UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1743
J.W., by
Wikle,
and
through
his
father
and
next
friend
Eugene
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CORPORAL CARRIER; ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; RAMONE JARVIS; DARCEL PARKER; KYLE
MCKNETT,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
ARUNDEL
MIDDLE
DEPARTMENT,
SCHOOL;
ANNE
ARUNDEL
COUNTY
POLICE
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-02386-MJG)
Submitted:
March 28, 2016
Decided:
April 19, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Hopkins, Mount Rainier, Maryland, for Appellant.
McCutchan Duden, County Attorney, Hamilton F. Tyler,
County Attorney, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.
Nancy
Deputy
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
J.W.,
Wikle,
by
and
appeals
through
the
his
district
father
courts
and
next
orders
friend
granting
judgment to Defendants and denying reconsideration.
Eugene
summary
J.W. argues
that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues
of material fact exist as to whether Corporal Carriers use of
force was reasonable.
We affirm.
We review[] de novo the district courts order granting
summary judgment.
Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts,
780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015).
A district court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine
dispute
as
to
any
material
fact
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
and
the
movant
is
Id. at 568 (quoting
In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, we view the facts and all justifiable
inferences
arising
therefrom
. . . the nonmoving party.
marks omitted).
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
Id. at 565 n.1 (internal quotation
Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving partys] case.
Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A
claim
that
law
enforcement
officials
used
excessive
force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or
3
other
seizure
of
person
is
properly
analyzed
under
Fourth Amendments objective reasonableness standard.
the
Estate
of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d
892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386,
388
(1989)
omitted)).
(alteration
Evaluating
the
and
internal
quotation
reasonableness
of
the
marks
officers
actions requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests
against
the
countervailing
governmental
interests
at
stake.
Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graham,
490 U.S. at 397).
We look to three factors when making this
determination: [f]irst, . . . the severity of the [conduct] at
issue; second, . . . the extent to which the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officer[] or others; and
third, . . . whether [the suspect] is actively resisting the
officers
attempts.
quotation
marks
Armstrong,
omitted).
810
[T]he
F.3d
at
question
is
899
(internal
whether
the
officer[s] actions are objectively reasonable in light of the
facts
and
circumstances
confronting
[him],
[his] underlying intent or motivation.
without
regard
to
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Corporal Carriers use of force in lifting
J.W.s arm was objectively reasonable.
Immediately prior to
placing J.W. in handcuffs, Carrier heard J.W. threaten to harm
4
himself and saw J.W. tip over a desk near a teacher.
J.W.
resisted the initial handcuffing and continued to resist Carrier
once
in
handcuffs;
J.W.
tried
to
pull
his
handcuffs and kicked Carrier in the thigh.
hands
from
the
It was only at that
point that Carrier lifted J.W.s arm, resulting in injury to
J.W.
While the government has little interest in using force to
effect [a] seizure justified by preventing harm to the subject
of the seizure, Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 901, at the time Carrier
lifted J.W.s arm, Carrier could have reasonably believed that
J.W. posed a threat to both himself and others.
Moreover, J.W.
was actively resisting the seizure at the time Carrier lifted up
J.W.s arm.
We therefore conclude that Carriers use of force
was objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts orders.
dispense
with
contentions
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
We
and
legal
materials
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED