts. There is no
dispute in this case that Jones was on parole. Jones received all of the
opportunities afforded by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1). In addition, we note that
Local Rule 1.00 of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of North Carolina
states that "[a] judge or magistrate, for good cause and in his discretion, may
alter these rules in any particular case." There was clearly no abuse of discretion
in this regard.

22

AFFIRMED.

At least two other circuits have suggested that the use of the drug courier
profile as substantive evidence is improper. See United States v. HernandezCuartas, 717 F.2d 552 (11th Cir.1983), and United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878
F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.1989)

Rule 50.03 states:

Time for completion of presentence report. Within fifteen (15) days thereafter,
counsel shall communicate, in writing, to the probation officer objections to any
material information, sentencing classifications, guideline ranges, and policy
statements contained in or omitted from the report. A copy shall be served on
opposing counsel.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1) provides:

At the sentencing hearing, the court shall afford the counsel for the defendant
and the attorney for the government an opportunity to comment upon the
probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the
appropriate sentence. Before imposing the sentence, the court shall also-(A) determine that the defendant and his counsel have had the opportunity to
read and discuss the presentence investigation report made available pursuant
to subdivision (c)(3)(b);
(B) afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity to speak on behalf of the
defendant; and
(C) address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a
statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of
sentence....
4

Section 4A1.1(d) provides: "Add 2 points if the defendant committed the

instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation,
parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status."
(November 1, 1989)