OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: THE OTHER SIDE

OF THE BORDER

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 26, 2011

Serial No. 112100

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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

DARRELL E. ISSA,
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
JIM JORDAN, Ohio
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
CONNIE MACK, Florida
TIM WALBERG, Michigan
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona
L R. LABRADOR, Idaho
RAU
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOE WALSH, Illinois
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

California, Chairman
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking
Minority Member
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Columbia
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JACKIE SPEIER, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director
ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel
LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk
DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS
Page

Hearing held on July 26, 2011 ...............................................................................

Statement of:
Gil, Darren, former ATF Attache to Mexico; Jose Wall, ATF Senior Special Agent, Tijuana, Mexico; Carlos Canino, ATF Acting Attache in
Mexico; Lorren Leadmon, ATF Intelligence Operations Specialist; William Newell, former ATF Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division; and William McMahon, ATF Deputy Assistant Director for Field
Operations West, including Phoenix and Mexico .......................................
Canino, Carlos ...........................................................................................
Gil, Darren .................................................................................................
Leadmon, Lorren .......................................................................................
McMahon, William ....................................................................................
Newell, William .........................................................................................
Wall, Jose ...................................................................................................
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of ..........................................................................
Canino, Carlos, ATF Acting Attache in Mexico, prepared statement of ......
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Virginia, prepared statement of ..............................................................
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................
Gil, Darren, former ATF Attache to Mexico, prepared statement of ...........
Issa, Chairman Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of ...........................................................
Leadmon, Lorren, ATF Intelligence Operations Specialist, prepared statement of ...........................................................................................................
McMahon, William, ATF Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations
West, including Phoenix and Mexico, prepared statement of ...................
Newell, William, former ATF Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field
Division, prepared statement of ...................................................................
Wall, Jose, ATF Senior Special Agent, Tijuana, Mexico, prepared statement of ...........................................................................................................

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OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: THE OTHER

SIDE OF THE BORDER
TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Issa, Burton, Jordan, Chaffetz,
Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Buerkle, Gosar, Labrador, Meehan,
DesJarlais, Gowdy, Ross, Guinta, Farenthold, Kelly, Cummings,
Maloney, Norton, Kucinich, Tierney, Connolly, Quigley, Davis,
Welch, Murphy, and Speier.
Staff present: Robert Borden, general counsel; Steve Castor, chief
counsel, investigations; John Cuaderes, deputy staff director;
Carlton Davis, Henry J. Kerner, Jonathan J. Skladany, and Jessica
L. Laux, counsels; Kate Dunbar, staff assistant; Adam P. Fromm,
director of Member liaison and floor operations; Linda Good, chief
clerk; Jean Humbrecht, professional staff member; Ashok M. Pinto,
deputy chief counsel, investigations; Laura L. Rush, deputy chief
clerk; Ashley Etienne, minority director of communications; Carla
Hultberg, minority chief clerk; Justin Kim, Scott Lindsay, Donald
Sherman, and Carlos Uriarte, minority counsels; Dave Rapallo, minority staff director; and Susanne Sachman Grooms, minority chief
counsel.
Chairman ISSA. The hearing will come to order.
Todays hearing continues the committees ongoing investigation
into the reckless program known as Operation Fast and Furious.
The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles: First, Americans have a right to know that the money
Washington takes from them is well spent; and second, Americans
deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. Our
duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to
protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a right to
know what they get from their government.
We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to
deliver the facts to the American people and to reform the governments bureaucracy. Thus far, the committee has heard testimony
from ATF agents who reported that they were ordered to let guns
destined for Mexican drug cartels to walk away from the hands of
known criminals.
COMMITTEE

ON

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2
Today this committee will have the opportunity to question supervisors of these agents who knew about and believed these tactics were appropriate. The committee will also hear from ATF
agents who worked in Mexico and who were horrified to learn ultimately about this program.
The task before the committee is very serious. The acting director of ATF in a transcribed interview with investigators has said
that the Justice Department is trying to push all of us away from
its political appointees. Indeed, the Justice Department continues
to withhold key information and has inappropriately interfered
with this investigation.
Let me be clear, the Justice Department is not our partner in
this effort. They are the subject of this investigation, and their continued interference will not be allowed to derail the committees
work.
Last month, members of this committee traveled to Mexico on a
factfinding mission where we were briefed on how the United
States and Mexican law enforcement agents are working together
to fight the drug lords who are responsible for more than 34,000
deaths in the last 412 years.
That effort cannot be derailed by the fallout of Fast and Furious.
One of our goals is to ensure that the Mexican Government can
have confidence in its partner here in the United States from this
date forward that we in fact will not let guns walk, that we will
be as open and transparent as possible.
In the time ATF officials in Mexico have been increasingly
alarmed by both volume and location of weapons that have been recovered, after reporting these concerns to ATF and Justice Department officials in Washington, these agents were told nothing about
Fast and Furious. Again, our trip to Mexico City taught us that
ATF agents and, more importantly, likely DEA agents and likely
two U.S. Ambassadors were not informed about a program that
was causing an increase in violence and an increase in guns arriving throughout Mexico, from Tijuana to Mexico City to Sonora and
beyond.
We have before us today witnesses who worked in Mexico for
years, and they will tell the committee their frustration about
being kept in the dark by officials in Washington and in Phoenix
and about what really happened as a result of Operation Fast and
Furious. They are going to have the opportunity to tell this committee about what happens when the Justice Department intentionally lets weapons flow across the border and how Mexican officials reacted when they began to learn the truth.
The committee will also offer ATF supervisors the opportunity to
publicly explain why they thought it was okay to let weapons flow
from Phoenix to Mexican drug cartels without making an effort to
interdict them.
The committee is eager to know why one particular suspect was
permitted to purchase 685 weapons before he was arrested. We are
also eager to hear justifications for decisions that have created
deep divisions within the ATF and outrage in both the United
States and Mexico.
We have yet towe have not yet seen the end of the violence
from Operation Fast and Furious. The deadly consequences of this

3
irresponsible program could last for years to come. Today the committee estimates at least 1,600 weapons, including .50-caliber sniper rifles, are still out there waiting to kill. The possibility that administration officials perhaps at the highest level of the Justice Department approved this strategy and are now trying to cover up
their own involvement by stonewalling the committee is alarming.
Today we are focusing primarily on the effects of Fast and Furious in Mexico. President Obama is keen to talk about who didnt
know about the program and who didnt authorize it. But the
American people have a right to know once and for all who did authorize it and who knew about it.
The ranking member and I both pledged the Terry family that
we would focus our efforts on finding out who was responsible for
Fast and Furious. Until we have those answers, the committee will
remain focused on these basic questions.
And with that, I yield to the ranking member for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Darrell E. Issa follows:]

6
Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank the chairman for this hearing.
And I want to thank all of our witnesses for your service to our
country and for what you do every day to protect so many lives.
We have an important responsibility in this committee to thoroughly investigate allegations of waste, fraud and abuse and to follow evidence wherever it may lead and to base our conclusions on
the evidence before us.
The committee has now been investigating allegations relating to
Operation Fast and Furious for 5 months. The committee staff
have conducted 16 transcribed interviews of ATF managers and
field agents in Phoenix, Washington and Mexico.
During these interviews, officials at various levels have acknowledged mistakes in the planning, execution and oversight of this operation. That is most unfortunate.
Although key questions remain, I would like to make four points.
First, the head of ATF Acting Director Ken Melson stated during
his transcribed interview on July 4th that he did not become aware
of any allegations about so-called gun walking until they were reported publicly. And this is what he said: That issue had never
been raised; it had never been raised to our level by the whistleblowers in Phoenix that stayed in-house down there.
Second, the officials interviewed by the committee did not support the allegation that the controversial tactics allegedly employed
in this operation, such as suspending surveillance or failing to
interdict weapons, were part of a top-down strategy devised by senior ATF management or the Justice Department. Again, Acting Director Melson said that no Justice Department officials ever told
him or anyone at ATF that these tactics were part of a new strategy to let guns go. He stated, we never discussed those types of
tactical strategies.
William Hoover, the acting director of the ATF, is the principal
liaison between ATF and the Deputy Attorney Generals Office. He
also rejected this allegation. When asked whether these tactics
were part of a top-down policy, he responded, no, sir, it is my firm
belief that the strategic and tactical decisions made in this investigation were born and raised with the U.S. Attorneys Office and
with the ATF and the OCDETF strike force in Phoenix.
He added, theres been reports that deputy attorneythe department attorney generals office was aware of the techniques
being employed in Fast and Furious; thats just notthats not the
case, because I certainly didnt brief them on the techniques being
employed.
Third, although these tactics may not have originated in headquarters of ATF or the Justice Department, the evidence before the
committee indicates that after receiving briefings in March 2010,
Deputy Director Hoover and other senior ATF officials became seriously concerned about the number of weapons being trafficked by
the suspects. As a result, Deputy Director Hoover ordered an exit
strategy, those are his words, to close the case and seek indictments within 90 days.
Although this exit strategy was developed, there were no indictments until this past January. One question I hope to explore
today is why it took nearly 10 months, from March 2010 to January 2011, to close this operation and bring indictments.

7
Finally, nearly all of the officials interviewed by the committee
strongly supported additional law enforcement tools to combat the
flood of high-powered military grade assault weapons from the
United States into Mexico. Mexico is our neighbor, our ally and our
friend; yet U.S. weapons are arming the worlds most violent and
powerful international drug cartels, costing the lives of 40,000
Mexicans in the last 45 years.
While I will continue to work with Chairman Issa to investigate
the facts of Operation Fast and Furious, we must also examine opportunities for reform. And I look forward to, again, following the
evidence where it may lead.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

10
Chairman ISSA. I thank the ranking member.
All Members will have 7 days to submit opening statements and
extraneous material for the record.
We now recognize our first panel of witnesses. Darren Gil is a
former ATF attache in Mexico. Jose Wall is ATF Senior Special
Agent in Tijuana, Mexico. Carlos CaninoIll get better in time
is the ATF acting attache in Mexico. Lorren Leadmon is the ATF
team leader, Field Intelligence Support Team Southwest Border.
William Newell is the former ATF Special Agent in Charge of the
Phoenix Field Division. And William McMahon is the ATF Deputy
Assistant Director For Field Operations West.
And I apologize, as usual, for never getting names quite right.
Pursuant to the rules of this committee, all witnesses must be
sworn.
Would you please rise and raise your right hands to take the
oath?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman ISSA. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Thank you. Please be seated. Now, even for this committee, this
is a large panel, so if each of you take 5 minutes, we have 30 minutes. If you take more than 5 minutes, the guy next to you will also
take more than 5 minutes. So, please, observe the green, yellow
and red light. Realize that any official material or even additional
material you choose to submit will be put into the record. So you
can provide us what is exactly in your opening statement, which
often happens, read in a verbatim way, or you can summarize and
get it all done in 5 minutes or less. It is your choice. And I appreciate your staying within the time so that we can have maximum
time for questions.
Mr. Gil.
STATEMENTS OF DARREN GIL, FORMER ATF ATTACHE TO
MEXICO; JOSE WALL, ATF SENIOR SPECIAL AGENT, TIJUANA, MEXICO; CARLOS CANINO, ATF ACTING ATTACHE IN
MEXICO; LORREN LEADMON, ATF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST; WILLIAM NEWELL, FORMER ATF SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION; AND
WILLIAM MCMAHON, ATF DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR FIELD OPERATIONS WEST, INCLUDING PHOENIX AND
MEXICO
STATEMENT OF DARREN GIL

Mr. GIL. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member

Cummings and
Chairman ISSA. Youre going to have to pull the mic close.
Theyre deliberately designed to be somewhat insensitive, so you almost have to kiss them to make them work.
Mr. GIL. Very well. Well, thank you again for inviting me to the
conference hearing this morning.
First, I offer my sincere condolences to the families of agents
Brian Terry and Jaime Zapata. Im deeply sorry for their loss and
for the grief that this ill-conceived operation may have caused.

11
Also, I thank ICE Special Agent Victor Avila for his services and
sacrifices in fighting the narco-violence in Mexico and along the
border. I can only imagine the horror of helplessly watching a
brother law enforcement officer die in the line of duty.
As a former head of ATF in Mexico, I also would like to apologize
to my former Mexican law enforcement counterparts and to the
people of Mexico for Fast and Furious. I hope they understand it
was kept secret from me and my colleagues.
Unfortunately, as a result of this operation, it is the Mexican
people who will continue to suffer the consequences of narco related
firearms violence. I have no doubt, as recent media reports have indicated, that American citizens will also face more firearms related
violence as a result of this operation.
I would like to provide the committee with a brief description of
my background. I received a bachelors degree in criminology from
the University of Maryland, a masters degree in criminal justice
from the University of Alabama and am currently completing my
dissertation at the University of Southern Mississippi focusing on
international affairs and security studies.
Ive been in service to our Nation since my enlistment in the U.S.
Army in 1980. After service in the Army I joined the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department and later received my commission
as an ATF Special Agent in 1987. I then served for 23 years in various positions in ATF, including intelligence and assignments and
as attache to Mexico, until I recently retired.
I chose ATF because it was a small organization with a focused
mission, combatting the most violent offenders in America. During
my first 12 years as a field agent, I participated in or directed investigations that targeted the worst of the worst. For the remainder of my career, I supervised, managed and led agents who conducted similar investigations.
Throughout my career, not once never did firearms walk from
any investigations I directed or fell under my command. This includes my services as ATF attache in Mexico. To put it bluntly, it
is inconceivable in my mind or the mind of any competent ATF
agent to allow firearms to disappear at all. Furthermore, it is even
more inconceivable that a competent agent would allow firearms to
cross an international border knowing that they are destined for
the worst of the worst criminals in the Western Hemisphere.
I recall my first days at the ATF academy where it was drilled
into us that under no circumstances would any firearms in any investigation leave the control of ATF. Instructors stressed that even
if a weapon was lost by accident, the agent was still subject to termination.
My point is that ATF agents dont allow and ATF as an organization has not tolerated firearms to disappear. Yet apparently that
happened here.
After retiring from ATF, I started receiving inquiries from former
colleagues, including Special Agents Vince Cefalu and Jay Dobyns,
as well as from the press. They all wanted to know whether I was
aware that ATF had allowed firearms to walk into Mexico. I advised my former colleagues that I was not aware but I refused to
speak to the media without a complete understanding of the issue.

12
After talking with several agents, I became convinced that firearms might have been walking to Mexico by ATF. Thankfully, Congress and the media continued to investigate, and Fast and Furious
began to receive greater notoriety. Nonetheless I remained reluctant to speak out about what I had come to suspect since retiring
from ATF but was never told about this operation.
When I later learned that ATF executive staff would not make
statements exonerating my former staff in Mexico of any knowledge of the gun walking aspects of this operation, only then did I
decide to speak to the press. My understanding is that my initial
interview with Sharyl Atkinson of CBS News did have some
calming effect on relations between the Mexico government and
ATF personnel in Mexico. To this day, I do not understand the failure of ATF executive staff to provide their own support in this matter to their personnel in Mexico.
During dissertation research, I came across a study entitled The
Waco, Texas, ATF Raid and Challenger Launch Decision: Management, Judgment and the Knowledge Analytic. The papers title
could have been substituted Operation Fast and Furious for
Waco, Texas, ATF Raid, and the conclusions would have been the
same, namely poor management, poor judgment and poor leadership resulted in disaster.
Operation Fast and Furious is indeed a disaster. Im here today
to answer the committees questions, but I also have a few questions of my own. For example, who actually presented this operation for implementation? What was the objective? My staff was already working with Mexico in tracing thousands of firearms recovered from crime scenes. Why the need to introduce even more firearms into a country that is seized by narco-violence? Why did ATF
leadership fail to exercise oversight of this disaster? And why were
ATF personnel in Mexico kept in the dark from this operation,
which has now imperiled trust and cooperation between United
States and Mexican law enforcement at a time when trust and cooperation is more essential than ever?
During my tenure in Mexico, I observed firsthand the extraordinary changes occurring there. The heads of the agencies leading
these changes are some of the bravest people I ever met. As a result of their leadership, they have become targets of Mexican drug
organizations. I find it grotesquely ironic that as a representative
of U.S. law enforcement in Mexico, my staff and I were asked to
expose ourselves and our families to the same sort of risks while
speaking to our American counterparts of integrity, rule of law,
honor and duty in policing. Meanwhile, members of our own ATF
and Department of Justice, for whatever reason, appear to have refused to follow the same principles.
As a career Special Agent, I believe in the mission of people of
ATF. The men and women of ATF go to work every day with a
strong sense of duty. I hope that once all the facts are known about
this operation, that ATF will emerge a stronger, more effective organization, focused on its core mission, taking the worst of the
worst armed violent offenders off the streets.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Ill be
happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gil follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Mr. Wall.
STATEMENT OF JOSE WALL

Mr. WALL. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member

Cummings and members of the committee for inviting me to speak
today.
I am saddened by the circumstances that bring me here today.
As an employee of ATF, I know that this situation is an anomaly
and not reflective of the good work that ATF does in the service
of this country. And I am hopeful that this process will shed light
on what has occurred so that we in ATF do not have to travel down
this path again.
This year marks my 26th year of Federal service and my 19th
as an ATF Special Agent. During my years as an ATF Special
Agent, I have been involved in hundreds of firearms trafficking investigations. These investigations date back to the early 1990s. I
have seen firearms trafficked internationally from the United
States to countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Canada and
Macau. These international investigations were as unique as the
places to where the guns were going. However, one aspect shared
by most of these investigations was the fact that most international
gun trafficking is being done in the interest of organized crime.
In late 2007, I became the border liaison officer for the Phoenix
Field Division. My duties allowed me to develop a working relationship with Mexican authorities and to travel into Mexico to examine
guns or meet with officials. It was at this time that the struggle
against the drug trafficking cartels was started by the government
of Mexico. Large scale gun battles and murder became a daily occurrence in Mexico.
To me and other agents, it became apparent that the level of firepower being used was more than we had ever seen. As the level
of firearms trafficking increased, we in the Phoenix Field Division
realized that this was an arms race between the various cartels, an
arms race that could very well determine the future of Mexico and
tremendously impact our own countrys future.
Phoenix agents initiated many good investigations during this
time. These investigations served to disrupt the trafficking of guns
and prevented them from reaching Mexico, but the urgency displayed by the agents in stopping these gun traffickers was not apparent in the prosecution of these cases. As we saw, some of our
best trafficking cases languish at the U.S. Attorneys Office.
In an effort to do more against this tide of weapons, in the fall
of 2009, I transferred to the newly opened ATF field office in Tijuana, Mexico. There I worked closely with ATF and other agents.
I also traveled to some of the most heavily fought for areas in Mexico. In these contested areas I examined hundreds of firearms.
Among these, I examined some that can now be traced to the Fast
and Furious investigation.
The majority of these firearms had been seized from criminals
engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other
crimes. Having firsthand knowledge of the reality in Mexico, I was
skeptical when the first whistleblower came to this committee with
allegations of hundreds, maybe thousands of guns being allowed to

19
walk into the country of Mexico. I could not believe that someone
in ATF would so callously let firearms wind up in the hands of
criminals, but it appears that I was wrong, that hundreds and
quite possibly thousands of guns have been allowed to reach the
hands of organized crime in Mexico, and that this activity has
seemingly been approved by our own Justice Department and ATF
management in the misguided hope of catching the big fish.
Having had enough experience with gun trafficking investigations, I can only imagine that once the DOJ OIG report was released, a report that was critical of ATF efforts in stopping gun
trafficking, the emphasis changed to following the food chain up to
the leaders. What the persons approving this debacle failed to realize is that the end does not justify the means.
These firearms that are now in the hands of people who have no
regard for human life pose a threat to all of us, a threat to which
none of us is immune. I am especially concerned for the brave law
enforcement officers and military in Mexico and here in the United
States. I fear these firearms will continue to exact a terrible toll
long after these hearings are over.
Finally, I have a request of this committee that the serious problem of gun trafficking not be forgotten. I dont believe we need another toothless law. What we need is vigorous enforcement and
prosecution of those that would traffic in firearms. A policy of no
tolerance for straw purchasers and a change in the sentencing
guidelines that would dictate mandatory sentences for these crimes
would go a long way in curbing this criminal activity. I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wall follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Special Agent Canino.
STATEMENT OF CARLOS CANINO

Mr. CANINO. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member

Cummings and members of the committee for inviting me to speak
today. I want to thank you for taking the time and effort to visit
Mexico last month to get a boots-on-the-ground perspective.
On behalf of Charge John Feeley, I want to convey his deep appreciation for your interest in Mexico and U.S.-Mexico relations.
Im not here today to lay blame, point the finger or assign punishment; that will be for others to determine. I am simply here to discuss these events as I know them and let the committee and the
American people know what the ATF Mexico Country Office, referred to as the MCO, knew and when we knew it.
During my 22 year career with ATF, I proudly spent 15 years as
a street agent investigating violent crime and gun trafficking and
the last 7 supervising others doing the same. Im a recipient of the
U.S. Attorney Generals Award for Excellent Law Enforcement, two
ATF Distinguished Service Medals and two Medals of Valor. I mention this not to boast but to illustrate my recognized dedication to
ATF and public service. I paid my dues.
I can say with authority that walking guns is not a recognized
ATF investigative technique. These guns went to ruthless criminals. U.S. law enforcement and our Mexican partners will be recovering these guns for a long time to come as they continue to turn
up at crime scenes in Mexico and the United States. It infuriates
me that people, including my law enforcement, diplomatic and military colleagues, may be killed or injured with these weapons.
In my professional opinion, this investigative strategy was
flawed. It was allowed to continue due to ineffective oversight in
the Phoenix Field Division and possibly beyond. Its alleged that
over 2,000 guns were trafficked in this investigation. To put that
in context, upon information and belief the U.S. Army 75th Ranger
Regiment has approximately 2,500 rangers. That means that as a
result of this investigation, the Sinaloa cartel may have received almost as many guns that are needed to arm the entire regiment.
Under these 2,000 weapons, 34 were .50-caliber sniper rifles. That
is approximately the number of sniper rifles a Marine infantry
regiment takes into battle; thats 3,000 men.
For the MCO, this case is one of the many ATF traffic investigations with a U.S.-Mexico nexus. I would like to inform this committee and the American public that I believe what happened here
was inexcusable and we in Mexico had no part in it. We were
aware of this investigation, but we were never aware of the policy
to walk guns in this investigation.
Since these questions have surfaced, I have become aware that
critical details were deliberately kept from the MCO as well as
ATFs Office of Strategic Intelligence. I have reason to believe that
we were kept in the dark because the ATF leadership in Phoenix
feared that we would tell our Mexican partners.
Reasonable people can disagree on investigative techniques, but
there is no room for walking guns. This goes against everything we

24
are taught at ATF. And I hope the committee gets to the bottom
of these allegations.
In Mexico, ATF has been doing great work, and Im proud of our
efforts in combatting violent crime with our Mexican counterparts.
The whole point of law enforcement mission in Mexico is to liaise
with Mexican government officials and support their efforts to combat the transnational organized crime that plagues both our countries and threatens the security of our people. These allegations
stemming from this case that a few ATF agents and supervisors
deliberately allowed guns to walk have destroyed ATFs credibility
with our Mexican law enforcement partners and the Mexican public.
As this committee knows, Mexico is plagued by terrible violence.
Time and again, my Mexican counterparts blame the United States
for contributing to that violence. But paramount to ATF, they
blame us for an uncontrolled flow of weapons that end up in the
hands of Mexican criminals.
I do not endorse the view of the Mexican government that American indifference is responsible for the violence and deaths. I make
mention of it because it is what I hear on a daily basis in my dealings with my Mexican colleagues. However, in this particular case,
with these specific guns, Im unable to defend this position.
This case has made my life more difficult for me personally.
Imagine my shame when my mother called me on the telephone
and said, please tell me you werent involved in this. My mother
is a very wise person. She may not know much about law enforcement, but she knows right from wrong. Even at great riskeven
at great distance, she could see that walking guns was a terrible
risk.
The public safety must always come first. Please remember, regardless of good intentions, walking guns will never be right.
The ATF rank and file know this, and we have not been given
a satisfactory explanation for what happened. So what I would like
to say to my ATF colleagues is simply this: Stand tall. Hold your
heads high. We work for a great agency. Look around, because
there are heroes at ATF. We do not quit. We will not lie down. We
will continue to honor our commitment to each other and to the
public.
I thank you for your time, and I welcome any questions the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Canino follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Mr. Leadmon.
STATEMENT OF LORREN LEADMON

Mr. LEADMON. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member

Cummings and designatedexcuse me, distinguished members of
the committee.
My name is Lorren Leadmon, and Im honored that youve summoned me here today to serve as a witness for the citizens of the
United States. Im an intelligence operation specialist with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and a law enforcement veteran with 40 years of dedicated service.
Im appearing before you today with a heavy heart, laden with
sorrow, to provide this committee with testimony that I hope will
prove to be useful.
First, I would like to express my grief by extending a sincere
apology on behalf of myself and likeminded ATF colleagues to the
family of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.
Likewise, I offer an apologize to all Mexican law enforcement officers and military personnel placed in harms way while confronting the violent criminals armed by the targets and their associates in the Fast and Furious investigation.
I started my employment with ATF in December 2004 in the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. I was designated to
support ATFs Project Gunrunner from the inception of the initiative in April 2005. In July 2008, I became the team leader of the
newly established Field Intelligence Support Team For the Southwest Border. The team works in partnership daily with OSII personnel assigned to the El Paso Intelligence Center and ATF personnel working in Mexico.
Each of the partners work toward a common goal to determine
the location and circumstances surrounding firearms recovered
throughout Mexico, identifying the criminal element associated
with the firearms, collecting intelligence pertaining to the criminal
elements and ensuring the firearms are traced. The team coordinates the information with case agents and the field intelligence
groups. A major function of the team is to identify the firearms
trafficking trends and patterns and to establish links between firearms trafficking cases and seizure events in Mexico.
The team is dedicated to ATFs strategic mission as set forth in
the 2007 Project Gunrunner Southwest Border Initiative Report
that is summarized as follows: Working with its domestic and
international law enforcement partners ATF will deny the tools of
the trade to the firearms trafficking infrastructure of the criminal
organizations operating in Mexico through proactive enforcements
of its jurisdictional areas in the affected border States in the domestic front, as well as through assistance and cooperative interaction with the Mexican authorities in their fight to effectively deal
with the increased violent crime.
The report had the following strategic outcome: Suppression of
the firearms and explosives related violence occurring on both sides
of the border through effective law enforcement collaboration involving the focused training, investigation and interdiction of the

31
illicit trafficking and illegal use of firearms, explosives and ammunition.
The Southwest Border Team first learned of the Fast and Furious investigation November 20, 2009. I had located the seizure
event in Sonora. The Mexican authorities had recovered 42 guns
from two transporters in a vehicle that just crossed the border from
Arizona. With the assistance of the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, I was able to obtain the information on the firearms,
submit traces, and the results of theascertain the results of the
investigation.
From those firearms, there were 37 that related back to the Fast
and Furious investigation. And the informationthis information
became the foundation for the fact that all the firearms obtained
in the Operation Fast and Furious investigation were potential
crime guns and murder weapons predestined to be utilized by outlaws and assassins affiliated with a violent criminal organization
in Mexico.
In the months leading up to February 2010, the Fast and Furious purchasers were buying the types of firearms preferred by drug
trafficking organizations in record numbers. By this time, they had
purchased over 1,000 firearms and some of the purchases were procuring them in lots of 10 to 20 at a time. At the same time, approximately 200 firearms in this investigation were recovered in
the United States and Mexico.
The types of firearms and the volumes of the purchases, the seizures and circumstances surrounding the seizures, along with the
information provided by our law enforcement partners fully corroborated the fact that these firearms were being acquired by a violent criminal organization in Mexico.
In December 2009, I beganto the beginning of March 2010, I
conducted numerous briefings on the investigation with the ATF
senior management staff in headquarters. During each briefing, I
provided detailed information depicting the progression of the acquisition of firearms and described the location, number, type and
identity of the purchaser for each firearm recovered.
I provided the briefing to acting directorthe acting director in
the first part of 2009 concerning firearms trafficking to Mexico in
which he was briefed on the upstart of the Fast and Furious investigation. He later attended one of the field operations briefings in
the first part of January. In March 2010, I conducted a video conference briefing with the managing officials from the four ATF border divisions; an attorney from the Department of Justice and
every one of the ATF senior management staff, except for the acting director.
With the assistance of the group supervisor in charge of the Fast
and Furious investigation, I provided a briefing outlining the
amount of firearms purchased and the expenditures up to the end
of February along with the number of firearms seized and seizure
locations. The totals briefed were the same as previously stated
here. The issue of the firearms not being seized by the case agents
was brought up briefly and discussed. From this point on
Chairman ISSA. If you could summarize, the rest will be placed
in the record.

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Mr. LEADMON. All right. So, basically, what we are talking about
is by the end of it, we had the 2,000 guns. To date, theres about
590 that have been recovered; 363 in the United States; 227 in
Mexico. And theyre still coming.
I would just like to say at the end here, the strategy of the Fast
and Furious investigation did not take into account the public safety of the citizens of the United States and Mexico and blindly concentrated only on the goals of the investigation. The blatant disregard for public safety has had tragic consequences that will continue in the unforeseen future. And the rest of my testimony you
can see.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leadmon follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. I thank you very much.
Special Agent Newell.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM NEWELL

Mr. NEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Issa, Representative Cummings and distinguished
members of the committee, I am William Newell of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. As a former Special
Agent in charge of the Bureaus Phoenix Field Division from June
2006 to May of this year, I oversaw ATF operations in the States
of Arizona and New Mexico, which includes 552 miles of the U.S.Mexico border.
I appear before you today to discuss ATFs Operation Fast and
Furious, an ongoing and active OCDETF strike force investigation
of a large-scale firearms trafficking organization. For the past 23
years, I fully dedicated myself to confronting violent crime, especially firearms related violent crime along the Southwest border.
Having served 15 of these years along the Southwest border combatting firearms trafficking, I am keenly aware that this violence,
fueled largely by Mexicos drug cartels, poses a serious challenge
for U.S. law enforcementUnited States and Mexican law enforcement, threatens the safety of innocent civilians and law enforcement personnel on both sides of the border.
At the conclusion of every investigation of this magnitude, a
thorough review is appropriate in order to determine whether tacticswhether changes in tactics and strategy are in order. With
that in mind, I recognize that in this case and future large-scale
investigations, it is imperative that there exists an effective flow of
information between the field and headquarters elements to ensure
that critical investigative information is being shared timely.
Second, in retrospect, in a case of this magnitude it is incumbent
upon me to communicate a greater sense of urgency to my staff and
the U.S. Attorneys Office as to the need for the return of expeditious charges.
Finally, I now recognize that in these types of investigations,
more frequent risk assessments would be prudent. Firearms trafficking investigations are not always easy to conduct for a variety
of reasons, including a lack of a Federal statute that specifically
prohibits firearms trafficking related activity, the fact that firearms, unless altered in some way, are not in and of themselves
contraband, a lack of adequate punishment for straw purchasers,
thus impacting our ability to identify the leadership of the criminal
organization and the limited resources at our disposal.
These types of investigations are made even more challenging
when none of the individuals in the firearms trafficking chain are
presumptively prohibited by law possessing firearms. Consequently, in order to identify and investigate the responsible higher-level individuals, agents must use a wide variety of investigative
techniques. This can take time and considerable effort.
Throughout this case conscientious and dedicated agents pursued
numerous leads in order to determine who the decisionmakers of
this organization were in an effort to get beyond the straw purchasers and thus potentially disrupt and dismantle the entire organization.

38
Through experience, we have learned that the arrest and prosecution of straw purchasers alone does little to frustrate the capacity of the Mexican cartels to continuously obtain firearms, as new
straw purchasers are easily recruited to replace those arrested and
continue the cycle of purchasing firearms.
Finally, our conduct of this investigation, as with any large scale
OCDETF investigation, was coordinated with ATFs supervisor at
headquarters in Washington, DC, and with Federal firearms prosecutors at the Phoenix U.S. Attorneys Office.
In October 2009, the Department of Justice proposed a Southwest border strategy to combat Mexican cartels, which was finalized in January 2010 and which outlined successful strategies related to the identification, disruption and dismantlement of Mexican cartels through comprehensive multi-agency criminal enforcement operations with an emphasis on impacting the leadership and
command structure of such organizations in order to have a substantial and sustained impact.
The DOJ strategy recognized the ineffectiveness of merely interdicting weapons absent identifying and eliminating the sources and
networks responsible for transporting them. It was with this guidance in mind that Operation Fast and Furious originated.
To be clear, Fast and Furious was a no-step operation designed
to, one, identify the purchasers, financiers, transporters and decisionmakers in a Mexican cartel-based firearms trafficking organization; two, to interdict, when lawfully possible, firearms presumptively destined for Mexico; three, to share, when appropriate, relevant information with United States and Mexican law enforcement authorities; four, to develop intelligence on other firearms
trafficking organizations; and five, to charge, arrest and dismantle
the entire organization.
In this regard, there are some key points I would like to make.
One, it was not the purpose of the investigation to permit the
transportation of firearms into Mexico, and to the best of my
knowledge, none of the suspects in this case were ever witnessed
by agents crossing the border with firearms.
Two, our agents, in compliance with ATF policy, were engaged in
the strategic effort to determine who the decisionmakers and actual
purchasers of the firearms were in order to disrupt the entire
criminal organization. The effectiveness of this strategy has been
recognized by the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
in a reviewin their review of Operation Gunrunner.
Three, we attempted to be innovative in tracking and seizing
firearms purchased by the suspected straw buyers. Four, when appropriate during the investigation, we made reasonable effort to
share and coordinate the relevant investigative details to our Mexican law enforcement counterparts.
Finally, throughout my past 23 years in law enforcement, I have
lost some very good friends to firearms related violent crime. I witnessed firsthand the grief and despair suffered by families who
have lost loved ones in the law enforcement profession. That is why
I take very seriously my responsibility and dedicated myself to
doing everything within my authority to confront and curtail these
criminal organizations that would seek to do harm to my peers and

39
innocent civilians. I did not discard that responsibility in the conduct of this investigation.
The death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry is one I will
mourn for the rest of my life, as I do for all those brave heroes who
have taken up the badge to serve and protect and then made the
ultimate sacrifice.
I express my deepest condolences to the Terry family and may
our Heavenly Father bless him and the Terry family through this
very difficult time.
Distinguished Members, I now stand ready to answer your questions, and thank you for the opportunity to make this opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newell follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Special Agent McMahon.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MCMAHON

Mr. MCMAHON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee.
I am Bill McMahon, deputy assistant director, Office of Field Operations for of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives. Thank you for inviting me to this important hearing.
Let me be clear from the onset, as the ATF senior executive in
charge of the West Region, I share responsibility for mistakes that
were made in the Fast and Furious investigation. The advantage
of hindsight, the benefit of a thorough review of the case clearly
points me to things that I would have done differently. However
good our intentions, regardless of our resource challenges, and notwithstanding the legal hurdles we face in fighting firearms traffickers, we made mistakes.
But know that I am very proud of the men and women who
risked their lives investigating this case. Under tremendous pressure, they continue to work this case and many others we have in
the American Southwest. Please do not let our failings impact their
noble deeds.
Mr. Chairman, I was the Assistant Special Agent in charge of
New York City on September 11, 2001. Our offices were in the
World Trade Center. I have witnessed great human suffering
brought to bear by those to whom violence is a stock and trade.
This is one of the reasons I was so committed to bringing down the
complex network of criminals operating in our homeland and bringing violence on both sides of the southern border. But in our zeal
to do so and in the heat of battle, mistakes were made, and for
that, I apologize.
Mr. Chairman, I am no stranger to the great and ultimate sacrifices made by my fellow law enforcement officers. I have lost
friends in the line of duty, whether it was in the rubble of the
World Trade Center, on the streets of our communities, or in the
desert Southwest. Nothing hurts more than losing a fellow law enforcement officer in the line of duty.
With that in mind, I want to express my sincere condolences to
the Terry family. And while the investigation into his tragic murder remains ongoing, and because of this, I may not be able to comment on that investigation, please know that I honor his great sacrifice, and I am truly sorry for his familys loss.
With that in mind, I appear before you today of my own free will
to answer to the best of my ability questions you have regarding
this operation and my role in it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McMahon follows:]

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you all.
Before we begin, I have been made aware that all of you, or presumably all of you, received from the Department of Justice counsel a letter that speaks specifically to your testimony here today,
and its from Barry S. Orlow. Did all of you receive that letter?
Mr. GIL. No, sir.
Chairman ISSA. You did not?
Mr. GIL. No, I did not.
Mr. MCMAHON. No, sir. Those letters were only issued to people
that were actually under subpoena. And that is normal for any case
we have agents that are under subpoena by defense or others.
Chairman ISSA. Okay.
I want to make some clarifications. The letter infers that you
may not be able to answer certain questions here today. And I
want to make sure it is clear that where it says, for example, you
may not reveal any information covered by Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure related to a manner that occurred before a Grand Jury, and it goes on, up and above.
Now, we have a former 20-year defense attorney to my right. We
have a former prosecutor in Mr. Gowdy down below; Mr. Meehan,
a former U.S. attorney; and a number of other people who have
worked before they came here in law enforcement. I am asking all
of them, if a question occurs from any of us that clearly would lead
to something believed to involve compromising the ongoing investigation or the actual chances of convicting somebody, that we take
a pause. I am not beyond that.
If you believe, any of you, that you are asked a question that in
this format would, by it being open to the public, would compromise the ability to convict any of the 20 people now charged or
others who you reasonably believe will be charged, I want you to
take a pause.
On the other hand, I want you to understand, every question we
ask, you are compelled to answer, unless you assert your Fifth
Amendment rights. There is no executive order or executive branch
decision that can stop us from compelling that answer.
If you believe that you are protecting the ability to reach convictions or to save somebody who is undercover in any other way
would be harmed by your giving an answer in open hearing, I want
you to assert that we need to be in executive session.
The committee can go to executive session at any time by a simple vote of the committee or concurrence of the chairman and ranking member. We probably will not go to executive session at that
moment but would pend that question until the end.
So understand our intention is to be very clear. We know that
in fact the cartels continue to operate. We do not want to have material here unreasonably disclosed.
I want to make one other thing clear before we start, and then
I will recognize the ranking member. This committee has been
made aware that there were wiretaps in this Fast and Furious investigation. That was not by the Justice Department turning over
material required by subpoena. We will not be going into the details of any subpoena in our questioning, and we do look forward
to Justice providing the subpoenaed material in a timely fashion
they have not yet done.

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But again, those are under seal. So their existence, which was
obtained and has been fairly widely understood, is no longer under
seal. But the details of those at this point, including Kenneth
Melsons statement that when he read the details, he was sick to
his stomach, is as far as we are going to go on the details of wiretap at this time.
This hearing is about our relations with Mexico, what they knew
in Mexico, what they didnt know, how the agency did or didnt
communicate.
That doesnt mean that we may not want other information from
you in due time, but I think we want to be very careful that today
we have no reason to go into some of these areas, and so we are
going to avoid them.
With that, if the ranking member has any comments.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just some clarifying items. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you for what you just said.
I think that is a very balanced approach to take, and we are all
concerned about ongoing investigations and putting people in jeopardy that should not be as a result of our efforts here.
But I just want to, there may be some things, Mr. Chairman,
where, say, for example, these gentlemen may not even know that
they are crossing a line. And I know that we are looking into the
Justice Department. I have no problem with that.
But if we have a situation where Justice, and I understand we
have some Justice attorneys here, where they think that there may
be a crossing of the line, is there a way that we can at least pause
and just make sure that we are not crossing over into some territory, the very type of territory you are talking about?
Chairman ISSA. And I appreciate the gentlemans question.
Although I want that very carefully and sparingly used, and the
Justice is not an invited guest here today, if you believe that a line
of questioning is going down that way, we will entertain a request
from representatives of Justice.
Again, this investigation is about Justice. It is about your bosses.
We believe that in fact there are people culpable for what happened for the mistakes, as Special Agent McMahon said, the mistakes that were made, besides Special Agent McMahon, so we do
intend to get to those errors and mistakes.
But for the ranking member, absolutely, we want to make sure
that if somebody inadvertently starts down a line of questioning,
whether you see it, somebody from Justice brings this to our attention, Mr. Gowdy, who certainly understands what it takes to preserve a prosecution, Mr. Meehan or anyone else, that I want this
to be a little bit like the quality control line on a Toyota production,
anybody can pull the stop if you see a mistake about to happen.
Now, that doesnt change the fact that this letter is a little out
of line, and it may be boiler plate, but it implies that you dont
have to answer. Yes, you do have to answer, but we will use executive session or another setting to get additional information so as
to ensure that what we must do does not get in the way of what
you all must do.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, just one other thing.
Chairman ISSA. Of course.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. I was just looking at the expression, particularly
of Special Agent McMahon.
I want to make sure that they understand what you just said.
I mean, can you inquire? Do you all understand what he just said?
All right. Very well. I just want to make sure.
Chairman ISSA. And I use the English language so poorly that
sometimes my wife does mention that perhaps just because I say
what I mean doesnt mean that they can figure out what it means,
too.
But again, set it off at the right tone because this is important
that we get to where we have to get to, but do it in a respectful
way for the fact that there are lives at stake on both sides of the
border of many of your brethren.
I will now recognize myself for a line of questioning.
Mr. McMahon, you said that you made mistakes, that people
made mistakes. Would you like to give us just one of those mistakes?
Mr. MCMAHON. Sure. Again, as I said, after a thorough review
of everything after the fact, I do see that one of the mistakes that
I made personally was maybe more thoroughly reviewing some of
the documents that were coming across my desk on this case. And
I think that has been brought out in my review, and it is something that I know will not happen again.
Chairman ISSA. Special Agent Newell, as recently as yesterday,
you called this, you said, Fast and Furious is a phenomenal program. Now, it was, I hope not is. Do you stand by that?
Mr. NEWELL. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman ISSA. This was quoted in the Washington Post. It came
out yesterday, that, and they quoted you by name as having called
this a phenomenal program. Do you thinkdid you at one time
think and do you think today that Fast and Furious was a phenomenal program?
Mr. NEWELL. Chairman, that quote, I dont know the date of that
quote, it wasnt yesterday, it wasI am sorry.
Chairman ISSA. But it came out. Okay. Let me rephrase the
question. This is back to my inability to work with the English language. Did you ever think that Fast and Furious was a phenomenal program?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, to answer your question, I believe that Fast and Furious was conceived with the idea of disrupting and dismantling an entire organization.
Chairman ISSA. But lets get into the details. Fast and Furious
was at its heart about letting guns walk. Your agency knew that
if you let guns leavebe bought by straw purchasers, who you
knew in fact were straw purchasers, including two felons, and in
the opening statement when people talk about people that had
every right to buy them, felons at that moment that they bought
them were criminals; they could have been stopped. They could
have been arrested. There was an inherent crime. So at least in the
case of two of the buyers, they were felons. They bought guns. They
committed a crime by buying them. They were allowed to move on
and eventually turn those weapons over to intermediaries who got
them to the drug cartels. That was always part of the program. Do

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you think that that was in fact, whether you say phenomenal, do
you think that that was a good idea?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I am unaware of two felons involved in this case.
Chairman ISSA. I am informed they became felons during the
pendency of the case, so I may not know the exact date. But lets
go on beyond that.
Even if they werent felons, documents that we have seen provided by whistleblowers show that in fact all along in this program,
you knew that the weapons purchased were destined for drug cartels. You knew all along that the weaponsthat someone buying
over 600 weapons was not buying them for sport hunting, especially 50 calibers. So do you, and my time is running lean on trying
to get an answer, did you think it was a good program? It appears
as though you thought it was a good program at some time.
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, as I said in my statement, I acknowledge now
that we did make some mistakes in this initiative, in this program.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. I think we all acknowledge that you are
right on that.
When I was in Mexico, I observed a lot of things. And, Special
Agent Canino, my understanding, I was told in Mexico by a number of your colleaguesyou were not there at the timethat when
they entered into the data base, into the trace data base Fast and
Furious weapons, they got a system error. In other words, they
didnt get a hit or a miss, they got a network error. Are you aware
of that?
Mr. CANINO. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. So when your agents, your Federal agents, with
20 or more years entered in the information that would have allowed them to contact a special agent in Phoenix, they did not get
the information that would have allowed them to contact the special agent in Phoenix; isnt that correct?
Mr. CANINO. Thats correct, sir.
Chairman ISSA. So you were blocked.
Mr. Gil, and I have run over a lot of my time with the other
questions, but for both you and Mr. Canino, if you had known
about this program, were you or were you not obligated to tell the
Ambassador?
Mr. GIL. Sir, upon my arrival, I had discussions with the Ambassador about arms trafficking being the number one issue. The second call I would have made would have been on the Ambassador.
The first call I would have made would have been directly to the
Acting Director of ATF to find out exactly what this case was all
about.
Chairman ISSA. So in my remaining timeand, Special Agent
Wall, this would, of course, apply to Tijuana, tooif you are operating in a foreign nation as an American law enforcement individual, as a liaison invited on behalf of a government, not having
law enforcement power in that country, dont you owe it to the Ambassador to keep him or her fully informed of anything you learn?
Because youre not there to do law enforcement, youre there to
help them do law enforcement through the embassy. So for all
three of you, first three witnesses, isnt it reasonable to believe that
one of the reasons that you were not told about Fast and Furious

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is had you been told, in addition to the Acting Director, the Ambassador and the rest of the State Department would have had to have
been read into this program considering its magnitude?
Mr. CANINO. Sir, to follow what Darren said, we werent aware
of the technique that ATF agents were actually following known
gun traffickers away and letting them go. That is insane. It was
inconceivable. You would never think that because ATF does not do
that. If I had known that that was, in fact, occurring, I would have
called ATF headquarters. And if we did not get relief from them,
we would have gone upstairs and told the Ambassador, and hopefully he would have been able to stop it.
Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, from early on in this case, various ATF agents and
officials raised concerns about the number of guns purchased by
Fast and Furious suspects that were flowing from Arizona to Mexico. Mr. Leadmon, you testified in March 2010 that you provided
a detailed briefing about Fast and Furious to Acting Deputy Director Hoover, Assistant Director Chait, and several others; is that
correct?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. McMahon, after this March 2010 briefing, Mr. Hoover directed the Phoenix field office to prepare an exit
strategy to shut down the operation within 90 days; is that correct?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats correct, sir. We did ask for an exit strategy, a 306090-day exit strategy.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And in his interview Mr. Hoover told the committee that this was the first time in his career he had ever asked
for an exit strategy, but that he felt that he needed one because
he was very concerned about the large number of guns being purchased by these suspects.
Mr. McMahon, did you share Mr. Hoovers concern about the
large number of weapons in this case with others?
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely, sir. I think we were all concerned
about the large number of case. But this magnitude of a case was
something we had never encountered before in my career.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And did you ask Mr. Newell, Special Agent Newell, to provide with you an exit strategy?
Mr. MCMAHON. I did, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And when did the exit strategy envision indictments arriving?
Mr. MCMAHON. We received the exit strategy, I believe, the end
of March.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Of what year? Of 2010?
Mr. MCMAHON. Of 2010, I am sorry. And we had a 306090-day
plan. If certain things were accomplished by 30 days, we would be
able to seek an indictment. If certain things were accomplished by
60 days, we would obtain indictments. That sort of thing.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So you had more or less some sort of a time
schedule; is that correct?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats correct.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Were you following that schedule? In other
words, were you checking back every 30 days, 60 days, whatever?

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Mr. MCMAHON. We were actuallyI was checking back more
than that. Bill and I were probably talking weekly about the activity of what was going on in the case and how much closer we were
to completing our investigation.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, according to that strategy from the very beginning, what was the day that you expected, envisioned indictments arriving? You did it in March, what, 2010?
Mr. MCMAHON. Correct. We were expecting indictments sometime in the summer of 2010.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, I want to understand why it took from
March 2010, when Mr. Hoover ordered the operation to be shut
down, until January 2011, when indictments were finally issued.
Can you help with us that?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, again, we were working day to day with
the U.S. Attorneys Office. And it is a partnership when you put
a case like this together. And we thought we had enough. Obviously, we have to prove that to the prosecutors that we have
enough, and that does take a little bit of extra time.
Mr. CUMMINGS. That was more than a little bit of extra time;
was it not? I mean, you were talking initially, I guess, about the
summer of 2010, and you end up January 2011. Youre approaching
a year as opposed to a few months. Is that right?
Mr. MCMAHON. It was about 6 months, sir, yes.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Newell, when did you eventually shut
down ATFs investigative portion of this operation?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, the investigation is ongoing as we speak.
Mr. CUMMINGS. But at some pointI am talking about what we
were just talking about, Special Agent Newell.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. There was a plan to shut this piece down, an exit
strategy. And I am asking you to refer to what I just asked Special
Agent McMahon, Mr. McMahon, about.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. What was the plan?
Mr. NEWELL. The plan was end of July present to the U.S. Attorneys Office what we believed to be the evidence that we needed to
secure the first round of indictments. And as the exit strategy said,
the 30, 60, 90 days was not a firm, depending upon, you know,
what type of investigative material or information we get, depending on each 306090-day timeframe. So it was roughly aboutI
believe about mid-August when we felt that we presented to the
U.S. Attorneys Office all the evidence we needed to secure the first
round of indictments. So in essence we probably went over a couple
of weeks.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So, I assume, Mr. McMahon, did you approve
this going beyond the time period that you initially stated for the
exit strategy? Is that right?
Mr. MCMAHON. There was nothing to approve, sir. I was getting
updates from Bill about his work with the U.S. Attorneys Office.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So basically if he said, look, we need more time,
you just assumed you needed more time?
Mr. MCMAHON. And he would give me a reason why we needed
the more time. Correct.

54
Mr. CUMMINGS. And so Mr. Issa, Chairman Issa, said the purpose of the program was to let guns walk. And I just want Mr.
Newell and Mr. McMahon to be clear. We are trying to get to the
bottom of this. We have been going ring around the rosy forever.
What was the purpose of this operation to the best of your knowledge, Special Agent Newell, and then yours, Mr. McMahon?
Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Cummings, thank you for the question. The
purpose of this investigation was to identify, and disrupt and dismantle an entire firearms-trafficking organization that was linked
to Mexican drug cartels. That was the purpose. And to do so we
needed an extraordinary amount of work on the part of the agents
to, in fact, achieve that goal.
Mr. CUMMINGS. But it was not to let guns walk; is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. No.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Go ahead.
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir. As I said in my statement, sir, one of the
things that Ithat frustrates me to some extent is there is that belief. And at no time in our strategy was it to allow guns to be taken
to Mexico. No, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I dont know if you heard Special Agent Canino,
but he was almost in tears and very frustrated because he felt that
all of this went against the very things that he stands for and
these other agents stand for.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would just like Mr. McMahon to just
answer my question, and then Ill
Chairman ISSA. Without objection.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCMAHON. I totally agree with you, sir. That is not in the
makeup of an ATF agent. We do not allow guns to walk. What we
did in this investigation was investigate a large group of individuals that were breaking the law, and we were trying to put our
case together so that we could actually make an impact. If we pick
off these one or to two straw purchasers, they get replaced in a
day, and we have even more guns going into Mexico. That was the
plan.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now recognize Mr. Burton for his 5 minutes.
Mr. BURTON. First of all, Agent Newell, what was the origin of
this program? Who came up with this idea? Where did it come
from?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, it was based onit was based on the fact
that when wethe OCDETF Strike Force was initiated, the idea
of the OCDETF program is to disrupt and dismantle entire organizations.
Mr. BURTON. Who came up with this idea? Was it you or Mr.
McMahon or somebody higher up the food chain?
Mr. NEWELL. Idea for what, sir?
Mr. BURTON. For the whole program.
Mr. NEWELL. It is one investigation, sir. Fast and Furious is one
investigation.
Mr. BURTON. Where wasI mean, the selling of the guns, or the
giving of the guns in Fast and Furious, where did that come from?
Who made that decision?

55
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, we have a policy that allows for the transfer of firearms in order to pursue targets in investigation,
identify
Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, there was as many as 2,000
firearms; is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. Thats approximatelyyes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. And you were allowedyou allowed 2,000 firearms
to go in the system, this Fast and Furious program. How were you
tracking those?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, Fast and FuriousI apologize, but Fast
and Furious was not a program, it was an investigation that
was
Mr. BURTON. Okay. How did you track the weapons, the 2,000
weapons?
Mr. NEWELL. Depending on how the information got to us. Sometimes the information got to us after the sale. Sometimes it got to
us through investigative means that firearms were
Mr. BURTON. Did you have a set of records that showed who got
them and who reported to you where they went and all that?
Mr. NEWELL. Through our tracing system we have a way to determine when firearms were seized. And we also received information from
Mr. BURTON. On all the firearms did you get this information?
Mr. NEWELL. No, I dont believe so, sir, no.
Mr. BURTON. Why not?
Mr. NEWELL. Why not we didnt get all the information?
Mr. BURTON. Yeah. If you have 2,000 firearms that are out there
that are going in the program or the investigation, and youre putting them out there, it seems to me you would want toif you are
trying to make a case, you would want to track those and know
where all of them went.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, we did track the ones that we knew about,
yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Well, there were 2,000 firearms. Did you have control of those at any time?
Mr. NEWELL. We seized, sir, over approximately 300 guns in this
case in the United States through our efforts. And the other firearms we put into our suspect gun data base.
Mr. BURTON. I must be missing something. You had 2,000 firearms.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. You put them into the system, into the investigation, correct?
Mr. NEWELL. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Who did?
Mr. NEWELL. Agents in the group, agents in Group VII.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. Who kept records of that? The agents that
were doing it, did anybody keep records who they were giving the
guns to?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, I am a littlethe weapons were being purchased by a criminal organization.
Mr. BURTON. Okay.

56
Mr. NEWELL. So when we found out about that information, be
it through weapons seizures, or through cooperating dealers, or
through other means, we would keep track of that, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. So you have a record of all of the weapons that
were put intothat were sold.
Mr. NEWELL. To this day we are still discovering more, because
this was a very prolific firearms-trafficking organization. When we
first initiated this investigation in November 2009, I believe the
number wasthey had already purchased that we believe to this
date, and the number changes, something like 400 firearms. By the
time we initiated our OCDETF strategy to focus on the entire organization, I think it was close to 1,000 firearms by the time we
opened up our OCDETF.
Mr. BURTON. I must have missed something, because it seems to
me if there were 2,000 weapons that were sold and went into the
and you were investigating this, and you were trying to find the
criminals that were buying them, that there would be a record of
all of the weapons that were sold.
Mr. NEWELL. We have a record of
Mr. BURTON. All of the weapons that were sold.
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir, because we are still to this date discovering
firearms that were purchased by these individuals that we werent
aware of.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. So do you have a record of the ones that purchased those weapons, the individuals that purchased those weapons?
Mr. NEWELL. The ones we are aware of, yes, sir, we do have
them.
Mr. BURTON. You have the records of all those?
Mr. NEWELL. I do believe so, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. And youre still in the process of making the case
on this?
Mr. NEWELL. Because we are identifying additional suspects as
we go, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. I will yield to you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

57

58
Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield?
Yes. So let me understand. From previous testimony, agents
were there at the scene. Videotape or video observance, digital
video observance, occurred as they bought them. The agents in
many, many cases followed the suspect leaving with 6, 10, 20
weapons for a period of time. And then they were ordered by this
task force to break off and let those weapons continue going. And
you have charged Mr. Acosta, one of the 20 defendants, the only
one that is not just a meth user, who was straw buying, you have
charged him with being trafficking.
When did you know that Acosta was trafficking weaponshis intent was to traffic weapons into Mexico? And when weapons occurred in Mexico that you knew Acosta had received from straw
buyers, and they turned up at crime scenes in Mexico, then what
did you do?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, regarding Mr. Acosta, I believe it was Mr.
Acosta, sir, or
Chairman ISSA. Acosta.
Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Acosta.
Chairman ISSA. He is the money man.
Mr. NEWELL. Actually Mr. Acosta in this investigation right now
is the head of the Phoenix cell of this trafficking organization.
Chairman ISSA. Right.
Mr. NEWELL. So
Chairman ISSA. And you knew he was trafficking. You knew he
was receiving these weapons. You knew these weapons were showing up at crime scenes. I am just trying to understand, and my
time has expired, but why you couldnt seem to answer the gentlemans question straightforward? You knew guns that you had
watched be delivered or bought to be purchased went to third parties and ended up in Mexico, and yet this program continued as
though you somehow didnt know they werethat the purchasers,
the same purchaser who had purchased guns that were already in
Mexico, was purchasing more.
I yield back. Who do we have next? Mr. Davis is next for 5 minutes.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leadmon, you have been at ATF for 7 years studying gun
trafficking on the southwest border. Before that you were a homicide detective here in Washington, DC, for many years. Can you
describe to us briefly how the Mexican drug cartels get firearms
from the United States?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir. I guess one way to kind of summarize
this, this came to light to me several years ago when an individual
describing it to me put it as follows: He says the Mexican people
have been trafficking drugs into the United States since 1880. They
have also been buying Sam Colts guns since 1880. So that kind of
gives you a groundwork of the culture and the reason why we have
this problem, because we have these firearms being sold, and the
Mexicans are coming up, these cartels, and they are purchasing
these weapons. That is a fact.
Mr. DAVIS. In your experience, what type of weapons are in demand by the cartels?

59
Mr. LEADMON. Like I alluded to in my written testimony, which
I didnt get to finish, but there is awe have actually gone in and
identified a lot of what we call DTO-preferred weapons. And these
are usually your AKs, your ARs. They like the .38 Supers, the .45s.
We have a list of them. And in this particular case, the firearms
are being purchased byall the firearms being purchased by these
individuals were
Mr. DAVIS. Let me ask you, why do you think they focus on these
type weapons?
Mr. LEADMON. Because they are weapons to use toone, they
have to protect theirselves against their rivals. Two, they are confronted by law enforcement in Mexico and the military, so they
need this type of firepower and that heavier firepower to exist
down there.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.
Mr. Wall, you have spent the last 19 years as an ATF special
agent and have most recently served as the ATF representative in
Tijuana, Mexico. We have heard a lot today about the problem of
gun trafficking in Mexico, and I am hoping that you can help me
better understand the problem. Based on your experiences in Mexico, where are the cartels guns coming from?
Mr. WALL. From my experience, the majority come from the
United States.
Mr. DAVIS. Are you seeing a representative sample of all guns
used in crimes in Mexico, or are the Mexican authorities just
maybe showing you firearms that they believe come from the
United States?
Mr. WALL. They make them available to us. In the last 4 years
since 2007, I have probably looked at slightly over 2,000 firearms
in Mexico. These are firearms that I went out, and soon after they
were seized at a crime scene or a stash house, I went out and examined the guns. And of those 2,000, less than 50lets just say
50 of them I could tell were from foreign manufacture, meaning
outside the United States, possibly from South America, guns that
maybe were tied back to even the guerilla wars in Central America.
Mr. DAVIS. So you believe that these statistics are accurate, that
they are real?
Mr. WALL. I know guns, and I know what I see. And I am the
person on the ground, yes, sir.
Mr. DAVIS. Are you finding many of the weapons coming from
Central America? Some people seem to think that some actually
are coming from Central America. Do you think that many of them
are?
Mr. WALL. Some do, yes, especially with some groups. Certain
cartels have more of a tendency to acquire their firearms in Central America or South America, possibly even from guerilla groups.
However, the other cartels, the ones that I am familiar with, most
of their firearms are U.S.-sourced firearms.
Mr. DAVIS. So you think the United States is the main source of
these weapons?
Mr. WALL. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.

60
We now go to the gentleman from Utah Mr. Chaffetz for 5 minutes.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Chairman.
Agent Newell, when did you first become aware, know, anticipate, or maybe even suspect that these firearms in this program
were being transported or transferred into Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, I think we started getting the first traces I
want to say I believe sometime in November 2009, yes, sir.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. So in November 2009 you believed they were
being transferred or transported into Mexico. Did that cause you
any concern?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. It always does.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. But you say here the program continued on,
knowing full well that these guns were going to Mexico. You said
in your opening statement here, it is not the purpose of the investigation to permit the transportation of firearms into Mexico.
Mr. NEWELL. When we were lawfully able to seize firearms in
this case, and the many, many firearms-trafficking cases we conduct in Phoenix and Arizona and across the southwest border, we
take every effort to stop that, yes, sir.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. But in January, coming out of your office, in a
January 2010I mean, you testified today in your opening statement it was not the purpose of the investigation to permit the
transportation of firearms into Mexico. Thats today.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yet in MarchI am sorry, January 8, 2010, in
this memo, point number 13, you write, or it is written, Currently,
our strategy is to allow the transfer of firearms to continue to take
place, albeit at a much slower pace, in order to further the investigation and allow for the identification of additional coconspirators
who would continue to operate and illegally traffic firearms to Mexico drug-trafficking organizations. So it was the goal, it was the
intention of the program to allow guns to be trafficked to Mexico
based on this memo; is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is wrongthat is from your statement. It
also says in here, a number of different seizures in Mexico. It
seems very inconsistent, at best, to suggest that it was not the purpose to allow them to go to Mexico, yet you know in 2009 that they
are going to Mexico, and you put it in a memo in 2010, January
2010. How are those statements compatible?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, if I may, and I am glad I am given the
opportunity to clarify that paragraph that has been obviously well
publicized. The wording in that, the way my understanding was
when that briefing paper was drafted, was that our efforts to allow
the transfer to identify additional coconspirators was so that we
could further the investigation, take out the whole organization.
Otherwise, these individuals would, in fact, continue as part of a
larger
Mr. CHAFFETZ. So you allowed is it hundreds or is it thousands
of weapons to continue to flow through this program and go into
Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. I am sorry, can you repeat the question, sir?

61
Mr. CHAFFETZ. How many hundreds or thousands of weapons did
you allow to be purchased, knowing that they were going to Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, the purchase was being done by a criminal organization, a large
Mr. CHAFFETZ. But you facilitated it. You allowed it; did you not?
I mean, that was part of the program, allow these straw purchases
to happen so that the guns could end up in Mexico. And you know
in 2009 that that is happening.
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, again, the goal of the organization, the goal of
the investigation was to disrupt and dismantle the entire organization.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. I know. I understand the goal. But the problem
is youre purposely, knowingly allowing the guns to go to Mexico,
and you have information in 2009 that it is being successful, yet
you never put a stop to it. It is meeting the goals and intentions
you laid out in this memo in January 2010, and it continued on
and on. And consequently, there were thousands of weapons that
ended up in Mexico, killing people. Killing people. Thats the reason that were here today.
When did you first know or think that guns were walking?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, in this investigation, as best of my knowledge,
we didnt let guns walk for that perspective.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you first think that they were?
Mr. NEWELL. Were what, walking?
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Walking, yes. Did you everhave you ever
thought that they were walking?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, the policy regarding transfer of firearms regards the fact that we were trying to develop an investigation.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. I know what you are trying. When did you first
think that guns were walking?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, again, the goal of the investigation
Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you first think that guns were walking?
Did you ever think that? Do you think that here today?
Mr. NEWELL. I truly believe, as I have said before, that we didnt
intentionally let guns walk.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Lets go to slide two, if we could, please. This is
an email from Mr. Newell to Mr. McMahon on December 21, 2010,
6 days after Brian Terry was killed. Since I dont like the perception that we allowed guns to walk, I had David Voth pull the numbers of the guns recovered in Mexico, as well as those we had a
direct role in taking off here in the U.S.
So youre telling me you didnt suspect that the guns were walking?
Mr. NEWELL. As my email says, it is about the perception. There
wasI didnt want people to think there was a perception, because
in my mind that was not the case.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. How were guns not walking?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, knowing and proving that the transfer or purchase of firearms is illegal are two different things.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am asking. This is 1 month before the indictments and 2 months before John Dodson went on CBS News with
the accusations that the case was still an active investigation. Why
did you have Mr. Voth pull the numbers 1 day after the Terry mur-

62
der for the number of guns recovered in Mexico and the United
States? Did you know Fast and Furious was about to come under
massive scrutiny?
Mr. NEWELL. I did not know at that time that it was going to
come under this level of scrutiny, no, sir.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is the differenceexplain to me why you
dont think that guns were walking. You obviously thought that
others had that perception.
Chairman ISSA. Mr. Chaffetz, could you summarize?
Mr. CHAFFETZ. My apologies. I am way over. Thank the gentleman.
Chairman ISSA. We now go to the gentleman from Vermont Mr.
Welch for 5 minutes.
Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.
Mr. Newell, I am also trying to justunderstand the sequence here
that some of my colleagues were asking about. As I understand it,
agents would watch a straw purchaser purchase guns. Correct?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. WELCH. They would follow the straw purchaser and come, in
some places, to another location where they would observe that the
guns were left. Correct?
Mr. NEWELL. Left. Yes, sir. I believe.
Mr. WELCH. They were dropped off by the straw purchaser and
delivered to whoever the middleman was. Right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. WELCH. All right. And then on a couple of occasions the
agents called in for permission to make an arrest, and they were
denied that permission because of the overall objective of the plan.
Correct?
Mr. NEWELL. I am aware of that in one instance, yes, sir.
Mr. WELCH. All right. So the question I have, and I think Mr.
Burton and Mr. Issa were asking this, what procedures did you
have in place to follow where the guns went from that point where
they were dropped off to wherever they ended up?
Mr. NEWELL. I know we had surveillance teams out there that
their job was to do that, yes, sir.
Mr. WELCH. But you got a report. I am an agent. I observe a
straw purchaser. I watch the purchaser go to a delivery point. So
the next step is following the guns from that delivery point to
wherever they may end up. Now, I understand how this plan
worked from the point of watching the straw purchaser make the
purchase, watching the straw purchaser make the drop, but I dont
understand what happened after that or what your system was in
order to follow where those guns went.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, it wasnt my system, it was decisions that
were made in the field by dedicated agents that
Mr. WELCH. No, no. There has to be a system. What is the system? Whoevers system it is.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, agents in the field do the best they can to follow firearms, follow loads and see where they are going and
Mr. WELCH. I dont get that. Trained lawyou guys have plans,
right, about how youre going to execute a complicated and very
dangerous situation? So I am just wondering what it is. A load of
assault rifles has been delivered to a middleman. Was there an ex-

63
plicit plan by which you would follow where those guns went after
the drop to the middleman?
Mr. NEWELL. The best of my knowledge, we did everything possible to, in fact, do that with the resources we had out in the field.
Mr. WELCH. Right. But I am asking how you did it.
Mr. NEWELL. With surveillance, with agents on the ground, boots
on the ground.
Mr. WELCH. Well, if you had boots on the ground, how is it that
you wouldnt know where those guns went from the drop to the
next step?
Mr. NEWELL. Because in some instances guns would go to a
home. And unless we had anyunless we had any lawful basis to
approach those individuals, we sat on surveillance as much as resources would allow. And then other priorities, other cases would
take them away from that house.
Mr. WELCH. All right. So then basically there was not either the
resources to follow those guns from the drop to wherever they
ended up.
Mr. NEWELL. Not in every instance, but in some instances, yes,
sir.
Mr. WELCH. All right. Mr. Leadmon, in your testimony you discussed the 2007 Project Gunrunner. You highlighted the strategic
mission of the ATF and the need to cooperate with domestic and
international law enforcement partners to deny the tools of the
trade to the firearms-trafficking infrastructure. Can you clarify one
important issue about what happened? Do you have an opinion
that it was a mistake in this operation to focus on the Mexican cartels, the criminal organizations that are trafficking firearms? Or
was it a mistake or a failure to prioritize public safety as ATF targeted the cartels?
Mr. LEADMON. It is not an opinion, it is my observation. What
I will say is that I think there is a term here, everybody said, Let
these guns walk. I personally believe our agents walked away
from the guns as they were traveling down the road, similar to seeing something off at a train station.
To skirt around this, to me, is ludicrous. These firearms, right,
like I testified earlier, were crime guns, murder weapons. We knew
it in 2009. We knew that based on our information out of Mexico.
We knew where these guns were ending up by our partners in
Mexico down there recovering them and researching them. There
is no doubt that this was going to a criminal organization as early
as 2009. As every day went on thereafter, it became more and more
substantiated.
My thing here is we have been talking about lawful ways of arresting or going in. Well, we have an obligation to the Mexican people and the U.S. Government and the citizens of the United States.
There is other ways to stop the flow of guns other than arresting
people. You can go and seize the guns. You dont have to arrest
them. You can approach the people, right, and put an obstacle in
front of them so they will stop the purchase of these firearms, instead of allowing thousands of guns to be purchased and try to tie
the cases to make it a big case because you have big numbers.
What we should have done is broke these people down as they
came up before we let these guns go south, and then through our

64
intelligence assets, and through our hard work of our other agents
and networking from the other divisions, we could tie these cases
together and go after and get the big people. Thats how our law
enforcement partners do it, and thats how we should do it.
Mr. WELCH. Thank you.
My time has expired. I yield back.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from South Carolina Mr. Gowdy for
5 minutes.
Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, you said firearms are not in and of themselves contraband. Thats true unless they are sold to, possessed
by, or acquired by a prohibited person, which would include a
straw purchaser. So my question to you is this: Did ATF have contemporaneous or preknowledge of any straw purchasers purchasing
weapons in Arizona?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, straw purchasers are not prohibited individuals unless they have been convicted of some crime.
Mr. GOWDY. No, it is against the law to purchase a gun knowing
youre going to transfer it to someone else to therefore get around
the fact that the person youre going to give it to is a prohibited
person. Agreed?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Okay. Well, thats a straw purchaser. Someone who
is going to give the gun to a prohibited person is a straw purchaser.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. GOWDY. So now that we have that cleared up, did you know
that anyone who was acquiring firearms from firearms dealers in
Arizona were straw purchasers? Contemporaneous with the acquisition, did ATF know it?
Mr. NEWELL. We have to prove that, in fact, that its a violation,
yes, sir. We presented to the U.S. Attorneys Office evidence that
we believed that these individuals were, in fact, straw purchasers.
Mr. GOWDY. Lets do it another way. The very first weapon recovered in Mexico through a trace, did you go back to the purchaser
of that weapon and interrogate them?
Mr. NEWELL. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Did anyone with ATF?
Mr. NEWELL. I am not aware of that, no, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Why not?
Mr. NEWELL. I dont know, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Youve got a gun that was purchased in Mexico
that was purchased in the United States that makes it into Mexico.
You know through your trace that thats the gun. Did you go back
to the person who purchased it? Thats an old-fashioned investigative technique. It is not as complicated as letting guns walk. It is
more effective, though, to actually go interrogate the person who
made the acquisition. Did you do that?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, as I stated earlier, in this investigation, realizing that if you take out one straw purchaser youre not making
an impact on the greater organization

65
Mr. GOWDY. I want to ask you about the greater investigation,
because I have read now four different times you have said disrupt, dismantle, destroy.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. How are you going to extradite drug kingpins from
Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. We dont have plans do that, no, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. So once the guns make it to Mexico, there was nothing you were going to do about those drug kingpins.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, there was.
Mr. GOWDY. What?
Mr. NEWELL. One of the things we wanted to do was as soon as
we had solid information on who the drug kingpin, if you will, was,
to share that information with Mexico.
Mr. GOWDY. But you didnt share the information with Mexico
ahead of time. So they are supposed to trust American law enforcement, who has been conducting an investigation and knows firearms are going into Mexico, and you tell them after the fact, and
they are supposed to thank you and be partners in this endeavor?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, it wasnt only until we had information on who
the specific recipient or the drug kingpin was that we felt it was
prudent to share that information, because we werent
Mr. GOWDY. How are you going to dismantle Mexican drug cartels if you are not going to extradite the kingpins back to the
United States?
Mr. NEWELL. Because we hoped that the Mexican officials would,
in fact, prosecute them for that.
Mr. GOWDY. So youre doing this to help the Mexican criminal
justice system. Youre just not going to tell the Mexican criminal
justice system about it.
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir, I disagree with that premise.
Mr. GOWDY. Thats exactly what you just said, Special Agent,
that you were going to tell them about it after the fact.
Mr. NEWELL. We had to know it first. We had to know who the
drugwe hadthrough this investigation, and as it continues
Mr. GOWDY. Okay. You have the first trace that tells you a U.S.
gun is found in Mexico. Why did you not go interview the person
who acquired the gun? Why not do the investigation the old-fashioned way, with car stops, with search warrants, with active surveillance? Why do it this way? It was never going to work.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, again, years of experience have shown us, sir,
that removing one straw purchaser will not have an effect on the
larger investigation.
Mr. GOWDY. Well, Special Agent, the only way it possibly could
have worked would have been if Mexico had extradited these kingpins. If you want to disrupt, dismantle, destroy, the only way it
could work is if you told Mexicoor I would have settled for you
just telling your own fellow agents about it ahead of time. Because
ATF and Mexico didnt know about it, did they?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir
Mr. GOWDY. Yes or no? Did Mexico ATF office know about this?
Mr. NEWELL. They were aware of the investigation, yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. They were aware that weapons were going into Mexico and you knew about it?

66
Mr. NEWELL. That we knew about it? Sir, weapons go into Mexico all the time.
Mr. GOWDY. From straw purchasers that you knew about. Let me
ask you this: If Mexico were to ask us to extradite the law enforcement officers who knowingly aided and abetted weapons going into
Mexico, what would your reaction to that be?
Mr. NEWELL. I would explain to them that our concern in an investigation of this type is to take out the whole organization so we
have the greatest impact possible. If you just take off one straw
purchaser, youre not having an impact on the greater effort, which
is the whole organization.
Mr. GOWDY. Special Agent, my time is up. I will just say this in
conclusion. I worked with ATF for 6 years directly. I worked with
ATF indirectly for 10 years as just a State D.A. This is one of the
saddest days in my 6 months in Congress. It may be the saddest
day. ATF has a wonderful reputation in South Carolina. We never
once contemplated letting firearms walk ever. A first-year Quantico
or Glencoe person knows that.
I will yield back.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now recognize the gentlelady from California Ms. Speier.
Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, what were you thinking? I think thats
what we are all scratching our heads about here today. And the
embarrassment that you have put on ATF generally, an outstanding organization of line agents, is deeply troubling to all of us.
But what I am really concerned about is but for the fact that there
were whistleblowers, but for the fact those whistleblowers went to
Senator Grassley, but for the fact CBS did an investigation, this
travesty would still be going on today. Thats my big objection.
Who did you tell? Did Mr. Melson know about this?
Mr. NEWELL. About the investigation?
Ms. SPEIER. Yes.
Mr. NEWELL. My belief is yes. I briefed him and
Ms. SPEIER. When did he know about it? When you started it?
When you were conceiving it?
Mr. NEWELL. I am not exactly sure when the first time he was
made aware of the investigation.
Ms. SPEIER. Who did you make aware of the idea of this investigation?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, when the investigation first initiated, in, I believe, November, we sent upor I sent up a briefing paper, we sent
up a briefing paper, I believe, the first part of December.
Ms. SPEIER. To whom?
Mr. NEWELL. To my supervisor.
Ms. SPEIER. Who is?
Mr. NEWELL. Mr. McMahon.
Ms. SPEIER. And, Mr. McMahon, what did you then do?
Mr. MCMAHON. When I was briefed on the initiation of this investigation, I passed it up the chain. This is the initiation of an investigation. We had apretty early on, that is why the title Fast
and Furious came on it, we had a large group of people that were
buying a lot of guns in a short period of time. And then we were
having recoveries in Mexico. What we had was purchases in the

67
United States, recoveries in Mexico. We didnt have what was in
between, and thats what the agents in Phoenix were trying to
prove.
Ms. SPEIER. So you all thought this was a great idea.
Mr. MCMAHON. To stop guns going into Mexico, yes, maam.
Ms. SPEIER. No, this particular investigation of letting guns walk
into Mexico.
Mr. MCMAHON. We didnt have an investigation of letting guns
walk. We had an investigation into a group of individuals who were
breaking the law and trafficking guns into Mexico.
Ms. SPEIER. All right. So 2,000 guns walked into Mexico. You
have retrieved maybe 300; is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe the current number is roughly 600 firearms have been recovered.
Ms. SPEIER. And my understanding is that the way you were,
surveilling them, is that you were putting GPS systems on them;
is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. On the firearms or on vehicles? Depends onwe
used all kinds of investigative techniques to further the investigation to try to determine if, in fact, the firearms were going into
Mexico.
Chairman ISSA. Would the gentlelady yield? We have previous
testimony that three times and only three times were any electronic tracking devices placed on the products.
Ms. SPEIER. Only three times?
Chairman ISSA. Thats correct.
Ms. SPEIER. And that those batteries ran out is what I was told
as well; Is that correct?
Chairman ISSA. Exactly.
Ms. SPEIER. All right. What Peter Forcelli, the special agent, testified earlier said that in his opinion, you know, if we monitor
money being wired to the Middle East, and we take down actual
information about people who buy Sudafed, because we are concerned about meth labs, we know that gunrunning is coming from
the United States into Mexico, that is the source of it, why arent
we requiredwhy arent we requiring people who purchase multiple long arms from reporting that? And my question to each of
you is should we be doing that? We do it for things like Sudafed,
but we dont do it for long arms.
Mr. MCMAHON. I believe that we put forward a demand letter requiring gun dealers along the southwest border to report the sale
of two or more firearms that fire from the shoulder at greater than
.22-caliber that accept a detachable magazine.
Ms. SPEIER. Whats the penalty if they dont?
Mr. MCMAHON. If the FFL doesnt? It would be part of the revocation process if they dont follow our rules.
Ms. SPEIER. They would lose their license.
Mr. MCMAHON. Correct.
Ms. SPEIER. Thats like a slap on the hand, isnt it?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats all that we have at our disposal.
Ms. SPEIER. I am asking you if there should be a law passed requiring the reporting of long arms that exceed a certain number.
Mr. MCMAHON. I think that is the job of this body.

68
Ms. SPEIER. No, we are asking you. You are out in the field. You
are telling us that the gunrunning into Mexico, the drug cartels are
getting those guns from the United States. They are originating
here. So I want everyone on the panel to just answer that question.
Mr. MCMAHON. Demand letter three that is going forward is
going to be a great tool for us to combat this.
Ms. SPEIER. All right. Mr. Newell.
Mr. NEWELL. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Yes. Yes, any tool that we have to assist us in detecting early on,
to detect, help us assist to detect early on a firearms-trafficking organization that is trafficking in large quantities of multipleof assault-type weapons would help.
Ms. SPEIER. Thank you.
Next.
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, maam. I think that if we are going to do
this, it should be in a balanced approach, maybe through legislation. But we also have to take in mind that we do have Second
Amendment rights. And this needs to be balanced. And I think that
we should approach this with caution.
Ms. SPEIER. What does that mean? Either you think we should
have one or we shouldnt.
Mr. LEADMON. That means to me that there is a common good
in this idea and this legislation, but there is a responsibility for us
to balance it also.
Ms. SPEIER. Next?
Mr. CANINO. Yes, maam, it would help.
Mr. WALL. Yes, maam. I agree with Mr. Leadmon, though, we
need to balance it with the Second Amendment rights. We require
purchases of handguns withintwo or more handguns within a 5day period to be reported to us. However, the situation in Mexico
right now and along the southwest border, I think it is an exigency
that we have some type ofwell, some help along that line with
the assault weapons or the long guns.
Mr. GIL. I would disagree to some extent that that would be beneficial. I would rather have a relationship with the Federal firearms licensee for when an individual does come in and wants to
purchase multiple weapons of any sort, handguns or long guns,
that they would work with us on that. And that would provide us
some information targeting those individuals. So I would somewhat
disagree with that.
Ms. SPEIER. My time has expired.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman Mr. Walberg for 5 minutes.
Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for
also giving us the opportunity to go to Mexico City and meet with
the officials down there, both our hardworking agents and agencies,
as well as the Federal police in Mexico. I justhearing some of the
responses this morning, I am kind of surprised that the Mexico
Federal Police met us with such openness in providing information
to us of what they are attempting to do when it is apparent we let
them down.
I guess to try to come at it from the other side to get some answers, let me ask Mr. Caninoand thank you for your service
Mr. CANINO. Thank you.

69
Mr. WALBERG. When did you first learn that a large number of
guns were being seized in Mexico and traced back to Phoenix?
Mr. CANINO. Well, sir, it was around November or so. My intel
officer in Mexico reported to me that there was a large amount of
weapons in the suspect gun data base.
Mr. WALBERG. What was your reaction to that?
Mr. CANINO. Well, sir, I looked at it. I thought three things about
this case. Number one, I thought that the case was out of Phoenix.
Anybody who has ever talked to any agents in Phoenix or worked
in Phoenix knows that the U.S. Attorneys Office there has been reluctant to prosecute firearms cases. Thats number one.
Number two, I thought that our agents in Phoenix had stumbled
upon a gun-trafficking group, and in their due diligence were finally realizing, okay, these guys have beat us for these many guns.
And number three, I thought somehow our agents are losing
these loads, or a combination of all three.
Never, never in my wildest dreams would I think that ATF
agents were ordered or participated in actually following known
gun traffickers and just walking away. That is, to me, inconceivable. And to this day I still am trying to get my head around this.
What happened in this case is this is the ATF gun trafficking
book, something we have done since 1972, and we do it well, and
they went in Phoenix to the shredder and shredded the best practices, all the techniques that you use to investigate a gun-trafficking case. It is not rocket science. If it was, I wouldnt be here.
Mr. WALBERG. Had you received any warning from ATF in Phoenix or Washington about the possibility of a spike in guns showing
up in Mexico?
Mr. CANINO. No. I was talking with Lorren and the folks at the
Office of Strategic Intelligence, you know. We became aware, okay,
there is a gun-trafficking case in Phoenix. The first guns that I became aware of that were related to that case were in November
2009, where nine guns turned up in a seizure of 42 guns in Sonora,
Mexico.
Mr. WALBERG. So no warning.
Mr. CANINO. Once those guns came up and we traced them, hey,
okay, now we found out there was a case out of Phoenix. But out
of that case, out of those nine guns, that person who purchased
those nine guns purchased close to 700 guns. So in 2009, we
knewwe meaning ATF, ATF Phoenix, ATF Mexicowe knew
that at least one person involved in that case had guns recovered
in Mexico. And like I said, that person was allowed to buy 700
guns.
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Gil, let me ask you the same questions. When
did you first learn that a large number of guns were being seized
in Mexico and traced back to Phoenix?
Mr. GIL. Sir, I learned actually during the same event that Mr.
Canino just referred to. He and my chief analyst, Dennis Fasciani,
came into my office. And I had just arrived in early October, and
this event came across. So they briefed me at that time.
Mr. WALBERG. And your reaction to that?
Mr. GIL. I picked up the phone. We discussed it. I picked up the
phone. I called the Phoenix Field Division to find out what was
going on with this investigation, we were recovering an abnormal

70
number of weapons, and if they were aware of it, and if so, what
was going on.
Mr. WALBERG. And you received no warning prior to that?
Mr. GIL. No, sir.
Mr. WALBERG. In the few remaining seconds let me move over to
Mr. Leadmon. Whats eTrace?
Mr. LEADMON. It is the ATFs electronic tracing system. It is the
system we use to submit traces and to get the results.
Mr. WALBERG. Was the data base useful for tracing guns, or did
you face obstacles with the tracing system?
Mr. LEADMON. Well, within the tracing system we have a flagging system called suspect guns. And in that suspect gun data
base, right, it is utilized to notify case agents when a weapon that
they suspect is being used in a criminala crime gun, that it is
flagged, and then the agents notified.
Mr. WALBERG. Were they any delays in the uses of eTrace on this
particular issue?
Mr. LEADMON. No, the tracing comes out ofespecially the Mexico guns or the U.S. gunsthat comes from the recovering officers
or their agency. But the flagging system has a mechanism in it
or it did in the inception of Gunrunnerexcuse me, projectthis
project, Fast and Furious, it had a system that waswe couldnt
have it through our electronic system.
Mr. WALBERG. Why was that?
Mr. LEADMON. It was just a matter of just merging the systems
together. It is now part of our eTrace system, and it is all fully
available.
Chairman ISSA. The gentlemans time has expired.
We now go to the gentleman from Illinois Mr. Quigley for 5 minutes.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. There is
several committee meetings going on. So if I ask a question thats
been answered, I apologize.
But perhaps the most obvious, Special Agent McMahon, was it
your intention to go back and get these weapons after this all took
place? People left these stores with guns. Your intention was to go
back and get all these weapons. Correct?
Mr. MCMAHON. Our intention was to prove that they were doing
something illegally when they bought those weapons, and thats
easier said than done. Proving that someones a straw purchaser
actually means that you have to prove the day that they came in
to fill out that form, that they lied when they answered one of the
questions. And proving that, we had to prove that they knowingly
lied when they filled out that form. So once we have determined
that someone is a straw purchaser, yes, we want to be able to get
the weapons that they are responsible for as quick as possible.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Did you believe that you could get these weapons
back, if that was the case, regardless of where they went?
Mr. MCMAHON. Again, I think our problem with this case is
proving that a violation occurred in the United States and then determining how those weapons were being transported into Mexico.
We know that of all the people we identified in this case that are
purchasers, none of them were actually physically taking the weapons into Mexico. We were checking border crossings, all of those

71
sort of things, and that was not happening. So there was a great
unknown at the beginning of this case trying to figure out what the
size of this network was and how it was operating.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Well, if you and Special Agent Newell have used
the line, if we pick off one or two straw purchasers today, they simply get replaced, in your words, in your mind, why is that the case?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, because I think the way I understand firearms trafficking into Mexico, which is totally different than any
type of firearms trafficking we have ever done beforeI am from
New York. I worked firearms trafficking cases all the time, but it
is totally different in Mexico. What you will have is a plaza boss
that orders guns from the United States. He will give someone in
the United States, say, $70,000 and says, I want $70,000 of guns.
And he expects to get $70,000 worth of guns.
Mr. QUIGLEY. How do they find each other typically?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats an established network from the drug
trade of drugs going north. So that individual
Mr. QUIGLEY. I am sorry, so that relationship is already there because of the drug trade?
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely.
Then that person will recruit individuals that have clean records
that are U.S. citizens to buy weapons. Now, if we start picking off
one or two people, that hurts the money in the person in the
United States, but the person in Mexico is still going to get his
$70,000 worth of guns. And thats what happens. So knocking off
straw purchasers one by one, yeah, it makes life hard on the money
person in the United States, but it doesnt make an impact in Mexico. And thats the key to what were trying to do at ATF. And
there has to be that balance, obviously.
As I said, the mistakesin no way should we have ever allowed
anyone to get up into the 600 purchases without talking to that
person, trying to find out what they were doing, seeing if they
would cooperate. But again, I think we learn things in every case
we ever do, and we are learning an awful lot from this one.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Well, this is a network. People talk. So they would
talk about what it is like to be a straw purchaser from an economic
point of view. They encourage someone else, as you say, to do this.
What would discourage someone from being a straw purchaser that
we could do?
Mr. MCMAHON. I think obviously, you know, stiffer sentences for
some of these individuals. We are tied towhen we make a case
against these individuals, obviously they have all clean records.
The Federal system is tied into punish individuals that have a
criminal history. Obviously, straw purchasers will not have a criminal history. That makes them viable to purchase weapons. That
would help us an awful lot to have a hammer over their head to
either cooperate or ultimately never do this.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Weve heard the expression that many feel like this
is doing 60 in a 55, or some reference to that, that it is not particularly strongly punished, and typically not with a jail term. Is that
your understanding?
Mr. MCMAHON. It is. It shouldnt be. Every time I talk about
this, whether it is through the media, or other people, or Members
of Congress, always trying to stress that these individuals that

72
think they are just doing maybe a paper violation are actually
causing havoc in another country or else here in the United States,
because the people that need them to buy guns arent using them
to protect their store or protect their residence. Theyre using them
to create mayhem.
Mr. QUIGLEY. And the last question. Editorials about the Second
Amendment aside, if you go into a store, a gun store, in Arizona,
how many AK47-type weapons can you buy?
Mr. MCMAHON. As many as he has.
Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. QUIGLEY. Yes.
Chairman ISSA. Ask unanimous consent the gentleman have 30
seconds.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.
Special Agent Newell, I must tell you that your testimony has
been quite frustrating, I think, for both sides. I just want you to
answer one question. Mr. Leadmon said the way this should have
been conducted. Do you remember hearing what he said? He said
the way this should have been done.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I just wanted to know your reaction to that.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, as I said in my opening statement, I recognize that in retrospect there were mistakes made in how we handled this investigation. We should haveone of the things I said
in my opening statement was it was incumbent upon me to have
more risk assessments throughout the investigation. I acknowledge
that. I acknowledge the fact that one of the things I should have
done was more frequently throughout the investigation conduct
risk assessments to ensure whether this was still a prudent strategy to occur.
But I will tell you, sir, that from years and years of experience,
as Mr. McMahon just said, these Mexican drug cartels are going
to get their firearms. Theyre going to get them. So we have to do
everything we can in terms of taking out the infrastructure that
manipulates the straw purchasers. Straw purchasers are the lowest
rung on the ladder. They are like a street-corner drug dealer. If you
just focus your investigations on straw purchasers, youre not having a lasting impact.
But to answer your question, sir, I acknowledge that yes, in fact,
that there should have been more frequent risk assessments. I acknowledge that fact.
Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
panel for appearing here today.
Regretfully, I have to attend a teleconference, but I would like
to yield my time back to the chair, as it is very important we continue this discussion.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to follow up somewhat along the lines that the ranking member was on. Mr. Patino bought 730 weapons is our best
count right now. He worked through Mr. Acosta. For both of Spe-

73
cial Agent Newell and McMahon, was there a time in which either
one of you were aware that Mr. Acosta, buying weapons, the total
of 730 from this particular straw buyer, who was on food stamps,
who had no incomewas there a time that you became aware Mr.
Acosta intended on transporting those weapons to the drug cartels
to sell them? You have charged 19 straw purchasers, who are all
out on their own recognizance right now just waiting for trial sometime next year. You have charged one person with trafficking. Was
there a time you became aware that, in fact, you had a known
group of buyers, including Mr. Patino at 730 weapons, and you
knew that the purchaser, the money man, intended on transporting
those to Mexico? Was there ever a time that you knew that? Mr.
McMahon first.
Mr. MCMAHON. There was never a time that I knew that, no.
Chairman ISSA. Mr. Newell.
Mr. NEWELL. There was never a specific time that we knew that,
no, sir.
Mr. ISSA. Please stay awayfrom words like specific. They worry
me. Was there ever a time? Did you get to an understanding that
you had a known buyer buying from these people with an intent
to traffic them to the cartels? Was there a time?
Mr. NEWELL. Throughout the investigation we had information
that
Chairman ISSA. What was the first time that you had that information?
Mr. NEWELL. That this group was trafficking firearms to Mexico?
Chairman ISSA. That you had a known buyer, Mr. Acosta or that
group, and that the purchaserssome of the straw purchasers they
were buying from were, in fact, providing to these people for their
purpose of transporting?
I ask you this question very simply. Now, wait a second. You
have been here as a paid not answerer so far. And I appreciate that
you have been here as a paid not answerer, but there comes a point
where I go, wait a second, 730 weapons bought by a man who had
no money. Every penny he bought with he had to get from somebody. You knew that at some point. You knew who was buying
them, and you allowed it to continue.
Now, there comes a point where, as we go through the rest of the
investigationand this was about Mexico, and I want to get back
to that very quicklybut there comes a point where we have to
have more than just mistakes were made. My understanding is you
knew from credible information, your organization knew that, in
fact, you had a buyer providing the money to Patino and others,
that he was taking possession of those weapons, and you knew
with specificity that those weapons, some of them had already
ended up in Mexico; is that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. And what was the first date; 2009, what was the
first date?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, to answer your question, throughout the investigation we had information that Patino wasMr. Patino was
working with Mr. Acosta throughout the investigation.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. So from day one you had a straw purchaser with no means of support buying hundreds of weapons, pro-

74
viding them to his intermediary, which meant that both of them
were very much a part. You didnt have a buy and lie situation at
this point, you had an individual who could be charged with his
participation in the actual trafficking of weapons. You had somebody who was trafficking specifically for the intent of getting it to
the drug cartels, providing huge amounts of informationIm
sorry, huge amounts of money. You had that early on. Were now
2 years later, and youve only charged 18 other people with buy
and lie and the one person you knew early on was doing this.
Where, quite frankly, is any semblance of roll-up or any semblance of going further? It looks like you knowingly allowed these
to be sold, waiting to see if the other end in Mexico would give you
information. It seems like you knowingly allowed these weapons to
get out of your control knowingly to someone you knew was trafficking into Mexico. You saw the results, you allowed it to continue,
and now youre telling us, we dont let guns walk.
Well, Ive got to tell you, before this investigation ends, Ive got
to have somebody in your position or at Justice admit you knowingly let guns walk, because right now your agents, both the agents
here today from Mexico and the agents that were part of Phoenix
and part of this program who became whistleblowers, had told us
you were letting guns walk. Its only you and Mr. McMahon and
other people at Justice who continue to come before this committee
and say, we dont let guns walk. Are they lying, or are you lying?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, in this investigation it is my opinion that we
did not let guns walk.
Chairman ISSA. Youre entitled to your opinion, not to your facts.
With that we go to the gentleman Mr. Tierney.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wall, before you were transferred to the ATF field office in
Tijuana, Mexico, you were in the Phoenix office; is that correct.
Mr. WALL. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. TIERNEY. And you said in your written testimony that you
personally saw some of the AFTs best trafficking cases languish in
the U.S. Attorneys Office. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. WALL. Yes, thats accurate, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Now, we also had other ATF agents tell us the
same thing, that there was a lagging of proceeding on these cases
in the U.S. Attorneys Office.
When was that period of time that you were assigned to the
Phoenix office?
Mr. WALL. Well, I was working primarily gun trafficking to Mexico from 2007 until I left for Tijuana in 2009, fall of 2009.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Newell, a number of ATF witnesses that the
committee interviewed have said that this case was ready for indictment probably in August 2010, but the U.S. Attorneys Office
didnt really seek the indictments until January 2011. Is that an
accurate reflection of your memory?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. TIERNEY. Do you know why you experienced these delays?
Mr. NEWELL. I think thats a question better asked of the U.S.
Attorneys Office, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Did they ever give you an understanding of why it
was that they were seeking to delay?

75
Mr. NEWELL. That they were continuing to put together information they needed to seek indictments.
Mr. TIERNEY. And it was that broad an explanation, no certain
specifics?
Mr. NEWELL. Certain specifics regarding financial for the money
laundering statutes that are in themoney laundering violations
that are in the indictment.
Mr. TIERNEY. Did you consider those reasons to be legitimate, or
did you think that they were somewhat suspect?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe that they were legitimate in the sense of
the return on some subpoenas, yes, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Now, Mr. McMahon, you said that a number of
your agents were certainly frustrated from time to time with the
U.S. Attorneys Office in Phoenix, correct?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats what was being relayed to me from Bill,
yes.
Mr. TIERNEY. But you didnt have direct knowledge of that;
agents hadnt expressed it to you?
Mr. MCMAHON. I shouldnt say that. Yes, there is a personal
friend that I had that works in Phoenix that I hired in New York.
He did express his frustration with the U.S. Attorneys Office, yes.
Mr. TIERNEY. Now, at some point in time when, Mr. Newell and
Mr. McMahon, you thought that the case was ready for indictment,
the August 2010 and after that, did you start using seizure warrants to interdict some of the weapons?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. We started doing that, I believe, in September 2010 in an effort to seize firearms as we were waiting for
the indictment.
Mr. TIERNEY. All right. So
Mr. NEWELL. Civilly. Seize firearms civilly.
Mr. TIERNEY. So once you thought that the case had been
made
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. TIERNEY [continuing]. Then you started to take extra actions
to make sure that the weapons didnt get beyond a certain point.
All right. And when would you exercise the seizure warrants in relation to this whole trafficking activity that was going on?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, I thank you for the question. During the
summer of 2010, we finally convinced certain individuals in the Judiciary that we had a very strongwe believe we had a very strong
ability or theory on being able to seize firearms civilly in order to
stem the flow, and we got that approved, I would say, September
2010.
Mr. TIERNEY. Now, this problem with the U.S. Attorneys Office
in Phoenix, the lag of time between when the people in the field
thought that they had their case made and waiting for the indictments to go down, is that a problem that exists with the current
U.S. attorney?
Mr. NEWELL. I will say, sir, that having been there 5 years when
I was there from 2006 to 2011, the current U.S. attorney has been
much more aggressive and much more proactive than previous administrations, yes.
Mr. TIERNEY. The previous administrations, however, were insistent in having that issue, a lag on that?

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Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. McMahon, you told the committee that ATF
agents had secured confessions from straw purchasers to develop
certain cases, but that your agents presented those cases to the
U.S. Attorneys Office in Phoenix, and the assistant U.S. attorney
declined to prosecute and said there was no violation. Do you remember telling the interviewers that?
Mr. MCMAHON. I do remember speaking about a single case that
was relayed to me by Bill Newell, yes.
Mr. TIERNEY. Can you give us some specifics of what it was you
related?
Mr. MCMAHON. What was told to me was we were working an
operation at a gun show. Our agents observed someone that looked
suspicious pushing a baby carriage with a couple of long guns in
it. They followed her out to the parking lot where she actually
transferred that to an individual, and our agents saw a transfer of
money. We had other agents follow the car that had the guns now
out of the parking lot, pulled him over, did a traffic stop, identified
him as a multiple convicted felon with not only the two guns this
woman gave him, but also a third gun. We also confronted the
woman, and she confessed that she was paid to purchase these
weapons. I believe it was a Saturday or Sunday when this happened. Bill relayed to me that it was presented to the duty agent
in Phoenix, and they suggested that we take the case to State
court.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
Im going to yield back to the ranking member at this point in
time.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.
Chairman ISSA. We will ask that you also have another 30 seconds.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, I want to go back to something the chairman asked you, because I want to makeI want us to be real
clear, and this is for the benefit of the entire committee.
Ive got aIm trying to figure out what your definition of walking guns is. Maybe thats part of the problem. I think webecause
I think almost everybody up here has our opinion about this, and
Im just wondering if theres a difference between your definition
of walkingallowing guns to walk and ours.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to answer that.
My definition of walking, and I believe its the common law enforcement term, is when a law enforcement agency, be it ATF, be
it DEA, be it a State and local agency, actually puts some sort of
evidence into the hands of a suspect in furtherance of an undercover operation, in furtherance of an investigation, and then does
nothing with that property. That property, for instance, with ATF
it can be a prop gun, one of our evidence guns. You put it in the
hands of that suspect and then dont takedont do the follow-up,
dont attempt to determine where that gun is going.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So you dont think there was any walking allowed in this based on that definition in this case?
Mr. NEWELL. Based on that definition, yes, sir.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Arizona Mr. Gosar for 5 minutes.
Mr. GOSAR. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Newell, one of my colleagues on the other side brought it up
about new laws. Now, I want to emphasize, it wasnt the gun sales
operator. And let me emphasize that again. It wasnt, was it, because they were alarmingly bringing forth these sales; were they
not?
Mr. NEWELL. Im sorry, Congressman.
Mr. GOSAR. Oh, here we go again.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, I didnt understand.
Mr. GOSAR. It seems like this is the Moe, Curly and Larry show,
and were looking for Larry. I mean, its disruptive to actually see
what Im seeing here. As a business person coming from Main
Street America to actually see what Im seeing here, youve got to
be disgusted about this. And to go round and round the corner, its
ridiculous.
Agent Canino, I watch your body language. Im a health care
physician.
Mr. CANINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOSAR. I watch body language like crazy. Tell me what you
disagree with that man right there.
Mr. CANINO. On this specific case?
Mr. GOSAR. Yes. Talking about records. Lets talk about records.
Are there adequate records being kept?
Mr. CANINO. At the FFLs?
Mr. GOSAR. Yes.
Mr. CANINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOSAR. And how they relate between the sale of these guns
and Mexico.
Mr. CANINO. I think ATF does a great job in regulating the firearms industry.
Mr. GOSAR. But in this case in tracking, were they actually able
to track them? They had no idea where they were going, did they?
Mr. CANINO. No, sir. The reasonyouve got to put this in context. Everybody is saying, oh, this case was so big, it was complicated. Firearms-trafficking cases are not complicated, sir, okay?
Theyre not complicated. The reason this case was so big was because we didnt do anything, plain and simple. Everybody wants to
make this bigger than it is.
Like I said earlier, you dont have toI spent 19 years, 15 as a
street agent, 4 leading a street group, okay? You dont have the
luxury or the right, in my opinion, as an ATF agent to say, I like
this law, I like that law, okay? Thats you guys set the law; we follow it. Now, its up to me as an ATF agent how best to make up
an investigative technique and best practices so I can make a case
and present it to the U.S. attorney. Ive done my job. Now its up
to the U.S. attorney if he wants to prosecute it or not. Im going
to bring him the best case I can.
In this case, like I said earlier, we have the ATF trafficking
guidelines and best practices, and we just threw it out the window.
Nobody got stopped. Like I said earlier, how can you let somebody

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buy 730 guns, and at what point are you going to stop them? I
mean, I am embarrassed, sir. I have agents, guys who I consider
American heroes, my friends, who I never thought I would hear
this, who theyve told me since this broke, Carlos, Im ashamed to
carry an ATF badge, to me. I have cried over that literally, and Im
unashamed to say that. This is not a job to me, its a profession.
I dont have a hobby. My hobby is being an ATF agent. I love this
job. I hit the lottery when I came on. And Im proud of what I do,
and Im proud of the ATF agents in this country. We have heroes,
we really do. Butand Ive been watching your body language, too,
and Mr. Burtons. Im sorry, sir, but thats all I could say. I have
no other way to describe this.
Mr. GOSAR. Well, I mean, I look at this, and I look atyou know,
when were doing medical procedures, we look at whats our end
game and whats all the processes in between, and theres collateral
damage. And the problem is that collateral damages are crimes,
and there are going to be deaths like we just saw, and there are
going to be many more. And theyre on this side, and theyre on
that side. And do you know what that tells me? That tells me that
when you were in this planning stage, weve got a problem. Its not
on the field, its right there in the office, in the head office coming
up with this. This was absurd to even have this idea. And to hear
this merry-go-round bantering back and around where we cant get
an answer from Mr. Newell, I mean, the buck stops to somebody.
Who is it? Its obviously to me. Its not these two gentlemen right
here.
I want to find out who Larry is. Thats where were going to have
to go with this. But this is absurd. And the fact that we used peoples lives and theirand our friends from Mexico as pawns in this
without even discussing it, how absurd. Its reprehensible to even
conceive of whats transpired here. And I hope the buck stops, and
I hope you take accountability all the way through, because this
cant go on again. This isI mean, both sides of the aisle are furious, and the American people ought to be furious at you. If this is
what you would get for higher ups in ATF or the Department of
Justice, shame on you.
And I yield back.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Virginia for his 5 minutes, Mr.
Connolly.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Im sure all of
our panelists are so pleased to be here today.
I guess I have a slightly different take on the subject. I dont defend Fast and Furious, and I dont defend the actions of the U.S.
Attorneys Office at the time in Phoenix, and I certainly believe
that it was a botched attempt that led to a tragedy, perhaps many
tragedies. And I think this committee and this chairman are right
to raise those issues and to try to assign blame.
But theres another part of the story I doubt very much the press
will print in tomorrows headlines, because its so much easier to
print who screamed the loudest at ATF and that you got beat up.
But what the press wont print tomorrow, sadly, is the fact that
Congress hands are hardly clean on this subject. We have done everything to make sure that the F in ATF is nullified. We have

79
made sure that you havent got a permanent Director for 6 years.
We laud the private sector. What private company would think its
okay to lack a permanent CEO for 6 years? We have done everything in our power in Congress to try to defang the ATF to make
sure that its toothless. Weve done everything we can to fight your
budget and reduce it so that you dont have the resources to do the
job. Were not criticizing you for not doing well. We had testimony
before this committee by one of your colleagues called by the committee majority who said there are more New York police officers
per square mile in New York than there are ATF agents in all of
the State of Arizona, and yet somehow were going to stop the hemorrhaging of arms trafficking going into Mexico with that kind of
paltry set of resources. But that wont be in the headline tomorrow.
Some of the loudest critics of ATF today are also on a bill misnamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Enforcement
Act. What does that bill do? It allows firearms dealers to liquidate
their inventories after having their arms dealer license revoked,
and would decriminalize gun sale recordkeeping violations even if
they contributed to cross-border gun trafficking. How does that
help ATF and its mission? Where is the accountability here in Congress on this subject?
Its easy to beat up on you, its easy to look for a scapegoat when
the agenda really is to make sure that we make it harder, not easier, to enforce gun trafficking. We had testimony from one of your
colleagues before this committee who said theres more regulation
on over-the-counter Sudafed than there is in arms trafficking going
into Mexico. And he testified, and was interrupted in this testimony because it wasnt welcome, that he believed we needed to
toughen enforcement laws as a tool for ATF to be able to fulfill its
mission along the border.
So I have no doubt that we can all pile on, and correctly, criticizing ATF for a botched mission. But what isnt said, and sadly
what the press isnt going to bother to write about, but they should,
is the fact that Congress for 6 long years and maybe longer has
done everything in its power to make sure, in fact, you cant do
your job. And this set of hearings needs to explore that, too.
With that I yield back the balance of my time to the ranking
member.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly follows:]

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Mr. CUMMINGS. There is no currently no Federal statute that
criminalizes firearms trafficking. Instead traffickers are often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922, which prohibits engaging in
firearms business without a license. The need for a Federal firearms trafficking statute was also a common refrain of law enforcement agents interviewed by the committee, as Mr. Connolly said.
They told us that a dedicated firearms trafficking statute would
give them the ability to address patterns of activity by traffickers
who divert firearms from legal to illegal commerce.
Mr. Leadmon, based on your decades in law enforcement, do you
believe a Federal firearms trafficking statute would be helpful in
disrupting the flow of guns to Mexican drug cartels?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir. I have viewed your proposed legislation.
I agreed with it wholeheartedly. One of the things I think that
might be added to that is a little more emphasis on international
trafficking. Maybe we can tighten it up a little bit as far as going
to drug cartels. I, too, think that if you reach a certain amount of
weapons, that can even be a life offense.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas Mr. Farenthold, also a
Member who went to Mexico City.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to take a moment to address something I heard, before I asked the questions, from the other side. They were talking
about how much more difficult it is and how much more regulated
the purchase of Sudafed is. I dont see anywhere in the Constitution where were guaranteed the right to bear Sudafed, but we are
guaranteed the right to bear arms. So I think that is an inappropriate distinction.
Mr. McMahon, when my friend the former prosecutor, the gentleman from South Carolina, asked you what the goal of this was,
you said that it was to bring down a drug kingpin in Mexico. Is
that a fair assessment?
Mr. MCMAHON. Did I say that, sir?
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Im sorry, I guess that was Mr. Newell.
Did you say that, Mr. Newell.
Mr. NEWELL. I believe what I said was the goal of the investigation was to disrupt and dismantle an entire firearms-trafficking
network, yes, sir.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. And so I believe you said a drug kingpin.
Let me ask Mr. Giland to identify some drug kingpins. Let me
ask Mr. Gil, does the Mexican Government know who the drug
kingpins are in Mexico?
Mr. GIL. Sir, they are aware of the heads of the organizations.
To answer your question shortly, yes.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. And so let me go ahead and ask you another
question there, Mr. Gil. In your time working with the Mexican
Government as a former ATF attache in Mexico, did they ever ask
us to do anything like that; you know, you let guns come across the
border so they could track them or find or bring down government
kingor drug kingpins?
Mr. GIL. No, sir.

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Let me go on to Mr. Canino. I want
to applaud your service and your candor with this committee.
Weve heard that were trying to bring down the drug kingpins, or
whatever the words were, as far as stop the trafficking. If you were
put in charge of developing an investigation to do that, how would
you do that? Would your plan involve letting firearms move across
the border, or how would you do it?
Mr. CANINO. To stop a drug kingpin?
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Or if you want to go even more simply with
the firearms, stop the firearms trafficking?
Mr. CANINO. Well, to stop a drug kingpin, I would call DEA because thats what they do, number one. Number two, you work the
traffic investigations paint by the numbers. Its frustrating to be an
ATF agent. That comes with the badge, okay? Trafficking investigations, the laws, like I said, you have to be open-minded, I guess
is the word Im looking for. I dont know if thats the best description.
But like I said, its paint by the numbers. You have to work
its like building a house. You start building a foundation; you work
from the bottom up. In this case nobody got stopped. They didnt
grab somebody and say, okay, hey, were going to roll you. And I
dont want to get into sources and methods, but theres a whole
you know, we have schools on this.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. If you watch a cop show, you know how its
done.
Mr. CANINO. Right.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. You follow the guns, or you arrest them at the
first stop and try to flip them both. Or if you really want to partner
with the Mexican Government, you follow the guns until it crosses
the border and radio across to your colleagues in Mexico, and they
move it up the line there. It seems like common sense to me.
Let me askI want to ask this question to everybody on the
panel, because I think this is really important. Weve seen Operation Fast and Furious. Weve recently heard about Operation
Castaway, a similar program in Florida. Are any of you all aware
at this time of any similar operations going on that allow guns to
flow across the border to friendly countries now? Are you all aware
of those, and if you are, are we doing anything to stop them? And
if you could just come on down the line. Well start with Mr.
McMahon.
Mr. MCMAHON. I am not aware of any case like that of friendly
or unfriendly government, no.
Mr. NEWELL. Neither am I, sir.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Is anybody?
Mr. LEADMON. No.
Mr. CANINO. No, sir. Im unaware of any.
Mr. WALL. No, sir.
Mr. GIL. No, sir.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. And we only found out about this one through
whistleblowers. And my prayer is that if there is anybody watching
this committee hearing, ATF or another agency, that knows of
something going on like this, that they let this committee know
about it. This is one of the most shameful moments, I think, in our

83
governments history when we are letting guns go across the border
to our friends in Mexico.
Let me just ask anotherI only have 32 seconds left. Im going
to stick around for a second round of questioning, so Ill yield back
my remaining 30 seconds.
Chairman ISSA. And Ill pick it up.
Special Agent Newell, what did this program expend in money;
millions of dollars, right?
Mr. NEWELL. The program or the network?
Chairman ISSA. Well, Fast and Furious. Up on this side we think
of it as a program, you think of it as a simple investigation. The
investigation, you spent millions of dollars over the course of 2
years, correct?
Mr. NEWELL. I dont believe it was millions of dollars, sir.
Chairman ISSA. Hundreds of thousands?
Mr. NEWELL. Probably a couple hundred thousand dollars, yes,
sir.
Chairman ISSA. Agents were camped out in some cases for a period of time at a drop location?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. So when you were trying to do the big hit, the
big fix, the big get the roll big guys, why is it that testimony shows
us that only three times were there any kind of detection plants?
And I dont want to get into sources and methods either, but only
three times we have been told that they tried to do any detection,
and one of these, GPS tracking, was a Radio Shack make-it-yourself. Why in the world would the quality and the quantity of agents
and time, video cameras planted with Internet connections, etc.,
why is it there wasnt some tracking to track the weapons?
Mr. NEWELL. We had trackers on vehicles, sir. We had the trackers you mentioned on weapons. But again, it goes to resources. I
mean, its resources. We have agents that are out there working
16-, 18-, 20-hour days.
Chairman ISSA. Unfortunately you have just made my case, and
time has expired. Eighteen hours of an agents time is so much
more money than one of these tracking devices that you were
penny wise and pound foolish by not having sophisticated devices.
With that we go to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia
for her 5 minutes. Ms. Norton.
Ms. NORTON. Well, suppose you had had a tracking device. Then
what would have been the next step?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, maam, it depends on how long the firearms
stayed in the area. For instance, many of thein many of the
transactions here, the firearms never left the Phoenix area, and
trackers, the battery life of a tracker is only good depending on
Ms. NORTON. So if it didnt leave the Phoenix area, what could
you charge this so-called trafficker? This law-abiding citizen who
doesnt have a record, but hes buying many, many guns, what
could you charge him with?
Mr. NEWELL. Theres nothing to charge him with at that point.
We have to prove a violation has existed, has occurred.
Ms. NORTON. I just want to say, to sit in a hearing and hear people beat up on the ATF is very, very interesting to me. You sit in
a Congress where the gun lobby controls the Congress of the

84
United States. On the Republican side of the aisle, theyre totally
controlling; on my side of the aisle, they are virtually controlling.
And the Second Amendment is cited as you try to do your job to
keep guns from essentially bringing down the government of an
ally.
So when it comes to Mexico, let me ask you, what kind of gun
control laws does Mexico have? Any of you know about their gun
control laws? Yes, sir.
Mr. CANINO. Yes, maam, I do.
Ms. NORTON. Yes, sir. Would you speak up?
Mr. CANINO. Civilians could buy nothing greater than a .38-caliber. Anything after that is for the exclusive use of the military and
the police.
Ms. NORTON. So here is Mexico who does its job on its side of
the border. It saysessentially it makes it very difficult for anyone
except someone in law enforcement or the military to get a gun. So
they come to the United States where trafficking is wide open.
Let me ask you this: We are concentrating on Mexico now. Let
me ask you about trafficking to Chicago. Let me ask you about
trafficking to the District of Columbia, to Baltimore. Let me ask
you about trafficking to L.A. Do these same traffickers operate as
effectively in our country as we have now seen them operate taking
guns to Mexico?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, I believe that the organizations are a little
bit different. Thats why I said earlier about weve never encountered an organization like this for Mexico. Trafficking in the United
States, my experience anyway, is a little bit different. Its a little
bit more association-related. But obviously trafficking domestically
is a major issue for us. And I spent the majority of my career working those kind of cases.
Ms. NORTON. If a person, lets say, buys 200 guns, and here you
made mistakes. If I had a dollar for every mistake this Congress
has made when it came to guns, I would be a very rich woman.
You made a mistake. It was a fatal mistake, it was a mistake for
which you are being held accountable. Lets say you hadnt made
a mistake, that someone without a record bought guns. Thats me.
You found me with 200 guns. What could you do to me?
Mr. MCMAHON. Nothing at all, maam.
Ms. NORTON. Did you feel disarmed in your fight against this
wholesale movement of guns from our country to Mexico, or did you
feel you were equipped to, in fact, by law enforcement to do what
was necessary?
Mr. MCMAHON. I think in my experience, ATF agents are very
resilient. You have to be to make the case. And thats what our
people do. And they do that every day, and theyre out there doing
that today.
Ms. NORTON. And they may design tactics to try to make them
to make themselves more effective on the ground?
Mr. MCMAHON. I think thats what we should always be doing,
yes.
Ms. NORTON. Could I ask each of you, would you feel better able
to stop this traffic if the Congress passed a law that made it and
added to our Criminal Code a section that prohibited the transfer
of a gun when an individual knows the gun will be transferred to

85
a person who is prohibited from carrying a gun or intends to actually use the gun illegally?
Mr. MCMAHON. We currently do have a statute that does handle
that. Thats the whole lying on the Federal form violation.
Ms. NORTON. But lying on the Federal form gets you to where?
Mr. MCMAHON. Gets us toif we can prove that someone knowingly filled out that form incorrectly or lied
Ms. NORTON. Can you seize guns? Weve been talking about seizures here. In order to seize guns, what does the ATF have to
show?
Mr. MCMAHON. That a violation of law is committed with that
firearm.
Chairman ISSA. The gentleladys time is expired, but if anyone
else wants to answer the question
Ms. NORTON. Whats the law thats been violated?
Chairman ISSA. If anyone else wants to answer.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that firearm
was somehow used in the violation of afurtherance in violation
of a crime or in violation of a crime. We cant just go out and randomly seize firearms from individuals. Firearm are in themselves
not contraband. If we stop someone on the street with 5 AKs, 10
AKs, 20 AK47s
Ms. NORTON. Or 100 AKs.
Mr. NEWELL [continuing]. Or 100, and theyre not prohibited, as
frustrating as that may be, and believe me it is extremely frustrating, but as frustrating as that may be, we may not have any
legal ability to take thoseto seize those firearms.
Chairman ISSA. Does anyone else want to answer that? Mr. Gil.
Mr. GIL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
In my experience, and as I look around the room here, Ive had
the opportunity to work in pretty much every State of the Union,
and Ive always been able to use the current laws to success in investigations. Whether youre pulling somebody over with 100 AK
47s, I found that ATF special agents are very qualified in interviewing techniques; 99.9 percent of the time well get confessions
from those individuals, well take those guns. And if not that case,
then we would at least end up getting an abandonment from them
for those weapons so they dont hit the streets.
So there are other avenues to approach versusthat we could
use under the current laws.
Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
We now go to the most qualified person on the committee to ask
questions, the gentleman from Pennsylvania Mr. Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent, youre a trained special agent for ATF. Are you
trained in the issue of walking guns?
Mr. CANINO. No, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. With regard to walking guns, when you are in
training, what do you know aboutwhat does ATF tell you about
walking guns?
Mr. CANINO. You dont walk guns. Sir, I teach at the ATF National Academy, I teach at our first-line supervisor school, I teach
at our command-and-control school for GS15s and above.

86
Mr. MEEHAN. Are you aware of anybody who has been disciplined
for walking a gun in ATF?
Mr. CANINO. No, sir. But Darren was talking to me last night
and put it in perspective. If youre an ATF agent, and you lose your
gun, its 3 days, no questions asked, up to termination on the circumstance if you lose your gun.
Mr. MEEHAN. If you lose your gun.
Mr. CANINO. If it was your gun, its 3 days.
Mr. MEEHAN. What do you define as walking a gun?
Mr. CANINO. What exactly happened in this case.
Mr. MEEHAN. In your words what do you think walking a gun
is?
Mr. CANINO. Walking a gun is when you have custody and control of that firearm, and you let it get in the hands of a suspect,
and you dont interdict that suspect. In this case we had cooperators at the gun stores, so theyre acting as agents of the government. So it doesnt matter if those guns came out of an ATF prop
vault or
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
Agent Newell, is that what you meant when you said that if ATF
puts evidence into the hands of the gunor into the hands of a
suspect, theres a distinction somehow between a straw purchaser
getting it or ATF putting it? Please explain to me what you talk
what you meant by the distinction of ATF putting it in the hands
of a suspect.
Mr. NEWELL. The distinction for me, Congressman, is that its
ATF actually putting evidence or some sort of prop firearm in the
hands of a suspect.
Mr. MEEHAN. So thats a distinction from a straw purchaser who
goes and under your observation?
Mr. NEWELL. In that aspect, yes, sir, it is.
Mr. MEEHAN. So youre suggesting here that the distinction is because you did not put the handthe gun in the hands of the purchaser here, that somehow theres a distinction from allowing a
gun to walk?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, Congressman, I disagree with something Mr.
Canino just said regarding the fact that the FFLs were acting as
agents of the government. My recollection of this case, two FFLs
in particular were clearly instructed as to follow the letter of the
law, to abide by the rules and regulations.
Mr. MEEHAN. Lets move on because thats a distinction. The
strategy. You were asked a specific question who defined the strategy for Fast and Furious?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, a case like Fast and Furious goes through
several levels of approval, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. Who originated the strategy for Fast and Furious?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe it was at the street level.
Mr. MEEHAN. Tell me who the person is who created the strategy
for Fast and Furious? You are the special agent in charge of your
area. It emanated from your district.
Mr. NEWELL. Right.
Mr. MEEHAN. Who originated the concept for Fast and Furious?

87
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, its not one person who did that, it was a group
of individuals who looked at the set of facts in this case and determined that this was the best strategy to follow to take
Mr. MEEHAN. Where did it start? Where does the stream start?
Mr. NEWELL. It starts
Mr. MEEHAN. Tell me who participated in that conclusion.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, its several individuals. It was a group supervisor, assistant special agent in charge, myself and individuals in
headquarters.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. So there were a number of people who were
very learned in this process. Now, you testified here today earlier
no part in the strategy to allow guns to be taken to Mexico. It was
no part in the strategy to allow guns to be taken to Mexico; is that
right?
Mr. NEWELL. To knowingly allow guns to go to Mexico, yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. To knowingly allow guns to go to Mexico.
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, in this case we did everything. We had seizures
in this case. When we had evidence
Mr. MEEHAN. I asked you a specific question. I said that there
was no part in the strategy to allow guns to go to Mexico; is that
accurate?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. Would Mr. McMahon have participated in any way
in the development of this policy or this the Fast and Furious strategy?
Mr. NEWELL. I know he was aware of it, yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. He was aware of it.
Mr. McMahon, you testified a plaza boss. He has $70,000, he
wants $70,000 worth of guns. Whats a plaza boss?
Mr. MCMAHON. Its someone who controls an area for a cartel.
Mr. MEEHAN. And where is that plaza boss?
Mr. MCMAHON. In Mexico.
Mr. MEEHAN. So you testified that part of the theory here, your
words, is the plaza boss expects $70,000 worth of weapons.
Mr. MCMAHON. Correct.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Newell, the strategy Mr. McMahon identifies
that you expect, you understand that he expects $70,000 worth of
weapons, where does that get in that there was no part in the
strategy to allow guns to be taken to Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. We stillduring the beginning parts of
this case, we did not know who the plaza boss was. We didnt know
who
Mr. MEEHAN. Thats not my question about who the plaza boss
was. The question is is there a plaza boss? Agent McMahon just
said hes in Mexico.
Mr. NEWELL. Right.
Mr. MEEHAN. And the plaza boss expects $70,000 worth of guns.
Now youre saying no part of this strategy was allow the guns to
go into Mexico. Who is right here?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, the strategy wasnt to allow guns to go to Mexico.
Mr. MEEHAN. But what did Agent McMahon just say? This was
an OCDETF case.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.

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Mr. MEEHAN. Who else participated in this, in the form of this
going up the chain
Chairman ISSA. I ask unanimous consent the gentleman be allowed to have another 30 seconds.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.
Was this an OCDETF case?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. That implies that at a certain point in time,
it moves beyond your agency; does it not?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. What does that mean with regard to OCDETF?
What kind of other participants were there as part of OCDETF?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, there are other agencies who are involved in
this.
Mr. MEEHAN. Other agencies. What other agencies were involved
in this?
Mr. NEWELL. In this investigation, they were full partners in this
case, was the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, now known
as Homeland Security Investigations; we had Internal Revenue
Service; and we had assistance to some level from DEA.
Mr. MEEHAN. So are you saying DEA, IRS and ICE all knew
about this program to participate in the OCDETF?
Mr. NEWELL. They participated in the investigation, yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. In the investigation. Were they aware that guns
were being walked to Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, again, Im assuming that theyI mean, I know
they would know of the strategy.
Mr. MEEHAN. They were aware of the strategy?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. Which included what Special Agent McMahon
talked about, allowing $70,000 worth of guns to go to the plaza
boss?
Mr. MCMAHON. Sir, I never said that we were allowing $70,000
worth of guns to go on.
Mr. MEEHAN. You said it was the expectation.
Mr. MCMAHON. I was giving a scenario of how it works. Theres
a plaza boss in Mexico thats requiring $70,000 worth of guns. So
if hes not getting it from the network were investigating, hes getting it from somewhere else. It wasntthe $70,000 example I gave
you wasnt specific to this investigation, it was an over-real generalization of how trafficking to Mexico works.
Mr. MEEHAN. But were talking about plaza bosses, were talking
about plaza bosses in Mexico.
Chairman ISSA. The gentlemans time has expired. We are going
to have a second round in just a moment.
The gentlelady from New York Ms. Buerkle.
Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Im uncertain as to where to start here because of what Ive
heard. I think that Ill start with Mr. Canino.
Mr. Canino, your comments were that its inconceivable to let
guns go, its not the way the ATF does things. So in your experience is what happened in Operation Fast and Furious an aberration from the usual way that ATF does business?

89
Mr. CANINO. This is the first time Ive ever heard of anything
like this in 20I start my 22nd year on Friday. This is the first
time Ive heard anything like this.
Ms. BUERKLE. And during the course of this operation, were you
advised that there was going to beat one point did you become
aware that there was going to be a different method of operation?
Mr. CANINO. Maam, I need to put this in context. I didntthe
first time I ever heard of someone accusing ATF agents of actually
watching suspected gun traffickers just drive away was when Special Agent Dodson was on CBS. I hadand I didnt believe them,
and I was very vocal about that. I didnt become aware until it
started coming out little by little, talking to fellow agents. And
then mid-April I saw some documents, and that convinced me that
what Special Agent Dodson was alleging was, in fact, correct.
Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you.
And the other special agents that are here, Mr. Gil, Mr. Wall,
Mr. Leadmon, in your experience is this the first time youve ever
seen ATF operate this way?
Mr. GIL. Again, I recently retired. And aftergoing on 23-plus
years. Its inconceivable. And again, I didnt believe it even after
seeing Mr. Dodson as well. And I still didnt believe it until after
I talked with Mr. Dodson and others that then I became convinced
that perhaps ATF did walk these weapons.
Ms. BUERKLE. And Mr. Wall.
Mr. WALL. As I stated in my opening remarks, yes, its the first
time I have ever seen it. And I was very skeptical. I didnt believe
Mr. Dodson at all.
Ms. BUERKLE. And Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. LEADMON. Maam, part of my duties and functions is to look
at the southwest border cases, all of them, and this is the first one
Ive seen.
I would like to add something that the panel was asking earlier.
You asked when we first became aware that Mr. Acosta, right, was
involved as the leader of the straw purchasing ring and some of the
other issues as to Mr. Patino. That was in 2009, and it was early
on. I briefed it to my senior directors January 2010. And we know
this, and one of the driving forces behind how we know that these
were going to Mexico and there were Mexico people involved is because our other law enforcement partners provided us with information, specific information, that allowed us to know exactly what
was going on and to what cartel it was going to. This was not a
mystery. We knew this in December 2009. I briefed it in 2010, January.
Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, sir.
So, Special Agent Newell and Special Agent McMahon, well get
to you because youre his supervisor. So at some point, based on the
IGs report and DOJ, they said, were going to try something different here. Im assuming, because thats the way things work in
government, and maybe Im wrong, that someone said, we need to
have this operation, and were going to make a determination that
for the first time ATF is going to conduct business this way, were
going to let these guns walk. Now, maybe he didnt say it, but in
essence thats really what happened, because this is a different way
of conducting business with ATF.

90
Where would that plan have come from? Somebodyand I know
you said you sat down with this group, Mr. Newell, but somebody
higher up than you made a determination that for the first time
ATF was going to run this. Weve heard from this panel, weve
heard from the panel prior to today that this is a complete aberration from the way ATF has done business. Where would that have
come from?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, maam, in putting a strategy together for this
case, the strategy came from several places. The Department of
Justice issued originally in a draft in 2009, October 2009, and January 2010 about how to combat southwest border drug trafficking
by Mexican drug cartels, and one of them dealt with firearms trafficking, which said through use of the OCDETF colocated strike
forces, mere interdiction is not the answer; you have to go after the
structure of the organization of thewhatever it be, firearms,
human, drug-trafficking organization to make the biggest impact.
Ms. BUERKLE. Okay. And who would that memo have come from?
Mr. NEWELL. I do believe that memo came down from the Deputy
Attorney Generals Office.
Ms. BUERKLE. And thenso this is now were going to change
strategy. This is going to be a different way to conduct an operation. So you get your directive from them. And then these groups
that you talked about, you sat down and you came up with a plan,
or did that plan come from up on high?
Mr. NEWELL. The plan figured intoor the memo figured into
how we were going to address this. When we first looked at it in
November 2009, it was already a very active, prolific firearms-trafficking organization, as Mr. McMahon testified. In my 23 years we
have never seen an organization that was this prolific in buying
firearms in such a short period of time. So we felt that at that
time, in conjunction with the OCDETF Strike Force where this
Group VII was located, that the best way to attack this organization was through the use of a multiagency, conspiratorial-type investigation would dismantle the whole organization.
Chairman ISSA. The gentleladys time is expired.
We now go to the gentleman from Michigan Mr. Amash.
Mr. AMASH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Im going to yield my
time to Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Leadmon, for those who are perhaps watching and not familiar with the full panoply of investigative techniques, surveillance is
a tried and true investigative technique, correct?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. What about consensual encounters where you just
do a knock and talk, where you walk up to somebody and ask
them? Theres a reason Dostoevsky wrote Crime and Punishment,
theres a reason Edgar Allen Poe wrote The Tell-Tale Heart. Sometimes people confess, dont they?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir. Theres several tools in the toolbox, especially when youre faced with the fact that we know that these
weapons are going to be used in such carnage down in Mexico and
the United States. We should have pulled every tool out of that
toolbox, not just to make our case. Our case should not have been
the priority here. The stopping the flow of those firearms should

91
have been the number one priority. And we should have reached
into that toolbox, we should have conducted interviews, or we
should have done interviews to surrounding people. We should
have tracked these weapons better. We should have followed everything by the letter to stop them. I mean, just where do we stop
with the number of guns; 1, 5, 10?
Mr. GOWDY. Have you ever heard tell of a law enforcement officer stopping someone for speeding when really they may have had
another purpose in mind?
Mr. LEADMON. I have heard that
Mr. GOWDY. It happens from time to time, doesnt it? Crossing
the yellow line?
Mr. LEADMON. Sooner or later you are going to make a mistake.
Mr. GOWDY. Exactly. And when you do a lawful, nonpretextual
car stop, it also opens up a full panoply of other search options,
right, like searching the vehicle or a pat-down?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes.
Mr. GOWDY. How about a proffer? Is that in your toolbox to go
to a U.S. attorney and say, I would like to proffer this person, I
would like to send them a grand jury subpoena?
Mr. LEADMON. Correct.
Mr. GOWDY. Its the same way you conduct every other investigation other than this one, right?
Mr. LEADMON. Correct.
Mr. GOWDY. From shoplifting to murder, we do them all the
same way except this one?
Mr. LEADMON. Correct.
Mr. GOWDY. Special Agent Newell, I happen to think this was illconceived from its inception. You have testified repeatedly that the
purpose was to destroy and dismantle drug cartels. So Im going to
ask you again, how would this ever have succeeded? What was
your purpose? How would we have known, hey, this was a great
investigation, it succeeded?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, you said to disrupt a dug cartel. The purpose
of this investigation was to disrupt and dismantle a firearms-trafficking organization that was feeding firearms
Mr. GOWDY. In Mexico.
Mr. NEWELL. In the United States. A firearms trafficking organization in the United States. Not only the straw purchasers; the
middlemen, the transporters, the financiers.
Mr. GOWDY. Well, then, when the guns were going into Mexico,
you should have known that this was an abject failure, because
thats not what you wanted, right?
Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely. We didnt want any guns.
Mr. GOWDY. So when you found out the first gun went into Mexico, why did you not abort the investigation?
Mr. NEWELL. Because we were still putting the facts together to
be able to convict all
Mr. GOWDY. When is the very first time you knew or should have
known that firearms were going to Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, I believe it was when I got thewhen we got
the first traces, I was advised of the first traces, which I believe
was November 2009.
Mr. GOWDY. 2009. And when did you abort the investigation?

92
Mr. NEWELL. The investigation is ongoing, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Right. Thats my point. So you knew the weapons
were going to Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Right.
Mr. GOWDY. Were you at some point going to let Special Agent
Canino know about it?
Mr. NEWELL. Mr. Canino knew about the investigation.
Mr. GOWDY. He knew that weapons were going into Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, absolutely, yes.
Mr. GOWDY. When were you going to let your Mexican counterparts know about it?
Mr. NEWELL. Im assuming they knew that firearmsbecause I
haveyou know, sir, one of the issues about that is theres only
one field division in this country, only one, that has a PGR representative in it. Thats the Mexican Department of Justice. In all
my years of working with MexicoI spent 4 years in Bogota, Colombia, representing ATF in South America. I am very, very, very
key on the fact that we need to share information with our foreign
law enforcement partners.
Mr. GOWDY. Well, you testified earlier that you were going to
turn the information over to Mexican prosecutors and let them
prosecute. Because I asked you were you also going to allow U.S.
law enforcement officers to be extradited to Mexico for breaking
their law, and you said no. So my question to you is this: How in
the world are you going to get our brothers and sisters in law enforcement to trustwhy would you trust the prosecution if you
dont trust them during the investigation?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, to answer your question about the drug cartel,
the kingpin, orin your words, the kingpin that were going to get
the guns in Mexico, we did not have information until late in this
case, an ongoing part of this case, who that individual was. And I
invited with Mr. Canino, we invited in December 2010, as well as
in January, Mexican prosecutors to come in. And I dont think
thats ever been done before. And Im the one that requested it.
Mr. GOWDY. Did you debrief them on Fast and Furious?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. GOWDY. Did you tell them the guns were going into Mexico?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, yes.
Mr. GOWDY. You told them when?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, my PGR representative that I have in my office who has been there for 2 years knew about this case, not in
specifics.
Mr. GOWDY. When the first gun showed up in Mexico that you
knew was from Phoenix, the first one that was connected to this
showed up in Mexico, did you go interview the straw purchaser?
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir, we did not.
Mr. GOWDY. Why not?
Mr. NEWELL. Because, again, our strategy was that we, knowing
from years of experience, you take off one straw purchaser, youre
not having an effect on the greater organization, which is at that
pointin November 2009 you have to realize it wasnt
Mr. GOWDY. Have you ever flipped a cooperating witness before?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, I have.

93
Mr. GOWDY. How do you do it without asking them? How do you
do it without interviewing him?
Mr. NEWELL. It depends on what your goals in investigation are.
Mr. GOWDY. Your goal is to bring down an organization. Its very
compelling testimony to have someone from within the organization
testify against his comrades, right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. So why didnt you gowhy didnt you approach him?
Mr. NEWELL. Approach who, sir, the one straw purchaser?
Mr. GOWDY. Yes, the straw purchaser.
Mr. NEWELL. Again, the goal, sir, in this case was to take out the
whole organization. We felt that by just trying to flip one straw
purchaser, if he, in fact, did flip, it would not affect the overall
goal.
Chairman ISSA. The gentlemans time is expired. Well have a
second round.
We now go to the gentleman from Idaho Mr. Labrador.
Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Canino, I just think I just heard Special Agent
Newell say that you knew about this gun walking. Can you
please
Mr. CANINO. Yes, sir. I want to make it perfectly clear to you,
the American people, the Mexican Government, my family, my
friends, at no time ever did I know that ATF agents were following
known suspected gun traffickers, one of which bought 700 guns,
and we knew about his guns showing up in Mexico 6 weeks after
we opened up that investigationnever, ever would I imagine that
we were letting that happen. We have 4,000 investigations, plus or
minus, with a Mexico-U.S. nexus. There are guns coming in. Thats
trafficking, that guns are coming into Mexico. I had no clue that
we were allowing these guys to operate like this.
Like Mr. Gowdy said, there was no interdiction to start any case.
You have toyou have a toolbox. We have classes. Jose Wall teaches those trafficking classes. Ive been to them. Its like building a
house. You start from the bottom, and you try to work your way
up, you know. At one point youre only going to reach so far. And
then you come in and you have a meeting and you say, okay, how
can we advance this? You meet with the U.S. attorney. From what
I see here, none of this was done, or if it was, it wasnt very effective.
Mr. LABRADOR. So when did you first realize that the gun-walking allegations were true?
Mr. CANINO. April.
Mr. LABRADOR. Of this year?
Mr. CANINO. Yes. AprilI mean, I was starting to lean that way,
and then I was at ATF bureau headquarters in April for a meeting,
and I sat down with Mr. Leadmon, and he convinced me.
Mr. LABRADOR. Did you come across any specific evidence to
prove that ATF had taken part in these actions?
Mr. CANINO. One more time. Sorry.
Mr. LABRADOR. Did you come across any specific evidence to
prove that ATF had taken part in these actions?

94
Mr. CANINO. Well, from the totality of the circumstances, and
then speaking with different agents and speaking with Mr.
Leadmon, yeah. And, you know, the guns showing up in Mexico.
Mr. LABRADOR. Did you review any documents or anything?
Mr. CANINO. You know, sir, when I visited Mr. Leadmon, I saw
I took a look at the management log, and if I read it correctly,
there are three instances in the first two pages where we walk
away from guns. At that point I was so disgusted, I didnt even
want to look at the case file anymore.
Mr. LABRADOR. And when was that?
Mr. CANINO. That was in mid-April or so of this year.
Mr. LABRADOR. Why were you so upset with this information?
Mr. CANINO. Because it goes against everything were taught. I
mean, like I was explaining earlier, you dont do that. Were not
taught to do that from the first day we walk into the academy all
the way until you leave this job, like Darren said. Its not a recognized investigative technique. This is not a special case, this is just
a trafficking case that we do. This is what we do, you know,
amongst other things. But trafficking is what we do, especially on
the southwest border. This wasthis wasnt a one of, this wasnt
a who done it. This was, you knowthis was a ground ball.
Mr. LABRADOR. Just a basic case?
Mr. CANINO. Yeah.
Mr. LABRADOR. What you do every day?
Mr. CANINO. Exactly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Special Agent Newell, do you know who Kevin
OReilly is?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. LABRADOR. Whats the nature of your relationship with him?
Mr. NEWELL. Ive known Kevin for, I would say, probably 10 or
12 years.
Mr. LABRADOR. How often do you communicate with him?
Mr. NEWELL. I havent communicated with him in a while, but
probably three or four times a year, something like that, or maybe
more depending on him reaching out to me.
Mr. LABRADOR. Isnt it a little bit unusual for a special agent in
charge of an ATF field division to have direct email contact with
the national security staff at the White House?
Mr. NEWELL. Hes a friend of mine.
Mr. LABRADOR. How many times did you talk to him about this
case?
Mr. NEWELL. The specifics of this case? I dont think II dont
think I had one specific conversation with him about the specifics
of this case.
Mr. LABRADOR. Who
Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman allow me to help him a little? Not that you need it. But could you take the word specific
out and answer the general, did you talk to him about this case?
Mr. NEWELL. I might have talked to him about this case, yes, sir.
Mr. LABRADOR. Do you know when that was?
Mr. NEWELL. I was probablyas I recall, I think it was during
the summer. It might have been the summer or early fall of 2010.
Mr. LABRADOR. So, Special Agent McMahon, you took responsibility this morning here for the actions of the agency, and I appre-

95
ciate that. Who at the highest levelsI cant imagine that this is
something that you decided to do on your own. Who did you communicate with at the highest levels about this case?
Mr. MCMAHON. I communicated to my chain of command within
ATF. We were all very much made aware of this investigation and
what was going on.
Mr. LABRADOR. And who was aware atwho was aware that this
investigation was occurring and that guns were being walked to
Mexico?
Chairman ISSA. You can answer that question. The time has expired, but go ahead.
Mr. MCMAHON. I mean, no one was aware that guns were walking at my level or above me. And again, were getting caught up
in this whole definition of walking. But even given whatever the
definitions are, no one from my level up knew of any gun walking.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Florida Mr. Ross for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McMahon, I had an opportunity to read your opening statement. I apologize, I have been in and out of here.
First of all, appreciate your service. And I understand your remorse with what is going on here. I have to talk to you a little bit
about your interview that you had, your transcribed interview. And
I would like to review some of that with you.
In fact, if I could get slide six brought up. This is a transcript
of your interview that you had for the committee when you were
asked whether you read the wiretap applications for the Fast and
Furious. And you responded, No, I did not. Do you recall that
question and that answer?
Mr. MCMAHON. I do.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. Then you were asked if it was your job to sign
off on the wiretap applications, you stated, No, I never signed off
on a memo for a wiretap application.
Mr. MCMAHON. That is correct.
Mr. ROSS. That was your statement, and it is still today?
Mr. MCMAHON. Yes, it is.
Mr. ROSS. Slide seven. Could we see slide seven? Okay.
This is a memorandum dated February 5, 2005, addressed to you
from the group supervisor of Phoenix Group VII. And the first line
states, This memorandum serves to request authorization to initiate a Title III cellular telephone intercept. It is addressed to you.
Do you recall that memorandum?
Mr. MCMAHON. I recall seeing it just recently, yes.
Mr. ROSS. Just recently? You dont recall seeing it before?
Mr. MCMAHON. I do not.
Mr. ROSS. At all.
Mr. MCMAHON. I do not.
Mr. ROSS. Okay.
Slide eight. If we could get slide eight up there.
And this is an email from William Newell to you on February 5,
2010. Attached to this email was an emailwas a memo that we
just saw in the past slide. And the email states that attached to
the coverup memo requesting authorization to conduct a T-III

96
intercept on the main suspect of the OCDETF Strike Force firearms trafficking case out of the Phoenix entitled, The Fast and
Furious. I am FedExing that to you. Do you recall receiving that
email?
Mr. MCMAHON. I dont recall, but I mean, I obviously received
that email, yes.
Mr. ROSS. Okay.
Mr. MCMAHON. I dont specifically recall receiving this email, no.
Mr. ROSS. Do you recall seeing the attachment that was attached
to it?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, I do not. And I think our email records show
they werent able to scan the attachment because it was so large,
and they said they were going to FedEx it.
Mr. ROSS. Who said that to you?
Mr. MCMAHON. I think it says it here in this email.
Mr. ROSS. Told you it was too large?
Mr. MCMAHON. That is what I read here. It says, I could not
scan the actual affidavit due to its size, so I am FedExing it. So
scanning it would mean attach it to this email.
Mr. ROSS. Now, this is a request for a wiretap. Yeah. This is a
request for a wiretap that is attached to the email.
Mr. MCMAHON. A wiretap is actually an affidavit that is prepared at the U.S. Attorneys office.
Mr. ROSS. Okay.
So lets go to slide nine then. Okay. This is an affidavit prepared
by Special Agent Hope MacAllister in support of an application for
authorization to intercept wire communications. It is attached for
your review.
Now, the signature block is for Mark R. Chait, but there is someone elses signature there. Do you recognize that signature?
Mr. MCMAHON. I do.
Mr. ROSS. Whose signature is that?
Mr. MCMAHON. That is my signature.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. So you were aware of this request for a wiretap.
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. And having seen these documents now, is there
anything youwould you like to clarify any of your testimony or
your interview at all?
Mr. MCMAHON. Not at all, no. I know that we forwarded the application for the wiretap through the legal counsel process to get
their approval before it went back to the Phoenix U.S. Attorneys
office and then on to the OEO in Main Justice.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. But you just testified just minutes ago that you
werentdont recall ever requesting authorization for the T-III
intercept.
Mr. MCMAHON. No, I said that I never recall receiving this request. I did get the actual application for the wiremany wiretaps,
and then they were forwarded on.
Mr. ROSS. And this is one of those requests for the wiretap that
you authorized, the affidavit.
Mr. MCMAHON. The last slide that you put up that had my signature for Mark Chait
Mr. ROSS. Yes.

97
Mr. MCMAHON [continuing]. That would transmit the actual application for wiretap, yes.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. Now, in your interview, were you asked about
this?
Mr. MCMAHON. Not this specifically, no.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. Did you volunteer it?
Mr. MCMAHON. Not that I recall, no.
Mr. ROSS. Okay. Any reason why not?
Mr. MCMAHON. I am trying to figure out what I need to volunteer. I think I did tell the staff when I was interviewed that I dont
recallI did recall receiving applications.
Mr. ROSS. You downplayed to Mr. Kumar your knowledge about
any of this.
Mr. MCMAHON. I downplayed to Mr. Kumar my knowledge about
this?
Mr. ROSS. Yes. Didnt you?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, that is not correct. I told Dan Kumar everything I knew about this case.
Mr. ROSS. When was that? In March 2010?
Mr. MCMAHON. It was throughout this investigation. I think Dan
sat in on some of the briefings. We discussed it.
Mr. ROSS. I see my time has expired.
Chairman ISSA. I ask the gentleman have an additional 30 seconds.
Would the gentleman yield that 30 seconds?
Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. So if I am to understand, just as a lay person,
I am one of the nonlawyers up here, so that is why I introduced
the qualified people early on. But as a lay person, it looks to me
like you had an intimate part in the wiretap request. Your signature was part of a request process. And yet when we asked you
about your being involved in them, you did not volunteer to tell us
about this part. You simply relied on you didnt actually sign the
affidavit. Is that what you are saying? The truth was you didnt
sign the affidavit, even though you signed this document and saw
other documents and were sent other documents that you may not
remember?
Mr. MCMAHON. I signed this document that transmitted the application for the wiretap to our counsels office for them to review.
Chairman ISSA. But you never looked at it?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, I did not. Again, I think I said earlier on
mistakes were made. And one of the first questions you asked me,
sir, is what mistakes. And that mistake is not doing a thorough
enough review of the documents that were coming across my desk.
I accept full responsibility for that.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
Would the gentlelady from New York like to have a round of
questions?
Mrs. MALONEY. First of all
Chairman ISSA. The gentlelady is recognized.
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much.
And I thank you and the ranking member for holding this hearing, and all of you for your service to our country. We appreciate
it.

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We have had a series of hearings. I regret I was also in a hearing
that we are having in Financial Services that I am ranking member on it, so I had to be there. So I wasnt here for most of it. But
Mr. Cummings is going to brief me completely on everything that
happened.
But in one of our prior hearings, we had Special Agents that basically testified that the enforcement was not strong enough, that
that was one of the problems on the border, that there wasnt an
express law against trafficking in guns. And that a lot of times the
penalties were, to use the terms of one of the agents, he called
them toothless, that you really couldnt do anything with it.
And they said that the penalties, even in trafficking guns and
very serious offenses, and straw purchases and all kinds of things,
really ended up in nothing more than probation. So, therefore, they
didnt even feel like pursuing convictions because the penalties
were so lax. And it was inadequate either to deter illegal purchases, and it wasnt strong enough to encourage the cooperation
of suspects when they were cooperating. They had to have stronger
laws.
So I put in a bill with other members of this committee to make
trafficking in guns a Federal crime. And I would like to ask Special
Agent McMahon and Newell whether or not you think this would
help in combating violence, drug trafficking, illegal gun trafficking
at the border.
Mr. MCMAHON. Currently, obviously, we have some laws that are
in place that we are using and we are enforcing to the best of our
ability. I think any extra tool is going to be helpful to us. I think
when it gets more specific, as I think some of the legislation that
has been presented would be more specific, would make things obviously easier.
Mrs. MALONEY. Do you think it would disrupt the flow of guns
on the border? Do you think it would help in that way?
Mr. MCMAHON. I think a tool like that would help, yes.
Mrs. MALONEY. And Newell, would you also like to testify on it?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, maam, I believe, as a matter of fact, the Congressional Research Service in July 2009 published a report which
said, I believe the title of it was Gun Trafficking in the Southwest
Border. And in there, they talked about the need for a specific
statute to address the trafficking of firearms by a group of individuals that would aid law enforcement, a statute that would aid law
enforcement in being able to address the specific activity that is
currently not illegal. So any tool that we would have to assist us
in that obviously would be welcome.
Mrs. MALONEY. Does everyone else on the panel agree? If you
disagree, would you like to express why? Does everyone agree that
this would be a tool that would be helpful or
Mr. GIL. I would somewhat disagree.
As I stated earlier, I think the lying and buying, the straw purchase is by definition itself, you are buying a weapon or purchasing
a weapon or obtaining a weapon for transfer to some other third
party in and of itself is trafficking. We have some personnel that
give outstanding trafficking courses throughout my career, certainly in the last few years. And we provided this training to State
and locals, as well as to our Federal partners. And lying and buy-

99
ing, straw purchasing is of itself is trafficking. And that is what we
promoted during these sessions.
Now, I would agree with you that, by definition, a straw purchaser has no criminal history. Therefore, we would have to increase the penalty for those folks that are actually making the initial purchase.
Mrs. MALONEY. That is what the bill does. And I think oftentimes I listen to the people that are in the combat, that are on the
streets trying to get the job done, which is our Special Agents. And
in several panels, including today, they have said that a strong
anti-gun-trafficking bill would help them do their jobs. So I think
we should listen to them.
One of the testimonies in our last hearing, one of the agents said
that they were military-type weapons, that it wasntno one wants
to inhibit a hunter for getting a gun to go hunting with or someone
to protect themselves. But these were really the type of weapons,
like AK47s, that are used in military combat. And they were
training and trading in these very deadly, deadly guns. And I understand even the protective equipment has to be reinforced for
military-type guns.
And the rule that was put in place to report on rifles that are
beinglong guns that are being sold was also, they testified, very
helpful. And I would like to hear what your view is from the front
lines, Mr. Newell and Mr. McMahon.
Mr. MCMAHON. We were asked that question earlier. We all
agreed that the demand letter reporting the multiple sale of those
rifles would be helpful for us, yes.
Mrs. MALONEY. Is there any other tool that this Congress could
give you that would help you save lives? We are all for the Second
Amendment for a lawful person to own a gun. But for a criminal
and a drug cartel to have easy access, I think the number was
40,000 deaths last year.
Chairman ISSA. The gentleladys time has expired. Is there a
question?
Mrs. MALONEY. Yes. I just want to know if there are other tools
we could give you that would help you combat on the front lines
the illegal sale of guns that is leading to the violence on the border.
Mr. MCMAHON. I have testified before Congress a number of
times. And it is not my place to ask. I know ATF will do whatever
we can with the resources and the laws that Congress provides us.
Mrs. MALONEY. Any others?
Chairman ISSA. With that, we now go to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan.
And this is a second round, folks.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Newell, I am certainly struggling to find out who knew
what, when, in the form of the not only formulation of this process,
but the approvals as well. So it is my understanding that this was
conceptualized in November 20, 2009. Is that correct? Fast and Furious?
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir. The investigation first began in November
2009 under the name of Jacob Chambers, who at that time was
identified as one of the more prolific straw purchasers. As the case
progressed, and I will say that in November, about mid-November

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2009, when the Special Agents started looking into what appeared,
obviously, to be some connected activity in terms of straw purchases, she did a phenomenal job in putting a bunch of pieces to
the puzzle together, if you will, and noticed that one individual by
the name of Jacob Chambers seemed to be at that time one of the
more prolific straw purchasers.
At that time, I think when she put all the pieces together, she
knew at that time it was something like 350 guns that had been
purchased by this group. As the case progressed through December
and then early January, we were working out of the OCDETF
strike force, I think she realized
Mr. MEEHAN. When did you begin the process of having this be
an OCDETF strike force case?
Mr. NEWELL. In mid-January, yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. In mid-January 2010?
Mr. NEWELL. We submitted it as an OCDETF proposal in January 2010, yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay, 2010. Okay.
Mr. Leadmon, am I correct from your testimony, I just heard you
make a comment with respect to you are an intelligence analyst,
among other things. Isnt that correct? One of the things that you
do is try to take a global perspective on how guns may be moving
in the United States and Mexico and anywhere?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. So part of this is to follow the flow of guns.
Your testimony was that within 6 weeks of the beginning of this,
other law enforcementyeah, other law enforcement providers provided us with information in December 2009, because you were
concerned about guns that were in Mexico being found in Mexico.
So, in essence, December 2009, prior to really the beginning of
Fast and Furious, you as the analyst are already identifying for
people that guns are being trafficked into Mexico that you are concerned are coming from Phoenix.
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir. Let me kind of explain that a little bit
and bring things in perspective. In November 20, 2009, there was
an interdiction by the Mexican authorities in which there was approximately 41, 42 weapons, firearms recovered. The information
we got through the assistance of ICE and so forth down there, they
covered the interviews
Mr. MEEHAN. Was this in November 2009, 42 guns were seized?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. So 42 guns were seized in Mexico.
Mr. LEADMON. Correct.
Mr. MEEHAN. And you are just beginning this OCDETF in January, which means you are moving up the chain and getting approvals from other people beyond you, Special Agent Newell, beyond
you, Mr. McMahon. You are getting approvals to pursue this. You
know 40 guns have already left Phoenix and gone into Mexico at
that point in time. Mr. Newell.
Mr. NEWELL. You are correct.
Mr. MEEHAN. I am correct that in January, when you begin this,
you were aware that those guns were trafficked from Phoenix into
Mexico.

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Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. To be clear on that seizure, I believe Mr.
Leadmon has better information. I think it was seven of those guns
were Fast and Furious guns.
Mr. LEADMON. Thirty-seven.
Mr. NEWELL. Thirty-seven of those guns were Fast and Furious
guns. And we did submit in mid-January, for OCDETF approval,
of the Fast and Furious plan.
Mr. MEEHAN. What was the plan then? Because you knew at this
point in timebefore you testified that there was no part of any
plan that guns would be known to be going to Mexico. Now you are
telling me that you are part of bringing in OCDETF because now
you have confirmed that guns are going to Mexico and things are
going well. So, at some point in time, I am trying to get clear when
it was that you are now participating in helping to get authority
from up higher for a broader investigation. OCDETF, as you said,
is multiple agencies that are participating in this.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, like I said, in mid-January 2010, we submitted for OCDETF approval the investigation, which eventually
was approved by the Southwest Region OCDETF Office in Houston, I believe, the first week of February.
Mr. MEEHAN. You testified before OCDETF, right here today, including in this OCDETF from DOJ, the Deputy Attorney General.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. Those are your words. At what point in time are
you aware that the Deputy Attorney General became aware of any
aspect of this investigation?
Mr. NEWELL. I am not aware at what time he became aware, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. When do you believe that he became aware?
Mr. NEWELL. I am not sure. I believe it was earlier this year, but
I am not sure.
Mr. MEEHAN. But you stated that OCDETF from the beginning,
these are your words, as this was being conceived, this is your testimony today, it was not justI asked you where this came from.
Mr. NEWELL. Right.
Mr. MEEHAN. And then in your subsequent testimony, you identified that this is from DOJ, the Deputy Attorney General. This is
the conception phase, Mr. Newell, the conception phase. Your
words. The Deputy Attorney General. So when did he know it?
What did he know?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, what I mentioned about the Deputy Attorney
General was that, in October 2009, a draft, and then eventually,
in January 2010, a formalized strategy on the DOJ strategy to combat Southwest border violence, drugMexican drug cartel, Southwest border violence came out, which highlighted, among other
things, how to attack different levels of criminality by the Mexican
drug cartels, be it firearms, be it drugs, be it full cast smuggling.
When it came to firearms, there was a strategy outlined there
which said, you know, mere interdiction is not the only solution.
You know, working with co-located OCDETF strike force, it is imperative that we attack the infrastructure, and the command and
control infrastructure of these organizations to have a lasting impact. Thats not verbatim, but it is something along those lines.
Mr. GOWDY [presiding]. The gentlemans time has expired, the
distinguished former U.S. Attorney.

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At this point, the chair would recognized the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, the ranking member of the full committee,
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Special Agent Newell, I want to pick up on the
last questioning. You testified that Fast and Furious originated
with street agents and local supervisors of Group VII. Do you remember saying that?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And so what did you mean by that? I meango
ahead. Because we have a lot of questions as to how this thing
came about. And that seems to be leading us somewhere. And I
just want to see where we are going.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. Agents in the field, in pursuit of evidence
in further of some investigation, some sort of criminality, be it a
firearms case, an explosives case, an arson case, will open up an
investigation, with their supervisors concurrence, into whatever
they believe to be, you know, some sort of criminality by one or
more individuals. Thats how a case is initiated, and thats how this
case was initiated. It was initiated under the name of Jacob Chambers, et al.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay.
And Special Agent Canino, you testified that you are a senior
trainer and instructor for ATF agents, but have never heard of
noninterdiction, or gun walking, as an approved tactic. It is just
not done?
Mr. CANINO. No, sir. Ive never heard of it.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And Mr. McMahon, did anyone at the ATF headquarters instruct Phoenix Group VII to conduct the investigation in
the manner that we know it ended up being conducted in and to
not interdict weapons of known straw purchasers?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, sir, we did not.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thats a fact?
Mr. MCMAHON. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So this was not a new DOJ policy?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, sir, it was not a new DOJ policy. I think
what we got to realize is guns to Mexico from the United States
has been a problem for an awful long time. We have been trying
to make an impact, and it is something that we are continuing to
try to do.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, going back to you, Special Agent Newell,
you know, if we listen to all the testimony, this is what it boils
down to. I listen to your definition of walking, and youre basically
talking about a commission, and it sounds like we have an instance
here of omission; in other words, failing to stop guns from going
through. So but there is something bigger than that. And that is,
it seems like we need to balance, knowing guns are going into Mexico, and this grand plan to try to get to the cartel, and the whole
idea if we omityou know, making sure that these guns dont go
inin other words, we let them gothey go in, let them go in, and
stand by and watch them, where these guns end up and the harm
that, when they got in the wrong hands, what they would do. Was
there ever a balancing of that? Because that seems like what this
boils down to.

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I mean, I think that is why these agents are so upset. They are
trying to figure out, you know, did anybody say, okay, this is going
against the policy that we normally do? Our number one goal is to
make sure weapons dont get into the hands of the wrong people.
But then they are trying to get their arms around it. Was there
some greater, greater cause that was worth it, the risk to see these
guns actually land in the hands of the wrong people? Can you comment on that? Do you understand the question?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, I understand the question. And one of the
things I said in my opening statement, sir, was thatone of the
things I readily admit is that there should have been moreit was
incumbent upon me that there should have been more, throughout
the case, risk assessments to determine where we were in the investigation. Because as Ive said before, the whole plan was to take
out the whole organization. But I realize in retrospect that there
were times when I should have conducted more risk assessments.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And to your fellow agents here, I think you
would agree then that if you truly did a balancing situation, you
probably would not have gone along with this the way things went.
Is that right? In other words, the omission piece. You follow me?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. You know what bothers me here? You got agents
here who are very emotional about this. I mean, and I appreciate
these are honorable people who go out there and put their lives on
the line every day. And then theyve got you, who is more of a supervisor type, and they use I guess some of sort of a military style
operation where youre supposed to do what the folks over the top
of you tell you. But then you start looking at the folks over the top
of you, and you say, well, you know, what is this about? So you can
comment because I am running out of time.
Mr. NEWELL. Like I said, Congressman, in my opening statement, was I realize now in retrospect there should have been more
risk assessments. I realize that. I acknowledge that. And that was
one of the mistakes that were made. I should have had more risk
assessments throughout the case.
Mr. GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.
Special Agent Newell, there has been some talk this morning and
this afternoon about tools in the toolbox so to speak. What is the
penalty for 924(c), first offense?
Mr. NEWELL. Five years, 60months.
Mr. GOWDY. What is the penalty for the second offense?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe it is 15 years.
Mr. GOWDY. What is the penalty for the third offense?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe it is 30 years.
Mr. GOWDY. And so you are quickly approaching 60 years with
the 924(c)s. And OCDETF, this was an OCDETF case, right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. What does the D stand for in OCDETF?
Mr. NEWELL. Drug.
Mr. GOWDY. And 924(c) is a Federal statute that proscribes the
use of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking offense
or other Title XVIII offenses, right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.

104
Mr. GOWDY. So this had to have a drug connection, or it wouldnt
have been an OCDETF case.
Mr. NEWELL. Actually, sir, I believe in 2008, 2009, the OCDETF
office issued guidance which said that you can in factyou can use
the OCDETF program to attack firearms trafficking organizations
because the other related crimes.
Mr. GOWDY. These were drug cartels, though, right?
Mr. NEWELL. The firearms trafficking organizations?
Mr. GOWDY. Right.
Mr. NEWELL. It was related to a drug cartel, yes, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. What is the statutory maximum for lying and buying?
Mr. NEWELL. The statutory maximum, I believe, is 5 years.
Mr. GOWDY. What is the statutory minimum for 924(e)?
Mr. NEWELL. Fifteen years.
Mr. GOWDY. What is the statutory maximum for 924(e)?
Mr. NEWELL. It can be up to life.
Mr. GOWDY. Up to life. So if you can get up to life for 924(e), you
can get over 60 years in theory for 924(c)s, and you dont think you
have enough tools in the toolbox?
Mr. NEWELL. I did not say that, sir.
Mr. GOWDY. Do you believe you have enough tools in the toolbox?
Mr. NEWELL. I believe the laws that we have now, the ones that
we have, thats the ones we have to use. Any additional tool would
be welcomed.
Mr. GOWDY. Let me ask you this. When you begin a sentence,
You didnt get this from me, what does that mean to you?
Mr. NEWELL. This means that you didnt get it from me.
Mr. GOWDY. Well, but thats kind of a pleonasm, isnt it? Because
you are getting it from them. So its awhat do you mean by that,
you didnt get this from me? I am referring to your email to Mr.
OReilly.
Mr. NEWELL. Well, obviously, Mr. OReilly was a friend of mine.
And itsI shouldnt have been sending him that. Obviously, I recognize that. Being a friend.
Mr. GOWDY. What do you mean, you didnt get this from me?
Does that mean you should not have been talking to him about it?
Mr. NEWELL. Not that I shouldnt have been talking about it. He
is a friend of mine. He asked for information, and I provided it to
him.
Mr. GOWDY. Well, then why wasnt it appropriate for you to give
it to him? Why would you preface it by saying you didnt get this
from me? Was it an improper communication?
Mr. NEWELL. No, it wasnt an improper communication.
Mr. GOWDY. Then why would you preface it by that?
Mr. NEWELL. He has been a friend of mine for a long time, and
he asked me for information. So I gave him information that just
probably is an improper use of the term or phrase.
Mr. GOWDY. Okay. I yield my remaining time to the chairman.
Chairman ISSA [presiding]. So following up on where Mr. Gowdy
was, and I apologize, we are trying to keep going during the votes.
Mrs. MALONEY. Are there votes?
Chairman ISSA. Yes. You have 1 minute left. Actually, you have
36 seconds left. You sent something to somebody because they were

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a friend that works in the White House on the National Security
Team who requested something about a rather esoteric single investigation. Why do you think he asked you for that information
that you didnt get these from me? Why do you think he asked for
that information you said he didnt get from you?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, the way I am reading the email now, and
my recollection, he wasnt asking about a specific investigation, he
was asking about our efforts during the Gunrunner impact team
over the summer of
Chairman ISSA. Why do you think he was asking?
Mr. NEWELL. If I recall that email, he was asking for information
to brief his boss, I believe, in preparation for a trip to Mexico, in
our efforts along, in our area along what we were doing to combat
firearms trafficking and other issues.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. So this is September 2010.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. Wasnt it already a failed program that you had
recognized needed to be shut down, that there was a 30, 60, 90day shutdown some time ago? Wasnt this after you had been frustrated by a U.S. attorney who couldnt seem to end this thing?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, at this time, sir, I believe our case had been
over at the U.S. Attorneys Office now for about probably 2 to 3
weeks.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. Let me go on another line of questioning
for you, because I have these ATF agents who dont see the world
the way you, Bogota, and your other experience see it. And I just
want to understand the difference. You saw this as necessary. You
saw that you had to make your case. You saw that 30, 60, 90 days
went by even after you recognized that an awful lot of guns had
walked. You may not have said you walked them, but they walked.
They are in Mexico. They are distributed broadly. So 2,000 weapons are gone and you still think this program was a good program.
Right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. So you would do this program again?
Mr. NEWELL. As I said earlier in my opening statements, I would
do several things differently if we were to do something like this
again.
Chairman ISSA. But you would do a program in which you contact federally licensed gun sales organizations, tell them, in response to what they believe are suspected straw purchasers, to go
ahead and install video cameras, watch these people buy, and follow them to a location and then wait to see where they turned up.
Mr. NEWELL. That would be one of the things in the risk assessments that I would seriously consider changing.
Chairman ISSA. What about the American people? You said risk
assessment. You know, that sounds like the doctor telling you that
you have non-Hodgkins lymphoma and there is a zero percent
chance, but we think we can operate and get you an extra month.
Risk assessment.
Mrs. Maloney, Ms. Norton, they are radically against the Second
Amendment. They absolutely, positively do not want anyone having
any guns. They are pretty straightforward about it. They will say

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they respect the Second Amendment, but they have never seen a
gun limitation they dont want.
In your case, your agency has a special, special obligation. Maintain the Second Amendment, law-abiding citizens rights to keep
and bear arms; stop bad people from getting them. Now, you said
you need more laws.
I am going to go to some of the other agents for a moment. Mr.
Canino, if the U.S. attorney agreed to prosecute every case, or in
a State where there were strong gun laws, if he or she only gave
up that prosecution if the State agreed to prosecute, would we have
dramatically reduced gun violence on both sides of the border if
there was 100 percent prosecution of existing laws?
Mr. CANINO. Eliminate gun violence?
Chairman ISSA. No, I said greatly reduce.
Mr. CANINO. I dont thinkwhat is the word I am looking for
I dont think FederalizingI dont think Federalizing street crime
is the answer. I think theres plenty of gun laws. Now, some of
them are better than others. Some of them theres really no deterrence; theres no significant time that people are facing. Thats the
frustrating part.
But in my opinion, you know, the political reality is that right
now there is no appetite or will for any substantive legislation. I
am an ATF agent. I cant worry about that. I got to worry about
catching bad guys. And Im going to do the best can with what Ive
got. And thats it.
Chairman ISSA. Agent Wall, you happen to be just south of the
San Diego border right now. I am just north of it. President Bush
fired Carol Lam to a great extent on my request. I dont worry
about the other eight U.S. attorneys that got fired. I helped get her
fired because she wouldnt prosecute trafficking in human beings,
and she wouldnt prosecute gun crimes. She basically said, turn
them over to the State, and then walked away, knowing that in
most cases, they wouldnt prosecute. Does it make a difference if
you have a U.S. attorney at each of those border areas who takes
trafficking in human beings, trafficking in drugs, and trafficking in
guns seriously enough to basically not let anyone walk away not
being prosecuted just because they might only get 6 months or a
year?
Mr. WALL. Yes, sir. Unequivocally. Federal agents, police officers
on the Federal task force, and agents in ATF, in my opinion, we
have a tremendous effect on crime.
However, when cases dont get prosecuted, when they languish,
as I said in my opening statement, and the cases are either declined or given the minimal sentence, it doesnt send a message to
the people engaged in this type of activity. Take, for example, gun
trafficking. When you have individuals that arent prosecuted, however maybe there was a search warrant served and guns were
taken from them, all they are going to do is tell the next guy, hey,
watch out for these guys that do this because this is how I got
caught. But there is no deterrent. We need to prosecute people. We
need to put them in prison for this. And we need to put them there
for a while.
Chairman ISSA. Special Agent Canino, in your experience, if you
have somebody dead to rights, you have them with the weapons,

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lets just take our 730 man, if you walked in and said, look, weve
got you, we know who youve been selling to, weve got you, if you
dont give us testimony right now, if you dont roll, youre not leaving here, and youre going away for a very long time; in your experience, is there a high likelihood that theyre going to essentially
flip on the next guy up in return for essentially the minimum
charge of simply buying and lying? Is that an effective tool when
you have what we had in this case? We knew that he had sold to
a trafficker. We had hundreds. Any jury is going to consider him
part of the trafficking charge you can bring. And we had evidence
of exactly who he sold to, so we could tell him we already know
who you sold to. But if you are not willing to testify, we are going
to put you away with him. And by the way, people have died in
Mexico. And then we are going to allow you to be extradited to
Mexico. Does that techniqueand I am not asking you for your
techniques, I am giving you the NCIS one, because that way we are
not get into sources and methods, but does that work?
Mr. CANINO. Yes, sir. I mean depending. Each individual is different. But if it is done correctly and respectfully, and you treat the
person like a human being, and you honestly tell them, hey, you
know, these are your choices
Chairman ISSA. So here it is, I really dont want to hit you with
the stick, but I will.
Mr. CANINO. Pretty much. I mean
Chairman ISSA. Let me go to Mr. Leadmon for a second.
On March 5, 2010, you did a briefing at ATF headquarters on operation Fast and Furious. At that time, did you brief that over
1,000 weapons had been sold?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, 1,026.
Chairman ISSA. Did you in that presentation brief and show the
links between the straw purchasers and the Sinaloa cartel?
Mr. LEADMON. I identified the cartel. And in the briefing, I
showed the links toward the seizures in Mexico and how they
moved from Sonora over to Juarez area.
Chairman ISSA. So was it clear on March 10th, when you gave
that briefing, that everyone in the room that guns were going to
gun dealers in Arizona and then going into Mexico?
Mr. LEADMON. Absolutely.
Chairman ISSA. Who was in the room at that time?
Mr. LEADMON. Everybody in senior management, ATF field operations, except for Mr. Melson.
Chairman ISSA. Were there representatives of the Department of
Justice?
Mr. LEADMON. Yes.
Chairman ISSA. Who?
Mr. LEADMON. Mr. Joe Cooley.
Chairman ISSA. So Justice was fully informed that guns were
walking?
Mr. LEADMON. I dont think he is very high hanging fruit, but he
was there.
Chairman ISSA. Did anyone express concern at this meeting that
the number of weapons appearing in Mexico, or the number of
weapons bought by straw purchasers seemed to be too high?

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Mr. LEADMON. Yes, someone on the other end of thein the
video, because we had a video conference, I believe it was somebody
out of the Dallas Field Division voiced that concern, and there was
some discussion.
Chairman ISSA. And we also have a memo that says we got to
close this down, basically, at that same time. So at a thousand, it
was too many.
Let me ask our two defenders of this program. And I am sorry,
but that does appear as how your role here today has been. Did it
ever occur to either one of you after Mr. Leadmons March 10th,
or before, that you could let some of these walk and interdict others? Meaning, quite frankly, when somebody had already bought
100 of them and transported them to him, they werent going to
sell them to somebody different. You knew it was a straw purchaser. He basically usually had one customer. He has made the
sale once, twice, 20 times. Did it ever occur to you to go ahead and
at least stop these guns a few times?
As you said, Mr. Newell, make it expensive by intercepting some
of them?
Just blind dumb luck they had to figureand this is just me
talking, but I think I have lived this thing long enough. The cartels
had to realize at some point that you were helping them buy guns
because they were having such a good batting average. Isnt that
true? The fact that these guys werent interdicting the guns almost
had to be conspicuous at some point. Couldnt you have at least
stopped some of these guns to make it look more real?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, sir, as I said in my opening statement, thats
one of the things I would do different.
Chairman ISSA. Well, we are going to take a short recess. There
will be a little bit of voting. We will come back. And I know you
have been patient.
During the recess, our restrooms are available to you. I would
suggest that on that side, there is a restroom where you dont have
to go out and be accosted by the cameras and so on.
But what I would like you to do, Special Agent Newell and Special Agent McMahon, but for all of you, I would like each of you,
if you will agree, to give me back a list of the things that you would
do differently.
And Special Agent Newell, I would like your list because youre
the one that has most said it.
Special Agent McMahon, I would like yours because you oversaw
it and you said some things. But each of the four of you, from your
experience, would you each be willing to give me what would be
done differently?
Now, I know the easy thing is, I wouldnt have done the damn
stupid thing. But short of that, case-by-case breakdown, what
would have to be different if this would be done? Because this is
the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The minority suggests
that we pile on a bunch more gun laws. And maybe that will happen someday. But I am looking for answers that we can do to get
effective work that you need to do, effective prosecution. And if it
needs legislation, we are happy to look at it and put it into the mix.
But I am looking for the kind of reform for the most part that
doesnt just assume that a stronger gun law, selectively enforced by

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U.S. attorneys who lose interest in these cases, is necessarily the
only answer.
So, with that, we stand in recess until about 5 minutes after the
last vote.
[Recess.]
Chairman ISSA. The hearing will come to order.
We now recognize the chairman emeritus, Mr. Burton, for his
round of questioning.
Mr. BURTON. That means the old guy.
Chairman ISSA. Well, that, too.
Mr. BURTON. First of all, I want to start off by saying that the
ATF, the FBI, the CIA, all of our intelligence agencies, we have
high regard for all of you. And I know some of my colleagues indicated today that we were beating you over the head. We are not.
We are investigating this issue. And we are certainly not investigating the good work that you guys do.
And I know some of your colleagues have been killed; some of
you have been injured. We know you lay your lives on the lines for
us. And so you have our respect and admiration for what you do.
Now, let me just say to Mr. McMahon and Mr. Newell, you know
that you are under oath.
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. Both of you know that. What I want to know
is do you know who was involved in the decisionmaking process to
start this whole program?
Mr. MCMAHON. Again, I think this was not a program; this was
a criminal investigation.
Mr. BURTON. Well, okay, this criminal investigation. Do you
know who suggested or started this criminal investigation?
Mr. MCMAHON. The agents on the street are the ones that will
initiate the investigation.
Mr. BURTON. I know, but someone said this is what we are going
to do. Who started it? Where did you get the instructions to do
this?
Mr. MCMAHON. We dont give our agents instructions to do
things. They go out and produce cases on their own.
Mr. BURTON. So what you are telling me now is that this investigation that we are talking about, what is the name of it again?
What is it called?
Chairman ISSA. Fast and Furious.
Mr. BURTON. Fast and Furious, this just came from an agent in
the field, and that was it; nobody else had anything to do with it.
You didnt get a letter of instruction or anything like that.
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely not.
Mr. BURTON. What about thisyou say you got a memo. There
was a memo from a Deputy Attorney General about this. What was
that?
Mr. MCMAHON. I believe that Bill Newell was referencing a
memo the Deputy Attorney General put out regarding our strategy
on how we are going to combat firearms
Mr. BURTON. Who was the Deputy Attorney General?
Mr. MCMAHON. I believe that one came from Deputy Attorney
General Ogden.

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Mr. BURTON. Deputy Attorney General Ogden. When did that
come?
Mr. MCMAHON. It had nothing do with Fast and Furious.
Mr. BURTON. What did it have to do with?
Mr. MCMAHON. It had to do with the governments strategy to
help combat the violence that is going on in Mexico.
Mr. BURTON. Did it have anything to do with the weapons that
were going down there?
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. So it did have something do with what we
are talking about.
Mr. MCMAHON. Yes, it did.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. And his name is what?
Mr. MCMAHON. I believe it was David Ogden, but I am not positive.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. But you also said earlier in testimony that
there were a number of other agencies that were involved in this
whole investigation process. You mentioned IRS, Customs, DEA,
FBI, and so forth. You remember that? What were the names of
the people that were involved in that?
Mr. MCMAHON. Again, I think Bill Newell answered those questions regarding this case being conducted out of
Mr. BURTON. What I want is the names of the people that were
involved in the investigation from each agency.
Mr. MCMAHON. I dont know the names.
Mr. BURTON. Somebody does. Do you know, Mr. Newell?
Mr. NEWELL. I know a couple of the names, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. We want those names. The reason why we
want those names is I am going to ask the chairman to talk to
them about continuing this investigation to find out how involved
everybody was, and why it went on as long as it did when we knew
in 2009 that this kind of thing was going on. And if there were IRS
agents, FBI agents, DEA agents, Customs, or others, we want to
know who was involved so we can question them as well. So I want
their names. Do you have any of their names right now?
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir, I dont.
Mr. BURTON. And you dont remember any of their names?
Mr. NEWELL. I remember one of their names.
Mr. BURTON. Whats his name.
Mr. NEWELL. I believe that the ICE agent assigned to the case
was a young man by the name of Lane France.
Mr. BURTON. Lankford?
Mr. NEWELL. Lane France.
Mr. BURTON. Lane French?
Mr. NEWELL. France, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Okay, you got that. How about the other agencies?
Do you remember any of the names? Were there other people involved?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, but I dont know their names, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Can you find their names for us?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Can you get those names for us?
Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. Will you get those names for us?

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Mr. NEWELL. Absolutely.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. And every single one of those names from
those various agencies that were involved in the whole thing. We
would like to have their names and their titles and the agencies
they work for.
Mr. NEWELL. Okay. Yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. And you will get those for us?
Mr. NEWELL. I will do my best, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. No, no, no, no. I dont want you to do your best. I
want the names. Can you get us the names?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. BURTON. And you do know who they are and you know how
to get their names?
Mr. NEWELL. I will find out who they are, and I will get their
names, yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Okay.
Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON. I would be happy to yield.
Chairman ISSA. Would you also include the dates that they were
read into this program with sufficient specificity that they would
understand the details of how the gun following that you say is not
gun walking occurred? In other words, we dont want to just have
names of people on lists; we want to have the names of people who
were read into the program.
Mr. BURTON. And the dates that they were involved.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. And if I can clarify a point, sir.
Mr. BURTON. But before you go clarifying, I want to make sure
I get all this.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make absolutely sure we have their
names, dates, times, places that they were involved in this investigation so that we can trace it all the way back to its origin and
see where we went, see who was involved, and how all these weapons, 2,000 weapons got down in there into Mexico, and whether or
not somebody higher up in the Justice Department or the food
chain might have been involved. And the only way we can get that
information is from you two, or the other people who were involved
in the investigation from these other agencies. So I just want to say
one more time, this is very important that you understand that you
are telling us right now that you will get us this information, you
can get us the names, times, dates and places that we need. And
you will do that.
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BURTON. Okay. Very good. I just want to make sure youre
under oath and you understand that. I yield to the chairman.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the gentleman from Cleveland, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Newell, on June 15, 2011, three agents under your command
testified before this committee. And they outlined the very serious
allegations that prompted this investigation. The line agents told
us that as part of Operation Fast and Furious, one, they were instructed to cut off surveillance of suspected straw purchasers; two,
they were ordered to forego arrests of straw purchasers; and three,
they were prohibited from seizing or interdicting weapons from

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straw purchasers on several occasions when they believed they had
the lawful authority to do so.
Mr. Newell, these are very serious allegations. But in your transcribed interview with the committee, you said you never heard
these complaints before they became public in February of this
year. Is that right?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. KUCINICH. Here is what you said. You said, To the best of
my recollection, I dont remember any time ever being advised that
there was some discourse amongst the agents. I became aware of
that when some of the documents were released that I saw, and I
want to say it was probably February, early February, something
like that of this year. Isnt that information you would have expected to have received earlier?
Mr. NEWELL. I would have hoped to have received that earlier,
yes, sir.
Mr. KUCINICH. Who would have been responsible for bringing
these agents concerns to your attention?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, if they followed the chain of command, I
would hope that that information had gotten to me, yes, sir.
Mr. KUCINICH. But who specifically would have been responsible?
I mean, there are people in your chain of command. Can you
Mr. NEWELL. If they had voiced those specific concerns to their
supervisor, I would hope thatand they did not get a response that
they felt appropriate from their supervisor, then obviouslythey
obviously have the right to go over his or her head, in this case his
head, and go to the second line, and so on from there.
Mr. KUCINICH. Well, obviously, the committee has the names of
the people who were in those various lines of command. So Special
Agent McMahon, in your interview, you said the same thing, that
you didnt hear about these allegations until they were reported in
the press. Isnt that right?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats correct.
Mr. KUCINICH. And is that information you would have expected
to receive sooner? Did you feel you should have received it sooner?
Mr. MCMAHON. I would have hoped to. If the concerns that were
expressed this late on were expressed earlier on, I would hope that
if there was so much urgency, it should have been brought to our
attention earlier.
Mr. KUCINICH. The line agents testified that they made their concerns known to their group supervisor, David Voth. Yet he, too,
told the committee that he knew nothing about their allegations.
He said this, I dont recall people coming to me with those concerns. Now, Mr. McMahon, as the line agents immediate supervisor, should Mr. Voth have known about the allegations?
Mr. MCMAHON. I am assuming if they were expressed to him, he
should have known about them, yes.
Mr. KUCINICH. The committee has apparently identified a conflict
in the testimony. Either the line agents are having difficulty being
able to communicate the truth or their supervisor is having that
difficulty. Now, what steps, Mr. McMahon, did the ATFs management take to ensure that line agents can make headquarters aware
of their concerns if their direct supervisor is not responsive? And

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can they do that without in effect bringing upon themselves some
kind of sanctions for going other the head of a line supervisor?
Mr. MCMAHON. I believe they can. I think the processes that we
have set up in ATF headquarters allow that. We have an ombudsman program. We have obviously the chain of command anywhere
in there. I think our director, every time he has actually been out
to visit offices, he has told people about his open door line of communication. He receives emails from line agents. I have tried do
the same thing on my visits to the field divisions that I oversee.
You know, you try to make yourself as open as possible to everyone
within the Bureau.
Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman. And I just want to say we
all appreciate the very difficult and challenging work that everyone
at the agency has to carry out, so Im sure you can understand the
questions that have been raised about the conduct of this particular operation, that things dont fit, and when they dont fit, it
makes it difficult for Members of Congress to be able to defend the
kind of support that they want to maintain for the Bureau. So I
want to thank you for being here.
I yield back.
Mr. MEEHAN [presiding]. I want to thank the gentleman from
Ohio. At this point in time I will give myself 5 minutes for further
questioning.
Mr. Leadmon, when we last left, you were talking about law enforcement partners providing you information in December 2009
that had given you concern about guns that had actually showed
up in Mexico; isnt that correct?
Mr. LEADMON. They didnt provide it to me, they provided it to
the Phoenix agents, and it was routed to me.
Mr. MEEHAN. So when you say other law enforcement partners,
is this partners outside of ATF?
Mr. LEADMON. Correct.
Mr. MEEHAN. Can you identify what other partners at this point
in time in December 2009 were part of this investigation?
Mr. LEADMON. They werent part, to my knowledge, but they
were running a parallel, and it was DEA. I dont want to get into
their investigation, even though they wrapped up that investigation I want to say February or so of 2010, but they were
Mr. MEEHAN. February 2010, but they became part of the
OCDETF case; isnt that right, Mr. Newell, DEA?
Mr. NEWELL. There were several investigations involving DEA.
But what Mr. Leadmon is talking about is I believe the information
on that seizure came from DEA to us, and then it was routed to
Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. MEEHAN. Came to you.
Mr. Gil, at point in timeor, Mr. Canino, while you were in the
field doing this, were you aware of any other agencies that had information pertinent to this that you believed was not being shared
with you?
Mr. GIL. The only other agency that we worked with while in
Mexico would have been ICE, and we actually used them to a certain extent to conduct interviews either with us or on our behalf
regarding arms trafficking.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Leadmon.

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Mr. LEADMON. A clarification. That investigation was not originating out of Mexico. That was a U.S. investigation that DEA was
doing out of the Phoenix area.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Thank you.
Special Agent McMahon, you just responded partially to a question, and unfortunately you werent allowed to give a full answer,
but I was intrigued by what you were beginning to say when,
again, there was a once more question about the genesis of the
case, and you began to talk about agents in the field. You know,
the agents were the ones that begin to make these cases. Can you
explain to me what you mean by that?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, the way ATF works is our agents are the
ones that conduct the investigations, theyre the ones that generate
investigations. Obviously they should get approval from their firstline supervisor of which investigations to open or not.
Mr. MEEHAN. So those agents, what were they investigating, just
straw purchasing in general?
Mr. MCMAHON. When you have a division group, the division
usually breaks down those groups into specific types of cases. You
might have an arson explosives group, you might have a gang
group, you might have a firearms trafficking group. If youre out
in the field
Mr. MEEHAN. The agents working on this case.
Mr. MCMAHON. The agents were assigned to a gunrunner group
that was specifically assigned to investigate firearms trafficking to
Mexico.
Mr. MEEHAN. At what point did the gunrunner group take it up
higher to the chain as part of this? Did they include the assistant
U.S. attorney? Was there an assistant U.S. attorney appointed to
that group?
Mr. MCMAHON. Im not sure if it was appointed to that group,
but I know we usually try to get an assistant U.S. attorney onto
the case as early as possible.
Mr. MEEHAN. How early do you think, Mr. Newell, do you recollect, that an assistant U.S. attorney was assigned to this case?
Mr. NEWELL. From the very beginning.
Mr. MEEHAN. From the very beginning?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Did the assistant U.S. attorney to you
knowledge communicate with the U.S. attorney about this case?
Mr. NEWELL. To my knowledge, I dont know, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. You dont know the answer. But this case began
somewhere in November 2009, and we have testimony that by December 2009, there was already concern about scores of weapons
that were being recovered in Mexico. But what was the response
of the assistant U.S. attorney to that revelation?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, as outlined in the January 8th briefing paper,
they felt that there was not enough evidence at that time to secure
anymoreor to secure for prosecution, so to continue monitoring
the sales.
Mr. MEEHAN. They continued monitoring the sales, but were they
aware and did they believe that guns, ultimately thousands, were
continued to be trafficked with the approval of the assistant U.S.
attorney?

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Mr. NEWELL. Im not sure exactly what they were aware of, sir,
but I know they were informed.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Gil, at any point in time, did you get a visit
from anybody? And who was the highest person that visited you
from the Department of Justice with respect to this matter?
Mr. GIL. To a certain extent it would have been a DOJ contingent to business, I believe, during the summer or spring, and I believe it was Kevin Carlisle. Lanny Breuer visited.
Mr. MEEHAN. Lanny Breuer is the head of the Criminal Division;
is that not right?
Mr. GIL. At that time. I dont know where he is today.
Mr. MEEHAN. When did Mr. Breuer visit you in Mexico with respect to this case?
Mr. GIL. I would have to check.
Mr. MEEHAN. Whats your recollection?
Mr. GIL. I think it was the summer of
Mr. MEEHAN. The summer. That would be after we already know
that thousands of guns had been trafficked?
Mr. GIL. Yes.
Mr. MEEHAN. Was that communicated to him?
Mr. GIL. By me, no.
Mr. MEEHAN. By anybody, to your awareness?
Mr. GIL. No, sir.
Mr. MEEHAN. My time has passed.
At this point in time the chair would recognize the gentlelady
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. MALONEY. Well, I thank you for recognizing me. And I am
deeply concerned that while I was on the floor voting, that the
chairman, for whom I have tremendous respect, made derogatory
remarks about Ms. Norton and myself. And as I hear, I would like
to quote what he said: Mrs. Maloney and Ms. Norton, they are
radically against the Second Amendment. They absolutely positively do not want anyone having any guns. Theyre pretty
straightforward about it. Theyll say they respect the Second
Amendment, but theyve never seen a gun limitation they do not
like.
I would like to say that I support the Second Amendment, and
I support legal guns for sportsmen, for law defense, for hunters, for
self-defense. Just recently one of our colleagues, Leonard Boswell,
literally someone broke into his home, and he thought his life was
in danger. His grandson took a legal registered gun and got the intruder out of the home. I respect the right to own legal guns for
self-defense, for other reasons, but I do not support illegal guns
that are fueling drug wars and putting lives at risk.
In testimony before this committee it was told that 40,000 people
have died in the last 5 years on the border of Mexico. What we
have put forward is a simple statute that would prohibit gun trafficking in illegal guns to people who want to use them for illegal
purposes. I think that is respecting law enforcement, helping law
enforcement, and protecting lives on both sides of the border. And
I must also say that the ATF agents who testified and were called
by the majority to testify, they indicated that this would help them
do their job and help them to protect innocent people in Mexico and
in the United States of America.

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And I just really wanted to clarify that since I feel that Ms. Norton and myself were attacked unfairly. And I do not think that legitimate debate or ideas or legislation should be attacked in this
unfair way. So I just would like to clarify that.
Chairman ISSA [presiding]. Would the gentlelady yield?
Mrs. MALONEY. Absolutely.
Chairman ISSA. Well, I stand corrected if, in fact, youre for the
Second Amendment. And I will not consider the same with Ms.
Norton, who said that my entire side of the aisle was owned by the
NRA in some of hers, or somebody in the District of Columbia continues to support basically this being a gun-free zone in violation
of the Second Amendment. But I take you at your word, and Im
sorry that I exaggerated to include you.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentlelady yield very briefly?
Mrs. MALONEY. Absolutely.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank the chairman for his apology,
but I can attest to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that when the
gentlelady and I introduced our recent bill, she basically said what
she just said, that she had no problem. And I think the confusion
comes in those of us who have seen over and over again the result
of gun violence, those of us who go to the funerals, those of us who
listen to the ATF agents who beg to make sure that we help them
because theyre fighting weapons of war. And thats what we are
concerned about. We didnt debate it. The ATF agents came in here
and said it. Some of them have said it today.
So I yield back to the gentlelady, and I want to thank the chairman.
Mrs. MALONEY. I just want to also add that I think we both
agree on both sides of the aisle that mistakes were made in the
handling of Operation Fast and Furious, and we are legitimately
trying to get answers and to look at this. But the larger issue that
I feel is in danger of possibly being overlooked is the flow of illegal
weapons. And were not talking about regular guns. In the testimony from the agents, they called them military-style weapons.
They were AK47s, very special deadly rifles. So these arent normal guns, these are our military guns. And this is an even larger
issue than Fast and Furious is, to stop the flow of illegal guns. And
I believe that on both sides of the aisle we can agree that illegal
guns flowing into America or Mexico is something we need to address and stop as quickly as possible.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas Mr. Farenthold for his
round.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Im going to kind of bring it more back to where we were going,
I think, with the investigating Operation Fast and Furious as opposed to discussing the merits of any proposed new gun regulations
or gun laws. Let me ask some of the gentlemen from ATF, if you
remembered the lessons we learned from 9/11, we found that we
probably would have had a much better chance of stopping the attacks on the World Trade Center had the various organizations
within our government been communicating with each other better.
Weve spent millions of dollars on fusion centers for information
sharing among agencies. And then Im troubled to find here that

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youre basically running an investigation covering some of the same
suspects, basically parallel investigations, with the Drug Enforcement Administration, and there was an unwillingness to or a failure to coordinate among those agencies. Would that be a fair assessment of what happened: There were multiple investigations,
and the DEA didnt know what you were up to, and vice versa?
Mr. MCMAHON. Sir, as far as Im concerned, that is the complete
opposite of that. I think when we received funding to get our gunrunner groups up and running, one of the first things we did was
assign them to strike force groups so they could work hand in hand
with the other agencies. And I think this case is an example of how
that was one of the positive things out of this case. DEA had some
information that they shared with us that helped us in our investigation and actually helped foster it even more so.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Then why werent you all coordinating, and
there were two different investigations going on? At the very least
that seems wasteful of the taxpayers money.
Mr. MCMAHON. I dont think from what Ive seen that there were
two different investigations. It was two parallel investigations.
DEA obviously is going to focus on the narcotics. We focus on the
firearms.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Ive got a couple other questions. I ran out of
time last time going off on things that just struck me as odd.
Mr. McMahon, during the pendency of the Operation Fast and
Furious, did you ever get the chance to go down to Mexico and visit
with any of our folks down in Mexico?
Mr. MCMAHON. I did. Yes.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Did you speak to Mr. Canino?
Mr. MCMAHON. I did.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. And did he raise any concerns about some of
the guns tracing back to Phoenix?
Mr. MCMAHON. Not that I recall, no.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Canino, did you all discuss that, do you recall?
Mr. CANINO. Yeah. It wasnt anything specific, it was in passing.
Like I said earlier, you know, whenand Mr. McMahon has been
very supportive of our office in Mexico and me personally. But like
I stated earlier, when this case was going on, and when Darren
asked me, what do you think is going on, like I stated earlier, I
thought the U.S. Attorneys Office in Phoenix is reluctant to let our
guys make any arrests. Our guys have stumbled onto a drug traffickingI mean, a gun-trafficking ring, theyre doing their due diligence, and thats why so many guns have turned up in the suspect
gun data base so quickly. And three, I thought that our guys were
just losing them on surveillance, not being able to get to the gun
store in time. Thats what I thought at that time. You know, I
didnt know that we had cooperators in a couple of the gun stores.
So myour concern, and I just said, hey, how come theres so
many guns turning up so quickly?
Mr. FARENTHOLD. And he didnt share with you what was going
on?
Mr. CANINO. Well, like I say, we have a drug-trafficking case in
Phoenix, and, you know, all the guys are doing a good job.

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Mr. McMahon, did Mr. Gil ever raise
concerns over the number of weapons that were being recovered in
crime scenes in Mexico?
Mr. MCMAHON. Congressman, I think its important to realize
that guns were being recovered in Mexico for quite a while, and we
were all concerned about that. Guns were coming from Phoenix,
they were coming from Texas, they were coming fromI mean,
thats what we did, that was our main focus in Mexico and obviously along the southwest border. For the past 4 years, thats
where all of our resources, our new resources, have gone. Guns
being recovered in crime scenes in Mexico from the United States
is something that ATF has been putting everything we have into
for the past quite a few years, as long as Ive been in headquarters.
Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Well, I see I once again have run out
of time, and I realize we are getting late, so I yield back. Thank
you very much.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, as we wind this hearing down, I was
just sitting here and I was just thinking, you know, this agency is
very important, and weve heard now from two sets of agents, all
of whom seem to be, I know, very dedicated to their jobs. And I
think one of my greatest concerns as we go forward, Special Agent
Newell and McMahon, since youre in supervisory-type positions,
you know, I just hope this does not hurt the morale of the organization.
When I look at the emotions of Special Agent Canino and others,
I mean, in some kind of way weve got to make sure that we get
back on track. I just think its so important because the job that
you do iswhat, theres only 1,800 of you all? Its not many.
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats correct, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Its a small agency. And we cant afford to have
division in this kind of agency. Would you agree, Special Agent
McMahon?
Mr. MCMAHON. I totally agree, sir. Thats the highest priority for
us right now is to get our people back on track. Not a lot of us can
have or show the passion that Carlos has, but I guarantee you we
all have that. We might keep it inside a little bit more than Carlos
does, but this is a passionate thing for all of us.
We talk about the Second Amendment, and I believe that we,
ATF, are the defenders of the Second Amendment. And we have to
follow a very fine line of whats part of the legal commerce and
whats part of the illegal commerce, and thats part of the challenge, a challenge that we fully accept. And thats something that
we weredrilled into us from early on while in the academy. Its
something we fully accept, and its something that we do every day.
And as I said in my statement, I am very proud of the people that
are out there now and have been out there in the past and the
work that theyre doing.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Im going to go back to a July 12, 2011, letter
to the Attorney General. Chairman Issa and Senator Grassley
wrote these words. They said, there has been public speculation
that gun control politics may have been a motivating factor behind
approving the risky strategy used in Operation Fast and Furious.
In other words, by allowing straw purchasers to continue to oper-

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ate, and by encouraging gun dealers to go through with what were
obviously suspicious sales, the ATF helped create a big case in
order to justify additional regulatory authority. The letter notes
that the committee has seen no evidence to support this speculation, but goes on to ask the Department of Justice to respond anyway.
Mr. Newell, you were the special agent in charge who oversaw
this operation and the agents who worked it for the last year. What
is your reaction to this speculation when you were engaged in Operation Fast and Furious? I ask you for the record, were you deliberately attempting or do you know others that were deliberately attempting to send guns to Mexico to justify additional firearms regulations?
Mr. NEWELL. In response to your question, sir, I dont recall saying that.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I didnt say you did. Im just saying do you believe that
Mr. NEWELL. No, I dont.
Mr. CUMMINGS [continuing]. Based on everything you know?
Mr. NEWELL. No, sir, I dont.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. MCMAHON. Absolutely not, sir.
Mr. CUMMINGS. And did you see any evidence that your line
agents acted out of anything but a sincere desire to combat a major
trafficking network in this case? Mr. McMahon.
Mr. MCMAHON. Not at all, sir.
Mr. NEWELL. Not at all, sir. That was their goal, and that was
they are very dedicated agents out in the field who are doing that
every day in this case and many other cases.
Mr. CUMMINGS. While its fair to question the judgment used in
the case, and I certainly question it, and again we are trying to get
to the bottom of all of this, suggesting a conspiracy to harm others
goes beyond the pale. And I think thatyou know, I justI just
want to make sure that the American people are clear that we
have an ATF which is operating and doing what it is supposed to
do. Obviously some mistakes have been made, very unfortunate
mistakes. And I think the one thing we have to do is we have to
learn from those mistakes and not let them happen again, because
they can have very, very, very tragic consequences.
And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman ISSA. Thank you. And Ill try to be brief in a couple
of last questions.
First of all, I ask to include some additional documents that were
shared and partially redacted with Justice so that we can keep
them in the record and potentially ask you questions afterwards.
Would all of you be willing to answer additional questions based
on whats in the record afterwards if we have follow-ups? Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. Newell, on January 8, 2010 you produced a memo that in
line 13 said, currently our strategy is to allow the transfer of firearms to continue to take place, albeit at a much slower pace, in
order to further the investigation and allow the identification of additional coconspirators who would continue to operate illegally trafficking firearms to Mexico DTOs.

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Now, if I read that correctly, in addition to later where it says,
DEA has specifically requested that the ASAC and SAC level at the
ATF continue the investigation, if I read this memo of yours correctly, at least by January 10th or January 8, 2010, you knew that
these weapons were going tospecifically weapons that you were
allowing to be sold were going to the drug cartels in Mexico, and
that you lobbied for in this memo the continuation partially because of DEAs request? Is there anything in plain English that I
dont understand here?
Mr. NEWELL. Yes, sir. As I stated earlier in the testimony, I
think that sentence about who wouldthat part of the sentence
who would iswho would continue is based on the fact that we
believe that if we didnt take the necessary steps to disrupt the
whole organization, this group would continue to traffic in large
quantities of firearms to Mexico.
Chairman ISSA. Agent, were not disagreeing that these are determined, incredibly rich, billions-of-dollars-of-drug-money groups
that have the power to corrupt the Mexican Government, at times
corrupt U.S. officials, to buy anything they want anywhere in the
world in vast quantities. Certainly I dont think anyone on the dais
fails to understand that we have a narcostate almost being formed
in Mexico the way we had in Colombia, and that they and we are
fighting to push back on a terrible tragedy that has occurred in
Mexico.
But the question here is as of January 8th, I find this document
to be irrefutable evidence that you knew that weapons you continued to sell, quote, albeit at a slower pacealthough actually the
evidence is it didnt slow down right away, but eventually it did
were, in fact, going to Mexico. You knew it. You knew that when
you sold to particularly some of the specific individuals whose
weapons had already been found, you knew that the straw buyer
was buying it, you knew who they were transporting it to, who was
paying for it and where it was ending up. Isnt that true as of January 2010?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, we didnt sell the firearms, sir.
Chairman ISSA. Well, you came pretty close. You told the firearm
dealer to go ahead and sell it. You knew who the buyer was. You
knew there was a repeat buyer. You knew who the intermediary
was that was the supplier of money, and you knew where they
were ending up. Isnt that all true?
Mr. NEWELL. We believed that obviously we were working a firearms-trafficking organization that
Chairman ISSA. Wait a second. Look, were not talking about
what you had to prove to a jury of 12. Ill go over these agents, and
theyre going to make you look like a fool here if you dont answer
this honestly. You knew that A was going to B, and B was going
to the cartels. You knew that outright. So did the DEA as of January 8thand thats what this briefing says, doesnt it? Answer me
honestly just once, clearly and simply.
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, with all due respect, when it comes to the DEA
portion of that, it was the fact that DEA had an ongoing investigation from which we gathered the information which led to the initiation of our case. So that sentence there discusses the fact that

121
DEA said, hey, whatever you do, dont do anything to compromise
our case, which we respected.
In response to your other question is absolutely, the group that
we were working, we knew that that was their intention to funnel
guns to Mexico.
Chairman ISSA. Wait a second. Intention. Not intention. It was
a pattern of success that had occurred for a year; isnt that true?
You had watched straw buyers, repeated straw buyers, make purchases, deliver them, and those weapons had shown consistently in
the hands of specific cartels, and, as you know, you knew who was
paying for them. Isnt that all true?
Mr. NEWELL. Well, you said a year, sir. When that memo was
written in January, we were probably, I would say, 2 months into
the investigation at that point.
Chairman ISSA. Three months earlier, I apologize. The previous
year.
Mr. NEWELL. Three months.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. So 3 months into this program, about
1,000 weapons or less in, you knew that the weapons you were telling gun dealers to go ahead and sell to the same straw buyers
again and againyou already had 20, the number 20 is here. So
Im kind of going, well, youve indicted 20, 19 of whom were the
straw buyers, so you knew the straw buyers and the repeats kept
coming after you knew starting point, bag man or money man, and
end point; isnt that true?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, what we believed and what we suspected is far
short of what we could prove.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. Finally youve given me the answer I
wanted. You knew everything you needed to know to understand
everything that led to the charges. What you didnt have was
enough to make a case, so you went on month after month for
1,500 more weapons while you were trying to make a case; isnt
that correct?
Mr. NEWELL. Sir, in January we didnt know all 20 at that point.
The 20 that we indicted, we had a large group of straw purchasers,
and we were continuing to build a case throughout. But we still
in full conjunction with the U.S. Attorneys Office, we still needed
the evidence to be able to prove that these individuals were, in
fact
Chairman ISSA. Who at the U.S. Attorneys Office wanted this investigation to go on past January 8, 2010?
Mr. NEWELL. When?
Chairman ISSA. Who? Did Lanny Breuerwas he briefed by January 8, 2010?
Mr. NEWELL. I dont know if he was, sir.
Chairman ISSA. But his office approved the wiretaps under his
authority. You said you didnt read the wiretaps. I guess neither
one of you read the requirements. But somebody had to be briefed
who signed it on his behalf, on his authority. Did either of you ever
brief Lanny Breuer or anyone else that could sign on his behalf?
Mr. NEWELL. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. MCMAHON. I did not, no.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. So I guess were just going to figure that
you knew on January 8th that you had the same people buying

122
weapons repeatedly, leading to the same cartel, and you didnt quit
because you hadnt made your case, so we continued selling until
we had a dead Federal agent and a scandal? Thats pretty much
what Ive heard here today. Any of the agents that work in the
field, did any of you see something different then? This thing kept
going after everything was known, except maybe if we keep doing
it long enough, well get better cases for the U.S. attorney; and
then it began falling apart after Brian Terry was murdered? Does
anyone in the first four see anything different? Correct me if Ive
missed something.
Mr. GIL. Chairman, Im still sitting here listening to the conversation, and its still unbelievable to me, and to be quite honest
with you, I still dont know what to believe, why this investigation
was initiated, and why it continued for so long. I cant. I know you
look speechless. Im speechless. I just dont know.
Chairman ISSA. Well, words escape me to try to do any better
than you dont know why and I dont know why either.
The gentlelady from New York for an additional round.
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.
I would like to follow up on the line of questioning of Congressman Farenthold when he was talking about the lack of communication, which after 9/11 we had many commissions, we had many
studies. And what came out of these commissions was that our intelligence wasnt working, and we werent communicating. And we
then overhauled our government, the most major overhaul of our
intelligence since 1948. And it seems to be a little bit of the same
thing of what I am hearing about these hearings, because people
are saying they didnt know anything, and people are saying they
told people and its not getting through, so the communication is
not taking place.
When you mention 9/11, the mayor of New York, and we are
about to come upon the 10th anniversary of that tragic day, has
been airing TV ads in New York where they use the words of an
al-Qaida leader who is talking to his followers and saying, go to
America. Its so easy to get a gun. Go to America, get all the guns
you need in our fight for the al-Qaida. So this is an ad about how
illegal people who want to hurt Americans are being instructed literally to come to America and get guns in order to combat democracies. And so I think this hearing is very, very serious about the
flow of illegal guns.
Earlier we had a hearing and we had several agents who seemed
very brave, very frustrated and very courageous. And they testified
that they were concerned about the sale of the guns to straw
agents; they were concerned about not having arrests, about being
ordered not to make arrests and not to conduct surveillance. And
I understand that you were asked, Mr. Newell and Mr. McMahon,
and you did not hear any of their frustrations. They testified that
they reported this to their supervisors, and nothing happened, and
thats why they were so frustrated.
So I think weve got to figure out what happens when someone
reports something they feel is illegal, wrong, dangerous or harmful
to life. And Im not just talking about what happened in Fast and
Furious, Im talking about going forward. Agents on the ground
who think that someone should be arrested, and theyre being told

123
not to make an arrest, or when theyre being told not to make a
surveillance, and a supervisor says dont do it, and theyre saying
we should do it, and theyre complaining to someone else, that information has to go up the line in order to have proper law enforcement and proper protection for our citizens.
So I ask anyone on the panel to comment, but I see this as a very
serious, a very serious blockade or a very serious problem. If people
who feel something wrong and harmful to the safety of Americans
or Mexicans is taking place, then someone should be listening. And
if a chain of command is not listening, maybe there should be an
alternative chain of command put in place or something, because
this type of concern has to get to the proper authorities in order
to make proper decisions to make arrests, continue the surveillance
and do the proper things to stop illegal activity.
So I just would ask any of you to comment on what weve been
hearing. People say they asked for help, and other people say they
never heard anything, so whats going on? Is there some, you know,
black hole that complaints fall into? What is the chain of command? Why did not the complaints or concerns of the on-the-line
defenders of justice, why didnt their concerns about what they
thought was illegal and dangerous get to the proper authorities?
Mr. MCMAHON. I can take that, if I could. That is a concern, a
major concern. ATF is my family, and obviously when I heard
agents criticize things that were happening on the street and obviously theres a communication breakdown, thats very concerning to
me.
One of the things I wrote down here, the things that I would like
to improve on, is my access to people in the field, maybe even just
sitting down, hey, what can you tell me, whats going on, that sort
of thing. Im actually going to be going into a new position soon
thats going to be talking aboutIll be overseeing the review of our
office and the effectiveness andefficiency.
Mrs. MALONEY. Well, what happened now? Are you conducting
an investigation to find out why the information from the agents
on the street didnt get to the proper authorities?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, I believe the inspector general is conducting that investigation, and we look forward to the results of
that.
Mrs. MALONEY. And when do you expect that to come back?
Mr. MCMAHON. I dont know.
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.
Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady.
I will recognize myself for another round. Im going to go down
the row as we often do here and just pose a single question for each
of you to answer. Special Agent Newell answered it already. If it
was January 9th, you had just written that briefing; you knew
what Special Agent Newell and Special Agent McMahon knew
about what had happened, what was happening; you knew about
the DEAs request; but you also knew about where these guns were
ending up. Mr. Gil, start with you. If we put you in charge of the
Phoenix field office on that day, what would you do?
Mr. GIL. Mr. Chairman, that investigation would have been
closed, come to a conclusion.
Chairman ISSA. In 30, 60, 90 days?

124
Mr. GIL. No, sir, immediately. That part of an investigation on
a trafficking is notyou have the trafficker, you have him there,
you have the probable cause, you have the intelligence, you have
everything you need to make the arrest; and as the discussion occurred earlier, the other tools in the toolbox are there, interviews,
phone records, interviews of cohorts and so forth. The investigation
with these guns, theyre not a disposable product. These weapons,
theyre going to be out there for years, decades, and theyre a durable good, theyre a marketable item. And thats why historically
ATF, my career, my training officer educated us on this, as I
trained my young agents on, its justits inconceivable that you
would let weapons walk.
Chairman ISSA. Agent Wall.
Mr. WALL. The same thing, Chairman. Letting one gun walk is
a huge risk. Again, a gun can last 10, 20, 30 years. A gun in the
hands of criminals, virtually its a loaded weapon thats out there
thats uncontrollable. We in ATF typicallyI justIm dumbfounded by just the number of weapons and how it got to that
point, and really just supporting what Mr. Gil said.
Chairman ISSA. Agent Canino.
Mr. CANINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, weve met now a couple of times. You can see Im
kind of passionate about what I do. I dont want to give you the
impression, or the ranking member, or the committee the impression that I never made mistakes. I was a street agent for 15 years,
very active street agent. Anybody who knows me knows my reputation. They know Ive made mistakes.
You know, I respect Gil and Bill. I consider them friends. I know
its not easy for them to be here today. But hopefully this wont
happen again. And hopefully when the committee finally issues
their report, our agency will be the better for it, and we can move
on down the line.
I agree. I think the first order of business for our agency right
now is to build the morale, close ranks and move forward and support each other.
Chairman ISSA. Thank you.
Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. LEADMON. Yes, sir. I would like to expand and say that I
think Congressman Maloney kind of touched on what the underlying problem is for our agency in these major investigations. She
talked about 9/11, the lessons weve learned, the lack of sharing of
information, the intel. Well, from my perspective, in my law enforcement career involved in major case investigations in the District of Columbia, I learned some things with my task forcing with
other agencies, FBI, DEA and ATF. And one of the things that I
see in ATF that were lacking, were lacking on the intel-led investigative side of the house. Our intel structure within the ATF is
very limited. Our field FIGs need resources. Our headquarters entities need resources also.
Now, to put this in perspective, ATF now, with the battle that
Calderon is waging against the drug cartels in Mexico, we need to
meet that challenge. And that challenge is theyre going out and
theyre taking off these guns in these seizure events. We have to
stop the flow because they cant win if they keep getting replen-

125
ished. So with that in mind, we have to start taking some of the
best practices of our other agencies. And, i.e., under an intel-led investigation, Im not just talking about single investigations. In ATF
we have silo systems. We have divisions that work out of their divisions. Everything comes out of the division. This has to stop. There
has to be headquarters; not oversight, get all in their business
type thing. But it has to do like our other agencies are that exchanges the information freely, partners up with outside agencies
at all levels, not just in the divisions, but all the way up into headquarters. And to do that we have to build a structure, an intelligence structure, to support not only our agents in the field, but
our partners in Mexico and our other Federal agencies.
Chairman ISSA. Im going to cut you off only because of time limitations. We have a subcommittee coming in in a short time.
But first of all youre singing, I think, on a bipartisan basis to
what we need to do. And we probably will have you back as we get
into the corrective phase, the reorganization, if appropriate.
Let me just ask one closing question. Jaime Avila, Panino
Patino, Im sorry, Chambers and Stewart, theyre all on the street
today. They have not been convicted of a crime as straw buyers. If
they walked into a gun shop today, just because theyve been arrested, does that mean they cant buy? Would they be able to buy
a weapon today?
Mr. MCMAHON. They wouldnt be able to buy the weapon because
theyre under indictment. But Im not sure if the NICS system in
Phoenix would capture that if they did attempt to buy a weapon.
Chairman ISSA. So today you know that they shouldnt be able
to buy, they shouldnt be on the street, but 20 straw buyers are on
the street, and youre not sure if all 20 are, in fact, presently in
the system where any federally licensed gun store would stop them
immediately; is that correct?
Mr. MCMAHON. Well, thats not our system, sir. The NICS system is run by another agency.
Chairman ISSA. No, I understand that. But right now you dont
have full confidence that these people are not out doing straw purchases again?
Mr. MCMAHON. No, sir. They were granted bail, as everyone is
entitled to.
Chairman ISSA. They were also granted a speedy trial that I understand is delayed at least until February of next year, so they
continue to be out there?
Mr. MCMAHON. Thats correct. The trial was scheduled for June,
and then its been postponed until February.
Chairman ISSA. Okay. With that Im afraid we have to adjourn.
I thank you all.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, a point of personal privilege.
Chairman ISSA. Yes, a point of personal privilege.
Ms. NORTON. Since my position was mischaracterized in this
hearing, I have come back to state my true position, and I wonder
if I may be given a few minutes to do that.
Chairman ISSA. If you want to state your true position, bearing
in mind that you told us that all of us on this side of the aisle were
owned by the NRA

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Ms. NORTON. If I could be heard from you, if I could state my
position. I was here for some time, Mr. Chairman, and I note that
I didnt hear anyone speak up then. I can understand that
Chairman ISSA. Actually the gentlelady left before
Ms. NORTON. I was here for about 15 or 20 minutes. But its the
right of any Member to speak up. And I can only be grateful, Mr.
Chairman, that you didnt say that I was vile or words of a kind
that were uttered when another Member was outraged that in his
absence his position was characterized.
Yes, as I heard pontificating before law enforcement officers who
risked their lives, I was moved to indicate that we had not given
ATF agents the tools that they deserve. Indeed I indicated that the
issues spread even into our cities.
As for the District of Columbia laws, which apparently were
raised, the District of Columbia barred guns in light of carnage
over the decades. Those laws had been found to be constitutional,
and for decades every appellate court had so found for the Districts
laws and for the laws of other States until an activist and much
more conservative Supreme Court overturned the findings of prior
Supreme Courts for the first time.
The District of Columbia proceeded to obey the new law and enacted a set of gun laws, which have since been found constitutional,
and yet Members of this body have filed bills seeking to overturn
the laws of a local jurisdiction not their own simply because they
disagree with the way they approach gun control. You can approach gun control any way you like in Arizona or California, but
you are not at liberty to tell the people of the District of Columbia
who have to live with the carnage how to approach it, particularly
when the laws have been declared constitutional.
Yes, I stand by the notion that the reason that the ATF agents
dont have the laws they need is because the Republicans have over
and over again introduced laws that would, in fact, keep them from
getting those laws and have stood in the way of their acquiring
those laws. And I have been bipartisan because there have been
some in my own party who have stood with them.
Mr. Chairman, having taken the agents to the woodshed, it does
seem to me then the Congresstheyre entitled to something from
us. So I would like to ask you, in light of the fact that they have
all testified that they need more tools in order to do their job,
whether you would cosponsor the bill that has been introduced that
would, in fact, give them a trafficking tool so that this would not
happen again to them or to us, and would you be willing to sponsor
that bill, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman ISSA. No, maam.
Ms. NORTON. Enough said.
Chairman ISSA. And with that, gentlemen, you bear witness to
the other side of the aisle at work.
With that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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