Stare Decisis

The doctrine that rules or principles of law on

which a court rested a previous decision are
authoritative in all future cases in which the
facts are substantially the same.

Civil Code Art 8

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

DE CASTRO VS JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL
(JBC)
and
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the
controversy
that
has
arisen
from
the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,
2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President
may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the

prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the

Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy
in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political
pressures,
such
as
stringent
qualifications
for
the
positions,
the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of
the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial

Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The
fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of

presidential appointments. If that was their

intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.

Constitution Sec. 4
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions
of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court
en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc.

Types of Court Opinion

A majority opinion is a judicial opinion agreed
to by more than half of the members of a court.
A majority opinion sets forth the decision of the
court and an explanation of the rationale behind
the court's decision.
Not all cases have a majority opinion. At times,
the justices voting for a majority decision (e.g.,
to affirm or reverse the lower court's decision)
may have drastically different reasons for their
votes, and cannot agree on the same set of
reasons. In that situation, several concurring
opinions may be written, none of which is
actually the view of a majority of the members
of the court. Therefore, the concurring opinion
joined by the greatest number of judges is
referred to as the plurality opinion.

A dissenting opinion (or dissent) is an opinion

written by one or more judges expressing
disagreement with the majority opinion. A
dissenting opinion does not create binding
precedent nor does it become a part of case law.
However, they are cited from time to time as a
persuasive authority when arguing that the
court's holding should be limited or overturned.
In some cases, a previous dissent is used to spur
a change in the law, and a later case will write a
majority opinion for the same rule of law
formerly cited by the dissent.
The dissent may disagree with the majority for
any number of reasons: a different interpretation
of the case law, use of different principles, or a
different interpretation of the facts. They are
written at the same time as the majority opinion,
and are often used to dispute the reasoning
behind the majority opinion.
Normally, appellate courts (or panels) are
staffed with an odd number of judges to avoid a
tie. Sometimes when judicial positions are
vacant or a judge has recused himself or herself
from the case, the court may be stuck with a tie,
in which case the lower court's decision will be
affirmed without comment by an equally divided
court.
A majority opinion in countries which use the
common law system becomes part of the body
of case law. Such decisions can usually be cited
as precedent by later courts. In some courts,
such as the Supreme Court of the United States,
the majority opinion may be broken down into
numbered or lettered sections. This allows
judges who write an opinion "concurring in part"
or "dissenting in part" to easily identify which
parts they join with the majority, and which
sections they do not.
An opinion may be released in several stages of
completeness. First, a bench opinion may be
handed down, with the judge or panel of judges
indicating their decision and a rough explanation
of the reasoning underlying it. A slip opinion
may also be issued the day the decision is
handed down, and is usually not typeset or fully
formatted. It is not the final or most
authoritative version, being subject to further
revision before being replaced with a final
published edition. The Supreme Court of the
United States issues slip opinions with the
following disclaimer:
The "slip" opinion is the second version of an
opinion. It is sent to the printer later in the day
on which the "bench" opinion is released by the
Court. Each slip opinion has the same elements

as the bench opinionmajority or plurality

opinion, concurrences or dissents, and a
prefatory syllabusbut may contain corrections
not appearing in the bench opinion.
Caution: These electronic opinions may contain
computer-generated errors or other deviations
from the official printed slip opinion pamphlets.
Moreover, a slip opinion is replaced within a few
months by a paginated version of the case in the
preliminary print, andone year after the
issuance of that printby the final version of the
case in a U. S. Reports bound volume. In case of
discrepancies between the print and electronic
versions of a slip opinion, the print version
controls. In case of discrepancies between the
slip opinion and any later official version of the
opinion, the later version controls.[1]
Opinions may also be issued in ways that limit
the amount of authority that they have as
precedents for future cases. In United States
legal practice, a memorandum opinion (or
memorandum decision) is an opinion that does
not create precedent of any kind in some
jurisdictions. A memorandum is often brief and
written only to announce judgment in a
particular case. Depending upon local court
rules, citation of the opinion as case law may not
be accepted. A memorandum opinion may be
issued where the law is so clearly defined that
no purpose would be served by issuing an
explanation as to why the law requires a certain
disposition of the case before the court. In
appellate courts, a memorandum opinion may
indicate that the judges hearing the appeal find
no error in the opinion being appealed to be
worthy of comment.
A per curiam decision is one rendered by the
court (or at least, a majority of the court) acting
collectively and anonymously.[2] In contrast to
regular opinions, a per curiam does not list the
individual judge responsible for authoring the
decision,[2] but minority dissenting and
concurring decisions are signed.[3]

Constitution Sec. 13
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any
case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before
the case is assigned to a Member for the writing
of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case and served upon the parties. Any Member
who took no part, or dissented, or abstained
from a decision or resolution must state the
reason therefor. The same requirements shall be
observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Minute Resolution
Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt
dispatch of the actions of the Court. While they
are the results of the deliberations by the
Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by
the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose duty is
to inform the parties of the action taken on their
cases by quoting verbatim the resolutions
adopted by the Court.[1] Neither the Clerk of
Court nor his assistants take part in the
deliberations of the case. They merely transmit
the Courts action in the form prescribed by its
Internal Rules:
Sec. 7.
Form of notice of a minute
resolution.A notice of minute resolution
shall be embodied in a letter of the Clerk
of Court or the Division Clerk of Court
notifying the parties of the action or
actions taken in their case.
In the
absence of or whenever so deputized by
the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of
Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or
Assistant Division Clerk of Court may
likewise sign the letter

Philippine Health Care v CIR

J. Corona
Facts:
Philippine Health Cares objectives were:
"[t]o establish, maintain, conduct and operate a
prepaid group practice health care delivery
system or a health maintenance organization to
take care of the sick and disabled persons
enrolled in the health care plan and to provide
for the administrative, legal, and financial
responsibilities of the organization.
It lost the case in 2004 when it was made to pay
over 100 million in VAT deficiencies. At the time
the MFR was filed, it was able to avail of tax
amnesty under RA 9840 by paying 5 percent of
the tax or 5 million pesos.
Petitioner passed an MFR but the CA denied.
Hence, this case.
Issue:
Was petitioner, as an HMO, engaged in the
business of insurance during the pertinent
taxable years, and was thus liable for DST?
Held: No. Mfr granted. CIR must desist from
collecting tax.
Ratio:
Section 185 of the NIRC . Stamp tax on fidelity
bonds and other insurance policies. On all
policies of insurance or bonds or obligations of
the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or

liability made or renewed by any person,

association
or
company
or
corporation
transacting the business of accident, fidelity,
employers liability, plate, glass, steam boiler,
burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other
branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland,
and fire insurance).
Two requisites must concur before the DST can
apply, namely: (1) the document must be a
policy of insurance or an obligation in the nature
of indemnity and (2) the maker should be
transacting the business of accident, fidelity,
employers liability, plate, glass, steam boiler,
burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other
branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland,
and fire insurance).
Under RA 7875, an HMO is "an entity that
provides, offers or arranges for coverage of
designated health services needed by plan
members for a fixed prepaid premium."
Various courts in the United States have
determined that HMOs are not in the insurance
business. One test that they have applied is
whether
the
assumption
of
risk
and
indemnification of loss are the principal object
and purpose of the organization or whether they
are merely incidental to its business. If these are
the principal objectives, the business is that of
insurance. But if such is incidental and service is
the principal purpose, then the business is not
insurance.
Applying the "principal object and purpose test,"
there is significant American case law supporting
the argument that a corporation, whose main
object is to provide the members of a group with
health services, is not engaged in the insurance
business.
For the purpose of determining what "doing an
insurance business" means, we have to
scrutinize the operations of the business as a
whole. This is of course only prudent and
appropriate, taking into account laws applicable
to those in the insurance business.
Petitioner, as an HMO, is not part of the
insurance industry. This is evident from the fact
that it is not supervised by the Insurance
Commission but by the Department of Health. In
fact, in a letter dated September 3, 2000, the
Insurance
Commissioner
confirmed
that
petitioner is not engaged in the insurance
business.
As to whether the business is covered by the
DST, we can see that while the contract did
contains all the elements of an insurance
contract, as stated in Sec 2., Par 1 of the
Insurance Code, the primary purpose of the
company is to render service. The primary
purpose of the parties in making the contract
may negate the existence of an insurance
contract.

Also, there is no loss, damage or liability on the

part of the member that should be indemnified
by petitioner as an HMO. Under the agreement,
the member pays petitioner a predetermined
consideration in exchange for the hospital,
medical and professional services rendered by
the petitioners physician or affiliated physician
to him.
In other words, there is nothing in petitioner's
agreements that gives rise to a monetary
liability on the part of the member to any third
party-provider of medical services which might
in turn necessitate indemnification from
petitioner. The terms "indemnify" or "indemnity"
presume that a liability or claim has already
been incurred. There is no indemnity precisely
because the member merely avails of medical
services to be paid or already paid in advance at
a pre-agreed price under the agreements.

is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower

and later jurisdictionthrough the doctrine of
stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule
decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction
however, out of interests of judicial comity, they
generally try to follow coordinate rationes.

Obiter Dicta

Fallo

Latin for a word said "by the way", that is, a

remark in a judgment that is "said in passing". It
is a concept derived from English common law,
whereby a judgment comprises only two
elements: ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. For
the purposes of judicial precedent, ratio
decidendi is binding. Obiter dicta are persuasive
only.

The final decree or judgment given

a controversy* at law
*Controversy is a litigated question

Ratio Decidendi
Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the
rationale for the decision". The ratio decidendi is
"the point in a case that determines the
judgment" or "the principle that the case
establishes
In other words, ratio decidendi is a legal rule
derived from, and consistent with, those parts of
legal reasoning within a judgment on which the
outcome of the case depends.
It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal,
moral, political and social principles used by a
court to compose the rationale of a particular
judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi

The process of determining the ratio decidendi is

a correctly thought analysis of what the court
actually decidedessentially, based on the legal
points about which the parties in the case
actually fought. All other statements about the
law in the text of a court opinionall
pronouncements that do not form a part of the
court's rulings on the issues actually decided in
that particular case (whether they are correct
statements of law or not)are obiter dicta, and
are not rules for which that particular case
stands.

in

Florentino vs Rivera

Question of Law vs Question of Fact

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court categorically states that the petition filed
shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.