Engineering Geology, 24 (1987) 239-256

239

Elsevier Science Publishers B. V., Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

LESSONS FROM THE TETON DAM FAILURE

JAMES L. SHERARD*
Consulting Engineer, P.O. Box 1416, San Ysidro, CA 92073 (U.S.A.)

(Accepted for publication December 1986)

INTRODUCTION

The Teton Dam failure is one of the most important single events in the
history of dam engineering. Teton Dam is the highest dam which has com
pletely failed. It was designed and constructed under the supervision of the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation which had built many major dams over the
previous 70 years, and which was widely reputed to be a leader in the field.
This paper is one of a group on the same subject for the International
Workshop on Dam Failures, Purdue University. The objective is to determine
whether concentrated re-examination of the failure details after about 9 years
have elapsed, and most of the emotional heat generated by the disaster has
dissipated, will allow any better understanding of the "lessons learned" for
the profession.
No attempt is made here to describe all the project features or review the
failure details. The reader is assumed to be already familiar with the main
reports prepared by the two eminent review panels (Independent Panel,
1976; U.S. Dept. of the Interior Group, 1977,1980). A good summary of
the main failure details is given in Seed and Duncan (1981).
Soon after the failure I spent several weeks studying the problem, for my
own edification. This effort included discussions with the responsible
engineering staff of the USBR in the Denver headquarters. In Denver also I
studied all the main documents, and had conferences with the geologists who
worked on the job during the design stage, and others who had mapped the
detailed geology exposed during the dam construction.
Subsequently during September 1976 I spent about ten days at the site.
During this time the embankment remnant on the right abutment was being
slowly and carefully excavated, exposing the rock foundation and rock walls
of the cutoff trench as part of the failure cause investigation. The Resident
Engineer and inspection staff which had controlled construction were still on
the site and they spoke frankly about all the main points, although they
were still somewhat shell-shocked.
Later, during 1979-81, I was employed to study the subsequent events
by a group of insurance companies who had paid flood damages and were
petitioning the U.S. Government (unsuccessfully) for reimbursement. During
*James L. Sherard died in July, 1987 .
00137952/87/$03.50

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1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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this period I studied in detail the results of the exploration of the left bank
remnant and the discovery of the famous "wet seams",
RESULTS OF SHERARD'S INVESTIGATIONS

My basic conclusions and opinions from the activities described above

were essentially the same as those of the two main official groups of investi
gators. The official reports (mentioned above) included descriptions of all
parts of the project in exhaustive detaiL These reports are so voluminous
that, in spite of the panel's efforts to summarize briefly, they tend to give
the impression that the situation was complex. In fact, in my opinion the
situation was clear and straightforward, with main elements as follows.
(1) The failure was caused when a concentrated leak developed through
the earth-filled trench excavated in rock or at the earth-rock interface at the
bottom of the trench. The leak eroded the core material and carried the
eroded material into large open cracks in the rock foundation. Progressive
erosion of the highly erodible Zone 1 embankment material led to complete
failure within a few hours after the erosion started.
(2) It was known from the original explorations and observations during
construction that the rock foundation and rock walls of the cutoff trench
had large open cracks. There was no provision in the design to seal these
cracks at the surface and the sealing carried out during construction was
inadequate and incomplete. The design provided no filter between the fine,
erodible Zone 1 and the cracked rock and none was installed during
construction.
(3) Because of this absence of crack sealing and filters the Teton Dam
design was not acceptable, as compared with general practice in the industry.
The great majority of experienced dam engineers, knowing the nature of the
rock. would have rejected the design as unacceptable: if the dam were built
according to the design, serious damage or failure by erosion of the Zone 1
material into the rock cracks would have been considered not only possible,
but probable.
(4) The absence of design provisions for sealing or filtering the rock cracks,
and subsequent failure to modify the design during construction, when the
extreme conditions of rock cracks under Zone 1 were exposed clearly to
view, can only be explained as a monumental error in judgment. This error
was made possible by long tenn bureaucratic restrictions on the activities of
the dam design group which had severely limited their experience and
capability.
(5) The initial erosive leak could have been caused by any of the several
mechanisms cited as most likely by the main investigators.
(6) There are no technical "lessons learned" from the Teton Dam failure
which make it desirable to consider any change in current dam design or
construction practice.
(7) The general lesson learned is the reconfirmation of the old fundamental
rule that no important dam should be left wholly in the hands of one engineer
or close team without independent review by other specialist engineers with

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the power of veto. This was expressed eloquently in the verdict of the Los
Angeles County Jury following the even more disastrous failure of the St.
Francis Dam, California, in 1928: "A sound policy of public ... and engineer
ing judgment demands that the construction and operation of a dam should
never be left solely to the judgment of one man no matter how eminent, with
out check by independent expert authority, for no one is free from error ... "
In addition to these main points, study of the failure raises several tech
nical details of considerable interest to the dam specialist, some of which are
discussed in the remainder of this paper. These include: "Where did the initial
leak start?" "What caused the wet seams?", and "Was the lack of instru
mentation an important factor?", etc. While these points have large intrinsic
technical interest, they have no significant influence on the main conclusions
presented above.
Reasons for these main conclusions are presented in more detail in the
following sections.
ZONE 1: MATERIAL PROPERTIES

During the time that 1 was at the site investigating the failure in September
1976 I was still actively involved in the research then being carried out by
the U.S. Soil Conservation Service on dispersive clays and erodibility of fine
grained impervious soils (Sherard et al., 1976a, b; ASTM, 1977). I took ten
large samples of the typicalloessial soil used in the Teton Dam Zone 1 from
various parts of the dam remnants, left and right side, and the borrow area.
These were thoroughly tested in the SCS National Soil Mechanics Laboratory,
Lincoln, Nebraska, using all the main tests which had been developed for
evaluation of dispersive (highly erodible) fine-grained soils. Later these same
samples were used as one of the soil types tested during the comprehensive
research on filters for dams carried out by the Soil Conservation Service
during 1981-85 (Sherard and Dunnigan, 1985). The main results of these
studies, pertinent to the Teton Dam, are as follows.
(1) In gradation and visual appearance the Zone 1 material is remarkably
uniform. All ten samples taken from different parts of the dam and borrow
area had very similar gradation and plasticity limits. The soil deposit com
prising the large volume borrow area had a smaller range of properties than is
common for the impervious sections of embankment dams.
(2) The Zone 1 material, silt of loessial origin ranging from slightly cohesive
to cohesionless (plasticity index generally from 1 to 7), is a common type of
soil in the midwestern USA. Many earth dams have been built with practically
identical soil over wide geographic areas, such as large parts of western
Nebraska, including some of the main USBR dams.
(3) The material is not dispersive; that is, it does not have high content of
dissolved sodium in the pore water, causing repulsive forces between clay
particles. Nevertheless, the material is among the most erodible fine grained
soils in nature, because of its low plasticity and the high content of silt-siZed
particles which do not have high surface forces. Compacted specimens of the
typical Teton Dam Zone 1 material erode in the pinhole test (Sherard et al.,

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1976a) as readily as a highly dispersive clay, an unusual property for a non

dispersive soil. This means that a small concentrated leak with a velocity of
only a few centimeters per second will erode the compacted material.
(4) In filter tests on the typical material, sand filters with DIs size of
0.5 rom or smaller will prevent all erosion. Using sand filters with D IS size of
1.0 rom or larger, important erosion occurs in the filter tests using compacted
base specimens of the typical Teton Zone 1 material. Since the diameter of
critical pore channels in sand filters is roughly 10% of the DIS size (Sherard
et a1., 1984), this shows that the typical Zone 1 material can be eroded and
carried into rock cracks of widths only slightly larger than (0.1) (1.0) =
0.1 rom, and would easily be carried into cracks with widths of 0.2 mm or
larger.
(5) When compacted in the laboratory at water content near or slightly
below Standard Proctor Optimum, the material is very stiff and brittle, com
pared to similarly compacted specimens of other fine-grained impervious
soils. When well-compacted at or below optimum water content the material
is highly dilative and has relatively high capillary stresses in the pore water,
which actions give compacted specimens the appearance of a brittle, cemented
material.
(6) There are few impervious soil deposits in nature which are more
uniform in visual appearance or have a smaller range in gradation and Atter
berg Limits. Compared to borrow areas commonly used for impervious
sections of embankment dams, the Teton Zone 1 material was remarkably
uniform in properties.
In summary, the relevant properties of the Teton Dam Zone 1 material
are; (1) highly erodible even by small concentrated leak with low velocity;
(2) very fine, and erodible material can be easily eroded into narrow open
cracks in the rock foundation; (3) very rigid and brittle compacted embank
ment so that relatively small settlements in the lower part of the dam would
be expected to generate significant transfer of stresses and arching of the
portion of the embankment above.
"GRAVITY GROUTING" OF THE RIGHT ABUTMENT SURFACE CRACKS

A major element of the Teton Dam story has to do with the sealing of
open rock foundation cracks under Zone 1 on the right abutment. The wide
open surface cracks were treated by gravity grouting during the first part of
the construction. However, this surface crack filling was abandoned near the
location where the failure occurred (about Station 14+00). Subsequently the
wide surface cracks under Zone 1 embankment were left open and untreated
from about Stcltion 14+00 to the right end of the dam. These facts are docu
mented in the report of the U.S. Dept. of the Interior Group (1977), but
they deserve more prominence than they have received. These facts support
the conclUsion that USBR bureaucratic restrictions had a major influence on
the failure.
When the excavation was made for the 70-ft. deep trench and the rock
foundation surface was uncovered upstream and downstream of the trench

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by excavation of the colluvial soil overburden, many large cracks in the rock
were exposed to view. These were commonly several inches in width, fre
quently up to 1.0 ft. Some were open (empty), some were silt-filled and
some partially filled. During construction of the dam the USBR geologists
made an excellent map, showing locations, widths and filling of these cracks,
reproduced in fig.34 (and also p.D-101) of their report (op. cit.). This map
shows literally many dozens of wide open rock cracks exposed in the
foundation excavation from Station 16+00 to the right end of the dam.
These cracks in the foundation rock under the main Zone 1, many com
pletely open, over several hundred feet of the dam length, were exposed for
inspection by all parties for about 2 years before they were covered by the
dam. Since there was no provision in the contract for sealing these surface
cracks, the inspection forces devised a method of filling them by "gravity"
or "slurry" grouting in stages above the rising embankment surface. This
consisted of bringing in transit-mix concrete trucks filled with cement-water
grout, and pouring the grout by gravity into open cracks, working from the
rising embankment surface. No piping or grout pumps were used for this
activity. This gravity grouting was evidently instigated by the inspection staff
and accepted by the design group, although there was no written record or
change order on the subject. A payment item for miscellaneous concrete
backfill was agreed with the Contractor.
Approximately 1800 cu. yd. of grout were poured into cracks at about
265 individual locations on the right abutment, over an area of about 300 by
500 ft. This gravity grouting was done in cracks in the excavated walls of the
cutoff trench, as well as on the natural rock foundation upstream and down
stream of the trench. The pours into individual open cracks ranged from less
than 1.0 cu. yd. to more than 100 cu. yds., with many in the range from 5 to
30 cu. yrd. Locations and amounts of each pour are presented in the report
(op. cit.), fig.34, in tabular form (pp.G32-G39) and shown on the USER
geologists' "as built" map.
When the embankment construction reached approximate El. 5200 on the
right side, roughly at Station 14+00, this gravity grouting was abandoned.
After this date no further sealing of surface rock cracks on the right abutment
was carried out during the remainder of the dam construction.
During my site visit of September 1976 I discussed this problem in detail
with the responsible inspection staff, trying to understand how this vital
piece of the work could have been stopped. Later the Interior Dept. Review
Group interviewed everyone involved about this point, and included sum
maries of the interviews in their main report (op. cit.), pp.C-13 and C-19 and
G99 to G102. Conflicting statements were obtained from the site inspection
and Denver design staffs. The inspectors generally stated that the gravity
grouting was stopped on orders from "above" even though there were still
many open cracks in the foundation.
The replies by the design staff members were not consistent. The record
of interview with Mr. Richard Bock contained the following: "Design was
not involved in the decision to terminate the surface treatment at Elevation

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5205. Mr. Bock did not know of the decision until after the failure. To
Mr. Bock's knowledge, the geologists had no input into the problem." (Op.
cit., p.C-1S.)
Later (p.G100) the designer's position was rephrased: "The designers did
not make the decision to not treat the rock above approximately elevation
5200. The decision not to treat the rock above this elevation was dictated by
the rock conditions. Above this elevation, the openings were minimal, hori
zontally oriented, and rubble and silt infilled. This type of rock and the joints
were not conducive to gravity grouting."
The latter statement is in complete disagreement with the inspectors'
statements and with the USBR geologists' excellent "as built" map of the
exposed bedrock surface, which shows large open cracks in the trench walls
in the critical area of the failure, as follows (op. cit., fig.34):
(1) In the upstream wall of the 70-ft. deep trench, there is a vertical crack
shown at approximate Station 13+50, striking upstream-downstream, des
cribed as "0.5 to 1.0 ft. (wide) open with rubble and silt filling locally".
(2) In the downstream wall of the trench directly opposite the above wide
crack there are several vertical cracks shown with widths of 0.1 ft. striking in
0
various directions and one larger, vertical crack striking about 45 with the
dam axis described as "up to 0.3 ft. (wide) open" at about Station 13+25.
It is apparent from the documentation that the above wide, open cracks
were not grouted. I have no doubt about this practice since in September
1976 I saw similar open cracks, nearby up to 0.5 ft. wide, in the trench walls
being exposed as the embankment section remaining in place on the right
end of the dam, which was being carefully excavated for exploration purposes.
As far as I was able to understand the problem from personal discussion
with the people involved and study of the documents, the inspection staff at
the site decided themselves to stop the gravity grouting, and did not ask for
approval from the design group. Probably the gravity grouting was stopped
in 1975 because the embankment construction was going very rapidly and
delays created by this gravity grouting,which was not in the contract, were
an item of significant controversy with the Contractor.
THE BUREAUCRACY PROBLEM

Main elements of this experience are as follows.

Although it was realized during the design stage that the foundation
rock had open cracks, a design was made in which a wide central Zone 1 of
highly erodible, fine soil was placed directly on the cracked rock with no
design provision to prevent the fine soil from entering the cracks.
(2) During construction the rock foundation surface with dozens of wide
open cracks was exposed for inspection for about 2 years.
(3) A decision was made to seal the larger surface cracks by gravity grout.
ing.
(4) On the right abutment the gravity grouting was abandoned at approxi.
mate Station 14+00, after which the Zone 1 embankment was compacted
(1)

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directly against rock with wide, open cracks, both in the trench and in the
foundation upstream and downstream of the trench.
The decision to abandon the gravity grouting was surprising. The gravity
grouting was not a very conservative method of sealing the cracks but it was
much better than doing nothing. I believe that there will be no strong argu
ment with the opinion that it was completely unacceptable practice to stop
the gravity grouting at Station 14. It is very difficult to conceive why the
design staff did not insist on the continuation of the gravity grouting for the
entire foundation. I believe that this blunder can only be explained as the
long time result of bureaucratic restrictions on the USBR staff. The abandon
ment of the gravity grouting could only have been pennitted because the
individuals in the design group who would have known to insist on the con
tinuation of the gravity grouting were separated from the decision.
In the early 19508 I was employed as a young engineer by the USBR
Earth Dams Section. In the period 1960-1975, I made periodic visits to the
Earth Dam Section for the purpose of discussing problems and practice with
the staff and also occasionally visited USBR dams under construction. Hence,
I believe I have a reasonably reliable understanding of the USBR organization
as it related to design and construction of earth dams at the time when the
Teton Dam was being studied and built.
While there were undoubtedly exceptions, I believe the following are
generally valid.
(1) The organization suffered from inbreeding. Engineers and geologists
were hired at the junior level, and were trained by engineers who had been
taught by USBR engineers. They had little or no understanding of the struc
ture and modes of practice of other engineering groups designing and building
dams.
(2) Travel to sites for design engineers was considered generally unneces
sary and was frowned upon. The responsible design engineer for major USER
dams frequently never visited the site, either in the design stage or during
construction. At periodic fairly regular intervals, usually following federal
elections, all "unnecessary travel by federal employees" was banned by fiat
from Washington. As a result, the designer was sheltered from problems and
experience.
(3) Consultants were not used, so that the designers were not exposed
directly to the experiences of independent specialists.
(4) Chimney drains and processed filters were not employed in USBR
dams (except small toe drain filters).
(5) Cooperation between the construction supervision staff and the design
group was not encouraged and was held to a minimum. It was considered
that the resident engineer in charge of the construction should have the
ability to solve problems arising during construction. Frequent requests for
assistance or advice from the design staff by the resident engineer would
have had a negative influence on the resident engineer's advancement record.
(6) In the design organization there was no qualified independent review
group with veto power to challenge designs.

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Decades of such bureaucratic restrictions and inbreeding led to the

situation in which the Teton Dam was constructed according to a design
which would have been considered unacceptable by independent specialists.
At the same time the general mode of practice prevented the recognition by
USBR designers during construction that there was a special problem at the
site and that it was essential to do something besides the "gravity grouting"
to assure that the erodible fine silt would not be carried into the open rock
cracks. The practice allowed even the incredible decision by the inspection
staff to abandon the gravity grouting and allowed them to do it without the
knowledge of the designers.
This bureaucratic and organization problem has since been well recognized.
Since the Teton Dam failure the USBR design organization has been com
pletely changed. All the main bureaucratic problems listed above have been
eliminated. They have a new design staff of experienced engineers and
geologists recruited from outside the USBR at the senior level. Engineers
travel frequently from the Denver design office to job sites. Independent
consultants are used routinely. Chimney drains and processed filters are used.
The organization includes a technical review staff, independent from the
design group, with veto power over the design.
THE LOCATION OF THE INITIAL EROSIVE LEAK IS NOT IMPORTANT

AU investigators agreed that the failure was caused by progressive erosion

of a concentrated leak which carried eroded Zone 1 material into open cracks
in the rock foundation. It was also generally agreed that the design was
inadequate because of the failure to provide for conservative rock surface
treatment and filters. But there was a lot of speculation among different
investigators on the probable path and cause of the initial erosive leak.
A large part of the efforts of the two official review panels was devoted to
examination of the most likely path of the initial concentrated leak. This is
also true for the efforts of other investigators who presented opinions on the
failure cause later (Seed and Duncan, 1981; Leonards and Davidson, 1984).
Before the "wet seams" were discovered there was general agreement that
there were two principal alternate locations, both possible and likely, of the
initial leak: (1) along the interface between the Zone 1 embankment and the
rock bottom of the trench; and (2) directly through the embankment in the
trench, either through an open differential settlement crack or a crack
opened by hydraulic fracturing.
For each of the above there were several subcategories considered possible.
F'orexample, for (1) above, the initial leak could have gone over or under the
concrete cap, and it could have traveled at the rock embankment contact
(possibly because of low compressive stress at the contact; i.e. hydraulic
fracturing) or just below the contact in open rock cracks.
In such a situation there is always a basic scientific interest in determing as
well as possible the path of the initial leak, and the mechanism which caused
it to develop. From the standpoint of "lessons learned" from the failure to

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guide future design practice, however, reliable knowledge of the origin and
location of the initial erosive leak is of no significant importance, because:
(1) the initial leak could easily have developed at any of the several paths
considered likely by the main investigating panels, as discussed in more detail
below; and (2) regardless of the path or origin of the initial leak the most
economical and reliable defense is the sarne; Le., conservative rock surface
treatment, filters or both.
As an illustration for support of this point, let us assume a hypothetical
situation in which by exhaustive investigation it was proved conclusively that
the initial leak leading to the Teton failure developed through an embank
ment layer which had been frozen during construction. The main lesson
learned would not be that it is undesirable to include frozen layers in a dam.
The main lesson is the same: the failure should and would have been avoided
by a design with conservative provisions to prevent eroded embankment
material from entering the open rock cracks.
Some investigators of the failure believed it was impossible for the initial
erosive leak to have developed at the bottom of the trench at the rock
embankment interface, because the rock seen everywhere in the bottom of
the trench was essentially free of open cracks and there was no place for the
eroded soil to be carried. I do not believe this was a valid conclusion because
the Zone 1 soil was so fine that large quantities of eroded material could
have been carried into cracks with open widths equal to a small fraction of a
millimeter. Such cracks are difficult to identify with the naked eye and not
normally considered important. Also at any point along the trench there
could have been a much larger crack just below the trench bottom, capable
of carrying away large quantities of eroded soil rapidly.
At the time of the Teton Darn final design, about 12 to 15 years ago, it
was not the common practice for a designer to assume that a concentrated
leak should be expected through the impervious section of an embankment
dam. At that time there was already considerable evidence for the conclusion
that concentrated leaks probably developed fairly commonly by hydraulic
fracturing (Sherard et al., 1971; Sherard, 1977) but there was no widespread
discussion of the phenomenon in the profession. This situation has changed.
There is now sufficient evidence available to conclude that concentrated leaks
commonly occur through the impervious sections of embankment dams by
hydraulic fracturing without being observed, even in dams which are not
subjected to large differential settlement. I believe that there is now essen
tially incontrovertible evidence that hydraulic fracturing probably develops
unseen in most embankment dams, as discussed in detail in Sherard (1985).
Usually these leaks do not cause erosion, either because the velocity is too
low or because the leaks discharge into an effective filter.
In light of this conclusion, based on the experience of many dams, it
would be expected that a concentrated leak would probably develop through
the Zone 1 in the narrow, steep walled rock foundation trench, where there
was obviously a very high stress transfer to be expected by the natural hang
ing up of the Zone 1 backfill on the steep and incompressible trench walls:

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the tendency for stress transfer and hydraulic fracturing in this trench, and
along the Zone I-rock interface on the trench bottom, was obviously much
greater than that existing in many dams which have had concentrated leaks
by hydraulic fracturing (Sherard, 1985).
I believe, therefore, that the Teton Dam failure must be considered another
experience to support the general conclusion that concentrated leaks by
hydraulic fracturing should be anticipated at least when there is more than a
moderate tendency for differential settlement and stress transfer.
WOULD FAILURE HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT AN INITIAL CONCENTRATED
LEAK?

There was no disagreement by the two official investigating panels that

the failure must have resulted from the development of a concentrated leak.
The time was probably too short and the Zone 1 embankment too impervious
for water to have seeped through the soil pores to the downstream edge and
then progressively eroded back upstream by piping. I agree that in all prob
ability there was at least a small initial concentrated leak for the same reason.
From the standpoint of lessons learned it is necessary also to examine the
question: "If no concentrated leak developed when the reservoir was filled
for the first time, would Teton Dam have failed?"
It is impossible to form a strong opinion on this question. If the reservoir
became filled without generating a concentrated leak anywhere through the
Zone 1 embankment, it is easily possible that the dam would never have
failed because the seepage discharge at the downstream exit point did not
have sufficient energy to initiate backward erosion. But it is also quite poss
ible that backward piping, starting from a small seepage discharge in one of
the large open rock cracks in the downstream face of the foundation trench,
would gradually lead to failure after several years. In this event, the final
failure would be expected to have been just as sudden and disastrous as the
1976 failure. It is also possible that an initial erosive leak from hydraulic
fracturing could have occurred during reservoir filling on some subsequent
year, as the result of continuing settlement and stress transfer. In any event,
I believe that few of our experienced colleagues, knowing the nature of the
foundation and the way the dam was designed and built, would have been
very surprised to learn that it did not fail on the first reservoir filling, but
failed some time later.
A most fortunate aspect of the Teton Dam failure was that it started in the
morning at a time when the USBR staff were still there to observe and take
action. Because of this it was possible to evacuate most of the people from
the area downstream. If the dam had failed a year later in the middle of the
night the failure consequences would have been very much more serious.
WET SEAMS: HYPOTHESIS AND SIGNIFICANCE

During the exploratory excavation made in the left end of the dam, "wet
seams" were encountered of rather peculiar nature located near and above

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the elevation of the construction surface during the 1974-75 winter shut
down (U.S. Dept. of the Interior Group, 1980; Seed and Duncan, 1981).
Various members of the two official investigating panels suggested different
possible hypotheses for the cause of these wet seams. These included the
influence of a rainy period during construction, frost heave and ice segrega
tion, and simply poorly compacted layers. Some of the official investigators
had the opinion that the action that caused the wet seams probably was
related to the failure and some were doubtfuL
I did not see the wet seams and am not convinced that I understand with
certainty their origin. However, I was intrigued to read descriptions and see
photographs of free water "dribbling" out of these seams in the walls of
newly excavated surfaces in the compacted Zone 1 embankment, and I did
form definite opinions about this. The portion of the embankment compris
ing the main wet seam area was constructed in the Spring of 1975 and the
wet seams were first discovered in October 1977 about 30 months later. This
main wet seam area was roughly 200 feet below the top of dam, so that it
was loaded under a pressure of the order of 150 psi since the completion of
the dam construction in November 1975, for about 23 months.
It seems to me very strange that free water could dribble out, albeit in
very small quantities, of a compacted layer in a silty embankment which had
been loaded for 23 months under the weight of about 200 feet of dam. Dur
ing these months any conceivable amount of surplus water which should
have been added to a given embankment layer during construction, such as
by rainfall penetration would have long since disappeared. It would have
been pushed out by consolidation and sucked up by capillarity into the
adjacent embankment layers and there would have been no trace remaining.
Therefore, I believe it is impossible that the wet seams could have been
caused by anything that happened during construction: the water had to
come from the reservoir in 1976 after the water level raised above the wet
seam location.
The reservoir level reached the general elevation of the main wet seams
(El. 5115) in December 1975 and rose to about El. 5300 on the day of
failure (June 5, 1976). Therefore, the reservoir elevation was above the main
wet seams for more than 5 months and reached a maximum height above the
wet seams of the order of 185 ft.
I believe it should be generally agreed that the wet seams couId not have
been caused simply by water seeping into the embankment from the reservoir
through the voids of the compacted Zone 1 embankment. Such seepage only
increases the water content a few percent by filling the portion of the voids
in which a little air remains (most of the original air voids would have dis
appeared already because of the compression which has taken place under
the load of the overlying embankment). The little added water caused by
general seepage, displacing air, couId not possibly have accounted for free
water dribbling out of the wet seams in October 1977, 15 months after the
dam failure.

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The only way which I can imagine a sufficiently large amount of water
being injected into these wet seams to explain the observed phenomenon is
directly from the reservoir by hydraulic fracturing.
In order to examine the mechanics by which such hydraulic fracturing
could occur, it is necessary to consider the relative settlement of various
points at different times during construction. First, consider a point "e"
inside the dam near the center of the valley located directly over the bottom
of the cutoff trench in the river alluvium, at about the initial riverbed eleva
tion (El. 5030; Figs.1 and 2). Point "c" has about 100 ft. of compacted
Zone 1 embankment under it and 300 ft. of dam above it. Assuming that the
Zone 1 in the cutoff trench compresses about 5 or 6% of its height under the
load of 300 ft. of dam, a reasonable compressibility for this material, a
monument set during construction at point "c" would settle about 5 or 6 ft.
before it reached equilibrium. This is an expectable estimated settlement.
The cutoff trench was backfilled to the river level by the summer of 1974
and the embankment level was constructed to about El. 5130 by November
1974 when work was stopped for the winter. Starting in the late spring of
1974, when dewatering of the cutoff trench excavation in the river alluvium
was abandoned, the Zone 1 embankment in the cutoff trench (below point
Pri",ary arch preveelS crest
(ro", settling when Point lie"
settles from Oct. 1975 to
June 1976

Main IIWet seams"

"Probable H wet sea",.

(located in borings)

Scal.

Rock (ounda lion

Fig.l. Longitudinal section (looking downstream) used to illustrate the hydraulic fractur
ing hypothesis for the origin of the "wet seams".

Secondary arch assists in

stress transfer
Upstream slope \

/,~

Fig.2. Section

A~-A.

__ ~Rock foundation

251

"c") had ground water on both sides and there was a small gradient from
upstream to downstream, caused by the cofferdam pushing the river
into the diversion tunneL This condition existed for about one year by the
time construction started again in May 1975. During this year the degree of
saturation of the submerged Zone 1 embankment in the cutoff trench
increased substantially and pore water pressures increased, probably approach
ing hydrostatic pressure distribution below point "c" by May 1975.
During May to October 1975 (6 months) the embankment was constructed
from about EL 5130 to crest level (El. 5330); i.e., in about 6 months an
additional 200 ft. of embankment weight was placed above point "c".
Because of this relatively rapid load application and the higher degree of
saturation, probably a substantial part of the load added in 1975 to the
Zone 1 embankment in the cutoff trench below point "c" was carried
temporarily by "construction pore pressures".
During the period of time between the end of construction (Nov. 1975)
and the failure (June 1976), 7 months, the construction pore water pressures
in Zone 1 in the trench progressively dissipates, causing progressive settlement
of point "c". The magnitude of the settlement of point "c" during this
7 -month period caused by the consolidation of the 100 ft. of Zone 1 below
it could easily have been of the order of one to two feet.
During this 7 -month period, as point "c" continues to settle because of
pore pressure dissipation, there is practically no continuing settlement of
points "a" and "b" (Fig.1) and points "e" and "f" (Fig.2), because they are
underlain by rock and relatively incompressible and pervious coarse allUvium,
respectively. The continuing settlement of point "c"with respect to these
other four points at the same elevation creates differential settlement in two
directions which must cause a substantial stress transfer within Zone 1 above
point "c". Point "d" located about 100 ft. above point "c" settles less than
point "c", primarily because the top of the dam above point "d" acts as a
beam or arch in the longitudinal direction, about 200 ft. thick, spanning
from rock abutment to rock abutment (Fig.1). There is also a significant
secondary tendency of the top of the dam to arch in the upstream-down
stream direction (Fig.2).
Since point "e" settles more than point "d" during the winter and spring
1975-76, the distance between the two points increases and compressive
stresses on horizontal planes between the two points are significantly reduced.
Sometime during the spring of 1976, such as March or April, as the reservoir
level is rising, the water pressure acting on the upstream face of Zone 1 at
the approximate elevation of the wet seams exceeds the reduced vertical
stress acting on near horizontal planes in the embankment and the water
enters the embankment in a thin concentrated leak by hydraulic fracturing.
This might have occurred, for example, when the reservoir level reached
about EL 5200, or when there was about a water head of 85 ft., at the level
of the main wet seams located at EL 5115. At the time of the initial water
penetration the water pressure is only slightly greater than the earth pressure
on the plane of the crack, so that there is no large stress change or deformation

252

in the surroWlding embankment, and the initial water-filled crack is very thin
(a fraction of a millimeter).
In the subsequent weeks or months, as the reservoir continues rising, the
water pressure in the thin crack increases, by perhaps 70 ft. of head, or more,
and the crack width is jacked open, possibly to a final width of many centi
meters. Failure or erosion doesn't occur during this initial period of hydraulic
fracture development, either because the crack does not extend all the way
across the wide Zone 1 or because the leak discharges into the downstream
Zone 2, which is a suitable filter. Hence, the water in the hydraulic fractures
in the "wet seams" during the weeks or months before the failure was not
eroding the Zone 1: the water in the near horizontal cracks was only seeping
out into the embankment upward and downward. During this period the
embankment material forming the roof of the near horizontal water filled
crack would inevitably collapse and pieces of softened embankment would
fall down by gravity into the water. Hence the crack width would be increased
and the fracture would consist of loose pieces of softened embankment
surrounded with free water. Such near horizontal cracks filled with loose
muddy material were caused by hydraulic fracturing in the central core of
sandy silt (cohesionless) of the Manicouagan 3 Dam, Quebec (Sherard,
1985).
Under this hypothesis concentrated leaks of water could have been fed
into the wet seems from the reservoir for weeks (or even for 2 or 3 months)
before the failure. On the day of the failure the reservoir pressure dropped
abruptly below the elevation of the wet seams (within a few hours). The free
water in these near horizontal cracks would tend to be squeezed out of the
interior portion of Zone 1 as the pressure dropped rapidly and the cracks
closed. But the cracks would collapse erratically and close first at the exterior
boundaries of Zone 1, inevitably trapping a large portion of the free water in
the cracks inside.
By hydraulic fracturing action similar to the hypothesis described above
concentrated leaks of water would have been fed into the wet seams for
weeks or months before the failure and a substantial quantity of free water
would have been trapped in the wet seams on the day of failure (JWle 5,
1976). This is the only way in which I can imagine that sufficient water could
have been injected into the wet seams to accoWlt for the fact that free water
dribbled out of the wet seams when they were Wlcovered in the exploratory
excavation in October 1977, at depth of 200 ft. below the crest. Hence,
while it is impossible to have a strong conviction on the subject, I believe
that hydraulic fracturing, not greatly different than described above, is the
most likely origin of the wet seams.
None of the members of the two official investigating panels speculated
that hydraulic fracturing may have caused the wet seams. I am sure also that
many readers of this paper will find the hypothesis difficult to accept, but I
believe that the hydraulic fracturing hypothesis is consistent with the recent

dam experience (Sherard, 1985) and is the only way to explain the free water
seeping out of the wet seams in October 1977.

253

Before leaving the subject, I call the reader's attention to the experience
of the Wister Dam in Oklahoma, where I believe it has been demonstrated
beyond all reasonable doubt that a near horizontal leak, more than 700 ft.
long, broke through a well constructed clay dam by hydraulic fracturing
(Sherard, 1985). The physical conditions at the Wister Dam were not more
conducive to hydraulic fracturing than at Teton Dam. The Wister Dam settle
ments were not high and the clay embankment, compacted near Standard
Proctor Optimum water content, was not particularly rigid or especially
susceptible to arching and stress transfer.
The settlements at Teton Dam were higher than at Wister Dam and the
embankment was very rigid and capable of arching and stress transfer. Every
one who had the opportunity to inspect the Teton site after failure was
impressed with the near vertical cliff, 300 ft. high, of Zone 1 embankment
standing stable for months forming the left wall of the breach. It was
apparent to me that the Zone 1 embankment had sufficient undrained
strength and rigidity so that the 200 ft. thick top of the dam could span
across the valley as shown in Fig.1. The fascinating series of photographs of
the failure included a picture of an arch developed temporarily over the final
erosion tunnel on the right abutment, at about 11.30 a.m. on the day of
failure, just before the crest caved into the breach.
There was some indication from the tests made later that the soil compris
ing the wet seams had somewhat different properties than the average embank
ment material. Evidently the average tested wet seam material had a somewhat
lower maximum density and higher optimum water content when tested in
laboratory Proctor Compaction Tests. Permeability tests on compacted
specimens indicated that the wet seam material may have had higher perme
ability than the average material. Also, mineralogical examination of two
undisturbed samples (one cut from a wet seam and one from nearby ordinary
embankment) made by soil scientists of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
showed significantly different mineralogy (U .S. Dept. of the Interior Group,
1980, p.A184). I do not know if these differences are real or only random
differences resulting from averages of an inadequate number of samples. If,
in fact, it is true that the wet seams were comprised of a significantly different
soil mineral, the hydraulic fracturing hypothesis described above should still
be valid; the lower density wet seam material probably offered a slightly
easier entry point into the embankment than the adjacent material for the
hydraulic fracturing, because of the slightly higher permeability.
MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

Left bank excavation

The exploratory excavation on the left side was made for the primary
purpose of exam1ng Zone 1 in the left bank trench. It was reasoned that the
conditions on both sides were very similar, so that it might be expected there
could be some evidence uncovered on the left side of a leakage mechanism at
work that would help explain the failure.

254

The result of the careful removal of all the embankment material from
within the left bank trench was only to show nothing unusual. There was no
indication found anywhere that an initial erosive leak had started on the left
side (in the trench). The discovery of the "wet seams" was a different matter,
outside the trench backfill.
This result led some investigators to the conclusion that it was difficult to
explain the development of the initial leak on the right side (Leonards and
Davidson, 1984). They essentially concluded that since no evidence was
found of incipient hydraulic fracturing or erosive leakage through the trench
or along its bottom on the left side, then it was not likely such leaks developed
on the right side.
This conclusion is not valid because it does not take into consideration the
probability that the time which elapsed between the development of the
initial erosive concentrated leak and complete failure was only of the order
of 24 hours, or perhaps 2 or 3 days at the most. If the failure had not
occurred on June 5, 1976, on the right side, it could have occurred on the
left side on June 10, 1976, when the reservoir was higher, as a result of an
initial erosive leak which first appeared on June 8, 1976.
The new left side leak could have been along the bottom of the trench or
directly through the Zone 1 embankment by hydraulic fracturing, and would
probably have been caused by the higher water pressures. Therefore, the
absence of evidence of any kind of incipient erosion in the left bank trench
means nothing.
Lack of instrumentation

The fact that no instruments were provided inside the dam is not a signifi
cant point. The failure would have occurred in the same way at the same
time regardless of the numbers and types of instruments which might have
been installed. The lessons learned from the Teton Dam failure do not
support the conclusion that more or better instruments are generally needed.
Rate of reservoir tilling

The reservoir was filled at a somewhat faster rate than had originally been
planned, and the main bottom outlet was not ready for operation for use in
controlling the reservoir level during the initial filling. These points received
much scrutiny by the various investigators, with the general conclusion that
they had negligible influence on the failure.
Conceivably if the reservoir had been filled much more slowly the initial
erosive leak might not have developed, because the dam possibly would have
had sufficient time to accommodate to the changing conditions without the
development of the leak. But even if this occurred, the risk of failure at later
date,discussed above, would still have been high, and the consequences might
have been much worse. Therefore, this experience cannot reasonably be used
to support the general idea that more future restrictions are needed on rates
of first reservoir fillings.

255

Clearly our embankment dams should be designed to be completely safe,

regardless of the rate of the first reservoir filling.
SUMMARY

(1) There is no fundamental technical "lesson learned" from the Teton

Dam failure which requires changes in current practice for dam design and
construction.
(2) The Teton Dam design was unacceptable compared with common
general practice in the industry because it did not provide for the needed
conservative rock surface crack sealing and filters.
(3) The circumstances which permitted the Teton Dam to be built accord
ing to an inadequate design were created by long-time USBR bureaucratic
restrictions. These restrictions limited the capability of the USBR design and
construction control staffs sufficiently so that they did not recognize the
inadequacy of the design. (The USBR organization has subsequently been
completely changed to eliminate the problem.)
(4) Failure was caused when an initial erosive concentrated leak developed
through the erodible fine silt Zone 1 embankment, and progressively carried
the eroded material into open rock cracks in the foundation.
(5) There are two possible general locations along which the initial leak is
most likely to have developed: (a) directly through the Zone 1 by hydraulic
fracturing, or (b) along the embankment rock interface at the bottom of the
trench. Both of these causes are likely and leaks could have been expected
from them; therefore, knowledge of the actual origin of the initial leak has
no importance to the evaluation of the lessons learned from the failure.
(6) Even if an initial erosive concentrated leak had not developed during
the first reservoir filling, there is a strong probability that the dam would
have failed later in about the same way.
(7) The main general lesson learned is the reconfirmation of the old funda
mental rule, that is, no important dam should be designed and built under
direction of one man or close team without independent review by other
specialist engineers with veto power. If the Teton Dam design had been
reviewed by completely independent specialists there is almost no conceiv
able possibility that the design would have been accepted or that the failure
would have occurred.
(8) The origin for the wet seams considered most likely is near horizontal
water-filled cracks which were jacked open to widths of many centimeters
by hydraulic fracturing during 1976 when the reservoir level was above the
elevations of the wet seams. No other action conceivable to me can explain
the existence of free water dribbling out of the wet seams when exposed in
October 1977.
(9) "Whatever the origin of the wet seams, it is clear that a concentrated
leak occurred through the impervious section of the dam on the right abut
ment, which was well constructed and founded on a relatively incompressible
bedrock. This is another experience among many which supports the

256

conclusion (Sherard, 1985) that concentrated leaks occur commonly in well

constructed embankment dams without being observed.
REFERENCES
ASTM, 1977. Dispersive Clays, Related Piping, and Erosion in Geotechnical Problems,
ASTM Spec. Tech. Pub!., 623, 486 pp.
Independent Panel to Review Cause of Teton Dam Failure, 1976. Report on Failure of
Teton Dam. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 20402.
Leonards, G.A. and Davidson, L.W., 1984. Reconsideration of failure initiating mech
anisms for Teton Dam. Proc. Int. Conf. Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering,
University of Missouri-Rolla, Vol. III, pp.ll03-1113.
Seed, H.B. and Duncan, J. M., 1981. The Teton Dam failure - a retrospective review.
Proc. lath ICSMFE, Stockholm, Vo!' 4, pp.214-238.
Sherard, J.L., 1977. Discussion of "Load transfer and hydraulic fracturing in zoned dams",
by G.H. Kulhawy and T.M. Gurtowsky. J. Geotech. Eng. Div., ASCE, July 1977,
pp.831-833.
Sherard, J.L., 1985. Hydraulic fracturing in embankment dams. Proc., ASCE Symp.
Seepage and Leakage from Dams and Impoundments, Denver, May 1985, pp.115-14l.
Sherard, J.L. and Dunnigan, L.P., 1985. Filters and leakage control in embankment dams.
Proc., ASCE Symposium Seepage and Leakage from Dams and Impoundments, Denver,
May 1985, pp.I-30.
Sherard, J.L., Decker, R.S. and Ryker, N.L., 1972. Hydraulic fracturing in low dams of
dispersive clay. Proc., Specialty Conf, Performance of Earth and Earth-Supported
Structures, Purdue University, ASCE, June 1972, Part I, pp.563-590.
Sherard, J. L., Dunnigan, L.P., Decker, R.S. and Steele, E.F., 1976a. Pinhole test for
identifying dispersive soils. J. Geotech. Eng. Div., ASCE, January 1976, pp.69-85.
Sherard, J. L., Dunnigan, L. P. and Decker, R.S., 1976b. Identification and nature of dis
persive soils. J. Geotech. Eng. Div., ASCE, April 1976, pp.287-30l.
Sherard, J.L., Dunnigan, L.P. and Talbot, J.R., 1984. Basic properties of sand and gravel
filters. J. Geotech. Eng. Div., ASCE, June 1984, pp.684-700.
U.S. Dept. of Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group, 1977. Failure of Teton Dam. A
Report of Findings. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
U.S. Dept. of Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group, 1980. Failure of Teton Dam,
Final Report. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.