United States v. Shawn Horton, 4th Cir. (2013)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Shawn Horton, 4th Cir. (2013)
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Scribd Government DocsUNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4404
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN HORTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence.
Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:12-cr-00576-TLW-6)
Submitted:
October 17, 2013
Decided: October 21, 2013
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Thomas McBratney, III, MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, PA, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Horton pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846
(2006), and was sentenced to 192 months in prison.
Hortons
counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsels view, there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court:
court
accepted
Hortons
motion
(1) complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when the
Hortons
for
guilty
downward
plea;
(2)
departure
erred
in
sentence;
properly determined that Horton was a career offender.
denying
and
(3)
Horton
has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving
notice of his right to do so, and the Government has declined to
file a responsive brief.
We affirm.
The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure that
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the guilty plea.
See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).
Thus, before
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform the defendant
of, and determine that he understands the nature of, the charges
to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).
The
court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
2
the plea.
Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th
Cir. 1991).
There
is
strong
presumption
that
defendants
guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate.
Cir.
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th
1995).
Additionally,
in
the
absence
of
motion
to
withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for
plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under
Rule 11.
2002).
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
To establish plain error, [Horton] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Muhammad,
Even if Horton satisfies
these requirements, correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.
Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Horton has not presented any evidence or argument to
demonstrate plain error.
Indeed, the record reveals that the
district court fully complied with Rule 11s requirements during
the plea colloquy, ensuring that Hortons plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
3
the
offenses
attested
to
during
which
the
he
was
hearing
pleading
that
guilty.
he
fully
Horton
also
understood
the
ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
to
him
outside
agreement.
We
voluntary,
and
those
made
conclude
by
the
that
supported
by
Government
Hortons
a
plea
sufficient
in
his
was
plea
knowing,
factual
basis.
Accordingly, we affirm Hortons conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard.
See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009).
both
the
sentence.
district
procedural
This review requires consideration of
and
substantive
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
court
properly
reasonableness
of
the
We first assess whether the
calculated
the
advisory
Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2013), analyzed any arguments presented by
the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 4951; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
57576 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is free of significant
procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to
see
whether
the
sentencing
court
abused
its
discretion
in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in 3553(a).
United States v. MendozaMendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, the district court properly calculated
Hortons Guidelines range, 1 granted the Governments motion for a
downward departure sentence, 2 treated the Guidelines as advisory,
and considered the applicable 3553(a) factors.
record
establishes
that
the
district
court
Moreover, the
based
Hortons
sentence on its individualized assessment of the facts of the
case.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.
2009).
Accordingly, we conclude that Hortons sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
therefore
affirm
the
district
courts
judgment.
This
We
court
requires that counsel inform Horton, in writing, of the right to
petition
the
Supreme
review.
If
Horton
Court
of
requests
the
that
United
a
States
petition
be
for
further
filed,
but
We discern no error in the district courts decision to
classify Horton as a career offender.
See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2012); United States v.
Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 529-30 (4th Cir. 2006).
2
We may not review the district courts decision to deny
Hortons motion for a downward departure.
United States v.
Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (We lack the
authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward
departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to
do so.).
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel
may
move
representation.
in
this
court
for
leave
to
withdraw
from
Counsels motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Horton.
We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials
before
this
court
and
argument
would
not
aid
the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
