United States v. William R. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 4th Cir. (1989)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. William R. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 4th Cir. (1989)
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Scribd Government Docs872 F.
2d 94
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William R. ATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 87-5179.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 9, 1989.
Decided April 11, 1989.
William Eric O'Brian, Jr. (Newman T. Halvorson, Jr., Covington &
Burling, Washington, D.C., on brief) for defendant-appellant.
William Graham Otis, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Henry E. Hudson, U.S. Atty.,
Alexandria, Va., on brief) for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge,
and HARVEY, Chief United States District Judge for the District of
Maryland, sitting by designation.
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:
The case is not complicated insofar as the facts are concerned, they having
been stipulated. The defendant, William Roy Atkins, served in the United
States Army from 1963 to 1972 at which time he was honorably discharged
after three tours of duty in Vietnam.
Atkins was convicted in 1981 by the Crown Court of Croyden, England, of
unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. Sentenced to a
term of 5 years incarceration, he was released and deported after three years.
On the night of April 4, 1987, Atkins was at the Officers Club at Fort Myer in
Arlington, Virginia. His car was parked in the Officers Club parking lot.
Attached to his car was a sticker he had obtained on June 28, 1985, entitling
him to entrance into the base, which he had fraudulently obtained by presenting
identification that purported to indicate that he was on active duty in the Army.
Having previously determined that the sticker might be unauthorized, Fort
Myer Military Police placed the car under observation. When Atkins returned
to his car he was arrested. A search incident to that arrest revealed a Smith and
Wesson .38 caliber pistol fastened to his ankle.
4
Thereafter, Atkins was indicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia for violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g), making it
unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ... possess ...
any firearm or ammunition...."
Atkins has conditionally pleaded guilty, reserving only the question of whether
his conviction in England had been "by any court" of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The length of the term is not in
question, but Atkins denies that he was convicted in any court. The argument is
that American legislatures, including Congress, dealing with affairs in this
country, do not, unless they explicitly so state, mean a reference to "any court"
to extend to the court of a foreign jurisdiction.1 It is argued that the statute is
sufficiently ambiguous, bearing in mind the concept of lenity, which applies to
criminal statutes, see Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28
L.Ed.2d 493 (1971), that he should not be held guilty of violating 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 922(g).
United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.1986), holds squarely to the
contrary. We are favorably impressed by the logic employed in United States v.
Winson and agree with the Winson court that the scant legislative history of 18
U.S.C. Sec. 922, as well as that of a similar provision in 18 U.S.C.App. Sec.
1202, and the cases and materials construing the two statutes, offer no
illumination as to Congress' intended meaning nor serve to inject any
uncertainty into the subject language. United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d at
757, 758-59. If statutory language is unambiguous, the principle of lenity is
inapplicable. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-88 n. 10, 101 S.Ct.
2524, 2530-31 n. 10, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981).
Thus, considering the plain meaning of the subject language, Atkins' conviction
appears to satisfy the requirements of the statute. "Any" is hardly an ambiguous
term, being all-inclusive in nature. The attack must properly center, if it is to
have any chance of success, on the word "court". However, Atkins suffered the
misfortune of violating foreign law in England, the country which provides the
origin or antecedent of the jurisdictional system employed in the United States
of America. We here deal with a system of common law and statutes refining it
which obtains in England and America alike. Accordingly, we find that Atkins'
English conviction was a proper predicate for conviction under Sec. 922, and,
consequently, conclude that the judgment of the district court should be
8
AFFIRMED.
Atkins does not suggest his English conviction was the "result of the violation
of [his] civil rights or contrary to any cherished principle of American
constitutional law," United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757 (6th Cir.1986),
nor does he dispute that the English offenses he was charged with--inter alia,
pulling a loaded handgun on a police officer--would constitute offenses of
similar gravity under American law
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