WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S.

POLICY
PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 23, 2007

Serial No. 11018

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
http://www.oversight.house.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON

37094 PDF

2007

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 5121800; DC area (202) 5121800
Fax: (202) 5122250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 204020001

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00001

Fmt 5011

Sfmt 5011

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California
TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DIANE E. WATSON, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
Columbia
BILL SALI, Idaho
BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff
PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director
EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk
DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL SECURITY

AND

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(II)

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00002

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

CONTENTS
Page

Hearing held on May 23, 2007 ...............................................................................

Statement of:
Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security Program, Union of
Concerned Scientists; Theresa Hitchens, director, Center for Defense
Information; Jeff Kueter, president, the George C. Marshall Institute;
and David Cavossa, executive director, Satellite Industry Association ...
Cavossa, David ..........................................................................................
Grego, Laura ..............................................................................................
Hitchens, Theresa .....................................................................................
Kueter, Jeff ................................................................................................
Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, U.S.
Department of State; Major General James B. Armor, Jr., Director,
National Security Space Office, U.S. Department of Defense ...................
Armor, Major General James B., Jr. .......................................................
Mahley, Donald .........................................................................................
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Armor, Major General James B., Jr., Director, National Security Space
Office, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of .....................
Cavossa, David, executive director, Satellite Industry Association, prepared statement of ........................................................................................
Grego, Laura, Ph.D., staff scientist, Global Security Program, Union of
Concerned Scientists, prepared statement of .............................................
Hitchens, Theresa, director, Center for Defense Information, prepared
statement of ...................................................................................................
Kueter, Jeff, president, the George C. Marshall Institute, prepared statement of ...........................................................................................................
Mahley, Donald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of ..............................................
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Massachusetts:
Prepared statement of ...............................................................................
Various statements ...................................................................................

52
107
52
67
93
24
32
24
35
109
56
69
95
26
14
3

(III)

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00003

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00004

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

WEAPONIZING SPACE: IS CURRENT U.S. POLICY PROTECTING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, McCollum, Platts, and Foxx.
Staff present: Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Dave
Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy Wright, professional staff
members; Davis Hake, clerk; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel;
Christopher Bright, minority professional staff member; Nick
Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; and Benjamin Chance, minority clerk.
Mr. TIERNEY. Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for joining
us here today. I am pleased that our witnesses are able to make
it here today.
I want to briefly take care of some business, if I might, before
we get started.
A quorum is present for the subcommittee hearing on
Weaponizing Space: Is the Current U.S. Policy Protecting our National Security? The hearing will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking minority member of the subcommittee make an opening statement,
provided that the ranking minority member can delegate that to
another Member. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open
for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee may
be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the following written statements
and materials be placed into the hearing record: a statement by
Mr. David McGlade, the CEO of Intelsat General Corp.; a written
statement from Iridium Satellite LLC; a written statement from
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation; a written statement from Dr. James Clay Moltz, the deputy director of the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute for International Studies; and two articles from Space News International
SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

(1)

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00005

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

2
and two articles from Defense News authored by Dr. Michael
Krepon from the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00006

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00007

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00008

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00009

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00010

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00011

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00012

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00013

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

10

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00014

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

11
Mr. TIERNEY. Since the dawn of the space age, the U.S. leadership has put a man on the Moon, has allowed us to see to the edge
of the universe, saved countless lives by helping to better predict
hurricanes, and revolutionized the way the peoples of the world
communicate.
Our countrys leadership over the years in helping to establish a
clear understanding among all nations that the peaceful use of
space is of paramount importance has repaid us untold benefits,
and it promises to increasingly do so in the future.
Our country owns or operates 443 of the 845 active satellites
around our planet. It is a $100 billion a year industry. Global Positioning System technology is taking off, and even space tourism is
becoming more and more of a reality.
And our military and intelligence capabilities have become huge
beneficiaries of a weapons-free space. Without space, our smart
bombs would not be precise. Without space, our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq would not have the real-time information they need.
Without space, crucial intelligence gathering would simply vanish.
Satellites have, quite literally, become the eyes and ears of our national security.
However, there are potentially ominous clouds on the horizon.
Space experts, some of whom we will hear from at todays hearing,
charge that over the last handful of years the current administration has undertaken a series of actions and changes in policies that
could have a profound impact on the future of space and the future
of our national security.
Exhibit A is President Bushs new space policy. Though the new
policy had been widely anticipated for years, the unclassified version was stealthily posted on a Web site late on the Friday prior
to Columbus Day weekend in 2006. The rest of the world, both our
allies and our potential adversaries, took notice, particularly at its
aggressiveness and unilateral tone.
The previous space policy spoke of the need for a stable and balanced national space program, one in which [t]he United States
will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of space for
peaceful purposes.
The Bush administration policy, on the other hand, treats space
as one more battlefield besides air, land, and sea, and states unequivocally, The United States will oppose the development of new
legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit
U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements
or restrictions must not impair the right of the United States to
conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.
But the aggressive and unilateral record of this administration
is not just limited to the one document. For example, in 2002 the
United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on
the grounds that it needed greater capabilities against rogue states
following the September 11th terrorist attacks.
In September 2004, then Under Secretary of State John Bolton
stated, We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00015

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

12
race in outer space. We just dont see that as a worthwhile enterprise.
In October 2005, the United States was the only country in the
world to vote against a United Nations resolution calling on the
need for a treaty to limit weaponization of space; 160 countries
voted in favor.
The Air Force doctrine during the Bush administration has also
been criticized as being overly unilateral and aggressive. Air Force
doctrine and top officials repeatedly speak of space dominance,
with one document noting: Space superiority provides freedom to
attack.
Our hearing today will explore the Bush administrations space
policies and actions and what impact they have had and will have
in the future.
Will others in our world use the administrations language and
actions as justification and cover to build their own weapons capabilities in space, thereby threatening the very assets and advantages we seek to protect? Or will other countries in the world ramp
up their own space weapons capabilities no matter what United
States policies and actions are? In other words, is the
weaponization of space inevitable, and to think otherwise would
only cause us to lose ground?
Our hearing will also explore the apparently successful anti-satellite missile test by China earlier this year. China has long been
viewed as a potential competitor to the U.S. interest in space and
a potential threat because of its emerging space program and the
increased frequency of its satellite launches. We have watched
them closely. We were well aware when they attempted two antisatellite missile tests in 2005 and 2006.
So it should not have been a surprise to anyone when China used
a ground-based ballistic missile to successfully hit their own orbiting weather satellite in January of this year. We knew when they
were going to conduct the test and were certain which satellite
they were going to hit. We stepped up monitoring of the satellite
and Chinese launch pads. We knew that the test would cause thousands of shards of space debris to float around for decades in lowearth orbit, potentially harming everything and anything in their
path.
But following the destruction of the satellite the silence was deafening. Though they didnt do anything to hide their launch preparations, the Chinese did not initially own up to the test, and the
United States apparently decided not to do anything beforehand to
try to prevent the Chinese test.
We understand that this single Chinese test alone raised the
threat to satellites in frequent low-earth orbits by as much as 40
percent. This incident should caution all of us about the stakes of
getting space policy correct.
What, if anything, could our country and our allies and our partners around the world have done to prevent all that debris? What
should have done, if anything?
This hearing will explore the administrations space policies and
actions and ask the simple question of whether this is the path we
should be going down.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00016

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

13
By alienating friends and potential adversaries alike, is the current approach weakening our national security through its actions
and inactions toward space policy? Should our country take a leadership role in engaging our allies bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in order to preserve
space for peaceful and commercial interests? Should we work with
other countries to lay out rules of the road for space conduct; to put
in place confidence-building measures and to work together to limit
space debris?
Or is the administrations approach the only real option for us
in a world in which it and some others contend international cooperation and treaties will only serve to weaken our national security assets and interests?
Up until the present, space has been a frontier that has been
used peacefully by all of mankind, in many respects because it is
inherently a global commodity.
As the undeniable leader in space, the U.S. actions and policies
will play a huge role in shaping the future of space and how it impacts our economy, our science, our exploration, and our national
security. We must act with a sense of responsibility here and ask
tough questions now while this renewed interest in the
weaponization of space is in its infancy. We must ask tough questions now, before it is too late.
Over the first 50 years of space exploration and use we know
where U.S. leadership has taken us. This hearing will essentially
ask where U.S. leadership should take us over the next 50 years.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00017

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

14

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00018

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

15

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00019

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

16

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00020

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

17

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00021

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

18

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00022

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

19

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00023

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

20

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00024

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

21

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00025

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

22

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00026

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

23
Mr. TIERNEY. I would now like to yield to the ranking member
for an opening statement, Mr. Platts.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Ranking
Member Chris Shays and myself, we appreciate your holding this
important hearing on a vitally important topic, and also that we
have with us today two panels of witnesses, both representing the
administration and outside experts.
Todays safe and secure access to space is essential for a wide
range of commercial activities. Satellites are an integral component
of telephone and television service. They also provide GPS services
used daily by many Americans, and they aid in weather forecasting, mapping, and many other functions.
Space is also critical to American security. Satellites provide important capabilities to the intelligence community and the Defense
Department. They are an indispensable tool on the global war on
terror.
The integration of space capabilities into most aspects of modern
military operations is one of the distinctive and essential ingredients of Americas military prowess. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the United States and all other nations continue to
enjoy safe and peaceful access to space. This makes some events in
recent years very troubling. Most disturbing is what occurred in
January, China fired a ballistic missile into space and destroyed
one of its own outmoded satellites. This created a huge amount of
debris in orbit and had the potential to damage or destroy other
satellites.
Many experts wonder what motivated China to take such provocative action. They question whether China was signaling that it
had dangerous capabilities which they might use against the
United States in the event of some future crisis.
Today we will hear about the Bush administrations national
space policy, which is meant to guide every aspect of Americas endeavors in space. Some have suggested that the points it sets forth
are a radical departure from past practice. Critics have claimed
that it will cause other nations to threaten our space capabilities.
Others vigorously disagree with all of these contentions.
We will be honored to hear from several experts with varying
perspectives today. I look forward to their presentations, to their
assessment of the Chinese action, and to their evaluation of the appropriate American response.
I am also interested to learn the perspective of the witnesses on
the viability of arms control agreements or other regulatory efforts
to restrain threats in space. I wonder if such treaties will be enforceable, and certainly question the effect of such treaties, given
that terrorist groups would certainly not consider themselves
bound by them.
Finally, I seek to find out what one means when referring to
weaponizing space. I am not certain if this is an allusion to arms
placed in orbit, weapons fired into space from the ground, or simply
ground-based arms which travel through space.
Mr. Chairman, we stand together in recognizing the indispensable role which space plays in the American economy and the Nations security. I look forward to hearing our witnesses testimony
and the opportunity to have questions thereafter.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00027

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

24
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
I want to begin now, for our witness testimony section by introducing our witnesses on the first panel. We have representatives
from both the Department of Defense and the Department of State.
Ambassador Donald Mahley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Threat Reduction, and we have Major General James B. Armor,
Jr., Director of the National Security Space Office within the Pentagon.
I want to thank you both for coming and welcome you to our
hearing today.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in before you
testify, so would you please stand and raise your right hands, and
if there is anybody else that will be testifying with you, we ask that
they also stand and take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. TIERNEY. Let the record reflect that both witnesses answered
in the affirmative.
With that, Ambassador Mahley, would you be kind enough to
begin with your statement? I think you know from ample past experience it is a 5-minute clock. We try not to be too strict on that,
but you need not read directly from your remarks if you do not care
to. You can summarize it any way you wish. The remarks for both
you and the General will be placed on the record, at any rate.
Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF DONALD MAHLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THREAT REDUCTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. ARMOR, JR., DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF DONALD MAHLEY

Mr. MAHLEY. Chairman Tierney, members of the committee,

staff, thank you very much. I greatly appreciate the fact that you
have already indicated that my written statement will be placed on
the record. I would, if I could, like to summarize it orally in just
a few short sentences.
In accordance with the committees request, my statement encompasses three topics: The administrations national space policy;
Chinas January 11th anti-satellite test; and the administrations
position on space arms control.
I would offer two caveats to my testimony at the outset. First,
because it is an unclassified hearing, there is, of course, a certain
limit on some discussion of some sensitive topics that will occur.
Second, the Department of State does not execute the material elements of national space policy. For that information, I will, of
course, defer to my very able colleague from the Department of Defense sitting to my left here.
In June 2002, the President directed an interagency review of
national space policy. The resulting directive, signed by the President on August 31, 2006, and publicly released on October 6, 2006,
supersedes the space policy directive signed by President Clinton
nearly a decade earlier.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00028

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

25
This policy reaffirms the basic principles articulated a half century ago by President Dwight Eisenhower, our Nations commitment to a free exploration and use of outer space by all nations for
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.
U.S. space policy also continues to recognize the necessity to protect our assets in space. Defense and intelligence-related activities
in pursuit of national security interests fall within the scope of and
are consistent with the 1967 Outer Space Treatys provisions mentioning the peaceful uses of space.
On January 11, 2007, the Peoples Republic of China conducted
a test of an ASAT weapon that destroyed an old Chinese weather
satellite in orbit. The administration has conducted numerous classified briefings to Congress in the wake of that test, and some even
preceding it. The United States has sought an explanation from
China regarding its test. To date, we have not received a satisfactory response.
And it is also true the Chinese test generated some 1,500 pieces
of trackable debris, and is estimated to pose a risk to both human
space flight and satellites for the next 100 years.
The Chinese proposals for arms control negotiations in outer
space would only ban a ground-based ASAT weapons testing and
use, not its deployment or development. An additional space treaty
would not improve the existing legal regime which has functioned
effectively for over 40 years. A number of U.S. administrations
have recognized the futility of seeking additional formal space arms
control agreements. However, in response to international interest,
as Ambassador Roca recently noted in Geneva, the United States
is prepared to discuss but not to negotiate outer space topics in the
Conference on Disarmament.
I do thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahley follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00029

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

26

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00030

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

27

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00031

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

28

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00032

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

29

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00033

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

30

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00034

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

31

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00035

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

32
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.
General.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. ARMOR, JR.

General ARMOR. Chairman Tierney, Congressman Platts, members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before the subcommittee today as the Director of the National Security Space Office and the Executive Secretariat for the Department of Defense
Executive Agent for Space.
It is a very timely issue to discuss national space policy and the
policy implications of Chinas counter-space development, specifically their January 2007, anti-satellite test. I must admit I am
heartened by both your comments in pointing out the critical importance to national security in space. I also appreciate having Ambassador Mahley at my side here to discuss the Department of
State policy issues.
Our appearance today is our affirmation that space capabilities
are vital to U.S. national interests and underscores the importance
of continued unity of effort in implementing U.S. national space
policy. I have been in the space business over 30 years, and every
President since President Dwight D. Eisenhower has addressed
space policy.
Each administration has evolved space policy to reflect the increasing maturity and cumulative experience of the Nations activities in space. Basic policy tenets have remained remarkably consistent: free passage and peaceful use of space; compelling need for
a strong civil, industrial, and national security space sectors; and
that, since they are vital to national interests, the United States
has the inherent right to defend those interests in space.
The current national space policy issued by the President last
August addresses current opportunities, challenges, and threats
facing the United States and our space capabilities. The policy provides direction as we conduct a host of space activities.
The evolution of space technology coupled with continued integration of space capabilities into our Defense forces has, as you
noted, revolutionized U.S. military operations. Space technology
has radically enhanced the effectiveness of our now smaller combat
forces, and reduced collateral effects on non-belligerence.
Space capabilities enable us to employ our armed forces within
the guidelines established by the international laws of armed conflict.
Space capabilities provide us with the eyes and ears that give us
unmatched battlefield awareness, advanced warning and characterization of missile attacks, precise application of force, synchronization of our combat forces, and essential command and control
functions.
More broadly, space capabilities form the bedrock of our Nations
infrastructure, including diplomatic, informational, military, scientific, and economic elements of our national power.
The new policy, consistent with previous national space policies,
reaffirms longstanding principles: U.S. commitment to the use of
outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, continued encouragement to cooperate with others, strict adherence to existing
international agreements regarding the use of outer space, rejec-

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00036

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

33
tion of any claim of sovereignty by any nation over outer space, the
right to use or acquire data from space, and the free passage
through and in space without interference.
The Defense Departments goal for space and space-related activities is to possess the necessary space capabilities to achieve our
national security objectives. The Secretary of Defense is further
charged with developing capabilities, plans, and options to ensure
freedom of action in space and, if directed, to deny that to its adversaries.
Along these lines, our focus is on, first, space situational awareness, then preservation of our space capabilities, protection of our
space capabilities, and, finally, protection of our terrestrial forces,
our boots on the ground, if you will, from harm by adversarys
space capabilities.
Many nations and organizations around the world have recognized the benefits of space, and with the growing availability of
technology, the general economic prosperity, and longstanding free
passage and useful peace of space created under the current treaties, space has become a critical enabler for the global economy.
China is one such nation, and they are pursuing space capabilities
on a very broad fronteconomic, scientific, military, intelligence.
They should be rightly congratulated for the impressive technical
achievement of becoming the third nation in history to conduct
manned space flight.
Other nations have also recognized the asymmetric advantage in
space power that the United States retains. Potential adversaries
have and will continue to seek capabilities and to deny our advantage in space, and, as was made dramatically clear by Chinas test
of an ASAT, space is now a contested environment. We believe Chinas testing of a direct ascent ASAT system, specifically the onorbit destruction of a satellite that resulted in thousands of pieces
of long-lived orbital debris, is not responsible behavior for a spacefaring nation. It is inconsistent with Chinas stated position on preventing an arms race in outer space, its signed agreement to mitigate space debris, and the constructive relationship outlined by
President Bush and President Hu.
China is developing a wide range of anti-access and aerial denial
capabilities, such as direct ascent ASAT, radio frequency jammers,
and other capabilities, as part of a general transformation of their
military forces. In addition to the counter-space capabilities, China
is developing and deploying modern intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance satellites with advanced command and control,
communications, and targeting capabilities.
Today many nations are taking their first steps as space-faring
nations. These nations should strive to adhere to international
outer space legal guidelines and ensure they are ready to operate
safely in space.
The United States has long urged the international community
to focus on gaining universal adherence to current treaty guidelines. Not all countries have signed the Outer Space Treaty, for example.
Space activity is strategically significant to the health of our Nations security, defense, and economic well-being. The U.S. Government and Department of Defense policies recognize that fact, and

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00037

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

34
access and use of space are central in preserving peace, protecting
U.S. national security, and promoting civil and commercial interests. Space, bottom line, is vital to U.S. national interest.
I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the implications of the new national space policy and the anti-satellite test
by China, and look forward to any questions you might have.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Armor follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00038

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

35

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00039

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

36

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00040

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

37

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00041

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

38

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00042

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

39

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00043

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

40

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00044

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

41

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00045

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

42

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00046

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

43
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, General. Thank you both for your testimony, both oral and what will be submitted on the record.
Let me just start the questions by asking this. Under Secretary
John Bolton made a statement I mentioned in my opening remarks
on September 2004. He said, We are not prepared to negotiate on
the so-called arms race in outer space. We just dont see that as
a worthwhile enterprise. Ambassador, why isnt that a worthwhile
enterprise?
Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think I could answer that most
succinctly by saying that no arms control is better than bad arms
control. We have indicated in the Conference on Disarmament that
we are prepared to discuss the topic and see if we can find some
way in which one could frame it in a fashion which might be constructive. But, frankly, the kind of framework that has long been
promoted as the prevention of arms race in outer space [PAROS],
and the Conference on Disarmament documentation, including the
most recent P6 proposal, the A5 proposals that were there for a
long time, allow things that simply do not have either a verifiable
or an enforceable means of trying to actually prevent an arms race
that would be inimical to our national interest.
As I indicated in my opening statement, the particular proposal
there, for example, would, indeed, make it illegal for the Chinese
to exercise an anti-satellite weapon, but it would not in any way
constrain them from developing it and deploying it. So we do not
believe that is simply a means by which we are going to advance
our national security in that kind of a negotiation.
Thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that would be some of the things that
you would be negotiating?
Mr. MAHLEY. It is my experience in these, at least, that when we
start out with a negotiation that already has that kind of a serious
flaw in it, the exercise is one in which you are going to try to find
out how many more flaws you end up with, as opposed to trying
to get rid of some of those that are in there. It has simply been
there for a long time that no one was prepared to take that out in
terms of the opening proposal, despite the fact that we have frequently indicated that is one of the things which is unacceptable.
Thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Just on a personal note, you have testified before
us, we discussed outside, on chemical, biological. Your consistent
opinion is you cant verify any of these treaties, so we shouldnt do
them, period, right?
Mr. MAHLEY. It is my view that when you have a treaty it is the
responsibility of everybody that is a party of that treaty to comply
with it, and that, unfortunately, in the course of the world there
are probably going to be countries at one time or another which are
not going to want to do that because they seek some advantage.
In that case, the inability to determine that they are, indeed, not
complying with their obligations is a serious, if not fatal, drawback.
Thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. So bottom line is no treaties ever, in your view?
Mr. MAHLEY. I would not wish to draw that conclusion, because
I think we have done some in the past, and I think there is even
the possibility of looking at things in the future that might be able

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00047

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

44
to meet those standards, but I do think that we shouldnt get into
any that dont meet the standards.
Mr. TIERNEY. Give me a call some time, Ambassador, when you
think of one that you think you might support, all right, because
your numerous testimony, I think we havent got there yet on that.
General, where we are talking about debris and things of that
nature, wouldnt that be at least something that we would want to
be concerned about, the amount of debris that any of these actions,
like Chinas action, happen, and something we want to engage
rather vigorously in trying to make sure that we mitigate or stop?
General ARMOR. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And there are ongoing
international discussions on debris mitigation. I think it is the
Interagency Debris Coordination Committee, of which China was a
signatory. This ASAT was not consistent with their signature on
that.
I know that, consistent with the international discussions we
have on those rules, we have Department directives that direct us
to minimize debris on all of our space activities, and it is pretty rigorously enforced.
Mr. TIERNEY. When you talk about the United States establishing international space debris mitigation guidelines, essentially
that is what they are, guidelines, and just
General ARMOR. Yes, sir, voluntary guidelines, if I understand it
correctly. I am not a lawyer.
Mr. TIERNEY. Has there been, to your knowledge, any negotiation
trying to get some sort of regime that goes beyond the voluntary
compliance aspect?
General ARMOR. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that would be useful?
General ARMOR. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that such a regime would be useful,
given the amount of debristhis is one incidentand the potential
that exists if others were to follow suit.
General ARMOR. These guidelines are very useful, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Are you saying that there would be no use for having something that could be enforced?
General ARMOR. I dont know what enforce means in that context, sir, but guidelines like this that help stimulate responsible behavior and good rules in space are, I think, beneficial to all responsible users, all space powers.
Mr. TIERNEY. It wasnt too beneficial to us with respect to Chinas actions, was it?
General ARMOR. Well, we are a little bit
Mr. TIERNEY. Guidelines.
General ARMOR. We are a little bit mystified as to Chinas intent
and behavior in this case, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. But we werent mystified to the fact that they did
it, because we knew well in advance that they were gearing up to
do it, right?
General ARMOR. There were intelligence indications. Yes, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Are you able to share with us why it is that we
made the decision to not even make any public statement in advance that might have stopped them from doing that, or at least
shined a light on them to make them think twice about doing it?

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00048

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

45
General ARMOR. I would defer to others on that, sir. I had no insight into that decision process.
Mr. TIERNEY. Who are the others that you would defer to?
General ARMOR. I would defer to the White House and the other
departments.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Ambassador, on the question of the current administrations not pursuing a space arms control agreement, and that
would be an effective approach to take, am I correct in saying that
is consistent with the previous several administrations, as well,
that President Clinton, President Bush 41, President Carter, that
they took this similar approach?
Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, I think what is most accurate to say is that the
last time that we attempted to negotiate a legally binding outer
space treaty was in the Carter administration with the then Soviet
Union. We did that for a number of years and we came to a conclusion that we could not even define the terms of what we were trying to negotiate at that point, let alone the question of what actually constituted weaponization of outer space and what would constitute an effective means to try to prevent it in any fashion.
Since that time, I can say that there have been a number of internal deliberations in which we have tried to look at, in various
U.S. administrations, things that might appear to be effective. And
you are absolutely correct that it is a consistent view for at least
the last four administrations that I am aware of that we have not
been able to find anything that looked like it would be a productive
means of trying to reach an international legally binding agreement. Yes, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. On the issue of China, I think both of you reference
in your statements the inquiries, both through the military channels and diplomatic channels, as to seek to get an explanation, and
nothing of substance has been forthcoming. In this setting are you
able to share what answers we have been given thus far?
Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, the only thing that I can share with you diplomatically, because it happens to constitute the extent of my
knowledge on the matter, not necessarily because it is all there is
and I will be happy to take the question to give you a more complete answer in terms of exactly what we have heard back from the
Chinese. But the issue is that we demarged them about that and
we have not as yet gotten from them anything which, in our general terminology, we consider satisfactory. By that I mean we have
gotten nothing which attempted to indicate what their purpose was
or to indicate what their intent was in doing it.
We have gotten a flat statement from them which, in diplomatic
terms, is sort of a push off, which simply says that it was not directed at any specific country. That is fine. It wasnt. It was their
own satellite. We knew that to begin with. And beyond that, we
have gotten no constructive dialog from the Chinese in response to
our query.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Ambassador and General, would you, either one,
want to conjecture, given that China has been one of the nations

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00049

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

46
pushing for arms control agreement, that since they are the only
nation in the last 20 years that has actually pursued a weapon in
space, as this test or this action in January exemplifies, their
thought process? They are the only ones that have done it, yet they
are seeking to limit that ability, from a diplomatic standpoint or a
military standpoint.
Mr. MAHLEY. Sir, I will take a stab at that, even though getting
inside Chinese minds is not one of the things which is useful in
most cases, or possible.
I think the answer would, in some respects, be that the Chinese
have generally been developing an overall military improvement
operation, and so therefore that would makeand I would defer to
my Defense colleague to contradict me if he thinks I am incorrect
herebut therefore that kind of a test would not be inconsistent
with their overall general military policy that they have been pursuing.
In terms of why they would do that when they are continuing to
push the preventions arm race in outer space idea and Conference
on Disarmament, again, I would refer you back to my opening
statement when I indicated that certainly their proposal for an
agreement would not have prevented their development and deployment of such a system. The fact is that it wasnt a choice in
place, and so therefore it could well be something like a nuclear
test. If you will recall back when we were doing the CTBT negotiations, the Chinese went through an entire series of nuclear tests
when they thought they might want to try to get that done before
the conclusion of the negotiations.
Whether that same kind of philosophy was engaged here, I really
have no knowledge to say, but I would simply refer that to you historically.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. General, did you have something you would like to
add?
General ARMOR. Congressman Platts, no, I really dont have that
much to add. I mean, that test is consistent with the broad Chinese
investment in space, and so if you are pursuing that technology,
that is a logical technology thing to do, but it is not consistent with
the other things they have said openly and/or in agreements at the
President-to-President level, so I am still a little mystified.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TIERNEY. In October 2005, I mentioned this also in the opening remarks, we had sort of an annual vote at the United Nations,
and the vote generally talks about preventing an arms race in
outer space, the need to do that, and in past years the United
States has always voted present. This year it was a 160-to1 vote.
The United States was the one to vote no.
Ambassador, what was the change of heart there for that vote
change? Just being obstinate, or was there something deeper in
policy?
Mr. MAHLEY. Well, sir, I would not try to tell you that I, again,
am perfectly familiar with all of the internal deliberations that
went into making the determination on that vote, but I will tell you
the following: this year the resolution did have changes in the
wording, and what it did is, particularly in conjunction with the

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00050

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

47
other things that were going on in the Conference on Disarmament
proposals at that same time, led us in language down a slippery
slope into exactly the kinds of things that we had been protesting
about in the Conference on Disarmament that we were not going
to engage in, and so therefore it was the judgment of the administration that we ought, in this case, to simply make very clear that
we were not going to let that language then be thrown back at us
in the Conference on Disarmament context as having agreed to
something which we were not prepared to agree to, and therefore
the best way to do that was to vote no.
Mr. TIERNEY. General, in your written testimony you made the
statement that China is pursuing a broad-based, comprehensive
transformation of its military forces to include space, counter-space,
and information operations, including a modern intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance architecture with advanced space-enabled command and control and targeting capabilities, also developing a wide range of anti-access and aerial denial capabilities, including the direct ascent anti-satellite radio frequency jammers, lasers supporting space surveillance and information, warfare capabilities. Then you go on to talk about the lack of transparency in
their expenditure.
Are you able to say that the United States and other nations are
not walking down the same path?
General ARMOR. Other nations not walking down
Mr. TIERNEY. Not pursuing a broad-based, comprehensive transformation of forces, including space, not dealing with counter-space,
not dealing with information, operations, not doing any of that?
General ARMOR. We can share intelligence assessments on all the
space-faring nations with you, gentlemen, in another venue, and
we have shared those intelligence
Mr. TIERNEY. And I have seen them, so I am not asking you for
specifics.
General ARMOR. I see.
Mr. TIERNEY. I am asking you for a broad statement. Are you
able to state that no other country except China is taking that path
or doing those things?
General ARMOR. As broadly as China is doing it, I believe they
are the only ones, as well as us, that are that broad and deep
from
Mr. TIERNEY. So the United States and China?
General ARMOR. Yes, at the current time.
Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, there is some information out there that
some people in the Chinese community didnt know that the test
was happening. It was a relatively small group of people that were
informed about that, and, in fact, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
might have been largely cut out of the decisionmaking process on
that. Is that something we should believe, Ambassador Mahley, or
is that something they would like us to believe but is not real?
Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any specific information, so when I tell you that I dont know the answer to that question it is not that I cant share it with you, it is that I dont know
the answer to that question. But I will tell you that it has been my
experience, in dealing with the Chinese government over a number
of years and over a number of topics, that they have internal com-

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00051

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

48
munications problems within their government at times, and so
therefore it certainly would not surprise me to hear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not fully briefed by their Ministry of
Defense on that test and the impending nature of that test. Yes,
sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. General, do you want to add anything to that? I
think that is what you were signaling me?
General ARMOR. No, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens, who is going to testify on the second
panel today, makes an important observation in her written testimony and states, The more the United States seeks high-power
means to both protect itself in space and ensure that others cannot
use space against it, the more threatening U.S. intentions seem
and the more others will seek to counter U.S. actions. Do you gentlemen agree with that observation? If not, why not? General?
General ARMOR. Let me start. No, I dont really agree with that.
I think most countries are now recognizing that space is in their
national interest, economically, and a wide variety of domains, and
they are going to pursue it to the extent that their nation is able
to. There are even some organizations, consortiums that see the
economic benefits and will put resources in space. Space tourism,
like you said, is another example of another organization. So I just
see this as a general growth and mankind expanding into the space
domain, and I dont see it as necessarily one versus the other.
Mr. TIERNEY. Let me proceed a little on that, because we just
talked about the comment that at least the United States and
China, with some depth, and others in less depth, are pursuing
comprehensive transformation of military forces to include space,
counter-space, information operations, intelligence, all those things,
so yes, they are all doing it, but I think Ms. Hitchens point seems
to bewe will hear more from herthat the more the United
States seeks sort of hard power, or China or any of these others,
to protect themselves in space and ensure that others cant use
space against them, the more threatening this whole thing becomes, and it has a potential to spin a little bit out of control. You
dont agree with that?
General ARMOR. No, Mr. Chairman, I dont. I mean, we are the
worlds super power. We sort of are on the leading edge in space.
When you say space, people think of America. It has been that way
for decades now. And so I think this is just part of the natural evolution of other nations expanding into the space domain.
We are No. 1 so you could say that we were the cause of all of
their behavior, but I also think this is a natural progression of expanding into the space domain.
Mr. TIERNEY. And that includes all the military uses and things
of that nature?
General ARMOR. Well, yes, sir, when mankind goes anywhere, it
tends to take its defensive nature with it, as well.
Mr. TIERNEY. And both of you gentlemen are fine with the idea
that we shouldnt do anything on the diplomatic end about trying
to get some sort of a treaty or agreement to slow that down or stop
it?
General ARMOR. Well, just like in the air and the sea, there are
conventions and rules and guidelines that are very helpful to re-

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00052

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

49
sponsible behavior, navigation of the seas. Our militaries follow all
of the air rules for traveling in air space, as does our Navy traveling in sea space, and so I believe that rules like that are genuinely
signed up to an agreed-to conventions, rulesI am not a lawyer.
I am not sure I know the right terminology, but those are generally
helpful to prevent purposeful interference or to create situations
where there is miscalculation of intent or just good, responsible behavior in the space domain.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Platts.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to make sure I understand both your positions on the
issue of pursuing or the ability of a space arms treaty, that the position you have is based on the complexity of the issue and the ability to actually pursue one that would not compromise our national
security and be verifiable and it is the issues around a space arms
treaty that is why this administration and previous administrations have not pursued and actually engaged in one. It is not that
you are not receptive, but it is just not a possibility that is going
to not diminish our national security in todays environment.
Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Platts, I think I would answer that in the following fashion. The United States has as a policy right now, the
fact that we are prepared to pursue equitable, effectively verifiable
treaties that are in the national security interest of the United
States and its allies. Now, that is not new. That is a policy that
has been generally the nature of U.S. negotiating practice for at
least the last 15 years that I have been engaged in negotiations.
So, therefore, I think that it is safe to say that if we could find
that kind of a treaty, that there is no inherent reason we would
not be prepared to pursue it. But, as we have indicated, I think
that we have had a number of false starts in the space area along
that line which have been unsatisfactory. When I say false starts
I go all the way back, as I say, to the ASAT negotiations that we
engaged in with the Soviet Union someI hate to look as old as
I am, but some 30 years ago in that. And then the case that we
have had, for example, the prevention of arms race in outer space
proposal the Chinese have and the Conference on Disarmament.
That has been around with only minor modifications for at least
the last 12 years, and so therefore all of that is something which
says those are not the ways to do that answer.
I would also point out, with just one side note, the Chinese have
been pursuing an active anti-satellite program for at least the last
decade, so again I dont think that is because of any wording that
is in the current national space policy that caused them to do that.
Thank you.
Mr. PLATTS. General.
General ARMOR. I have been impressed with the Outer Space
Treaty the last 40 years and the framework that it has laid out.
Look at the way space has prospered now over the last 40 years.
Again, I do feel that, now that there is more and more space-faring
nations and entities in space, that we do need to help augment the
rules or just coordinate guidelines on how to operate responsibly in
space. In fact, we have made our space situational and space surveillance data available on an Internet site to all users in space;
www.spacetrot.org goes right into the Cheyenne Mountain data

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00053

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

50
base so that people who are moving in space can sort of see that
they dont bump into each other and otherwise know what is going
on. That is the kind of responsible behavior that I think we would
like to try and stimulate.
Mr. PLATTS. On the issue of a specific arms treaty, the actions
of China in January kind of add additional concerns why that is
not necessarily feasible if we take the answer of the Chinese Defense Ministry not well communicating with the Foreign Ministry
in the sense of the military trumping diplomacy. An arms treaty,
in essence, is a diplomatic agreement, and it kind of makes the
point that, when dealing with China, we maybe all the more need
to be careful because within their government some friction between their foreign ministry and diplomatic efforts and their military pursuit of expanded and more-developed capabilities. Is that
a fair statement?
Mr. MAHLEY. Congressman, I think it is always a fair statement
to say that when you have any kind of friction like that you tend
to get policy which does not necessarily satisfy all the kinds of
things that you would like to have done with it. And by that I
mean that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has certainly been
among the people in the Chinese Government that have been pursuing the PAROS Agreement in Geneva.
I would not want to say that the Ministry of Defense was trying
desperately to undercut their efforts in Geneva, but I will say that
it is not clear that diplomatic effort by the Chinese in Geneva constitutes a consensus opinion of the Chinese government, in which
case you may get actions which are not consistent with it. And certainly we think that the ASAT test was not consistent with any
kind of an arms control agreement that they have been pursuing.
Mr. PLATTS. And certainly the actions in January, the launching
of the satellite, didnt bolster the diplomatic efforts, and the refusal
to give very much information in response to the launch doesnt
bolster the diplomatic position of the Chinese.
Mr. MAHLEY. No. Neither that action nor their response to the
action, not only to us but to a number of other countries that have
made an inquiry, has done anything to promote their diplomatic efforts to try to get a negotiation going on outer space. That is a fair
statement.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have one more. One other one for both of you. If you had
to highlight the most significant difference between the 1995 directive under President Clinton for a space policy and this one, what
would you highlight as the most significant change? General?
General ARMOR. Why dont I start. I thought it was easy. I have
been working in the framework of the 1996 policy for 10 years, and
when I read the new one the two things that jumped out at me
was, No. 1, more cooperation internationally, and especially with
our allies. So I personally have been doing that. I have been out
talking with our allies. I went to Geneva to the U.N. Institute of
Disarmament Research a couple of months ago. I am planning another trip to Europe here soon, and working with the Australians.
So there was an emphasis in the new policy about, hey, working
with allies and cooperative countries works, why dont we do more
of that.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00054

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

51
The other one was creation of new organizations within the executive branch, the Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Defense Department also, to bring more unity of effort within the executive branch.
Those were the two things that jumped out at me, from my experience.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. MAHLEY. Substantively I think I would first of all agree with
General Armor. I would also say that I think the language is more
explicit in identification of space as not only a top priority but as
being vital to our national security. And I also think that there are
some welcome changes in the new space policy in terms of the bureaucratics in the sense of organizing and assigning responsibility
for the establishment of the resource base to pursue space policy
that we need to pursue.
Those are the things that I would think are changes, sir.
Thank you.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you both for your testimony and your answers.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
I think we are pretty much at the end of this particular panel.
I only make the note that the Foreign Ministry in China might
be at odds with its Defense Department. That would never happen
in this country. The Secretary of States office would be at odds
with the Department of Defense? We have not seen any of that in
our recent history at all.
I do want to thank both of our witnesses for appearing here
today and for your testimony, both oral and written.
At this point, with your assent, we will move on to the next
panel, and we give you our gratitude for your time and effort here
today.
Thank you.
Mr. MAHLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to impose on just one
comment. If it were the case that the Defense Department and the
Department of State were at odds with each other in this Government, we wouldnt tell the Congress about it, but we will tell the
Congress that we think that is the case with the Chinese. Thank
you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.
We are going to take about a 2-minute break here, if the witnesses of the second panel would like to come forward and take
their places. We will change the name tags. Mr. Platts will be back,
I think he said in a minute or two, and we will get started on the
second panel. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. TIERNEY. We are going to reconvene the meeting.
Mr. Platts is tied up for a couple of moments, and he has said
he is fine if we start to proceed. He will join us when he can.
I want to introduce our second panel, which represents the scientific community, space and nonproliferation experts, as well as
the commercial space industry. On this panel we have Dr. Laura
Grego, staff scientist from the Union of Concerned Scientists based
in Cambridge, MA; Ms. Theresa Hitchens, who is the Director for
the Center for Defense Information; Mr. Jeff Kueter, who is the

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00055

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

52
president of the George C. Marshall Institute; and Mr. David
Cavossa, who is the executive director of the Satellite Industry Association, originally from Lowell, MA, just outside my district in
Massachusetts, and I may have some family members moving in.
Welcome to all of you.
Again, it is the policy of the subcommittee to swear in witnesses
before they testify. I am going to ask you to stand and raise your
right hands, and if there are any other persons who are going to
be responding to questions, might they also rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please indicate that all witnesses
have answered in the affirmative. In case you didnt hear me the
first time, we would love you to give a summary of your comments.
You can read, if you wish, but a summary of about 5 minutes. We
wont hold you strictly to that, but in order that all of you get your
statements in and we allow for some questioning and answering,
that would be a terrific thing. Your full statement will be put in
the record, in any event. Thank you.
Ms. Grego.
STATEMENTS OF LAURA GREGO, PH.D., STAFF SCIENTIST,
GLOBAL SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; THERESA HITCHENS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION; JEFF KUETER, PRESIDENT, THE
GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE; AND DAVID CAVOSSA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF LAURA GREGO

Ms. GREGO. Mr. Chairman and distinguished representatives,

thanks for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today.
I would like to address the question of what approach the United
States should take to develop an effective and sustainable policy toward space security. I am a physicist by training and currently
apply my technical background to analysis of space security issues.
An important part of understanding security issues is understanding both the possibilities and the limits of technical approaches to security.
I have four main points that I made in my submitted statement,
and I thank you for submitting that to the record. They are discussed in more detail in there, but I will summarize them quickly.
The first is that in recent years the United States has taken a
largely unilateral approach to space security, based on pursuing
technical measures and capabilities. The unclassified version of the
national space policy released in 2006 formalized at the highest Administrative levels what was essentially already U.S. policy. Arms
control and diplomatic approaches are considered largely irrelevant
to solving outstanding space security issues.
Two, while there are useful technical measures the United States
can and should take to improve security, because of the increasing
technical capabilities of other countries and the dual use nature of
micro satellites and other space technologies, the current unilateral
technical approach is ultimately going to be neither effective nor
sustainable. Defensive space weapons are not a solution to providing security to our critical satellite capabilities.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00056

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

53
The third point is that, as a result, there is a need for diplomatic
efforts to pursue rules of the road and operational constraints on
space operations, as well as verifiable legal constraints on systems
intended to damage and destroy satellites. In the future, limits on
specific technologies will not be sufficient and operational constraints and other rules of conduct will be essential to maintain security.
And the last point was that, as a first step toward controlling
anti-satellite systems, an international ban on debris-producing
anti-satellite weapons similar to the weapon that China tested in
January will be a way of starting an international process in taking an important step toward preserving the use of space for the
future. If such a ban could be negotiated and respected, it would
prevent the production of a large amount of space debris that
would be generated in testing programs, and the single biggest
threat to the future of the space environment could be mitigated.
It would also reduce the military utility of extant or developing destructive ASAT weapons due to the decreased confidence in an untested or an incompletely tested system. Such a ban would be verifiable, perhaps with already existing surveillance assets.
A ban on destructive anti-satellite weapons will derive still greater relevance and usefulness as part of a comprehensive regime of
technical measures to preserve satellite capability and arms control
measures, rules of the road for space conduct, and confidence-building measures between space-faring nations.
In the remaining time I just wanted to spend a few minutes talking about in more depth a couple of points in my written testimony.
The first is space debris. The Chinese ASAT test in January increased the amount of debris in low-earth orbits by about 20 percent. I would like to emphasize that the approximately 1,600 pieces
of debris cataloged in the space catalog by the U.S. Air Force are
only those that can be tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, specifically, pieces of debris bigger than about 10 centimeters
or 4 inches in size. That does not include the pieces of debris that
are too small to track reliably but which still can create significant
damage to a satellite during a collision.
The destruction of the Fengyun 1C satellite released, according
to our calculations, over 40,000 pieces of debris of that untrackable
but still very dangerous type.
Fortunately, the absolute risk to satellites due to this debris is
still low. However, the situation could become much worse if China
or other countries continue testing these weapons, and it is critical
to stop this now. We have been calculating the amounts of debris
that would be produced by destructive ASAT weapons, and find
that destroying a single large satellite such as a U.S. spy satellite
would double the amount of dangerous debris in low-earth orbit.
This is the same amount of debris that would be avoided during
70 to 80 years of space activity under the strict debris mitigation
guidelines of the kind being considered at the United Nations and
to which the United States is a consulting party.
At the Union of Concerned Scientists we continue to conduct research on the subject of the debris from ASAT attacks and would
be happy to provide our expertise to Congress.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00057

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

54
This brings me to my comments on the lead up to Chinas ASAT
test. The Chinese research program on hit-to-kill technologies appears to have begun in the 1980s, probably sparked by observing
the United States and Soviet Union developing and testing ASAT
weapons during that time and the United States pursuing homing
missile defense technologies. The research likely continued at a low
level through the 1990s and may have been boosted in recent years
in response to U.S. missile defense tests, as it would be in the Chinese self interest to understand this technology if it wanted to
counter it for its own missile defense and to plans released by the
United States for new military uses of space.
The Chinese ability to master the difficult technical challenge of
maneuvering a high-speed interceptor to hit a high-speed satellite
about the size of a golf cart indicates the advanced state of Chinas
space technology. However, the complexity of this technology does
also indicate that, without further testing, this nascent ASAT
weapon could not be considered an operational military capability.
We are not privy to the internal decisionmaking process that led
China to pursue this final destructive test, but we do know that the
United States was not taken by surprise by the test, having observed the preparations for it, which reportedly China made no attempt to disguise, and the United States did see it take place.
We also know that the United States also observed at least two
previous tests of the ASAT system reaching back at least 18
months in which the interceptor passed near to but did not collide
with the satellite.
It has been reported again that, after seeing the earlier tests,
that the United States decided not to contact China to protest or
ask about them. Since China would have known that the United
States could see this test with its early warning sensors and understand it for what it was, it may have interpreted the lack of reaction by the United States as a lack of concern, if not tacit approval.
So one does wonder what might be characterized as unverifiable
about that.
While the responsibility for this test rests fully with China, the
United States may have missed an opportunity to avoid it if it used
thoughtful diplomacy. Reports indicate that the U.S. officials assumed China was committed to this test and let the United States
have little leverage to stop it. This assumption cant be evaluated
since the United States didnt actually attempt to dissuade China.
Moreover, we do have evidence that suggests this assumption may
not be correct.
Based on information we have collected about the January test,
there appears to be an ongoing debate within China about the wisdom of this test and about possible future tests. It appears that the
Chinese leadership did not anticipate the strong international reaction to the test. The decision process may have included a narrow
set of people, in particular the Foreign Ministry appears to have
been largely cut out of the decision to conduct that test, which may
have led to this surprise. And Chinese decisionmakers may not
have been adequately advised on the degree of consequences and
the harm it would do to other space-faring nations, a number of
which China has strong partnerships with.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00058

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

55
Had the United States raised this issue with China prior to the
test, that would have almost certainly broadened the set of people
who were involved in the decisionmaking process. This could have
had a significant effect on the Chinese decision.
So what happens next or doesnt happen is important. Some in
the United States argue that the ASAT program is central to Chinas military strategy of disrupting U.S. space assets, so it would
not have stopped the test even if the United States had protested;
that it would continue developing and testing the program, despite
the strongly negative international reaction.
The system, itself, cannot yet be considered a proven capability.
If China refrained from future tests, this would call into question
just how central China sees this ASAT system is to its military
posture, and that Chinese decisions may be influenced by international concerns.
I will leave you with the idea that technical solutions cannot get
us all the way to a secure future in space. Diplomacy and arms
control measures will be essential to building our future in space,
a future where the enormous potential of space as an agent of prosperity and stability is realized.
I urge the distinguished members of this committee to ask the
hard questions. Why isnt the United States using all the tools
available to ensure security on space and on earth? Why are we not
vigorously pursuing all the potential diplomatic avenues, when
there are many? And while the United States has apparently abandoned the development of its own kinetic energy ASAT weapon
back in the 1980s, it has taken a very welcome leadership role in
developing international guidelines for debris mitigation and has
the most to lose from space debris, owning over half the active satellites in orbit. Why doesnt it do more to make sure that no other
country develops and tests this kind of weapons? Specifically, why
did it apparently stand by and watch while China tested its massive kinetic energy ASAT system and did not vigorously try to dissuade the Chinese from the test in which they actually destroyed
a satellite, especially with so much at stake?
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grego follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00059

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

56

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00060

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

57

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00061

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

58

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00062

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

59

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00063

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

60

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00064

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

61

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00065

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

62

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00066

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

63

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00067

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

64

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00068

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

65

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00069

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

66

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00070

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

67
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
Ms. Hitchens.
STATEMENT OF THERESA HITCHENS

Ms. HITCHENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee, for inviting me today to discuss what I believe is one
of the most important subjects for the 21st century, and that is the
future security of space and, in particular, the impact of U.S. policy
on that security.
Warfare in space would endanger all space operations, civil, commercial, and military. As the worlds preeminent space power, the
United States will have the most to lose if space becomes a battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. policy is leading us in exactly that direction, toward embracing space weaponization and away from international diplomacy that could reduce future threats to our space
assets.
As has been stated, the Bush administration on October 6, 2006,
released international space policy superseding the previous Clinton policy. While there are similarities to previous policies in that
new national space policy, the wording is strikingly different from
its predecessors in its unilateralist tone and its focus on the exercise of military space power. In seeking to assert unhindered U.S.
rights to act in space, the new policy, at best, ignores the rights
of others under the Outer Space Treaty, which deems space a global commons.
The new policy not only repeats the 1996 language asserting a
right to deny U.S. adversaries the use of space, but it goes further
by stating U.S. intentions to deter others from even developing capabilities that can challenge U.S. freedom of action in space. That
is a difficult thing to uphold, considering that most space technologies are dual use.
It stops short of overtly authorizing space weapons, but when
read in concert with current military documents designed to implement it, which detail the missions of offensive space control and
space force application, U.S. intentions to pursue such weaponry
seem clear.
Reaction to the new policy, especially abroad, has been exceedingly negative. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese of the U.S. Navy War College provided this assessment: The blunt and even confrontational
language of the new policy puts the United States at odds with the
priorities of other space-faring nations. The language is so broad
that it reads more like a blanket claim to hegemony in space. And
the document, as the chairman has already noted, further distances the United States from international efforts to establish collective security in space.
Sadly, this aggressive U.S. declaratory policy and the Just Say
No attitude to diplomacy is utterly failing to protect Americas interest in space. To the contrary, it is backfiring, alienating allies
and prompting our potential adversaries into seeking ways to
counter any expansion of U.S. space power.
Certainly if the aim of U.S. policy is to dissuade and deter others
from obtaining capabilities to threaten us, it has failed at doing so.
As we heard, China has tested an ASAT weapon. India is threatening to develop similar capabilities which would no doubt spark an

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00071

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

68
Asian ASAT arms race involving Pakistan and possibly others. And
we have already heard about the debris problem.
The time has come for the United States to rethink its failing
strategy. A first step would be to engage other space-faring nations
in efforts to define peacetime rules of the road, as mentioned by
General Armor. A space code of conduct would bolster U.S. national
security by serving to reduce tensions and making it easier to identify and constrain bad apples.
Second, the United States should renounce not only the development and deployment of debris-creating ASATs, but it should also
urge an international ban on testing and use of these indiscriminate satellite killers. While such a ban may not prevent people
from working on them, it certainly would discourage other nations
from using them or testing them, which is where I mentioned
would make it less likely that they would want to rely on them in
warfare.
As they say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and
in the case of space debris this is doubly true since there are currently no technologies available for cleaning it up. There is no such
thing as a Space Hoover.
Finally, the United States needs to sit down with other spacefaring nations to discuss how to avoid an arms race in the heavens,
and I am glad to hear that Ambassador Mahley said that the
United States is no longer refusing informal discussions in the CD.
That is a change, and it is a welcome one. But I would hope that
we would be willing to at least talk about crafting a treaty to ban
space-based weapons, even though we know it would be fiendishly
difficult to do. Certainly there can be no harm from an honest discussion.
My last point is that a new focus on diplomacy and collective security in space does not and should not mean that the United
States should abandon necessary efforts to protect its satellites, for
example, by improving space situational awareness, but the fact is
that what any one operator does in space directly affects all others,
and not any one nation, not even the United States, can guarantee
safety and security in space on its own.
Thank you. I will be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hitchens follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00072

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

69

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00073

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

70

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00074

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

71

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00075

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

72

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00076

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

73

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00077

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

74

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00078

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

75

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00079

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

76

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00080

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

77

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00081

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

78

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00082

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

79

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00083

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

80

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00084

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

81

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00085

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

82

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00086

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

83

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00087

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

84

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00088

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

85

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00089

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

86

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00090

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

87

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00091

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

88

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00092

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

89

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00093

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

90

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00094

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

91

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00095

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

92

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00096

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

93
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Hitchens.
Mr. Kueter.
STATEMENT OF JEFF KUETER

Mr. KUETER. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss this very
important issue. I agree completely with Theresa that it is, I believe, the national security question of the 21st century.
Our use of space has clearly changed, and what it means for the
strategic environment has clearly changed. As has been mentioned,
the missions provided by space are integral to the American way
of warfare. This way of warfare brings us enormous advantages. It
requires less manpower, puts fewer U.S. forces in harms way, and
integrates all space-based missions into real time boots-on-theground and stand-off precision strike operations.
By fulfilling these real-time war fighting needs, as well as the
broader strategic reconnaissance and intelligence missions, space
assets no longer just tell us where people are and what they are
doing, they are integrated with and improve the effectiveness of
weapons systems that are used to target and destroy. That is not
a convenience to the war fighter; they are now part of the weapons
systems that we use every day, and not an insignificant part of
that.
These capabilities are uniquely American strength and provide
clear incentive for attacking American spacecraft. Other nations
have clearly taken notice. Chinas demonstration of its direct-ascent anti-satellite system in January 2007 shows those emerging
capabilities. Last September, reports surfaced that China had successfully conducted laser blinding tests against U.S. reconnaissance
satellites, and further investigation reveals that these blinding
tests had been ongoing for several years. China has made no secret
of its efforts to develop techniques to jam navigation satellites, as
have many other nations.
Chinas perceptions of its security environment and the nature of
the future conflicts explain their investment in military space capabilities. They understand that the control of space is essential to
success in future warfare. Without control of space, Chinese military leaders believe neither they nor an adversary can expect to assert air or naval dominance or win a ground war.
In light of this changed environment, what are we to make of the
national space policy? Released after many years in the making,
the policy charts a reasonable course, upholding established beliefs
about safeguarding the security of the United States in space while
preserving the flexibility needed to respond to the uncertain security environments of the future.
The policy is not without its failings, but it does reiterate the
commitment to preserving and protecting U.S. assets in space, as
has been directed by Democratic and Republican Presidents, alike,
over the years. But as the first space policy written for the age of
the space-enabled reconnaissance strike complex, the policy rightly
asserts that the national security establishment should develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space
and, if directed, deny such freedom of actions to adversaries.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00097

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

94
This goal draws its origins from the earliest days of the U.S.
space program, nor is there really anything unique about directing
the security establishment to develop plans and options to deny
freedom of action to adversaries. Even President Carter ordered the
Defense Department to vigorously pursue development of an antisatellite capability and allowed for the production of such systems.
Nevertheless, this mandate is widely interpreted as presaging
the deployment of new U.S. space weapons rather than for what it
actually is, a reaffirmation of the continuing strategic approach.
The declaration that the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space also is offered as evidence that the new policy is part of some nefarious framework to
expand U.S. hegemony in space. Instead of just simply a statement
that the United States will not support international agreements
that it considers contrary to its interests, it is not the blanket prohibition on arms control, as is often asserted.
Past space policies include similar qualifying language. For example, President Clintons 1996 policy stated that the United
States should conclude agreements on such measures only if they
are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the
United States or our allies. The new policy sends the same message as the old policy: the United States will not become a party
to an agreement that it feels is contrary to its interests. Nevertheless, the new policy does not eschew internationally. For example,
it strongly calls on the United States to assume leadership on overall debris mitigation.
So the question now facing Americas leaders is, how does the
United States best deter, deny, and dissuade the Chinese and other
emerging space powers from hostile actions in space?
The first step I suggest is moving beyond the tired lexical dispute
over what is militarizing or weaponizing space. That is too late.
Space is already both of those. A positive step would be to build
on recognition of the new reality in space to enable public and political support necessary to begin the work to protect critical space
programs. A new emphasis on policies and programs likely to improve our capabilities to respond and react to incidents in space is
needed. The United States should not foreclose the option of developing active defenses, if necessary. And, finally, diplomatic efforts
can play important roles in preserving U.S. security, but only in
combination with other measures.
There are a number of topics that I suggest we consider there,
most importantly involving more actively our NATO allies.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kueter follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00098

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

95

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00099

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

96

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00100

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

97

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00101

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

98

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00102

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

99

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00103

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

100

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00104

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

101

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00105

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

102

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00106

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

103

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00107

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

104

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00108

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

105

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00109

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

106

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00110

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

107
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Kueter.
Mr. Cavossa.
STATEMENT OF DAVID CAVOSSA

Mr. CAVOSSA. Mr. Chairman, Representative McCollum, Representative Platts, on behalf of the Satellite Industry Association it
is my goal today to provide you with an overview of the critical role
satellites play in our global economy, the role they play in support
of our military and first responders, and then finally speak for a
few moments on the importance of space situational awareness and
being a responsible actor in space.
Whether broadcasting television programming to viewers
throughout the world, enabling the U.S. military to conduct large
and small scale operations across large distances, or providing communications to first responders during disasters, satellites are
there.
Today satellites permeate our every-day lives and contribute over
$106 billion to our global economy. Today commercial satellites
support daily activities such as truck fleet management, credit card
validations, pay-at-the-pump services, ATM withdrawals, highspeed Internet access, traffic and weather reports, and almost all
television and radio distribution. In rural areas where terrestrial
communications do not reach all residents, satellite broadband, satellite television, and satellite radio provide consumers services they
otherwise would not have access to through terrestrial means.
As we all know, satellite communications have also played a critical role during the response to each of the natural and man-made
disasters in recent memory. In 2005, satellite communications provided a lifeline for aid workers and victims in the remote islands
of the Indian Ocean following the Asian tsunami, and in the earthquake-desolated towns and villages of Pakistan. In response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the recent tornadoes in Kansas,
satellite communications once again proved their essential value
when all other forms of terrestrial communications were wiped out.
In many of these affected areas, satellite communications provide
the only means of communication.
Military forces are also perhaps the most dependent upon satellite communication systems today. Telemedicine via satellite puts
the resources of the world-class specialists and surgeons at the disposal of medical teams in the field. Unmanned aerial vehicles such
as the Predator and Global Hawk are heavy users of satellite bandwidth today. Other bandwidth-intensive activities such as secure
video teleconferencing and encrypted command and control are also
supported by satellite communications. The DOD estimates that
satellite systems provided over 60 percent of all communications
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Given this reliance on satellite communications, during the last
5 years the satellite industry has spent thousands of hours and
millions of dollars working with the government, both domestic and
allied, to improve the performance, security, and reliability of our
satellite infrastructure. These activities are being coordinated,
again, both domestically and with our allied partners through what
is called the Commercial Satellite Mission Assurance Working
Group [MAWG].

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00111

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

108
Through the MAWG we meet on a regular basis with representatives of the combatant commands, the military services, and Defense agencies, as well as the U.S. State Department, the intelligence community, and representatives of allied governments. The
issues we discuss are space situational awareness, information
sharing, jamming and intentional interference to commercial communication satellites, and how to handle close approaches in space
between commercial satellites and government satellites.
For the past few years our companies have worked closely with
the U.S. Government to develop a series of best practices to reduce
the chances of orbital collisions and close approaches between commercial satellites and government satellites. As part of that effort,
for the past 3 years our companies have used space surveillance
data provided by Air Force Space Command. Their commercial and
foreign entities pilot program is very essential to avoid collisions
with other natural or man-made objects in space.
A key piece of this coordination effort, as General Armor mentioned during the question and answer session, is in jeopardy, however. The CFE program, or the Commercial and Foreign Entity
program, is currently on a list of unfunded priorities in the DOD
budget, and therefore we urge Congress to fully fund the CFE program to ensure we are all able to continue safe operations and responsible operations in space. We need that data from the Department of Defense.
We believe that the U.S. Air Force should fully implement the
congressional mandated CFE program and that the program
should include launch support, conjunction assessment, end-of-life
and re-entry support, anomaly resolution, and emergency services
during close approach times. This will all help us operate safely.
In closing, satellite systems, as I have mentioned, represent a
critical infrastructure for the United States, its allies and our trading partners. As such, Congress must ensure that space commerce
is as protected as maritime commerce is today, and therefore we
need to invest to raise the robustness of the space infrastructure
to mute the effect an attack would have on any one object.
The commercial satellite industry is fully focused on reducing potential vulnerabilities in our systems and, further, we are working
proactively with the U.S. Government and with allied governments
to establish these best practices that I have referred to to promote
safe and responsible operations.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for having me
today. I look forward to answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cavossa follows:]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00112

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

109

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00113

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

110

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00114

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

111

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00115

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

112

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00116

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

113

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00117

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

114

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00118

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

115

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00119

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

116
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the witnesses
on the panel.
If you are good enough to key up a small video that I would like
to play just for a minute and a half on this, this is a video by
sellerstrack.com, which uses debris data from the Air Force. As we
watch it, I think we can remember the model-sized piece of debris
in low-earth orbit would hit a satellite with the same force as a one
ton safe dropped from a five-story building on earth. But after this
I want to ask a question of Mr. Cavossa.
[Video presentation.]
Mr. TIERNEY. The red that you see there is obviously a depiction
of the debris from the Chinese satellite being shot down.
[End of video presentation.]
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Cavossa, can you talk to us a little bit about
the challenges of space debris to your commercial satellite sector?
Mr. CAVOSSA. Our commercial satellite operators are located both
in low-earth orbit, in relative proximity to what you saw there in
that illustration, but a great number, a majority of our satellites
are located in geostationary orbit, which is 23,000 miles away,
quite a bit further away. But our satellite operators today, both in
low-earth orbit and geostationary orbit, work very closely with each
other. They make sure that when a satellite from one company is
going to perhaps maneuver to a different orbital slot, it coordinates
with all the satellites around it to make sure that everyone knows,
hey, I am about to move, and give that data on where you are
going to move your satellites so everyone is aware. We call it Nation Watch of Space Situational Awareness.
Mr. TIERNEY. But debris doesnt give you much of an opportunity
to plan with anything, does it?
Mr. CAVOSSA. No. If it is, of course, debris that we dont know
about, that is a problem, and that is why this CFE program that
I mentioned that the Air Force Space Command runs is so critical
to commercial satellite operators. We dont have the ability to track
objects in space, the same ability that the U.S. Government has.
Mr. TIERNEY. So you think tracking would be enough if a number
of nations decided they were going to test as China did and all that
debris got in there? Do you think the ability to track that would
give comfort to your commercial sector?
Mr. CAVOSSA. Well, sir, tracking alone would be important, of
course, but if there was quite a bit more debris up there, yes, that
would cause a problem for our satellites.
Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens, would you respond a little bit to Mr.
Kueters testimony and to the first two witnesses of this concept
that we cant really verify any treaty on that, we cant define the
terms, I think the first panel said whats weaponization, they cant
determine whats a violation, cant be verified and cant be enforced. Do you have a reaction to that?
Ms. HITCHENS. I think everyone who works on this issue recognizes that it would be very difficult to craft a sort of generic space
weapons ban treaty, and Laura referred to it with the idea of the
difficulty of banning technology, and in particular the difficulty of
discerning between dual use technology on what is a weapon and
what is not a weapon.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00120

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

117
On the other hand, that doesnt necessarily mean that it is not
doable. The United States has signed treaties that dont have verification provisions. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe the Biological Weapons Convention does not have verification protocol, because the United States insisted that it did not.
Certainly there are other approaches like the ASAT testing and
use ban, which we have rejected, and I dont know why because
you can verify testing and use of a debris-creating ASAT.
So there are a lot of different approaches that need to be explored. The problem here has largely been a lack of will and not
a lack of way.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter, on that other point, I heard you say
pretty clearly that U.S. warfare and intelligence relies on satellites.
I dont think anybody disputes that, or that it is a useful thing to
have, but cant we differentiate between not interfering with a nations ability to use satellites for those purposes and the prospect
of people attacking those satellites and then creating debris from
it or other difficulties on that, and then go back to Ms. Hitchens
point of wouldnt it be useful to at least make a differentiation and
then talk about having some agreement that would not allow people to do that.
Mr. KUETER. The satellites that we use for real-time war fighting
capabilities, the communication satellites, the GPS signals that enable precision navigation and timing, are integrated into terrestrial
power projection capabilities today. That is the point that I am trying to make in terms of why those assets are now very attractive
strategic targets for a real or potential adversary of the United
States to go after. If they were to successfully eliminate our access
to those capabilities or deny our use of those capabilities when we
desire to use them, they would gain an enormous asymmetric advantage over us at a particular point in time.
Mr. TIERNEY. I guess that is the point. So isnt that what we
want to negotiate with them so that they wouldnt be able to do
that without some sort of agreement prohibiting that?
Mr. KUETER. Well, sir, there are two specific responses to that.
The first is I dont see where it would be in the interest of any
other nation to negotiate their right away to exploit that asymmetric advantage at some future point in time; and, second, I dont believe that it is possible to verify all of the numerous ways that one
might hold those assets at risk, both electronic, which we have not
talked about very much, or through direct threats, such as the direct-ascent ASAT that we have talked about.
Mr. TIERNEY. On the first point, isnt that a little bit like saying
people wont want to negotiate away their right to have nuclear
weapons, so we shouldnt have any weapons nonproliferation agreements in that respect, and biological, chemical, the whole idea that
somebody might want an advantage that they think they can get
some day means that they will never negotiate in good faith and
preclude that?
Mr. KUETER. Well, the first point I guess I would make against
that statement is that we are talking about a set of capabilities
today that China clearly possesses and that other nations have
nascent capabilities to possess. In the sense of being able to launch
a ballistic missile from the surface of the earth carrying a nuclear

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00121

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

118
warhead into space, exploding it, and destroying any number of
satellites in its path, those capabilities exist in the hands of numerous nations today. So you would be talking about an arms control
effort that would require rolling back capabilities.
I would suggest that we have very few arms treaties that we can
point to that suggest a rolling back of capabilities on a multilateral
level.
Mr. TIERNEY. I can name a few.
Ms. Hitchens and Ms. Grego, why dont we ask you for a comment on that?
Ms. GREGO. Well, I think really the question is are we better off
in a world where we have unrestrained ASATs or not. You can
argue that you cant define every threat, that you cant verify every
threat, and that may be true. I dont think that we have gone far
enough to really determine that. But the question is: would we be
better by moving ahead with diplomatic efforts to restrain the most
dangerous technologies; for example, direct-ascent ASATs. I think
the answer really is yes. And I think that is the type of ban that
is actually verifiable, that is doable with our capabilities right now.
Whether or not countries have the technology to approach or to
develop those weapons, well, I think soon enough anyone who is interested or finds it in their interest to have an ASAT weapon would
be able to develop some technology that can do that. That is the
reality we have to face, and I think we will best face that if we
have some kind of comprehensive arms control agreement to manage that transition to the future.
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Platts.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Cavossa, as to the specific national space policy for
your industry, do you think it adequately addresses the role of commercial space travel and involvement as it is written currently?
Mr. CAVOSSA. Sure. Representative Platts, as an industry association, we are a consensus-based trade association, so all 30 members of our group have to agree before we go forward with any position, so on that issue the industry doesnt have a position of supporting or opposing.
I can highlight, though, that there was some interest in the
things we did see in the space policy we hadnt seen in the past,
which was the focus on interference becoming a problem. Jamming
up commercial communication satellites is a problem, and it was
mentioned in the national space policy as an issue that the U.S.
Government was looking at and viewed as a serious threat. So we
were happy to see that.
Mr. PLATTS. OK. And certainly you mentioned the funding on the
CFE issue, not part of the space policy but just the importance of
that to your industry?
Mr. CAVOSSA. Yes, sir.
Mr. PLATTS. OK. Ms. Hitchens, you talk about in your testimony
that the space policy, we are, in essence, giving China an excuse
or a basis to pursue the weaponization of space. Given the timing
of this launch in January, I think it is fair to say it was really
under the language of the last policy of 1996, because the new policy had just come out in the fall of 2006. So how do you reconcile
that if this new policy is so dramatically different and more mili-

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00122

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

119
tary focused, China went ahead with their launch, anti-satellite
launch, under the Clinton policy, so why would this one be more
encouraging given that it happened already under the Clinton policy?
Ms. HITCHENS. I think there are two parts to that question, sir,
so I am going to try to answer maybe the last one first.
It is obvious that China has been interested in what we call
counter-space technologies, things we have been pursuing for more
than a decade, for a long time due to their recognition that United
States and others space power is something that might be vulnerable. OK? So there is no denying that.
Second, it is probably not true that Chinas test was a direct response to the new national space policy. I think what I was trying
to say in my testimony is that such a national space policy that can
be read as very aggressive, especially when you read it along with
Air Force doctrine that talks about counter-space operations, offensive counter-space operations, attacking satellites, you can see that
it could give political cover to the Chinese to say we are doing this
because the United States is a threat.
And the Chinese, indeed, have said that we are a threat, the
United States is a threat, both with its efforts to create hegemony
in space and contain the Chinese and, second, with the U.S. missile
defense effort, which the Chinese have long been concerned will
nullify their very small nuclear deterrent.
So U.S. space power has been an issue for China for more than
a decade, and it has numerous factors.
Mr. PLATTS. So is it your contention, then, that if we had just
continued under the Clinton space policy, China would not be pursuing its endeavors as it is?
Ms. HITCHENS. Actually, no. I think obviously the Clinton administration didnt pursue space arms control, either. Although they
did not, they ruled out space weapons and anti-satellite weapons.
They canceled programs. Despite the language in the policy, their
implementation of it was very, very different. They did not approve
of the weaponization of space.
That said, I dont necessarily think the Chinese might not have
gone down this path if we would have continued the Clinton policy,
because we have failed. This administration has taken a harsher
line, but we have failed for more than a decade to properly pursue
diplomacy as one end of our space policy.
Mr. PLATTS. I guess when I read the sections of the 1996 policy
that you quoted and the 2006, I would look at it similarly to Mr.
Kueter that I dont see a whole lot of difference. There are some
slight words, but I think the key is, when they talk about an arms
control agreement, only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable,
and enhances the security of the United States and our allies.
Maybe they put that at the end of the sentence as opposed to
lead with that, but the focus is still we are not going to pursue and
enter into arms agreements that are not in the national security
interest of our country.
Ms. GREGO. No country would enter into an arms control agreement that wouldnt be in their interest. That would be silly. And
I dont believe that is what I or others who are advocating for certain kinds of agreements and diplomacy are trying to advocate. In-

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00123

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

120
deed, in my humble opinion it is in the U.S. national security to
try to use diplomatic tools to counter some of these problems, because I dont believe that we can do that using hard power.
Mr. PLATTS. One real quick.
Mr. TIERNEY. We have four votes coming up, so that everybody
gets a chance to ask questions.
Mr. PLATTS. OK. Final one is just, 1996, the last policy, is a very
different world coming out of the end of the cold war to 2007 and
the global war on terror and the threat that exists today. Would
you acknowledge that you cant compare 1996 and the decisions
then directly to 2006, given the changes in the threats to American
security?
Ms. HITCHENS. I actually think that is a very good point, sir. One
of the things that I believe that we need to look at currently with
regard to space is the fact that there are more and more space actors and that the technology has spread, and we have to really
think about how we handle space in a globalized world as opposed
to in a bipolar world, and that makes it a lot more difficult but it
makes it a lot more crucial that we figure out things like rules of
the road for space actors. I think that is what you and General
Armor were talking about, the expansion of space technology and
the need to
Mr. PLATTS. I would like to explore further, because the issue
that has not been mentioned is the difference in terrorism today
versus 1996 in a global sense, but I am out of time.
I thank all of you for your testimony.
Mr. TIERNEY. There may be more time for you after Ms. McCollum, but I want to make sure Ms. McCollum has an opportunity.
Ms. McCollum.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To the difference in languageand I might add that the Bush
administration, when it is working on language like this product
doesnt hold discussions, hearing from the best and brightest in a
public venue, talk to Members of Congress about things. Usually
it gets released on a Friday after Congress has adjourned to go
home to work for the weekend in our Districts. But I found it interesting in your testimony, Ms. Hitchens, I think words do have
meaning, and I think the meaning is very, very different.
The Clinton policy: Consistent with treaty obligations, the
United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure the freedoms of action in space, and if directed
denies such freedom of access to adversaries. These capabilities
may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal, or military measures to
preclude an adversarys hostile use of space systems and services.
Clearly, going to defend the country but clearly wants to work with
the international community for a solution.
This is our new doctrine: The United States considers space capabilities, including ground segments, as supporting links and vital
to its national interest. Consistent with the policy, the United
States will preserve its rights and capabilities of freedoms and actions in space. But heres where the language, I think, in my opinion, really changes: Dissuade or deter others from either impeding
those rights or developing capabilities to do so, to take actions necessary to protect space capabilities, to respond to interference and

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00124

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

121
deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile
to the United States interest.
One is inclusive, kind of to what you were saying about your industry doesnt have a position on it but lets get people together
and talk about what is in the common good, making sure that the
U.S. security interests are taken care of, and the other one is saying I dont have to worry about the common good, I just have to
worry about my good. And when I just worry about myself, or if
we just worry about the United States, other countries quite often
perceive that as hostile, that they are not being included in it.
So if you could comment, internationally what have you heard
from even some of our allies internationally on this different tone
that is being taken, and perhaps you, as well, sir, from the industry perspective internationally.
Ms. HITCHENS. Well, as I said, the reaction, particularly internationally, to the new space policy was exceedingly negative. I
want to point out that this didnt just come from places that would
be likely to bash the Bush administration or the United States. I
mean, Aviation Week, the industry journal, called the new policy
judalistic and fretted that it would harm NASAs ability to find
partners for the Moon and Mars. The Times of London called the
policy comically proprietary about the United States wish to control everyones access to space. And you heard my quote from Joan
Johnson-Freese, who is a tenured professor at the Naval War College. So we are not exactly talking about the flaming liberal left
commentators here.
Language is important. Language is important, and the language
in this policy talks about U.S. rights, U.S. rights, protecting U.S.
freedom of action; whereas, if you look at the Clinton policy and
you look at the words, it talks about sovereign rights of any nation.
Those are differences. In fact, the Reagan policy talked about sovereign rights of any nation. So this is a change in tonality.
While we may think that is no big deal in the substance, on the
international stage that is what diplomacy is about. It is not only
about what you say, but it is about how you say it.
Mr. CAVOSSA. Congresswoman, all I can say is, as an industry we
tend to be a global industry. The satellite industry is very much
the telecommunications industry, so the companies that are represented by the Satellite Industry Association across the board are
U.S. and non-U.S. companies. What we have seen, I mentioned in
my testimony the Mission Assurance Working Group, that we have
been working with the Department of Defense and allied governments. In those meetings, allied governments are in the room, representatives of the government or of the ministries of defense are
there, and they are trying to work with us. To the DODs credit,
they are inviting them to be involved in these discussions.
That is all I can speak to.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.
We are going to have to go to vote, but if anybody has a final
comment that they want to make in 30 seconds, I will give you
each an opportunity to do that, and then apologize for the fact, but
I dont want to make you wait around for another hour before we
come back.
Does anybody care to say anything? Mr. Kueter.

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00125

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1

122
Mr. KUETER. I would just like to comment on your question. I
think the reactions that we saw in the immediate aftermath of the
release of the policy reflect the greatest failure that the administration pursued in releasing this policy, which was the failure to come
out publicly and articulate what they meant when they used the
language in this particular document. I think the language that
you quoted compared to the Bush administration or the new space
policy is consistent in terms of an interpretation that one could put
on it.
And I would say that, in terms of the real rubber meets the road
part of international cooperation, I would refer you to General Armors comments on the first panel, where he said that, in fact, from
his perspective the new policy encouraged greater international cooperation on a military-to-military side, something that he didnt
see in the earlier program.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.
Mr. Cavossa, anything to close?
Mr. CAVOSSA. No, sir.
Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Grego.
Ms. GREGO. No, thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Hitchens.
Ms. HITCHENS. I just want to mention that I do want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and the panel for undertaking this, because I
believe this has been the first hearing on space policy, the first
public debate, and we really do need to have more of these.
And the second thing I wanted to say is the one thing I think
you will hear agreement on across the board here if you listen hard
is the question of rules of the road and the idea of establishing new
rules for people to operate together particularly in peacetime. That
is an issue that I think there is more and more consensus about,
and I would really urge the committee and the subcommittee to
look into that in more depth.
Thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you all very, very much for your
time, patience, and your contributions.
I would invite you to write the committee with any suggestions
you have on what a further hearing would focus upon. If it could
be helpful to the debate, we will then discuss it as a committee and
decide if we are going to do that. We do want to make sure that
this issue gets covered. We think it is important also or we
wouldnt have had the hearing.
Thank all of you, thank my colleagues.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

VerDate 11-MAY-2000

11:09 Aug 16, 2007

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00126

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6011

C:\DOCS\37094.TXT

HGOVREF1

PsN: HGOVREF1