United States v. Alphonso Buster Gilbert, JR., 39 F.3d 1179, 4th Cir. (1994)
United States v. Alphonso Buster Gilbert, JR., 39 F.3d 1179, 4th Cir. (1994)
3d 1179
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (CR-93-76)
Allen T. Wilson, Roanoke, VA, for appellant.
Robert P. Crouch, Jr., U.S. Atty., Kenneth M. Sorenson, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Roanoke, VA, for appellee.
W.D.Va.
AFFIRMED.
Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM
1
Alphonso Buster Gilbert, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a) (1988). The only issue
raised by Gilbert is whether the evidence presented by the government was
This Court reviews the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), including all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, United States v.
Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1109 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479
(U.S.1993). It is well established that possession of a controlled substance can
be actual or constructive. See United States v. Wright, 991 F.2d 1182, 1187
(4th Cir.1993). Constructive possession may be established by either
circumstantial or direct evidence. United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067,
1077 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). In this case, there was
substantial circumstantial evidence that Gilbert resided at the apartment and
constructively possessed the drugs found therein. In addition, the quantity and
packaging of the drugs supported an inference that Gilbert intended to distribute
them. See United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir.1982).
Gilbert relies on one case, United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425 (5th
Cir.1989), to support his contention that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he had dominion and control over the premises where the drugs
were found. In Onick, the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction for possession
with intent to distribute cocaine because "a reasonable jury could not conclude
that Onick exercised dominion and control over the premises or the drugs
themselves." Id. at 1429. However, the facts in Onick were significantly
different than the case at bar: there was no evidence establishing that Onick
lived in the house where the drugs at issue were found and the officers who
searched the property testified that they did not expect to find Onick there.
Here, by contrast, there was ample evidence that Gilbert resided at apartment
112 and the officers testified that they were looking specifically for Gilbert at
the time they executed the warrant.
5