The United States of America v. The District of Columbia and The Department of General Services, District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 239, 4th Cir. (1986)
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Scribd Government DocsThe United States of America v. The District of Columbia and The Department of General Services, District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 239, 4th Cir. (1986)
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Scribd Government Docs788 F.
2d 239
The UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,
v.
The DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; and The Department of
General
Services, District of Columbia, Appellees.
No. 84-2329.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 7, 1986.
Decided April 14, 1986.
Kathleen P. Dewey, Dept. of Justice (F. Henry Habicht II, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Washington, D.C., J. Frederick Motz, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md.,
David C. Shilton and Pamela S. West, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
Catherine C. Blake, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.
Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Corp. Counsel (John H. Suda, Acting Corp.
Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Appellate Div.,
Roberta Gross, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., on brief), for
appellees.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit
Judges.
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a dispute between the United States and the District of
Columbia ("the District") over the possession and use of certain property
located in Prince George's County, Maryland. The property is titled in the name
of the United States but currently possessed by the District. The United States
sued for ejectment. Applying Maryland law, the district court, 596 F.Supp. 725,
found that the District had an equitable interest in the property and so granted
summary judgment for the District. The United States appeals, arguing that
federal law should control the resolution of the case. Finding other grounds for
upholding the district court's judgment, we affirm.
* In 1929, Congress authorized the District of Columbia Commissioners to
acquire a site and to construct a children's tuberculosis sanatorium. Act of Mar.
1, 1929, ch. 422, 45 Stat. 1425. The next year, Congress amended the Act and
added the following provision:
3
That
if the land proposed to be acquired as a site for the said sanatorium is without
the District of Columbia the title to said property shall be taken directly to and in the
name of the United States....
4
Act of Apr. 18, 1930, ch. 186, 46 Stat. 218. Later that year, two parcels of land
in Prince George's County, Maryland, were purchased. Together, they are
known as the Glenn Dale property. Both deeds transferred title to the United
States in fee simple absolute. Neither deed mentioned the District of Columbia,
either as a party or as a holder of any interest in the property.
The District constructed the facility for the sanatorium and commenced
operations. In the late 1960's, because of medical advances in the treatment and
care of tuberculosis, the Glenn Dale facility began to be used less for the
treatment of tuberculosis and more for the treatment of other chronic diseases.
By 1972, the last tubercular child was treated at Glenn Dale. The facility was
used as a general hospital until 1981, when continued operations were found to
be economically unfeasible and the facility was closed.
Thereafter, both parties claimed the right to control the Glenn Dale property.
The General Services Administration (GSA) claimed that the District had a
right to use the property only so long as it was used for a hospital and that GSA
could dispose of the property under the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 (FPASA), since hospital operations
had ceased. The District published notice of intent to lease the site in November
1982, but attempts to lease the property were suspended pending discussions
between the parties. When discussions failed and the District again published
notice of intent to lease, the United States brought this action on behalf of GSA
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The United
States sought to eject the District and enjoin its attempts to lease the property.
On the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
judgment for the District; its opinion is reported as United States v. District of
Columbia, 596 F.Supp. 725 (D.Md.1984). The court held that the District was
not a federal agency under the FPASA so that the FPASA would not apply.
Applying the Maryland law of purchase money resulting trusts, the court found
that the District held the equitable interest in the property and was entitled to
possess and use the property until Congress legislates to the contrary.
II
8
On appeal, the United States argues that federal law controls the resolution of
this dispute and thus the district court erred in applying Maryland law and
determining equitable title to the property. We find that the Acts of Congress
are sufficiently clear that we need not resort to Maryland law to determine that
the District has the right to possess and use the Glenn Dale property.
The United States claims the right to have the District ejected from the
property. The United States holds fee simple absolute title to the Glenn Dale
property pursuant to the 1930 Act. The United States asserts that it is entitled to
possession: allegedly, the District had the right to use the property only so long
as it was used for a hospital, and the District forfeited that right by
discontinuing hospital operations in 1981. We find no basis for such a
condition. Nothing in the 1929 or 1930 Acts indicates any such condition or
potential forfeiture, and we refuse to create limitations that Congress did not see
fit to impose.
10
On the contrary, Congress specifically authorized the District of Columbia
Commissioners to acquire the site and to construct a facility for use as a
children's tuberculosis sanatorium. Congress subsequently provided for the
District to control the facility:
11
The following hospital and sanatoria, on or after July 1, 1937, shall be under
the direction and control of the Department of Human Services of the District
of Columbia and subject to the supervision of the Mayor of the District of
Columbia: Tuberculosis Sanatoria....
12
D.C.Code Sec. 6-116 (1981) (originally enacted as Act of June 29, 1937, ch.
403, Sec. 1, 50 Stat. 371, 376). The District has continuously exercised control
over the property from the time of its acquisition to the present. Finally,
Congress has provided:
13 Mayor of the District of Columbia is authorized and empowered within his
The
discretion to rent any building or land belonging to the District of Columbia or under
the jurisdiction of the Mayor, or any available space therein, whenever such building
or land, or space therein, is not then required for the purpose for which it was
acquired....
14
D.C.Code Sec. 1-337(c) (1981) (emphasis added) (originally enacted as Act of
Dec. 20, 1944, ch. 611, Sec. 1(c), 58 Stat. 819, 821).
15
The United States correctly observes that this statute applies to property under
the control of the District, but it argues that it does not apply to property
controlled by the District but owned by the United States. This argument is
refuted by the clear language of the statute itself. Section 1-337(c) has no
language stating, or even suggesting, that property owned by the United States
is excluded. Had Congress wished to limit the scope of the power to property
owned by the District, it needed to use only the phrase "belonging to the
District of Columbia" and could have omitted the phrase "under the jurisdiction
of the Mayor." We refuse to assume that Congress is ignorant of the distinction
in meaning between these two phrases and to ascribe to the statute a meaning
inconsistent with its plain language.
16
Section 1-337(c) is directly applicable here. The District has jurisdiction over
the tuberculosis sanatorium. It ceased operating a hospital at the facility when it
was found that it was not economically feasible to make the renovations
necessary to continue operations. Thus, Glenn Dale was no longer required as a
medical facility, the purpose for which it was acquired. Thereafter, when the
District sought to lease the property rather than let it sit idle and deteriorate, it
was doing no more than what was already authorized by Congress.
17
In conclusion, looking at these statutes as a whole, we find that Congress
intended for the District to possess and use the property until it legislated to the
contrary. Further, Sec. 1-337(c) governs the present dispute and authorizes the
District's attempts to lease the property. For these reasons, the judgment of the
district court is
18
AFFIRMED.
