Louise Landry v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 989 F.2d 493, 4th Cir. (1993)
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Scribd Government DocsLouise Landry v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 989 F.2d 493, 4th Cir. (1993)
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Scribd Government Docs989 F.
2d 493
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of
unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
Louise LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 92-1889.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: January 29, 1993
Decided: March 26, 1993
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, at Aiken. William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-10621)
Mary J. Wiesen-Kosinski, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, E. Bart Daniel, United
States Attorney, Bruce R. Granger, Chief Counsel, Mack A. Davis,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Mary Ann Sloan, Principal Regional Counsel,
Holly A. Grimes, Supervisory Assistant Regional Counsel, Cheryl L.
Nikonovich-Kahn, Assistant Regional Counsel, Laurie G. Remter,
Assistant Regional Counsel, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
D.S.C.
AFFIRMED.
Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN,
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
OPINION
1
Louise Landry (Claimant) appeals from the district court's order affirming a
decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying her
application for Social Security disability benefits. Finding that substantial
evidence existed to support the Secretary's decision, we affirm.
Claimant filed a claim in 1988 for Social Security disability benefits, alleging
that she became disabled with arthritis and fibrositis on November 15, 1987.
Claimant was last insured for disability insurance benefits on December 31,
1987. Therefore, Claimant was required to prove that she became disabled prior
to December 31, 1987.
Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Claimant then
requested an administrative hearing, which was held on May 31, 1989.
Claimant was represented by counsel at the hearing. Claimant, her brother, and
a vocational expert testified, and voluminous medical records were presented to
the administrative law judge (ALJ).
The ALJ issued a decision in June 1989 denying benefits based upon
Claimant's ability to perform her past relevant work as a clerktypist, at least
through the date she was last insured for benefits. The Appeals Council denied
Claimant's request for review in March 1990, and in May 1990 Claimant filed
this civil action pursuant to the Social 6350 35 1 Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
405(g) (West 1991).
After reviewing the evidence, the magistrate judge recommended that the
Secretary's decision be affirmed. Claimant filed objections to the magistrate
judge's report. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and
affirmed the Secretary's decision in June 1992. Claimant timely appealed,
alleging that the denial of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence.
We may not engage in a de novo review of the evidence, but must uphold the
Secretary's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.A.
405(g); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1990); Blalock v.
Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972). Substantial evidence is that
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
more than a scintilla but somewhat less than a preponderance. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is the duty of the ALJ, not the Court, to
make findings of fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d at 1456.
7
To be considered disabled, an individual's physical or mental impairment or
impairments must be of such severity that the individual is unable to perform
not only his or her previous work, but, considering the individual's age,
education, and work experience, any other kind of substantial gainful activity
which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.A. 416(i)(1), 423(d)(2)
(West 1991). The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish that she has a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment and that the impairment
prevents her from performing substantial gainful activity. Gross v. Heckler, 785
F.2d 1163, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
1981).
In cases in which a claimant alleges a non-exertional impairment, including
pain, the claimant must present medical evidence of a condition that could
reasonably be expected to produce pain. Objective evidence of pain or its
magnitude is not required. Foster v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1125, 1129 (4th Cir.
1986). If the ALJ finds complaints of pain or the magnitude of pain to be
incredible, she must give specific reasons for her finding. Hammond v.
Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985).
The evidence presented at the administrative hearing showed that Claimant was
fifty-eight years old when last insured for benefits.
10
Although she graduated from high school, attended two years of college, and
received some technical training, her work experience was primarily in parttime clerical or secretarial positions provided through government programs.
Claimant last worked in October 1987; she testified that she left work because
she lost the government grant which had paid for her training.
11
Claimant alleged she could not work after November 15, 1987, because of pain
throughout her body caused by arthritis and fibrositis. She also alleged that she
suffered from extreme nervous anxiety brought on by low levels of stress.
Despite her pain, however, Claimant was able to perform housework, cook,
shop, walk, drive, and visit with friends and relatives. Claimant did not receive
psychological counseling between November 15, 1987, and December 31,
1987.
12
Claimant's brother testified at the hearing that she complained of pain, was
indecisive, and seemed to have great difficulty concentrating during extended
conversations, but that she did not appear to have problems using her hands.
The vocational expert testified that Claimant's past relevant work fell primarily
in the sedentary category and would be described as semi-skilled. The
vocational expert testified that the stress levels involved in Claimant's past
relevant work would be at the lower end of the spectrum.
13
Claimant presented little medical evidence from the relevant time period to
substantiate her claims. Dr. Michael Cohen, Claimant's treating physician,
treated Claimant during the relevant time period for joint pain, but noted that
her main problem was depression. Dr. Cohen diagnosed fibrositis,
osteoarthritis, and depression, and indicated that Claimant would be limited by
her mental problems in her ability to perform work activity.
14
Claimant presented evidence that she had been treated in 1984 by Dr. Tikare, a
psychiatrist, for complaints of anxiety and depression. Dr. Tikare concluded
that Claimant had a dependent personality and became depressed when her
needs were not met. He diagnosed dysthymic disorder and recommended
medication and counseling.
15
Claimant discontinued her medication in September 1984 due to financial
problems, and sought no further treatment from Dr. Tikare.1
16
In response to a request from the Disability Determination's office in July 1988,
Dr. Cohen acknowledged that there were not many objective physical findings
of impairment, but opined that Claimant's combination of psychiatric and
physical problems made it "almost impossible" for her to work. In December
1988 Dr. Cohen completed a medical assessment form which reflected his
opinion that Claimant should be placed under numerous lifting, weight, and
environmental restrictions.
17
Finally, the ALJ considered the evaluation of Dr. O'Leary, a psychologist who
evaluated Claimant at the suggestion of Claimant's attorney in December 1988.
Dr. O'Leary diagnosed obsessivecompulsive personality disorder with a
depressive reaction, with significant functional limitations including little or no
ability to make certain occupational, social, and performance adjustments.
18
Based on the medical evidence and testimony, the ALJ found that, while
insured for benefits, Claimant retained the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work which would allow her to alternate sitting and standing
and would not expose her to high stress or require frequent interaction with
others. Despite finding that Claimant had severe impairments including
osteoarthritis, possible fibrositis, a dysthymic disorder, anxiety, dependent
personality, and early cataracts, the ALJ determined that Claimant could
perform her past relevant work as a clerk-typist with the above restrictions.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled within the meaning
of the Act, and denied benefits.
19
In reaching her decision, the ALJ considered the lack of medical evidence
documenting Claimant's symptoms, as well as Claimant's daily activities,2 her
absence from or refusal to participate in aggressive treatment, and the
frequency, intensity and consistency of her alleged symptoms. We will not
disturb this credibility determination which is supported by substantial evidence
of record. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456; Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d
at 426.
20
The ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Cohen's December 1988 disability
opinion, because his physical findings of arthritis and fibrositis provided no
basis for the extensive physical limitations he imposed on Claimant. Dr.
O'Leary's December 1988 evaluation was likewise accorded little weight
because it was developed one year after Claimant's eligibility for disability
benefits expired.
21
The ALJ gave reasons for finding that the physical capacity evaluations of Dr.
Cohen, the treating physician, and Dr. O'Leary exaggerated Landry's
limitations. The ALJ found that Landry's daily activities were inconsistent with
the physical limitations ascribed to her by Dr. Cohen. Although Dr. Cohen was
Landry's treating physician, the ALJ was entitled to discount his evaluation
because of the existence of this persuasive contradictory evidence. See Coffman
v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
22
We find that, taking the record as a whole, substantial evidence existed to
support the ALJ's finding that Claimant was not disabled prior to the expiration
of her insured status. Conflicts in the evidence and credibility determinations
are within the discretion of the ALJ, and we may not substitute our judgment
for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456. Although Claimant
appears to suffer from various disorders and medical conditions, she simply
failed to show that she became totally disabled prior to December 31, 1987. The
medical evidence does not support her claim.
23
The district court properly found that the Secretary's decision was supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
Claimant also presented the medical records of several other doctors who had
treated her from time to time, but the records revealed no significant
impairments
The ALJ may look to a claimant's daily activity patterns as evidence of
disability. Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d at 1168
