UNRESOLVED INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AT DHS:

OVERSIGHT OF INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT

IN THE OFFICE OF THE DHS OIG

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION,

EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
AUGUST 1, 2012

Serial No. 112171

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(
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75642 PDF

2012

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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

DARRELL E. ISSA,
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
JIM JORDAN, Ohio
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
CONNIE MACK, Florida
TIM WALBERG, Michigan
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona
L R. LABRADOR, Idaho
RAU
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOE WALSH, Illinois
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

California, Chairman
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking
Minority Member
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Columbia
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JACKIE SPEIER, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director
ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel
LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk
DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, EFFICIENCY

MANAGEMENT

AND

FINANCIAL

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania, Chairman

CONNIE MACK, Florida, Vice Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Ranking
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
Minority Member
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
Columbia

(II)

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CONTENTS
Page

Hearing held on August 1, 2012 .............................................................................

WITNESSES
Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Written Statement ............................................................................................
Mr. David V. Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Written Statement ............................................................................................
Mr. Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Written Statement ............................................................................................

(III)

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6
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UNRESOLVED INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AT

DHS: OVERSIGHT OF INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT IN THE OFFICE OF THE DHS OIG
Wednesday, August 1, 2012,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION,
EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room
2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Todd Russell Platts
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Platts, Lankford, Farenthold, Towns,
and Connolly.
Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Majority Communications Advisor;
Molly Boyl, Majority Parliamentarian; John Cuaderes, Majority
Deputy Staff Director; Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Mitchell
S. Kominsky, Majority Counsel; Mark D. Marin, Majority Director
of Oversight; Tegan Millspaw, Majority Research Analyst; Cheyenne Steel, Majority Press Assistant; Noelle Turbitt, Majority Staff
Assistant; Jaron Bourke, Minority Director of Administration; Beverly Britton Fraser, Minority Counsel; Ashley Etienne, Minority Director of Communications; and Devon Hill, Minority Staff Assistant.
Mr. PLATTS. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Government
Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management will come to
order.
The purpose of todays hearing is to conduct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General and its
management of investigative cases. The Department of Homeland
Security is the third largest department in the Federal Government and has the crucial mission of ensuring the United States
safety, security, and that we are resilient against terrorism and
other threats. Because of the importance of DHSs mission, it is
crucial that it have a fully capable inspector general and staff to
provide oversight and accountability.
Over the past few years, DHS OIG has had thousands of open
investigations that must be properly managed and resolved. Our
hearing today will review the number of open cases at DHS OIG,
as well as its recent decision to transfer cases back to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and the Customs and Border Protection
entities.
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2
As of March 2012, DHS OIG had 2,361 open investigative cases.
In its latest semiannual report, which covered a six month period
between October 2011 and March 2012, DHS OIG closed only 730
cases. This is 31 percent of DHSs open cases.
Since 2009 the Office of OIG number of cases has not dropped
below 2,000 at any point, while the number of cases closed has
averaged approximately 566 per six month reporting period.
In April DHS OIG announced that it would transfer cases of misconduct involving employees at the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and the United States Customs and Border
Protection entities back to these agencies for handling. In order to
make sure that allegations of misconduct were fully investigated in
a timely manner, 377 cases were transferred in April and another
280 transferred in June.
While transferring OIGs case work may help to ensure investigations are resolved more quickly, this process certainly must be
overseen with great diligence. Allowing ICE and CBP to investigate
their own misconduct, or staff within their entities, could create the
appearance of a conflict of interest unless proper internal controls
are maintained and emphasized.
Additionally, these transfers have resulted in a 68 percent increase in the cases at ICE and CBPs internal affairs offices. If ICE
and CBP do not have sufficient resources to manage these cases,
it could result in wrongdoing going undetected.
Our hearing today will review how ICE and CBP are managing
these cases. It will also focus on the OIGs relationship with these
component entities and how it can better collaborate to investigate
and manage its cases.
In 2010, DHS OIG wrote, and I would emphasize not the current
IG, but prior personnel wrote that its relationship with the agency
was a longstanding problem due to resistance and lack of cooperation with OIG investigations.
Today we will learn more about that relationship between DHS
and its OIG and staff, and examine ways to improve collaboration
from now and into the future.
The United States is unique in the important role of inspectors
general. The Inspector General Act of 1978 established IGs to act
as independent watchdogs over federal departments and agencies.
Today IGs are on the front lines of preventing waste, fraud, and
abuse across the Federal Government. Their role directly benefits
both Congress, in our oversight duties, and taxpayers by creating
a government that is more transparent and accountable. In order
to do their jobs well, IGs need to maintain strong accountability
and integrity, while fostering a collaborative relationship with the
agencies they oversee.
DHS OIG has an extremely important task of overseeing an
agency that protects our borders, guards against terrorism, and ensures the security of our Country here at home. I commend OIGs
efforts in moving forward in a productive manner, especially in the
last year and a half, and working with their component entities
that are represented here today, and certainly look forward to the
testimony of all three of our witnesses and the insights you can
share with this Committee.

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3
With that, I yield to the Ranking Member, the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Towns, for the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing today.
Today we will focus on the efficiency of investigations into employee misconduct at the Department of Homeland Security components, Customs, Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for, again, holding this hearing.
The largest law enforcement agency in the Country, over 47,000
law enforcement personnel, are deployed along the U.S. borders, at
ports of entry and overseas, on a continuous basis to secure our
borders.
At ICE, the second largest federal law enforcement agency, over
20,000 employees enforce federal laws governing border control,
customs, trade, and immigration.
These agencies, along with TSA, form the backbone of our homeland security enterprise.
I want to first acknowledge those that perform their missions
with integrity and thank them for a job well done. Unfortunately,
we must turn our attention to the few employees who have disgraced themselves and the agencies that employ them through acts
of personal misconduct, and in many instances criminality.
Some employees come into contact with sensitive, sometimes
classified, information, and in many cases our national security interests lie literally in the palms of their hands. Dishonest employees have leaked sensitive information to drug cartels, smugglers,
and others under investigation. Others have taken cash bribes or
other favors in exchange for allowing contraband or undocumented
aliens to pass through our borders.
More than 140 CBP officers since 2004 have been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption. Many others are under investigation
as we sit.
Corruption or misconduct occurring at DHS can have greater national security implications than misconduct occurring at other federal agencies. For this reason, investigations into CBR and ICE
employees, misconduct and criminality must be dealt with swiftly
and efficiently.
The Office of the Inspector General has the primary authority
within DHS for investigating allegations of criminality and misconduct among employees. The inspector general has a staff of 219
investigators and a budget of $150 million to investigate a workforce of over 220,000 employees. That doesnt seem to be enough.
With the escalation of complaints of employee misconduct and
corruption, and a decreasing IG budget, it is not surprising that
the IG must find innovative ways to move the investigative process
forward. The CBC Office of Internal Affairs at ICE, the Office of
Professional Responsibility, are playing a critical role in the investigation of these complaints.
We have to remember that DHS was only created in 2002, when
Congress joined together previously independent agencies that may
not have had a history of cooperating with one another to resolve
cases. But today cooperation between OIG, ICE, and CBP is ex-

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4
tremely important to securing our border personnel against corruption.
Fortunately, under its current leadership, there is more DHS
interagency cooperation than ever before. That recent positive development addresses a historic weakness present at the creation of
DHS. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and hope we
can find stronger pathways forward to such an important mission,
because working together is very important, and without it we will
not be able to achieve our goals.
On that note, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the Ranking Member.
Before I yield to the gentleman from Virginia, I just want to echo
very well stated important statement by the Ranking Member, that
while we are here to talk about investigations of cases of wrongdoing, that we make sure we herald the great work of the 99 percent plus of the officers, agents, staff of DHS, all the entities who
do great work, courageous work, are truly on the front lines of protecting this Nation and, Mr. Towns, I thank you for that reminder
that I intended to include and did not reference. Well stated.
We are grateful to each of you and your staffs and your offices
who are out there on the front line.
With that, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly,
for an opening statement.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. I want to commend you personally for your
longstanding commitment to holding fair and substantive oversight
hearings that not only highlight deficiencies in government programs, but, importantly, do so in a productive manner, as you just,
in fact, stated, that allows members to work in a bipartisan fashion
to implement corrective actions. We are going to miss you around
here.
Todays hearing is focused on the DHS OIGs performance adjudicating cases and coordinating investigative efforts with the U.S.
Immigrations, Customs and Enforcement Office of Professional Responsibility, and the U.S. Customs Border Protections Office of Internal Affairs.
However, I believe this hearing actually highlights a far more serious fundamental management challenge that can contribute to
impeding our efforts across the Federal Government to prevent and
detect waste, fraud, and abuse, while promoting departmental efficiency, economy, and effectiveness: longstanding vacancies in key
agency leadership positions.
The U.S. Senates inability to efficiently confirm presidential
nominees has resulted in a dysfunctional oversight system that increases the threat of fraud and abuse going undetected, while, really, raising a question of the Senates constitutional responsibility to
provide advice and consent in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, it
has become common for months to pass before non-controversial
nominees are given an up or down vote.
A disgraceful, yet increasingly common experience is that of Michael Horowitz, his nomination to be inspector general for the Department of Justice. That was announced on July 29th, 2011, but
did not receive a vote in the Senate until March 29th of this year,
at which point he was approved unanimously.

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Most concerning is that IG vacancies appear most prevalent
among IG positions for the Federal Governments largest and most
complex agencies, such as the Department of State, which has been
without a permanent IG for 1,658 days; the Department of Defense, which has been without a permanent IG for 220 days; and
the agency that is the focus of todays hearing, DHS, we are lucky
to have an acting IG, but it has been without a permanent IG for
250 days.
Fortunately, there appears to be bipartisan recognition that
OIGs require a permanent Senate confirmed leadership to be most
effective and to best serve the American people.
Senator Grassley, a Republican from Iowa, stated recently that
even the best acting inspector generals lack the standing to make
lasting changes needed to improve his or her office. I concur in
that sentiment and hope even now that we can move forward to ensure federal IGS are adequately staffed, funded, and empowered to
reduce wasteful spending, increase agency efficiency, and ultimately improve the lives of the people we serve.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the gentleman. You make very important
relevant points here about the importance of the confirmation process and giving the Department a fully confirmed IG, and hopefully
that will happen sooner than later. Not because we are not grateful
for the current work of the acting, but the points that the gentleman made in giving that additional standing and presence of a
Senate confirmed IG.
We are going to keep the record open for seven days for any
members who want to submit opening statements or other materials, and we will now move to our testimony from our witnesses.
We are honored to have three very distinguished public servants
with us: Mr. Charles Edwards, Acting Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection; and
Mr. Daniel Ragsdale, Acting Deputy Director at United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Pursuant to our Committee rules, if I could ask the three of you
to stand and raise your right hand to be sworn in.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Mr. PLATTS. Let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
You will see a light system in front of you. The timer is set for
five minutes, but if you need to go over that, that is understandable. We appreciate your written testimonies you have given us; I
call it my homework in preparation for the hearing and allow me
to have a better understanding and better exchange with you here
today. But we are glad to have you here in person and share your
oral testimony, so it is at five, but if you need to go over, dont
worry about that.
We are glad to have you. Mr. Edwards, if you would like to
begin.

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WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman Platts, Ranking member

Towns, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for inviting me to testify today about the critical investigative
work of DHS OIG.
OIG has 219 criminal investigators deployed at 33 offices around
the Country, with a concentration of resources in the southwest.
While OIG has a primary focus on employee corruption, it also has
jurisdiction for allegations involving DHS contractors and financial
assistance beneficiaries, including disaster assistance recipients.
Both the personnel and organizational independence of OIG investigators, free to carry out their work without interference by
agency officials, is essential to maintaining public trust in the DHS
workforce. Resulting complex corruption investigations is challenging and time-consuming. OIG makes every attempt to expedite
these investigations, but some of the more complex investigations
take time to obtain the necessary evidence of corrupt activity and
identify any additional employee involvement.
OIG recognizes the importance of ensuring that corrupt CBP officers and border patrol agencies who are willing to compromise
homeland security for personal gain are quickly removed from any
position that would allow harm to the Country, so we work closely
with the components to balance homeland security needs, while investigating thoroughly to expose all wrongdoers, not just a single
employee against whom allegations have been made.
Generally, once a matter has been presented to the U.S. Attorneys Office and accepted for prosecution, the majority of investigative activity is complete. However, OIG still classifies the case as
open until all judicial activity is done, which may take years.
Although case complexity and time to prosecute may extend
some cases for several years, over 70 percent of OIGs criminal investigation cases have been open less than 24 months.
In August 2011, the CBP commissioner and I signed an agreement to enhance joint efforts against border corruption within the
ranks of CBP workforce. Cooperative efforts between OIG and CBP
IA have provided OIG with additional assets to meet the challenge
of CBPs significant and ongoing expansion. Our agreement established and integrated DHSs approach to participation with other
agencies investigating border corruption, recognizing both OIGs
obligation to work independently of DHSs components and the
need for collaboration and information sharing among law enforcement entities.
A key component of our investigative strategy is to leverage limited resources and share intelligence with law enforcement at all
levels. DHS OIG has agents participating in border corruption task
forces in many parts of the Country. These cooperative relationships ensure that different law enforcement agencies are not pursuing the same targets, which compromises law enforcement
agents safety and is a duplication of effort.
With respect to information sharing, the OIG and FBI have a
mutual responsibility under the attorney general guidelines to

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promptly notify one another upon initiation of any criminal investigation. OIG timely meets this responsibility.
By fiscal year 2011, OIGs policy to open allegations of employee
corruption or compromise of border or transportation security, combined with the expanding workforce, led to a 95 percent increase
over fiscal year 2004 of complaints involving CBP employees. The
growth of OIGs cadre of criminal investigators did not match the
growth in complaints. The increased volume led to increased case
openings and the DHS OIG investigative staff was taxed beyond its
capacity.
As a part of my commitment to ensuring that allegations of employee corruption are fully investigated, ICE Director Morton and
I agreed, in April 2012, that OIG would transfer 370 cases involving CBP and ICE employees to ICE for completion. As a part of
OIG oversight of the component internal affairs elements, OIG is
requiring periodic reports from CBP on the status of the transferred investigations until each is closed. To date, ICE OPR has reported that it transferred about one-third of the cases it received
to CBP IA and has closed 60 cases.
Also, in June 2012, OIG transmitted 287 completed investigations involving unknown subjects to the relevant DHS component
for appropriate action. Because the cases were completed, OIG is
requiring no follow-up.
We appreciate the Subcommittees attention and interest in
OIGs criminal investigative work. We will continue to pursue collaboration with all our law enforcement partners to ensure employee corruption does not jeopardize homeland security.
Chairman Platts, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
be happy to answer any questions that you or the members may
have. Thank you, sir.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]

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Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. I appreciate your testimony.
Commissioner Aguilar, before you begin, I just want to recognize,
as I referenced, appreciate the service of all three of you, but knowing, as we have talked, of your now over 34 years of service, I want
to especially thank you for your service and leadership to our Nation and all of our citizens, and that dedication especially in such
an important role with border protection.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAVID V. AGUILAR

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Platts, Ranking

Member Towns, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the invitation to speak about the ongoing collaboration, the great collaboration, I believe, between U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, DHSs Office of Inspector General, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Our efforts to combat corruption
and maintain integrity within our ranks are critically important to
CBP and to the public that we serve.
I would like to begin by recognizing the commitment, the bravery, vigilance, honor, and the character demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of CBP agents and officers who put their lives
on the line every day to protect our Nation.
CBP has more than 60,000 employees, including over 47,000 uniformed agents and officers who carry out CBPs critical mission of
securing our Nations borders, while expediting lawful trade and
travel. We recognize that public service is a public trust. That public service is a public trust is at the forefront of our interest.
At the center of CBPs core values is integrity, and it is of the
utmost importance that all of our employees are guided by the
highest ethical and moral principles. Tragically, embarrassingly, a
small number within our ranks have disgraced, dishonored the
proud men and women who serve honorably and with distinction
each day to protect our Nation.
Although the number of CBP employees who have betrayed the
trust of the American public and their peers is a fraction of one
percent of our workforce, we continue to focus our efforts on rooting
out this unacceptable and deplorable behavior. One act of corruption is one too many. It is unacceptable.
CBP prides itself on being a family. However, when one member
of this family strays into criminality, he or she cannot go unchecked and without consequence. Our most valuable, and we recognize, sometimes vulnerable, resource has been and will continue
to be our employees. They are key to our success in protecting this
Nation. And it must be emphasized that no act of corruption within
our agency can or will be tolerated.
Collaboration amongst us seated at the table here is key to combating corruption and other forms of serious misconduct. We rely
on our partnerships with the Office of Inspector General, with ICE,
with FBI to work towards this common goal.
In December of 2010, CBP and ICE executed a Memorandum of
understanding that established protocols for agents with CBPs Office of Internal Affairs and ICEs Office of Professional Responsibility to collaborate in the investigation of CBP employee-related

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misconduct and corruption. CBP and ICE are jointly working currently over 300 cases, many of which are a result of a transfer that
Mr. Edwards just talked about, that came about as a result of our
May 2012 agreement.
To date, ICEs Office of Professional Responsibility and CBPs Office of Internal Affairs have closed over 60 of these cases.
In August of 2011, CBP entered into a similar MOU with the
DHS OIG and deployed 14 CBP internal affairs agents to OIG offices across the United States. This had never happened before.
Today, CBP internal affairs agents are working side-by-side with
DHS OIG agents on approximately 90 CBP employee-related investigations of alleged corruption and misconduct.
Collaboration with our DHS partners has greatly enhanced our
effectiveness and has given CBP leadership unprecedented insight
into the threat that potentially corrupt employees may pose to the
homeland, giving us the opportunity to make adjustments, to look
at our processes, and instill new workforce policies in order to
avoid any kind of corruption.
Consistent with ICE and OIG efforts to pursue criminal investigations, CBP is also striving to more effectively use administrative authorities that rest within our capabilities to mitigate the
threat caused by CBP employees accused of corruption during the
course of an investigation. This may include reassignment to administrative duties, administrative leave, indefinite suspension,
suspension of law enforcement authorities, or other appropriate actions. This forward-leaning approach provides CBP with the flexibility to address the threat posed by employee corruption and misconduct in a manner that reduces the impact on the agency, our
mission, and the responsibilities to the American public.
Chairman Platts, Ranking Member Towns, members of the Subcommittee, again, we thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Integrity is the great cornerstone of everything that we do at CBP
on a daily basis in protecting this Nation. I look forward to addressing any questions that you might have of us.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Aguilar follows:]

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33
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. Ragsdale?
STATEMENT OF DANIEL H. RAGSDALE

Mr. RAGSDALE. Good morning. Thank you. Chairman Platts,

Ranking Member Towns, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today and discuss the
ways in which ICE upholds DHSs standards for integrity and professionalism.
With more than 20,000 employees in 72 offices around the world,
ICE is the second largest federal investigative agency. ICE promotes homeland security and public safety through criminal and
civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs,
trade, and immigration. While the vast number of ICE and DHS
employees perform their law enforcement and other duties with
honor every day, isolated acts of employee misconduct do sometimes occur.
As noted in my written testimony, ICEs Office of Professional
Responsibility is a robust program with over 500 employees and
252 special agents trained to investigate border crime and misconduct offenses. ICEs Office of Professional Responsibility works
closely with our partners in DHS and CBP to ensure that a vigorous process exists to ensure the integrity of our shared mission.
To build on the partnership between DHS IG, ICE, and CBP, two
MOUs were executed to ensure close collaboration among the agencies. In December 2010, ICE and CBP entered into a Memorandum
of understanding that assigned CBP internal affairs personnel to
ICE OPR to assist in investigations of CBP employee criminal misconduct. In August 2011, the IG and CBP executed a similar
memorandum of understanding. I can candidly say that we did not
always have this level of collaboration. However, I am proud to report that the MOUs have reinforced ICEs commitment to providing complete and timely awareness in cases involving criminal
misconduct by DHS employees.
One example of the collaboration with our partners was found in
the investigation of former CBP officer Devon Samuels in Atlanta.
This individual used his position of trust to bypass TSA security
measures to smuggle drugs, money, and guns for a Jamaican drug
trafficking organization. ICE partnered in this effort with CBPs internal affairs and the DHS IG and federal, local, and international
private partners. The investigation led to 17 arrests and the seizure of 15 guns, a kilogram of cocaine, more than 300 pounds of
marijuana, a quarter of a million units of ecstacy, and a quarter
of a million dollars in U.S. currency. Samuels ended up being sentenced to eight years in jail.
Likewise, in an ICEOPR-led case with support from the FBI,
former ICE special agent Jovana Deas was criminally convicted for
abusing her position of trust to share information from law enforcement databases with members of a drug trafficking organization.
Following this ICE-led investigation, she was arrested, pled this
February to a 21 count indictment, and resigned her position. She
was recently sentenced to two and a half years in jail.

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While not every case involves the kind of allegations I just described, we regard every example of employee misconduct as potentially undermining our critical mission, and we take every matter
that comes to our attention seriously.
As you know, as part of our continuing commitment to effective
law enforcement, in May 2012, the DHS IG transferred approximately 370 cases to ICE regarding criminal and administrative
misconduct allegations. ICE and CBP promptly began working to
determine the next investigative steps needed in each case. Since
we received the cases, ICE has transferred 155 non-criminal cases
to CBP for administrative action and returned 4 to the IG. 195
cases remain open with ICE OPR, with assistance from CBP IA.
Further, I am proud to note, as the commissioner said, our partnership with CBP has already been effective in closing over 60
cases. As we strive toward swift resolution of these cases, regardless of the outcome, we look forward to resolving the remaining
cases as efficiently as possible.
We are heavily invested in addressing all issues of misconduct to
ensure that ICE upholds public trust and conducts its mission with
integrity and professionalism. I am proud of the honesty of the
overwhelming majority of ICE employees and assure you that the
rare cases of employee misconduct are dealt with swiftly and fairly.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address you today, and
I welcome any questions you may have. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Ragsdale follows:]

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45
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Ragsdale.
I will yield myself five minutes for the purpose of questioning to
kick things off.
General Edwards, I will start with you in the sense of just the
overall big picture and the number of cases, as referenced in my
testimony, the number of open cases that remain, now over 2,000
for several years.
In your written testimony, as well as here today, in talking about
the demands on your workforce and a significant increase in the
number of open cases in recent years, and there is a chart that
shows the number of open cases kind of spiking up here; whereas,
the number of closed cases is pretty level. Is it fair to say that one
aspect of the number of open cases is related to the huge ramp up
in border protection officers, customs, so we have many more personnel up there, and with more personnel comes greater risk, especially with the type of enemy that we are dealing with here, the
drug cartels and terrorist organizations, what we are guarding
against, that, first, the amount of increase in that workload is directly due to the increase in the size of these component entities?
Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Chairman. Let me start by saying
that the vast majority of CBP employees are not having this corruption issue. Our border patrol has increased over 38 percent in
the last several years and OIG has remained relatively flat. OIG
is fully supportive of the Presidents budget; however, we have been
asking for resources over the last several years.
As of July 15, we have 1,591 open cases. We have done a number
of things internally, and also a number of things, based on Secretary Napolitanos leadership, both Director Morton and Commissioner Aguilar and myself met to force multiply and get more resources to address the cases. Out of the 1,591, there are 661 employee corruption and there is about, non-employees, 473; and a
majority of them, 457 of them, are unnamed subjects.
We have done a number of things internally. One is when we
have tried to vet this turnout the unnamed subjects to a potential
lead and then we still kept holding on to it. What we have done
now is when we cannot get any further with that, they close that.
That was the 287 that we transferred to ICE on the second round.
We have a holding it and trying to come up with some more information, but it is not getting us anywhere. So that was holding us.
The other thing is also, the way we categorize our cases, we have
open and closed. When you look at the number of cases that are
open, a lot of these cases, well over 70 percent of these cases are
open less than two years. But what we found was, or what we are
finding is that a number of these cases we have done the investigative work and we are waiting for the U.S. attorneys for some judicial action. So now we are have categorized our system to better
capture that.
So these are some of the internal things we are doing, and also
working with our partners, the commissioner and John Morton, we
are able to force multiple and work the cases. So there is no backlog; we have this under control.
Mr. PLATTS. Let me come back to that, about the backlog. So internally you have requested additional funds for more investigation
related personnel, but that has not been included, ultimately, in

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the decision, what is submitted up here as far as the Presidents
budget?
Mr. EDWARDS. Right. Every year since 2009 I have been requesting 50 investigators.
Mr. PLATTS. Yes. As far as not having a backlog, with over 1500
still open and, again, recognizing the limitation of your resources,
there is only so many investigators you can assign to pursue these
cases, what would constitute a backlog? If it is over 2,000 or at
what point do you have a backlog that each of these casesbecause
I dont think, of the ones that are open, are all 1,500-plus actively
being worked?
Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. So none are sitting, waiting for attention?
Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
Mr. EDWARDS. What has happened, as you indicated earlier, out
of the 2,061 open cases, our average caseload for an agent was well
over 12 cases per agent. These are some of the most complex. If it
is a FEMA disaster relief fraud case, an agent can hold up to 22
to 25 cases. But every one of these cases were worked, but it was
just the volume of it was too much for them to handle. And then
we were also holding on these unnamed subjects. So working this
partnership, we were able to transfer some of these. But there has
not been any case that has been in a backlog or pending or not
being investigated.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
Mr. Ragsdale, of the 270 or 280 or so cases that were transferred
back most recently that were the ones that were unnamed and ICE
kind of ran the distance on them, couldnt find anything, transferred back, where do those stand now with ICE? Are they still
being looked at to see if you can identify other leads or are they
being closed out? What is the status?
Mr. RAGSDALE. Well, that is exactly right. We are obviously looking at every case to make sure that there is no investigative steps
that are outstanding, but as the inspector general said, at least in
the IGs view, those cases should be closed, so we will obviously do
just a quick independent look to see if there is any logical next
steps that could be gleaned from our vantage point and, if not, then
they will be closed.
Mr. PLATTS. Quick final question. I am way over my time before
I go to the Ranking Member. To all three of you, are you aware
of any cases that because of the volume and the increase, without
the increase in staffing to account for the increase in volume, that
statute of limitation on a possible criminal charge has run because
of just the inability to get all the way through that case in a timely
fashion?
Mr. EDWARDS. No, sir. It is the agents responsibility and the
manager at the local office to make sure that they work with the
U.S. Attorneys Office to make sure that the statute of limitations
does not run out. If there is a potential for that to happen, we all,
working with our components, we always start working the HR
piece of it so the administrative action can take place. We havent
gotten anywhere where the statute of limitation has run out.

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Mr. PLATTS. So when you talk about open cases with the U.S. Attorneys Office and kind of waiting, it is not to the point where you
are waiting and, while you are waiting, a statute is running? You
are tracking that so that, if you are getting close, it gets a higher
attention, trying to make sure that charges are properly filed and
the statute is told?
Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. Another thing we have done internally with our case management system is an agent is supposed to
submit a memorandum of activity when he meets with the U.S. Attorneys Office to get an update of the case, to see where it is. That
information needs to be uploaded into our case management system and his or her immediate supervisor should also be approving
that. We also have the ability at headquarters in DHS OIG now
to randomly go and select, and we also have alerts in place so we
are aware of this and make sure that we take active steps.
But also one point, sir, is while we are working, because many
times the U.S. attorney would require us to get multiple transactions to prove an intent, but just in case the U.S. attorney does
not accept it, we get the components involved early on so the HR
piece of it can start so we are not waiting to the tail end to do that
part of it.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
And Commissioner Aguilar, Mr. Ragsdale, as far as your knowledge of any cases where the statute has run, are you familiar with
any?
Mr. RAGSDALE. From the ICE OPR perspective, we have not seen
any cases where the statute of limitations has run in the criminal
context. And as the IG said, the administrative context does not
have an applicable statute of limitations, so, from our perspective,
we have not seen any cases that have become stale because of the
statute.
Mr. AGUILAR. My response would be the same. We count on the
case management and our two partnerships.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay. Thank you.
I yield to the Ranking Member for the purpose of questions.
Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just ask all of you how have the MOUs improved the
working relationship and information sharing between your organizations. Has it helped? Right down the line. Mr. Edwards? Right
down. Yes.
Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. Absolutely. There is absolutely no
turf battles between OIG, CBP, or ICE or the Bureau. Sitting up
at the component head level, we have excellent working relationship. We need to put that in writing and make sure that the agents
at the field office level work well together; we just have to have a
process in place. And getting this MOU to work together, because
if you look at it, it is a DHS problem and we have to address this
together.
If you dont have the resources, you have to use the force multiplier. And having this MOU signed with CBP really has enabled
CBP agents to work under our supervision, but also have given the
commissioner meaningful information that he was looking for, because getting rid of an employee is not just the immediate solution.
For example, if you have a weed, just pulling out the weed isnt

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going to help; you need to get to the root of the problem. And working jointly with us and sharing that information with the commissioner has been very fruitful.
Mr. TOWNS. So duplication is not a problem?
Mr. EDWARDS. Well, there is no duplication, sir, because we are
trying to avoid that. That is why we are working together, we are
working the same case. There is well over 90 cases, as the commissioner talked about, that we are working together. They are not
working independently or we are not working independently; we
are working jointly together under our authority. So, one, the IGs
independence is never sacrificed. We are transparent. At the same
time, the commissioner gets meaningful information on where the
cases are.
Mr. AGUILAR. Congressman, I would answer your question in the
following manner. The current relationship that we have between
our three organizations is unprecedented. The level of transparency, both on the quantity, the type of issues that we are facing,
the cases that we are facing, and the qualitative efforts ongoing between us we have never seen before.
As to the duplicity duplication effort, because of the relationship
that we have, it provides for de-confliction at the lowest level and
at the earliest time in any one of these cases. So it gives me, it
gives us in CBP an insight that we have never had before, gives
us the ability to act as quickly as possible in support of removing
any possibility of integrity lapses, ethical lapses and things of that
nature. So I am very happy to report that we are at a level that
is tremendous. I think all of us would agree that we have some
challenges ahead of us, but with the processes in place, we have
good processes in place to continue chipping away at the things
that may challenge us in the future.
Mr. TOWNS. It is encouraging.
Yes?
Mr. RAGSDALE. And I would just add that what the MOUs do is
balance very nicely some competing interests. If either the IG or
ICE OPR has a criminal case open on an employee, we certainly
want to balance the integrity of that investigation to make sure
that it is secure in itself. Having said that, there has to be transparency to CBP and ICE managers to make sure that the extent
that employees ability to damage border security is limited. So we
see a very nice balance in these MOUs that balance those competing interests.
And certainly from the ICE perspective, as we know that employee corruption does not exist in a vacuum, and as we look at
transnational border crime, ICE homeland security investigations
often has paralleled investigations that may in fact be an umbrella
of a criminal strategy of which the employee misconduct was only
one piece. So we are seeing a very good level of coordination among
us, as well as sort of a very integrated strategy to make sure that
the employee misconduct is not allowed to sort of damage border
security.
Mr. TOWNS. Let me put this properly out. Have you evaluated
overall trends or patterns of corruption that could lead to problems? Have you looked at that in any way, the overall pattern? I
guess to you, Mr. Edwards. The overall pattern in terms of the

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trends that have led to corruption that you could point to something specific.
Mr. EDWARDS. Well, if you look at the CBP or the border corruption, the drug cartels have the resources, the money, and they have
the technology, and they want to infiltrate DHS employees. Not
only just getting to one corrupt employee, and corrupting the employee could be forthe employee could be going through financial
difficulties, gambling debts, or sexual infidelity, and the drug cartels know this, so they target this one employee.
So just by getting rid of that one employee is not a deterrent, because you need to make sure these law enforcement officers, there
is a process in place, and if there is corruption, the penalty is you
are going to be, hopefully, serving time. So just getting rid of the
employee is not going to be helpful.
Also, like I indicated earlier, we need to get to the root of the
problem and see what is causing that and get rid of that. So as we
are looking atbut at the same time it is just a small percentage
of the entire CBP workforce, so I dont want to say that the entire
CBP is a problem; there is just a very small number, and these
small numbers are getting influenced by the drug cartels.
Mr. TOWNS. Do you think any kind of special training would
make a difference?
Mr. AGUILAR. Congressman, you have asked some very, very important questions here, and, if I might, and this goes to one of the
questions that the Chairman asked. The successes that we have
had in hardening the borders to the degree that we have and making them as safe as they are today, which, by the way, they are
safer today than they have been in decades, has caused some of the
situations that we are looking at. The Chairmans question as to
the escalation, in my years of service, it used to be that what we
used to worry about the most was the dopers, the alien smugglers,
the coyotes basically walking around us, getting around us because
there was just not enough of us in physical presence, in technological capability, investigators and things of that nature.
As a Country, we have ramped up our capability tremendously
over the last eight, nine years, especially over the last two to three
years. What that has caused now is because they can no longer go
around us, below us, over us because we are in the water, we are
in the air, we are actually have tunnel detection and thing of that
nature, now they come at us, directly towards our employees, trying to corrupt us. So that is one of the reasons. So our success is
part of the issue here, so we need to recognize that.
And then every time that we take a look for developing trends,
we look at the stats, we look at the numbers, we look at activities
and things of that nature. Some quick stats that we have looked
at: of the 141 cases, the average time in service of the officers that
have fallen by the wayside is about 9.2, 9.3 years in service. We
took a look at the time frame of the so-called hiring surge, between
2006 and 2009; a total of 21 employees hired during that time
surge are part of that 141. Very small compared to the over 9,000
border patrol that we hired. So we take a look at those trends all
the time.
One of the most important things that we do, which goes to the
latter part of your question, as to training or anything else that we

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take a look at, is we now take a look and de-construct at every opportunity every one of these corruption cases, looking to whether
it was a failure of the individual to go corrupt and, if so, was there
a failure on the part of leadership on procedural processes that we
need to take a look and make adjustments in order to tighten up
a process, or is it an organizational process that we need to take
a look at. So we are constantly looking for those trends and for
ways to address it.
One of the things that we often do is focus on what I would call
the obvious. When we take the actions that we take on investigating allegations, we need to do that and we need to do better
and we need to do more. That is what I refer to as the reactive portion of our responsibility. Again, I reiterate, do better and do more,
as we are doing today.
But more importantly to me, from an organizational standpoint,
is taking a look at what we can do preemptively, what we can do
proactively to constantly be persistent in trying to prevent integrity
lapses or corruption situations, do more of the reactive and then do
a heck of a lot more in the area of sustaining a culture that is just
not accepting of any lapses in integrity and corruption.
Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Ragsdale?
Mr. RAGSDALE. The only thing I would add is I think one of the
things that we have seen is we look at border crime and sort of
transnational criminal organizations. One of the reasons why we
are particularly effective at locating what is, thankfully, a very
small number of employees is the folks in ICE OPR come from
homeland security investigations, where they are trained or ready
to investigate border crimes.
So we see a technique here to exploit employees, as the commissioner said, because of the hardening and security that exists on
the border now. So as we look at sort of drug trafficking organizations, nailing smuggling organizations ability to move both contraband and people across the border, we see this as a technique and
we see these robust misconduct investigations in the larger strategy to combat transnational crime.
Mr. TOWNS. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your generosity.
Mr. PLATTS. You are welcome.
I now yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Farenthold.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I would like to first
start and ask Mr. Edwards kind of a Texas based question, but it
also has huge national implications. The DHS OIG is under grand
jury investigation for falsifying documents out of the McAllen Office. Can you give us an update, understanding that there is obviously litigation involved, as to what is happening there and what
has happened to the personnel in that office?
Mr. EDWARDS. There is a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice and I am not at liberty to comment on that, sir.
I would be glad to come by and talk to you in a private setting.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Can you tell us what has happened to the
agents there? The Center for Investigative Reports has said, I

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think, 11 of them are on administrative leave and others are being
transferred. Can you tell me if that report is accurate?
Mr. EDWARDS. There are 8 people on administrative leave.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Well, my concern is you have to be very worried when the watchdog organization is having some problems. Do
we have an issue where there is such a pressure to get cases
turned out that we are doing sloppy work or there is something encouraging employees to take shortcuts?
Mr. EDWARDS. Without getting into specifics of that investigation, sir, I want to point out that there is not an overload, there
are not too many cases that an agent has to work. I have and we
have put effective processes in place to ensure that the integrity of
our cases are maintained. We have policies and procedures both
from an agent perspective and also from a case management and
a review process that there is integrity in the work that we do.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Well, with the number of investigations going
on, not just within your organization, but within the government
in general, you see the length of time it is taking getting longer
and longer, and in a lot of instances employees under investigation
are on administrative leave, and we are basically paying them to
sit at home. So obviously the delay is costing the taxpayers some
money.
Can you talk a little bit about the decision-making process, about
what the OIG determines they are going to investigate versus what
they refer back to the various internal affairs or professional responsibility departments of other agencies? What are the guidelines there or the general principles that are in place?
Mr. EDWARDS. According to the IG Act and Homeland Security
Act and our internal management directive, all employee corruption criminal investigation comes to the OIG and OIG opens these
allegations and works these cases not by themselves; we work
jointly with many of our partners. For instance, in the 1,591 cases
I talked about that are open, we have about 18 cases we are working with the BCTF even though we havent signed a MOU there;
we are working with the FBI on 142 cases; and we are working on
a number of cases internally with ICE OPR and with ICE HSI and
with CBP IA. So we open the case and if there are cases that we
are not going to work them, we transfer them over to ICE OPR.
But we still have very strict and stringent internal controls and reporting process to report back to us.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Now, does that leave you the resources? I always envision the way it should work is the Office of Inspector
General is a big picture organization that is looking for waste,
fraud, and abuse almost on an institutional basis, while the internal affairs is more towards an individual agent or officer. Do you
have the resources to do investigations of the big picture? Is there
enough resources for you or people in your office to be looking at
the forest, instead of just focusing on the trees?
Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. That is why we have taken a number of internal steps to better and streamline our processes internally, and also working with our partners within DHS, but at the
same time looking at the big picture, that is what our audit function does; they look at systemic issues, they look at programmatic
issues, and that is also what our inspections division does. So apart

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from looking at a specific individual and allegation that an investigation looks, the overarching for audit function and there is not
just at CBP or TSA or ICE, we look at DHS as a whole, and our
audit function does a number of reports on that.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I see my time has expired.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly.
Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you.
Mr. Ragsdale, your title is Acting Deputy Director?
Mr. RAGSDALE. It is.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Why are you Acting?
Mr. RAGSDALE. I am a member of the Senior Executive Service.
I am permanently in a different job at ICE, but I have been Acting
since June, early June.
Mr. CONNOLLY. But why isnt there a permanent deputy director?
Mr. RAGSDALE. The last permanent deputy director just left the
post and we are looking to see when the job will be filled permanently.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Aguilar, your title is Acting Commissioner.
Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, sir.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Why are you Acting?
Mr. AGUILAR. My answer is very simple, sir: the commissioner
that was nominated was not confirmed.
Mr. CONNOLLY. By the U.S. Senate.
Mr. AGUILAR. By the U.S. Senate back in the December, and the
Secretary asked me to step in; I did back in January.
Mr. CONNOLLY. And, Mr. Edwards, you are an Acting Inspector
General. Why are you Acting?
Mr. EDWARDS. Well, having a permanent inspector general is desirable, but I can tell you, even as Acting, I have not taken this
job as Acting for a day; I have ensured and made sure that I act
very independent. The secretary, deputy and all of the component
heads treat me as being very
Mr. CONNOLLY. No, Mr. Edwards, absolutely true. By all accounts, all three of you have sterling reputations and are doing a
great job in service to your Country and to the respective agencies.
I am asking a different question, though. Why dont we have a permanent, an inspector general, as opposed to an acting inspector
general?
Mr. EDWARDS. There is no nominee yet, sir.
Mr. CONNOLLY. There is no nominee. Had there been one?
Mr. EDWARDS. There was one, yes.
Mr. CONNOLLY. And what happened to that?
Mr. EDWARDS. The Senate did not confirm.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Senate did not confirm.
Mr. EDWARDS. Let me take back. The Senate had a confirmation
hearing and they did not vote on it.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Did not vote on it. They must be very busy over
there, that distracts them from their advise and consent role.
I just want to ask each of you to comment on the relationship
you have with the intelligence sections of your respective agencies.
How would you characterize the relationship between, for example,

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DHS, Mr. Edwards, OIG investigators and the intelligence sections,
various intelligence sections of DHS?
Mr. EDWARDS. Sir, I just want to go back. You asked me the
question about the nominee. One last point I wanted to add to that
question.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure.
Mr. EDWARDS. The nominee to the press reporting withdrew herself. That is the latest on that.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Sometimes, though, somebodyI mean, I cant
judge the merits of the case, but a reasonable human being at some
point is unwilling to put their life entirely on hold for months and
months and months and years and years and years, and may very
well decide to get on with their life and withdraw their nomination
because it is just more than a mortal can bear.
Mr. EDWARDS. Answering your question about working with intelligence within DHS, I am also part of the intelligence IG form,
so we do a number of inspections on the intelligence portion of
DHS, but I am also among the 15 or so IC committee members, I
am an active member of that as well.
Mr. CONNOLLY. But I guess I am asking a little different question, and I welcome Mr. Aguilar and Mr. Ragsdale to also comment
on this. In theory, if I am doing highly classified intelligence work
that needs to be carefully guarded in terms of what we are trying
to do and the mission is very important, I may not want some pain
in the neck IG staffer coming into my shop and mucking around
and perhaps, like an elephant in a china shop, stepping on very
fragile glass that we worked so carefully to protect or create or
whatever, and my cooperation might just be culturally wanting, for
reasons I think are good. Maybe you dont, butI dont mean I, the
congressman, but if I were in that situation, you could see how that
mentality might develop. Is that a problem, in getting cooperation
from intelligence sections in respective agencies? Mr. Ragsdale?
Mr. RAGSDALE. Well, from my perspective, we understand our obligation as a component to respond to the IG. Certainly, the IG,
like ICE employees that have security clearances, in fact, make
sure that those are appropriate at the appropriate levels to make
sure the information flows freely. Again, the inspector general sits
in a unique place in the department, and we have an obligation to
respond. So I know of no problem in that regard.
If I may also just add to your first question. This job is not a political appointment; it is not a Senate confirmation job.
Mr. AGUILAR. To your question, sir, specific to intelligence, I
think all of us recognize the importance of intelligence to any kind
of enforcement work that we are responsible for carrying out. In
Customs and Border Protection, we actually took the affirmative
act of not only creating, when we created our office of intelligence,
but we created our office of intelligence and investigative liaison
because of that recognition. So our head of intelligence has basically, I am going to say, daily, ongoing contact with our investigative partners in order to ensure that any kind of intelligence that
is gleaned either by us or by them is instituted in carrying forth
our responsibilities, to include ethics, integrity, and corruption.

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Mr. CONNOLLY. Just a final point. I am over my time, but, Mr.
Edwards, would you concur it really hasnt been much of a problem, cooperation?
Mr. EDWARDS. Well, at the highest level the cooperation is there,
at the best level. I dont want to sit here and say that it is a perfect
marriage. That is why we have IGs. IGs will go and say they are
there to help and, really, some people may not like that part of
they are there to help. At the same time, if there are instances that
there is not cooperation, we have a resolution and de-confliction
process. So, overall, it has been working very well in my tenure at
DHS OIG.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for holding this
hearing.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the gentleman and thank him for his participation.
I am going to yield to myself again for a second round, a couple
follow-up questions. One is initially, I guess, more of a comment.
Inspector General Edwards, you had stated earlier absolutely no
turf battles today, and that is, I think, an important message to be
heard today, which probably two years or so ago might have been
very different, and that is an important part of this hearing; where
are we, where have we come from, where are we heading, and that
is, I think, critically important.
And then related to that, Commissioner Aguilar, you referenced,
again, the positive interactions and MOUs and the cooperation and
kind of more unprecedented understanding of cases that you have
because of that cooperation. But you also said yet we have challenges ahead of us. What would you, and then if I could ask the
other two as well, each of you to identify, what are the greatest
challenges, as we go forward, to maintain and further enhance the
cooperation that is ongoing so that, two years from now, we are not
back to where we have department personnel, IG personnel saying,
hey, there is no real relationship here, there is no cooperation, and
that we dont revert back? So what are those challenges and how
do we guard against going back?
Mr. AGUILAR. I think one of the challenges that we have at this
point in time is making sure that we do everything that we can to
institutionalize what we have now come to recognize the right way
of doing business. I lived this two years ago, and two years ago it
was not a good way of doing business. When the component heads
got together, decided to move forward, we started making some
strides immediately. The advancements that we have made have
been tremendous.
There is a recognition on the part of us; more importantly, I
think, there is a recognition on the part of our people on the
ground, the boots on the ground that really do the work. So it is
continuing the relationship; it is building the institutionalization of
these processes to ensure that we do not step back, regardless who
is sitting at these chairs five, ten years from now.
Mr. PLATTS. And before the others answer, in reference to Mr.
Connollys question, identifying all three of you as Acting, given the
direction we are heading with all three of you as Acting, maybe we
dont want permanent. Maybe Acting is good. Because we seem to

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be heading in that right direction and that cooperation. The three
of you arent just here at the table today together, but are interacting on a regular basis, and your subordinates. And I think that
is an important aspect, is putting in place the structure so, as you
well stated, whoever will be in these seats in the coming years, if
it is not you, that we still have the same level of cooperation.
General Edwards?
Mr. EDWARDS. I totally agree with what the commissioner said.
Having these MOUs solidifies that. We have to continue in that direction; we cannot go back. But also within DHS we know it is inherently DHSs problem and we are trying to address it. My hope
is that I need to have an MOU with the Bureau.
Mr. PLATTS. I am sorry, say that again, with the Bureau?
Mr. EDWARDS. Yes. I have been working for the last several
months meeting with officials from FBI, and I am hopeful. We have
agreement in the majority of areas, and as long as IG independence
and transparency is attained, I am really, really hopeful that we
will have a signed MOU that we all can work together jointly and
get this, because it is a problem that we all need to address, and
everybodys heart is in the right place and we just need to move
forward.
Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Ragsdale?
Mr. RAGSDALE. I would just add, also, as the commissioner and
the inspector general said, what we certainly want to see is a complete codification of sort of the business practice that has led to an
appropriate level of workload at each of our various components at
the front end. As we all staff the Joint Intake Center, or as we
know it, the JIC, we want to make sure that at the earliest possible stage the cases are assigned out for early action.
From the ICE OPR perspective, we complete most cases, or at
least for the year, about 80 percent in about six months, and we
are actually doing a little better so far in fiscal year 2012. We want
to make sure that we can continue to do that, and the way to do
that is obviously to have sort of the cases separated as early as
possible.
Mr. PLATTS. And that goes to, I guess, a follow-up about the challenges that none of the three of you referenced, and that is the
caseload and that early identification. Is it safe to say, IG, that the
roughly 600 or so, the two turn-backs combined, that going forward
there is probably going to be an effort to better identify them up
front or more quickly to go back, versus holding them and then
turning them back at a latter date? Is that a fair statement about
the approach?
Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely. I mean, we have given more authority
to the SACs in the field. For instance, if there is a SAC and they
have 10 agents, and there is an average of about nine cases a person, and the more allegations that come in, rather than adding to
the inventory, the SAC needs to make a quick, immediate judgment and assess it, and then look at the case details and transfer
it over to ICE OPR. So, system-wise, we have put processes in
place and also this cooperation that we are venturing towards and
want this to happen. I think this is a good way of addressing the
cases now and in the future.

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Mr. PLATTS. With the caseload that has come back, the number
of cases that have come back, certainly it has increased significantly the caseload that your entities are handling. Do you envision, at your level, making requests for additional staff investigators, as well as the IG has been making at the department level?
Mr. RAGSDALE. One of the things that does make ICE somewhat
unique in this situation is because we have between 6,500 and
7,000 special agents in homeland security investigation, ICE OPR
is able to, internally within ICE, get extra investigative support
sort of internally. In sort of an era of sort of limited resources, we
have to be very careful about sort of balancing requests for additional personnel, but we do have the luxury at least for what I
would say a built-in surge capacity at ICE that will let us sort of
deal with this both now and going forward.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
Mr. AGUILAR. In the case of CBP, Chairman, we have a total of
about, as of this morning, 199 investigators assigned to these types
of cases. At the present time, I think between both entities here,
we have probably close to 50 officers; of those officers assigned to
either one of these entities on either side of me. They serve as force
enhancers to ICE and to IG. I believe that we could add some more
to ICE and IG from within the ranks of the ones that we have now.
So at the present time I think we are in good shape.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay. Thank you.
Inspector General Edwards, you talked about the 140-plus cases
that you are currently working with the FBI, and then also about
working to try to get an MOU with the Bureau. How would you
describe that relationship, where it is today versus a year ago? You
have been in your position about a year and a half, maybe from
when you came in to where it is today, and where you are trying
to get with that MOU?
Mr. EDWARDS. Right after I signed the MOU with Commissioner
Burson, my next step was to work with the Bureau, so I met with
officials there and talked to them about the IG independence and
also having an agreement with them, because in March of 2010 we
didnt sign the BCTF MOU because it didnt take into account IG
independence. So I expressed my desire to work with them and
they seemed very interested and willing to do as well. But as we
have progressed over several months, there are key issues that
they are working, and I am hopeful that we will get that resolved.
I am hopeful before my tenure is up that an MOU is signed.
But at the same time, at the field level, the 142 cases, whether
it is the Bureau, DEA, ATF, ICE, or CBP IA, at the field level the
agents really work well together, because when you look down,
there are only a few agents; they have to work together. The relationship is great. Even though we havent signed the BCTF MOU,
there are a number of places we are working cases together. It is
just in the headquarters level we need to come to an agreement so
we set a precedence in place that, going forward, we are going to
work this way, have a signed MOU, and I am hopeful of that.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay. Thank you.
My colleague from Texas talked about the McAllen situation. I
realize you cant go into the details there, but also how it relates
at headquarters with the top two officials at the Office of Investiga-

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tions being on leave as well. That is related to those ongoing investigations and the grand jury that is currently seated, is that correct? I think the approach of transparency as those investigations
are concluded, then the more information you will be able to share,
what did transpire at that specific center and then how the Department has responded to those allegations.
A specific question as the type of investigations, just so I have
a better understanding, criminal versus administrative. Each of
you or if one of you can appropriately explain what is the difference
in level of misconduct and how, when we talk about in the testimony there is a lot about the number of investigations, this many
that were criminal and being pursued, but this many that are administrative. Where is that dividing line between administrative
wrongdoing and criminal?
Mr. EDWARDS. Well, let me start out, sir. When we get an allegation, either through our DHS OIG hotline or any sources through
the JIC, the Joint Intake Center, when we look at an allegation,
essentially if it is of administrative in nature and we are not going
to work itwe call it box 1, box 2, and box 3we will send it to
the component level and ask them to work it administratively
Mr. PLATTS. And what would constitute that type of case?
Mr. EDWARDS. Lets say somebody is cheating on a T&A, time
and attendance. It is more of an administrative nature that the
component needs to deal with. So they will have their internal affairs component look into that, work it. But if it is something of administrative in nature but it is at a higher level, the threshold is
higher, than we will ask them to investigate it administratively
and then report back to us what the closure, what the outcome
was.
If it is criminal in nature, then we will take the case and then
looking at the location where we are, suppose we are in south
Texas and it is something to do with ICE HSI, then we will work
jointly with them, because for that particular matter ICE Homeland Security is better equipped because they are the subject matter expert, so we will work with them jointly.
So a lot of these cases OIG is not working independently; they
are working jointly with each one of the components or other law
enforcement partners.
We also havewe need to notify the Bureau within 30 days, the
OIG and the Bureau, according to the attorney general guidelines,
when we open a case at the district that this case is being opened.
So when we notify them, many times they will want to work with
us, or they will get the lead and they will ask us if they want to
work with us. So the relationship was not the best, but it is getting
better, and I am hopeful that just like we are sitting here together
and saying that we are working well, my hope is that the Bureau
will be sitting with us and say we all are working well together.
Mr. PLATTS. Is it fair to say that line between administrative
case being investigated and a criminal, it is a judgment call by
your investigators that pilfering supplies may be handled administratively, but if it got to a point where they are embezzling not just
supplies, but large amounts of equipment or something to get to a
level that it would rise to a criminal? Is that a fair statement, that
there is a subjective determination here?

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Mr. EDWARDS. And based on our experience and cases in the
past, there is a certain amount of judgment call one needs to make.
Also, at the end of the day, is the U.S. attorney going to accept it?
Mr. RAGSDALE. I would add that is exactly right. If the investigation may not be, clearly on its face, either administrative or criminal, the special agent would take the case to the U.S. Attorneys
Office for a charging decision, and recognizing that the Department
of Justice, like every other agency, has limited resources, while the
facts may sound both administratively or in a criminal violation,
the resolution just based on sort of the gravity of them may sort
of favor one or the other.
Mr. PLATTS. And my follow-up, there is probably a good number
of cases that maybe could be pursued criminally, but they are at
a level where that is not going to happen, but you still do pursue
them with administrative punishment or repercussions internally?
Mr. RAGSDALE. That is exactly right. Just like there is a range
of sort of ability to investigate and sort of prosecute the conduct,
it could either be through, again, a criminal prosecution or an administrative resolution that could lead to firing or a suspension.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
Mr. TOWNS. No further questions, Mr. Chairman, but I want to
thank them because it is very encouraging to know that they are
working together, because I think in government, as you know, a
lot of times we waste resources because we just dont have a working relationship; we dont talk to each other. So sometimes we are
involved in duplication and, of course, you seem to have been able
to sort of work that through and work it out.
And sometimes you have agencies that they dont want to share
and they just want to do whatever they are doing and dont want
anybody toand a lot of times they are not even in the best position to even follow through or to carry it out. To come this morning
and to hear you are working together and that your Memorandum
of Understanding is something that all of you respect, I want you
to know that I am really encouraged by that.
However, when I look at the fact that 220,000 employees and
only 219 investigators, I think I get a little nervous when I look
at that. I understand you said that you support the budget, but
sometimes we support when it is not really the proper thing to do.
But I think that is something that needs to be talked about, Mr.
Chairman, and to see whether or not that is adequate for the
220,000, only to have 219 investigators. That seems to me to be inadequate. But here again I think it is something that needs to be
explored and looked at further.
I understand your position, Mr. Edwards. It is very clear to me
that you support the budget. I understand that. I do understand
it, but sometimes we have to go beyond that.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PLATTS. I thank the gentleman.
I will wrap up with one, again, thanks to each of you for your
testimony here today, your written testimony, but, most importantly, day in and day out your leadership of your respective components and the importance of what you are doing in a broad sense
and as you are focused on that more rare bad apple, and not just

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holding them accountable, but also because of the importance of
what your department and component agency missions are.
So when that individual who is, unfortunately, corrupt is letting
products come through that shouldnt, and they may think it is less
of a threat, but it might be weapons; if it is persons, it might be
terrorists, not what they think, just somebody, an illegal alien, but
it may be an enemy of our Nation. So all the more what you are
doing is critically important.
And, Mr. Towns, just well captured the message that you conveyed in our interactions, both staff and members, prior to the
hearing and today, is, I think, a very important message and, most
importantly, a most important direction that you are following, and
that is let turf battles be on the football turf or the soccer turf, not
in public service or government, and to truly work hand in hand
with each other; and that is clearly what you are seeking to do. As
the commissioner said, that doesnt mean there arent challenges
yet to institutionalize this approach so it is pervasive and continuous. That is something we all up here, we certainly know the
challenge of working to improve our cooperation.
But I commend you for the approach you are taking and very
much thank you for your dedication to our Nation and our citizens.
We will keep the record open for seven days for any other materials. This hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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