United States v. Coletraine, 4th Cir. (2006)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Coletraine, 4th Cir. (2006)
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Scribd Government DocsUNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4038
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEONTAE RAYSHAUN COLETRAINE,
Reshawn Coletrain,
a/k/a
Deonte
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (CR-05-49)
Submitted:
October 31, 2006
Decided:
November 27, 2006
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary M. Bowman, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
John L.
Brownlee, United States Attorney, Edward A. Lustig, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Deontae Rayshaun Coletraine appeals his conviction and
33-month prison sentence pursuant to his conditional guilty plea to
one count of possession of a firearm by a user of marijuana, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (2000).
Coletraine reserved the
right to appeal the district courts order denying his motion to
suppress a firearm recovered in a search of his person.
We review factual findings underlying a district courts
suppression determination for clear error and the district courts
legal conclusions de novo.
873 (4th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,
When a suppression motion has been denied, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct
brief,
investigatory
stop
when
the
officer
has
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
To conduct a Terry stop, there must be
at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
Reasonable suspicion requires
more than a hunch but less than probable cause and may be based on
the collective knowledge of officers involved in an investigation.
Id.; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).
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In assessing police conduct in a Terry stop, courts must
look to the totality of the circumstances.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
United States v.
Officers conducting a lawful Terry
stop may take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal
safety, check for identification, and maintain the status quo.
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 235; see also United States v. Moore, 817
F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (brief but complete restriction of
liberty is valid under Terry).
We have reviewed the record, the district courts order,
and
the
evidence
parties
in
the
briefs
on
Governments
appeal.
favor,
Viewing
as
we
the
must,
conflicting
the
officer
observed Coletraine, whom he knew from past dealings was involved
in drug activity, in a high drug trafficking area.
The officer
knew that Coletraine did not live on the property, which was posted
No Trespassing.
Moreover, the officer knew that Coletraine and
the other individuals present were suspects in a recent shooting.
When he saw the officers, Coletraine looked surprised and began to
walk backwards.
Given these facts, the officer had reasonable suspicion
that crime was afoot.
He was therefore entitled to conduct a
limited frisk to ensure his own safety and that of the others
present.
During the patdown, the officer felt an object he
immediately knew to be a firearm.
Looking at the totality of the
circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
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to the Government, we find that the gun was lawfully seized as part
of a proper Terry stop-and-frisk.
See United States v. Mayo, 361
F.3d 802, 805-08 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Raymond, 152
F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
Coletraines motion to suppress the firearm.
Coletraines conviction and sentence.
Therefore, we affirm
We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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