THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB,

LL.D.

EDITED BY

fT.
t E.
L. A.

CAPPS,
POST,

E.

PAGE,

PH.D., LL.D.

L.H.D.

E. H.

O.H., LITT.D.

W. H.

D.

WARMINGTON,

ARISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES
ON INTERPRETATION
PRIOR ANALYTICS

ROUSE,

m.a.,

litt.d.

f.b.hist.soo.

AEISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES
ON INTERPRETATION
BY

HAROLD

P.

COOK, M.A.

FORMERLY LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY AND CLASSICS

IN ARMSTRONG COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

PRIOR ANALYTICS
BY

HUGH TREDENNICK,

M.A.

UNIVERSITY READER IN CLASSICS AND HEAD

OF THE DEPARTMENT OP CLASSICS AT QUEEN
MARY COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMLXn

Firtl prinUd 10S8

Reprinted 149, LM. IMI

i
I

PHnttd in

Gr^ BriUim

CONTENTS
PAQE

Preface

vii

The Categories

Introduction

Summary

of the Principal

Text and Translation

On

Interpretation

Summary

of the Principal

.12

Themes

.112
.114

Introduction

Select Bibliography

The

Text and Translation

Prior Analytics

Themes

Traditional

Mood -Names

.182
.196
.197

Text and Translation

Book
Book
Index

198

II

406
533

PREFACE
With an eye to the English reader, who knows,
perhaps, Httle of logic and less in that case of
Aristotle's, I have tried in translating these texts
to bring out the philosopher's meaning as clearly as
How far I have succeeded in
was in my power.
doing so, provided I interpret it rightly, the reader
I cannot, in consequence,
alone can determine.
pretend that I literally translate the Greek, where
it seemed that a literal translation would fail to
Some scholars may
achieve this main purpose.
possibly object that at times I paraphrase Aristotle.
I can in that case only plead that a more or less
intelligible paraphrase does convey something to the
reader, unlike strict adherence to the letter.
Moreover, a literal translation might often repel EngHsh
readers and read like some alien jargon, as well as
in all probability demanding rather copious notes,
which are foreign from the scope of this series.
The Greek text here printed is Bekker's, except
for some slight deviations that are noted at the foot
of the page.
The short introduction that follows was submitted
to the Provost of Oriel.
I have to thank my friend
and former tutor, Lt.-Col. A. S. L. Farquharson, for
help and advice on certain points in regard to the
meaning of the texts.
H. P. C.
Cambridge, 1984
vii

ARISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES

A 2

INTRODUCTION
What

In oidliiaffy
is the subject of the CaUgories ?
usage KUTrjyopLaf rendered in Knglish bm cMCigW//
meant nothing more than a predicate' Thli meaning it seems highly probable that it retains In this
text. The ten categories, then, arc ten predknUt.
What sort of predicates, however, and preoicates alto
of what ? Let us first raise another point here. If
we ask how Aristotle came bv them, the critk
The following
are not in agreement.
the whole, the most plausible view of the
Aristotle,' says Theodor Gompert, imagines a
standing before him, say in the Lyceum,
in successive review the questions which may be put
and answered about him. All the predicates wl^ch
can be attached to that subject fall under one or
other of the ten heads, from the supreme qoestloii
What is the object here perceived ? down to socfa a
subordinate question, dealing with mere externalities,
as
What has he on ? What equipment or aceoatrements, e.g. shoes or weapons ? Other questions are
concerned with his quahties and his site (white,
'

'

'

instructed in grammar, so many feet tall) ; onder

the head of relation (Related to what) come answen
in which a term such as Greater or Less, Handsomer
or Uglier, implies a reference to an object or objects
of comparison. The " When " is explained by a

INTRODUCTION
Yesterday or To-morrow, the Doing and Suffering
" He is cutting or burning,"
" He is being cut or burnt." The enumeration is
intended to comprise the maximum of predicates
which can be assigned to any thing or being. A
maximum, be it observed for it can hardly be by
chance that the full number is found in only two
passages of the work, while the two which are at
once the most special and the least important, those
relating to Having, or possession, and to Lying, or
attitude, are in every other case passed over without
mention. And indeed, what sense could there be
in speaking of the possessions of a stone or a piece of
iron, or of the attitude of a sphere or a cube } We

by the sentences

further observe that several others of the categories

are often lumped together under the one name of
" Affections," while others are collectively designated
**
Motions." ** Grote took a similar view.
Now
what is remarkable,' he wrote, about the ninth and
tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals
are the only Subjects respecting whom they are ever
predicated, and are at the same time Subjects
respecting whom they are constantly (or at least
frequently) predicated.
An individual person is
habitually clothed in some particular way in all or
part of his body ; he (and perhaps his horse also)
are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover animals are the only Subjects, and among them
man is the principal Subject, whose changes of posture
are frequent, various, determined by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to
know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle
'

'

'

Greek Thinkers (Eng. tr.), vol. iv. p. 39. * A maximum,'

a man, for a man might have no clothing on

too, for

ARISTOTLE
down the Ten Categories, as Smmwtm Gmerm for
predications which can be made about any |five
Subject, the Subject which he has wh<Uy, or at le*t
principally, in his mind is an individual Man.
understand, then, how it is that he declares /Maiv
and Jacere to be so plain as to need no furthrr

lays
all

explanation. What is a man's posture ?

his clothing or equipment ? are questkNM

by every

What

Is

one.'

If the views thus expressed are correct fan

seem to admit of no doubt) in regard to tne

of the doctrine, we can draw, I think,

elusions respecting the nature of the e
they appear in this text, as distinct from
of Aristotle, and, at least, in their primai
They constitute the most general predUeatCS
able to one single subject. That subject can only

be either an individual

man

other subject whatever not

or an

all

animaL

Of any

of them are powjbte

predicates.
They constitute, therefore, ' a navfas Theodor Gompers well puts it. To certain

mum,'

other namable entities a number may, donbtlcM,

belong
and, moreover, on a secondary view, at
least one may belong to all others.
We may thus
describe ever}- thing existing as a substance or quantity or quality or refer it to one of the others.
This latter point brings us, I think, to a cuminon
explanation of the doctrine. Dr. Ross, for example,
considers that the categories are a list of the wiaeat
predicates which are predicable essentially of the
various namable entities, i.e., which tell os what
kinds of entity at bottom they are.' * If I onderttand
;

'

AruMU (ed.
*

ArutotU,

2. 1880), p. 7.

p. 9S,

INTRODUCTION
statement correctly, this means that the ultimate
answer to the question what is red is a quality,*
the ultimate answer to the question what space is
or time is a quantity.' On that view each namable
entity falls under only one category, having one only
for predicate. And surely one category only can tell
this

us what a thing is
at bottom.'
Now, a careful
inspection of the text shows, I think, that this view
is
correct.
Aristotle, in particular, of quantity
enumerates several examples, such as time, space,
speech, lines, solids, numbers. And if you were to
ask what these are, then the ultimate answer to the
question is quantities discrete or continuous.' Moreover, he expressly reminds us that only some things,
strictly speaking, belong to the category of quantity.
This implies that all namable things can be classed
under one or another. And the fact that he admits
the possibility of a thing's falling under two categories
scarcely affects the main point.
And this view is
consistent with our statement that one of the categories, at least, will belong to each namable entity.
These contentions, I think, will hold good. Not,
however, of the classification in its earliest form
and significance. For nothing, indeed, in that case
appears clearer, at least to my mind, than that all of
the ten were envisaged as the predicates of one single
subject. This is not to deny that the doctrine has
additional aspects or meanings and that it might
come to be made to serve purposes other than the
primal and, possibly, far more important.
So, again, we may properly argue that one subject
of our text is the meanings of uncombined,' isolated words (or of terms as opposed to propositions)
and the things signified by those terms. Thus the
*

'

'

'

ARISTOTLE
doctrine of the categories may fcrvc as a
of such meanings. It is only again in regard to
the primary sense of that doctrine that 1 do aol
It would seem,' to ho 9&f
quite follow Dr. Ross.
very briefly, that in its earhest form the ductllBO
was a classification of the meanings of, ijt* of tlM
things meant by, " uncombincd words,** ill Other
words an inventory of the main aspects of really*
so far at least as language takes account of them. *
<

'

'

me only to be true of the doetrino * to

form,' if reality is taken as mea ntof as
individual man or an animaL
Then the terms of the text make it evident, at
This seems to

its earliest

Gomperz has

'

rightly observed, that the

ducUino

had a definite bearing, in the uses to wiiich It

put, on the theory and practice of dispotation a
matter of small interest now. Otherwise wm shoald
not find

it

dealing with the subject of

dJlloirtletl

questions.

That the subject of all the ten categories is aa

man or an animal may be possibly doe io
some measure not only to actual obsm'ation of men
in the market-place of Athens but also to AristDtle*8

individual

holding that the real is the concrete individoal* And

what better instance could he take with a view to
illustrating his lectures than a Plato, a CaUias, a
Socrates, or (being possessed of some humour) some
member of his logical classes ?
This view presupposes, of course, that the doctrine
derives from Aristotle.

Some

scholars

deny

this

supposing he found it ready-made an'

it over complete from the Academy.
Certato
may lend colour to this theory, among them the iaet

doubt

it,

ArittotU, p. S.

INTRODUCTION
we have

noticed, that some of the categories only

appear to possess real importance or even come in
Any positive evidence in its favour
for much notice.
And the writings
it is difficult, however, to adduce.
of Plato himself do not seem to lend any support to it.**
One objection to regarding the categories as preIt is true, the first
dicates calls for brief notice.
category is substance and so-called first substance
individual, and what is individual can never be,
properly speaking, a predicate. But, if we ask what
Plato is, then the answer we shall give in the long
run as being the broadest about him is that he is a
primary substance,' a concrete and individual man.
So in that sense first substance is a predicate.
The text. On Interpretation, does not require much
comment here. It was seemingly so called since
language was regarded as interpreting thought. If
we say that the Categories for subject has isolated,*
uncombined terms,' then this text has propositions,
their theory, analysis and so on for subject and is
specially concerned with developing the possible
oppositions between them. The distinction between
*

'

'

true and false also naturally finds a place here.

Propositions are called true and false,' a distinction without any meaning as appHed to mere uncombined terms.* Aristotle assumes here that truth
Concepts
is a kind of correspondence Avith reaUty.
likenesses
of things. Propositions combine
are
or separate them. They are true, when the things
represented are similarly combined or separated ;
they are false in the contrary cases. Apart from
'

'

'

'

'

" Failing positive evidence to the contrary, I take the

traditional view that the first nine chapters of this text are
the genuine work of Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE
what Aristotle says or impUea of the
is open to all the objcctioat that are rmhd
against I^ocke and othert. llie reader mmy
Truth, tba
pare this from I>ocke
t
in the proper import of the word, to alu ullW I
but thf joining or teparaitng of Signs, ms lit Tkimgi
selves, this

'

tignijied by

MMM

them do agrte or disttgnt one miik mmtktr.

bm

luc joining or separating of signt

MMSt* ii
what by another mune we call pvpo^ilKMi. So tiMit
truth pmperly belongs only to pronoaitiofit : whereof
there are two sorts, rfak mental aid veilMl; at
there are two sorts of signs iwmmonly made ate oC
viz. ideas and words.'*
*

C.5.

An

Etfajf come^ntim^ iimmtom

Umd^niamdimf, Bk.

hr.

^^ni-1:"i'.

.ii;;

THE CATEGORIES
Summary of the Principal Themes
The meaning of

Ch.

1.

Ch.

2.

Ch.

3.

univocal, equivocal and

derivative terms.
Expressions are simple or complex.
Things are (1) asserted of a subject, (2)
present in a subject, (3) both (1) and (2) or
(4) neither (1) nor (2).
Predicates of the predicate are predicable

Ch.
Ch.

4.

The

5.

Of Substance.

also of the subject.

categories stated in outUne.

Primary and secondary substance defined.

is not primary substance is either
asserted of or present in a primary substance.
If primary substances did not exist, neither
would anything else.

What

Of secondary substances species more truly

substance than genus.
All species, not being genera, are substance
in the same degree
so are all primary
;

substances.

No

secondary substance other than genus

and species.
Primary substance related to secondary substance and all other predicates as secondary
substance to

all

other predicates.

ARISTOTLE
Neither primary nor
present in a subject.
Primary substmnce individual,
stance a qualification of the indiridoaL
Substances have no contraries.
Substances never admit of degrees.
The characteristic peculiar to Mbttaiice
that contrary qualities are predkable of it.
Ch.

6.

la

Of QuanUty.
Quantity discrete or continuous.
The parts of some quantities have relatifV
positions, while the parts of others have not.
Quantitative terms may be used of things
other than quantity.
'
Great/
small
and similar tenns not
quantitative but relative.
Quantities never admit of degrees.
'

'

The characteristic peculiar to quantHr If that

we predicate equal and unequal of It.
Of Relation.
'

Ch.

7.

'

'

Preliminary definition.

Some
Some

relatives

have contraries.

relatives admit of degrees.

Every relative has a correlative.

The

relative

only so

must have

its

proper

name

the correlative e\ident. Neeessltj

in certain cases for coining new names lor
the purpose.
Relatives usually come into being together.
Exceptions in the case of perception and
is

knowledge.
Primary substance never relative, neither
any part of such substance.
Corrected definition of relatives.
10

CATEGORIES
Impossible to
unless

Ch.

8.

its

know

that a thing

correlative

is

is

relative,

known.

Of QuaUty.
Qualities defined.

habits and dispositions,

affective quaUties and
affections, (4) shape, figure and so on.

Their kinds
(2)

(1)

capacities,

(3)

Most
If

qualities have contraries.

one of two contraries is a quaUty, so

is

the other.

Most qualities admit of degrees.

The characteristic peculiar to quality

we predicate
to

Ch. 9Ch. 10.

like

'

and unlike
*

'

is

that

in reference

it.

Of the remaining categories.

Of the four classes of opposites
relatives,

(2)

contraries,

(3)

(1)

cor-

positives

and

privatives, (4) affirmation and negation.

Ch. 11. Further discussion of contraries with special

relation to

Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.

12.
13.

14.
15.

good and

evil.

The five senses of 'prior.*

The three senses of 'simultaneous.*
The six kinds of motion.
The various meanings of to have.*
*

11

API2TOTEAOT2
KATHFOPIAI
la

'OfuLwfia Aeyeroi wv ovoyLa fx6yo ou^, 6

Aoyw rrji ovaiat mpoi, olbr
iwov o T avdpwTTos Kol TO yfpaiifivo, roimur
yap ovofia fiovov kowov, 6 hi Kara rowofta Xoyot
TTJs ovaias crepos' av yap Tiy anoBiS<ft rl iorw
I.

h Kara rovvofia

avrCjv iKarepo) ro a>^ lyai, ISiov tKaripov Xiyo

GVVtjwpLa 5< X^ytrai atv to

d7roha>Gi.

Koivov KoX 6 Kara rovpofia Xoyo^

r^

Tff tfK)|ia

odalais

6
avros, otov ^a>ov o T dvBpomo^ koX 6 fiodf,
yap dvdpojTTos Kal 6 Poth Koii'<p Svofum trpoQ-

ayopeverai
10

C<{^^

f<**

o Xoyos

5c

rrjs

ovaCa^ o

avros' idv yap drrohiBw Tts rov Kar4pov X6yo,

rl icTTLV aincov cKarcpo) ro a>a> tyai, rev

\6yov diToBwaci.
rivos

hia<f)4povra

aur^

napwwfjLa 5c Ar/rreu San dno

rfj

Trrcacrct

rriv

Kara rowofia

retain the traditional renderings, * unirocal,* nantely.

equivocal.' The ordinarj' reader, I siuprct, wlU br
little familiar with
the former.
He may, it he
substitute such terms as * ambi^ous,* * unas
"

and

Univocal
"

12

Zcpoi'

'

in

has the advantage of being a potUiv4

Greek had two meanings, th^ b to mj, IHrii^

ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES
Things are equivocally named, when they have
name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being
I.

the

For instance, while a man and a portrait

can properly both be called animals,' these are
equivocally named. ^ For they have the name only
in common, the definitions (or statements of essence)
corresponding with the name being different. For
if you are asked to define what the being an animal
means in the case of the man and the portrait, you
different.

'

give in either case a definition appropriate to that

case alone.
Things are univocally named, when not only they
bear the same name but the name means the same
has the same definition corresponding.
in each case
Thus a man and an ox are called animals.' The
name is the same in both cases ; so also the statement
of essence. For if you are asked what is meant by
their both of them being called animals,* you give
that particular name in both cases the same definition.
Things are derivatively named that derive their
own name from some other, that is given a new verbal

'

'

creature, and, secondly, a figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture.

have no ambiguous noun. However, we use the word ' living ' of portraits to mean
true
to life.'

We

'

13

ARISTOTLE
olov dno rfji ypafAfMrunff 6
ano t^5 aSp(as 6 dv^pflof.
Kara avfurXoteifif
II. Tcov Xeyofievwv ra fiv
to fiv od irard
Acycrat, ra 8* dvv avfjLnXoKTJs
crvfjLTrXoKrjv olov dvdpwnog rpXi, dpdpomof Kurf
ra 8* dvv arvfjLTrXoKTJs olov aydpunroi, fioOf, T/Mx*'*

7Tpo<rqyopiav
15

Xi,

ypafXfjLaTLKos Kal

VLKa.

TcDv

ovrwv

Xeyerai,

20

rd

fiev

V7roKifMV<(}

Kad*
B

vnoiCi^Uvav
ou5cvi

iaruf,

rw6t

oUm

fuv Xdytrai roO roM^

dvdpamov, v vnoKcifievtp Si ovStvl iarv tA
v imoKip,vo) fjLv *OTt, Ka0* ^notcttfUiMm SI
ovhcvos Xeyerai (cv v7roKifUv<{> Si Xdyw, B IW nut
26/X17 65? pLcpos vndpxov dhvvaTov x<*p<S hfai ro$
dvdpojiros Kad* imoKip,vov

v (L iarlv), olov

-q

ris yp<ififiaTucq tv unotcti^vtp

iari rfj ^xfl* '^^* vnoKifUvov B* ovdcMOf

Xdyeraiy Kal to ri XevKov iv {moKti^U^ fth^ r^

pLv

1 b

awpLarl eariv (dyrav yap xp<^H^

aa>fuin), ttnSt
V7TOKLpiVOV Si Ot^CVOS* A^CTCU* TO Si Kott iJjIOKcifidvov T Acycrat koI v v7roKifivo} iariv, dio^
iTno-rqfxr) iv vnoKLfiva) fjLv c'ort

rj

tq

^Ifvxj,

mtt

v7roKLpLvov Si XeycTOi Tfjs ypafLfLarucijf' tA hi

OVT V V7TOKip.Va} ioTLV OVT Koff imOKt^UvOV

TWOS Xeycrai, olov 6 ris dvdpamos Kal 6 liq hrmtf

ovSiv yap riov rotoirrcuv ovt iv V7TOKifLvw <mv
ovT Kad* v7TOKip,vov XiyeTox,

dnXws Si T^Sroua

.2Uki

Courageous man,* * courage,* in Greek. Bat tkm

former obscures the real point by consisting of two woffJt
in English.
By a new verbal form is intended a
**

'

termination or inflexion.

14

mv

CATEGORIES,

i-ii

form, as, for instance, grammarian from grammar,*

frogaJ heroism,* hero,' and so on."
,^^^We may or we may not combine what we call
words, expressions and phrases. Combine them ;
you have propositions for instance, man runs or
man wins while examples of uncombined forms
*

'

'

'

runs and wins and the like.

But as for the things that are meant, when we thus
speak of uncombined M^ords, you can predicate some
of a subject, but they never are present in one.
You can predicate man,' for example, of this or that
man as the subject, but man is not found in a subBy in,' present,' found in a subject I do
ject.
not mean present or found as its parts are contained
in a whole ; I mean that it cannot exist as apart from
the subject referred to. And then there is that class
of things which are present or found in a subject,
although they cannot be asserted of any known subpiece of grammatical knowledge
ject whatever.
is there in the mind as a subject but cannot be predicated of any known subject whatever. Again, a
particular whiteness is present or found in a body (all
colour implies some such basis as what we intend by
*
a body *) but cannot itself be asserted of any known
find there are some things,
subject whatever.
moreover, not only affirmed of a subject but present
Thus knowledge, for instance,
also in a subject.
while present in this or that mind as a subject, is
There is, finally, that
also asserted of grammar.
class of things which can neither be found in a subject
nor yet be asserted of one this or that man or horse,
For nothing of that kind is in or is
for example.
ever affirmed of a subj ect. More generally speaking,
indeed, we can never affirm of a subject what is in its
are

man,'

ox,*

'

'

'

'

'

We

15

ARISTOTLE
/cat v apidfiw Kar oiJSevoy viroKifUvov Xdy^rm,
iv v7roKLfivu) Se via oubv K(oXvi c&xu* ij ydp
ris ypaixfiaTiKT) riov cV vnoKifi4v<p iari}

Mpov Karqyopiinu wt
ooa KaTo. roO KarrfyopovfUyov
Aeycrai, Trdvra Koi Kar A rov U7roKifi4vou (nfi^'
crcrat, olov dvOpajnos Kara rod twos apBp$imov
KaTqyopelTai, to Sc ^wov Kara tow avBptimvuf
III. "Oral/

10

Kad*

Irepov Kad*

v7T0Ki,fjLV0Vt

ovKovv /cat /caret rov rivos ayOpaynov Karfjyofnfi^*

acrat to t^atov 6 yap ris diSpamos koX ibSpmw^i
16

coTt

t,wov.

/cat

Tcov Tpcjv

Kal

yvcjjv*

fiTj

aXX7}Xa rrray-

iJtr*

ficvwv TpaL rw ctSct Kal ax Sia^pai, otov it{tOV

Kal iTTKrrqfirjs' ^(oov fjLV yap Buu^pai^ro rt
7r^6v Kal TO BIttovv Kal to Trrqvov koI

to
tovtvjv ov yap
iniGT-qiJir) inKrrqfirjs rw hinovs ttfai,
Tatv Be y tm* dXXrjXa yvdw ovStv KotXmi ras
avrag Bia<f>opa9 etuax' ra yap CTrayoi rtjv vn a^r^
yevLJV Karr]yopirai,, ware ooot tou tcarrfyopoV'
fiivov hia<j)opaL elm, roaavrax Kal rov vnoKtifUvov
Sc

iirLGrrni-qs

20

ovSfjua

eoovrai.

IV. T(x)v

25

Kaarov
irpos TL

Kara

tJtoi
rj

avfiJi^K^v XryofUpta^
ovalav OT^/tatVct ^ -noaov ^ noiO w

TTov

rj

p.i]Bp.iav

ttotc

Bekker reads

Tdv

'Co-ordinate'

what

rj
'

c;(tv
-

JUp icn,

rj

mt

voifu^

ij

^wmtyidp^

B.
is

one under the other.'

16

Ke^Oax

T(ap iv inroicnftdpff

iTp<rffvCi

constitutes

rj

is

literally in

The

known

Greek 'not arnuifed the

differentia added to the gvnut

as the species. Supposing that

CATEGORIES,

ii-iv

nature individual and also numerically one. Yet in

cases nothing prevents its being present or found
in a subj ect.
Thus a piece of grammatical knowledge
is present, as we said, in a mind.

some

III.

word upon predicates here.

predicate this
a subject, the
also hold good
of a man ; so
Therefore, of
*

animal
man.'

When you

thing or that of another thing as of

predicates then of the predicate will
of the subject.
predicate man
of man do we predicate animal.*
this or that man we can predicate
too.
For a man is both animal and

We

'

'

'

When genera are co-ordinate and different, differentiae will differ in kind.* Take the genera, animal
and knowledge.
Footed,' two-footed,' winged,'
aquatic are among the differentiae of animal. But
none will be found to distinguish a particular species
of knowledge. No species of knowledge will differ
from another in being two-footed.'
Where the genera, however, are subordinate,
*

'

'

'

nothing whatever prevents them from having the

same differentiae. For we predicate the higher or
larger of the smaller or subordinate class. The
differentiae, then, of the predicate will also belong to
the subject.
IV. Each uncombined word or expression means
what (or Substance),
one of the following things
how large (that is. Quantity), what sort of thing (that
:

Quality), related to what (or Relation), where (that

Place), when (or Time), in what attitude (Posture,
Position), how circumstanced (State or Condition),
how active, what doing (or Action), how passive,
is,
is.

'

building

'

difference,

is

the genus and

used for a dwelling
the species called house.'

we then have

'

'

the

'

17

ARISTOTLE
cm hk ovaia yikv ctfSL.xvir<^ hm^ ofcr
avSpwiTOs, Innos' nocrov 8^ otov hinrp^, rplwifx^*
54
TTOiov be otov XevKov, ypa^^xarucov npof
otov SnrXaGLOv, rj^iav, /ictfof noO 8<r olbr Jr
AvKux), v ayopq.' trorrk hk otov c'x^^y, niovow
olbr
KeloOai otov ova^ctrcu, KdOrjrax' CYCCV

Trdaxciv.

8 a

noulv bk otov r/ftvci, iraXci*

7rd(TXi'V Sk otov rcfiverai, xaUrax,
"E/caoTov 8c TcDi' elprjfifvwv avro fUv #ca^ avro
iv ovScfuq, fcara^oaci Acyercu/ rn S^ irp^ aAAi}Aa
Toirrcov avfinXoKfj Kardtfaoi^ rj ani^aaii yivtrfu,
diToaa yap hoKi Karda^aoiS Kai avd^aais ^ffoi
LXr}$^s rj iltv^^ lv<u' ratv hk KaiA firfitfiUuf
uTToScScrat, wTrXiarrau'

Xeyoficvwv ovSkv ovrt dXrfSks oCrt

<mVf otov dvdpomos, XevKOv, rpivtt, vurf

ovp.iTAoKr)v
10

15

f//vS6s

V. Ovaia he eariv i} Kvpiorrard tc koI nptarutt

Kai fiAXiara Xeyou^vrj, rj /iijrc Kod* iiroKtifUmv
rivos Xeyerai fi-jr iv ^noKetfUvw rwl i<mv, otov
6 tIs dvOpwTTos ^ 6 rls iTmo^. Sevrepau hk o6<rl(u
Xiyovrai, iv ots eiBeaiv al irpilnuts o^Uu Xfydfunu
VTrdpxovari, ravrd re koI rd tcov eiBwv To i^ r r
yevT), otov 6 Ti; dvBpwnos iv cZSci ^kv tmdipxn
Tw dvBpwncp, yevos 8c rov etbovs iarl t6 {aMilf^

^ Awo<f>^i omitted after Xfytrtu.

I give here two versions of each oategorj.

The Greek
as a rule is more concrete than the cuatomarj EogtUtx
translations.
The reader may here be icferi ed to Ulcodor
Compere. Gr^k Thinkert (translated by G. G. BcrrjK

vol. iv.

4.

" Asserted of a subject " here refers to the relaikia

of universal to particular, " present in a subject *' to that
of an attribute to its possessor ' (W. D. Rom, .^IrMollc
The distinction is the same as that faitof iwHil and
p. 23).
18
*

'

CATEGORIES,

iv-v

what suffering ( Affection). ** Examples, to speak but

man ' and a horse,'
in outline, of Substance are
three cubits in
of Quantity * two cubits long,'
*

white
and
length
and the like, of Quality
half,'
double,'
grammatical.' Terms such as
greater are held to denote a Relation.
In the
market-place,' in the Lyceum and similar phrases
mean Place, while Time is intended by phrases like
yesterday,' last year and so on.
Is lying
or
*
sitting
means Posture, is shod or is armed
means a State.
Cuts or bums,' again, indicates
Action, is cut or is burnt an Affection.
Not one of these terms in itself will involve any
positive statement.
Affirmations, as also denials, can
only arise when such terms are combined or united
together. Each positive or negative statement must
either be true or be false that, at least, is allowed
on all hands but an uncombined word or expression
(for instance,
man,' white,' runs or conquers *)
can neither be true nor be false.
V. Substance in the truest and strictest, the
primary sense of that term, is that which is neither
asserted of nor can be found in a subject.^ We take
But
as examples of this a particular man or a horse.
we do speak of secondary substances those within
which, being species, the primary or first are included,
and those within which, being genera, the species
themselves are contained. For instance, a particular
man we include in the species called man and the
species itself in its turn is included in the genus called
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

accidental predicates. Aristotle under substance distinguishes,

first of all, primary substance, that is to say, the individual
(or this or that man, for example), and, secondly, secondary
substances, that is, the species and genera in which the
individuals are included

19

ARISTOTLE
Sevrepai ovv adrai Xiyovnu oMai, cJam S t
dvdpwTTOs Kal TO (cpoi^.
^avp6v Sc K Tlov flprjfitvutv art rwv Katt wiro20 KLiJLvov Acyo/xcVcov cwayKoZou Kal ro&fOftM
rov ^oyev Ka'n)yopiadat rov {moKni4vov, olo 6
avdpamos KaB v7roKifivov A/ycroi roB rtP^
dvdpwnov, Kal KaTrjyop^lral yt rowofia' r^ yip
avOpwTTov rov rivo^ dvSpamov Karffyopfi^attf. tnl
6 Xoyos 8c o rov avBpwmov Kara rod rti^ <Jr25 dpwTTov KarrjyoprjOi^airai' 6 yap ris dyOpwmof Kal
dvdpcoTTOs iari koI /[ax>F.
oxttc koI rowQfta Kol
6 Xoyos Kara rov tmoKifivov leanyyo/yiy^ i^a c r .
Tcuv 5* v \moKniVif} ovrwv inl iiiv rui
nXUTra}v ovr rovvopua oud* 6 Xoyog KanyyopU'
rat rov \moKipiVov in tylatv hi rowofia tip
80 ovhev
Ka)Xvi KarryyopilaBaL iror roB ^aoMfifievov, rov 8c Xoyov a&vvarov, otov r6 AiiMr3r ip
imoKipLva) ov rtp awpiari Karrjyopilrai roO ivo*
KCLfjicvov (XevKov yap atjfia Acycrcu), 6
X&yo9
6 rov XevKov oiSdnort fcarcL ajjfxarof Korriyop^'

md

dijacrai,.

Td

86

^Z

2 b

8*

oAAa rrdvra

Ka6* vnoKifUvoM^ A/rj

iv {moKi^Uvaii
icrrlv.
rovro 8e Saytpov K rwv KoSt
Kaara 7r/)o;^tptJo/xcVa>i', otov ro {^i^ Kara rod
avOpwTTov Kar7jyopirai' ovkoOv koI Kara row
rivos dvdpwTTOv Karrfyop-qdijacrai ro {^v* ci yap
yerai
avrals

rjroi

rwv irpwrwv ovgiwv

Kara fn)hv6s rwv rivwv dtfdpwnwv, ou6^ Kara

Understand by

*
the name* here ri Xn^, and moi
substantive XfVKinjt ;
both of ttiem ttenlfied
whiteness.* So also we use * white * in Ei^^lUi at aa

the Greek
*

SO

CATEGORIES,

*
animal.* These, then, are secondary substances,
that is to say, man and animal otherwise, species and
genus.
From what we have said it is plain that the name
and definition of the predicates can both be affirmed
'
of the subject. For instance, we predicate man
of an individual man as the subject. The name of
the species called man is asserted of each individual ; you predicate man of a man. The definition or meaning of man will apply to a man, in
like manner, for a man is both man and an animal.
The name and definition of the species will thus both
apply to the subject.
When we come, on the contrary, to things which
are present or found in a subject, we find that their
names and definitions we cannot, at least in most
cases, affirm or predicate of that subject.
Indeed,
the definition itself will in no case whatever apply.
But in some cases nothing prevents us from using the
name of the subject. Suppose we take white as an
Now white is, no doubt, in a body and
instance.
thus is affirmed of a body, for a body, of course, is
*
called white.' The definition, however, of white
of the colour, that is, we call white
can never
be predicated of any such body whatever.**
Everything else but first substance is either
affirmed of first substance or present in such as its
This is evident from particular instances
subject.
taken by way of examples.
predicate animal
of Vman.*
So we predicate animal' also of any
particular man.
Were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could

'

'

'

'

'

'

We

commonly speaking, but also at times as a noun,

means a white paint or white colour.*

adjective,

when

it

'

'

'

81:

ARISTOTLE
avdpoynov

ovKovv

to

TroAtv

oAcos'.

/cat

iv rivl

awfiarr

yap^rj

KaO* eKaara, ovhc cv aca/xart oXw^.

navra
6

ovaicov

tJtoi.
"5

KaO*

Iv

XptofUM,

vnoKifJLV(itv

awfiori'

iv xtA Ta>r

utort

Acyrro*

ra oAAa

rwy npunwv

xmoKiyivais atVrouy iarw.

fit)

ot^vkf

ovv Twv TTpatTOJV ovGiwv oZvyaTov ra>v aXXiov

etvai.

TcDv Se ScvTcpwv ovaujjv fiaXXov ovaia t6 cOcf

rod yivovs' yyu>v yap

rfjs

npamjs owrla^

^^T&i,

iav yap aTToSiSw Ttj rriv iTpafrqv ovaiay rl iarit

yvwpijiayrepov Koi olKWTpov airo^otati to
10

aiTohihovs 7Jnp ro yvos, olov rov timo

rOof

& 6)pctf WO

<

>

amohihovs yvajpifianepov av dnoSolrj ay$ptifWO ^

^a>ov aTToStSovj- to fiv yap iBiov fiaXXov roG twos

avdpamov, ro hk Koivorepov.
dnoSLSovs yvcDpLfiancpov
StSous

rq

Koi t6 tI

a'rroh<tKri

hMpp9

bl^^pow dbro*

<I>vt6v.

"Ert at nptorai ovaUu Sta to TOty oAAois* dnatrw

15

xmoKelaBai Kai irdvra ra oAAa ifard tovtow /cot7)yopLa6ai

ev avrats tvai Bid roOro iJuSXumx

ovoiai Xeyovrai.

(hs

ra oAAa ndvra

e)(ov(jw,

y al npwrai ovauu vpof

ovrw Koi r6

ro yV09 Xr vnoKeirax ydp ro tSos

20

cfSof npos

r^

yiptr

ra fiv ydp yevq Kard rwv clBafV KarTjyoplTai,

rd Sc ciSt] Kard ra>v ycvcjv ovk dvrurrpt^i. wart
Kol CK rovroiv ro cZSoy rod yvovs fidXXov ovfria,

23

CATEGORIES,

not be affirmed of the species. Colour, again, is in

body so also in this or that body. For were there
;

no bodies existing wherein it could also exist, it

could not be in body at all. In fine, then, all things
whatsoever, save what we call primary substances,
are predicates of primary substances or present in
such as their subjects. And were there no primary
substance, nought else could so much as exist.

Of secondary substances species is better called

it is nearer to primary subsubstance than genus
stance, while genus is more removed from it. Suppose someone asks you what is it ? regarding a
Your answer is both more
primary substance.
instructive and also more apt to the subject, provided
you mention its species than if you should mention
You
its genus. Take this or that man, for example.
would give a more instructive account, if you stated
the species or man,* than you would, if you called
him an animal.' The former belongs the more to
Or, again,
liim, the latter is somewhat too wide.
take an individual tree. By mentioning the species
or tree you will give a more instructive account than
by giving the genus or plant.*
Moreover, the primary substances most of all merit
that name, since they underlie all other things, which
in turn will be either their predicates or present in
such as their subjects. But exactly as primary substances stand to all else that exists, so also stands
Species is related to genus as
species to genus.
subject is related to predicate. We predicate genus
of species
but never, indeed, can we predicate
On this further ground
species of genus conversely.
we may hold that of secondary substances species
is more truly substance than genus.
:

'

'

2S

ARISTOTLE

MpOU

TpOV

LLOXXOV

OLKeioTcpov a7roha>ais

26TOV dvdpwnov anoBiBovs

rov limov, oyaavrat^ &

yap fid^Xov 6

rU

rj

tcara rov

#cai

axSpoynos

tw

Xwpom

rwv vptxmmt cmnm^

Mpov o^ia

ovS^ fiaXXov'^cpov

oMt f^

iiTTtV'

OXXJUX

Kara tow rut>j

itrrhf'

o^ia ^ 6 rU

OPW

fioOf.

Eucorcus hi fura rag npatras oiioLaf fi6^ rum

ttbuj teal ra y^vti 5urpaA oMo* Xiycm*

aXXojv ra

rcu* itiva

y6p

rffopovfUvtav,
ri(

9v)Xei

iori, r^

({p^y

teal

ware

ri

otMar tAt

tear*

diro^iSoik*

rp^x^i

rj

i)

t6

Y^i^os

iwoUovt
Mput"

yyu^p^uurtptm wovffotk

dTroSt34> r((, aAAor^/icu;

Acuicoi/

vpeurrjtf

fUp cISoc

ootc^ox anoS<oa<i
trov

r^r

r^ y^ nva oydpttmm Idb^ doSt5f

rc^
^<rra4

5*

iXXmn^ 6 rt wf

diroScftoMrctff ,

olbif

orioDv ru>v roto&rwtf diroSi^oi^.

eucarcjs rcuv d^Xatv

raiha fiova ovalai Xi"

yovrai,.
8 a

"En at Trpanai ovoiai Sid ro rocf dAAoif dvoiy

WTOK^lcrdai Kvpianara odaiai Xeyoyrai,
Ls S4 yt
at TTpcoTaL ovatai irpos ra dAAa vdi^v
^yotiou',

ovTco

ra

to yoo^ rwv npatnt^ Q^oui^ wpof

ra Xoina navra e^^et- Kara rovrwv
y^ w^rm ra
AotTrd Karrjyopctrai, rov yap rwa
Mpt^wov iptlg
6

ctSi; /cai

ypafifiariKov ovkoOv Kal di'Bpcjnov kqI ^ipo

ypa^ipels.
(Laavrws & teal inl ram dXXbt.
Kowov Be Kara irdarfi ovtnas to

imriKov

/ci^cVa> luai,

24

-n

tup

y^

npilnrj

pMa

^hd*

oiht

CATEGORIES,

we

turn to the species themselves, none, unless

is more of a substance than another.
No apter description is man of a concrete or
Individual man than is horse of a concrete horse.
So also of primary substances none is more a substance than others. For this or that man, for example,
could not well be more truly substance than, let us
say, this or that ox.
Apart, then, from primary substances, species and
genus alone of the things that will then remain over
are rightly called secondary substance, for they of all
possible predicates alone define primary substance.
1 or only by species or genus can this or that man be
and we make
defined in a fit or appropriate way
our definition preciser by stating the species or
man than by stating the genus or animal.' Anything else we might state, as, for instance, he runs
or is white,* would be foreign from the purpose in
So species and genera only are rightly
hand.
designated as substance, first substances only
excepted.
Substance,' again, strictly speaking, applies to
first substances only, because they not only underlie
but provide all things else with their subjects.
Exactly as primary substance is related to all else
whatever, so also are genus and species, in which is
Included that substance, related to all attributes not
included in genus and species. For these are the
subjects of such. You may call a man learned in
grammar.' And, therefore, his species and genus,
that is to say, man and animal, you may also call
learned in grammar.' And this will be so in all cases.
That it never is present in a subject holds good of
For what we call primary
all substance whatever.
If

it is

also a genus,

'

'

'

'

'

'

25

ARISTOTLE
8 s

cWtV OVT Kad* VnOKtifUvOV Xf/tTOU*

oSrwf
6 yap diSpontOf
oTt ovK elalv v v7roKi,fivu}.
Kad* v7TOKLfivov fiv Tov TWOS ovSpaytTov XtyfTOlm
iv uTTo/cet/icVoj OVK <mv' ov yap iv rtp rvn
V7TOKLfJiV<x)

rcov 8e Scvrepojv ovcriwv <l>avp6v fi(v leai

10

dvdpcjTTO) 6 avOpwTTos <JTW.

^wov

Kad*

v7roKifj,vov

fiv

(jjaavTOJS

AcyfTou

TOW

Kol t6

na^

^WOV iv Tip TtA dUu OpaiTTU). TC Se Twv v \moKi^v(D 6vru}V ro /A^r

ovopxL ovhkv kcjXvi Kar7jyopiaBat. v<nt rov vno*
KLfivov, rov B Xoyov aSwarov. rCiv hk htifriptttj^
ovariwv KaTqyoplrai, koX 6 Xoyo^ icard roil iwo^
KipLvov Koi Tovvofjui' TOV yop Tou dpBptuwov X6yatf
Kara rov nvog avBpwirov KaTrjyopi^tf, Kol rdr
20 rov t,cpov woavro}^.
uKrrt ovk av ciiy i} odala
dvdpaJTTOV,

rWV

C7Tt

TO

iv V7TOKLpLV(i}.

Ovk

tSiov

hLa<f>opd

25

OVK

roiv

5^
firj

rovTO

rijs ovalas, ^AAd itoi i)

v vrroKtLfi^vip iortM,
r^ yi^

TTcJoi^ Koi ro hinow Kod* vnoKtifjJvov fjih^ Xiyrnu

rov dvdpwnov, ev imoK^jiv<p b ovk larw ov yap
iv rdp dv6pw7r<p iarl ro Blrrow ^ ro nt^ov.
k(u
o Xoyos S Kar7jyoplrai 6 rijs Sia^pds, Koff* od
av Xiyrjrai r) hiaif>opd, olov ct to v^w Kara to$
dvdpaynov Acycrai, koI 6 Xoyos 6 rov vt^ov KotT'
7)yopr]drj<7raL rov dyBpwnov trc^ov yap iarw 6

avOpcjTTos.

Mi7 raparriro) Bi rjfids rd lUpt) rCa oiavS^

cv v7roKifivoLs ovra rois oAoiy, fi-q nor oifayKaa^
80 dajpLcv

rd iv

26

OVK ovuias avrd <f>daKw lvai' od yap ovrw

iXiy^ro rd ihs fJ^p^ (map^WTa

6noKi,fivu)

CATEGORIES,

substance can neither be present in a subject nor yet

predicated of one. And as for the secondary substance, the following points, among others, will prove
We predicate man of a
it is not in a subject.
man,' however, is not in a subject. For manman
hood is not in a man. As the species, so also the
genus. For animal is also asserted of this or that
man in particular but cannot be found present in
him. Again, we may notice this point. When a
thing can be found in a subject, then nothing prevents
us from using its name of the subject in question ;
not so the definition, however. And yet of a secondary
substance both name and definition hold good in the
case of the subject as well. The definition of the
species (or man) and that of the genus (or animal) are
used of an individual man. Therefore, substance is
not in a subject.
That they cannot be present in subjects is true
not of substances only but holds of differentiae, too.
Thus we can of the species called man assert
going on foot and two-footed.' But these are not
found present in it. For neither of these is in man.
Where, again, you affirm the differentia, you also
affirm its definition.
Suppose of the species called
man you should predicate going on foot.' The
definition also of that attribute then will apply to
that species. For man does, indeed, go on foot.
That the parts of the substances are present or
found in the wholes as in subjects is a fact that need
hardly disturb us or render us fearful of having to
brand all such parts as no substances. Did we not
qualify present in a subject by not as the parts
in a whole ? **
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

See the

definition,

a 24.

2T

ARISTOTLE
'Tndpx^i rals ovauus
p5

teal

toTs Si a^opais ra

-navra Gvviovvfxcog air* avratu Acyco^cu. wdocu yop

at OLTT* avTotv KaTTjyoplai rjroi Kara rutv ^r^fum^
dn6 flip y^ip
Karrjyopovvrai, rj Kara rwv t&civ.

ovaiaq ovSffiia tori KonfyopUi' tear

^tvriptmf
ovhevos yap \nTOKip,vov Acyerai* rCtv
ovGLU)v ro p.v .lZos Kara rod dr6fiov Kortfyo*
pflraif ro Be yivos koX Kara rod v^v^ k<u mrra
8bTou drofiov. waavrui^ 5c K-ai ai hia/^opaX irard
.TcDv etScuv KoX Kara rwv drofiwv Karrfyopoi/PTaL*
Kal rov Xdyov hk 'mSXovrai ai nparrai oMoft
rov rCiv (.]hCjv koX rov rdv ycvoji', KOi to c28of
rrjs 7Tpa)T7js

10

rov rod ydvovs' oaa yap Kara rov KartfyopmtiUpau

Acycrat, ndvra koX Kara rov vnoKifUpov fifM'
waaurws 3c Kal rov rwv ^io^opufP Xiyo
aerat.
awaiwta hi
cTTtSexcTat rd iSr) Kal rd drofia.
ye '^v a>v Kal rovvopua Koutdv koX 6 Xoyof 6 ai^fitt
ware ndvra rd drrd rCtv ovaimv koX tA imi tH/^
i
hia^opcjv (Tvvojvvpxu^ Xiy^rax,
riaaa 8c ovaia hoKtl toSc ti arjfuuvtUf.
pLv ovv rcov TTpwroiv ovaiwv dt'aiuhio66i nrw Kol
dX-qdcs eoTLV on toSc ti (Tr)pLaivi' arouov yip teal
v dpidpcp ro ^r]XovpLv6v coriv* iirl
rfiy S<lK

Mf

rcpojv

ovaicjv

(faivcrat fiv

ofwlutf T<p

ay$uwi

toSc ti <rr)fuuvw, oroy <^1|

dvdposrTTOV ri (,a)OVf ov p,j)v dXrj9s yc, oAAa ficUUor
rroLov T( OTj/xaiVct' ov ydp v <m ro vnoK^ian^
wG7Tp r) ITpom) ovaia, oAAd icaTa nijXXut i
dvdpoxnos AcycTai kox ro ^(ftov,
ovx dnXAt 6^
TTOLov
arjfjiaiveL, wairtp ro XVk6v,
ovSh^ yip
oAAo arjjxalveL ro Xcvkov oAA* ^ ttqiov. to
c&off

IS rrjs

TTpoo-qyoplas

JO

28

CATEGORIES,
Differentia

and substance

alike

have

this charac-

common, that, wherever we predicate them,

we predicate them univocally. For such propositions
have always individuals or species for subjects. The
teristic in

primary substance, no doubt, being never predicated

of anything, never itself can be predicate of any proposition whatever. Not so with the secondary sub-

The species is predicated of all individual

examples, the genus of these and the species. And
so with differentiae also. Of species and individuals
we predicate these in like manner. Both definitions,
moreover, or those of the genus and species, apply to
the primary substance and that of the genus to the
species. For all we affirm of the predicate will also
be affirmed of the subject. The definition of each
differentia applies in a similar manner to both individuals and species. But, as we have already noticed,
univocal is used of such things as not only possess
the same name but are also defined the same way.
Hence it follows that in all propositions having substance.

stance or difference for predicate that predicate is

quite unequivocal.
And this is
All substance appears individual.
indisputably true in the case of the primary subIn that of
stances. What each denotes is a unit.
the secondary substances language may make it
appear so, as when Me say animal,' man.' This,
however, is not really so, for a quality rather is meant.
Second substance is not one and single, as, no doubt,
not of one but of many, indeed, do
the primary is
we predicate animal,' man.' Species and genus,
however, do not merely indicate quality, as white
merely indicates quality. Accidents, that is, like
white,' mean a quality simply and merely. But species
'

'

'

'

'

29

ARISTOTLE

^ ^^

^oM

h' troio*
Kox TO ykvos 'rTpl ovaCav to noiov oi
TLva ovalav crr)fialvi. iirl rrAcIoK & t^ yA^c
to) l!8 TOP a(f>opi,<TfJL6v noulrai' 6 vap (4'*'*'
ctTToIv cVt nXcZov 7rpiAa/x/3ai^i ^ o T^r Mpo^tnm.
'TTraipxci 8^ Tais ovalais fcai ro firfih^ adraJr
ivavTiov etvcu.
rfj yap irpayrf) ovaiff. rl eb^ cwy
ivavrCov, olov r<p rivl avBpwiroi ^ t<J Ttvt C^*^*
ovSt y r& atSpamt^
ouScv yap (mv ivavrlov.
otMC Tiiot^ 0
Tip t,(x)ip ovhiv ioTiV evavriov.
ri
Touro TTJs ovalas, oAAd Kol in* aXXofy noXXia^,

\yap
\;

'

4/
'Y^u

olov
0

7rl

Tov TToaov- rtp yap

BiTJijx^i

rj

ouScV ioTLv ivavTiov, ovSi yc Totf S4ica,

rpiwi^x^i

oM

rik^

roLovrujv ouScvt, t /i^ Tts to ttoXv r<^ SXly^

^*fl
rw q
evamiov efvai 17 to /xeya Ta> pxKpift.

-^f

TToawv ovScv ovStvl fvamiov iarw,

ovaia p,rj emhix^aBai ro fiaXXot^ irai
TO "^TTov. Xiyoi hk ov\ on ovuia ovala^ ovtc ioix
Kal -^rrov ovaCa {roOro fiiv yiip
lb pLoXXov ovala
etpTjTai OTi coTcv), oAA* OTi ^icaoTTj oiMgi tow
OTTcp iorlv, ov AcycTat /xoAAov kcu i^'TTOI'.
olbr 1
icTTLv avTTj^ rj ovala avOpunros, ovk tarai fiaXXa^
Kal "^TTOv avBpoynoSt out avros lavrov ovt trtpof
irepov ov yap iariv Tpo^ tripov uaXXov ar4 a dpcjTTos, wcmcp to A;*coi' mpov Irtpov fAoXXS^
ioTL Kal "^TTOv XcvKov, Kol KoXov tTtpov Irlpov
jjLoXXov KaXov Kal ^rrov Xiy^rax.
kox avro hk
avTov p,aXXov Kal -^rrov AcycTat, olov t6 ao^fia
XevKov ov fidXXov XevKov ctkcu ArycTcu vv ^
6 TTpOTCpOV, Kal dpp.6v OV fJLoXXoV B^ppuOV KOX ^TTOT
Xeyerai.
rj 8c yc ovaia ov^kv fidXXov koI ipror
a(j)CDpiap,V(x}v

Ao'/ct

80

8c

9]

CATEGORIES,

and genus determine a quality in reference to substance. They tell you what sort of a substance. In the
case of the genus, however, such determining qualification will cover a much wider field than it does in the
case of the species. Say animal ; you comprehend
more than you would, if instead you said man.'
Substances never have contraries. How could first
substances have them this man, for example, that
animal ? Nothing is contrary to them. And species
and genus have none. This particular characteristic
belongs not to substance alone. For it holds of a good
many things and, among them, for instance, of quantity.
Two cubits long has no contrary ; neither
has three cubits long ; nor has ten nor yet anything like it, unless, indeed, someone should say
large
and small,' much and little are contraries.
Definite quantities, however, can certainly
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

never have contraries.

No substance, it seems, has degrees or admits of a
more and a less. I do not mean here that one substance may not be more truly called substance, less
truly called substance, than others
indeed, we have
said that it may. But I mean that no substance as
such can admit of degrees in itself. For example, the
same substance, man, cannot really be more or less
man as compared with himself or another. This man
is not more man than that, as one white thing is more
or less white than another white object may be or,
again, as one beautiful object has more or less beauty
than others. The same quality in the same object
may vary at times in degree. For example, a
body, if white, is called whiter just now than it
;

was

or, if

warm,

a substance

is

is

called

more

or less

warm.

But

not more or less of whatever, qua

31

ARISTOTLE
Xeycrar ovbe yap avdpwnos fiaXXov vOv avBpumoi
7}

TTpoTcpov Acyerai, ovSc ye rufv aXXtav ov6t, Soa

oKrre oi5#c op itnhtxovro 1} owfui
ovalai.

iarrlv

TO
10

16

/LtdAAoV /cat "^TTOV.

MoAtorra Se thiov rijs ovata^ So#fC4 ttvai r6

rairrov Kal v dpi^/x<p ov -rdv ivavTiwv clia* 5tfTtKov, ofov cTTt p,v tCjv qXXu)v ovk om c^oi Ttf ni
Totoirro 7TpoVyKLV, oaa /i.i} cartv oi)auu, o Jr
dpL^a> ov tCjv va\rrioiv hKTUc6v iariv, olo r6
Xpcofia, 6 ioTiv ev koI ravrov rw dptBfim, oAk
orat. XevKov Kal fiiXav, ovS* 1) aiVr^ npdftt Hal
fjila rco dpLdpUp ovk carat if>auXrj Koi ohuvSoXb*
wcravrcjs 8e 'cat cm rwu aXXtjjv, oaa /ii4 cjffiy
ovaiai.
rj 8c yc ovaia cv Kai raiVror dpwfi^ 9l^
SeKTLKOv T<x)v ivavrlcjv cortV, ofbv o T15 &iSpt0WOt

20

cf? /cat

o auTOS"

c5i/,

ore

ftcv Acvico;

ori

fiJXof

ytVerat, /cat dcpfios Kal *lfv\p6^, koX ^OXof teal

cTTt be tCjv dXXwv ovSvoi ^au^trai
OTTovSalos.

25

TO roiovTov, ct firj ns ivUrraxro rov X6yo mu

rrjv Sofav <f)daKcjv ru>v fvam-Uuv c&tu OcirruaL
o yap atVro? Aoyo; dXrjdij^ Kal 0c 1^17; c2mu Soittf,
olov ct oA?;^? ciT^ o Aoyoy TO KoBrjadai Tumt
dvacrrdvros avrov 6 avros odros Xcyos ilfMff
corat.

ns

(oorauTcuff

Sc

dXrjdcjs Sofa^ot

/cat

cm r^

5ofiK* c/

y^

to KaOrjaBai riva, avatmiinrtf

avTov 0u8ai9 Sofaoct, rrjv avrriv \tjv ntpi, avroB

ct 8c Tt9 /cat toOto trapah^YOiro, oAAa t^
yc TpoTTO) hui<f)pi. Ta ftcv yap crrt Tc3r oi^ou^
aurd ficTapdXXovra 8c/cTi/cd Ta/v ivayriatv iarl'
ho^av.

80

i/wxpov yap k Ocppiov yv6fivov p^rifiaXtv (iJA*

Aotcorat ydp) /cat fieXav c/c Acu/cov /cat airovBaiaif
*

82

True at one time and

false at another.

CATEGORIES,

it is.
For a man is not more of a man than
he was at some time in the past. And so of all
substances else. Therefore, substance can have no

substance,

degrees.

But what is most characteristic of substance appears

to be this

that, although

remains, notwithstandit is capable of

being the recipient of contrary qualifications.
Of
tilings that are other than substance we could hardly
adduce an example possessed of this characteristic.
For instance, a particular colour, numerically one and
the same, can in no wise be both black and white, and
an action, if one and the same, can in no wise be
both good and bad. So of everything other than
substance. But substance, remaining the same, yet
admits of such contrary qualities. One and the same
individual at one time is white, warm or good, at
another time black, cold or bad. This is not so with
anything else, though it might be maintained that
assertions or opinions admitted of contraries. That
is to say, the same statement may appear to be
both true and false."
He sits may, for instance,
:

ing, numerically

it

one and the same,

'

be true. If he rises, it then becomes false. And

so with opinions as well.
One may be of opinion,
and truly, that such or such person is sitting.
And yet, when that person has risen, that opinion,
if held still, is
false.
Even though we allow
this exception, it would differ, in fact, from the rest
in its manner of coming about.
For whenever a
substance admits of such contrary quahfications, it is
by a change in itself. It is by a change in itself that
a thing that was hot becomes cold (having passed
from one state to another) or a thing that was white
becomes black or a thing that was good becomes bad.
B 2

33

ARISTOTLE
K

(f>avXov.

waavTw^ hk koX ini nwr

KaaTov avTwv fierapoXrju SxofUve Tftr A^oy6 b Xoyo^ koI 17 Mfa awra
rUx)v hcKTiKov cariv.
vpm/*''
85 fJLV aKLVTjTa TTOivrrj TTavTios hiafUyi, rov
fiaros KLVovficvov ro vavriov rrfpl cuiVrd yu^fTO**
o /xev yap Aoyo? 8iafivt 6 avros to icaB^aBal
I b Ttva, Toi5 8c TTpdyfiaTog KiyrjOtvro^ 6r^ fU oA^^^^

ore 8c ipevSrjs Acycrcu.

So^TjS'

TO

cjcrre rep rpoTrut

Kara rqv

iauTTJs

cuaatrrcu; & tal rfwl

yc

ZScoi'

av

firafioXfiv

irj riff

t^

odola4

5cimiC^

**

ivavTLCJV ctvoi.
Tt9 ^oi ratrra irapa&^xoiro, r^ X6yo mu
8of av heKTiKa rwv ivavruav thfox, ovtc iatm
dX-qOcg rovTo.
6 yap Aoyoj fcai 1} 5ofa od T^
aina hex^oBai ri rwv v<iyTiwv cImu ScffTurd
Acycrat, dAAa rw npl Irtpov
r^ w^B^f ytyt*
vrjadat.
tw yap ro npdyfui ttyat ^ /r^ tmu
rovro) Kal 6 Xoyos dXrfOri^ rj tf^vS^ clwu Xfvrrai,
ov rw avros SetcriKog ctoi ra>v Ivavruav, anXuH
yap ov^ev vn oiihevo^ ovr 6 Xoyos tciyura^ ovrt
Tj
8o^a, coore ovk ov etrj Scicrura rw iviurr{w
firjhcvos v avrols ywofitvov irdBous*
rj
hi y
ovala rat avrq rd evavrla hix^oBai, rovrtft Scirruo)
rcjv ivavrlcjv ttyai Acycrcu* voaov yap teal vyUttOP
Sc^fcrat, Koi XevKorTp-a koI p^Xai'lav koa Kaaro
r}v rotovrwv avrq SXop.V7j ru> va>rriijjv f&<at
SeKriKT) AcycTot.
coorc Siov ov ovaiag c2n mo
ravrov Koi ev dpidpup 6v hticriKov cimi noir ii

El 8^'

B 'n7i/

10

15

Kara rrjv daurfj^ pLtra^Xrpf, wtpi. fihf e*iv

ovatas roaavra elprjoBo}.
t
VI. Tov 8e noaov ro yJv i<m BiwpiafUpov, ro

rioav

80

SI

*^

CATEGORIES,

v-vi

And so, too, in all other cases where substance admits

The statement or opinion, however, remains in itself quite unaltered in any and
every respect. If it takes on the contrary quahty,
being now true and now false, then the facts of the
of such qualities.

- For
the statement
he
but according to existing conAs with
ditions we call it now true and now false.
statements, so, too, with opinions. In its manner,
then, of coming about it is really peculiar to substance
to admit of the contrary qualities to wit, by a change

case will have changed.

sits

'

is

unchanged

in itself.

If a man, then, should make an exception in favour

of opinions and statements, maintaining that these
admit also of contrary quaUfications, his view would,
in truth, be unsound. If opinions and statements are
said to admit of such qualifications, the fact is that
not they themselves but that something else undergoes
change. For it is by the facts of the case, by their
being or not being so, that a statement is called true
or false. It is not that the statement itself can admit
of such contrary qualities. For nothing, in one word,
can alter the nature of opinions and statements, and,
seeing no change occurs in them, they cannot admit
of such contraries. But substance admits of such
contraries by having received them itself: it alternately takes to itself health, disease, whiteness,
blackness, the like. By receiving them into itself
So, to conclude,
is it said to admit of such contraries.
we may call this above all distinctive of substance,
that, remaining still one and the same, it may yet
through a change in itself receive contrary qualiLet so much on substance sufl!ice.
fications.
VI. To quantity let us turn next. This is either

35

ARISTOTLE

aXX7]\a rojv iv avrols fiopiwv awtaryjM, r6

Gti 8c BujjpurfjJvov fiiv
fO^ oXov dpiOfiog Kal Aoyo?, <nn<Y9 8 otov vpo^
25 cTTt^oveta, (Tcofia, cri 8^ wapa rairra ypdror rui

ovK ef exovTOiV dcaiv.

oiitU
ra lt^6pttQi
avTOVy olov ra 7TVT ct corn rofv h4Ka fi6ptO,
TTpos ov^eva KOivov opov awdirrti ra nSrn Ktu
ra TTeWe, oAAa Stcupiorcu* Koi ra rpla yf tcai Ttt
eWd TTpos ovSeva Kotvou opov awdnrti' ovit*
oXojg av exois in* dptdfioO kowov opo Xafiuv tttfr
fxopLwv, oAA* dec Suopiorai* oKrrc o fiiv <yi||ii^f
TcDi' hLO)piapivu)v arw.
waavrot^ hk ccU ^ Jwyor
rcuv hiojpiGficvajv orw.
on fikv ydp irooi^ Artw
d Adyos", <f>avp6v' KarafXrpirai yap auXXafifj
TOTToj.

ioTL

80

6 a

TcDt'

KOivos

/xcv

ydp Tou apiOfxov

opos,

ov

TTpog

fjLOpua

Gwairrti

Xtyw 5^ ai)indi nJr firro

Ppax^ia Kal fiaKp^.
(jxDvrjs Adyor yiyvoyifvov.
npof o66^va vap MOwi
opov avrov rd fiopui cwdTrri' oi yap tori teow6f
opos TTpos ov at ouAAajSoi avvaTrrovaiy, dAA*
iKaarr) Sidjptarcu ai)n7 #ca^ avnj*'.
.
*H Sc ypafifirt <njvxi]s iariv ari yap Xafi^
KOLvov Opov TTpos OV xd fiopui ovrijf oiWirm,

ra ydp roO

^v^

tyTty/AT?^', 'cat rijs

ernTTebov p,6pi,a TTpos riva KOiVOv opo <nWT<fi.

ojdavTOJs Kal ttI rov aiofiarog c;^oi; dy Xafiti^
KOIVOV opov, ypap,fi7iv rj cVt^dvctoy, npof a ra

'nuj>avias ypafijinv

**
These divisions are Dot oo-extensive. IJne, plane
solid and space are all called continuous auantities t
too, consist of such parts as have interrelated

Time
36

is

a continuous quantity

*
;

its

parts have,

and
all,

CATEGORIES,

vi

discrete or continuous.
Some quantities, moreover,
consist of such parts as have relative positions in refer-

ence each to the others, while others, on the contrary,

consist of such parts as have no such positions.**
Of
quantities that are discrete we may here instance

number and speech, of quantities that

and

are continuous

which time and place

may be added. Consider the parts of a number.
You find there is no common limit at which they may
join or unite.
For example, two fives will make ten.
These, however, are wholly distinct
there is no
common limit whatever at which these two fives
coalesce. And the same with the parts three and
line, superficies

solid, to

And, indeed,

in the case of all numbers you

such a boundary, common to any two
parts, for the parts remain ever distinct.
Thus is
number discrete, not continuous. The same may be
said about speech, if by speech the spoken word is
intended. Being measured in long and short syllables, speech is an evident quantity, whose parts
possess no common boundary. No common limit
exists, where those parts
that is, syllables ^join.
Each, indeed, is distinct from the rest.
A line is, however, continuous. Here we discover
that limit of which we have just now been speaking.
This limit or term is a point. So it is ^vith a plane or
a solid. Their parts also have such a limit a line in
the case of the former, a line or a plane in the latter.

seven.

never

will find

positions in reference the one to the other.

See the following
from the summary by Waitz
quod quantum est id vel
discretum esse (numerus, oratio) vel continuum (linea,
superficies, corpus
tempus, spatium) exemplis demonstratur,' and
linea, superficies, corpus et spatium constant
e partibus positionem quandam inter se habentibus, non ita
numerus, tempus et oratio.'
:

'

'

37

ARISTOTLE

Tov acjfxaTOS fiopuL (TuvairrcL. cnrt 04 Koi o Xp09^c%

KoX 6 rOTTOS Tvjv roiovrcjv 6 yap vOv y(pi^nt
crwaTTrcL npos rov 7rapXrjXvd6Ta koI t6v yJX'
TToXtv 6 ronos tdv aw\wv ifrrv t6wo
\ovTa.
10 yap riva ra rov aa>p.aro9 fwpui #car/jf, a irpor
Ttya KOLVov opov crwaTrrei' ovkovv koI ra roO
roTTov p,6pt.a, a /care vet eKaarov rtov rov oto^iaroi
fjioplcjVf TTpos rovlxvTov opov avvam'i npoi 0
Kol ra rov awfiaros fiopia. oxrrc owtxts o** <in
/cat o roTTos' irpos yap Iva Koutov opov avrov ra
fjiopLa crvvaTTrei,.
16

Bemv txovrwv npoi oAAi^

ovtc
ra
ixovrcDv demv, otov ra fuv rifs ypaft^rj^ M^pMl
OeoLV XL 77/009 oXXrjXa' Kaarov yap avrutv Ktirml

"En

rwv

he ra p,v k

iv avroLS yuopujjv aw<rrqK,

Kal Xot9 av SiaXapelv Kai aTroSouvat omw

Kaarov Kelrax v rw iiriirihio icoX np69 iroibr

TTOv,

rwv Xomwv crwaTrrei. cjcravrw^ Si icoi tA

rov CTTLTTchov piopia Blow ;(^( rwa' opuoluti
av dnohodclr) eKaarov o^ Kclrai, koI iroia oiWirrci
\
\,0l
TTpog dXX-qXa.
Kal ra rov qz^fiov & dtaavrtoi,
Kal ra rod ronov. eVt Sc y rov dpiOfiov ovk ay
25 Xot. ris cVtScIf at cay ra fiopia avroO ddaw rtva
Xi irpos aXXrjXa rj Kclrai nov, ^ ytoui yf Ttpot
dXXrjXa auvaTTTci rwv ftopUov. ou& ra roG xp^^'ou'
\mojXVi. yap ovhkv rwv rov XP^*^^ fiopunv' S
firj ioriv tmofidvov, ttws av rovro deaiv rufO. cj^oi;
dXXa fJLoXXov rd^LV rivd cIttoh av <X^'*' '^*?
80 TTporcpov clvai rov xpdvov ro 8* varepov.
koX ivi
y rod dpiOfiov he waavrws rw ro V trporepor omB*
^^ ^ fielodai rwv hvo Kal rd hvo rwv rptwv Koi ourw
Toftv rivd av exoi, Oiaiv he ov ndyv Xifioii or.
20 fjLopuyv

y^

^ M^

38

CATEGORIES,

vi

Again, time and space are continuous. Time is a

whole and continuous the present, past, future are
For
linked. Space is also this kind of a quantity.
seeing the parts of a solid themselves occupy so
much space and these parts have a limit in common,
it follows the parts of space also, which those parts
themselves occupy, have exactly the same common
As is time, so
limit or term as the parts of the solid.
the parts meet at one
is space, then, continuous
common boundary.
and those
All quantities are made up of parts
parts, as we saw, have position in reference one to
another or else they have no such position. The
parts of a line, for example, must all have their
Each, Avithout doubt, must lie some^
relative places.
where, and each can be clearly distinguished. You
can say where each lies on the plane and to what
sort of part it is next.
So the parts of the plane
again you can say where each lies
have position
and to what sort of parts it is next. This is true, too,
of solids and space. But the case of a number is
different.
You never could show that its parts are
possessed of their relative places or even so much
Nor could you determine which parts
as have places.
are contiguous or adjacent to which. And the same
may be said of time also. For no part of time is
enduring. And how can what does not endure well
be said to have any position? Of time it were better
to say that the parts have a relative order, since one
part is prior to another. And so, in like manner, of
number, for numbers are prior in the counting, as
one prior to two, two to three. Thus of number also
we may say that the parts have a relative order but
certainly have no positions. This, also, will hold
;

39

'

ARISTOTLE
Koi 6 Aoyo9 Sc caGavTOJ^' ovShf yap vnoyJitt rum

avTov, oAA* lfnjrai t

85 fJLopicjv

rovro XaPetv, ware ovk av

avrov, etye

rwv

ixovroiv

ra

fir^Sev vtto/acVci.

fiopuov

o^k iarw fr%

*fot

cirj

rwv

O^ai^

ow

yutv

aw(rrr)tc,

fAoplotv

iK Biaw

to hi

i(

c4it

t^oJ^^i' Biaw.

KvpUos TToaa ravra fiova Acyrrot to ipfjfUva,

8c oAAa ndm-a Kara <TVfiPprjK6s' <& tovto
yap airopXlTTovTcs koX rdAAa iroaa kiyofity, oto
"TToAv TO XevKov AcycToi rw rrfv cVt^^fiov iroAA^
ctvai, Kal -q npd^i^ pxiKpa rip yt rov\p6Q noX^
clvai, Kal 7) Kivrjais ttoAAtJ.
ov yap KolEt qvt6

Bbrd
^

'

I(vc5

^^'^

cKaarov rovrcjv rroaov Xyrai.

rLs

ris

iToar)

r)

<m,

TTpa^is

otov car anoStiS^

rtp

ivLavGLalav ^ ovrto no)s aTroSiSov^.

TToaov

av

T)

rt,

olttoSlSovs rfj

Aeyerat ra
avroy oAA*

rw

"Ert

yap
**

opitX'

wr^

rd>v

ipr)p,va,
ct

rwv 5c oAAcov <Mh^

dpa, Kq^aGvp^p7)K6s

TToatp

oi55cV

d(t>wpiapJvu>v

>

iy^

ariv ivavriov,

ctvai

i'avTiov

ttotT
*

nl

rf

T/nm^x^i

rj

tj

tr

/i**

iorw

rj}

rwv roiovrwv rwi' oihh^ ydp

avroU ivavrlov, ct firj dpa ro iroXu T<p
rq

Tts

^>avp6v cr% ovSttf

ivavriov, olov rat SiTrrjxei

ipavcla

16 <pat7j

ydi/>

roaovrov Kal to Acvic^ ^ifovfcr

ware fiova Kvpiws Kal Koff oiM oa4

i7T(.<f>dveia if,

ai^ etvai.
10

Tri<l>avfUf.

XP^^ ^p^^t
Kal r6 Xtvtei^

An-

hmp
iXtytfi

ro /icyo rtp fuxput,

rovrwv 8c ovBcv eari noaov oAAo rwy npog n*

ovhcv ydp avro Kad* avro pjya Xfytrai
^ fuscpA^^
40

CATEGORIES,

vi

good of speech, for the parts have no lasting existence. Pronounce them, and then they are gone,
so that, since they pass out of existence, they cannot
have place or position. Of quantities, then, to sum
up, some consist of parts having position and others

of parts that have not.

The things we have mentioned alone can be called
Other things that
in the strictest sense quantities.
are so called are so called in a secondary sense with
an eye to some one of the former. To take an
example or two. A white object is often called large,
since the surface it covers is large, an action or process called long, since the time that it occupies is long.
The name quantity cannot be given to such things
as of their own right.
Someone asks you * how long
was that action ? * You mention the time that it
took, as
or the like. Someone
it lasted a year
You
asks you
how large is that white thing ?
mention the surface it covers. As large as the surface
it covers, so large, you will say, that white object.
The things, then, referred to alone in themselves can
be strictly called quantities ; other things thus designated can only lay claim to that name, if at all, in a
secondary sense in a sort of derivative fashion and
not from their intrinsic nature.
This will be
Quantities never have contraries.
perfectly clear in the case of all definite quantities,
whereby I mean, for example, two cubits or
three cubits long or a surface or something of that
sort.
These, it is clear, have no contraries. But
great
and small,'
possibly someone may say,
much and little are contraries. These are, however, more properly regarded as terms of relation :
as sucky things are not great or small. They are so

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

ARISTOTLE
aXXa
"\

A
9

rw

20

Trpo?

mpov

aya<^^p<T$ai , otov opof

of fuyaXrj

Acycrat, K^y^pos

jJiiKpov

r<p

/lo

rfiv ftiv

Tiov oyioyevwv fiel^ova etyax, to iXarrov roir

ovKovv trpos Irtpov 1} aya^pd^ cww

avro fiiKpov rj fidya fXlyTO, odtc
ITOre TO fJLV OpOS piiKpOV XyTO, T) & K^YXP*^
ttoXw iv fxeu rjj tcwfijf <f>afAv troXXavt
fieyaXr).
avdpajTTovs lvai, v *A6^'ai9 8c oXiyovi woX-

6fioyva)v.

etye

25

Kad*

XairXaaiovs avrwv ovras, Kol 4v fih^ rij ohcuf, noX

Xovs, v 8c to) dcdrpcp oXiyov^ noXXt^ irAcibvr
ovras.

TO

Ti.

p.v SiTny;^

koI rptirr)^ koX lictumm

tCjV TOIOVTCJV TTOOOV (Tr)pXLWit TO 8^

\,
^"

M^T^ ^

flUCpOlf

ov OT^/LtatWi, TToaov aXXa fia^Xov Trpoy T f ir/)6( yop

wart
Tpov dcajpcXrai ro fJ^ya. Koi ro futcpov,
80 <t>avp6v

oTt Tairra twi' tt^o^ t4 <rrw,

"Etc cov tc Tt^i7 Tty Tawra irooxi cZku ^fl(r t*

pLT] Tidfjf ovK (mv auTois ^I'can-iov ovb^P* 6
p.ri ioTLv avro KaB* avro Xafiflv oAA^ trp^ frcpor
ava<j)iprait nws av <f>airj T19 toi^<^
ivayrlofi^
cTt 8c t corat to /tcya icai to ftucpov ^vavrla,
(TvpLp-qoerai ro avro a/xa Ta ci^avTUi imtix^oBoi
Kal avra lavrols cfrcu ivavria.
avfxfiau'ti yap
TTore dfia ro avro /icya tc Kal fuxpov flvai' ion

y^

85

yap

rovro pxKpov, npoq TpO hk -ri

ciioTC to aiM kox fUyu tmd
Kara rov nvrov xp^*^^ tvtu avfifiabf^i*

TTpos

fiev

avro Toirro
{jLLKpov
6 a

wore

a/xa

8oKi a/xa
ovcrias'

aXX
42

/x.cya.

oMp

rd cvavria inth^x^aOat.
TO.

oAA*
ivavrla ^7ri8cxcc7^oi, otov Inl r^f

ScKriKTi

p.kv

rwv

ovri y a/xa voact

jjccu

fvavriotv
vyiolvti,

3occi

ttvoi,

oAA* ouS^

CATEGORIES,
Thus a

vi

called small, a
greater or smaller
than similar things of the kind, for we look to some
external standard. If such terms were used absolutely, we never should call a hill small, as we never
should call a grain large. So, again, we may very
well say that a village has many inhabitants, a city
like Athens but few, though the latter are many times
more ; or we say that a house contains many, while
those in the theatre are few, though they greatly
outnumber the others. While two cubits,' three
cubits long and the like, therefore, signify quantity,
great,' small and the like signify not a quantity
but rather a relation, implying some external standard

by comparison

grain large

only.

but we really

hill is

mean

'

'

'

or something above and beyond them. The latter,

then, plainly are relative.
Quantities, moreover, or not, there is nothing that
For what is not grasped by
is contrary to them.
how
itself but referred to some external standard
suppose that can have any contrary ? Secondly, suppose we allow great and small and the like to be
contraries, then the same subject, it follows, at one
and the same time admits of the contrary qualifications and things to themselves will be contrary. Does
it not sometimes occur that the same thing is both
great and small ? As compared with one thing, it is
small
it is great, as compared with another.
And
so the same thing simultaneously comes to be both
great and small or at one and the same time admits
of the contrary qualifications. But in dealing with
substance we stated that nothing can thus simultaneously admit of such qualifications. Substance,
no doubt, is receptive of contrary quahfications, but
not in such way that a man at the same time is both

'

'

'

4S

ARISTOTLE
oAA' ovSi i^5r

XevKov KOI fieXav earlv dfia.

6

S^Xom

ovhiv iarnv o dfia rd ivayrta CTrtSf^^rrai.

avrd

8'

ioTL TO fjLcya ra> fjLiKpw ivavriov, ro 8*

teaX

ydp
auro ^rrw

eavrots crviiPawi ivavrla c&oi.

tl

/cat fjLiKpov, auro cauroi lrj op ivatrrlami

oAAa Taiv aZvvdroiv iurlv avro iavrt^ itval ri
ovk <mv dpa ro fi/ya T<p V^^P*^
ivavrlov.

dfia ficya

ivavrioVf ovhk to ttoAu

10 /at)

tcDv TTpdj Tt

ravrd

t^

dXLy<^,

rij cpci

oKrrc <i jcai

oAAd tow irooo^,

ouScv ivavrlov ((ei.

MoAtora Sc

17

cvavTumyff toO noaoO nfil

r^

ro yap dvat Ttp Kdrw

ivavrlov rt^caai, rrjv npds r6 puiaov ;(cijpai' tcdrw
Xiyovrc^ hid ro nXclcmjv rw fi^aio huxtrrwjiv np^
roTTov

15

hoKl

imdp\iv.

rd 7Tpara rod Koafiov

tZrai.

ioucaai

fol

tw

rwv dXXcjv ivcarrlajv opiafiov and rovrutv hri<t>piv' rd ydp nXciarov d^ijXutv Stcon^fcora run
iv rep avrip ycVct ivavrla opl^otmu.
ao

"^

Ou

hoKX TO TToaov int&ixfoOai ro fiaXXd^

Kal -^jrrov, otov rd hlm^x}^' ov ydp iarw rtpO
irepov

fidXXov BlTrq^.
ovS* irri rov dpiBfi4f&^
rd rpla rwv nivrt ovScv /aoAAov rd rpim,
ovSe rd Trevre rwv rpuov.
ov8i XP^*'^ ^*po9
iripov paXXov xpovos tlvai Xiytrai.
M.

otov

oW

* ' The extremities

apparently refen to the cir cuniiErenee
taksn a* a whoU,
* The meaning I give to this sentence the context
appcan
to require.
But the text must, I think, be corrupt
*

44

CATEGORIES,

vi

and healthy, a thing black and white simultaneously. Neither can anything else be at any time
thus qualified. Then, if great,' small and so forth
were contrary, these to themselves would be contrary.
Granted for argument's sake both that great is the
contrary of small and that one and the same thing
can be at the same moment both great and small,
great or small ' to itself will be contrary. This
nothing to itself can be conis, however, impossible
Therefore, we cannot describe great and
trary.
sick

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

much

and
could such terms have
'

small,'

one should

call

'

'

little

as contraries.

Neither

contraries, even though somerelation but of

them terms not of

quantity.
In dealing with space, the contention that quantity
admits of a contrary seems to have most plausibihty.
Above and below are called contraries, when by
below what is meant is the region or space at the
'

'

'

'

'

This use is, however, derived from the view

that we take of the world, since it is at the extremities
of the world that the distance from the centre is the
greatest." Indeed, in defining all contraries, we seem
to have space in our minds. For we call those things
contrary which, being also within the same class, are
most distant the one from the other.
Quantities do not appear to admit of a more and
centre.

For example, take two cubits long.' Now,

never admits of gradations. A thing is not two
cubits long in a greater degree than another. And
One three is not,
so, in like manner, of numbers.
so to speak, three in a greater degree than another ;
one five is not, so to speak, five in a greater degree
than another.^ One period of time is, moreover, not
more of a time than another. Nor of any other
a

less.

'

this

45

ARISTOTLE
25 rai'

Lf}r)fjLvcjv

-^JTrov

Xlyirai.

TO fldXXoV

/cat

oXuiS ov6v6s TO fiaXXov ftai ri

Jkttc koX to noaov ovk ^iriBfyrrm

TO -^TTOV.

he fidXiara rov noaoO to unv rt ra2

Ka<jrov yap rwv elfirjfsJvojv
aviGov XiyeaOai.
TTOGcjv taov r Kol aytaov \iytrtu, oXov aC^ia kqX
laov KoX aviaov Xiyerax, Kol XP^^^^ *^*** "'^^ *^^
(jjGavrcJS 8c Kol ifti rwv oXAcov rw
aviaos,
prjd evTCJV Kaarov laov t xal dvuiov Xlytnu. rw
Se XoiTTijjv oaa firj cWi 'noad, ov vdw or Sofa*
"ISlov

80

Kal aviaa XiyeaBtu, o2br ^ hM^vg ov

T Kol dyiQos Xlytrai, oAAd fMoXXo^
ofiola, Kal TO XcvKov laov t koI ovujov ov ndi'Vg
ware rod noaov fiaXurra S cS|
oAA* 6yMU>v,
n
tSiov ro laov re kox dvvaov XeyeaOai,
VII. Upos ri b^ rd roiatrra Xeyerai, oaa mMi
dnep earlv erepwv etyat Xeyerat, ^ on ao Gi^ SXXotf
npos erepov, otov rd fui^ov ro06^ Sutep iorhf
irepov Xeyerar Ttvoy ydp Xeyerai /ii{ov* tctd t6
ht'nXdaiov rovG* ortep larlv eripov Xeytrax' rwdi
ydp hiirXdaiov Xeyerai, waavrws S^ kcu oaa aXXa
roiavra, eari he koX rd roiavra rwv npd^
oto
e^is, hidOeaig, aladr^ais, eTTurrqp,Tjt Btoi^.
trdyra
ydp rd elprjfjLeva avrd dnep iariv irepufv elmu
laa T

irdw

toT)

6 b

* Aristotle here classifies as relalhrca two

of terms, those said to be o/ other thia^ * and tboae said
*
to be towards something else * {ad aliqutd) * in wome other
manner.* He means by the former all terms with a g euUl f^e
dependent upon them. This distinction cannot he
wigtiC
out in the same concise manner in English. There b no
single form that will cover all the uses of the genitiTe in
Greek. The Greek genitive, for initance, txptxamm not
only our * of * but our^ than.'
'

46

CATEGORIES,

vi-vii

quantity mentioned can a more

or a
less
be
affirmed. The category, therefore, of quantity in no
wise admits of degi-ees.
What is really peculiar to quantities is that we
compare or contrast them in terms or on grounds of
equality.
predicate
equal,'
unequal,' of all
One solid is equal to
of the quantities mentioned.
another, another, per contra, unequal.
use these
terms also of time in comparing the periods of it.
So also of all other quantities that we have previously
mentioned. Of nothing, moreover, save quantities
can we affirm these two terms. For we never say
this disposition is equal to that or unequal.'
say it is like or unUke.' One quality whiteness,
is never compared with another in
for instance
terms or on grounds of equality. Such things are
termed Uke and unlike.' Thus our calling something equal,' unequal,' is the mark, above all marks,
of quantity.
VII. Let us now turn to Relation. We call a thing
relative, when it is said to be such as it is from its
being of some other thing or, if not, from its
being related to something in some other way."
Thus the greater is said to be greater by reference to something outside it. For, indeed, when
we call a thing greater,' we mean by that greater
The double is called what it is
than something.
from its being the double o/'something. For double
means double q/* something. And so with all terms
of that kind. Other relatives also there are, such as
habit, disposition, perception, position or attitude,
knowledge. All these are explained by a reference to
something to which they belong, and in no other way
'

'

We

'

'

'

'

We

'

'

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

4.7

ARISTOTLE

Acycrat Kal ovk oAAo ri- rj yap (vs riPOf ^(if

Acycrat icat rj imarrifirj rivog tnicm^firi teal ij
dioLS TLVOS deaig, koI to. oAAa Si wuavratf. wpof
TL ovv iorlv oaa avra antp iariv iripojv cua4
Acycrat, t} 6no}aovv oAAco; irpos Tpov, otov 6pos

mpov

yb fuyd
np69
Acycrat 7rp6s
Acycrat to opos' koI to opxytov rtvl opuotov A^ytnUg
npo^
10 /cat TO, oAAa 8c rd roiairra waavrut^
Acycrat. crt Se kcu 17 omxAtai; 'co* ij (rrclaif ira2
hi $019 rwv npo^ rt.
Kadehpa OeacLS rwis,
tJ
TO dvaK^laOcu ^ caravoi ^ KoBrjoBai avra fihf
OVK clal 6aLs, TrapcjvvpLws hi ano rwv ifiti^Uvui
diawv Xeyerai.
15
'Yrrapxci' hi koI ivavriorr)^ iv roiy vp^ rt, olav
/xcya

"f}

KaKia ivavriov, iicdrfpov

rutv irp^ n,
ayvota.
ov -ndai hi roif np6t rt
VTrapx^L TO ivavriov rw yap hinXaalw o^h4u iarw
ivavriov, ovhi rat rpinXaaup, ovhi rwv tou>iStw
apTr)

Kal

7Tt,Gn^p.7j

ovhevL.
so

AoKct hi Kal TO /xoAAoy Kal to i^ttov intB^xa0<u

ra TTpos Ti* oyuovov yap koI avopLowv fia^Xov kqI
AcycTai, Kal

laov koI

ovujov /xoAAor Koi

Trpos ri ov r6 rt
yap ofioiov rivl ofioiov AcycTOi Kai ro dvofiotov riyi
ao'opxnov,
ov irdvra hi rd npo^ ri inJhXrai to
fidXXov Kol r/rrov ro yap hmXdatov ov Xdymu
fidXXov Kal iJttov 3i7rAa<7toi', ovhi rwv roiovrwv
'^rrov

-^rrov AcycTai, Kdrpov

avrwv

ovhev.

l^

pf^'

riai^a 8c Ta npos
trpd^ dvrurrp^vra Acycroi,
6 hovXog hecmorov hovXo^ A/ycrcu Koi 6

otov

ScoTTOTTys'

8oi;Aoi;

'qp,laos hiirXdaiov

48

8c<77rorT;5,

#fat

rd

SttrAooior

koI rd rjpMrv hmXaatov rjfuav,

CATEGORIES,

vii

whatsoever. A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, position position

of something. We speak, then, of relative terms,
when a thing's being such as it is is explained by a
genitive following or else by some phrase or expression designed to bring out the relation. For instance,
we call a hill large,' meaning large as compared
with another. By such a comparison only it is that
a hill is called large.' So we call a thing similar,'
'

'

like

'

'

like

'

or

similar

'

to

something

It is

else.

thus with all terms of that nature. This also we notice

in passing
while lying and standing and sitting are
:

is a relative.
these are not them-

really specific positions, position itself

To

lie

and to stand and to

selves really positions

sit,

their

names

however,

are,

derived from the attitudes just now referred to.

Relatives sometimes have contraries.
Virtue is
contrary to vice, either term itself being a relative ;
knowledge to ignorance also. By no means all
relative terms can, however, be said to have contraries.
Double and triple have none, nor,
indeed, any terms of that sort.
Relatives also, it seems, may admit of degrees in
some cases, as like,* unlike,' equal,' unequal,*
which all may have more or less added, while
each is a relative term. For by like we mean like
something else and by unlike unlike something
else. It is not the case, nevertheless, that all relatives
admit of degrees. We do not say more or less
double,' and so with all terms of that kind.
All relatives have their correlatives.
Slave
means the slave of a master, and master,' in turn,
implies slave.
Double means double its half, just
as half means the half of its double. By greater,'
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

49

ARISTOTLE
Kai TO /ztJov cAarrovoy

^el^ovos
oAAcuv,
86

eXarrov.
rr

Xi^iv,

olov

(rrqixrj

kcu to iTnamjrov

7]

ataOrjais

1}

8^

cjcravrati

rwcc L

T^

77X171^

inLcrrqfn)

aloOr^rov

Aorrpr
T&r
Kard n^

Koi t6

fictfoi'

Aft

fol

cViore Siourci

itrianjTov Xiyrai
e-TTiorry/jijy

aloBrjai^

cirt-

entaTTjrotf, koa

kcu

to alaBfjrdi^

alodrio(. aladr^Tov.

OLKCLcos

firj

TTpos

XiyerojL

dnobodfj, dAAa

afidpTTj 6 dnobiBovs, otou

ro nrtpov

opvido^, ovK

opvij

dvriaTp<f>i

&

i^ aaroSoSfj

-rmpoO.

oi5

ydp

oIkcIws to TTpwTov aTToScSoTai irrtpov opviBoi' ov

7 a

yap

ij

opvis, ravrj) to

nrcpov avrov A/yt T04, oAA*

noXXwv yap icot

d ovk lalv 6pvi$^. wart

TrrepcjTov iari'

iariVf

oAAcui'
^cat

impd

dnx)^o0j

oLKcUos, Kal dinicrTp<f>i, otov r6 trrtpov frrtpurroC

TTTepOV Kal TO 7TTp<xtT6v TTTipW TTTtpurrOV.

*^vLor he

idv

fiTj

hodcLT), otov

10

Kal ovojiaTonoitw lauts dvayKoZo^,

KCLjicvov

tJ

dvofia

TO TTT^Sa^K.

vpo4 S ouctiwf ay d/wo'

'TO*;

nXotov eav dinioBfl,

OVK oLKcia 7j dTToboGis ytt'CTttf ov yap f irXoioy,

ravTT) avTov to rrqhdXtov Xlyerax' tart yap vXoia
cjv OVK ear I nrjBdXia.
8to ovk dyrurrpet^f to
yap ttXoXov ov Xeyerai mjSaXiov irXoiov,
oAA*
ureas OLKciorepa dv

17

dndhoais

etrf,

el

ovrm vca^

ro 7rr]hdXiov TrqhaXutrrov irqhdXiov,

oTTCjaovv dXXws' ovofia yap ov icelrai. Kai <ivnaTTohodeiT),

15

arpe<f>ei

50

ye, eav oiKelws dnoSoS^- to

yap

ir^Sci*

CATEGORIES,

vii

we mean

greater than this or that thing which

less than that which is greater.
So it is with all relative terms. On occasions, however, the case or grammatical inflexion will differ.
Knowledge is thus of the knowable the knowable
is knowable hy knowledge.
Perception is of the perceptible, which is perceived hy perception.
At times the correlation, however, will not maninamely, when a mistake has been
festly appear
made and the correlate itself wrongly stated. If you
call a wing wing of a bird, then will no correlation
appear wing and bird are, I mean, not correlative.
TTie wrong term was used at the outset in calling it
mng of a bird. For the wing is the wing of a bird,
when considered as winged, not as bird. Many other
things, not birds, are vnnged. When, however, the
right terms are used, the correlation will forthwith
appear, as when, for example, we say that a wing is
a wing of the winged and the \vinged thing is winged
by a wing. Wing belongs to the winged of necessity.
At times there is no word in Greek that A\ill rightly
bring out the correlation. Then, I think, we must
coin a new word. Let us take, for example, a rudder.
may say this belongs to a boat. To a boat is,
however, inappropriate and fails to bring out the
correlation. Not, indeed, to the boat viewed as boat
does the rudder belong of necessity. Are there not
boats without rudders ? Thus rudder and boat are
Boat is not boat of a rudder,' as
not reciprocal.
rudder is rudder of a boat. Since no proper term now
exists, we must coin one to suit the occasion and speak
with more accuracy thus the rudder is rudder of
the ruddered.' And, if we express ourselves thus,
then at least will the terms be reciprocal. That is to
again,

is

by

less,

less

'

We

'

'

51

ARISTOTLE
Xiorrov

cVt

TTrjhaXCa)

oAAoiv,

Tcov

yap

Xd^oL
/cat

oU

Tot?

firj

cd

yap r&

aiVd dvTiaTp<f>ovui
IttI

Ti^cii]

{^JMIT

dwo

#coi

tq <W-

OM^ roO

irfMUprnuvutv

rutv

TO TTTcpwrov

TTTcpov

ano&iSofUyfi'

fcftrat oyo/iara, ci aTr^ tcui' npcaraan^

TT/^os

a)G^p

fiara,

t,u>ov

ttal

ovroi 5^ pqxrra Sm Xouk tic

K^aXr]v ovK 6X.

20

ohcuyr4po9

K<f>aXri

rf

K<f>aXriv cxet- ttoXXol

fojoi/,

fj

otov

K<f>aXayrov

amohoOeiri

uHravrat^

TnrjhaXiarrov.

nrfiaXiav wi

ro<?

Tn^SoAtCOTOl'.

^^

Ilai^a ovv rd npos

Tt,

idv np ohc iws <i<W-

BtScDrat, rrpos din-iarp<l>ovra Xiytrtu, hti idv

26

TTpos

TO Tu;(ov dtTohthurrox KoX

AcycTat, OVK dvri,aTp4if>i.

irpd^

ofioj^yovfievai^

y
npof avro S

fitj

Xiyw hk cm oM^

dyriarp<f>ovra

rukf

Xeyofi^vtM^,

Kal ovofiaTajv avrols KLfivcjv, ovSiv dyrurrp^^i,

idv npos Tt TcDv avfiPcPrjKorcjv dnoht&ufrai

firj

80

npos avrd o AcycTat, otov 6 havXoq

ScCTTTOTOU

dTToSodfj

dXX*

dvOpcJTTOV

TJ

r)

aipovficvwy

;^-)'^|

Tt 8* cor

dTToSoais <mv.

aTToSeSojU-cVov

tJ

twv

tt^oj

oXXcjjv

AcycTcu,
o<ra

fici'

fnii

^
yOp

StiroSo?

OTOVOVV TWV TOIOUTIOV, OVK dvTLGrp^>t,'

OLKcla

tcai

i^
Ol5

rt ouccuof

ircuToi*'

irc^-

avfiPfPrjKora

7<m,

KaToXcLTTOfievov 8c fJLovov rouTOV Trpo^ o d'n'h6$rj

act TTpos" aiVro prjO-qcreToi, otov 6 hovXos
eav TTpog hcGTTOTTjv Xcyrp-ai, ntptaipovfjUvwy roir

85 ot/cta>9,

dXXwv

diravTOiv

oaa

au/i/St/SryKOTa

cori

rci

fitIt

52

CATEGORIES,

vii

say, what is ruddered is ruddered by means of its

rudder. So also in all other cases.
head will be
better defined as correlative of that which is headed,'
not, loosely, as head of an animal. Animals, simply
as animals, do not have heads of necessity.
Many,
indeed, have no heads.
may thus, I think, best
understand to what this or that thing is related, where
no name at present exists, if we take the thing having
a name and then, coining another name from it,
apply it to the former's correlative just as we coined
winged and ruddered above from the names
wing and rudder.'
Thus all relatives are referred to their correlates,
provided they are rightly defined. I must add this
proviso because, if the correlate happens to be stated
in casual, inaccurate fashion, the terms cannot well
be reciprocal. Let me explain what Imean. Even
\shere the right names do exist and the things are
admittedly correlates, no correlation appears, when
we give one of these tM^o a name that in no way brings
out the relation and has some irrelevant meaning.
Let slave be defined in relation to man or to
biped or what not, instead of its being defined (as
it should be) by reference to
master,' then no correlation appears, for the reference is really inaccurate.
Again, let us grant that two things are correlative
one with another and that the correct term is used
for the purpose of stating the second. Although we
remove all its other I mean, its irrelevant attributes, leaving that only in virtue of which it was
called the correlative, then will the said correlation
be, none the less, found to exist. The correlative of
slave,' for example, is properly said to be master.*
Suppose we remove all his other I mean, his irre-

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

53

ARISTOTLE
TO SiTToSt ctvai Koi TO iirumjfirjt o

aiTOTT), otov

KTiKO) Kal TO avdpdmu), KaraXciiro^^vov 0 liAvtMt

rod hcGTTOTqv ctvai, del 6 BovXo^ npof

adn

7 b

yap SovXos SeoTTorov hoCXos A/ytnu.

olKiiws ano^dfj npos o wor
ye
Sc
'Eav
fir)

p-qdrjaerar 6

Xdycrat,,

Trepiaipovfiivwv fiv

XeiTTOfidvov

Be

rdv

rov npo^ o
dwoScSoo^ai

fxovov

pr)driaTaL irpos avro.

aXXat,

MttTft*

ov

<tirco<wi|,

y^

hoCXof

dvdpcjTTOv Kal TO TTTcpov opviSo^, Kol ntfuffpn^tf^tt

5 Tot;

dvdpwTTOV TO heoTTorriv avrov

cfi'Oi*

od y^.

d hovXos irpos dvOpwnov prjdi^rai' /*i^ yap

ovros ScoTTOTou ovSe SouAd; <mv, aKrau/ra( irai
Tt

rov opvidos 7rpir)pi^G6o) to imporrt^ ttvax' oiJ ydi^

Iti eorat to irrepov rutv irpos ri' /ii^ yap orrof
TTTCpaJTOV OuSc TTTCpOV loTai. TIVO^,
"'HoTC 61 /ii' a7ro3i3d>'ai trpd; o irorc ouctloMf
10
AeycTai.

16

/cav

ytVcTcu*

/xcv

tcDj'

so

KtifLVO,

ptfhla

i}

TrXeiarojv

eon

dXrjOes

iorw,

dfui

yap

Kal rjfiuTv, Kal rifiiaeai ovrot

hiTrXdaLov eari- koX BeoTTorov ovro^ BovX6^ iar%t
Kal BovXov om-os Beanorrj^ eariv ofioiw^ Be ro^
TOLS Kal rd dXXa. Kal awavaiffet B^ ravra dXXrjXa*.
ydp ovro^ BinXaalov ovk earw rjfuav, koI
fiTj
'qfiiaeos firj ovros ovk eari Bi'irXdaiov cjoavrw^ 8i
Ifat 7rl rcov aXXojv ocra rouLura,
ovk im ircu^cuv
Be rwv TTpos Tt dXrjOes BoKel ro dfia rg ^vaei
SLTrXdaLov re

ovofia
/ii^

7rl

,^

/>iv

ovtoj 8^ ovayfroZoi' tcjcaif

otrrco 8c dirohv^yiivatv ^avtp^
dvoftaTOTrotctv.
OTL irdvra rd Ttpos ri npos dyriarpti^in'a Xtytnu.
Aofcct Be rd npos
a/xa rfj <j>vai ttvai, koX

aTrdSoorts'

54

CATEGORIES,

vii

two-footed/
levant attributes, such as his being
'receptive of knowledge or 'human,' and leave but
slave will be still the
his being ' a master,' then
correlative, slave meaning slave of a master.
On the other hand, let us suppose one correlative
'

'

'

'

'

named

Then,

incorrectly.

if

we

strip off its attri-

butes, saving that only in virtue of which it was called

a
a correlative, all correlation will vanish. Let
slave
be defined as a man's ; let a wing be
defined as a bird's.' Take the attribute master*
from man : then, indeed, the correlation subsisting
between man and slave will have vanished. No
master, in short, then no slave. Take the attribute
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

winged from the bird.' Then the wing will no

more be a relative nought will there now be a wing
*

'

'

the bird being no longer winged.

And so, to sum up, we must state all correlative
terms with exactness. If a name is already to hand,
then the statement will prove to be easy. If no
name already exists, then I think it our duty to
It is clear, when the names are correct,
coin one.
that all relative terms are correlative.
Correlatives are commonly held to come into existence together, and this for the most part is true, as,
That a half exists
for instance, of double and half.
means that the double of which it is half must exist.
The existence of a master involves the existence also
of a slave. If a slave exists, then must a master.
And so in all similar cases. Moreover, this holds of
them also to cancel one cancels the other. For
instance, no double, no half, and, per contra, no half,
and so with all similar terms.
then no double
However, the view that correlatives come into being
together does not appear true at all times, for it
of,

55

ARISTOTLE
TO yap 7n(mjr6v irpartpov op SofcM r^
vpoihrw^ yap hrl ro
'niarrnir)s ^Ivai.

etvai'

25

mM

apxovrwv
Tis av
"Ert,

oXlycjv yap av

in

Pavop,V'

ray entarrifAai Aofk'

irpaypLdrijjv

ratv

TO

fiv 7nar7iT6v

7TL(JT'qp,rjv ,

8c

Tj

avq^Oiv

eTTiarrjfiTj

tW

ovStv^

cV*

tf

dfjia Tip cmoTTyTcp rffv iirum^firjv

ytvofUnp^

r^

avyaafaipi

ovv

to iirurrtfTW OQ

yap fi^ ovto^ ovk 1<ttw

yap coreu cwMmJ/xij), tvumjfkffg

avaipcL' iTTLcmjTov pLv

(ovhevos

RO crrrip.7)

he

kwXui iiriarrfT^ cZmu, oHm'

ovoTjs ov8V

fir)

Kal 6 rov kvkXov rerpaym viafio^ <ty lUrriy 4nt'

GTTjTov,

auTo?

avrov ovk tarw odS/wcu^

p,V

iiTLcrn^pLrj

hk

7narrjr6v

<rrw.

ct*

C^v

<Ir

8*

htumfrOm

^i t^

ouT^i^cor

aLpedevTos ovk carat inurrqfiTi,

rwv

77oAAa cVSc^fTat clmi.

8*

'Ofxoiojs Sc Toifrotj #f<u

rd

Xt.

TO yap alaBtfTov nporepov

So/cel

elvai.

ro

p,v

crvvavaLpel rrjv alaOrjaiv,

ou owai^atpct.

at

ydp

yap
tj

alcS^/gtnf^

rrj/s

aloBrjTOtf

OfVipfMv

8c ataOrfaii to aZu ^ ifwW

aicr^Tjacij ircf>i autfia

iv acjiiaTL etaiv, aladrp-ov Si ayoipidhrros

B a peiTat /cat

to acjpxi (tojv yap aloBriTwv to ou^/ia),

awfiaros 8c
ei5oT

koX

<i*<u-

/X17

oio-oy dt'at/Htrat

OT;yai/aipct

to

aladrjrov

#cat

rriv

1}

oiotfi^aif,

aloBfiaw,

1)

Se ye aladrjmg to aloBrjrov ov avyavaiptV it^cni

yap avaipedivTos aXaOr^ais p-ev avaLptlrai, aiaOrjro^
6

Se corai, otov autfia, Oepfiov, yXvKV, nixpov, koI

ToAAa
5Q

TTciiTa

ooa

cort*' aiaBrjrd,

CATEGORIES,

vii

seems that the object of knowledge is prior to, exists

before, knowledge. We gain knowledge, commonly
speaking, of things that already exist, for in very
few cases or none can our knowledge have come into
being along with its own proper object.
Should the object of knowledge be removed,
then the knowledge itself will be cancelled. The
If the object no
converse of this is not true.
longer exists, there can no longer be any knowledge,
there being now nothing to know. If, however, of
this or that object no knowledge has yet been
acquired, yet that object itself may exist. Take
the squaring of the circle, for instance, if that can
be called such an object. Although it exists as
an object, the knowledge does not yet exist. If all
animals ceased to exist, there would then be no knowledge at all, though there might in that case, notwithstanding, be still many objects of knowledge.
The same may be said of perception. The obj ect , I
mean, would appear to be prior to the act of perception.
Suppose that you cancel the perceptible you cancel
the perception as well. Take away or remove the perFor the act
ception, the perceptible still may exist.
of perception implies or involves, first, a body perceived, then a body in which it takes place. Therefore,
if you remove the perceptible,body itself is removed,
And, body not
for the body itself is perceptible.
being existent, perception must cease to exist. Take
away the perceptible, then, and you take away also
perception. But the taking away of perception does
not take such objects away. If the animal itself is
destroyed, then perception is also destroyed. But perceptibles yet will remain, such as body, heat, sweetness
and bitterness and everything else that is sensible.
;

57

ARISTOTLE

a/xa

yap

rco

l^uto)

ylycrou Kal atoBrjotf' to 8/

atcrOrjrov iari kqX rrpo

rov l^wov

aia0rfaw c&oi*

rj

yap Kal vbwp koI ra roiaOra, i( iLv kojL to

Iwov avvloTarai, cart koI irp6 rov {<jiior Zku^
elvai 7} ataOrjaiv, uxrrt npartpov
rif^ ttZa O
f

TTvp
10

^w

TO alaOrjrov ^Xvai ho^iuv.

"E^^t anopiay Trortpov ovS^fUa ovoia, r<i

KaSdirtp Sokci,

rovro ii'hix*^^^

16

TTpos Ti AfycTai,

80

iwl fuv y^
iariv aCrt yip tA
oAa ovT ra p-^prj npos
ArycTOi.
6 ydp rtf
dvdpwTTos ov Acy^Tcu Tivoy Tiy opBpanros, ovS^ 6
Tts j8ou9 TWOS Tt9 /3ou9. cooavTcoy 5^ Koi TO /i/jpl}*
yap TLS xclp ov ArycTttt riv6^ Tiy )ftp oAAci
77

Kara

rii^a?

rj

r(ov hfirripotv ovauov,

Tcov TTpwriov oifouov

aXrjd4^

Tiyo? x^^P '^^^

'''^
'J

Toiv

A/yrroi

Kff>aXrj oJ

K^aAi7 oAAa Tti'oy K^>aXrj.

tu^

coaourcu^ S^

hcvrcpwv ovaujjv, ini yc

iroi

Ta>' 7rXurru}V,

Tiy

^4
otow

6 avBpoyrros ov Acycrai Ttvoy dvBpatno^, ovSi 6

25

PoVS TLVOS pOVS, OuSc TO (vXoV TIVO^ (vXoV, oAAcI

Ttvos KrrjpLa AcycTCu.
cVi /xcv oi^ twi' roiovTOiv
en* ofUov &

SevTcpiov ovauov Xi apuf>iaprJTrj<7iv, otov

K(l>aXr)

TLVOS

XeyeraL

XcycTox

;^tp

Kal

ravra ra>v
80 t/carcDs

58

rf

ou/c lore tCjv rrpo^

<l>avp6v ort

rwv

-rrpos

Tcoj'

K<f>aXri

Kacrrov

Tt Sofetev

rtov

av

1}

x^^P np69
roiovrtjv, uxrrt

kcu

1}

tvax.

Ci /iv

Trpdj Tt opiapLOS aTroScSoTOi,

o^
Ta

CATEGORIES,

vii

Perception, further, comes into being along with

the subject perceiving that is, with the live thing
itself.
The perceptible, however, is prior to the
animal and to perception. For sucli things as water
and fire, out of which are composed living beings,
exist before any such beings and prior to all acts
of perception. The perceptible, so we conclude,
would appear to be prior to perception.
The view that no substance is relative a view that
is commonly held
would appear to be open to
question. Exception, perhaps, should be made in
the case of some secondary substances. Doubtless,
the view we refer to holds good of the primary substance, for neither the wholes nor the parts of first
substances ever are relative. This man or that ox,
for example, is never defined with a reference to
something beyond or outside. And the same also
holds of their parts. Thus a certain hand or head is
not said to be a certain hand of someone or other, a
certain head of someone or other. We call them
the hand and the head of this specified person or that.
So, too, with the secondary substances, at least with
the vast generality. Species, like man,' ox and so
forth, are never defined with a reference to something
beyond or outside them. Neither is wood so
defined, and, if wood is regarded as relative, then is
it so as a. property, belonging to someone or other, and
not in its character of wood. It is evident, then, in
such cases that substance can hardly be relative.
Opinions, however, may differ in the case of some
secondary substances. Thus we define head and
*
hand in the light of the wholes they belong to,
and so these might seem to be relative. Indeed, it
would prove very hard, not to say an impossible task,

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

59

ARISTOTLE
'rrdw xo^^<^'

ovaia rwv irpos ri Acycrcu*

cl

54 |l4

ucavws^ oAA' coTt ra npos Tt

ofj to <&

TwMv

OTt Toi Trpos Ti

"''^

ovSefila

7ra>y

^X**^"*

/icv Traori Toij Trpoy ti,

ov

toiJt<Jv

^1171'

to aura dntp

Trpos Tt ayTotj ^ti/at

yrf^n

*Eif hk rovTCJv brjX6v

rwv

T19 toSc

clj'Ot

ori idv

t4

ttif^

wpot S Xfyrrtu

^Oi^pOV fUv o6

yap ofS^

OTt h TO

8 b Tt,

iarw

-npos ri, iccUrctyo

WpLGfldviOS U7Tai.
iarlv.

Mput

itrrht

XiyeoBai.

wpiGfievcjs

fv^^

6 Sc Trporc/XK opio/i^ naptueoXofM

trpos avrd.
85

V *' o^vvdrwv iari ro Scifat c&r

Sri

ffol

If

OlM^

/on rwv vp6s

TOtJ WpOJ TI TOVTOV

Ty Wp^

vpo^ o rovTO ntot fytf^

yap ovK otBev oXcJS irpo^ o roOr6 wca^ fyf^t oW*

Tt TTws cx^ti', Ka#(ctK> oIS<

t

npos ri

TTCJS

e^** cmtctou.

c/caoTa 8c S^Aov to TotoDroi',

ft

d<f>oipiap,ivix)s

ori

art,

TrAaortdv

ioTiv vSvs

p,r)hv6s

rwv

tnl

icot

oloi'

StnAootov, koX

d<f>wpi<7fivwv otS^v

avro

10

5m

orov

Qjf>wpuTpLvws

BiirXiiatov,

(uaaimuf 34

Kat ToSe Tt et ol8v ori koXXiov ion,

iariv v$vs

$ca0^

Ci olSi

aifKoptafUvwi o25cv* c/ yip

ouS' t StTrAao-tov coriv oAa>$ o23cv.

KGiAAtoi'

rwv

toSc T4

ireu

orov

dvayKOMV

c-

ovk dopiaru>s 84 cujcnu ^fi

TOVTO coTt xclpovos KoXXiov UTToAiH^tf ydip Tii
Sevat 8td ravra.

60

There seems to be something wrong here with the tacL

CATEGORIES,

vii

thus to show that no substance is relative, if we

correctly defined what was meant by a relative term.
On the other hand, if we were wrong, if those things
are true relatives only, whose very existence consists in their being in some way or other related to
some other object, then something, I think, might be
said.

The former

definition

apphes to

all relatives

beyond any doubt

but the fact that a thing is
explained by a reference to something outside it is
not the same thing as to say that it is of necessity
;

relative."

From what we have

is

said this

is

plain

if

a relative

known, that to which it is relative also

then be as definitely known. What is more, we

definitely

will

may

call this self-evident.

Provided, that

is,

that

you know a particular thing to be relative, relatives

being those objects whose very existence consists in
their being in some way or other related to some other
thing, then you know what that other thing is to
which that thing itself is related. For if you did not
know at all that to which it is somehow related, you
could not so much as know whether it was or it
was not a relative. Take some particular instances
then will the point be quite clear. For suppose that
you definitely know a particular thing to be double
then at once will you definitely know also that thing
of which it is double. You cannot know that it is
double without knowing that it is double of something
specific and definite.
Again, if you definitely know
a particular thing is more beautiful, at once must
you definitely know that than which it is reckoned
more beautiful. Thus you will not vaguely know that
particular thing has more beauty than something
possessing less beauty. For that would be mere
;

'

'

61

ARISTOTLE
TOiovro yiveraL, ovk

yap

'7ri<m^firj' ot)

Tvxv, ovhiv icni \ilpov avroO.

ns

OTL avayKalov ioTLV, o av lSfj

15

npo^ o

KaKiyo

a(j>wpi.a^iiva)s

Krt atepipwf

yap ovrwf
wart ^av*pO

ctaerai otl iarl \ipovos koXXiov,

rCtv npof

a^otpt'

Atyrroi

<7/xeVa>9 ciScVai.

'^

^ieeurni9
Ti7r he y K<f>aXriv Kal rfiv X^^P^
a elaiv ovaiai, avro fikv Offtp iartt^

rojv roLouTCJv,
wpLCTfievco^

(mv

avayKalov.

ciScVai, irpo^ o hk

tIvos

yap

avrrj

rf

Xlytnu, owe

kc^oAi^

rj

Wm>$

iJ

OVK cmv ciScVai wpia^vw^. oHrr^ odfc om

ravra rCyv trpo^ n. ct 5c /x^ ian ravm rui^

20;^tp,
11]

npos

Tt,

dXrjOcs

ajv

117

tCjv TTpos Tt ioTiv.

5^ x*^*"^*'

TOLOVTCJV a(f>o8pd>s anoifialptadat,

to /xcWoi

caKCfifjievov
airrcjv
25

elvai XeyoiTai.

BLcideais

'Sirj7ropr)Kvai i^*

8c

17

rwv

iroioTrj^

Buu^pi 5c

Xeycadwaav.

TToAu

Xeyw koB*

he

cm

;^poyi<j6T6poi'

TnGrrip,rj

Sofcct

Kai

cft^ai

Toiavrai 8e at re iTncrrfjfxai

yap

^^P "JW

woXXdxi^

iroiol

rail'

/ecu

^19 5ca^^9f<tff
tAOVifJLwrtpo^,

at QiKrat'

edy Kat ficrpUos Tt? inum^fiTjv

p.ydXr] fieraPoXri yevrfTai

85

TWV
62

SiKaLocnjvT] Kal

TOLOVTCDV,

OVK

tj

rt

aoxf>poav%rq koI

eVKlVTJTOV

SoKL

Xafiji,

vno poaov

^ dXsXov TLvog rotovrov (haavrws Sc Koi

T)

rj

'napafiovifiwv ttvai icoi

idv 7Tp

fjLTj

ramf

7rAc2piX(of

SucrxrivT^TOii^,

olov

iw

iicdarov

ev p,kv ovv ctSo; rroiOTTjros cfij icoi

Xeyofjidvcjv.

80

fitf

ovk axprqarov iartv.

VIII. UoLorriTa

Toi

oMa

Aryctv ori o^SffUa

tacos

tf

dpnj,

(Kaarov

ttvOl

oW*

CATEGORIES,

vii-viii

supposition and not really knowledge at all

you
would no longer certainly know that a thing was possessed of more beauty than something possessed of
less beauty.
For, indeed, it might happen that
nothing existed possessing less beauty. From all
this, I think, it is plain that a definite knowledge of
relatives means a like knowledge of those things
whereto they stand in a relation.
Yet a head or a hand is a substance, and men can
have definite knowledge what such things essentially
are, though without of necessity knowing to what
they are also related. For whose is this head or this
hand, that they cannot determinately know. But,
if so, we are forced to conclude that these things
and their like are not relatives, and, this being so, it
would be true to affirm that no substance is relative.
I think it is no easy matter to dogmatize over such
problems without more exhaustive inquiry. To bring
up the points in detail is, however, not itself wholly
;

useless.

VIII. To quality let us turn next. By quality I

that in virtue of which men are called such
and such. The word quahty has many senses.
Let habits and dispositions here constitute one kind
of quality. The former are unlike the latter in
'

'

mean

being more lasting and stable.

what we

call

habits

'

Comprised among

are virtues and

all

kinds of

knowledge. For knowledge is considered as lasting

and hard to displace from the mind, though a man
may, in fact, have acquired it in only a moderate
measure, unless some great change should come over
him, thanks to disease or the like. And the same
for instance, of temwill hold good of the virtues
perance, justice. For these are allowed on all hands

ARISTOTLE
huxdiatis

cvfierdPoXov.

S< X^yovrax

a iarw ^

Ta^y /xTaj3aAAoiTO, otov BtpfiArtff Kol

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CATEGORIES,

viii

to be hard to dislodge or' displace.

Dispositions,
however, are qualities easy to move or to change,
such as heat, cold, disease, health and so on. A man
is disposed in some manner according to all such conditions but rapidly undergoes change.
Being warm,
he may soon become cold being well, he may soon
become sick. So it is with all other dispositions,
unless one should chance to become second nature
through long lapse of time, proving either inveterate
or else, at the least, very hard to displace, when we
might, I think, call it a habit.
Those qualities, then, it is clear, men incHne to
denominate habits,' which are by their nature more
lasting and are the more hard to displace. Those
who cannot at all master knowledge and are of a
changeable temper are scarcely described nowadays
habit of knowing, although we
as possessing the
may say that their minds, when regarded from that
point of view, are disposed in a way towards knowledge I mean, in a better or worse. Thus is habit
unlike disposition
the former is lasting and stable,
the latter soon undergoes change. Habits are also
dispositions are not always habits.
dispositions
While those who have habits are disposed in some
manner or other in consequence, those who are some
way disposed have by no means in each case a habit.
By the next kind of quality I mean that which
leads us to speak of good boxers, good runners, the
healthy or sickly. Indeed, it will cover all terms
that denote any natural capacity, any innate inNot from their being disposed or concapacity.
ditioned in this or that manner, but rather from having
a power, which is natural, innate or inborn, or, it may
be, the lack of such power to achieve this or that
;

'

c2

65

ARISTOTLE
*
rj

fjL-qSev

Traaxctr, olov nvKrixol

20 8tafft(T^at

<f>vaLKr)v

TTCu?

Tov

TToirjaai Ti

ex^t-v <l>vGiKr)v
25

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p<fSuos,

tov

tov

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va/rxW ini

5< rtp a5vKifiiay

fraax^w pf^iuti \m6 rd^

KoX TO <TfcXflp6v

TOVTOi%

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TOV fJL^ p<fhUoS SiOtpcIodcU, T^ 5^
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/cat

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85

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to

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hehixQar caaavTUJS Sc Kai eni tCw aXXufV Xfi'

Iladrp-LKal Sc noioTrjTs Xtyot^rai o^ Tcp avrA

bra ScSey/icVa Ta? Troton/Tay neTTOvOduai ti* oirrt
yap to /xcAt t<J> rrciTovBevai ti Xcyerai yXvKv, aSr
Tcbv aXXwV TWV TOlOVTO}V OvSfV.
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Tcuv Lp7]pvojv ttolottJtojv ttolOovs

iraB-qTiKoX TroLOTTjTes

66

traBTjTucai

aurd Ta hhypuha

CATEGORIES,

viii

thing mth ease or avoid a defeat of some kind, do we

say men possess such a quality. We call men good
boxers or runners not in virtue of some disposition
but owing to a natural capacity to do this or that
thing with ease. When we speak of the healthy, we
mean that such people have powers of resistance,
ready, innate, constitutional, against all the commoner ills when we speak of the sickly, we mean
those who seem to possess no such powers. It is
We predicate
lhus, too, with hardness and softness.
hardness of that which resists ready disintegration
and softness of that which does not.
To continue, the third class contains passive
Examples are sweetqualities and also affections.
ness and bitterness, sourness and all things akin to
them such, too, are coldness and warmth such
are whiteness and blackness and so on. It is evident
all these are qualities, seeing that the things that
possess them are in consequence called such and
such. Just as honey itself contains sweetness and,
therefore, is said to be sweet, so the body itself contains whiteness and, therefore, is said to be white.
;

So

it is

in all similar cases.

we call passive are not, indeed,

name to denote that the things which
possess them are thereby in some way affected or
undergo change in themselves. Thus we call honey
sweet, as we said
but we do not imply that the
honey itself is in some way affected. And so with
all similar cases.
Again, if we take heat and cold,
though we call all such qualities passive, we do not
The

qualities that

given that

imply that the things which admit or possess them

are passive. We mean that the qualities mentioned
can, one and all, cause a sensation. The sense, for
67

ARISTOTLE
**

nddos Ti Kara Tqv yvaiv ifinoui Koi 1} B4ppu6m^

Kara rrjv o^r^. oyuolu}^ hk koX al SiXXai.
AevKonjs 8c /cat /icAovux koX al oXAoi XP<^ <wJ
10
rov ainov rponov rots iprjfivoi9 vaBrfTueai
TToionjrcs Xcyovr ai, oAAd r<^ o^ay atr^ wdWovf
ycyo veVat.

ort /icv oi5v yirovrou Sid iro^of iroAXoi

^erapoXal xpwaaTwv, hrjXov alaxwBl%

ipvdpos yVro Kal if>o^dU
16

war koI

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nadtov 7T7rovdv K

Tt

4 T19

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tJtis

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iarw

avuirrw
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raw irtpi

fyi

ra> aurxwBrjvai Sid^cotf

TO Gcofia iyevero, koi Kara ^volktiv avaraoxv

aifrr]
0

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1}

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oaa fiev odv rutv roiovrufv avfiima"

dno rivwv Tiadcov SvaKimjrcav Koi vrapa'

IJU)VLfjLwv

rrjv

Xiyovrai.
<hxp6r7)s
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i5

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citc
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yap

ev rfj

Kara ^vcrw gurr^on

Xdyo^nu

ficXavia ycycvrp-ai, novorrfrt^

yap Kara ravras Xcyofieda), ctrc Sid v6ao

rj
Sid tcavjia ro avro rovro avfifiPr)Kv

fJiaKpdv

wxpor7)s

rj

p.Xavia, Kal

firj

pq&ia>s anoKaOiaravrtu

Kal Sid piov napaficvovat, noiorrjrc^ koI avraX

ri

Xeyovrai' opLoiws yap ttoioi Kara ravras Xey6fJL0a

^r

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Sc

ciTro

paBUus hiaXvopJvaiv kcu ra^u dtro*

KadLorajievwv yiVcroi, nddri Aeyercu, noiorrjrtf S^

90

ov*

68

ov yap Xeyovrat. noiol rivs Kara ravraf,

CATEGORIES,

viii

example, of taste is affected by sweetness or sourness,

by coldness or warmth that of touch. So it is with
all qualities like

them.

All colours, as whiteness or blackness, are quaUties

also and passive, but not in the same sense, however,
give them
as those we have hitherto mentioned.
that name from the fact that they spring from affecThere are numerous changes of
tions or passions.
colour that clearly arise from affections. When men
are ashamed, then they blush ; when alarmed, they
turn pale and so on. So much is this really the case
that, I think, when a man is by nature disposed
towards shame or alarm as arising from a certain concomitance of bodily elements in him, we may not
unfairly conclude that he takes on the corrresponding colour.
For that state of the bodily elements
which for the moment accompanied the feeling of
shame or alarm might very well also result from
his physical organization, and thus a like colour
All
might also arise in the process of nature.
states of this kind may be, therefore, included
among passive quahties, seeing their source can be
For
found in some constant and lasting affection.
whether their source can be found in the bodily

We

organization or in long disease or sunburn,

when

they cannot be lightly removed and may even

endure throughout life, yet a pale and a dusky complexion are always called quahties by us, because we
are called such and such from our having that pallor
or duskiness.
Conditions, however, arising from causes soon
rendered inoperative, if not entirely removed, will
be known as affections, not qualities, seeing that no
one is called such and such on account of those con-

69

ARISTOTLE
^

ovre yap 6 pvdpia)v bia to aurxyvBrjvai ipu$0a$

Aeycrat, ovrc o wxpicitv 8id to

oAAa

/LtoAAoV TT7TOv6Vai Tl.

<foPrj$rjvai

wypiag,

ITO^ fMV

oJoTC

Ttt

Toiavra Aeycrat, TroionTTfy ou.

35

'0/XOUO9 8 TovTOiy KOA KaTO T17V ^X^** WO:.

ooo
TTOkOTrjrcs teal Trddr) A/ycrai.

y^

drp-LKal

ev ttJ yeveaci v6v9 d7r6 rivoiv fraOdw

yyV7]TaL, TTOLorqres Xiyovrai, oXov
10 a

eKaraoLs xal

dpyrj

-q

8c Kal octcu c^ccrraaccj

OTrd TLvojv dXXiov avp.iTra}fidTwv

,,^r-^'* 'SAAa/CTot

ttoioi

he

raxu

OLTTO

#(04

/iovuco/.

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fti^

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ri

oAa9 djcUnjrpi, iroiArrfTt^ teal

fcat

TotafJra*

rt fiavur^

koI to touivto* tt/hoI yap

Kara ravras Xeyovrai, 6pr^}^i rt

ojJiOLcas

hvoKWtfTwv

yap Kara ravras AryoJTCu.

aTTOKadiara^Uvtjjv

^(ro

nd^

yiytrok,

AcycTttt, olov el Xv7Tovfiv6s T49 opyiXurrtfids tartp,

ovhe yap Xeyerai, opyiXos 6 V

10

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I

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Tot?

Kal ica/xTTvAonyy,

ev6vrr]

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'i'

16

rw

roiovro} ndBti

n,
ware Trddr] fiv Xdyerai rd rouivra, noidrrjrts 5' ov,
Teraprov he yevos TTOLorTp-os oryrjua t tcai i}
TTcpt eKaarov imdp\ovaa puop^, eriot trpof rowopyiXcorepos

eariv.

Xeyerai'

roi*

oAAci

fiaXXov

#cat

ft

ti

yap rplyoivov ^ rerpdywvov c2mu

fJiop<f)'qv

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t)

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mu

8e eKa(rrov notov ri AcycTcu.

to 8c fiavov Kal ro twkvov koI to Tpa;^

70

TotrroAf

KaO* eKaarov yap rovrcav noidv

TTOLov ri Xeyerai, Kal rco^

Kara rm'

neirovOiyai

TAB.

iroA

to

CATEGORIES,

viii

ditions. He who blushes from shame is not, therefore,

regarded as naturally ruddy, nor he who becomes
pale from fear as one having a pallid complexion.
We say So-and-so was affected.' Such states are
affections, not qualities.
Likewise, there are in the soul passive quaUties
and also affections. When a man has a temper from
birth and its source is in certain affections not easy
to change or remove, then we give it the name of a
quality. Madness and irascibility and so on are cases
in point. For it is on account of such things that we
*

man mad or irascible. Likewise, distractions

of mind, which, although not innate in themselves,
yet arise from a certain concomitance of some other
elements in him and seem to be either enduring or
at least very hard to remove, are denominated
qualities also. For people are called such and such
on account of conditions like these. On the contrary,
those which arise from some source that is readily
healed we shall call by the name of affections, such
For a
as being somewhat angry, when vexed.
man is not known as bad-tempered from being,
when vexed, somewhat angry. We say Such a
man is affected.* Such states are affections, not

call a

'

qualities.

quality the fourth kind consists of the forms

figures of things ; add to these also crookedness, straightness and all other qualities like them.
For things are defined by these also as being of such
and such nature. And things have a definite nature
by being triangular,' quadrangular,' by being
In virtue, indeed,
straight,' crooked and so on.
of its figure or shape is each thing qualified. Rare
and dense, rough and smooth, while appearing at

Of

and the

'

'

71

ARISTOTLE

XcLov Sofctc fikv av noi6v

ar^yuai^tp,

louu hk

ra roiavra Xv<u t^ irtpi r^ voi^

hiaipia0}S' Oiovv yap fidXXov riva ^cuKcroi Twr
irvKv6v fikv yap r<p tA
fjLopiwv eKOLTcpov hrjXovv.

oAAorpta

Wio

fjLopLa

crvvcyyvs

eardvai dn*

oAA^Aoiy, fuxpov Sf

etvai

Kal Xiov /xv

oAATjAoii'*

ra /xdpca KlaB(u, rpaxy 8^

erav TO Sc iXXeiTrtw.

TTCos

25

t<Ji

T<ji

t<J*

^'

Sc-

v$Uis

to fU^^vwtp*

^(7Ct>? ftV OUV /cat oAAoS" OV Tt9 ^Ow/lJ T^M^fTOf

oAA' 04 y /ioAtoTa Acyoficvoi ojffWr

TTOLOTTjros,
oi^Tot

tmv.

IlotoTTTTcy
Ttt
80

icaTtt

aAAa>9

/xfi'

o^

ciati'

cu ilprjp^^vai,

iroicl

^ oircuao<
Tcuf nXiurra^

Tain-aj napwvvfux}^ Xey6fiva

aTT*

Kol ax^^ov

avToii'.

ctti

/av

o^i'

ndvrcjv irapwvvpM}^ Xtytrai, olo

aTTo rrjs Acuacott/toj XevKos Ktu dno rrjf ypo^'
pLaTLKTJs ypafifiariKos koI diro rij^ btscauxrvyfji
Si/coto?, waavTOJS #f<u ini rdv dXXotv,
'Ett' ivLCJV he 8ia to ^tj Klo6ai raZs notcrrfow
^^.
ovo/iara ovk vhj^^f;pat napwvvfut}^ an* aimSr
86 XeyeaOai otov hpofiiKo^ ^ TrvtcriKog 6 Kara Swtzfuv
io h (f)vaLK7)v Acyo/xcvoj (xtt* ot^Sc/ua; noiorqros nap'
wvufJLOJS Acycrat* ou ydp icctTcu oyopLara Totj 5uvd/icot /ca^* a? ourot Troiot Aeyoin'cu, wairtp nu^
e-marrniais Kad* as ttukti/coi tj naXaurrpiKol fcaTa
Sia^coii' AcyovTat* TWKTiKrf yap Xeycrai cVujttJ/iij
6 /cat

iirl

TroAatoTptKtJ, Trotot 8* airo

ol SiaKclfjLevoi. Xeyovrai.
KCLfievov
TTOiov

7a

toutwv

ov Acycrat trapwvvpxos to

Xeyofievov, olov

irapcjvvLUi>9

vlor S^ Koi 6v6fiaro^

dno

rrjs

airr^
6 airov

^caT*

dprij^

CATEGORIES,

viii

sight to indicate quality, are foreign, in fact,

class. They will rather be found to denote
a particular position of the parts. Thus we call a
thing dense, when the parts that compose it are
closely compacted, but rare, when those parts have
interstices ; rough, when some parts are projecting,
but smooth, when the surface is smooth, upon which,
so to speak, lie those parts.
These are the four kinds of quality. Others there
possibly may be, but these are those strictly so called.
Qualities, then, are those mentioned. The things
that derive their names from them or depend in some
other way on them are said to be things qualified
in some definite manner or other. In most
indeed,
nearly all cases the names of the qualified things
are derived from the names of the qualities. From
whiteness,' from grammar,' from justice,' we have
white,'
grammatical,' just.' So with all other
similar cases.

first

from that

Sometimes, however, the qualities having no names

of their own, no derivative names can exist. Thus
the name of the runner or boxer, so called from an
innate capacity, cannot be derived from a quality.

That is to say, such capacities have no particular

names, as the sciences have, with a reference to
which we call one man a boxer, another a wrestler
and so on. By a science we mean a disposition each
science, too, has its own name, such as boxing, for
;

instance, or wrestling. And those who are that way

disposed get their name from the name of the science.
Sometimes, moreover, the quality possesses a well-

defined name, but the thing that partakes of its

nature does not also take its name from it. For
instance, a good man is good from possessing the

73

ARISTOTLE
yap dperriv X^^^ (mov^aio^ Acycroi, oAA
ov 7rapcjvvfiw9 oltto rij^ dpTfj^, oi5#c circ noAAair
8c TO TOLOVTOV ioTlV.
Salos' to)

10

riotd

roivuv Acycrai ra TroLpwi'VfJuoi dno rum

TTouyrqTOJV Acyoftcva ^ oiroKJoiH' oAAoif

lprjiJLvcov

an

avTCJV.
'YTrapxcL 8c /coi ivavriorris Kara t6 notav, alov
SiKaioavvrj dSiKUf, ivainrlov Kol AcuKonyj licAon^

to xar ourar noia

hucau^ Koi to Acuirov
rw fxeXavi. ovk irri navrwv & to rotovro' rip
yap TTvppw t) wxPV V '''^^^ roiavrai^ XP*^*^^ ow&v
ivavriov ttoloIs ovaw,
"Etc he, idv rwv IvavrUov Bdrepov f noiov, tcaX
roOro Si SrjXov tr^xj^
TO XoiTTov coral noiov.
20 x^t^P^^2B^^^ '^^^ oXAay Karrjyopia^t olov ci /onv
I]
'Stfcotoowr^ T^ d8(K('^ evavriov, rroiov hi i}
bLKaioavvrj, rroiov dpa Kal rj aBu<ui' ovSe^ia yap

15

Kal ToXXa be cjoavrats,

oloi' to aZu<ov

Acyo/xcva,

tcai

T<ft

oAAoiv Karrjyopiwv <f>apiAoai TJ dBuci^'

ovre yap ro ttogov ovrt ro irpos ri ovrt nov ovo
oXcjs TL ra>v roiovTCjv ovSev, oAA* ^ noiov. wa
airrcus" he Kal inl rwv aXXwv rwv Kara to noiov
evavrlwv.
^EtniBex^raL 8c to fiaXXov Kol ro ^frrov ra votd.
XevKov yap fiaXXov Kal "^rrov rpov trtpov
fcal
AcycTat, Kal hiKaiov mpov iripov fiaXXov.
avro he iirihocriv Aa/xjScti'Cf Xcvkov yap ov hn
ov ndyra hi,
cvhex^rai XevKorepov yeveadai.

rCiv

25

jjf^^

80

oAAd rd

TrXcLcrra.

AcycTat

fiaiXXov

hiKaLoavvrj yap hiKatoovvtff l

Kal "^rrov, dirop^aeuv dv ng*
ivvoi
ofiolws he Kal inl rwv dXXwv hiadlaewv.
yap hiafx<f)LGpTjrov<n Trcpl rwv roiourwv Sucoio-

74

CATEGORIES,
*

We

do not, however, derive the

good,' from the other term,
virtue.'
Yet

quality, virtue.

term,

viii

'

seldom the case.

Thus those things have a definite quality which
have derived their name from it or in some other way
depend on it.
Qualities admit contrariety not in all cases, however. Justice and injustice are contraries, blackness
and whiteness and so on. The things that are called
such and such on account of their having these
qualities also fall into this class. For the just and the
unjust are contraries, the black and the white thing
and so on. But this is not so in all cases. Red,
yellow and similar colours are qualities that have no
this is

contraries.

If one of two contraries is a quality, the other is also

a quality. This will be clear to whoever examines the
rest of the categories. Inj ustice is contrary to j ustice,
and justice itself is a quality
so, then, is also inFor no other category fits it, not quantity,
justice.
neither relation, nor place, nor, in short, any other.
This holds in the case of all contraries that we
denominate quaUties.
Qualities admit of degrees. For one thing is more
white than another ; another, again, is less white.
And one thing is more just than another. And a
thing may get more of a quality ; for things
that are white may get whiter. This rule, while
it
holds in most cases, is subject to certain
exceptions. For if justice could be more or less
justice, certain problems might thereon arise, as
is also the case with all quaUties which we may call
dispositions. And some go so far as to say that these
cannot admit of degrees. Health and justice them:

75

ARISTOTLE
crvvrjv

fiv

yap

hiKaiocrvmrj^

ot)

ndw

^<iai

Stftr

XcyeadaL fiaXXov Kal iprrov, ovSi vyiiuuf vyulof,

35 -^TTOv
ficm-oL XLV rpov Mpov iyUuiv, iroi
mu yp<^i'
11 a hiKaixtcruvTiv Tpov mpov, ojoavrw^
oAA* ol>v t
fjLaTLKTjv Kal ras oAAay hiaBiati^.
ye Kara ravras Xy6fiva dyafi^iaPTjTi^to^ /rriScx^Tat TO fxdXXov Kal ro ^jrrov ypafifuirucanfpo^
yap Tpos Tpov Arycrai kqI vyiiv6Tpos tcai
b SLKaLorepos t koi im twv oXXljv waauruff,
Tplywvov he koI rerpdywvov oit 5orci t6 fiSX
Xov iniSex^adai, ovSe ratv aXXtov a^fi^fiaroiv ov&^.
Ta fiv yap iniSexofieva rov rov rpiywvov X6yo
71 rov rov kvkXov ndvS* ofioto}^ rpLywva ^ icvicXot
ctVt, rG)v hk firj iTTiBcxofievcjv ovbev fJLaXXo irtpoif
10 irepov prjOrjaerai' ovSev yap fiaXXov r6 rrrpdyutifm'
rod ercpofi-qKovg kvkXo^ iariv od^rtpov yap hnSexcrdt, rov rov kvkXov Xoyov.
anXatf W,
7n8xrp-ai dfji<f)6rpa r6v rov npoKetpi/ifOV
117)
Xoyov, ov p7]d'qarai, ro erepov rov trepov ^laXXov.
ov Trdvra ovv rd ttoui 7rtS;(Tat to p^iXXov Koi
ro T^TTOV.
16
Toil' p,V ovv Lp7)fJLV(x}V Ou5cV ThlOV ITOlOTrpXtf,
ofiouL be Kal dvofioLa Kara pudvas rds Troidrrpus
Xeyerai' ofioiov yap erepov irepw ovk ari kot*
aXXo ovhev t} Kad* o ttoiov iarnv. oKrrc ISiov af
L7} rijs TTOLorTiros rd dpuoiov kox dvopowv XdyeaOai

4^

Kor
so

avTTiv.

Ov

Set 8c rapdrreadai, p,'q rig rjfidg

xmtp
TToiorrfos rfjv npoOeaiv irovr^aapAvovg iroXXd rGmf
rrpds ri mjyKarapiB\ieiadai' rag yap c^ciy kox
oiadeacLs rcov npos ri etvat. iXyopLV, ax^hdv ydp
CTTL

76

TTavrcjv

4v^

rwv

roiovrcjv rd yevrj npds ri Xeyerai,

CATEGORIES,

viii

they contend, are not subject to such variabut people in varying degrees are possessed of
The same with gramhealth, justice and so on.
matical knowledge and all dispositions soever. And
certainly none can deny that the things that are
marked by such quahties have them in more or less
measure. This man will know more about granmiar,
be healthier or juster than that.
selves,
tions,

triangular,*
Terms that express a thing's figure
rectangular and so on can hardly admit of degrees.
For the objects to which the definition applies of
triangle or circle are equally triangular or circular.
Others, to which the definition of neither of these
things applies, cannot differ themselves in degree.
For the square is no more of a circle than is let us
say the rectangle. To neither of these the definition
we give of a circle applies. So, unless, in a word,
the definition of the thing or the term thus in question
is appropriate to both of the objects, they cannot at
all be compared. Not all qualities, then, have degrees.
The aforementioned characteristics are no way
peculiar to quality. What is peculiar is this, that we
predicate like and unUke with a reference to
For one thing is like to another in
quality only.
respect of some quaUty only. So this is distinctive of
'

'

'

'

quaUty.
It must not cause us trouble, however, if someone
objects to our statements that, quality being our
theme, we include in that category also a good
many relative terms. For both habits and disNow,
positions we admitted to be relative terms.

at least in

most

cases, it

happens that the genera,

77

ARISTOTLE
TcSv 8c KaB* Kacrra ovhtv.

fUv yap

ij

num^fi,rj,

yivos oZaa, avro oncp iarlv trtpov Xiytrai (nvoy

tbyap i7TL(mjfJLr) Xeyerai), rdv 5c Koff Kaonx odSh^
o7Tp iarlv Iripov Acycrai, otov ij ypofifUf
ov Xdycrai tivos ypafxparucfj ovS* 17 /iouour^
TWOS fU)vcrLKij. oAA* t opa, Kara ro yivos kox

avro
TLKrj

adrai rwv npos ri Acyoi^ot, otov

80

17

y/>a/i^rur^

AcycTttt rivos 7nGn]p.rj, ov Tivoy ypofifiaruci/j, Kol

rwog

fiovaitcrj

t)

7nrrjfirj

X^ytrai, ov

rwof

ftav'

aiK-q.

*QoT

at

KaS*

Katrra o^k

rojv

tltrl

np6^ n.

Acyo/xc^a hk ttoloI rais KaB* cfccurra* ravray ya/)

Kac xofiV' 'm<rrqp^v9 yap Aeyd/xc^a

85

rwv Kad* Kaara

TToiorrjrcs

/cat

etT^orav,

cu

nor Kal noiol Acyd/xc^a*

Trpd?

ert

Tt.

ct

rcji
^x*^
war a^cu om

7TiarT)fux>v rivd,

ica^'

o^at

tKaara, KaB* as
8^ ou#f

Tci>r

Cicri

rvyxdi'oi ro avro 7rp6s ri Koi

ovbkv dronov v dfuftordpotg rais ytvtow

avro KaraptdfielaBai.
IX. 'ETriSexcTOi Sc KOi ro trouiv Kol ro Trdax^u^
evavrLorrjra koI ro fidXXov koI ro iJttov t6

TToiov ov,

11 b

;^/^

y^

Bpp,alviv

rw

ilnjx^tv

evavriov kox ro BpfjLaiva6an

rCo i/jvx^c^BaL Kal ro -qScaOat.

6

CTTtSc^erat

ivavriorrfra.

'fjrrov OcpfiaCveiv

rw

Xv7TLaBai,

wart

Kal ro fiaXXov 8^

yap p,dXXov Koi

BepjialvcadaL fiaXXov Kal ^rrov,

koI

^jfrrov lart, teal

irriS^x^''^^

o^ ri

fidXXov Kal ro ^rrov ro rroiclv Kal ro irda)(iy.

rovrwv roaavra Aeycrairod KctaBax v rols npos

'Yttcp fiev odv

10

8c

78

Kol

V7Tp

ct^i/rot
rt,

on

CATEGORIES,
doubtless,

are

relative

viii-ix

not so the

individuals.

Knowledge, the genus, we define by a reference to

something beyond it, for knowledge is knowledge
ofsomething. Particular branches, however, of knowledge are not thus explained. For example, we
do not define by a reference to something external
a knowledge of grammar or music. For these, if in
some sense relations, can only be taken for such in
respect of their genus or knowledge. That is to say,
we call grammar the knowledge, not grammar, of
something, and music we call, in like manner, the
knowledge, not music, of something.
Thus particular branches of knowledge are not to be
classed among relatives. People are called such and
such from possessing these branches of knowledge.
These are the things they possess, being, therefore,
called knowing or expert,' and never the genus
or knowledge. And, therefore, those branches of
knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes described as of such and such nature, themselves must
come under the category of quality, not of relation.
Moreover, if anything happened to be both relation
and quality, then it were nowise absurd to include
it in both of these categories.
IX. Action and affection (or passion) have conThat is, heating is contrary
traries and also degrees.
to cooling, as also being cooled to being heated or,
again, being pleased to being pained. Thus it is
they admit contrariety. Moreover, they allow of
degrees ; for you can heat or be heated more or less.
Hence it follows that both action and affection may
admit of variations of degree.
*

Of

'

these categories so

or position

we spoke

of,

much is stated. Posture

when dealing before with
79

ARISTOTLE
11 b

TrapwinjfUi}^

ano rdv dla<av A/ycnu. vnkp

noO koI toO

W t<j^

XoiTTwv, rod T irork koX rov

.^-

^X^tv,

aXXo
to x<iv /i^
<rqp,alvi, TO inroSebecrBai, to amXiadai, to S^ iroO
oloi' 1^ AvKcCw, Kol ra oAAa S^ oaa i/]r<p ovtom^

8ta TO
Acyerat

7rpo<l>avri

-^

ouScv

cft^at

oaa V apxfj

virip

avrCtv

ipfUBr), on,

ippddrj.
15

X.

Ta

Tttcp /xv oi^ Tcuv 'nportOhmjw ywaiu orcu^

etprfpJva' npl 8^ Toii' dvTiKtifUvwi^, trogqj^ciuy

X^nu

euodev dvTLKelaOai, prjTov.

^^

l^^

JO

Kard<l>aais Koi an6<fxuTi9'

ratv Toiovraw

]^i//r

5tf

rrtpom

ircpoj avTiKelaOai, rrpaxu)^t ^ <o9 Ta frp^ Tt, ^

Ta evavT ia, r) ct>9 ar^prjaiq koI Ifi^, ^ coy
cis"
(Its

rvnia

olbv TO StTrAaatoi' r<p

olov TO KaKov

dyrltctirtu

l'ntlv
'qfiiai,

teaaro

w^ fih^ ra npof ti,

w^ hk to ivayrla^

rw

ayadt^, ws 8^ Ta icaTcl OT^pnrfag^

KOL ^Lv, otov Tv<f>X6rrjs Kal 6*l/is, <o9 8^ KaTOi^aatf
KOL d7T6<f>aaLS, otov KaBryran. ov KaOrp'tu.
''Oo-a fiv ovv cuj Ta npos ri dvTu<iTai, oui)rd
aTTtp coTt TcDi' ayriKtipJviov AcycTcu ^ oncjaoOi^
dXXcJS TTpos avrd, olov to 8(7rAcu7u>i', oi^to oircp
coTtV, ircpov SiirXdaiov AcycTai* Tivoy yap 84-

ifi

8c toj iirumjrtp coy Ta

AtycTai yc -^ ^C4m}/ii|
auTO OTrep ccrrt rov inurrrfrov. Koi to hna 1 ifi <W
8c az^TO OTrep cort Trpoj dvriKipLvov A/yrrai, ti^v
7TLcm^p,r)V' TO yap einanjrov TW'i Acyrrat
QTrfTov, rfj 7ncmjp,rj,
oaa oSv orrucciTai cuy rd
TrAaaiov.
Trpoff

80

Tt

icat

17

irrianjfjLTj

duTtVctTai,

icai

^-

The chapters that follow arc

scholars as spurious.

commonly regarded by

CATEGORIES,

ix-x

We

said that such terms get their names

corresponding to them. The
rest, that is, time, place and state, are so clear
that I need say no more than I said at the very
beginning that a state is intended by terms such
and the like, whereas
shod,* * armed
as being
*
place is intended by phrases like in the Lyceum
and so forth."
have now said enough on the subject of the
X.
categories that we proposed, and with opposites next
we must deal and the various senses of the word.
For we call things opposed in four ways first of
all, as correlatives are, either term of each pair to
the other ; in the next place, as contraries are ; in
the third place, as privatives to positives ; lastly, as
Speaking in outline, I
affirmatives to negatives.
mean that correlatives that are opposed are expresand half,' while of contraries
sions like * double
that are opposed we may take good and bad for
examples. Of privative and positive terms we may
here mention blindness and sight,' he is sitting'
and he is not sitting in the case of affirmatives and

relation.

from the attitudes

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

negatives.
Opposites, when relatives also, our custom it is
to explain by referring the one to the other and
using the genitive case or some other grammatical
Thus double,' a relative term, is
construction.
explained as the double of something. And knowledge, a relative term, is opposed to the thing that is
known and explained by a reference to it. The
thing that is known is explained by a reference to
for the thing that is
its opposite, to knowledge
known will be known by a something more preAll opposites, then, are
cisely, by knowledge.
*

81

ARISTOTLE
npos

dncp iarlv Tpwv A/ymu i;

npos dXXrjXa Acy^rai.
Sc
6t?
rd ivam-ia, avra fiiv

Ti, atVra

St/ttotc

Td
icrrlv

ovSafjuos

fjLcvroi

aXXrjXcov

KaKov Acyerat

rrpos

oAArjAa

ArycTOi,

Acyeraf

oin-c ydf>

dya^di',

dAA*

dmi
ivovrta,

to aya^o*' rod
ovrt to

ivavrtov,

Tou fieXavos XevKov, dAA' tvavrlov, wart

avrai al di^idc<Ti; oAAnAoir. Saa
rd)' ivavrioiv roiaOrd ianv uKrrt cv off V^UK
ylvcadai ^ wv KaTTjYopfiTai ovayKcuov wMtl^
Odrepov vnap^civ, tovtwv ovS^v iartv ava fUao
cSv Sc y /X17 dvay^fatbv Odrtpov vndp)(f, rovret^
cm Tt dvd p.(Tov ndvrwg, olov vdaos teal ^y^ui
v aco/Ltart {cjou 7r<l>vK ylva6ai, Koi dvayKaZS*^
y ddrcpov vndpx^iv r<^ rov ^(ftov awfiari, ^
VOCTOV ^ VyUiaV.
KOU 'ITpiTTOV hk kqx dpTUM^
dptdpLov KaTtjyopclrai, Kal dt^yKoUv y Banpoif
TO) dpiOfiw vTrdpx^tv, ^ Tr^pirrov ^ dprtov,
koa
oifK ecrri y tovtwv ovS^v dvd fUaov, otrn vdaov
Kal vyietas" ovt ncpiTTov koI dprlov.
Jtv S4 yt
dvayKOLov Bdripov irndLp^tiv, tovtwv cm Tt
p,7j
dvd ficaov, olov fieXav Kal XVk6v ev {ratfian
7r<f)VK ylvcadai, Kal ovk dvayKoXov yc Odrtpov
avTiov imdpx^f'V tw awjuiTi' ov yap trdv fJToi
XevKov ^ fxeXav gtIv, Kal (f>avXov 8c Kol anouSaSov
KaTTjyopeLTai, fiv koI /car* dvdpumov kqI iccrrd
dAAcuv TToXXwv, OVK dvayKalov 8c ddTpov ai)r<tfir
xmdpX'eiv Kivot.s wv dv KaTTfyoprJTOi' ov yap

Aeu/cot'

ht,axf>povaiv
12 a

10

V \*

16

^auAa 7) (nrovSald <rrw, ku (m

tovtwv dvd fieaov, olov tov fiev XofKOu tcmi

TrdvTa tJtol

ye
82

Tt

CATEGORIES,

explained by referring the one to the other and

using the genitive ease or some other grammatical construction, when these are correlatives also.
Opposites are no way dependent, when xiontraries,
the one upon the other but are contrary one to
The good is not called, for example,
the other.
the good of the bad but its contrary.
Similarly,
white is not kno^vn as the white of the black but
its contrary.
Thus these two kinds of opposition
are entirely distinct from one another. But contraries such that the subjects in which they are
naturally found or of which they can be predicated
must needs contain the one or the other these never
can have intermediates. When there is no such
necessity, then the reverse is the case, and they
always will have an intermediate. For example,
both health and disease may be said to be naturally
present in the bodies of all living things, and in
consequence one or the other must be present
We predicate both odd and even
in animal bodies.
in similar manner of number
in consequence, one
or the other must always be present in number.
Now, health and disease, odd and even, have no intermediate between them. But where there is no such
necessity, then the reverse is the case.
For example,
both blackness and whiteness are naturally present
in body, but neither need be in a body.
For not
every body existing must either be black or be white.
Then we predicate goodness and badness of man, as
of many things else. Neither goodness nor badness,
however, although they are predicated of them, is
present of necessity in them. Not all things are good
or are bad. Now, such contraries have intermediates.
Between black and white, for example, are sallow and

83

ARISTOTLE
TO ^(uov KQx ro wxpov koI oaa d[XAa
rod hk <f>avXov koI airovoaiov to oirri

fidXavos
20

)^pwfjLaTa,

M*

in* Ivioiv fiiv o9v

ovT GTTovSaZov.

<t>av\ov

ava fUoov, otov XdVKoO Ktd

fUXavog TO <f>ai6u Koi to wxpov Koi oaa oAAa
XpcjfjLara' in* ivUnv ht 6v6^rt /iv ovk cilPiropor

fiara

TO

rols

/cctrat

dm

ttTToSowtu,

iiiaov

5'

t^

iicaripov

T3f

to dva lUaov opHtrai, cXov to

dyadoiT 0VT KOKOV KoX 0VT hu(tUO OVT

CLKpajv ano<l>dGL
25

Otrr

dSlKOV.
1n-pr]GL he
Tt,

olov

17

Kol cfis A/ycTOi fUv vpl

oipis

KadoXov ht

Kol

-q

radi^

rw^Xorrfs irtpl i^Bak^k&ir

lniP, iv 4*

*f*f fr4^t y^prnfOoa^

iartpijeSak
5crrucciiK^
ccm
cf

wpi rovro Xiycrau Kdrpov a^hufv,

Sc TOT Xiyo^ev Kaarov

rdv

rrj^

n^vKv vnapx^ty toi Srt W<^vMipF

XW fnjhaficjs vndpxtl' vfj^v rt yap Xiyoptw oi
TO firj xov ohovras, koI rxt^Xov ov r6 fii^ ixp'i^

so oTiiv

hf 4

oiftiv, oAAa TO fx^ xov oT 7ri^vKV Ix^w TtwA

yap iK yVTris ovt wffw Xi ovrt dhdvraig^ ffiik
ov Xiyerai ovr vwSd ovt rwftXoL,
To 8c i<TTprJG6ai koI r6 rfiv (w c^fcu' oiJ#f Iot
arip-qms koX cfiy.
cftj yxv yap iarw ij &fm,

ariprjGLS Sc

coTiv

rf

0^49,

ariprjais

yap

rwfiXonjs' to 8c ex^f-v Trpf o^cy

Tv^X^

ovSk

TO

ris

rwftXdrrj^ iartv,

rj

tvai iareprjoda^,, ov ariprjols

84

tvai

iorw.

o^

rv^Xonf^

to hk

en

rv^X^
^

CATEGORIES,

grey and so forth, while between good and bad we

have that which is neither the one nor the other.
And some intermediate quaUties have their own recognized names. We may take as examples again
grey and sallow and similar colours, intermediate
between white and black. In some of the cases,
however, to name them were no easy matter. We
then must define the intermediate as that which is
neither good nor yet bad,' for
neither extreme
example, neither just nor unjust,' and so forth.

'

What are called privatives ' and positives refer

to identical subjects, as blindness and sight to the
It is ever the case with such pairs that we
eye.
predicate one or the other, wherever the particular
positive is naturally found or produced. Thus we
say that what may have a faculty then is deprived of
that faculty, when it is totally absent and yet should
be naturally present and present also at that time.
Not what is without teeth or sight do we, therefore,
But we rather use those
call toothless or blind.
*

'

'

terms of that which has not but should have teeth

or sight and should have teeth or sight at that time.
For, indeed, certain creatures there are which from
birth have no teeth or no sight but are not known as
toothless or bhnd.
To possess and to be without faculties cannot be
considered the same with the corresponding posi*

tives

'

and

privatives.*

'

Sight

'

for instance, a

is,

bhndness,' its opposite, a

privative.*
Sight and to have sight,' however, must not be
considered identical. So to be bUnd is not bhndness.' For blindness,* we said, is a privative,' but
*
to be bhnd signifies a condition of want or privation.
To be blind is itself not a privative.* This may,
'

positive,'

'

'

85

ARISTOTLE
12 X
40

rv(t>X6r7)s

12

rw rw^kov

ravTOV

Kara

dfJL(t>6Tpa

rod

tlvat.,

tcartiYoptiro

oAAa

avrou'

rv^k^f

mM

fi^

hXdyerai, 6 avBpotTTo^, rv<f>X6rrj^ 8c o^SafUMtf Xfyfrm.

6 dvdpUJTTOS.
*

AvriKetadai, 8c Koi ravra BoKi, to iartfnjoBiU

'^ <rrfniais teal tfij* 6 yap

dvridatwq
6 avros' wf yap ff rv^kirrfi
rpoTTOs rrjs
Ktu r6 rv^iMv c&u t^
dvTucirai,
ovroi
otpci
TTJ
/cat

TO

TTjv iiv X^Ly

o^iv ix^iv diniKCLTai.

OvK earn B ovSi. to
KaTd<t>aaw ciTro^aai;

10

vno

kqI

Kard<f>aais Xoyos core Kara^riKos tcax ^ air6^amt

Xoyos dTTo^TiKos, tCjv 8^ iJwp TT)v Kard^aiM iroi
A/ycroi 8^ Koi raOra
d'n6<f>aaiv ovhiv iari Aoyoy.

dvTLKeLGdaL dXXrjXois

ws Kard^aais

Koi yap cVt rovratv 6 rpono^

ws ydp

avTos.

ovTO) Kol TO

v<f>*

Kadrjadai rep

fj.rj

"Oti 8c

rd

rj

koX dir6^atng'

r^

dtrridtata^f 6
KaTo^aaif irpoi rrpf aWolov ro KaBrjrai rtp oi) KoBifrtu,
Kdrpov wpdyfia dvTlKirtu, to

ttotc

<l>aaLv ovrt/ccirat,
16

dno^amy

rriv

koI Kard^aais' ^ fih^ yop

iJ

Kadijadai.

Grpr)ais koI

ij

cf ly

ot5#c

cu^ucciTOA

ws

ov ydp AcycTcu ouro &np

iari rod dvTLKeifidvov. t) ydp o0iy ovk cort rv^Xd*
rrp-os oj/fi9, oi)8* dXXcjs ovhapxos frpo^ avro Acycro*.
(haavTCJS 8c ou8 ly tu^Aott^j AcyoiT* ov rv^Xir^
'Hpos

10 6iljajs,

Tt, <f>avp6v

oAAct

arepTjais

/xcv

otlf<jjs

rv^XSrrji

17

AcycTat, TV<l>X6n]s 8c oipcws ov AcycTtu.

cTi Ttt

Trpos Ti TT-anra tt/)? dvriaTp<f>ovra Xlytrai, apart

KOX

86

r)

rv<f>X6Trjs

vnp ^v

rwv npos

ti,

dyrdarpt^a^

CATEGORIES,

moreover, be noted, that, if to be blind could be

rightly considered the same thing with blindness,*
then should we predicate both, without doubt, of
identical things. This, however, is never the case. A
man may be said to be blind yet a man is not said
to be blindness.
*

'

As positives and privatives are opposites, so

are possessing a faculty and being in a state of privahave the same sort of antithesis. For to be
tion.
blind and have sight are opposed just as blindness
'

'

We

and

sight.

What

is affirmed in a statement is not of itself

*
Affirmation
affirmation nor what is denied a denial.
means affirmative statement,' denial means a
negative statement.' But what is affirmed or denied
in a statement is matter of fact, not a statement,
proposition, assertion. It, nevertheless, is the case
that the things we affirm and deny are called oppoFor we have the same sort
sites in the same sense.
of antithesis. Just as the affirmative statement and
the negative themselves are opposed take the two
and he is not
propositions, for instance, * he sits
so, too, are the facts thus expressed or his
sitting
*

'

'

'

and not sitting.

and privatives clearly are not in the
same sense opposed as are relatives one to the other.
We do not explain them, I mean, by referring the
sitting, that is,

Positives

'

'

'

We

do not call sight sight of blindone to the other.

ness, nor use any other form of statement that serves
And blindness, in similar
to bring out a relation.
manner, we do not call blindness of sight, but we
Again, relative terms
it privation of sight.
are reciprocal. Therefore, were bhndness a relative,

call

87

ARISTOTLE
12 b

oAA*

ay KOKclvo npos o Xeycrai.

26

ov yap Acycrat
"Ort 8^

oi58'

oipis

1}

ci?

TO ivavria eU^wfciTtu tA

irard

tcov&c &^Aoy.

rw9

areprjaiv koI e^iv Acyo/xcva,

yap ivavTLwv, wv

fiv

iv

oj'ayKalov,
80

yap ovScv

'^v

am

#f

dya fUaow^

iariv

firfSiv

yivtoBai

irtifnjKt

a>

ddrcpov avrwv

rjyopcLTai,

ivrurrp^^i

oiJif

rw^Xomjros o^f

cut'

rar*

vnapx^w ocr rovTW

fitaov, aiv Odr^pov

^vai)MiraSbr

r<p ScicTiKO) vnapxtiv, otov inl

yooov Mol vyulas

Kox TrepLTTov Koi dpriov,

<m

ovScTTore

ri

pJXav

n ovd fiJo^i^

vnapx^^ Bdrtpov ovfM

navrl

dvaytcr)

yap \vk6v

Jrv bt

avdytcrj

vdv

ftvai

t6 htKTucdt^g

ovT depyiov ovrf. ijfvxpdv' rovratv yap dvi fUaoif

85

ri ovSfv Ka}Xvi

Ti

dvd

tJv

tw

otov

40

xmdpxw

fieaov, cjv

firj

heKTLKcpf t

r<p

XevKTJ.

TTvpl

inl

TO

18 a fjLcXaivav.

/i*^

8^ Tot^ro^f

yap evSc^cTcu to
coore

tovtuw

4f^

dyayKoZov ddrtpov undpxtuf

oU

teal

^v<Ti

cfvoi

depfjup

ddrepov imdpx^w,

lh% bi teal

r6

#co4

^
rrj

d^a>pu7/xva>;

wnifiXf^B

;(m^ ri
dvayKoZov

ovx dndrtpav enrxV' ov

irvp tfaxpov
Traarri /icv

hai ovS^

ovk

rffv

x*^i

dpdytcr) rp 8irrue^

ddrepov avrdv vnapx^iv, aXXd fiovov ots ^uaci t^

88

CATEGORIES,
blindness and

however, not

would reciprocate. This is,

For we do not call sight sight of

sight

so.

blindness.
That positives and privatives,' moreover, are
not in the same sense opposed as are contraries one
to the other seems perfectly clear from the following.
When contraries have no intermediate, we saw that
the one or the other must ever be present in the
subject in which they are naturally found or of
which they will serve as the predicates. Where
this necessity obtained, then the terms could have
no intermediates. Health and disease, odd and
But
even, were mentioned above as examples.
where contraries have an intermediate, no such
It was not every subject that
necessity obtains.
may be receptive of black and of white that must,
therefore, he black or he white.
And the same,
That is, something
too, with coldness and heat.
*

'

or other intermediate between black and white

present, between hot and cold and the like.
(Moreover, we have already seen that those contraries had an intermediate, where it was not a
necessity that one of the two should be inherent in
everything capable of receiving them.) An exception must, however, be made where one contrary
naturally inheres. To be hot is the nature of fire,
and the nature of snow to be white. In such cases,
then, one of the contraries needs must be definitely
present, not one or the other, in things. It is out of
the question that fire should be cold or that snow
should be black. Hence it follows that one of the
contraries need not be present in all things that may
be receptive of such. It is present of necessity only
in the subjects in which it inheres. And, moreover,

may be

89

ARISTOTLE

ovx oTTorcpov rvxv.

'Etti 8c tt\s crTpriai.aiS Kal rff^ c(ca>;
b

7T(f)VK6s

OxfjLV

eXfl-V

OVT TV^XoV Otht

&l^

/)fC'

ravra r<jjv roiovruiv

ivavTiwv cjv ovhiv iariv ova fi^aov.
dXX* <M
(Lv TL cmv ova fieaov dvayKoZov yap wort watf^
TO) SfKTLKw Bdrepov airrwv vndpx^u^' Stop yd^i
tJSt] 'n<f>vK6s i oifnv cxciv, rdrrt ^ rv^Xov ^ SifHtf
Xov prjOTJaerai, koX rovruiv ovk w^piafjUift$t
ddrepov, oAA* oirojcpov^ Irvx^' ^^ Y^ catayKiAm
rj TV<t>X6v rj Xov oijfiv cti'ou, oAA* onortpov ifvyjl^ X
171 0 rojv i'avTLCJVf iov <m Tt aro fUaov, ov
Aeycrai,

10

ovhirtpov

yap dci T<ji t*terucip

avayKolov ddrcpov avratv vrrdpxtw t6 yAp fg^jnm

rcjv lpr)pLvu)v aXr^des' ovrt^

c5crr

ovk av

lrj

dvayKoiov ^v irayrl Bdrtpov vndpxtu^, ^'^^

TO v, wart 8if<Wlif
oTt Kar ovhTpov rwv rpdmatv an ra ^vavrld

TTore
15

Ttat, Kol rovTOLS wjxjjpiOfidvtjs

20

rd Kara ar^pr^aiv koi iv dvTucifAva.

fiv Twv IvavrUov, vndpxQvros rod
Sc/cTtKou, hvvarov ls aXXr)Xa ^rapoXrfv yiyr$ait
t fjii] TLVL (fivaei to v V7rdpxi, olov rip irvpl t^
OcpfjLOf tvai' Kol yap ro vyialvov Bwarov voarjatti
dvrlKCLrat.

^^

"FiTi,

Kal
^Vl
\

TO

iirl

XcvKov

fidXav

yevioBai

koX

to

depfwVf Kal iK OTTovSaiov ye <^vXov koI

ifn/XP^
ic

^av-

Xov cmovhalov huvarov yVo6ai, 6 yap ^aSX^s

els peXrlovs StqT^t^dj dyo/ievos koI Xdyov^

K^

90

ovSi B.

CATEGORIES,
in cases like this

it is

definitely

one or the other, not

the one or the other, which

either

is

of necessity

present.

Neither of the foregoing statements holds good of

our positives and privatives.' Subjects receptive
of such are not bound to have one or the other. For
what is not yet at the stage when it naturally ought
to have sight is not called either seeing or sightless.
And positives and privatives,' therefore, are not
to be classed with those contraries where there is no
intermediate. Neither, again, should we class them
with contraries having intermediates. For one or the
other at times must form part of each possible subject.
^Vhen a thing should by nature have sight, we shall
say that it sees or is blind, indeterminately and not
of necessity but whichever it happens to be. It has
it is not of necessity blind ;
not of necessity sight
it must be in one state or the other. But have we not
already seen that of contraries having intermediates
neither the one nor the other need be found in each
possible subject but definitely one of the pair must
be present in some of those subjects ? That posiand privatives,' therefore, are not opposed
tives
one to the other in either of the same ways as contraries will be evident from the foregoing.
Of contraries this, too, holds good, that, the subject
remaining identical, either may change to the other,
unless, indeed, one of those contraries constitutes
part of that subject, as heat constitutes part of fire.
What is healthy may well become sick, what is white
may in time become black, what is cold may in turn
become hot. And the good bec9mes bad, the bad
good. For the bad man, when once introduced to
new modes both of living and thinking, may improve,
*

'

'

91

ARISTOTLE
13 a

yi Tt TTlSpirj LS TO /ScAtUiM' c2mU. 09

8c dira^ Kov yuKpav eiriSoaiv Xdfif), <^avp6v &n ^
rcXecDS dv /xcrajSoAoi tj trdw woXX^p hrCioam
AajSof del yap VKi%rqr6rpo^ trp^^ dprriy vu^rrou,
Kav rjm-tvovv i-nlhocnv iXT)<f>ojs i( ^xfj^ u* <*oriV
tad
/cat ttXclcj lk6s iniBoaiv avrov Xafipaytiy,
sorovro del yiv6pLvov rcAcioi^ ctV rrw hrnvrlop Ifir
2J

fJLLKpOV

dTTOKadlarrjmv, idv iTp firi XP^^V f<feKyro.

84 y T^9 ^U}S Kol Tjrs <rrprHjivi aowofrov cif
dXXrjXa fjiTaPoXr)v ytviaBai.

dno fiiv yof

t^ ^it>s

cm TTjv (rrlp7)Giv yiverax yurQ^oXri,dft6 3< ttSj OTcpn*

85

ovrt yap rv^Xot yl4^q^jaxpof aW WAd^

KOfirjTTjs iyevero, oure vcjho^ wv oSoKrof i4*fOW,
''Oaa 8c o); fcara^a<n9 koI aTro^cun; ayr^Vfvnu,

aca>9

r^v cf ii* o^uvarov.

7rt

p,ev6g Tis

7^<IAt^'

ort icar*

lSb<^avpo^

dvTtVciTat*

CTTi

oi)8cva rail'

iprjpL4vtai^

yap fxovwv rovrwv

rp6mt

avaytciuoi^ dfl

oAry^cj TO 8^ tl/vSo^ auTiov c&oi.

ovr*
ivavTLwv drayKcuov del dartpov
dX-qdes etvai ddrepov 8^ 0ct>8o;, otrrc ^rri tcui' ir/)^
otatf ij
Tt, oirrc C77"t T^9 ^(jjs Kol TTJs <rrprjaa>s
uyteta /cat 17 voaos vavrla, kqX oihirtpdv yc olht
aXrjOcs ovT t[/vS6s icmv.
waavrtas
#fai r6
8t7rAdortoi' /cat to :7/xtov cis Td tt/h)? ti dt^ucciTOi, ici2
ou/c coTtv ai)Ta>v ovSercpov out dXr]dS otrrc ilfvSos,
ovbi y rd Kara ordprjoiv Koi i^iv, olov tj 0^15 Koi
oXws 8 rcov Kara firfSefuay (rvfinXo'
17 tv<I)X6t7)s*
KTjv Xeyofievcav ovSev ovt dXrjdes out t/KV^os rr%w
rrdvra he rd ci/n^/xcVa dvV avfiTrXotc^ A/ycTOi.
Ov firjv aXXd /xdAioTa dv 8d^ctc ro roioxrro avfi,^

TO

/xcv

yd/)

dvc/SAc^cj', oirrc

cTTt

Tcuv

10

See what was said in

truth

92

and

falsity.

4 upon uncombined wordlj

CATEGORIES,

be it ever so little. And should such a man once

improve, even though it be only a little, he might,
it is clear, make great progress or even, indeed, change
completely. For ever more easily moved and inclined
is a man towards virtue, although in the very first
We
instance he made very little improvement.
naturally, therefore, conclude he will make ever
greater advance. And, if so, as the process continues,
it will at length change him entirely, provided that
time is allowed.
As for positives and privatives,' however, there
cannot be change in both ways. From possession
you may pass to privation but not from the latter
to the former. A man who has once become blind
never finds that his sight is restored, as a man who
has once become bald never after recovers his hair
and a man who has once lost his teeth never after
can grow a new set.
Affirmations and negations are opposed, it is patent,
in none of those ways upon which we have already
touched. It is here, and here only, indeed, that one
opposite needs must be true, while the other must
always be false. In the case of other opposites
*

'

and privatives this

no wise hold good. Thus of health and
disease, which are contraries, neither is true, neither
half.*
and
Take correlatives,
double
false.
Again, neither is true, neither false. So also with
and privatives,' such as are blindness
positives
and sight. To sum up, unless words are combined,
true and false can have no application. And
all the afore-mentioned opposites are but mere uncombined words.**
However, when words that are contraries consti-

contraries, correlatives, positives

\vill

in

'

'

'

'

'

93

ARISTOTLE
TO yap

fiva)V'
16

avyL-nXoKr^v ivayritM^^ Aty9

r&v Kara

palvLV inl

vytalytaf

'Lcatcparqr

^cjKoaTnv ivavTiov <7Ttv. oXa ovo

dvayKcuov ael ddrepov fUv aXij$S

ry

woatip

cni TovrtMHf

Odrtpoy

Si

OVTOS ft<V yop HctflCfMkTOVS MTCU r6

om-o^ 54 d^i^drtpa
fiv dXr)dh TO be ipev^t
TfOJKpdrrjv
ovrt t6
tpcvhij' ovT yap to poatv
tlfvSo9 tvai.

vyiawiv iariv aXrjdes avroO

ovrog SXutf rov

firf

TtCUKparovS'

*Emi be

so

oXcjs

rijs

arepijaews koX rrjf iftwf

o^^rpov

aXrjB^^,

otrro^

iitj

rt

Bdrepov aXrfiks Odrepov hk i/KvSos' r^ y4/>

XW YtWKpdrr^v
Kirai

&filf

rip rv<f>X6v ttvai ^LuMcpdrrpf ovrl*

areprjdis

u)S

StfTOt

ad*r

#ccu

(is,

$ccl

otrros

rf oJ

y^

dvayKalov ddrepov dX-qdts etyai ^ ^vSof (^nt

i5/ii/7ra> 'iT<f>VKv \w, dfuf>6rpa ^fKvi/rj^, /ti) Smof
T 6Xu} rov ^ZcjKpdrov^, Koi

ovrw ^^(V^ o^i^-

rpa, Kox ro o^iv Xiv kqX to rv^Xov cuMtf c2mu.

'Ettc

del, idv re

T779 Karatf>da<M}s

ectv
fj

re

firj

Kol ro erepov 0X17 ^9.

80

Kal ro

pov

fiT)

on

85

ro yap voGelv Xcjtcpanm

vooelv ^IwKpdrqv, oin-of re avrov ^OPff*

ro erepov aurwv dXrjOei

ovros

ofjLotws'

ro be

fiTj

tStov dv

Kal rrjf oMO^dtrnttt

^, r6 erepov etrrai ifKvSoi

ro

p,ev

yap voaew

voaetv dXrjO^s.

elr\

rj

tfivSo9, icai

ftfi^

/i^ ovrof ifteifiog,

loare hrl fiovtov r^yana^

ro del Bdrepov avrcjv dXrjBes

rj

^vSas

ehai, oara coy Kardff>aat.s koX dno^aais oKruccircu*

94

CATEGORIES,

tute parts of those statements opposed as affirmative

and negative, these would especially seem to layclaim to this characteristic. The statement that
Socrates is ill is the contrary of Socrates is well.'
Yet we cannot maintain even here that one statement must always be true and the other must always
be false. For, if Socrates really exists, one is true
and the other is false. But if Socrates does not
To say
exist, both the one and the other are false.
he is ill will be false, and to say he is well will
*

'

'

'

'

no Socrates so much as exists.

be
As for positives and privatives,' however, if the
subject is not in existence, then neither proposition
If the subject exists, even then one will not
is true.
be true always, one false. That Socrates has sight,*
for example, is the opposite of Socrates is blind in
the sense in which opposite was used as applied to
privation and possession. Now, if Socrates really
exists, it is not of necessity the case that one statement is true and one false. For he may not as yet
have arrived at the stage when a man acquires sight,
so that both of the statements are false, as they are,
if he does not exist.
To return to affirmation and negation. Of these
we may say in all cases that one must be false and
one true, be the subject existent or not. For, if
Socrates really exists, he is ill or not ill must be
true
he is ill or not ill must be false. And the
same, if he does not exist. For, provided he does not
he is not
exist, it is false to pronounce he is ill
Thus that one of the two must
ill,' however, is true.
be true and the other be false in all cases will hold of
those opposites only which are in the same sense
opposed as affirmative and negative statements.
false, if

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

95

ARISTOTLE
XI. "EvavTLov 8^ arw $ avaytnjf iyoB^ fih
he SrjXov rjj Kad Kiartj itmyt^vB^
olov vyicla voaos koI diBpelq, SccA/a, 6iiOUiis cw
/ca*c<p 8c ari fUy ayoB^
Kal irrl rwv dXXvjv.

KaKov rovro
14 a

kokov

ivavTLov, ore Sc
T)

rjj

ivavrlov Kaxov

vireppoXr)

fieaonjs vavria KaT^pw,

oXlyojv 8* dv TO toioOtov

yap iv^uf, kok^ ctm

ov

6^u>iWf &4 Koi

oiaa

ij

in

ayo06,

tBot, riy, ^irj 5^ nfir

ro dyaBov ivavriov iarm*
"Ert cVt Twv evavTiaiv ovk m^ayKoZov, iiof Wtt*
pov fjt Kal TO Xoinov ehat. vytoMf^vrtMft^ fihf yif>
aTTdm-tuv vyUui fiev corrat, yoaos Bi ov* dfioutti
be Kal XevKwv ovrwv dndyrvjv Acvicon^ fUv l<mu,
en el ro ^AMiKpdrrjv vyuiu^u^ r^*
fieXavla he ov,
10 XwKpaTTjv vooelv evavriov eari, firf ^v^^^rnu 5^

TrXcLcrrcDV del

dfia

rw KaKw

rut

dfjL<l)6Tepa

avrcp

vndpxew, ovk

atf

/v*

rov erepov rutv hfoyruoy ovrof ttal t6

XoiTTov etvaf ovro^ yap rov ^iWKpdnp^ vytadttv
OVK dv eirj ro vocretv ^coKpdrrjv.
ArjAov he OTi Kal Trepl ravrov ^ eiSci ^ y6"Ct
voao^ fiV yap Koi
7Te<f)VKe yiveoBai rd evavrUk.
hexoLTO

15

vyieia ev owfiari ^(pov ire^vKe yiveoSai, Xivtcdrrfs

he Kal fieXavCa dvXws ev awfian, Bucaioavt^

20

Kal dhiKia ev ^vxfj dvBpwmov,

^AvdyKj] he navra rd evavria ^ ev
etvai

rf

etvai.

ev

rots

XevKov

evavriois yeveaw,

fxev

rw

adr<p ylrci

^ avrd

ydp koX /leAov iv

r<p

yirrj

avrtp

yevei (xpcofia ydp avratv ro yevos), SacaioorwTj Be

Kal dhiKta ev roty evavrlois yevecnv (rov /iv yap
dperri,

96

rov he KaKia ro yevos)' dyaddv hk Kol

CATEGORIES,

xi

XI. The contrary of good must be evil, and this

can be proved by induction. The contrary of health
is disease, that of courage is cowardice and so on.
Of an evil, however, the contrary is either a good or
an evil. For instance, defect is an evil
its contrary, excess, is an evil.
But the mean, which is
contrary to either in an equal degree, is a good.
You, however, find few such exceptions, and, generally speaking, it is true that the contrary of evil is
good.
It does not of necessity follow that, if one of the
contraries exists, then the other must also exist.
For suppose that all things became healthy. There
then would be health, not disease. Or suppose that
all things became white.
There would then be white
only, not black.
Inasmuch, too, as Socrates ill is
the contrary of Socrates well and both contraries
cannot exist at one time in the same individual, if
one of the contraries existed, the other could not
then exist. For, provided he was well was the fact,
he was ill could not also be fact.
the subjects of
This point will be evident also
contrary qualities must have the same species or
genus. For health and disease have for subject the
body of some living creature, and whiteness and blackness a body which need not be specified further.
And justice, likewise, and injustice arise in the souls
of mankind.
In addition, two contrary quaUties always belong
to one genus or else to the contrary genera, when
they are not themselves genera. White, for example,
and black will belong to the same genus, colour.
Justice, again, and injustice fall under two contrary
;

genera, those

we

call virtue

and

d2

vice.

Good and

evil

97

ARISTOTLE
14 a
26

Y^

KaKov ovK arw iv Y4vi dAA' avra rvyx^f^

rivwv ovra.
XII. Ufi6Tpov Tpov lrpov Xlymu rtrpaY&tl
Trpwrov ixkv koI Kvpiwrara tcara Xp6vc, tcaa o
7Tpa^vrpov Tpov rpov Koi naXoi^tpoy Xfyt*
rar Tip yap rov -xpovov vXiUa tifai koX frpta-

Pvrepov Kol TToXaiorcpov AcycTCU.

Avrpov Bk TO /iij avTiarp^v irard rrw toC
cfvat aKoXovOriaiv , otov to tv rwv 8w) irportooiSvolv fiev^yap ovtwv oKoXovQtl vBvi to iv wai,
dvos 3 otnos OVK opayKalov 5u> (2mi, okitc odx
avrurrp<t>i dno rov v6s ij dKoXovBtfOis rov cImu
^ TO XoiTTov, irporcpov hk hoKti ro rotodrov li^aAt
85 d^* o^ firj dyriarp<t>i rj rov cti^cu ouraAov^noif
Tplrov 8c Kara riva rd(w r6 np6rpov XiytfUMi
0
Y^icadd7Tp cVi rwv eniarrjfuxtv koI row X6yaf,
A~^ T yap rais d7ToSLKriKais ^icm/jfuus ^ndpxt* t6
TTpoTcpov KoX ro voTfpov rij rdfti (tA yap <rn))ffd
14 b 7rp6rpa rcov hiaypapnidrwv rfj rd(i, teal inl rfk
ypaiMfiariKTJs rd otoixcmi ftportpa rCHv av^Xafioti^,
inl re rwv Xdywv ofioiws' ro yap npooip*0 r^
80

.;

V^

r^ Tofci iariv.
T7y-irapa ra iprjfiva ro piAnov ircu to tc^uoi*
Tpov Tiporepov etvai rg ^vati 5oC4. CMu^oun &^
KoX ol noXXol rov9 ivrtfiorepovs Koi p^iXXov dya*
hvrjryrioews irporcpov

'

TTco/xeVou? VTT*

avrwv nportpovs ^KxaKtw vap* avnH$

iari fiv
rpoTTwv ovros.
ctvai.

ii

hrq

Koi

ypannariiHi, a much wider

*
in English.
Here

grammar

reading or \*Titing or both.

98

ax^^v dXXorpujraroi

tenn in
it

maj

rCtv

Greek than te
rerj well i%lliiy

tlie

CATEGORIES,

xi-xii

belong to no genera, being themselves actual genera,

having subordinate species.
XII. There are four different senses in which we
may call one thing prior to another. Whenever
we use the term prior in its proper and primarysense, it is time that we have in our minds.
It is thus
that we call a thing older,' more ancient than
some other thing, signifying that its time has been
'

'

'

'

'

longer.

Secondly, prior may be used, when the order

of being is fixed and incapable of being reversed.
One is prior, among numbers, to two.' For pro*
vided, that is, two exists, then it follows that one
must exist. The existence of one,' on the contrary,
does not imply that of two.' And the order of
being, in consequence, cannot be changed and re*
versed. Thus of two things we call that one prior
which precedes in irreversible sequence.
Thirdly, we use the term prior in regard to any
order whatever. And this is the case in the sciences,
as it is also with speeches.
In sciences using demonstration we have what is prior in its order and
what is, per contra, posterior. Take geometrical
science : the elements points, hnes and so on are
prior to propositions or problems.
And, likewise, in
what we call grammar * the letters are prior to the
syllables.
So in the case of a speech will the proem
be prior to the narrative.
Besides the three senses aforesaid whatsoever is
better, more honourable, is said to be naturally prior.
Thus the common folk, speaking of those whom they
hold in esteem or affection, describe them as coming
first with them or having prior place in their hearts.
But this use seems the strangest of all.
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

99

ARISTOTLE
10

^
\

ovv XcyofjLfvot rponoi rov nporipov ax^^O

S6^L S* av napa rovf tlftrifuvovf
Kal Tpos ctvai nporlpov rpono^' rufv yap <ivri
aTp<f>6vr(x)v Kara rrjv rov fti'cu aKoXoi^&rjaw rS

Ot

fJLV

TocrovTol ctaiv.

(^

atrLov onojaovv daripay rov lvfu trpirtpov thcSruMt^

rij

16

<t)vai

AcyotT* op.

on

8'

cori

to^

rouivra,

hr\Xov ro yap cfvoi avBpwirov dyrurrpd^i icara

rr)v rov ctvai oKoXovOrfauf irpo^ rov aXrfiyi VfX
avrov Xoyov. l yap torw avBpotno^, dXtfB^ 6
leai ai^nAoyos" (^ Xyop.v on tonv dvBpconof,

yap aXriB^ 6 X6yo9 <S X4yofiey on

ianv av0pw7TOS, cortv avBpojiro^. <m Si 6 pkiv
Grp<f>i y' 1

Xoyos ovSapujJS atrtos roG c&ou r6 irpdyua,

TO p.vroi irpdyfia <f>aLVral ttco; airiov rov cuxu
dXr)6rj rov Xoyov rat yap lvai ro irpdyfui rj fArj
dXrjOrjs 6 Xoyos rj ilfV&r}S Xiytrax,
cuorc rara
irvr rpoTTOvs irportpov Irtpov rtpov Arycroi*
XIII. "Afia hi Xyrax anXw^ pMv koa tcvptti*
rara, J}V rj y^aU corcv v rut avrtp j(P^^'
ovBercpov yap nporcpov ovSi varp6v iorw ai)ndr.
a/Lta he Kara rov \p6vov ravra Xeyerai.
^vatt Sk
dfia, oaa avri(jrp<l>i fiv Kara n^v roC ttvai (Leo*
Xovdrjoiv, fnjhafiats hi alriov ddrepov 6arpa roO
etvai iariv, olov inl rov hiirXaxjlov koI rov T^fxuitoi'
dvrLGrp<t>i, fxcv yap ravra (hinXaaiov yap ovros
corlv rjp.i<7v koI rffiurco^ ovros hinXdaiov iarw),
ovhcrepov he ovherepw alnov rod etvai iarw,
Kat rd eK rov avrov he yevovs dprthvQpmjiUim
dXr^dr)s

so

W.^

80

S5

aXX'qXois dfxa rfj ^u<7i Xeyerai. dvrthijjpijaBai

Xeyerai aXX'qXois rd Kard rijv avrqv Suiijpcoil^

100

CATEGORIES,

xii-xiii

These, I think, are the four distinct senses in which

use the term prior.' Yet another might
seem to exist beyond those we have already mentioned.
For where in the case of two things the
existence of either implies or necessitates that of the
other, that thing which is somehow the cause may,
in consequence, fairly be considered as naturally
prior to the other. Such cases can clearly be found.
The existence of a man, for example, necessitates the
truth of the statement wherein we assert his existence.
The converse is also the case. For if he exists, then
the statement asserting that fact will be true. If
the statement, conversely, is true, then the man
referred to must exist. The true statement, however,
is nowise the cause of the man's thus existing
and

we may

existence would seem in some manner or

other the cause of the truth of the true proposition.
For the latter is called true ' or false,' as the man
thus exists or does not. So it seems that we use the

3'et his

term

prior

'

in as

many

as five different senses.

we use in its primary

and
most correct meaning of things that have come into
being together. For neither in that case is prior, nor
XIII.

Simultaneous

'

is either posterior to the other.

We mean simultaneous in time.*
Simultaneous in nature we apply
to those things where the being of either necessitates
that of the other but neither is cause of the other.
For instance, take double and half,' for these two
have reciprocal dependence. If a double exists, then
a half; if a half exists, also a double. And neither
of these is the cause of the other's existence or being.
Species marked off and opposed under one genus
in
simultaneous
each to the others are called
nature.
I mean those marked off or divided by
*

'

'

'

101

ARISTOTLE
otov TO irrqvov r<^

15 a

w<"{tt'

'''^

'"**

MHiptft* ^raSra

yap aXXrjXoL^ dvriSirffyqrai ^k rov avroO yivovi*

TO yap f<J>ov 5tai/>tTai cty Tavro, tc to wnpir
Kal TO 'jT^6v /cat TO wSpov, Koi o^p yt Toifpwr
TTporcpov "q varepov iarw, oAA* ofia rg <^vai tA
TouLura SoKcl cfrai. Siaipdirf h* ay Kol Kaaro
rCiv roLovTCJV els ct^Tj naXw, olov to itc^of xoi r6
COTOi OlV JCfiUccu^a OfM
TTTqVOV Kal TO w6pOV,
Tg <f>vai, oaa cV tou ovrou ytvovs tcara t^
ciScwr <ul
a)rJ7P hmipaw iariv.
ra 8^ y^
TTporepa' ov yap dyTiaTp<f>i Kara rijv rov clwu

t^

OKoXovOT^aiv, otov ivvSpov pukv oiToy

hm

(ojOI^,

iw^pov ctrai.
AcycTcu, ooo dyrurrp/^

(oiou ovros ovK dvdyKfj

*A/xa oiV T^
10

<f>v(ri

Kara t^v rov

p.v

etvai dxoXovdrfaiv, ^rjSofUjkts

(UTiov TO rpov Tot

rov

avTov

Mpip

yevov^

ToO

etyoi

tan, koa ra

aMTiBijipfffUva

aAA^Aov

5c dfuif <5v T) y^ais v rd avriff XP^H*XIV. Kiirrjaws 8/ ^OTiv cSty cf , y/i^OK* ^^opd
av^ais, n eUom s. dXXoiwm^, ij icoTa rcJtrov firroolttXcus

vv

v\

r^^

i3oA|
16

At

p,v

ovv oAAai /cu^<749 ^avp6v Sri crtpat

dXXrjXojv elalv' ov

yap iarw

rj

yivtais ^Bopd

ovM

y tj av^Tjais fuutxns ovSt i} ncaTci Toiroi' /Acra^A-^, waavrois 8c Kal cu oAAat'

8c rrjs oAXoui)a(DS ;^ct Tiva dnopiav, firj irort dyayKoioy
TO oAAotou/xcvop #caTa Ttva tcuv Aoiiroii' jciv^octtir
tJ

fo

oAAotoucr^at.

toOto 8c ovk dXrjSt^ arf oxS3r

rj rd nXetara dXXiHoda$ai

yap Kara iravra ra nddr)

(TVfipePrjKcv

102

ripMf

ot)8c/ita;

raw dXXa/v

Kunffatom

CATEGORIES,
modes of

identical
*

winged

'

species

is

xiii-xiv

That

division.

called

'

is

to say, the
in nature

simultaneous

'

and terrestrial.' All are

marked off and opposed under one genus each to the
others. For into these species is animal,' the genus,marked off by division. And none will be prior or
posterior ; all are in nature simultaneous.' Each
of these species is further marked off into certain subsimultaneous
in
species, which also are called
nature for just the same reasons. The genus is prior
to the species. That is to say that the order of being
cannot be reversed. If the species aquatic exists,
but granted
then does also the genus or animal
the genus exists, there is not of necessity the species.
in nature those
simultaneous
Thus we call
things where the being of either necessitates that of
the other but neither is cause of the other, and also
those species marked off and opposed under one
with both the

'

aquatic

'

'

'

'

'

'

genus only. We use simultaneous,' too, in its first

and unqualified sense of those things that have come
into being at one and the same time together.
XIV. There are six kinds of what we call motion
generation, that is, and destruction, increase, diminution, alteration and, finally, changes of place. With
*

a single exception

it is

plain that

all

these are distinct

from each other. Destruction is not generation, and

increase is not diminution, nor yet does it mean
change of place. And so also it is with the rest. In
the case of alteration, however, it may be objected

by some that a

subject,

when

altered,

is

altered

by

one of the other five motions. And yet this is not

really so.
For by all or, at least, most affections
alterations are brought about in us that have nought
in common whatever ^vith those other motions we
103

ARISTOTLE
KOivojvovaw ovr yap av^taSai ovayKoZov r6 Kara

nddos
25

im

Ki,Povfivov

rcjv oAAcuv, ohtB* Irlpa op

KwrjGis

7)

oAAouomj-

oAAotou/xcvov i5^uj

Ttva

dvayKT).
oAAt^v
80

irapd Toy oXAos

ctiy

yap ^v

curnj, I8i 'TO

i}

Kai avftoBai

aAAa>v dicoAou^co'

rcDi'

ij

fUtovaOai

ijf

ij

owl

<SAA*

#fii'i}<Tttir*

waavTCJS 8c fo* t^ av(av6fAtva

T0l

Kwriaiv KivovfJLVov aXXoiovaOai cSct* oAA

a ovk

eoTt riva av^aroficva

oAAotoTcpov' 8
roil'

ov8^

to

oAAototrroi, oloi^

TCTpdycjvov yvwfJLOVOS 7rpiTdVTOs

7rt

mu

ovT fi^iovadai, waavruts 04

iyiJfi/T04

ycyanrp-ai- a>aavTa>9

oAAcuv raif roiovrcav.

wa^

fiaf

*fol

crr/xu

ai*

etT^aav at KivqoLS dXXi^Xwv.

"EoTi Sc a7rAa>5

16 b

Sc Kad* KaGTa at
au^Tjact Sc

Kara
6 17

ica^'

fiUjt)<n9, rfj

Toiroy rjpfiia.

Trpd?

Karcodev

104

/Xv Kiyrjai

Tov
rj

cKaora, ytviati

fxv

^Bopd,

icard TOtroi' fitrafioXj

i}

/xoAiora 8' cowccv orrucctoAii

vavriov
dvto,

rjpej^ ivavria, raXs

rdnov

fjLraPoXrj,

r^ 8c dvwdev

-ff

kotcu.

o(a rfj
t]^

84

CATEGORIES,

xiv

mentioned. For that which is thereby affected need

not be increased or diminished or undergo any such
process. It follows that alteration is different from
all other species of motion.
For, were it the same
with some other, the object, when altered, would
straightway be also increased or diminished or undergo
some other motion. But that is not so of necessity.
Moreover, whatever was increased or was subject to
some other motion would be of necessity altered.
And yet there are things that increase and are not
thereby altered as well. For example, if a gnomon
is added, a square is increased in its size but does not
undergo alteration, remaining a square as before."
So it is with all similar forms. Alteration and increase,
it follows, are two distinct species of motion.
Rest is, broadly, the contrary of motion.
But
particular species of motion have each their particular contraries.
Thus change in place may
be said to have rest in a place for its contrary,
increase will have diminution, generation destruction
or corruption. But as for the first of those mentioned,
a change to the contrary place would appear in the
strictest sense contrary
that is, ascent to descent
and descent to ascent and the like. But as for the

"

The accompanying

figure

illustrates

about the square and the Gnomon.

\-0

what

is

meant

ARISTOTLE
dTroSodcuraw Kunjatajv

XoiTrfj rcjv

Sowat

avTjj ivavrlov, el

10

TO
rod

rig koI inl TavTrfs t^'

fi-q

TTOLov rjpfilav dpririOelrj

rrfv cfe

TTOLOV /iTa)3oA^i', Kadarrtp Kfu

<lw>-

r7)v els

dXXoLwais
Kclaerai.

to

/ATaj3oAi7 /card

Kara ro

rij

TTotov TjpffjLLa

rj

1^

rj

rrf^

Kor^

-fjptftiay

Icrri yoip

ij

wart atrn^

rroto'.

iroiov

Kara

t^ ivayrlctf

Kar^ r6nov
fierapoXrj^
rov ivavrlov ronov fierafioXriv
rrjv

roTTov

16 jSoAtJ,

pfUim

oiJ

Tt 7TOTC ioTLV ivavTiov , OiJC 8i oi^h^ fUtu

riin)<7i

17

frard tA

ro h^avrtov roO notoO /ATra*

olov ro XevKOv ylva6ai rip

fUXav y6^c7AaD^

oAAotoOrat yap eiy ra tvavria, rov

nowO M^TO^

poXijg yLvofievrfs.

XV. To
7]

so

yap

^X^^v

(Lg ^lv

Kara

irXeiova^

koX hidB^atv

ri

rponov^ Xfytratu

aXXriv riva noiorrjra*

Xeyofxeda yap Kal i7ncm^p.rjv rivd ;('

rj

ws noGov,

icai

dpcnjr.

olov o rvyxoyfi ris cxtu*' fUytOof^

XeyeraL yap rpiirrjxv fieycOo^ ^^^*' V 'rrpdn7p(V

fj
CL>? ra 7Tpi ro awfia, otov Ifidriov fj ;(irtfMl.
Tj

(Ls

fJLpo9,
15

iopiw , otov iv

otov x^^P^

ficSLfjLvos

x^'-P*'

'''oba.

rovs Twpovs

Tj

rj

^xrvXiov.
utg v

^ji^i^^

awfutf. otov

TO KpdfJuov rov

otvoi^'

yap c^fiv ro Kcpdpnov Xeyerai, koI 6 fUSifiVOi

irupovs' ravr
ovv navra Xiv Xiytrai w^ hf
otvov

dyycCcp.

rj

to? Krijiia' Xiv

yap ouclav ^ dypc

Xcyofxeda.

Aeyofieda
80

Sc

icat

yvvaiKa

ex^iv

koI

rj

ywri

dvSpa' OLK 8c aAAoTpccaTaTos" o yvv pri$is rpdnrof

106

CATEGORIES,

xiv-xv

motion remaining of those we have mentioned above,

it were no easy matter to say what its contrary
actually is. And, in fact, it appears to have none or,
here too, it is rest in its quality or change to the
contrary quality,' just as we said change of place had
for contrary rest in a place or a change to a contrary
place. Alteration means change of a quality. Therefore, to qualitative motion we oppose either rest in
Thus
its quality or change to a contrary quality.
therefore,
black and white will be contraries
becoming the one will be contrary to becoming the
There is change of a quality here, which
other.
*

'

'

implies alteration, in consequence, into a contrary

quality.

We

To have has a good many meanings.

of habits, dispositions and also of all other
qualities.
Thus we are said to have virtue, to
have this or that piece of knowledge. And then
it is used of a quantity, such as the height a man has.
So it is that we say that a man has a stature of
three or four cubits. Again, it is used of apparel
a man has a cloak or a tunic. Moreover, we use
it of things that we
have on some part of the body,
employ it of
a ring on the finger, for instance.
parts of the body ; a man has a hand or a foot.
a jar will be said
It is used in the case of a vessel

XV.

use

'

'

it

'

'

'

'

'

'

We

'

'

to

'

have

'

wine and a corn-measure said to

'

have

wheat.
And in cases like these we are thinking
of what is contained in the vessel. Once more, we
use have of a property, men having houses or
'

'

fields.

People say that a man has a wife and a wife,

manner, a husband. This meaning is very
*

'

in like

In English, of course,

we say

hold.'

107

ARISTOTLE
15 k

ToO
/xv

Xw
t)

ovSev yap oAAo ra> f^** yinmifa arjfuuvo'

ori crvvoiKl.

KaTrjpCOixrjvrai.

lOS

'*

CATEGORIES,
far-fetched.

then we

When we

mean

xv

man

say that a

that he Hves

'svith

has a wife,

her merely.

There may be more senses of have.' But the

customary meanings, I think, are set forth in the
'

foregoing summary.

109

1^^

ON INTERPRETATION

SUMMARY OF THE PRINXIPAL THEMES

The

relation of language to thought.

Isolated notions express neither truth nor
falsehood.
Combination of notions or ideas in propod
lions or judgements essential before truth
or error is possible.
Ch. S. Definition of a noun.
Nouns simple or composite.
Indefinite nouns.

Ch.

Ch.

3.

Cases of nouns.
Definition of a verb.
Indefinite verbs.

Tenses of verbs.
Ch.

4.

Definition of a sentence.

Ch.

5.

Not every sentence a proposition.

Of simple and complex or composite pro-

Ch.
Ch.

6.

positions.
7.

Of contradictory propositions.
Of universal, indefinite and particular afiimuitive

and negative propositions.

as opposed to contradictory pco-

Of contrary'
positions.

Ch.
Ch.

112

8.

9.

Definition of single propositions.

propositions referring to the future, as
opposed to propositions referring to the present time or to the past.

Of

ON INTERPRETATION
Ch. 10. Affirmative and negative propositions arranged with a diagram in pairs.
The correct position of the negative (ov).
Of the truth and error of certain propositions.
Of propositions with indefinite nouns or indefinite

nouns and verbs.

To transpose the subject and predicate makes

Ch. 11.

no difference to the meaning of propositions.

Some propositions that seem to be simple are
really compound.
So are some dialectical questions.

The nature

of dialectical questions.
simple propositions, which have the
same subject, may be true but we cannot
of necessity combine the two predicates into

Two

one predicate.
Several predicates holding of one subject,

when taken by themselves and

Ch. 12.

Ch.

13.

individually,

cannot be combined together to make up

one simple proposition, unless all are essential
to the subj ect and none is implied in another.
Of propositions affirming or denying the
possible, impossible, contingent and necessary, and of their proper contradictories.
The relations that subsist between such

propositions.
The relation of the actual to the possible.
Three classes of entities.
Ch. 14. Of the proper contrary of an affirmation,
whether universal or particular.

lis

nEPI EPMHNEIA?
I.

16 a

Updrrov Sei 6iad<u rl ovo/ia #ctti ri fnjfia,

Kard^xuns Koi air<5-

cTTftTa ri ioTiv anotftaais Kal

<f>avai.s

"EoTi
6

Koi Xoyos.
/lev o^v ra v

'na6r)fidrcjv

ov/xj3oAa,

rfj

Kal

(fxjjvfj.

aiVra,

ouSc

axmtp ov^ ypd^fiara ndat rd

ifxoval

arjficla rrpdnivs,

^v^

rwv hf Tg ^^vv^
rfj
Kal rd ypa^fuva, rwv tv

al

aural'

ravrd ndai

vjv

fUvroi

raOra

naBrjfjiara riji ^nfYrjf,

wv ravra

ofiouofiara, npayfiara ifon ravrd.

ovv rovrwv ct^pi/rai Iv roT^ ircpt 4'^^XV'
aXXr^S yap 7rpay^arias.
vd/t^^ia dvtv
"EoTt 8', oxTTTcp iv rfj 4^XQ ^^
rov aXrjdevcw i) ^cuSco^cu, ore Se iJSij (Jt dvdyKri
rovTwv imdpx^tv ddrtpov, ovrat Koi iv rg ^om^*
npl yap avvdeaw Kal hiaiptaiv <m r6 ^tfdiof

Kal

rrpl fxkv

10

M^

It is hard to say which is the

JPM8C pTOirkkd tirft
means the D Anima. Dr. \V. D. Rom u ohmrrtd that
The D InterpreM ions was suspected by Andnmicua oo
the ground, apparently, of a reference to the Ik Jmimm to
*
which nothing in that work corresponds. There arc,
*

ever, many such references in undoubtedly genuine

of Aristotle, and more than one way of expUininil
There is strong external evidence for tts autiMB

Theophrastus and Eudemus both wrote books wfaidi

to presuppose it, and Ammonias telb us that

114

ON INTERPRETATION
I. Let us, first of all, define noun and verb, then
explain what is meant by denial, affirmation, proposition and sentence.
Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections
or impressions of the soul ; written words are the
signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech
not the same for all races of men. But the mental
affections themselves, of which these words are
primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections
are representations or likenesses, images, copies.
With these points, however, I dealt in my treatise
concerning the soul ; they belong to a different
inquiry from that which we now have in hand.
As at times there are thoughts in our minds unaccompanied by truth or by falsity, while there are
others at times that have necessarily one or the other,
so also it is in our speech, for combination and
division are essential before you can have truth and
<*

was the only critic who cast doubt on it. Finally, its style
and grammar seem to be genuinely Aristotelian. All that
can really be said against it is that much of it is somewhat
elementary but Aristotle doubtless gave elementary as well
{Aristotle, p. 10).
as advanced lectures
The Provost of
Oriel remarks that H. Maier suggests that the reference
in 16 a 8 should be transferred to 16 a 13 and relates to De
An. iii. 6.'
115
;

'

'

ARISTOTLE
*

16

Kal TO dXrjOeg. ra ^v o^v ovofiara ai^a Kol to

p^/Ltara olk Ta> avev avi'dtatios Koi Buup4awi
vorj^aTL, olov to avOpui-nos -n to XVKOv, orciy fi'q
TTpoGTedfj

Tf ouT yap
8*

G7]fxlov

OTt

crqp,aivi /icV
p.7)

TO Xvai

Ti,

17 /X17

tlttvoo^

ovT dXrfS^i nw.

6 rpayiXa^fK
^ lUvho^, iai^

Kal yop
ovttu) hk aXr)6S
ToOSc*

17

ifaro

arjiuiyruc)

Kara

^5^1 TTpoartdfj, ^

airXctff

X^povov,
JO

^^v ovv iarl

dvv xpovov, ^?

II. "Oj'o/xa

avvdrjKrjv

fiavTLKov Kxu}piap.vov' v

^irfiiv fi^po^ iirrl

KoAos

oi|-

yop T^ KoAAiTnroj to

ovB^v avTo Ka0* tauTo <n)iialvi,

LTTTTos

Tu> X6y(p r<^

86

<f>cjvri

ov

tTTTToj.

firjv

wamp

ou8'

iv

OHmtp

^ ^^

v Tols ttTrAots 6v6pM,aw, ovTtas fx** *f***

avfiTTeTrXeyp^ivois' cV cVetWi; ftii' yap to lUptft

ovSofiios (njfjLavru<6v, cv & TOim>4S /SouActcu fi^^

oAA* ovScw? Krxu}piapLvov , olov tv r6 tirafcrpo*
kcAt/?

To

to KtXri^ oiSev

ouScV

iariv,

hrjXovai
BrjpLajv,
80

ar)fiaivi

To

3*

ye
(J)v

dXX* orav Yvrrrai <n^/i/3oAoy,

Kal ol dypafx^roi 4f6^t,

ri

Arti
olbr

ovhdv iarw ovofia.

ov /x^ odS^
avTo* ot/T yap Xoyo^

ovK dvdpojiros ovk 6vofia

icctTat ovofia o ri Set koAcii'

ouT

koB* avT6.

8c #faTa (wvOrjKrjv, ore ^tK7i Ttuy <Vofi<itt0i'

CLTTocfHims ioTLv.

OTt opLoUjJS ^'

OTOVOW

oXX* TTa* ovofui d6picrTO,

XnTdp\l KoX 6vT9i ICol J^

onroj.
ij dirXwy 4) rard xp^^op ; some would imdrr these wmds * In
the present or some other tense.*
I retain the Greek word
rendered ' goat-stag,' which stands for a fabuloot ninuil,
half of it goat and half stag, since the word can nowadajt be
found in a number of good English dictionaries.

116

ON INTERPRETATION,

i-ii

A noun or a verb by itself much resembles a

concept or thought which is neither combined nor
man,' for example, or white/
disjoined. Such is
As yet it is not
if pronounced without any addition.
true nor false. And a proof of this hes in the fact
that tragelaphos,' while it means something, has no
truth nor falsity in it, unless in addition you predicate
being or not-being of it, whether generally (that is
to say, without definite time-connotation) or in a
falsity.

'

'

particular tense.*
II. A noun is a sound having meaning established
by convention alone but no reference whatever to
time, while no part of it has any meaning, considered
apart from the whole. Take the proper name GoodThe steed has no meaning
steed,' for instance.
apart, as it has in the phrase a good steed.' It is
'

'

'

necessary to notice, however, that simple nouns

While in the case of the
differ from composite.
former the parts have no meaning at all, in the latter
tliey have a certain meaning but not as apart from
Let us take pirate-vessel,' for instance.
tlie whole.
The vessel has no sense whatever, except as a part
of the whole.
We have already said that a noun signifies this or
that hy convention. No sound is by nature a noun :
Inarticulate
it becomes one, becoming a symbol.
noises mean something for instance, those made by
brute beasts. But no noises of that kind are nouns.
Not-man '-and the like are not nouns, and I know
of no recognized names we can give such expressions
as these, which are neither denials nor sentences.
Call them (for want of a better) by the name of
indefinite nouns, since we use them of all kinds of
things, non-existent as well as existing.
'

'

'

117

ARISTOTLE
16 b

To

Be ^IXcjvos

rj

oaa roiaOra,

^tXuavi Kol

XSyof

dvo/xara oAAd irrdja^is ovofiaro^.

avTov
eariv

TO. yLv
rj

-^v

W iaruf

oAAa Kara ra avrd' cri S4 /irrd roO

corat ovk aXrj6Vi

rj

rj

iarw

he ovofia del' otov ^iXtjjvog

6

odtc

iffvSrrtu,
fj

ovk

r6

iarw

ovhev yap vat ovr dXrjStiki ovrc tf^v^rrai.

III. 'Prjfia

oi)Scy

fiepos

Si iari r6 irpoaar)fiaufOP xpi^oift cB

<n}iJLaivt,

'^^^

x^P^^

lariv dci rcur

Xiym V 5n
^^^
vyUia
ovxyfia, to
fUv
XP^^^^
Se vyiaLVi pijfxa- npooarjfiaivti yap ro w^ im^
Kal del rwv koB* Mpov Xtyoft4O0
dpxiv.
KaB*

XtyofUvwv

crepov

ar^fitlov.

7rpoG<rrjfiaivt.

10

GTjfietov

ioTiv,

otov

Toip

KaS*

unoKifUvou

ij

A'

VnOKlfJLVa).

To

8c ovx vyiatvi koX to ov #ra/tvci od pfjfAa

Xeyo)' TTpoaarjfiaiPfi fiv

yap

xfiovov Koi omI

Kara

TLVos VTrdpxci, rfj Sc hLa<f>opq, ovofia ov Kirai' oAA*

16

earco dopiarov pfjfia, ori ofiouos

dpx^i, Kal 6vT09 Kal

'O/xotto? Kal

firj

if>*

orovow vn-

oyro^.

TO vyiavcv ^ ro vytavi

dAAct TrrcjGLs p-q^iaros'

hia^pei 5c tow

art TO fiv rov irapovra trpooinjfiaivfi

oiJ

^ua.

pu^fxarof,

Xfi^"'^'*'*

8c TO 7TpL^.
to

Avrd

jxev

ovv KaO* iavrd Xtyofi^va rd pj^fuvnk

dvofmrd ioTL Kal

118

(nj/xatVct rt

(umyai yap 6 Xdytm^

ON INTERPRETATION,

ii-iii

and so on are cases of

Otherwise we define all these
but when is,*
cases as the noun in itself is defined
was or will be is added, they do not then form
propositions, which either are true or are false, as
the noun itself always does then. For of Philo is
cannot by itself constitute a true or false proposition.
Nor yet can of Philo is not.*
III. A verb is a sound which not only conveys a
particular meaning but has a time-reference also.
No part by itself has a meaning. It indicates always
that something is said or asserted of something. Let
me explain what I mean by it has a time-reference
Now, health is a noun, for example, is
also.'
healthy is a verb, not a noun. For the latter conveys
its own meaning but also conveys that the state
signified (namely, health) now exists. Then, a verb
was an indication of something asserted of something
I mean, of a something predicated of a subject or
found present in it.
and so on I should not,
is not-well
Is not-ill,'
for my own part, call verbs. Though they certainly
have the time-reference and function at all times as
predicates, I know of no recognized name. Let us
call them (for want of a better) by the name of
indefinite verbs, since we use them of all kinds of
*

Of

Philo,'

to Philo,'

nouns and not nouns.

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

things, non-existent as well as existent.

He was healthy ' or he will be healthy ' I likewise should not call a verb. I should call it the tense
of a verb. Verb and tenses in this respect differ :
*

'

the verb indicates present time but the tenses all

times save the present.
Verbs by themselves, then, are nouns, and they
stand for or signify something, for the speaker stops
119

ARISTOTLE
Tr)v

htdvouiv, Kal 6 ojcovaas ripdfirjatv),

iariv
fXT)

25

7}

elvai

ovTTU} (rrifiaivr

fiTf,

rod irpdyfiaros,
avro KaB* cairro iftiXov. air^

(n]fii6v

<TTt

TO ov l7rrj9
ovh^v OTt, npoaarjfiau'ti
dvv roiv (wyKiiUvwv ovk
IV.

Aoyos 8/ fori

^ipCjv ri (rq^avTiKov

Ci

wSvBtow

ij

oW ^^
fihf

run.,

y^

Hcrrt voijoai,

<f>wyfi

<m

^W

oiJW yap t6 thnu

tnjfiayrucfl*

rflpf

K\u>f>iafiivov , af$ ^dotf',

ovx o>S KaTd<f>ams rj dno^aati, Xfyw W,

dvdpuynos <rqfjLaLVt, fUv n, oAA' ck&x
cmv ^ OVK lorw oAA* ccrrai tcanL^cuns n Jm6*
oAA* odxl roO ^itfVptumtv
tf}<l>aaLSt idv Ti trpoar$fj.
avXXapT) /xta. ovht yap fV t<J> fiwy to fc <yrjfia9
TLKOVt oAAd iJHVl'TJ cWi VW ^OVOV,
iw 5^ TM(
BiTrAoi? arjfiawi fUv, dXX* ov tcaff avr6, c&f
oAA'

olov

npoLpr)Tai.
17

"EoTt 8c Aoyo? dtray /x^ trrjfiaynKOf , oiJv c5y

opyavov 84, oAA* ci? 'npoipnriTai, Kara ovt^mpr,
dlTO<f>aVTLK6s OU TTttJ, cUA* V (L TO dXrj$VtP ^
ipcvhcGdai xmdpx^i.
ovk Iv dnaat 5^ ^(^Wi,
otoi' T] ux^ Aoyoj /xcV, ciAA* ovr dXrfi^ ovrc
j/tcuStJj.
ot /ici' ow oAAoi dt^KioButaav prp-opucrji
yap Tj Troi-qrLKTJs olKiorpa tj OKt^/ts' o 5^ airo*
(Jklvtlkos ttJ?

10

I'tJv

Bioipias.

,1

V. "EoTi Sc ?? TTpwTos Xoyo^ dno^oyrutos tcard*

^ais'> cira diro^oi.s' ol 5* oAAot iroKTfs^ Qwhiiffup
^
ij

B. adds card

#tir^4cir'

^^___^_-__^_____.._

* Here the existential sense of the rerb

to be is
and the copulative only considered.
* Aristotle, of course, has in mind
also questioiit*
mands and the like.
120
*

ON INTERPRETATION,

iii-v

his process of thinking and the mind of the hearer

acquiesces. However, they do not as yet express
positive or negative judgements.
For even the infinitives * to be,'
not to be,' and the participle
being are indicative only of fact, if and when something further is added. They indicate nothing themselves but imply a copulation or synthesis, which we
*

'

can hardly conceive of apart from the things thus

combined."
IV. A sentence is significant speech, of which this
or that part may have meaning as something, that
is, that is uttered but not as expressing a judgement
of a positive or negative character. Let me explain
this more fully. Take mortal.' This, doubtless, has
meaning but neither affirms nor denies some addition or other is needed before it can affirm or deny.
But the syllables of mortal are meaningless. So it is
also with mouse,' of which -ouse has no meaning
whatever and is but a meaningless sound. But we
saw that in composite nouns the particular parts
have a meaning, although not apart from the

'

'

'

whole.

But while every sentence has meaning, though not

an instrument of nature but, as we observed, by
convention, not all can be called propositions. We
as

those only that have truth or falsity

prayer is, for instance, a sentence but
neither has truth nor has falsity. Let us pass over
all such, as their study more properly belongs to the
province of rhetoric or poetry.^ We have in our
present inquiry propositions alone for our theme.
V. A simple affirmation is the first kind, a simple
negation the second of those propositions called
simple. The rest are but one by conjunction.
call propositions

in

them.

121

ARISTOTLE
17 k

^AvdyKT) he 'ndvra Xoyov ano^airruei^

elvai

TtTwaecjs pijfiaro^' Koi

ri

Aoyo?, idv

TO <mv ^
Xoyos

fi7)

77poor edij,

ovttoj

v ri ioTiv oAA* ov

ov yap
18

^ tarai

ij

f^^iarof

ti ro<o(mN^

dirotfxitrruco^,

woAAa to {<j^

avveyyv^

rat

Srj

^>'

itc

yap 6 rov wiSpomxnj

hi6fTi

irt {or

3/Dr*
ior%

tpijiBai cfp Kortu.

Se oAAry? npayfiareiai rotrro ifrTv.

"EoTt 8

Aoyoy awo^vTiifOj

cfy

rj

6 iv hrjXuMf ^

o avvbeafjLw eU, ttoAAoi 5 oi troAAa

iroi fi^

Ir

ot dcrvvhToi.

To
djoTC
20

oAA*

oi^ ovopux

fii^

7TLbr)

OVK eOTLV

d7TO<f>aiVGdai,

TovTwv

8^
rj

i}

iparrwyros ru^of,

i}

/ii},

/iev (XTrAiJ iarlv diro^avai^, otop rl

Xoyos Tis

rj

-fj^rj

S^ ^k TOi^Ctfr avy-

awStrof.

ion

hk

dnXij aTTo^j'oij ifnoi^ orjp.ayriKri ntpl rov vn^

rj

dpxtv Tt

Tj

firj

tmdpxttv, <o9 ot xpoi'Oi bi-QpTp^ai.

VI.

KaTo^aty

Sc

TWOS.

drr6<f>aais

Sc

25

Tj

ri arro tw-os",

olov

KLp,V7j

^daif larw fi60f00

tJ ^<<C^

OVTUt SljAotWd T4

irpoaipovfuvov,

aiVroi'

Kara twos

prj^ia

ri

CtTTCU'

cWtv aTro^ovaiV
coru'

rtniy teard

aTro^avonV ru'Of <Sm{

TtVOJ.
'Ettci 8c cart /cat

imdpxov Koi ro

to xmdpypv dno^au^oBai cor

xmdpxov

coy

TO vrrdpxov ws imdpxov koI to

ptri

/117

122

vndpxQV Koi
vndpxov w^

Complex or composite propositions are thoae that

more than one, as, for instance, A b B, C and
is B, and C is D/ and so forth.

prise
'

firj

D/

ON INTERPRETATION,

v-vi

Of all

propositions a verb or a tense of a verb must

The definition, for instance, of man,*
unless is,' was or will be is added or something
or other of that kind, does not constitute a proposition.
But someone may ask how the phrase, footed animal,
having two feet,' can be held to be one and not many.
That the words are pronounced in succession does
not constitute them a unity. However, that question
belongs to a different inquiry from the present.
Now, those propositions are single which indicate
one single fact or are one, as we said, by conjunction.
And those propositions are many which indicate not
one but many or else have their parts unconjoined.
Nouns and verbs let us call mere expressions. For
we cannot use mere nouns or verbs, when expressing
or enunciating something, for the purpose of making
a statement, and that is so whether we happen to
express a spontaneous opinion or someone propounded a question to which we are giving an

form part.

'

'

'

answer.

we repeat that one kind of prosimple, comprising all those that affirm or
deny some one thing of another, while the other is
composite, that is compounded of simple propositions."
And a simple proposition, more fully, is a statement
possessing a meaning, affirming or denying the presence of some other thing in a subject in time past or
present or future.
mean by affirmation a statement affirming
VI.
one thing of another we mean by negation a statement denying one thing of another.
As men can affirm and deny both the presence of
that which is present and the presence of that which
is absent and this they can do with a reference to

And

so, to return,

positions

is

We

123

ARISTOTLE
vndpxov, Kal nepl roif^ KT6f 04 rod vft
Xpovovs ojaavTwSt anav av cV&^'xoiTO ical 6 ifOTiijrqoi ns aTTCxfrfjaat koI o an^nja4 rif #rara-

80/117

ware

<l>rJGai,.

d7r6<f>aai,9

Kal

KLa6ai

85

rrji'

Kard^aat^

roO aurov Kara rov avrov,

dXXa rwv

vvfuos 8, Kol oaa

hk

okt**

/417

o/uo-

Xiyot

dvriKtljUvai.

at

d'n6(j>aGLS

Kara^aati darhf

irdajj

Koi irdtrQ ano^wrti Kara-

dvri^aiy roGro,

(mt)

Kal

(^acriff.

on

hrjXov

dvTiKifivrj

wpoa^-

rxHotirtMf

opi^oficda TTpo^ rds Go<f>i(mKdg ^X^ijcrcij.

VII. *E7Tl 8' iarl rd /icv KadoXou

40

o
17 b

'n^vK

ttXciovwv

inl

cKaarov he o

KarriYOpia$ai,

otov dvdpwTros fUv

firj,

KaXXlas rcjv KaO* tKaarov)'

(JKLLveadaL cu? xnrdpx^^ ti

KaOoXov
6

Tt

CTTt

Trds

rutv

KoB*

diTo<f>aixnp-ai. iirl

/xt},

t}

Se

oT

Ttvt,

rw wpay

rd Sc KaO* Ikootov (\tyw ht KoBdXov fU

p,dra)v

dvdpojTTos

dydytcrj 5^

Kaarov.

airo-

ia iihf oiV

rov KaBoXoo

&n

iMipx^^

drro<fHiv<ris.

dTTo<f>aivadai.

Acv/cos,

KoiSt

KtMXofi^f

drk fiv rdiv koBcXov

p.r)

Govrax ivavTiat, at

Tov KaSoXov

ruftf

Xfyw

KoBdXov, ola0

dvBpumo^ XtvK6t,
KoBdXov h4,
firi

ovS^ls

orav 8c cVt rwv KaBoXov pAv,

avraL

p.kv

(jrLV elvai
10

ovk

dTTo<f)aivadaL

dvdpojTTos,

lolv cvarrlai,

ivavria irori.
cttI

OVK

pL%nroi hnrjIXov^uva
firj

koSoXou

rd>v KadoXov, olov tart XevKOS

ari

XevKos

ydp ovros rov dvSpwrros ovx

124

rd

X4ya} hk rd

dvOpomo^'
cuj

klS6Xov

KaBoXov K^xprjrai

ON INTERPRETATION,
times that

may

lie

vi-vii

outside the present, whatever a

affirm, it is possible as well to

man

deny, and what-

ever a man may deny, it is possible as well to affirm.

Thus, it follows, each affirmative statement will have
its own opposite negative, just as each negative
statement will have its affirmative opposite. Every
such pair of propositions we, therefore, shall call contradictories, always assuming the predicates and subjects are really the same and the terms used without
ambiguity. These and some other provisos are
needed in view of the puzzles propounded by importunate sophists.
VII. Of things there are some universal and some
individual or singular, according, I mean, as their
nature is such that they can or they cannot be predicates of numerous subjects, as man,' for example,
and CalUas.*
Propositions, affirmative and negative, must sometimes have universal subjects, at others individual or
singular.
Suppose we state two propositions, one
affirmative, one of them negative, both universal in
form, having one universal for subject ; then these
propositions are contrary. By
both universal in
form, having one universal for subject,' I mean to say
such propositions as every man is white,' on the one
'

'

hand, and no man is M'hite,' on the other. When,

however, the two propositions, while having a universal subject, are not universal in character, we cannot describe them as contraries, though on occasions,
it may be, the meaning intended is contrary.
Take
as examples of these
man is white,' man is not
white and so on. The subject or man is universal,
and yet the propositions themselves are not stated
as though universal.
For neither contains the word
'

'

'

'

'

'

125

ARISTOTLR
17 b

rfj a7ro<f>dvai'

KaOoXov.

oTt

<L\A'

to yap nd^ ov to KaB6Xov

inl

5c roO

(r/ffjuuifti

KarqyopoufjJvov

KadoXov KarrjyopcLv to KadoXov ovK iarw dXrjS/s'

yap

ovhcfila
15

Karau^xiaii aXrfBri^

Sortu^ ht

9 T06

KaTTjyopovfi^'ov KadoXov to KadoXov #faTi;yop4ra4,

otov coTi

nds dudpanros wdv

*AvTiKL(7dai fiv oi5v

dvTixf>aTLKws

rqv

{<fiov.

KaTii^aw dno^dati
KadoXov

to

axnC) OTi ov KadoXov, otoy

Xiytat

fn^taivovawt

tA

nd^ dvBpanrof Acimc^

ov irds dvdpomos XrvKO^, ovSct; dvdpamot Xtfm6f

20

coTt

TLS dvdpwTTos XcvKOS' ivavTwj^ ht ttJt

/cadoAou KaTOffniaiv Koi rfjv rov koBoXov

oXov irds

Kos,

TO0

Aw6^om9^

ovStls wOpiMnrog Xtv

hucauy^ ot^^f <Mpanvo(

dvdpomos XevKO^

Traj

dvdpomos

SiVaio?.

Ato

85

Taifraff ftv

8c

TOLS

ou^ otov tc

din-iKifjivas

avrals

rou auToiJ a/xa oAt^^ci? cfvat,

XevKos

/cat

coTt tis

^^

oAi^if

cj-Sc^rroi
ofoi'

cli^flu,

irorc

^vi

od nd^ dvSpumoq

dvdpamos XevKos.

oaai

fiiv

o5v dvTL<f>dGLS Tcov KadoXov ciVt KadoXov, opdyKTi

TTjv

irepav

126

'

oXtjOtj cZvat

tj

^cuS^,

#cai

oocu cnt tw*

Distributed/ in the language of the tcxt-boolu.

ON INTERPRETATION,
The

vii

is not a universal in virtue of

but every,* apphed to the subject, confers on the whole proposition its absolute
universality.
And yet, if both subject and predicate
are used in their fullest extension," the resulting
proposition will be false. For, indeed, no affirmation
Every
at all could, in those circumstances, be true.
man is every animal will serve as a good illustration
*

every.'

having an

subject

every

'

'

of this.

When their subject is one and the same but of two

propositions the affirmative clearly indicates in its
terms that the subject is taken universally, the negative, however, that the subject is not universally
taken, I call them contradictorily opposed. Examples are every man is white,' not every man is
white and the like, or, again, we have some men
are white/ to which no man is white is opposed in
the manner of which I am speaking. Propositions
are contrarily opposed when affirmative and negative
alike are possessed of a universal character the
subject, that is, in both cases being marked as uniThus every man is white or is
versally taken.
just is the contrary, not the contradictory, of no
man is white or is just.'
In the case of such contraries we see that not both
can be true at one time. Notwithstanding, their
contradictories sometimes are both of them true,
though their subject be one and the same. On the
one hand, not every man is white,* on the other
hand, some men are white will be both of them true
propositions. But of those contradictory opposites
having universals for subjects and being universal in
character, one must be true, the other false. This
also holds good of propositions with singular terms
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

127

ARISTOTLE
Kad^

c/coora,

otov

cm

"LwKpdrrji

Arvirofov#r

cart 'LcjKpaTri^ XtvKOS' oaai hi hrl ratv KoBiXov

KadoXov 8^, ovK cUl i} fih^ dXrjB^ 1}

aifia yap dXrjdt^ ianv tlntw on lonv
dvdpojTTos XfVKos Kal oTi OVK tOTW okBpanros
XcvKos, Koi (OTiv avOpomoi KoXof Koi owe ioTW
avdpoiTTo^ KoXos*
1 yap alaxp^, teal od teaX&f
Kal t ylverai ri, Kal ovk torw,
5<$(cM J* Sr
^aL<f>vrjs drorrov etvai 8id to ^aiVa$ai atifialimtP
TO OVK (mv dvOpumos Xxvko^ dfia Kol on o05c2(
dvBpWTTOS XiVKOS' TO hk OVT TOVTOV OTifiaa^i oCft

80 fiv,

fiT)

tjjvhris.

85

dfia cf avdyKTjs,

Oavcpoi/ he ore Koi fiia dn6<^aats fuSs

<f>do(xJS

iarr ro yap avro

^aGiv oTTp

18 a

fi

xartt^

Set dno^TJaai rifv dir^-

1} KardifHiai^, Koi dn6 roO

Kaard rwoi rj dv6 rCtff
KadoXov TWOS, rj <Ls KadoXov rj tag fi^ KodoXov.
Xdycj 8c olov <m ^wKpoTrfs XfVKOgovK iem
TtCDKpaTrjs XcvKos.
idy 8c oAAo ti ^ drr* dXXov
TO auTo, ovx rj din-iKip,^inrj dXX* /oroi iKtlvrfi
eTcpa.
TTJ he nds dvBpamos XfVKOS 1} od wdf
dvdpWTTOS XCVKOS, TTJ hk TAJ dydpomOS XfVKOg ij

avrov,

ovhels

Tj

KaT<f>rjav

rcjv

Kad*

dvdpcjTTos

XevKos'

Tjj

hi

cotw dvBpwrrof

OVK coTLv dvOpumos XofKos.

"Ort p.kv ovv piia KaTa<f>dai pia drro^ms

XcvKos

rj

KLTai dvTL^aTiKOis Kal

10 icat

din-i-

aSrai, tiprjTai-

OTt at eVavTiat oAAat, koX tcvcs cmtiv oirroi,

" .*. either

128

TtVcff elaiv

distributed or undistribatcd.

ON INTERPRETATION, vii
for their subjects, as
Socrates is white * and ' not
white.' When, however, the two propositions are
not universal in character, albeit about universals,
not always do we find it the case that of these one is
true, the other false.
For, indeed, we can state very
truly that man is and man is not white, and that man
'

and man is not beautiful. If ugly, a man is not

beautiful ; neither as yet is he beautiful, if he but
tends to become so. This view on a summary notice
may well seem repugnant to reason, since man is
not white ' would appear the equivalent of no man
is white.*
But they do not, in fact, mean the same,
nor, again, are they both of necessity true at the same
time or false. It is evident that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation itself must be single
as well. The denial, that is, must deny just the thing
the affirmation affirms of the selfsame, identical subject.
further require that the subjects be both
universal or singular and also that both should be
used or not used in their fullest extension."
Socrates is white
and not white constitute in this
manner a pair. But if anything else is denied or the
subject itself should be changed, though the predicate yet may remain, the denial will not correspond
but be one that is simply distinct. To every man
*
is white,' for example,
not every man is white
*
corresponds, as no man is white,' man is not white
to some men are white,' man is white.'
Now to sum up the foregoing statements, we showed
that a single negation is opposed to a single affirmation in the manner we called contradictory and also
explained which these were. From the class of contradictory propositions we further distinguished the
contrary, explaining which these also were. We,
is

We

'

'

'

e2

129

ARISTOTLE
koI oti ov

ilprjrat,'

ndaa dXri$^

ij

j>aois, Koi Sid tI, koX fr^rt d^tjBrif

Kad* ivos OT^fuitVoiKTa,

1}

koBoXov oyrof $caB6Xo9

rj

nds avOpamof XiVfcot iarw^

ouK coTi way avBpwno^ XVk6s, tarw ap0pawof
XcvKos ovK iarw opOpomo^ Acvicoy, ov^U ay*
dpcjTTos Acv/cdff coTi rij aydpumoi Xfvtc6s, tl t6
rj

16

iari Kara4>axni koX dn6^aai

Mux S4

VIII.
1^

i^tMjf hni*
^ ifKV^t.

fjLTj

ofioLws, otov

Xvk6v v

wv

cf
20

(Tr)fiawi,

h^ hvchf hf S^ofM. itcCtm,

tcard^aaif* olo ft

ioTiv V, oi fiia

fiij

OeZro ovofia IfLaTiov lirnu} iccu avBpofWtf^^ to

ris

<Mi

(m.v IfjLaTWv XcvKov, avrr) ov fUa raTcC^aoic

diT6<f>aaLs
rj

(mv

ovScv
ioTLv
25

ovSev yap

fJiio..

rod lniv orw hntos Xtvtcos

dvdpwTTos

XevKos.

(rqp,aiiov(TL

koI

TTpixyrq tJtoi

iroXXd

rls

ctat
rj

noXXai,

dvdpwnos Ifmos.

*Em

/Av

Kal
^

130

5ri

oHrrt
-n^i*

5c

ovh*

irrl fikv

tt^v

rcov

O'

teal

ij

iarw

ravrats

c&cu ayrt'

f/nvSirj

yvofivw

kojL

drro^aaw

KadoXov

tcai

noXXA

a^rtu

iijXo

ouv rwv oyrtav

dvdyicr) rr)v KaTd<f>aaiv

80 ipvBrj ctvai,

oiv

ovSev arjfiaiytr ov yap

dvdyio) rrjv fiv oXtjOtj

IX.

c^irrtv

toOto $^

Kol di'dpomof XVk6s,

tTTTTOS

hia<f>pi

tovto

Siatf>4pt

dXrj&r}

rj

coy tcaOdXov

B. adds 01^ dri^otf If pim,

Both may be true or both fake.

ON INTERPRETATION,

vii-ix

moreover, have proved of two opposites that it is

not the case always that one must be true and one
false, and we set forth the reasons for this and explained the conditions in which one is false, if the
other i true.
VIII. A statement is single or one, when it either
affirms or denies some one thing and no more of
another, be the subject universal or not and the
statement universal or not.
We may take for
examples the following, provided that white has
one meaning
Every man is white.
Not every man is white,
Man is white.
Man is not white.
.

'

No man

is

Some men

white.

are white.

however, one word has two meanings, which do

not combine to make one, the affirmation itself is
not one. If, for instance, you gave the name garment alike to a horse and a man, then it follows
that garment is white would be not one but two
*
affirmations, as also would
garment is not white
be not one denial but two. For the statement that
garment is white really means horse and man
both are white.' And this statement, in turn, is the
same as to say horse is white,' man is white.' And
if these have more meanings than one and do not,
in effect, make one statement, it follows that garment is white must itself have more meanings than
one or, if not, it means nothing at all. For no particular man is a horse.
And accordingly not even
here is one necessarily true and one false of two
statements opposed contradictorily.
IX. In regard to things present or past, propositions, whether positive or negative, are true of
If,

'

'

'

'

necessity or false.

And

of those contradictorily
131

ARISTOTLE
18 s

0cv^

act Trfv fiev aXTfSrj rijv ht

uxmtp

Kaara,

/ca^*

Toil'

KadoXov

KadoXov

fXT]

c2ku,
inX

tlprjnu,

odK

Acx^cWcof

teal

M
twv

oniyic^i

dp-qrai, 8c Kai Trcpi Toirroii'.

8c

'EttI

dXr)dr)g
firj

Se

yap ndaa Kard^aais Koi ano^amt

ojjLOLCJs.
85

Ka6* Kaara koX fuXXotrrcav odx

rail'

tpevSij^,

rj

Koi dirav aydyKti iw^ipxtu^

toorc ci o fi^v ^rf^i lotoBai

vTrdpxfi'V,

^aci to avro

fxrj

rovro, hijXov

dXrjdVw rov Irtpov avrwv,

Kal a'n6<f>aais dXrjBri^
vrrapfct

CTrt

XevKov

Ci

ri

XevKov, dXrj6s

a/i^ci

"^v

ifxiyai

rj

Ci

ware

dvaytcri

ttjv

dno^avai'

Kardif>aaiv

oOjf

Ol^yiCI}

^ o^

cart Acuir^

VTrdpx^i, 0cu8cTcu, koI ci 0cu8crcu,

6

yip

t yelp (iAi;M(

^ OTt OV XtVKOV ioXW,

ov Xvk6v, koI

dydyfoj

iraoa tcarA^ams

0ct;8i^.

Toiy rotoi^oty.

OTt AcVKOJ'

18 b CtTTCtV

clival

a/xa

rj

&n

ri

iceu

tl fi^

owx vndpx*
rrf daro^aaiv

dXqdrj ctvai ^ ipv^.

OuScv apa ovT eariv oCt yiytrai out ami

rvxrjs

ov6*

dnorep*

ervx^v,

ou&

iarai

rj

adic

corai, oAA* cf di'dytaj^ aTrcuTa ireu oiJ^ d^n^rtp*

ervx^V'

rj

yap 6

<f>ds

dXr)6vaL

rj

6 ononis.

This chapter deals lareely \-ith contingency. H<

hard to determine wheUicr ArlsloUe heW that contingency
could anywhere be found in the universe. See W. D. ROM*
ArutotUt pp. SI, 75-78 and elsewhere.

it is

182

ON INTERPRETATION,

ix

opposed one, again, must be true and one false, when

they have a universal for subject and are in themselves
universal or else, as we noticed above, have a singular
term for their subject. This need not, however, be
so in the case of two such propositions as have
universals for subjects but are not themselves uni-

That question also we discussed.

When, however, we come to propositions whose

versal.

subjects are singular terms, while their predicates

refer to the future and not to the present or past,
then we find that the case is quite changed." Propositions, whether positive or negative, being themselves true or false, every predicate that we affirm
must belong to its subject or not. Hence it is that,
if someone declares that a certain event Avill take
place, while another declares it will not, one will
clearly be speaking the truth, while the other as

Both predicates cannot belong to

one subject with regard to the future. For, if it is
true to pronounce some particular thing to be white,
it must be of necessity white.
The reverse of this
also holds good. As, again, it is white or not white,
it was true to affirm or deny it.
And, if it is not, in
if to
fact, white, then to say that it is will be false
say that it is will be false, then it follows the thing is
clearly will not.

not white. We are driven, therefore, to concluding

that all affirmations and denials must either be true
or be false.

Now, if all this is so, there

by chance or fortuitously

nothing that happens

nothing will ever so
happen. Contingency there can be none all events
come about of necessity. Either the man who
maintains that a certain event will take place or the
man who maintains the reverse will be speaking the
is

133

ARISTOTLE

18 b

yap av iyivero

OTTOT^p

trV\V OvStV fJLoXXoV OVTCJ^

"Etc

10

OTt XevKOv

earat,

Tpov

or I

ciTTfLV

orioxjv

o%^k

fj

XevKov,

unrrt

rCiv ytvofidvwv

otov T

fi'f)

u aSwarov

elyai ovBi

fitf

larw

yVa6ai,

firj

fitf

aSwarov

i^SffBis

rj

yevtadai, dydyfcrj yv4a$ai,

TVXqSt OVK (

*AAAa

firjv

20 71 a'n6<f>a(Ti.s

/iT/Tc

di'dyKTis.

Kard<f>aGiv

Tovroij,
Set

a/i<^

earai

/X17

dXrjdes

avpiov,

ct

avpiov.

els

oAi^

ccVcu'

xmdpx^tv,

vavfjLaxCav avpiov firjre

184

Kara^oacciK

rijs

ouftjSatKCi
t

xmdp^w^

fxT)

oi)ic

Mi'
iaim,

^ffuSoifr

ovk dXrjBi^, koI ravrrf^ if^vSotk ownpi

fxtj

<2>xu.

tnl

ori

XtvKot^

koX

hk

vndpfti

tig

Si pxfrt iarai

C4

o^k ay

rvxv, olov vavp,axla' Scot

25

^vai^ra

ov8* cis oiihirepov y dXffiit

rrpwrov p.v yap owrrj^

avpLov,

fiij

S 5^

ov^ apa

X^raL Xiyciv, otov ori ovrt corai ovrc

ficya,

S hi

fi^ ytv^oOai'

ervx^v ovSe dno rvx^^ cortu* wl yap iiro

oirorep

TTpos

Ivrttl*

iartu, o^x

eaioBai.

ovv ra G6p.va ovayKoiov ytvtaOai.

rifv

np6'

c^<iW

<icl

&n orw ^

hk ail aXrjdes ^v lrriv 8ri

olov re rovro

OVIWf

/i^

aXrjdi^

vih',

y^

iyivrro* f^

ofiolws

irj

yap dv

yeveadai,

vrdp^ti B.

ro amirrtp

/i^tc yv4cSai

ON INTERPRETATION,

ix

truth on that point. Things could just as well happen

as not, if the one or the other assertion is not of
necessity true. For as that term is used in regard
to both present and future events, the contingent is
that which could just as well happen in this way as
that.
If, moreover, a thing is now white, then it would
have been true in past time to affirm that that thing
would be white, and thus at all times was it true of
*
whatever has now taken place to affirm that it is
or will be.' But if it at all times was true to affirm
*

that it is or will be,' how impossible that it should

When a thing cannot be or not be about to be so
not not come to be, how impossible that it should
not
If, again, its not coming to be is impossible, as
we assume, come to be then it certainly must. And
in consequence future events, as we said, come about
of necessity. Nothing is casual, contingent. For if a
thing happened by chance, it would not come about
of necessity.
cannot contend, notwithstanding, that neither
For example, we cannot conproposition is true.
tend that a certain event neither will nor will not
come to pass in the future. For, first, although one
affirmation or denial should prove to be false, yet
the other would still not be true. Were it, secondly,
*

'

We

same thing is both white and

have both these marks of necessity.
them to-morrow, it will of necessity
have them. But if some event neither will nor will
not come to pass on the morrow, contingency there
will be none. Let us take, for example, a sea-fight.
It is requisite on our hypothesis that it should neither
take place nor yet fail to take place on the morrow.
true to affirm that the
large, it would
If it will have

135

ARISTOTLE
Td

fihf

Tj

Tr)v

rwv KadoXov

XyofUv<jav

clvai

Tvxv

oTTOTCp*

rqv

dXrjdrj

fiv

raDra

&^

TOij

rwv

ws

tcoBoXov

ayructifUvuttf

4>v^,

o^v yap

ovK ar<u ToSl.

OTOV ros rov
85 <l>dvcu,

(jj(TT

axnCjv

TOVTO
ixrj

wf

rm.
ctiTov

p,v

diro^pa&r^vai

etj pLvpioarov

'^v

fxevcjv del

rj

ianu ^
^ A*
XP^*^

dyayTOVTO ycveadai, koI Ikootov rwv yvo-

ovtws cf^o'

T yap dXrjdcos
fH7

O^M

TOi fuSXXov

^^^ *t ^^ dnayri t^
mpov dXrjBetkaBai,

oTTOGOiovv xp^^V'
^r^ev c5<rrc to

oi?ra>9

|il|p

ovrl^aatP

yap on ovruys <X** ''^ npdyfuira,

KaTa^cni ri o 8< dtTO^i^o^* oOU

OVK lorat, oy8*

Kaiov

dXXA
T^fv

hrjXoif

yap hid TO KaTo/^BrjvaL ^

19 a

4ii^

roS^v

kcjXui koI cif fhvpto^

Tiv^

ptij

tovto aaO<u t6v 6i fi^

dydyKr)^ tatoBai SmfTtporoO^,

h(,a<f>pi,

p,r)

/tv (f>dvai

dXrjOh ^v flntiv

ctnov

Kov

arai robt, ^av

(iAXcL

uxrvt ourt

povXcvcaBcu Scot dv ovr TrpayfiamHoBai,

7roti7<rciiftv,

M^T^

yiyvo/iA^tf,

"ndvra ilvai Koi YiyvtaOai cf dvaYtcrji,

fiv ToSl

koX

ndarj^ Kara^datots Kol dno-

etrrcp

inl rcjv Ka6* Kaarov didyKTf

ctvaL
80

cVt

"q

<l>da0)s

arxma

avfipaiyoi^a

Toiavra Tpa,

(tKrT

elrri rtj

( dvaytcrj^ yp4aBai.

on

^orat, oux ol6 Tf

yeveaOar Kai to ya'op.vov dXifik^ ^v ltrttif

del OTL corai.

Et

hr)

TavTa aSuwrra

dpxfj Tcov iaoficvcov Kal

1S6

opatfiev yap on ifm

dno tov PovXeveaOai teal

ON INTERPRETATION,

ix

These and other strange consequences follow,

we assume in the case of a pair of contradictory opposites having universals for subjects and
being themselves universal or having an individual
subject, that one must be true, the other false, that
contingency there can be none and that all things
that are or take place come about in the world by
necessity. No need would there be for mankind to

provided

dehberate or to take pains, could we make the

assumption that if we adopt a particular line, then a
certain result will ensue and that, if we do not, it will
not. There is nothing to prevent any man from predicting some future event (say) some ten thousand
years beforehand, while another predicts the reverse
the event that was truly predicted must needs come
to pass at long last. And, indeed, it is quite im:

whether contradictory predictions were

actually made beforehand.
For that someone
affirmed or denied does not alter the course of events.
And events are not caused or prevented by someone's
affirming or denying that at some future time they
would happen. Nor yet, let us add, does it matter
how old the predictions may be. And, in consequence,
if through the ages the nature of things has been
such that a certain prediction was true, that prediction must needs be fulfilled ; and the nature of all
things was such that events came about of necessity.
For any event anyone in the past has once truly
predicted must needs in due course come about, and
of that which has once come about it was true at all
times to affirm that it would in due time come about.
All this is, however, impossible.
know from
our personal experience that future events may depend on the counsels and actions of men, and that,
material

We

137

ARISTOTLE
10

aTTo

rod Trpd^al

al

evcpyovai to

iv ots ayufxxi

ri,

Kal ori oXcjf

Swarov

iarw A
Kol

clitu

fii^,

TOiff fii)
6fU>ltitS*

vh\raif koI r6 tlvai tcai t6

fii)

ware koI to ytveadat koI to /ii^ ywia^tu,

KoX TToAAa "qyMf S^Aa cWtv oimu; tf;(oTXi9 oZor &n
Tovrl TO Ifidriov bwarov tart SiarfAfi&fj^ai Kol oi
cfi'ai,

oAA*

BiarfirjO-qacrai,
16

ofioLws Kol TO

av

vTTTJpxe

fiTj

hvvarov

tfiirpoaOiv

KararptfiifOtrai.

SiaT/xij^fcu SintiTdv oJ ydip

fiTj

TO tfiTTpoadev auro Kararpifiqyai, cryc

"fjv to /117 hiaTfir)Brjv<u.
uMTTf iral Arl

Tcov oAAcoi/ ycvcacctiv, oaou #(ard ^i^HOfUV Xfyottrtu

rrjv

roiavrrjv.

dvdyKTjS
20

OUT

^vtpov dpa ori o\^ dtt ny ra i(

tarw ovt yU'trax, dXXA tA fih^
Kard^aaig ^ 1}
koI utf Arl TO
oAA* <^';fTai yrWdtfoi imI

oTTorep* rvx, koI ov^iv fiaXXov

d7T6<f>aaLs aXrjdrji,

TToXv Odrcpov, ov

rd Sc fiaXXov
firiv

6drpov, 6drpov 8^

To
26 civat,

p.v

orav

/itJ.

ovv cfrai TO
firj

fj,

ij

fiv

oi'

di'dytcq'

orav

ij,

#fal

tA

/ii)

/ii)

ovt r6 ov dmOf
ov fi^ ttyax.
06

ov

fxriv

dvdyKT) elvai ovr to firj

ravrov iari ro ov dnav elvai cf dydyKTfi art
KoX TO dirXw^ etvai cf dvdyicqg.
ofuUco^

y^

ifrrtt

Koi

rov firj ovros.

Kai eni rijs dvri^datotf i
avros Aoyoy. elvai fih rj fiij thai dnav dvdytaig
Kai eacadaC yc rj /itJ- ov fUvroi SicAoi^a y Cifrctv
ddrepov dvayKoiov.
Acyoi Se otov dvdyicrj fUw
7rl

80

aaBai vavp.axiav avpiov rj /X17 aadai, ov fi4vTOi

caeadal y avpiov vavpxixlav dvayKaZav ov^ fd^
yeveadai- yeveaOai fievroi rj fir) ymaBax opayKOiav,
138

ON INTERPRETATION,

ix

speaking more broadly, those things that are not

uninterruptedly actual exhibit a potentiality, that is,
a may or may not be.* If such things may be or
may not be, events may take place or may not.
*

There are many plain cases of tMs. Thus this coat

may be cut in two halves yet it may not be cut in
two halves. It may wear out before that can happen
then it may not be cut into two. For, unless that
were really the case, then its wearing out first were
not possible. The same with all other events which
in any such sense are potential. Thus it is clear
;

that not everything is or takes place of necessity.

Cases there are of contingency ; no truer is then the
affirmative, no falser, than the negative statement.
Some cases, moreover, we find that, at least, for the
most part and commonly, tend in a certain direction,
and yet they may issue at times in the other or rarer
direction.

What is must needs be when it is what is not

cannot be when it is not. However, not all that exists
any more than all that which does not comes about or
;

exists

by

necessity.

That what

is

must be when

'

it

mean

the same thing as to say that all

things come about by necessity. And so, too, with
that which is not. And with two contradictory
statements the same thing is found to hold good.
That is, all things must be or not be, or must come or
not come into being, at this or that time in the future.
But we cannot determinately say which alternative
must come to pass. For example, a sea-fight must
No necessity
either take place on the morrow or not.
is there, however, that it should come to pass or
should not. What is necessary is that it either
should happen to-morrow or not. And so, as the
is

'

does not

139

ARISTOTLE
19 B

a>(7T*

85

inel ofiolws oi Xoyoi dXriBtl^ utantp rA ifptty

fiara,

hrjXov

TVX

Kol

w<m

6w6r9p*

avayKf)

6fu>uo9

oaa ovrcoi ^1

ori

TavavTia

ci'&x*a^<u,

Xiv Kol TTjv avrlxftaaw.

"Qhrcp ov/x/9atWt inl rots

fti^

act odcnr

it^ iutk

p^

6^ rtpC p/Apujv
T^9 avri<j>daU}S dArjdi^ cfj-ai fj ifKH^Of, q6 fUrroi
roBc rj ToSc oAA* o7r6rp* crvx^t *f* pS}Xa fiiv
fjLri

rovroiv yap cUayioy

ovmv.

Irlpav^ ov p^vroi

dX-qOij rrjv
19 b

aXrjBij

fjBrj

rwv diTtKtip^vww
ov yap cjcmtp

Kot aTTo^acoy^

rrjv 8c tljvSrj tti'ar

ovTCJS ^1 Kal

3c tvai
*

tj

^Ii8f^

oKTTC brjXov ori ovk oi^dyKyj ndtrqs tcaro/^dam^

X.

p,r)

Tj

'Ettci

irrl

ratv

/X17

cZmi, oAA*

hi

<rrl

r^

ovrutv fiiy Svranfir

wavtp

cifn/rou.

Kara rivo^

crqfxalvovaa, rovro hi iariv

tj

fiiw iXtfirj

^nl rj Strrum^

ofo/xa

Kora^^aawf

1}

rj

r6 hnttirvpump

rj Kara^dati
ovopa (Iprjrai Kal to mtjjwpov ftpirr^poir
ro yap ovk dvBpayjros ovopa ptv oiu Xiyo dXX
v he Set etvai koi Kad* v6s to iv
(to 3c

dopiarov
IP

dopiarov

dopLorov

^ot?

rf

ovofia'
'

cv

yap

atoTrep koX ro
prjfia),

ttios

tnjftaiytt

ov\ vyiawi ov

Koi ri

pfjpo,

oAA*

cotcu naxra Kard/^Kung kcu oir^-

cf ovoparos kox pi^pxiros

rj

i( dopiOTom

ovofiaros Kal prjfiaros.

dvv 3^ prfparo^ o^^fd^

Kard^aais ovhk d'n6<f>aGis' ro yap arw ^ ccmu
^15^-5 yi'Tat, ri oca oAAa Toiavra, pj^poTU

&

15

rwv
140

Kciplvoiv

iarl'

7rpoG(rrjpatyi

yap

XP^*'*^*

ON INTERPRETATION,

ix-x

truth of propositions consists in corresponding with

the case of events where contingency or potentiahty in opposite directions is found
that the two contradictory statements about them
will have the same character.
With what is not always existent or not at all times
non-existent we find this exactly the case. For one
half of the said contradiction must be true and the
other half false. But we cannot say which half is
which. Though it may be that one is more probable, it
cannot be true yet or false. There is evidently, then,
no necessity that one should be true, the other false,
For the case
in the case of affirmations and denials.
of those things which as yet are potential, not actually
It
existent, is different from that of things actual.
is as we stated above.
X. An affirmative proposition is one that states
something of something. The subject is either a
noun or a something not possessed of a name, and
of subject and predicate either must signify only one
explained what we meant by a noun and
thing.
by what has no name of its o^vn. For we said that
not-man,' for example, was not, strictly speaking, a
noun, and we called such indefinite nouns,' since
they do in a manner at least signify or denote single
*
things.
In like manner, the phrase is not healthy
is not, strictly speaking, a verb, and we called such
Thus affirmative and negative
indefinite verbs.'
judgements consist of a noun and a verb, whether
Unless there is also a
strictly so called or indefinite.
verb, there is no affirmation nor denial. For ex*
was,'
comes to be
will be,'
pressions like is,'
and so forth are all verbs upon our definition of the
word, for beside their particular meaning they have

facts, it is clear in

We

'

'

141

ARISTOTLE
ojar

irpam) corcu Karaipaais kol anop<uns to

ovk arw avBp<Mtrroi, cfra iortM

dvOpcjTTos OVK coTiv OVK av6punro^, troAu'

nds dvBpwnoi, Ion
dvdpajTTOS OVK
OVK dvOparrro^ovk Ian tray ovk oyBpofWos.

eariv dvOpajnos

ovK

<7Ti

0"Tt TTois

nds

7rt Tcov Kr6s hk xpovwv 6 ainoi X&yo^,

"Otov hk ro <m rpirov rrpooKaTrjYopiJTai, fj^

Kal
20

St,x<^s

Xeyovrai at oiTt^cacty.

Xtyta hk otov

StVatoj di'dpoyrros' ro cori rpirov

ovoyut

prjfia iv rjj Karcuf>dai.

ri

rerrapa carat ravra, wv ra

^/U

fan

ouyicifdwu

wort 3ca roOro

pikv

hvo wpot

ttjf

Kard<j>aGw koX dn6<t>amv cfci Kara r6 oraxoOt^

25

ws at OTcp^act?, ra hk hvo ov, Xiym h* hn t6

(mv ri rw hiKaup Trpoa/ccurcrai rj rw od hucaltp,
ware Kal rf dn6<f>aaiS' rtrrapa oiV c<rrcu. vooOfiMif
hk TO Xy6p.vov k rwv vnoytypofififvwv,
tart
dvdpoyrro^* aTro^ai; rovrov, ovk i<m
dvBpwno^.
tartv ot^'hiKOiO^ dt^potnof'
rovrov dtro^ais, ovk cmv ov'hiKotof di'Opomo^.
ro yap (mv kvravOa Kal ro ovk Ian rip hiKoup
TTpoGKCLGeraL Kal rw ov hiKaltp.
ravra fiiy ody,
a>a7Tp iv Tot9 *AvaXvriKois AcycTCU, ovrcj rcraic
rat.
6p,ol(i)s hk Xi kov koOoXov rov ovofiarof
f

hiKaios
hLKaios

80

Kard(f>aais,

i}

otov

nd^ iarlv dvBpomoi hucoiot,

aTTo^aoLs rovrov, ov irds iarlv dy$pcjno^ huccuof,

85

nds iarlv dvdpwnos ov hucaios

Called

adjacent,*

142

t^rtii

by

adiac^ntis,

later logicians.

ov

propositioos

way corcv

of the

ON INTERPRETATION,

also.
And, therefore, man is,*
form the first affirmation and denial.
Not-man is,' not-man is not follow. Again, we
have these propositions, every man is and every
every man is not,' every not-man is
not-man is

a time-reference
'

man

is

not,*

'

'

'

Just the same reasoning applies in regard to

times future and past.
Where there are two other terms and the term is *
is used as a third, there are possible two distinct types
of affirmative and negative statements.^ We take
man is just for example. The word is is here a
third term, be it called verb or noun, in the sentence.
And, therefore, from these terms or factors we form
in all four propositions.
Two correspond in their
sequence, in respect of affirmation and denial, with
those propositions or judgements which refer to a
state of privation. The others, however, do not.
Supposing, I mean, the verb is to be added to just
or' not just, 'we shall have two affirmative judgements;
supposing that is not is added, we then have two
negative judgements. Together these make up the
This the subjoined examples make clear :
four.

not.'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Negations
not just.
not not-just.

Affirmations

Man is just.
Man is not-just.
Now is and is

Man is
Man is

in these cases are added to

In this way are these statements arranged, as we said in the Prior Analytics.
Supposing the subject distributed, we find that the
rule is the same
*

just

'

'

or

not

'

not-just.'

Affirmations

Every man
Every man

is

just.

is

not-just.

Negations

Not every man is just.

Not every man is not-just.
143

ARISTOTLE
avOpomos ov SiKaios.
8ta/xTpov

ivhix^rai,

o^x oyLolw^ rai frard

iMx^^^*^

rrXrfv

<TvvfiXr^BVt'

iTore.
pikv o^ hvo avructiMTOX, oAAoi hk 5uo
npo9*
TO ovK dyBpwno^ cuy tmoKtifitvov
rcdevros,^ cart SiVatoj ovk 'dv0p<o no9 odtc Kim

Aurat

irpos

SiKaio9
20 a dpcoTTos

ovK-avdpayrro^t

cmv'OV huccuof o^K-iUf*

OVK ariv ov-hixaio^ ovK'Oi^pumos.

ovs Sc rovTCJV OVK aovT(u ovTiBioti^,

vXu"

ovroi

X^P^s Kivwv aural KaS* iavras iaot^nu, mf

ovo^ari TOi o^k avOparrro^ yputfifvai.
*E<t>' oacjv TO coTi fxrj apfiorrti, ofor hrl rfpO
6 vyialvcL Kol j^aSifci, errl rourwv t6 adrd mxif
oura> TLdp.vov ws av ct to core rrpoij t'fu i n u, o&r

avdpwnoi ovx vyiaivti wdy avdpotmof,

nds ovk dtSpumo^ ovx ^V*^*^* ^^9 o^*

vyuLLVL irds

vyiaivi

wpocrtHp B.

pive the text here as It staml<i.

But th^re
tables arraiurinfir all these ri^ht propaUtloM In IIm
order we find in the Prior Analytict, 51 b 36. Hcnoc llw
reference here to that text.
But, if tablet there ^rere fai
the Greek at one time, they arc no longrr tbov. Aad
I

some

'

the statements diagonally joined

are no longrr dUgooallj

joined.
And in each case the four oroposttioai are dHfcr*
ently arranged in the dreek from tne order in the Fri&t
Analytics^ as the reader will see from the IbUoviiic tluU
stand for the three missing schemes :

144

Man

is

Man

is

just

Man

Is

notjust.

not not-just.

Man

is

not-just.

ON INTERPRETATION,

is no possibility here, in the same way as in the

case, that the statements diagonally joined in the
scheme should be both of them true. None the less,

There
first

may sometimes be so.

Thus two pairs of opposed propositions have duly
been set out above, and two others will follow, provided a third term is added to not-man,' regarded
as some sort of subject
they

Negations

Affirmations

Not-man
Not-man

is

just.

is

not-just.

Not-man
Not-man

is
is

not just.
not not-just.

More pairs of opposed propositions cannot be discovered than these. But the last of these groups
should be viewed as distinct from the two that precede it from its having not-man for a subject.**
Where is does not suit as a verb and we use
has health and the like, then the same
walks,'
sort of scheme is produced as we get, when the verb
is
is used.
We have, for example, the following
Every man is healthy.
Every man is not healthy.
Every not-man is healthy. Every not-man is not
*

'

'

'

'

healthy.

Every man

Not every man

is just.

Not every man

is

not-just.

is

just.

Every man

is

Not-man

is

not just.

Not-man

is

not-just.

not-just.

Not-man

Not-man
The diagonal

is just.

is

not not-just.

lines in

each scheme are intended, therefore,

to connect the afl&rmations

and denials

respectively.

145

ARISTOTLE
ov yap

avopoynos.

to ou waj

(art

XcKreov, dAAa to ov, rriv air64>aaiy, rt^ dvBputtrtK

to yap nag ov ro tcoBoXov ojffuw^i,

npoadcreov.

SrjXov W iK tdOSc, t^yuuwi

KadoXov,
ou;( vytaa^t avOpumo^, vyuuyti owe
dvdpwTTosovx vyiawti ovk avdpumo^. ravra ya^

looAA*

oTi

dvdpwTTOs

KLvcjv Sia<f>pi Tip

nds

KadoXov Tov ovofiaros

15 Ttt

8^ oAAa

'E^TTct

Joiov

ctfcrrff

irpoatrrmah^i

to

^ in

Karo/^aaw ^ an6^aaw.

rj

TCI auTtt Sei irpoor idivoi.

t^ airay ^OTi

Sc cvai^Mx QTro^aiV ^ot

SUaiov

StVatoi',

Ka06Xov c&di.

oAAo

ovSiv

ovSls

rj

fiij

ij

crrjfjLaivovaa

ori oi^S/y

atJrai /acv <f>ai'p6v ori

^<m {^'

ovScVoTf loot^roi

ouT aAi7^t9 a/xa otJrc cVt tou atrrov, Oi S^ oti*

KCLficvai Tai^ai? Oovrai nor, otov
20

SiVaiov Kal coTi ti

^ok))'

od itSm

avrat, t^ /icv 7ra? dvBpamo^ ov hucavii

ouSctV

coTiv

i<pot^

okoXovBoOgi S^

StVoiov.

iarw

i}

avSpumos Swfcuoj, t^ 5^ cor* ny

dvdpcoTTos SiVaioy

art ov

dvTiKt,p,vi)

i}

ndi ar-

dpwTTos ioTiv ov StVacoy ovayKiy yap ctrai to.

Oavepov
t

aAT7^?

25 <f)TJGai

ifat

dX7]6g' otov

HcoKpaTTjs dpa ov

146

ort

eporrqOivra

ctti

#fa^ #fooTor,

/xcv toiv

aTTOifyfjoai,

ori

Kal Kara"

ipd y 'LwKpdrq^ <to^6^; ou.

ao<f>6s.

iirl

hi

rdv koBoXov

ON INTERPRETATION,

We must always beware in such cases

of speaking of
not every man.* For the not must be added to
man,* since the subject is not a universal in virtue
*
every
of having an
every,* but the adjective
indicates that the subject, as such, is distributed.
This will be seen from the following
*

'

Man is healthy.
Not-man

Man is

not healthy.
Not-man is not healthy.

healthy.

is

from the former propositions on account

of their being indefinite and not universal in form.
Thus the adjectives every and no signify nothing
more than the fact, be the statement affirmative or

These

differ

'

'

negative, that the subject itself

is

distributed.

The

remain in

rest of the statement will, therefore,

all

cases unchanged.

Every animal

has for contrary the stateit is clear, then, these two

propositions can never hold good of one subject nor
ever together be true. But their two contradictories
will sometimes turn out to be both of them true.
That is, not every animal is just and some animals
are just are both true. Then from every man is
not-just* there follows the statement that no man
not every man is not-just,' its opposite,
is just
follows from some men are just.' For there must,
indeed, be some just men.
When the subject is individual, provided a question
is asked and the negative answer is true, then a certain affirmative statement must also manifestly be
Let
Is Socrates wise ?
true. Take the question
Socrates then is unthe negative answer be true.
wise can at once be correctly inferred. In the case
of universals, however, not a similar but a negative
*

is

just

ment no animal is just

*

'

'

'

'

147

ARISTOTLE
20a

OVK
a7T6j>ams , olov dpd yc wdy avdpamof ooi^it; oC
Tras"

80

dvOpayrro^ ou ao^>o^' tovto

apci

oAAa TO ou
avrr) hi iariv

At 8c

/card

tra^

dpa dvBpomo^

yop mHnof

ow^

di-riKct/irn), ^Kturtj Si}

ri

o^erfii^

^ Awrfa^

ra ddpiora arTure{^vai ovofiara jnu

rov firj di'dpumo^ tcaX fir) ^ucawf,

pT^fxara, otov nl

axmcp

iroi
ot'Ofiarttg
diro^jxiaiis dvtv
fr^fiarof
ovk cu7i h4.' cut yap oXrfitikw
Bo^eiav dv etvai.
tlwwv
85 dvdyicq -q ipevSeadax rriv dixo^aaw, 6
OVK dvdpwiTos oifhiu /idAAot^ rov tlnoyrof dpOponrof
oAAd Kal ^JTTov TjXTJdevKi Ti Tf hfrnfiirm,
i^/fn
TTpoaredfj. <n;/iatV(i hk ro cort nas oi^*<i^/MiMrof
hiKaios ov8fiLq. iKtivwv ravrav, ovhk ^ airruCifUrn
ravTT) 7j OVK cart Trdy ovK-di'Spurtros S/muof* to
he nd^ ov SiVaio? ovk dvOpomo^ tw o^8clc ft/imuof
40 ou/c dvdpwTTOs ravTOv arjfiaivti.
20 b
Mcrari^c/icva 8c rd di'd/iara ral tA p^fjugp^
ravTov (rqp.aLVi, otov ton XtvKo^ dv0punof, cbrcr
dvBpixyTTos XevKog.
l yap fi^ rovrd itm, roC
avTov TrXclovg caovrai aTro^ocif . oAA* ^8/5urTO

i^

Tou p,v yap <m XtvKos dvBpatvos

ro ovk <m Acu/cd? dvBpomos' toC Si
coTtv dvdpwTTos XcvKOf, ^^ H-V V ^^^ ^<"'* Tw can
Aeu/coj di'dpwTTos , ccrrat d77d<^cun9 ijroi to ow#f
<rrLv OVK dvdpwTTos XevKos rj ro ovk <rrw <"
OTL fita /xids.

d7r6<t>acrLS

Meanine, of the positive answer to the

opposed to the negative.
" That is,
man is regarded in both as cmwtitwting the
grammatical subjed, the inversion being purely * rbetorictL*
The order of words would, however, depend in a d*/lnil4
conUxt on the primary inUrett of the spnker. It
148
*

'

ON INTERPRETATION,

If the
inference would rather appear to be true.
negative answer is true to the question Is every man
wise ? to infer that every man is unwise would,
in those circumstances, be false, and not every man
The latter is the contradictory
is correct.
is wise
and the former the contrary statement."
Indefinite predicates and nouns, such, for instance,
as not-man,' not-just,' might appear to be actual
negations without any noun, any verb, as those terais
are more properly used. This, however, is not really
so. Of necessity every negation must either be true
or be false, and whoever says not-man,' for instance,
provided that nothing is added, is speaking not more
but less truly or falsely than he who says man.*
Every not-man is just is a statement, which is not
in its meaning equivalent to any proposition we
mentioned, nor yet is its contradictory or not every
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

not-man is just.' Every not-man is not just,' however, amounts to the same thing as saying that
'

nothing that is not man is just.'

You can transpose the subject and predicate. No
change in the meaning, however, of the sentence
Thus we say man is white,'
is thereby involved.
white is man.' * For, if these did not mean the
same thing, we should have more negations than one
corresponding to the same affirmation. But we showed
there was one and one only. Of man is white,*
that is to say, the negation is man is not white,'
and of white is man,' if we suppose that it differs
in some way in sense, white is not man or white
*

'

'

'

on

'

'

whether he will say in a definite context,

Prime Minister of England,' or will put it the
other way round.
But to go into such points would raise
the whole question of Aristotle's logic, its character and
actual relation to concrete and live human thinking.
*

his interest

So-and-so

is

149

ARISTOTLE

^ " dpwTTOs
10

oAA*

XevKos.

rf

trtpa, ikiv

iarw aw64omi

rod earw ovk dvBpamo^ Xvk6s, iJ trdpa 0 rod

coTt XcvKo^ avdpoynost wart iiovrtu Mo um&9,
ori. fiv ovv firarid^ivov rod 6v6ftarot Koi roO
prjfiaros

17

aM)

yivtrax tcard/^aatt

teal

SrjXov.

To

Mi

Kara noXXatv

rj iroAAA Koff*
cav firi v ri f ro k rCiv
TToAAcDv Sr^Aou/icvov, oifK coTi Karoj^oMns fda
Acyoi 8c cv ouic idy oit>/ia i' j #f/d7T6<t>aais.

XI.

16

iw6^am9,

Kara^dvai ^

aTTOifHiyai,

o^

o dvQponm
hiirow koI ^fupoK, oAAa
Kat 1' Tt yw'CTat cV rovrwv iK 8^ tov An;rot;
cuort
ci'.
KoX rov dvOpamov Koi rod /3a8i{[civ
Kara rovrwv iraro^i^O]? ^^ M^
ovr edv v
Kard(f>aGis, dXXd ^vfj fiv fua KaraMatttf hi
TToXXal, cure idv Ka6* tvdf ravra, dXA dfiolatf

fjLcvov, firi

fi

8c

taoij coTt Kot

>'

T4 cf cVcutui', oloi'

J<ji>o'

#coi

o^

20

TToXXal.

Ec ovv

tpwrqots

-q

tj

hioXtKrucri

dtroKpiOtwi

^ Bartpov fjLoplov
rijs dvrufdaws, rj 8c irporaais dyrv^datwi fuas
p,6pLov, OVK dv cl-q dnoKpujis uia npd^ raOra'
ipwrtjois fxia, ovB toy j aXff&j/fs.
25 ovSe yap rj
iariv alrTjGLS,

rj

rrjs irporrdatuis

h v rots TottikoIs wcpi avrwv. dfia 8c

TO Tt coTti* ipwrTfOis iari buiXttcrt'
K'q' Set yap hchoadai k rijs cpconjoccoj IKlaBai
oTTorcpov ^ovXerai rijs dyruf>dato>s fidpiov dno'

Lp7]rai,

8^Ao' OTL ovhe

<f>'qva(jdat,.

80

dXXd

Set toi'

ipwrwvra irpoahiopUnu

TTorepov toSc cotii' o dvBpoynos rj ov tovto.

'EttcI 8c rd fiv Karrjyoptlrai awrtO^fUva,
* viiL 7.

150

ws

ON INTERPRETATION,

x-xi

not not-man.' For the former negates man is

and the latter negates white is not-man/
There will, therefore, be two contradictories of one
and the same affirmation. To transpose the subject
and predicate, therefore, makes no alteration in the
sense of affirmations and denials.
XI. A proposition is not one but several that
predicates one thing of many or many of one and the
same in a positive or negative manner, unless what
the many denote, in reality, is only one thing. I am
not using one of such things as do not, although
having one name, coalesce into one total unity. Man
these coalesce into
is animal, biped, domesticated
one, whereas white,' man and walking do not.
Should we predicate these of one subject or affirm
a single predicate of them, the resulting proposition
would be single in no sense except the linguistic.
dialectical question consists in
If, then, the
the granting, that is, of
requesting an answer
a premiss or of one out of two contradictories (such
the answer to any such
as each premiss itself is)
question as contains the aforementioned predicates
Though the answer
cannot be one proposition.
sought for may be true, yet the question is not one
but several. But this I explained in my Topics."^ At
the same time the question what is it ? is not a
dialectical question. And this will be clear from the
fact that the question ought so to be framed as to
give the respondent the chance to enunciate whichever he pleases of two contradictory answers. The
question must be made more specific, inquiring, for
example, whether man has or has not some definite
quaUty.
In certain combinations of predicates we find that
*

is

'

white,*

'

'

'

'

151

ARISTOTLE
nay

ou, ris

86

rwv

x^P*'^ Karrffopm^Uv^^,
Kara yap roO Mpamov
aXrjdes elntlv kol x^P*^ Joh)*' Kai x^P*^^ S/wow,
/cat raiha ws Iv, koI avBpwnov Koi XtVK6v, icoi

v TO

Ttt 8*

ravO*

KaTTjyoprjfia

(liS

17

v.

hixi<f>opa;

oAA* ovxi ^i atantvf koI

Kal GKVTCvs dyaOo^,

ct

ayoB^^

yap, ori iKortpov iXffBd^,

to arwdfuf>o, noXXa iceu Srowa iarai.

Kara yap rod avdpuynov KoX ro cuSponro^ ^rj$l$
iroAu^ Ci ri
Koi ro XcvKov, toart koX ro airov.

ctvaL SeZ Kal

40
21 a

XevKov auro, Kai ro dnav, oHrrc iarai avOpoMWOg^

AeuKo? XcvKos, Kal rovro cc; dnipot^, Kol miXt^
pjovoiKos

XcvKog

Koi

<^

dvdpwTTos Kal hliTovs, Koi dyBpamoi hlirovs*

"Ort

pLv

yiveadai,
OTTCJS

ovv

ct rty dtrXutq ^rffoti

ras avfinXosdt

avpPawi Xiytw drama,

iroXXd

hijlko*

dereoVf X(yofxv vvv.

Tcuv
10

rovro woXXdmf
^^Kpdrrff fctd

dvBpamo^.*

^(OKpdrrjs

Kal

dvOpcjTTos,
6

Koi

Pabi^ojv

cri ct o ^cjKpdrrj^

TTCTrAcy/xcVa.'

hrj

Karrjyopovfii'a}V, Kal

<f>*

off Karrfyopt'

oaa pukv Acycreu #card avfifiPriK6s

rj Kara rod avrov rf 6drpov Kara Oartpov, rouro
ovK earai cv, otov dvOpumo^ Acu#co; <<m koX
/xouatfco?, oAA* ovx v ro Xcvkov koI ro fiovaucd^*
avfipePrjKora yap dfi(f>w rip avrat.
ovS* Ci r6
Xcvkov iiovGLKov oXrjOes elnciv, opxjjs ovk arai
ro fiovoLKov XevKov ev rt* Kara avpfipr)K6s yap
adaL

CTv/xjSatVct,

B. adds

e/(

Avctpor.

* Kal 2,uKpdTijt 'ZuKpCLTTii ii9puwo% B.

KoX At^Ofxaros iv0p<awos Urovt B.

152

ON INTERPRETATION,

xi

the separate predicates fuse themselves into one

predicate
in others, again, they do not. How, we
ask, does this difference arise ? We can either use
two propositions and state, first, that man is an
animal, secondly, that man is a biped, or, combining
the two into one, state that man is a two-footed
animal. So we may use man and white.' This is
not so with cobbler and good.' Though a man is
a cobbler and good, yet we cannot combine them
together and pronounce him also a good cobbler.*
For if we can say that, whenever both predicates,
separately taken, are truly affirmed of one subject,
both also, when taken together, are truly affirmed of
that subject, then many absurdities follow. A man
is a man and is white.
He will, therefore, be also a
white man. And, if he is white, then it follows the
composite also is white, which will give us a white,
white man,' and so we go on to infinity. Take
musical,' walking and white
these may all be
combined many times. And of Socrates, too, we may
say he is Socrates,' he is a man,' and is, therefore,
the man Socrates. We may call him a man and a
biped and, therefore, a two-footed man.
To maintain, then, that predicates can always be
combined without any exception leads clearly to
many absurdities. Let us, then, state the real case.
Predicates, if accidental to the subject or one to
the other, do not coalesce into one. We may say
man is musical and white.' Being musical and
wliiteness, however, do not coalesce into one, being
both accidental to the subject. Nor, even if everything white could be truly said to be musical, would
musical and white form a unity
for only, indeed, incidentally is that which is musical white.
;

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

153

ARISTOTLE
16

XlVK^

TO flOVaiKOV XVk6v, WOTt O^K COTGU TO

fjLovariKov v ri.

8to ovS* a#firrwy' airXufS aya$6ii,

yap Kara ovfifi^firiKOS.

oaa v\mapxi iv rw iripi^. hio ovrt
TO XevKov noXXajci^ ovt 6 opBpumo^ avOpamoi
^a)6v i(TTLv rj StVow tvimapxtt yiip iv rtp av6pam<p
oAAd

l^it>ov

hiTTOvv ov

"EiTi ovS*

oAt^c; B4 iarw ^Intw

TO ^atov Kol TO hitrow.

20

K-aTO ToO riv6i koX atrAa>y, olav tot

to^

dvBponrov

avOpomov ^ rov nva XtvKOv dvBpwnov avBptumov

XiVKov ovK ad h, oAA* oTcu' /iiv hf Tip vpoaxti"
fievw

rCjv

duTuf>aais,

dvriKcifUvww rt itrvnapxjj

OVK

aXrjd^s

aXXa

redvcana aydpwTTov dyBpwnov

aX-qBist

orav Sc

wcmcp "Oprjpos

p^

^wrrdpxjl* ^*^^

(ttI

Tt,

Kara

Cfrmu

otop

orov

^ orov pAv hnmapxD*

cwTrdpxjfj, aXriBts.

i^v^of,
ciircti',

^^

olov voifjr^.

^^

r^
fi^

^*

iXfjfi4it

ip* o&'

yap tearyap rroirfn^

<mv, dAA* ov KaS* avro, KarrjyopiTai Kara rod

Koi coTW,

rj

ov;

Tfyopetrat tow *Opi/jpov to

<iufififirjKOS

tarw

ori

'OprjpOV TO OTW.
80

"Oore

Karqyopuui t*-^^ tvoprt^rrj^

V(mv, iav Aoyoi cut' ovopArow X^ywmu, teal
ev

oocu?

Kad* iavrd KarrjyopTJrai Kol fi^ Kard avpfitpriKds,

*

6 vtnnrii

B.

Otherwise, in the sense of existence. For the word ' b*

*
exists ' in addition to being the copula.

expresses

154

ON INTERPRETATION,

xi

And so being

musical and whiteness will not coalesce

man is both good and a cobbler, we
cannot combine the two terms and thus call him also
animal
a good cobbler.' But we can combine
and biped and call man a two-footed animal ; for
these terms are not accidental.
Again, predicates cannot form one, of which
one is impUed in the other.
So we cannot combine
white repeatedly with that which already
contains it or call a man animal-man, for example,
or two-footed man. That is, animal and biped
are notions already implicit in man.' But we certainly can use a predicate simply of one single case,
saying this or that man is a man, a particular white
man a white man. Not always is this so, however.
When we find in the adjunct some opposite such as
impUes contradictories, we then should speak falsely,
not truly, in making the simple predication, as in
calling a dead man a man.
Where there is, on the
contrary, no opposite, the simple predication will be
Or we might rather put the case thus. For,
true.
supposing that there is an opposite, we cannot make
the simple predication where, however, there is no
such opposite, we still cannot always do so. For
example, take Homer is something
a poet will
do for our purpose. But can we say also he is ?
Or will that be incorrectly inferred ?
Is was used
incidentally here.
For our statement was he is a
poet,' and is was not predicated of him in the substantive sense of the word.*
Therefore, in those predications having no contradiction inherent, if nouns are replaced by definitions
and the predicates are not accidental, belonging to
into one.

If a

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

155

ARISTOTLE
TO 8e firi 6v, art Sofaorov, ovK aXrfi^i tniy S^
Tf Sofa yap ainov ovk Icrrw ori tarw, <{AA' on
OVK (mv.
XII. TovTWv Sc huopiayLivwv OKtirrio^ onatg
86 exovmv al aTro^aci; 'coI Kara^dati^ vpa^ oAAi^Aoc
at ToC Sm^aroi' cft'cu Kal /X17 St/varov ircu Mx6tVOtf
Tf
/cat /X17 i^xo/i^w', #cai ir<^ rov oS iW n
i yiip
Kat ovay/catou* cx<i yap anopla^ TU*aj.
Ta>v ovfinXeKOfUvcav ouroi oAAifAoi^ du^urcirroi
avTitf>dai^ , oaoA Kara t6 etfoi #rai /x^ cIhu T<r21 b Toi^at, ofov Tou tlyai avBpomov ano^aaif r6 fi^
cfvat dvdpwTTov, od ro cfwu fxri dvBpumov, koX toO
clvai XevKov dvBpomov ro firi cl^at XtvKOV avOpta*

TTOv,

oAA* ou ro cfvoi

yap Kara natnog

rf

firj

Acvicov df$pufWO,

Kara^aai^

rj

iff

cM^amt,

tl

t6

$vXov arai dXrf$S iiriv tyai fi-^i Acvir^r dv'

Bpomov. ct 3c rovro ovrcjg, Koi oooi^ t6 c&04
/LtT7 TTpoaridcrai, ro avro frotijaei t6 eiKn tow cZi^iu
Xcyop-cvov, olov rov dxSpomog )3a5^Ci 01) ro ov#c
dvOpoynog jSaSiJei d'ncnf>aais coroi, oAAa to ow
dvdpoiTTog'
ovSv yap Sio^pcc ciirctv
jSaSt^ct
di'dpomov fia&i^vra clixu.
10 dvOpwTTOv jSaStJciv ^
a>OT t ovrojs 'navraxov, kox rov hwarow lyai
d'7T6<t>aGLg iarax ro Bwarov fiif cZrai, oAA* o^ to
/xt) Suvarov cfvat.
Ao/cet Sc TO avTo Sut'acr^ai Koi c&ai /cat /ii^
clvaf vdv yap ro bwarov rpvadai ^ Paht^w
6

A log is a white man

must be
156

true, or

a 1(^

'

is

is

false

the oootradktonr, then,

a not-white roan,* prorided that

ON INTERPRETATION,

xi-xii

the things in themselves, the individual may well

be the subject also of the simple propositions. As,
however, for that which is not, it is not true to say it
is
somewhat, because it is matter of opinion. The
it is that it is not.
opinion about it is not that it is
XII. Having made the foregoing distinctions, we
must prove the relations subsisting between affirmations and denials affirming or denying the possible,
contingent, impossible, necessary a question not
wanting in difficulty. Grant that those composite
expressions containing the verbs is and is not
are mutually contradictory. Take, for example,
man is ; man is not is the true contradictory
not-man is.' Or take man is
not, be it noted,
white ; then we have man is not white,' and not
man is not-white.' For, were this not so, inasmuch
as the affirmative or negative statement is true of all
subjects whatever, it would prove to be true to affirm
that a log is a not-white man.' "
All this may be readily granted, but what of those
numerous statements that do not contain is or is
If the views
not,' some other verb taking its place ?
just expressed are correct, then the latter performs
the same function.
Man walks has for contradictory, in consequence, man does not walk.' And to
say that not-man walks is >vrong. For the two propositions,* man walks,' man is walking,' mean just the
same thing. Now, if all this is always the case, it
*
applies to it may be as well. Not it cannot be
but it may not-he is, therefore, its true contradictory.
However, it certainly seems that the same thing
may be and not be. Thus, for instance, whatever
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

the statement ' man is white

white ' for contradictory.

'

could have

'

man

is

not-

157

ARISTOTLE
li

rifU^oBok Suvar^r. \6yo9

huvarov ovk qmI ivtfy^,
CUOT6 xmdp^t. avra> /cat ij dir6^aaif M^artu y6fi
Kai fir) pabi^iv ro PaBurruc^v koX fii^ 6pda$ai to

Kal

fir)

Se,

oTt

/SoStJcti'
ttTTai/

Kcu

TO

fiif

ouTci*

oparov.

oSwaroj' koto roG a^raO iXrfitikoOai

^aetj* oi5#c dpa roO ^war6f
<3rv/i*
etvai a'n6j>aals iari ro huvarov fi^ itvai,
jSatVct yap cV Totrroi*' ^ ro avro ^cutu icol otto(fxivat, dfxa koI Kara rov avrov, rj fi^ Kara r6
etvai Kal p.ri tvai ra irpoonBi^iAva ytytoBcu ^datg
KoX OTTo^acty. ct oOv c#ccux> ahwarov, roGr* or

*AAAa

TOiS

20

17)

25

/ii7r

avrLKifivas

alpr6v.

"Eariv dpa dir6(f>aais rov Stn-arov c&oi to ^^

hvvarov elvai.
6 h* avro^ Xoyoi koI irpl roG
ivScxofJLCvov elvai- Kal yap rovrov an^^auif t6
nfOi
^ni rw <{AAar
v8xofivov c!ycu.
hk o/xoioTpoTTO)?, olov dva-vKalov rt Koi iJ^wdrov.
yivrai yap axmfp ctt* Kivwv ro thmi #rol r6

firi

firj

TO

XcvKov ro

35

8* vnoKl^tva

8* dx'Opayno^t

ovrat^

hnaWa

KoX p.r)
Suvaa^at ^ot to evScvta^oi npo<jB4aif Siopl^ovaai, atcmcp ctt* Kiva}v ro tvai Kal uii

fikv lvaL
80

to

npdyvurra
r6
etvai w^ xmoKflfUvov ytymu, t6

etvai Trpoa^caciy,
fiv

lvaL TO dX'qOs Kol TO tlfvSos, o/iouoy o^roA CWl

rov clvaL Svvarov /cat efvat ov hwarov,
Tov Se Swarov p,ri elvai aTrd^acrty o^ t6 ov
Svvarov etvai, dXXd ro ov hvvarov firi tlvai, Kol
rov Svvarov etvai ov ro Swarov fit) cZmu, dXXd
TO fjLTj Swarov clvai. 8to icot oicoAou^cty ay h6(iaM

Grote has called these

p. 128).

158

'

intermittent realitiet

( Irirftlli

ON INTERPRETATION,

xii

or be cut may not walk or be cut. And

the reason for this is that such things as are in this
manner potential do not at all times energize. Both
the positive and negative statements will, therefore,
be true in such cases. For that which may walk or
be seen may, per contra, not walk nor be seen.
None the less, contradictory statements can never
be true of one subject. And so we conclude that it
may be has not, after all, it may not be by way of
For it follows from our previous
its proper negation.
statements that we can at one time of one subject
affirm and deny the same predicate or it is not, in
is
or 'is not that
reality, the adding the verb
raakes an affirmation or denial. The former posithe latter must thus be adopted.
tion is impossible
It cannot be,' not it may not be,' is, therefore,
it is contingent it
the proper negation. With
should be we deal in a similar manner, its true contradictory being it is not contingent it should be.*
So, too, mth the like propositions, it is necessary,'
*
As in the earUer instances is
it is impossible.'
and is not have been added to the underlying
things, so to speak otherwise, the two terms,
white and man
so in these it should be,' it
should not be,' are viewed as the things underlying,

may walk

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

to which thereupon have been added is possible and

is contingent,' additions denoting that something is
possible or is not possible, just as the is or the is
not denoted in the earher cases that something was
true or was not.
The contradictory, then, of it may be is it
cannot be,* not it may not be,' of which the contra'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

it cannot
is
it cannot not be,' not
So on these grounds it appears that it may be

dictory, in turn,

'

be.'

'

159

ARISTOTLE
oAA^Aatj at Tov Suvarov ttvai

Swror^

fA^

eWi' TO yap avro ^warov

tyai

ov yap

aXX^jXatv cu

routtmu, t^ 5vi<oT6r

lvai.

oXXa r6 5uvaroi'

din-i<f>d(Tis

Kcu

cfvat

Sin^aroi'

22 a cfvat /cat /x^

dfia

dfjM

/ii^

im

ov hvvarov

tlyai,

firf

TOV 5c avay#ratbi' /x^

(jLTi

elvai,

/Lti7

efi^at,

<l>a(nv

oAAa r6

4woT

fi^ dyayf^oZo^

dpoyKoiim

cZt^ou ti^ fiif

Kol TOV dBvvaTov cirai oJ to

oAAd t^

/xi}

elvai. Set

fit)

dSvvarov

cZt'Oi*

dSiWror

toO

d^

to ovk dhwarov fi^ c5tu.

efi^at

Kat KadoXov
10 /cat firj

<

Koi rod dyaytcalov th^at An6^aat9

ov TO dyayKoZov

Svvarov

roO adroG

ovbi ye t^

cZmc

fiij

cZi^Oi*

TOV avrov dX-qOfvoyrai,

'OfjMiojs $

etvai'

ayru<unajL ydp,

tvai koI

fir)

koI fi^

Suvaroi' cfwit ovS4mrrt

dXrjOevovrai'

hwoTov

fcal

8c,

ci^n^oi, r6 fiir

cooTrcp

TiBivai

ws to

^nu

i^iccificva, iraTi*

hk Kol dnoi^aatv Toiha iroiovyra wp6g t6

et^at KOL

jiri

elvai.

aim-aTTCtv.

cai

Tavras oUa9<u

XpTj

chai Ta?

djTt/cct/icVo?

^curct?,

SwaTOro^

Mcxdft^vov, dBwarov
OVK dSvvaTov, dvayKoxov dvayKouov, dXrjd^^
OVK d^Tjdes,
Suvarov, cv8e;(o/xcvoi'

ou/c

ouic

XIII. KaX at dKoXovdi^oci^ Sc Kara \6yov

160

ybmf

'

ON INTERPRETATION,
implies

it

may

xii-xiii

not be,' as also the latter the former.

These statements not being contradictory, the same

It may be,' however,
thing may be and may not be.
it cannot be,' being contradictory statements, can
never be both of them true -of one subject at any one
time. And the same may be said of the statements
it may not be.'
it cannot not be,'
'

Propositions concerning necessity are subject to

it
it is necessary that it should be,'
similar rules
Not necessary
is necessary that it should not be.*
that it should be will provide the negation of the
former, not necessary that it should not be.'
have, again, taking the latter, not necessary that
So also vidth it is impossible that it
it should not be.'
Not impossible that
should be or should not be.'
it should be constitutes the denial of the former, not
impossible that it should not be ; not impossible
that it should not be the proper denial of the latter.
Speaking generally, then, as we said, we must take
as the things underlying all such propositions as
*
these that it should be and that it should not be
and add one or other of these, would we make
affirmations or denials of those other terms that we
mentioned, of possible,' contingent and so on.
The following pairs must be reckoned as five con-

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

tradictory pairs
It

may

It

is

cannot be.
not contingent.
It is not impossible.
It is
It is not necessary.
It is
It is not true.
It is true.
XIII. From these affirmations and negations set
out in the foregoing manner certain consequences
It

be.

contingent.
impossible.
necessary.

It is

logically follow.

f2

161

ARISTOTLE
15

ttvan,

ivhex^crOai

#fot

Kal TO ^17 dSvvarov

cfi'af Ttp Sc Stn'aTov
cfi'at

TO

hvvarov
10

yap hwar^v

rat ovro) riBcfi^oi^' T<p /xv

firj

vBxoiJivov

/ii^

(fi'ai

/X17

firi

cfi^i

/ai)

avoyireubr

/A17

Kol r6

hwarov

TO ovayKatov

a5v^aTo' cfvai, toi 5^

ci'Scxo/xcyo)^

Koi to

clixu icoi i^)fO/ivoK fi^

/i.^

lv(u, r<p hi

tvai

to

rovro iKiy<^ dyrurrp^^y*

cfi'at

di'ayK'atb*'

/X17

tlvai

Stn^TOi'

i-

ttyai Kol /i^

cImu koI t^

fiij

fiif

t3 dt'ayKOibi'

oiJif

c2mu
clt'Oi

c<u /a^
urol

t6
'i

oSwaTov

/X17

Otwp^iaBw hi ix

lvai.

rrjf

viro-

ypa<l>rjs coj \iyop,v,

25

hvvarov ilvax

ov huvarov cu'ai

cVScxo/xcvov cfvai

ou#c

ovK a^vvarov

ohvvarov civcu

flvtu,

ovK avayKoiov
hvvaTov

fi-q

cfi'cu

vhx6fiVOV p-q clvai

so

OVK dhvvaTov
oitK

firj lvai,

dvayKoiov

firj

ovayiratoi'

fii^

ov hwarov

(U'ou

ttvai

clwii

cv5;(Oficn>i'

fii^

hfat

th^ai

ovk vhx6pLVO
dhvvarov

fi,'^

c2nu

^17 c2i*ai

dvayKoZov clyou

This is the wrong negation.

From Utementi that
follow we see that the table should be co r rected and * It is
not necessary that it should be * and * it is not
that it should not be ' shotild be transposed.

162

ON INTERPRETATION, xm
Implications

Propositions
/

1.

It

may

It is

be.

<J

2. It is

It is contingent.
It is
It

contingent.

not impossible.
not necessary.

may

be.

not necessary that it

3. It may not be (it is
should not be.
contingent that it
It is not impossible that
should not be).
it should not be.
It is necessary that it
should not be.
4. It cannot be (it is
It is impossible that it
not contingent).
should be.
It is necessary that it
5. It cannot not be (it is (
should be.
not contingent that /
It is impossible that it
it should not be).
j
should not be.
Consider these points more at length in the light
of the table subjoined
It is

It

may be.

It

cannot be.
not contingent.

It is contingent.

It is

not impossible that

should be.
It is not necessary that
it should be.

It is impossible that it

It

is

should be.
necessary that
should not be."

it

may

It is

not be.

It

It is contingent that it

It

It

should not be.

It is not impossible that

should not be.

It is not necessary that
it should not be.
it

it

cannot not be.

not contingent
is
that it should not be.

is impossible that it
should not be.
It is necessary that it
should be.
163

It

ARISTOTLE
To

hwarw

aKoXov6i

fUvcjs 3c* rep /icv

fifv

ayri<f>arixtj^ ,

yap buvarov

ctrtu

<f>ams'

KardKJKLais

anx^^ooif

To
ovx
22 b

aAA

Xi,

dm^ooct; x^P^^'
dvayicq

firj

yap

ovayACOto)'

aiTioF 5c Tov

y^

cm

lvax' ct S

elvai'

ware

ct

ovic

ro

ai)ro

dSvvarov

cVcu^

Swdfuvov.

p,rj

164

nd

c&cu.

ofioui>;

ovtc

ttpoA

yap
dXX^

lvu, rotrro avdytcrj

t^ bwartp tcai fiij,

yr TaiWv t({

aTjfia{yi

Tc dvay/catov koI ro oBvvarov, oAA'

dvrarpap^va)S .

<Sfi^or//>a(*

oyaynratoi'

t6 obwaTo^ rtp OMiy-

ravra cf vavrlas, cVci ou

10

ioTW an6^aats rod

dvayKaiov rotrro

clvax,

oi)ic

dKoXovdiv TO dvayKoiov ofioiutf

p,-^

a7ro3iSoTai,

dBvvarov

5*

^avpi 5^ 5r4

tou aim>0
cfixu

^117

r6

ctitu*

ouic cu'ay/ny cZi^oi* /i^;(crai

5Totff Tpois, OTt vaMrruo^

/caio)

Kara-

cu cvovrtoi cvoiatu* cu o

^^

to

cfvcu

yap dXr)dVa$aA

fi-q

cfvoi,

8* dvayc(uow woij, oirrlov,

oirrcjs

ij

ov hwarov c&'Oi to oSiWroi'

yap ro ahwarov

fii)

dyrtarpafi*
1}

Tou dSwarou axoXov6l, rj hi dno^datt

rw yap

r<p cv-

ovk ivSt^ofUvip Koi

Bxofivai Kol Svvar<p Kol

86

ahwaro

ovv dSvvarov kcu ovk

/xv

wovp

tipnjrai,

ON INTERPRETATION,
Now,

xiii

impossible that it should be,* not imposshould be are implied in * may be,' is
contingent,' and cannot be,* is not contingent
*

sible that it

'

'

contradictorily but with inversion.

For may be
implies
not impossible
im(denial, that is, of
possible *) ; impossible,' the positive, follows upon the
denial of may be or, that is to say, upon cannot be.*
Now let us see how things stand with propositions
predicating necessity.
Clearly the case here is
different, and contrary statements will follow upon
contradictory statements, which latter belong, in
addition, to sequences which are distinct.
For not
necessary that it should be cannot form the denial
or negation of necessary that it should not be.*
For both of these predicates well may hold good or be
true of one subject, as what of necessity is not need
not of necessity be. Now, what is the reason why all
propositions predicating necessity do not in the same
manner follow as the others with which we are dealing ? The answer will be found in the fact that
when used with a contrary subject, to predicate impossibility amounts to affirming necessity.
Supposing, I mean, it impossible for something or other to
be, it is necessary, not that it should be, but that
it, per contra, should not be.
Supposing, again, it
impossible that something or other should not be,
it must of necessity be.
So, if those propositions
affirming the impossible or the reverse will be found
without change of their subject to follow from those
predicating possibility or non-possibility, those predicating necessity will follow with the contrary subject.
It is necessary,' it is impossible are not of identical
meaning and yet are connected inversely a point
*

'

'

'

'

'

upon which we have touched.

165

ARISTOTLE
ovrtos Kia$ai raf rov dyayKolov

*H ahvvarov

ro /x^ yap dyayKoZov tyai huvariiv

(u^t^acrciy;

etvar t yap

yap ^
tvai,

Kaiov
16

cfvoi,

/i^

cfi'at'

ro)

dyayKalov

cfvat*

yap

/iv

fti^

Suvarov
icatoi'

S*

avay^

dp<l>w,

/x^

clvoi,

cZ^at

&np

t6 ai'aytcaXov tUni <L(o-

cfvoi,

TO oMiyKOtor

ot)5^

a/x^cu

^vS/^^rrtu
jj,

cfvoi

Acittctcu

/ii7

aviifiaivtw,

t<^

ircu

c&cu, ouic corot

tooow to

ducoAov^cu'

/ai^

o^k^ti Iotcu

dpa yap Syvarov cZmu

dXrjBrj.
t

^iMi)f^

r<p

crrcu* ctiaTC avfifialvi

TovTwv 8^ 6nroTpov ay aXrjdt^

Klva

5vMvr^
r6

firjv

<utxya4dr

^^>^ ot^^

hwaTov

Aov^ci TO)

fn^

cli^oi

oAAa

drorroF.

cImcu

oAAa

OTonov.

aSuvarov dpa

to ovk dhvi-arov ctitu dKoXovM,

avayKoiov

TO

20

tvai'

o7rc/>

lvai

rovTw 3c TO

war*

atroifHivar

i)

<l>dvat,

dhvvarov

Sui^arov

dn6<l>aaii dj(oXov$i/f<m' avaytaj

fii^, rj

ovic

avay-

dtn^r^M

cImoM^

toOto yap oAt^^cj kcu icaTa toO dvayKoZov (tvai,

Kal yap avrq ylvTai dvTt^aot; rj
S5

irrofidvjf

t^

ov hwaTov etvar iKclvw yap dKoXov$i to oSiWtot

er^at Kal

dvayKaZov

OVK avayKalov
ai^at at

p.Tj

/x^

ctvai,

dvrL<f>d(TLS

ctvai,

oC

17

dno^aatf t6

ojcoXovdoval tc dpa Koi

Kara rov iprip,^v

Tpdrrov,

Kal ovBev oBvvarov ou/xjSatrci riBcyuivoiv ovtoh.

Anoprjacif 8* dv Tty
166

cc tcj

dvayKOxov ttvai t6

ON INTERPRETATION,

xiii

Or is it the fact that one cannot arrange in the foregoing manner contradictories predicating necessity ?
For that which must be also may be. For if not, the
negative follows, since one or the other must follow.
And so, if a thing is not possible, then must it needs be
impossible. Hence we pronounce it impossible for
that which must needs be to be. But that statement,
of course, is absurd. Upon may be,' however, not
impossible follows in logical sequence, not necessary upon not impossible,' and things that must
needs be need not be which statement, again, is
absurd.
It is necessary,' again, that it should be
cannot be inferred from it may be,' nor yet can the
negative statement, it is necessary that it should not
be.'
I mean that
it may be
implies a bilateral
Should one of the two propositions just
potentiality.
mentioned, however, be true, there will then not
be both the alternatives. The thing that may be
yet may not be. But if we suppose for the moment
it either must be or must not be, we rule one alternative out, and no need is there that it should not
be (which equally holds of what must be) must
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

We

from it may be.'

note, too,
that this proposition negates that which follows on
follows in
it cannot be,' since
it is impossible
logical sequence it cannot be,* just as there follows,
in turn, it is necessary that it should not be,' and
this proposition the one that we mentioned itself
contradicts.
So we see that in this case as well contradictories follow contradictories after the manner
w^e mentioned, and, being arranged in that manner,
they lead to no logical absurdities.
One may at this point raise the question, whether
upon it is necessary
will logically
it may be

follow, therefore,
*

'

'

'

'

167

ARISTOTLE
toSwarov

yap

cJ tc

cTr^rai.

tlvai

dvrufKLGis cwcoAou^^ct, r6

fiif

hrmu, 4

fi^

hwar^

cfroi*

tnl

t Tt9 ravnjv firj <l>ijaiv cfvot avri^aaw, dvdyKfi

Xdyew TO Si/varoi' /ii7 cf^'OA* aircp a^t^^uf ^miSij
Kara rod dyayKoiov lvU. dXXa, fiiiv vaXu^ r6
avro etvai SoKt Siwarov r^^vta$ai Kol fi^i rifUf9*
85

adai

/cat etvai

Kal

firj

Koiov elvai ivBcxofifvov

lortu rh iow/^

(tvai, utort
firf

ttvai'

roOro

M ^08of.

ov irav ro hwarov ^ ctnu ^ fiahl*

<f>avp6v htf ori

{civ KoX ToL avrt#ci/iva

SiWroi, oAA* iarw i^*

ovK dXrjdes, npwrov yh^ iirl rwv fiij icari

Xoyov hvvarcjv, otov ro nvp Btppjayrucov rcu Ix^i
fjjv

at airral 'n\i6voiv koi

ov

Kal

dcpfialveiv

hwdfJLCLS

rovTo

rGiV

3c

rd

W9

x^P^^

oAAd

om

ircuva

din-LKifjLV(vv,

ou8*

hvvdp.is

ivepyeCa

yq(TiV dvy olov

168

ov

oaai

Xiyovrai

iatv,

ro yap

cISos".

oyuiiwpLoL

ov,

otov

fitv ori dXrj

btn^rov /SoBi^ccv ori

hvvarov cfvcu ort rjSrj

Vpyuiv o Acycrai elvat. SvvaroVf ro Bd
dv.

iil.

ht^aoBoA.

elprjrai,

lOjSaStfct, Kal oXcDS

o-ctcv

Surar^

rwv Kara rai dXSyovs

Svvarov ovx dnXcjs Acycrai, oAAa to

des

aXoyoi

h*

oca oAAa h^pytt

ovS*

din'iKLp,va

rourov

Kara ro auro
Eviai

/xtJ,

Surarcu kcu

dp,a

p.v

SvvafiLs

rwv ivavruov, al

dAA* aKnTp lp7jrat, ro irOp ad

Tracxai,

evia fivroi

hwapAiS

al /xcv oiV fitra Xoyov

ii%hvvafiuf aXoyov.

tan Kar

on

hwardv thai Pabi^tw on

Kal avrr) p,v

im

ivp/3a5i-

roZs Kunjrois ^ari

ON INTERPRETATION,
If not,

follow.

xiii

must the contradictory, it cannot

supposing you say that this
*

be,' logically follow or,

statement is not the correct contradictory, it may

not be logically follows. But both propositions are
It seems the
false as applied to what is of necessity.
accepted opinion that things that may be or be cut
may, per contra, not be or be cut. And we should
in that case be concluding that that which must be
may not be, which, it goes without saying, is false.
It is clear that not everything capable of being or
walking possesses the opposite potentiality. Cases
there are to the contrary. First, there are those
things which have a non-rational potentiaUty.
Among such, for instance, is fire, which is capable
of giving out heat
a non- rational potentiaUty.
Rational potentialities issue in more than one way
*

'

or in contrary results or directions. Not so all irrational ones. That is, fire, to repeat what we said,
cannot both give and not give out heat, nor can anything else always actual have any such potentiality.

Some

however, allow of such

So much, then, by way of explaining that,
even where potentiaUty is quite unambiguously
irrational potentialities,

issues.

'

used, not every potentiality admits of such opposite

issues.

But sometimes the term

ambiguous.
Possible
on the one hand, of
*
facts and of things that are actuaUzed it is possible
for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks,
and in general we call a thing possible,' since it is
now realized. On the other hand, possible is
used of a thing that might he realized it is possible
for someone to walk, since in certain conditions he
would. It is only to that which can move that this
itself is

ambiguous.

is

It is used,

'

'

'

'

'

169

ARISTOTLE
8c aXrides eiTrtlv ro fiYf oSiWroy clmi fiM'
elvat, Kal ro pahi^ov rj&rj Koi httpyff^
ovrw bifvarov oidx
ro fihf
pahiariKov

dfJLffxo

Jcty
16

TO

mU

rf

o^

dXrjOcs

Kara rov ovayKaiov

Sc oXqBls.

o)ar

Irrti

rat

atrXiv^ inW,

0drfpO

iv /i/pci r6

tcad^Aov

e^ dvdytcqi ovrt cweroi to ovmutvcu

ov fiein-Qi nav. Kal cori 5i) dpxh mto^ to
dvayKoiov koI firi dyaYKotov iTdyTW n ttvfu ^
yij)
lv(Ut Kol ToAAa <lti rovroii djcoXovBoikrra
CTTcrat, rat
^^'at,

to

TTiaKOTTlv Sct.

^avp6v Stj ck ruiv lpr)^va>v ori to 4( dvaytcrif

ov Kar \'pyidv arw, cocrrc ci npdrtpa rd oj&ia,
Koi ra yjtv
KoX rj Vf>yia Stntx/icco? nportpa.
dvv Svi'dfKOjg Vpyiai unv, otav al wparrai
25

ovcriai, rd 8c /xcTa 8tWfta>9* 5 Tfj fihf ^u<Mt

TTporepa rip 8c XP^^V wrrtpa, rd
iM4moT
VpyiaL claiv dXXd hm'dfiif fidvov.
XIV. II or pov hi vavria lariv ij Kard/^amf

rij
80

dTTOijtdaei,

rj

ij

8t/catoy

ro)

God and

Kard(f>aGii

rfj

tcara^dafi,

#ral

nds dvBpumoi
ou8cty dvBpumo^ huccuos, ^ to wo9

Aoyo? Toi Xoyat

6 Xtyaty

ori

intfllijrcncfs moving the

The arjrument implies that the
The main proof/ says I>r. Rom,

the

heavenly bodies.

*
is also eternal.
of the
priority of actuality is the following :
Whai ki cslcnMU
in
nature
to
what is perishable ; and nothing li cAenial
Erior
y virtue of potentiality. For that which has the potentUntj
of being has also the potentiality of not-being, while thie
eternal is that which from its very nature cannot fail to be.
In a sense, therefore, all the primordial entities in the universe are free from potentiality. God is in the fullest senst
actual, since He is always what He is at any tinte, and hit
no element of unrealised potentiality {ArisMU, p. ITT). '
*

170

ON INTERPRETATION,

xiii-xiv

kind of capacity belongs, while the former may also

belong to such things as have no power of motion.
Both of that which is walking and actual and of that
which is capable of walking but does not now actually
walk, it holds good that it is not impossible that it
should walk (or should be). Now, this latter potentiality we cannot affirm of the necessary in its unqualified sense
but the other we can so affirm. In
conclusion, then, as the universal must follow upon
the particular, so will the possible follow on that
which exists of necessity, although not in all of its
;

senses.
I think,

Of being,

not-being, indeed,

may

necessity,

absence be properly called the first

principles, so that all else must be viewed as but
following or consequent on them.
It is evident from the foregoing that the necessary
And the actual is prior to the
is also the actual.
There
potential, inasmuch as the eternal is prior.
are, first of all, those actualities entirely without possiThen there
bihty, such as the primary substances.
is that class of things which are actual and also
potential
actuahty is prior to possibiUty with these
in the order of nature, although it is not prior in
time.* There are finally those things also that
remain but the barest possibilities and never become

and

its

**

actualities."

XIV. Here

arises a

doubt as to whether an affirma-

contrary to a negative statement or

contrary to a second affirmation. Has the proposition every man is just for its contrary no man is

tive statement

is

'

'

Generated and perishable substances in the sublunary

world.
"

on.

Such as the

largest number, the least magnitude

realized, though conceivable.

and so

These are never

171

ARISTOTLE
dvBpornos StVatoff rw way avBpomoi aSurof, o&p
loTt KoAAtas SiVatos ovK <m KaXXiai &mco40>
KoAAia? aSt^coy cWf nortpa 817 A'ovrio rovrwv;
t yctf)

ra

/xcv o'

t^

^*^

o/foAov^ci ToJy iv

Staj'oia, cVct Sc ivavria 5<Jfa

nds avBpomos SiVoioy

tJ
toO ivayriov, oiov

avBpcanos dScicof,
ayayKti
rfj 4*<jjyfj
c^ 8< H'V ^'^^^ V ^^^ ivayriov
ofjLoicjg ^X^t'VSofa vavria arw, oiJW ^ $cara^aat9 rfj icoto<f>dai carat ivavrla^ oAA' i^ tifnjfi^vrj dttr^^acny.
oiOTC (7K7rrov nola Sofa oAi^^y ^kv^I Wfj^
vavria, ncmpov 17 1-79 diroi^atcjs fj ^ r6 AmvOTL

ij

^at

Tujv

7rl

rfj irds

Kara^xiofuiv

<7n nc
A/ycu 5 a5c.
Sofa^ouaa.
tou dya^ou ot4 ayo^c^, iE^Aei}
ort ouK dyadoi/ ^cuSi^, cr<7><i S< on iccucov.
TTOTcpa S17 Torrct>' o'cun-ux TJ dXrfitl; Ktu ti tan

h^tIov lvai
28 b

Sofa

/xta,

To

^a^* diTOTipav
/xv

817

rw

wpCadai,
5

oAryft^y

ri

ivavria.;

rovTut oUaOdi rdy ^ixuT^ff bofa^

rwv evavrtcjv e&oi, ilfvSof roO ydp

dya^ou ort dya^oi' ccu rov Ka*coO &n Koxdv 1}

avrrj laws Kal dXrjdris corai, ctrc TrAciouy ciTC /ua
GTLv.
evavTia oc rain^a.
oAA ov r<f ivatrruttv
elvai, evavrla, dAAd pLoXXov rw ^pavrta>y.
Et S^ loTi /xcw TOU dya^ov on iariv dyaBov
Grote observes upon this that some of AristoUe*t obrespecting the place and functions of the oegathre
particle (01)), must be understood with rcfcrenee to the
variable oraer of words in a Greek or Latin ffntfOfW t for
instance, the distinction between KallUu nan ml imttmt and
Kallias est non ituttu does not suggest itself to one tpenking
English or French * {AristotU, p. 1S7). But poadUy this
particular chapter is not by Aristotle himsdH

servations

172

'

ON INTERPRETATION,

xiv

every man is unjust the contrary ?

is unjust
is not just,'
illustrate
what I mean. Which of these propositions are
contraries ? Supposing that the verbal proposition
corresponds with the intellectual judgement, and,
further, that that judgement is contrary to a judgement asserting the contrary, as judging that every
man is just is to judging every man is unjust, then
the same thing assuredly holds of our verbal proposiOn the other hand, if we suppose that
tions as well.
the judgement asserting the contrary is not, in the
mind of the speaker, the contrary one to another, no
longer will one affirmation be contrary unto another.
ITie negation will be the true contrary. Which of
the true judgements, then, is the contrary one to the
false ?
Is it that which denies the false judgement ?
Or that which pronounces the contrary ? Take,
for example, three judgements concerning a thing
that is good a, true judgement or that it is good,'
a false judgement or it is not good,' and a third,
it is bad.'
Of the last two which
quite distinct,
Or
constitutes really the contrary one to the true ?
supposing them one and the same, then which verbal
expression is the contrary ?
To fancy that contrary judgements are those that
have contrary subjects is to take an erroneous view.
For the judgement that a good thing is good and the
judgement that a bad thing is bad may be possibly
one or more, they are both of
one and the same
them true. Yet the subjects are contrary here.
But what constitutes judgements as contrary is having
two contrary senses, not having two contrary subjects.
Suppose that we have two opinions regarding a
thing that is good, one opining that that thing is
just
*

Or

is

'

Callias is just,'

'

'

173

ARISTOTLE
o^k ayadov, <m hi <ZAAo t ^

8* art

""ScJfa, oAAt;

oux virapx^i ovS*

10

vndp(<u,

re

oEoi'

rtifv

{ih 3^
r6 /x^

oAAoiJ' ovBcfjuav dcriov, out oaai vwapx^Uf

oatu

xmdpxov ho^a^ovoiv ovB*

xmdpxov
dpx^Lv

ho$d^ovat to
ro

tnrdpx^iv
dTTdrrj.

cf

ctati'

dXX*

undpxov),

avrat 8

vndpxov

^117

wv

vmifixtw

fi^

yap dfu^crtpcu, kqi oocu

(d7Tipoi

teal

oomc

al ycWacif.

inr-

oooi ^1^
i^rriy
^*f

ij

Tcur

dvTiKipLva}V 5 at yoVaci;, coorc teai al awartu.

Et odv TO dya^oF

fai dyci^oi'

yap avrw ov

{(TvjJLpeprjKC

Kd(TTov oArj^j
/cai dXrjdrjg.

rf

t}

*ca^*

fUv

ow

tcoKta c&tu), /loAAov hk

iavro, koI ilm^i^, Ciircp

ori

rod Kad* iauTo xmdpxoi'ro^

20

ifjevhrjs

rov dyadov

ivavrlov Sofa.

arov 6

rwv

^ci^Sify,

rrjv

rrjs
1}

ij

rij^

Sc Toy

hk roO

on

toart fiaXXov av

diro^aato}^

evavrlav Xiov Sofov* Ta

TrXelcrrov Bia<f>p6inru)v npl

dvr(Af>d(j(x)s

1}

1}

roQ

SUtpevarai St fidXurra irtpl KA^

evaurla fiev rovruiv

25

ovk aya0o9 to ofyoBc^

KaKov rov Kara GvpLPtPr)K6^

17)

koI oi iau^ ioH^

iavTo TO & Kara avfiPp'qK6s

Kol TO p.v KaO*

rpa,

ij

hrjXov

on KaKov

on

yap ivavrla

r6 avr6.

1 o9i9

ivavruitrtpa

avrrj

op

ciiy

1}

iyama,

ro ayaOov crvfirrenXeyfurri

* In order to make this point clear, Aristotle, it Meoii.

should have added * whereas there can be but ooe amtwuy.

174

ON INTERPRETATION,
good and the other one that

it is

xiv

not,

and suppose

there exist other qualities such as are neither inherent nor could be inherent in good, no opinion,
notwithstanding, must be taken for the contrary one
to the true that opines that some quality inheres,
though it does not inhere, in the good or opines that
it does not inhere, though it does so inhere, in the
good, inasmuch as no limit of range is imposed on
these types of opinion.**
shall rather call contrary to the true ones those judgements, in which
there is error. And these have to do with generation.
Generation means passing or transition from one of
two extremes to the other
hence error is such a

We

transition.

What

is

good, then,

is

good and not bad.

The

one quality belongs to it essentially, the other by

accident only. For by accident is it not bad. But
supposing that judgement the truest that deals with
a thing's actual essence, that false one is really most
false, that in like manner deals with its essence.
A
false judgement, deahng with essence, is that which
is good is not good.'
It is bad,' though a false
judgement also, concerns what is accidental only. So
the judgement denying its goodness is falser than that
'

'

some other and contrary quahty. And

then most completely deceived is the man who on
this or that point entertains an opinion or judgement
which is contrary to that which is true. For contraries belong to those things that within the same
class differ most.
Supposing, then, that one of two
judgements is contrary to that which is true but that
that which is contradictory is even more contrary
still, then the latter must be the real contrary.
To
judge that a good thing is bad is, moreover, a compredicating

175

ARISTOTLE
yap

iari' koX

ayaOov

ori ovk

tntf Swo

dydytcrf

XafiPdvcLV rov aurov.

"Eti Sc,

Kol nl riuv o^Xljv ofAoiws 5<i <X*"'

^ yap

Kal ravrji av Sofcic KoXut^ tlpija^ai'

irov-

raxov TO r^y dvTKJxiatws ^ ovSofioO. Saoif

8o/ArJ coTiv ivavrla, 7rpi rovru)V tart fUv fJKV^ifi ^
T^ dXrjdcZ ain-ucifi^inrj, otov 6 rov &SpufUOt^ ovk
avdpWTTOV OlOflCVOS 8l^lKTTOi.

O^TOi ivOV'

1 Ol5v

rial, Kol al dAAai at r^j (U^t^orccoc.

"Ert opLOLOJS

85

X^i>

rov

17

TOU dyadov ort ovk ayadov koI

p.T]

oTt ctya^ov.

T^ o^v rov

97

roO

cti}

oiJif

vavria;

17

raimu^

fn^

dyoBov
dyaB6
ov

Acyouaa ort kojcov dfia yap dy ytdtc

Tt

p,7i

Miff

cm

dyadov KaKov, wGr ^i^;(crcu

d^

dX-qdels lvax.

yap Kal

y^

dXrjOri^ dXrjBtl ivoirrla'

dXrjdijs, ovb7TOT 8c

yap

1}

irp6s

dyodov ort

firj

dv

dXrjdel ovoT) B6(j) rls

817

a/o^^ mu

Tou aya^ov ori

17

ayadov on, ovk dyadov, Koi

r)

ovh* av

ot4 ov Koxdv' dXrfiifS

1}

yap Kal ravra dv cfty. AcwrcTttt ow t^ rov fi-q dyadov ori ovk dyadov ivayria
24 i} rod fiTj dyadov on dyadov ilf^vSr^s yap avrtj.
cjcrre Kal rj rov dyadov on ovk dyoBov r^ roO
dyadov on dyadov.
40

avrrj.

Q>avp6v he

indwfiev

dfia

on

vavria carat, olov

o av
176

ovScv Biolaci ovS*

TT)v Kard<f>aaLV'
rfi

ho^

^ dyadov dyadov iarw

dtv

koBoXov

yap KadoXov dard^aais

-q

-q

rfj

Bo^a^oikri) ori trap

on

ovShf rusv dyadwv

ON INTERPRETATION,

xiv

For the man who thus judges, I

posite judgement.
think, must as certainly judge it not good.
Then again, the contradictory judgement is the
contrary always or never. And if this holds good in
all others, so must it in this case as well, and the view
that we took was correct. In the case of things
having no contraries we hold that that judgement is
Thus a
false which denies what the true one asserts.
man is, for instance, deceived who supposes a man
not a man. If the contraries here are the negatives,
so, we conclude, are they always.

Then, that what

is

not good

is

not good

is

good thing
is good, and that that which is good is not good is a
parallel judgement to judging that that which is not
good is good. What is contrary, then, to the true
one that what is not good is not good ? Not, at any
that might well at the same time
rate, that it is bad
be true, and true judgements can never be contrary.
Some things that are not good are bad, so that both
may together be true. Nor is judging it not bad the
contrary, seeing that, too, may be true, since both
attributes might be compresent. And so in the case
of the judgement that what is not good is not good we
similar or parallel judgement to one that a

are driven at last to conclude that the contrary is

that it is good. For that judgement, of course, is a
Again, in a similar manner of the judgefalse one.
ment that a good thing is good the true contrary is
that it is not.
To make the affirmation universal will evidently
not alter matters. The universal negative judgement
Suppose, for
will then be the obvious contrary.
example, a man judges everything good to be good :
then the contrary of this is his judging that nothing

177

ARISTOTLE
Si a

dyadov, 17 yap rov dyadov on dyaB6, i tMXiHf

TO ayadov, rj atmy <m rfj on o ay f ayoB^
o^Shr hu/^ipi
So^a^ovarj on dyadov rovro
rov on ttSlv o dv ^ dyadov dyaMv itrrw, ifwli&t
b 5c Kal 7TL rov firj dyadov.
"Clare etfTCp ctti Sofijy ovru}^ ^**#
%k al hf
rij <f>wvfj Kara^ais koi dno<^<Tts avfifio^ rQ
v rjj ilfvxfj, SijXov on koI iraro^ooci ipoyria
fiv dn6<l>aaLS 17 nepl rov avrov KaB^Xov, otov t

84

*^

on ndv dyadov dyadov tj on wdi tu^pwnos

dyados 17 on ovSev tf oi)ScV OKn^ruf^ b^ on
^vp6v 8^ on teal 6Xfi$fj
Tf ov ndv rj ov nd^.
dX7]dL ovK iv^^x^rai ti'aiTiop clwt ot^c 8<$fav
ovrc di'rltj>amv^
vavriai fUv ydp al tr^pl ri
din-i,KifjLva, TTfpl ravra ht ^i-Sc'xrrat dXi}/di&Vif
rov ainov dfia Bi ovk tvhtx^rai rd i^ayrla Ow
dpxLv ro} avrw,
1

178

iw6^0tp B.

ON INTERPRETATION,

xnr

of that kind is good. For the judging what is good

be good, if the subject be taken universally,

to

amounts to a judgement pronouncing whatever is good

to be good, and the latter in turn to a judgement pronouncing good everything good. And the same is
the case with the not good.
If this is the case with our judgements and verbal
affirmations and denials are symbols of those mental
judgements, it is clear the universal denial, when the
subject is one and the same, is the positive statement's true contrary. For instance, propositions
affirming every good, every man to be good have for
contraries propositions affirming no man, nothing
good to be good. Contradictories, however, have
It
for subjects not every man,' not every good.'
is manifest, too, that true judgements and true propositions can never be contrary one to another.
While two propositions that are true can together be
truly asserted, two contrary propositions must predicate contrary quahties, and these in the selfsame
subject can never together inhere.
'

179

THE PRIOR ANALYTICS

INTRODUCTION
The Development or AmiroTUC*! Looic

I.

The

invention of the syllogism, or rather the tjttematic treatment of the laws of inference, was perhapt
Aristotle's greatest and most original achievement.
It stands to reason that his approach to logical t tudiea
must have been through the Dialectic of the Academy but although we can see something of the
practical application of Plato's theories in such dialogues as the ThratteluM, PanmenuUs, Sopkist and
PoUticuSt there is little ground for supposing that thej
were ever fully developed on the formal side. Indeed our evidence points the other way. MTien
Aristotle is consciouslv building upon Plato foundations, or upon those ot any other philosophical tcboolt
he is accustomed to point out and account for the
mistakes of his predecessors ; but in the AnaUfticM the
only overt reference to Plato (46 a 31) concerns the
practice of definition by dichotomy (as exemplified in
the last two dialogues mentioned above), and hia
description of it as " a kind of weak syllogism " scenw
to imply that it was Plato's nearest approach in this
direction.
It is moreover intrinsically probable th^t
the systematic treatment of the inferential ppoceaa
should be attributed to Aristotle's own remarkable
powers of analysis.
;

182

PRIOR ANALYTICS
The theory of syllogism, as we find it expressed in
the Prior Analytics, is clearly the result of long study
and experiment. Attempts have been made in
recent years by two German scholars, F. Solmsen
{Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik,
conveniently summarized by Professor J. L. Stocks
in C.Q., 1933, pp. 115-124) and P. Gohlke (Die
Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik) to trace the development of the theory. Solmsen arranges the main
logical works in the following order
(1) Topics IVII ; (2) Posterior Analytics I ; (3) Topics VIII and
:

IX (De
II

Sophisticis Elenchis)

(5) Prior Analytics.

(4) Posterior Analytics

Dr Gohlke on

the other

hand holds that the received order of the two Analytics is correct, and that Topics VIII and IX presuppose the Analytics. I do not find his arguments
Certainty about such a point
perhaps unattainable, but I am strongly inclined
towards the view that the Prior Analytics contains at
least some of Aristotle's maturest logical thought.
Of course the problem is complicated by the fact
that the logical works as we possess them are almost
certainly compilations from notes or rough drafts for
The material is not always
Aristotle's discourses.
well arranged (e.g. chs. xv-xxii of An. Pr. II would
come more naturally in the Topics, and there is no
reason to suppose that the present arrangement has
any chronological significance. It is moreover highly
probable that corrections and afterthoughts have
been inserted in the text without complete assimilaand that many of the minor inconsistencies are
tion
Dr Gohlke's attempt to
due to this procedure.
identify these later passages, and so to distinguish the
different strata of thought, is attractively worked
entirely convincing.

is

183

ARISTOTLE
out

but his results must as yet be regarded at con-

jectural.

II.

The Theory op Syixooum

dc

tbb Paiob

Analytics

Summary of the cotUenU

book of the Prior Anabftict falls into two
first 26 chapters arc devoted to the
the entuidatiaa and
formal statement of the theory

The

halves.

first

The

demonstration of the laws of srllogiatfo reatoiiiiig

and the analysis of the various tbmiB whidi the
logism can take. The last 90 chapten contain iiH
stnictions for the construction of syllogbnity either
in general or for special purposes, and a nomber of
practical directions and warnings to stodcnta.
Aristotle begias naturally by defining his subject
and explaining his terminology. It is worth noting in
this connexion that the use of the words epor (bound
or limit), OKpov (extreme) and iimrov (middle) to describe the terms, and of Siamifta (interval) as an alternative to Tporaa-ii or premiss, suggests that Aristotle
was accustomed to employ some form of bbfckboord
diagram, as it were, for the purpose of lUastratkm.
A premiss was probably represented by a line join->
ing the letters chosen to stand for the terms. How
quality and quantity were indicated can only be con-

jectured. These distinctions are stated In ch. ii.

The quantitative analysis of judgements was almost
certainly Aristotle's discover}- ; there is no trace of it
in Plato, and it is certainly not explicit in the
gories ; it is first formulated in ch. \-ii of the De Initrpretatione. The point is, of course, vital to the theory

Gu^

184

PRIOR ANALYTICS
of syllogism (cf. An. Pr. I. xxiv and xxxiii). The rest
of the chapter gives the rules for conversion of asserCh. iii. deals with the conversion
toric premisses.
of apodeictic and problematic premisses, which are
now mentioned for the first time. It is extremely
probable that this ** chapter " did not form part of the
'*
original course on the syllogism, but was " added

had outlined his theory of modality.

Chs. iv-vi describe the valid moods in the three
figures.
It should be observed that Aristotle did not
recognize the fourth or " Galenian *' figure (at any
rate as a separate type) ; in which he was probably
right.
Ch. vii sums up the findings of the three
previous chapters, and shows how all syllogisms can
be reduced to the universal syllogisms of the first
after Aristotle

figure.

Chs. viii-xxii are devoted to the analysis of modal

This part of Aristotle's theory is full of
difficulties, and is discussed in a separate section
syllogisms.

(l)p.

189-193).

In ch. xxiii Aristotle returns to his main theory,

and distinguishing logical proofs as either ostensive
or hypothetical, proceeds to examine the mechanism
of syllogism. He first explains the function of the
middle term, and shows that the three figures exhaust
the possible ways of relating the middle to the extreme terms. Hence all ostensive syllogisms are
effected by these three figures.
But hypothetical
syllogisms also depend upon ostensive proof
and
therefore all syllogisms are effected by the three
figures and are ultimately reducible to the universal
syllogisms of the first figure.
Ch. xxiv points out that in every syllogism (1) one
premiss at least must be affirmative, and (2) one
;

185

ARISTOTLE
premiss at least must be universl : i>. the middle
term must be distributed.
Ch. XXV lays down the materials
drawing a svUogistic inference, vix.

This doctrine is of course

the beginning, but it is first cleerlj
Ch. xxvi sums up the facilities for oamn
structive and destructive proof.
The second section of book I begins wlUi en zplanation, in chs. xxvii-xxx, of the metlMMl of tlndhy
premisses by selecting consequents and antecedents
of the major and minor terms ; and bow the method
is to be applied in the case of different prauMitioQi.
Ch. xxxi criticises the Platonic method of definitioa
by dichotomy. Ch. xxxii shows how to reduce erguments to syllogistic form in the several figures.
In chs. xxxiii-xliii we find a series of warnings
against errors in selecting or enunciating terms antd
premisses. Ch. xliv shows how far bjpothetieal
proofs admit of reduction, and ch. xW treats of the
Finally eh.
resolution of one figure into another.
xlvi explains the true form of contradictory statements.
Book II discusses various aspects and properties of
the syllogism and similar methods of reasoning. The
first chapter explains that more than one eoncluiion
can be drawn from the same premisses, and the next
three show how true conclusions can be drawn finom
Chs. v-\'ii describe circular or recifalse premisses.
procal proof, chs. \'iii-x deal with the conversion of
syllogisms, and chs. xi-xiii with redaction ml iwtpoiMlt
in the three figures.
Ch. xiv compares the piooedare
of ostensive proof with that of reduction ad impossihile, and ch. xv considers the question of drawing
containinf^ three terms.

^om

implicit
stated here.

186

PRIOR ANALYTICS
conclusions from contrary and contradictory preChs. xvi and xvii are devoted to the fallacies
misses.
of petitio principii and false cause, while in ch. xviii
Aristotle points out that falsity in an argument depends upon the first false statement which it contains.
Chs. xix and xx treat of the syllogism in argument
and refutation. Ch. xxi shows the possibiHty of being
mistaken in a particular judgement even when one has
knowledge of the universal truths upon which that
judgement, when properly conceived, depends. Ch.
xxii deals with the convertibility of terms, and with
the comparison of desirable and undesirable objects.
The last five chapters treat of argument by induction,
by example, by reduction, by objection, and by probabilities or " signs."
Aristotle* s view

of the syllogism

The formulation of a logical system which in spite

of modifications some of which are questionable
improvements remains the basis of all subsequent
logic, was so great a feat that criticism seems almost
ungenerous, especially when we consider that here
as elsewhere we are compelled to judge Aristotle, as
If he himself had edited
it were, at second hand.
the logical works for publication, he would doubtless
have removed many of the imperfections and incon-

which can be observed in our text. There

however, certain defects which call for notice.
A purely formal logic which is detached from
reality is a worthless instrument indeed
and since
Aristotle's logic is avowedly the instrument of the
mind in search of truth, we do not look in it for any
such detachment. But there is reason to suppose

sistencies
are,

187

ARISTOTLE
that he expected more corrcjfpondence between the
conclusion of a syllogism and objective reality than It
compatible with the conception of the tylk^gtan et a
process of thought. At any rate in 54 b 14 f." he apparently denies the validity of a syUogtai
the conclusion which follows from a pair
stating a narrowly restrictetl relation pro
could be inferred from complete knowM|ge ti the
i**
The premisses arc :
facts.

Everything which moves

an animal.
All men may move.

maj

(at

a given time) hi

The conclusion, says Aristotle, to apodeictie, not

problematic, because man is necessarily an animal ;
and since an apodeicUc conclusion cannot be drawn
from problematic premisses, Aristotle decides that
the syllogism is invalid. The same arlitrary olijeetion occurs in lines 32-37.
These are certainly exther come in a passage which to
;
so hastily expressed that ft appears to be an afterthought designed to meet certain practical diffficalties ; and I have observed no exact parallel to them.
But the general practice of rebutting the validity of a

treme examples

syllogism by selecting concrete examples (howe%er

natural and unobjectionable it may be in itself)
suggests a tendency to look for object! re truth in the
conclusion. The careful discussion of the possibility
of drav^ing a true conclusion from false premisses
{An. Pr. II. ii-iv) may perhaps point in the same
direction.

Elsewhere, too, Aristotle seems to emphasise the

apodeictic function of the syllogism by regarding the
conclusion as something distinct from the premisses
rather than as potentially latent in them. The Tery
188

PRIOR ANALYTICS
b 18 stresses the former
and throughout the early chapters of An. Pr.
I, when he is establishing the valid moods of the three
figures, he proceeds by taking different pairs of premisses and then considering what conclusion if any
can be drawn from them. Of course this is quite
and it comes almost
legitimate, but it is one-sided
as a surprise when in ch. xiii ad Jin. he reverses the
process and analyses the conclusion into its premisses.
Moreover, he is led to change his normal practice
the desire to show that a
here by a special motive
problematic conclusion can be drawn either from two
problematic premisses or from one problematic and
one assertoric premiss. Here again the section in
question has the air of an afterthought
at least it is
It is a
curious that the point was not raised before.
definition of syllogism in 24

aspect

similar failure to regard the syllogism as a coherent

whole that leads to the errors which I have noted on

b 2 and

however, to add that in

67 a 33-b 11, the true relation of conclusion to premisses is made quite explicit.
34<

An. Pr.

7.

It is only fair,

II. xxi, especially

The Modal Analysis and

its

defects

The whole section (An. Pr, I. viii-xxii) on modal

syllogisms shows signs of superficial treatment.
It
seems clear to me that Aristotle either found this
part of his theory unsatisfactory and left it incomplete (we know from Alexander and various scholia
that Theophrastus and Eudemus lost no time in
modifying it) ; or that he merely sketched it in outline and gave the task of working it out in detail to
The latter hypothesis is attractive, since
his pupils.
it would account better for the lack of proper syn189

ARISTOTLE
but in default of linguistic or styUstic e vfckoee
can only be entertained as a remote poadbUlty.
In the tirst place Aristotle never makes dear wlial
he means by the apodeictic, assertorie and problematic relations. It is practically certain that ne eoosiders the distinction to be grounded upoo
**
animal
objective, yet he uses the same terms
"
m an i n 25 a 25 26 a 8 , b 7 , and i8 a to iUtntrate
b 6 ete.
an assertorie, and in SO a 2i, b S8, 51 b 41,
One might topto illustrate an apodeictic relation.
pose the analysis of premisses as apodeictie, assei toi Jc
and problematic to refer to the predieatloQ of tlie
definiton^ genus or differentia, of the property, and of
the accident ; but the only evidence for
spondence seems to be in 43 b 6 IT. Hie
of the accident with problematic
perhaps also be inferred from a compaHaOB of TWef
102 b 6 with An. Pr. 32 b 10. But it is a aeriow dcfeet
that so important a point should receive no eiqplkit
treatment, and the omission in itself jnstlfiet vs in
supposing that the modal 83rstem was never brought
thesis,

it

'

to perfection.

The whole question of the problematic relation it

very difficult, and we can hardly acquit Aristotle of
entertaining inconsistent views about It. Three conceptions of the " possible " appear in the Anwihfluf,
This afcoane ex(1) That which is not impossible.
cludes neither the actual nor the necessary (5 a 88).
(2) That which is neither impossible nor necessary*
i.e. that which is neither necessarily so nor necessarily
not so. This still does not exclude the assertorie relation (cf. 34 a 36-38), though it Is doubtless generalhr
intended to do so. It is Uie '* definition " to whicn
Aristotle frequently refers (33 b 23, 30 etc) ; and

190

PRIOR ANALYTICS
which underlies the main development of the modal
analysis.
But we also find (24 b 14, 32 b 4) the possible described as (S) that which, as contrasted mth the
purely contingent, obtains generally but not necessarily, i.e. the probable.
It has been supposed that
this is merely a particular case of (2)
that indeed it
is the normal case of that type, since the purely contingent is outside the proper range of logical science.
Aristotle's language (32 b 13-22) certainly suggests
this at first sight.
But on this view the " problematic conversion " which holds good of (2) is hard to
justify.
If " all A may be B " is possible qua probable, ** no A may be B "is possible only qua improbable
the two judgements differ fundamentally in
implication, and the substitution of one for the other
cannot but affect the inference to be drawn. Indeed
in the " earlier " passage (which is probably a later
addition) Aristotle states definitely that a universal
negative premiss of type (3) is not convertible, although a similar premiss of type (2) follows the
general rule.
Dr Gohlke thinks (pp. 73 ff.) that
Aristotle was driven to restrict the sense of the problematic premiss so as to preclude conversion of the
universal negative by the awkward results which
would otherwise have followed in the second figure.
This seems extremely probable. At least it seems
obvious that the non-convertibility of such premisses
ought to have been demonstrated in ch. iii, if the
doctrine formed part of the original system.
An even greater mystery surrounds Aristotle's
attitude towards the convertibility of the particular
negative problematic premiss. The question is discussed at length by both Maier and Becker, but it
can only be briefly considered here. The main point
;

191

ARISTOTLE
is this : why is it that Aristotle, after expratflj admitting its convertibility (25 b 15 ; Maier appears to
overlook this statement at least I cannot find that
he refers to it), apparently never avails himself of it ?
Becker (pp. 60-63) shows that while in certain ol
Maier 's examples there is a definite reaion tor not
employing this form of oonvertion. In othen no tocb
reason can be quoted, so that the failure to employ It
appears to be a genuine oversif^hL Gohlke dJMnJTi
the difficulty by supposing 25 b 15 to be a late addiI cannot quite follow his theory of the detion.
velopment of Aristotle's idea of potslbiUtj.
In point of fact the problematic prenin of type
(2) will not fit coasistently into Aristotle't mtem.
One of its most awkward features is thai It has no
single contradictory, and so resists the jptooe
of
proof fxrr impossibUt ; and so in ch. xv we nod that it
gives place to type (1). It is moreover almost vahieless for purposes of argument.
Why then did
Aristotle adopt it as the normal type ? Plresomably
because he felt that to call anything ** pnssJhlf
which was in reality necessary was an Intolerable
looseness of terminology. At the same time a desire
for symmetrical tripartition induced him to frame a
system in which apodeictic and problematie should
show a perfectly antithetical correspondence about
the assertoric mean.
The attempt was bound to
fail, because objectively there is no mean between
the necessary and the not-necessary ; the two conceptions together are exhaustive.
It follows that any satisfactory threefokl system
must depend upon a subjective distinction of modality.
judgement is apodeictic if it rests on demonstrable grounds, assertoric if the fact Is appre-

192

PRIOR ANALYTICS
hended but the grounds are unknown, and problematic if the fact is regarded as capable of realization.
But even so the dividing line between the first two
and the universal problematic
is hard to draw
judgement is more naturally expressed as a particular
When we say " all men may be white,"
assertoric.
we presumably mean " some men are white, some
but we know no reason why the notare not-white
white men should necessarily exist."
Thus the modal analysis, which depends for its
value upon genuine distinctions, becomes practically
It was continued, with modifications, by
useless.
Aristotle's immediate successors, but being httle
more than a formal exercise it fell more and more
;

into neglect.

III.

Manuscripts and Other Sources

The chief manuscripts for this part of the Organon

are the following
:

Urbinas 35
B Marcianus 201
C Coislinianus 333
d Laurentianus 72.5
n Ambrosianus L. 93
f Marcianus App. IV. 5

saec. ix-x ineunt.

an. 955
saec. xi

an. 1320

u Basileensis F. 11.21
m Ambrosianus Q. 87
a AngeUcus C. 3.13
c Vaticanus 1024
i Laurentianus 72.15

saec. x-xi

saec. xi-xii
saec. xv
?

"

satis

"

uetustus
saec. xiv

"
Of these the first two are by far the best. Bekker
Waitz showed that B is generally more
preferred
;
193
G 2

ARISTOTLE
accurate, and this \iew is now generally accepted.
C is considerably inferior to either, but it tometimea
preserves the true reading. Of the others only d and
n have much independent value ; the rest are aometimes of use to decide a doubtful point. Light is abo
thrown on the text by the commentariei of Aleiander,
Philoponus, lliemistius and Padua, and the Latin
versions of Boethius and the uetus inlerpres Laliami,
The present translation aims at preserving loeie
thing of the effect of the original without too great a
I have tried to escape the
sacrifice of English idiom.
anachronism of interpreting Aristotle's meaning too

much in the terms of contemporary logic, of which

indeed I do not profess to have an exhaustive knowledge ; I have therefore avoided technicalitiea except
such as are sanctioned by tradition, and have attempted to examine the arguments, where <wwi^t
seemed necessary, in the light of what I coocei ve to
be common sense.
Apart from the ancient conunentatort, the moot
helpful authorities which I have used are Waits*!
admirable edition of the Orgatum and Maier't trcatiae
(see Bibliography).
have often consulted the
I
Oxford Translation and the new French version by
M. Tricot appeared just in time for me to refer to it on
certain points.
I am especially obliged to Dr. A
Becker for sending me his most instructive monograph on the modal syllogisms ; to my friend and
former colleague Dr. B. M. Laing for discussing
various points ^ith me ; and to Professor T. M. Knox
of St. Andrews University for much excellent advice
;

and
I

me

criticism.

much

regret that sheer lack of time has prevented

from doing greater justice to a subject which hat

PRIOR ANALYTICS
systematic treatment in this country
It became apparent, however, that
the appearance of this volume, already long overdue,
would be indefinitely delayed if I attempted to
examine all the points which interested me, and I felt
that I could not tax the patience of the editors by
keeping it back any longer. I hope that even in its
present form it calls attention to some points which
have not been noticed before.
received
for

many

little

years.

195

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
I append a short list of the principal editioot,
translations and works of reference which are likelj
to be most useful to the student of the AnaUftkt,

EDITIONa
Since the pubhcaUon of Bekker text (Berlin 1851,
Oxford 1837) there has been only one critical edition

of the Organon, that of T.

WaiU (Leipiig

lS4i^l46).

Translation!
T. Taylor, London 1812; O. F. Owen (Bohn
Oxford Translation (Prior
Library), London 1853
Analyhct by A. J. Jenkinson, Potierior Analwtici hy
;

G. U. G. Mure), Oxford 1906. Posterior AmoMcs

only: E. Poste, Oxford 1850; E. S. Boocfaier,
Oxford 1901. In French J. B.-Saint-Hilaire, Paris
1837 ; J. Tricot, Paris 1936. In Gennan J. H. von
Kirchmann, Heidelberg 1877; Ltkre vom ScJkUsM
(Prior Analutici) and Lehre vom Beweis (Posterior
Analytics), L. Rolfes, Leipzig 192.
:

Criticism and Interpretation

H. Maier, Die SyUogisUi des AristoUUs, TQbingen,

1900 O. Hamelin, Le Systhne d'ArisioU, Paris I90 ;
F. Solmsen, Die ErUtricklung der orisioieHscken Logik
und Rheioriky 1929 J. L. Stocks, " The Composition of
Aristotle's Logical Works," Classical Q^arierly, 1933,
;

pp. 115-124; A. Becker, Die aristoUUsche Tkeorie der

MUgUchkeitsschlusse, Berlin 1922 ; P. Gohike, Die
Entsiehung der aristoielischen Logik, Berlin 1936.

196

THE TRADITIONAL MOOD-NAMES

For the benefit of those who are forgetful or who
are not famihar with the mnemonic mood-names for
the various syllogisms, I give a list of them with a
brief explanation :
(direct) Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.
Fig. 1
(indirect) Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum.
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.

Fig. 2

Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi,

cardo, Ferison.

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Bramantip,
Fresison.

Camenes,

Dimaris,

Bo-

Fesapo,

The first three vowels of each word show the quahty

and quantity of the premisses and conclusion, A
standing for the universal and I for the particular
affirmative, E for the universal and O for the particu-

The consonants indicate the rules for

lar negative.
reduction. The initial letters correspond in every
case to those of the mood-names of the direct syllogisms of the first figure. The letters which immediately follow the significant vowels give the necessary
procedure.
(muta) means that the premisses must be trans-

posed.
s (simpliciter) means that the premiss denoted by
the preceding vowel must be converted simply.
p (per accidens) means that the premiss must be
converted by limitation.
c (conversio) means that for the premiss the contradictory of the conclusion must be substituted.

197

ANAATTIKQN IIPOTEPQN

^^^

Upanov iTriv ntpl

I.

OTL

(XTToSftfiv

TTcpi

ri ical rtvos iarhf

^ ok4i^9,

Kol iiTurrqfiTff airo8ccrrur^*

cfra StopuTcu rl cori rrporaaig koI r{ 6pos koI rl

ouAAoyia/xos, koI ttoIo^ riXtios kqX

16

voux

8c ratrra ti to cV oA<p clvoi

/icTct

ToiSe, Koi ri XeyofiV

ro Kara

^
wovr^

lireAify,

clmi roSt

fii^

rj

firfievof

KaTqyopi(T6ai

H poraais
amo^TiKo^
ri

iv

iJLpL

TTavrl

7}

jxr)

Tivo^

o^

Kara^rucos ^

iart Xoyof

Kara

rtpo^' o^roy hi

^ dSidpioTO?.

/iT^Sevl

20 Ttvt "5 /^^

rq

/i<v

rj

KaB6Xao

Acyw 5^ KaBoXov

ficv

vndpx^iv, cV /xc^i & to Tivi

ri
fi^

navrl imdpxiv, dBiopurrov Si to vndpxfu^

tmdpxeiv avV rov KadoXov

rj

Kara fUpOi,

olov ro rcov ivavrlwv ilvai rrfv avr^v hrurrr^rpf

ri

ro

TTjv rjbovfjv

Ai,a(l>pL

XeKrLKTJs,

he
ori

17

17

fiTf

lvai

dyadov,

d7ToBLKriKrj
p.v

nporaai^

aTrohcucrucfj

fiopCov rrjg dvri<j>dGws iariv (ov

198

rrj^

S*a-

A^i9 Barpov

yap

ip<trr^ aXXa,

PRIOR ANALYTICS
BOOK
Our

duty

to state the scope of our inquiry, Book i.

^*^*
it pertains
that it is concerned of ^
Syllogism,
with demonstration, and pertains to a demons tra^^*
tive science.
Next we must define the meaning
I.

first

is

and to what science

^rTa^ise^

of premiss and term

and syllogism,' and distinguish between a perfect and an imperfect syllogism ; and after this we must explain in what sense
'
one term is said to be or not to be wholly contained
in another ; and what we mean by
predicated of
all
or of none.'
premiss is an affirmative or negative statement Preliminary
of something about some subject. This statement of the^*
may be universal or particular or indefinite. By premiss, and
^^*'
universal I mean a statement which applies to all, or ^
to none, of the subject ; by particular, a statement
which applies to some of the subject, or does not
apply to some, or does not apply to all ; by indefinite,
a statement which applies or does not apply ^vithout
reference to universality or particularity, e.g., contraries are studied by the same science or pleasure
is not good.'
The premiss of demonstration differs from the Demonstrapremiss of dialectic in that the former is the assump- f^[ and^*^
tion of one member of a pair of contradictory state- syllogistic
ments (since the demonstrator does not ask a question p"^^^^^*

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

199

ARISTOTLE
o aTToStiKvviov), rj Si StaXKTUcfi iputniatt
ovScv 8^ Scourci npo^ t6 yavTujxxaews iariv.
vladai rov eKarepov avXXoyiofiov' Koi yap 6 do-

26 Aa/Ltj3ai'ct

beLKvvojv

Kal

crnXXoyicmKr}

ovAAoytJmu

pijjrCjv

Ttvo? \mdpxiv

/caret

y.v

/X17

xmdpx^iv,

Xaptlam Tt

wort laroi

nporaais dv^tttg tard/^aatf ^

Kara rwof rov ipir)fUv9 rp6wot

aTToSeitcTLKr) 8c idv dXrjB^ ij kcu 8ta Twr
<ifX^
S4 b 10 imodia^ojv iXrjfmVTj, 8iaAcicrt#r^ 8^ ww^mMOfUrtp
fjLv ipwrqais dvn^aatwi, av^Xoyi^oiUvtp hk i^jfjui
rov <t>aivofivov Koi v66(ov, tcaBdmp 4^ roSp
80 d7r6<f>a(7ls

Tivos

ToTTiicotj iprfrai.

Ti

fihf

XoyiariKr}
16

odv coTi npdraais, koI ri SuMi^pti atfX'

koI aTToSfiKrucfi koI SmXtKruc/j, 8t'

aKpLpelas p.kv v roZs inofi^vois prqBrjotrai, np69

Se rriv napovaav ;(puiv ucavws fffuv huafpUjBot

rd vvv.
"Opov 8c KoXof

ciV ov SiaXikrai 1) vp6rQ4ns, otov

ro re Karqyopovfievov koI to Ka$^ 06 ttim/yopUTai,
rj npoaridefievov fj Staipovfuvov rov th^OA teal
fiif
etvai.

2uAAoyt<7/xoy S4
20

ercpov Tt

rwv

ravra ehai.

(m Aoyoy

cv at rt94wrunt rtvwv

dmyioyy avfifialvti rw
raOra cS^cu to 8a tovto

KifjLvwv cf

Xeyoj Sc rep

<*
'.. that which is either self-evident
or oceptcd
for the immediate inquiry.
Cf. An. Po0t, I. but
100 a 27.

"

dialectical

premiss

native

aoo

TbMCV.
^

may be

chosen by an actual opponent

form

either the allenutive

in answer to a qocsHoo of the

Is X Y or not Y ?
or the a&sumpCkm of ooe
by a person reasoning indepcodeatly.
*

alter-

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

but makes an assumption), whereas the latter is an

answer to the question which of two contradictory
statements is to be accepted. This difference, however, will not affect the fact that in either case a
syllogism results
for both the demonstrator and the
interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first
assuming that some predicate applies or does not
apply to some subject. Thus a syllogistic premiss
will be simply the affirmation or negation of some
predicate of some subject, in the way already
the premiss will be demonstrative if it is
described
true and based upon fundamental postulates " while
the dialectical premiss will be, for the interrogator,
an answer to the question which of two contradictory
statements is to be accepted, and for the logical
reasoner,^ an assumption of what is apparently true
and generally accepted, as has been stated in the
;

Topics.^

What

meant by a premiss, and what difference

between syllogistic, demonstrative and dialectical premisses, will be explained with exactness
later ^
but for our immediate requirements the
present definition may be taken as sufficient.
By a term I mean that into which the premiss
can be analysed, viz., the predicate and the subject,
with the addition or removal of the verb to be or not
there

is

is

Term
^

to be.

a form of words in which, when

made, something other than
what has been assumed necessarily follows from the
fact that the assumptions are such.
By from the
fact that they are such I mean that it is because
syllogism

is

certain assumptions are

'

'

**

104a 8;
cf. also 100 a 29.
Demonstrative in An. Post. I. vi.-ix. dialectical in Topics.
;

201

Syllogism

ARISTOTLE
24 b
(Tu/LtjSatVctv,

TO Si 8ia ravra avfifiaiytiv r6 fiffipii

ycWo^cu r6 (ijoy-

^u}Bv opov npoaBiiv trpo^ ro

Koiov,

TT/KJcrSfOfio^i' ir<x^

oAAou

6 <l>avfjvai

npo^ to

tiXrjfifuva

t^

irpo<r^6fifvoi

a cWi /liv ayayca2a Sia tuii'

^^v ciAi/TrTOi &ia irporaovoir.
To 3c v oAoi cft'oi Tpov Mpi(f tcol r6 tmra
navTo^ KaT7iyopio6ai Ba.r4pov Bdrtpov radr6
iariv. Xyofiv 8c to icaTa naiTo^ KarriYOptto&ai
oTttv fiTjSev j} Xdpilv rwv roO vwoKtifUvov Kott
rj

v6s

Tf

ttAcioku*',

v7TOKifivwv opujv,

80

ra

TO awiy#cau)i', cLtcA^ S^

oi)

oS 6drpov ov Acx^iJacTOi* Koi t6 irani fisy3c0(

II.

25 a

'Ettci 5c Trdaa

nporaaU

^ Tou cf dmyiojj
xmdpx^iVt rovTcov h
d7ro<^aTi*cat Ka^*
6 KaTa<f>aTt.Kcov

8c

ci'

tariv

(mapxtiv
al fuv

Kd(mjv

^ roO

^vtl^^j^ffir

tou h^ix^oBai

KaTo^rucal

rrpoapr^QUf, iroAiV

Oi 5^

Taii

Kal dno<f>ariK(jjv oi fiiv koBoXov al

fipL al B dSiopicrroi, rriv fjtiv iv rt^ tht'

dpxW KadoXov
orpci^ctv,

olov

oreprfTiPcrjv dvdyicrj ToJy

ct

fi-qbfiia

dya^ov ovSev corcu 17801^

riiv

dvayKatov, ov

1780107

opois dyri-

dyaOov,

op8*

8c #ran;yopan^ dyrt-

KoOdkov oAA*
dyaBdw
10 Tt cfvat tJSoi^v tcDv 8c cv ficpct r^v fih tcara*
<f>aT(,Krjv dvTL(TTp<l>iv avdyKT) Kara fiJpo^ (ci yap
'qSoirq Tts- dya^dv, /cat dya^di' t4 cotcu rfiotn^, rqw
202
(TTp<f>(,v

p.v

fiifv

iv fipL, olov ct Tidaa 17801^ dya^di', koI

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I. i-ii

of them that the conclusion follows and by this I

that there is no need of any further term to
render the conclusion necessary.
I call a syllogism perfect if it requires nothing, Perfect and
apart from what is comprised in it, to make the gyuo^sms.
necessary conclusion apparent
imperfect if it requires one or more propositions which, although
they necessarily follow from the terms which have
been laid down, are not comprised in the premisses.
For one term to be wholly contained in another is To be
the same as for the latter to be predicated of all of taAneiS^
the former. We say that one term is predicated of ^"^ '^'^
all of another when no examples of the subject can SflnT
be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.
In the same way we say that one term is predicated
of none of another.
II. Now every premiss is of the form that some Premisses
;

mean

'

attribute applies, or necessarily applies, or

sibly apply, to

some

subject.^*

may

pos-

These three types

assertoric,

JP^'^j.obiem

are divided into affirmative and negative in accord- atic

ance with each mode of attribution ; and again of ^^J,*^^"
affirmative and negative premisses some are universal, negative
others particular and others indefinite. In universal versar*parstatement the negative premiss is necessarily convert- ^^ j" gJi?!
ible in its terms
e.g., if no pleasure is good, neither Rules for'
will anything good be pleasure
but the affirma- sfon*^o?^^^'
tive, though necessarily convertible, is so not as a(a)asser^"*^'
universal but as a particular statement
e.g., if every
pleasure is good, some good must also be pleasure.
In particular statements the affirmative premiss must
be convertible as particular, for if some pleasure is
good, some good will also be pleasure ; but the
:

This modal analysis is rejected by

Cf. Introd.. pp. 189-193.

ians.

many modern

logic-

ARISTOTLE
Be

arcpnrjTitcqv

dpamog

fiT)

avayKaXov' od yAp
koI i^kiP cwJ^

ovk

undpxi

rivl ^uxt),

W &n
'^''''fWC**
''

TLvl dvdpwTTO).

UpWTOV

o{^ COTCO OTtpUpXtC^ KoBiXoV^ 4

ovv /zt^Scvi rtth^ 3 r6 A {hnif>x^,
ovSe Twv A ovSevl imdpiti t^ B. c/ ydp rwt, olor
Toi r, ou/f akr]Ok^ ar<u r^ /iiiScvl TcJyv B t6
xmdpx^w TO yap V rwv B t/ ianv. tl 5^ irorri
TO A Toi B, Kal TO B TiW T^ A l^oI^X'^* **
ouScvt Tw B vnopfti* aXX'
p,T)hvl, ovSi TO
20 v7rKiTO nayrl xmapx^w.
6fLouo 5^ ccu C4 Jram
ti yap t6
rtA
fUpos <rrlv -q nporaois*
B, /cal TO B rwl TWV A dvdytcrf vn^pxf*^ ^
yap firfSevC, oub to A oi^cvc Ta>v B.' tt Bd y
Tii'i TWV B fii7 vndpxti, o^k dvdyfoj Koi t6
TO
B Ttvt rip A fit) xmdpxfiVt oXov tl r6 fikv B iorl
25 t^ipov TO A dvdpomo^' dvBocanof fiiv ydp od
Travrl t,ip<p, fak>v 5e Traiai dvupwntp vwdp^^i,
III. Toi' auTw TpoTTov cfci icoi /wt Toiv cU^tty
KaUxiv TTpordaccjv ij /xv ydp KaBdXov <rrpnfjruc^
15

AB

flV

TTporacri^.

ft

J^

r^

KadoXov
80 /^ttTct

TWV Kara^rtKUfv tKaripa

yap dmy#oj to A toi B fH^Scvi

dvrL(TTO<f>i,

p,pos.

VTrdpx^f-Vt

t /xev

dvdyKT] Kal to

Toi

/xi^Scvi tJwttpx**^'

to A Toi B to4 cvWyocto

av. L 0 ^ avaytajs to A wavri ^ Tiv Toi B
vndpxi, Kal to B Ttvt to) A omyK^ tnra^civ*
ct ydp /LtT7 dvdy/cr;, oi53* dv rd A
toiv B ^f
dvdy/oy? vndpxoi. to 8' ev /xpi aTprfTU<6v oiJk
dvTicrTpe(f>L 8td ti7v aiV7T7v alriav hC rJ icoi wporcpov <j>ap.v.
t

ydp

Ttvt cvScYCTai, icoi

rw

85

904

TOW

Ta C\ Bekker.
B vndp^n oodd. dett.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

ii-iii

for it does
negative is not necessarily convertible
not follow that if man does not apply to some
animal, neither will animal apply to some man.
First, then, let us take a negative universal premiss "
having the terms A and B. Then if A applies to no
B,^ neither will B apply to any A ; for if it applies to
some, e.g. C, it will not be true that A applies to
no B, because C is a B. If on the other hand A applies
to all B, B also applies to some A ; for if it apph'es
but ex
to none, neither will A apply to any B
Similarly too if the
hypothesi it applies to all B.
premiss is particular. For if A applies to some B,
B must also apply to some A since if it applies to
none, neither will A apply to any B. But if A does
not apply to some B, it does not necessarily follow
that B does not apply to some A e.g., if B is animal
and A man ; for man does not apply to every
animal, but animal apphes to every man.
III. The same principle will also obtain in the case
of apodeictic premisses. The universal negative converts universally, whereas each of the affirmatives
converts as a particular premiss. For if A necessarily
applies to no B, B also necessarily applies to no A ;
for if it may apply to some, A might also apply to
;

'

'

'

'

'

'

some B. But if A necessarily applies to all or some

of B, B must also apply to some A
for if this is not
;

necessarily apply to
necessarily so, neither will
some B. The particular negative statement is not
convertible, for the same reason which we have

already stated.*'
"

Sc. of the assertoric type.

It must be noted that in the Aristotelian
predicate regularly comes before the subject.
*

equivalent
*

is

'

No B

is

formula the

The modern

A.'

Ch. iL ad Jin.

05

(&)

*^

*^ ^'

ARISTOTLE
25 s

/X17

V flV TOtJ #COTO^TUfOif 4M'0^<^ *f**

avTiarpo<fn)v v amunv l yip t^

40AyO/lv),

25 b

y^

TO ^MiyiciaSor
ivhtx^odai (kox
dvay#cubv kqX to 3viT6r /iMS^yfoAai

TO

Acycrou
^ai TO
^cttTci

T17V

navrl

rj

tlvI

ci^fvcTcu,

t^ B tiW t^ A
ovS* ov to A o0mi4
coi

yap fir)dVi,
yap toOto np6rpov)' A' S^ TOi!p
d7To<l>aTiKots oux uHiavTws, dXX* ooa ftv iMxit"
o^at AcycTOi ^ T<p cf ovavKi^; vndpxu^ fj rt^ -jl^
ivhixoiro dv

B-

Toi

tw B
(ct

Sc'^^ticrai

cf dvdy/o}9 vndpxf^v, ofioiat^' otov i t(

imrov

^o^ t^

to Xcvir6r
/xr/Sevi Ifiariw xmdpx^^v rovrutv yap rd fUv
dvdyKT^y ovx vndpx^i, to 8^ ou#c dvaYKti vndpx^w
dvBpojTTov vhXadax

firj

ttvai

ff

10

15

KOX ofiolcjs dvTiarpttfKi 1) TrpoTcun;* c^ yap A^

hXTcu fJLr)Bvl dvOpamtp imrov, teal dtSpwrnotf
iYX<J^pL firjS^vi iTmuf koI tl ro Acvir^ iyx^f^
fifjocvl Ifiariw, kcu to IfuiTtov iyxtoptl iiipo4
Aev/coi* t y(zp rtvi dvdy*^* '^^ '''^ Acvic^ IfUKrlm
Ttvt carat cf dmyioyj* rovro yap S/Scurroi frp^
repov ofJLoUxJS Sc Kai errl t^j iv yApi diro^Tunjf
oaa to) aj CTit ttoAu icai T<Ji n^K^vaA A/vrnu

rponov hiopHofifv r6 ivOX^

ovx ofioiws ^4 v TOij cn'prrfTiKQZs atm"
GTpo<t>cus, dAA* 1} /tcv KadoXov OTpTjrucri nporaats
vS;((T^at, #ca^' o>'

ficvov,

^
fi-fj

vndpxfiv

vndpxfw

AB

(tLTi

supra lineam prmcfixo) PhiL, Waits

recc.

* This is obviously a loose application of the term, and

one which Aristotle does not always admit t e/. aSa IS^I
and Ds Interp. 22 a 16. For a discussion of his tnalBMak f

problematic syllogism see Introd. pp. 190-lOi.

06

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

in

With regard to possible premisses, since the term

possible
is used in several senses (for we call
possible both that which is necessary and that which
*

is

(c)

problem-

'

not necessary and that which

is

capable of being),
mil take place

in all affirmative statements conversion

under the same conditions as before. For if A may

apply to all or some of B, B might also apply to some
A for if it could apply to none, neither could A
apply to any B. This has been proved above. ^ But
in negative statements the case is not the same.
In
all examples which are said to be possible in the
sense that the statement is necessarily true, or is not
;

necessarily true, the conditions are similar to those

already stated ; e.g., if it were said to be possible
*
that a man should not be a horse, or that white
should apply to no coat. For in the former example
the predicate necessarily does not apply to the subject, and in the latter it does not necessarily apply ;
and the premiss converts like other negatives. For
if it is possible for
horse to apply to no man, it is
also possible for man
to apply to no horse ; and
if it is possible for
white
to apply to no coat,
it is also possible for
coat
to apply to nothing
white.
For if it must apply to something that is
white, white will also necessarily apply to some
coat ; this has been proved above.*'
Similar conditions govern the conversion of particular negative
premisses.
But in such premisses as are said to be possible in
the sense that they are generally or naturally true
(for we define the possible in this way), the conditions
for the conversion of negatives will not be the same
as before. The universal negative premiss does not
*

'

'

'

'

'

2oa

18ff.

25a

32.

207

premisses.

ARISTOTLE
ovK

avriGrp<f>i,

Sc

carat

Nvv
20 hrjiXoVf

-fj

<l>avp6v

S^ ev

Mn

^Upa avrurrp

orav

Trcpi

KaTCuf>aTLK6v c^ct TO uxfj^ia' to

Karqyoprjraif

80

KardufHUjw

atl

c^^ymu Ty

yap

(rriv, oTy

av npoa*

noul koa nayru^f,

iarw od XtvKOv ^

otov TO coTii' OVK dyodov rj

anXios TO coTtf ov rovro, &c>y ijoT tti 5^ kcu tovto
^
Kara oi rcLr iynarpo^^
Sta toiv 7TOfjJva}v.
ofioiw^ $ovat TQi; aAAa<s>.
IV. Atxx}piap.^vwv 8^ TOimuK Xdyofitv rjSrj 8uk
TtVcov /cat 770T6 *fat rrcuy ylyvrrai Trfiy cruAAo*
varcpov Si \ktov trpi, atro^tifcciic.'
yiGfios'
irporepov 8c Trcpi (ruAAovt<7/M>t; XtKriov ^ ir*/)i
drroSci^ccos 3ta to koBoXov fiaXXov tvai riv
ouAAoyto/iov ij /Ltci' yap aTroSct^t; avAAoyto/x4$( rt/gl
6 ovWoyuTfios hi ou Trd? aTroSci^cf.

"OTav GUI' opot rpi9 ourws ^xuxn

ware tov ^axarov ev oXcp tlvai rtp

irpoi aAAv|Aou{|

koi ndif
ciwi^
dvdyKT) rtov oKpwv tvai GvXXoyiafi^ rikgum,
koXu) hk fieaov fiv o Koi avro aXXat mil
oAAo V TOVTO) COTtV, O Koi Ttj B4al yiyVfTOl fJLtOO^
aKpa 8c TO avTo tc cv dAAa> ov Koi v tL dXXo
COTtV
t yap TO A Kara iravros rov B Koi ro
B KaTo. iravTos tov F, dvdyKT) to A KtXTa travroy
TOV r KaTTjyopelodaL' nporcpov yap ipnjTai rrw^
fieaov

85

.
toBto
ivSXOfUvou

Se roaovTov ij/xtv ctrroj npos Tocy tlfftnUpoiS

oTt TO iiStx^aOat p,rjbvl rj nyl firi xmoftxtw

(mv ofwlws TaTTCTOi, TO 5<

26

roO

oXat

rat

irpwrrtp

r^

fX4a(p

tlvax

ri

firj

"

Chs.

xiU.

*Ch.zlTi

ff.

In the Posterior Analytics.

'

208

24 b 28.

ft

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

iii-iv

I.

convert, whereas the particular negative does. This

will become clear when we discuss the possible.'*

For the present we

in addition to

may

regard this

what we have already

much

as clear,

that the
to apply to no B or
said

statement it is possible for A

not to apply to some B is affirmative in form
'

'

for

the expression is possible corresponds to is,' and

the word is,' to whatever terms it is attached in
predication, has always and without exception the
effect of affirmation
is not good
or is not
e.g.,
white or in general is not X.' This also %\dll be
proved later.^ In respect of conversion these premisses will be governed by the same conditions as
other affirmatives.
IV. Having drawn these distinctions we can now Figures and
state by what means, and when, and how every ^ihjglsm.
syllogism is effected. Afterwards we must deal with
demonstration.*' The reason why we must deal with
the syllogism before we deal with demonstration is
that the syllogism is more universal for demonstration is a kind of syllogism, but not every syllogism
is a demonstration.
When three terms are so related to one another The First
that the last is wholly contained in the middle and ^^'^^"'
the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the
first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.
By middle term I mean that which both is con- Middle
tained in another and contains another in itself, and ""'
which is the middle by its position also and by
extremes (a) that which is contained in another. Extreme
and (b) that in which another is contained. For if A nJ^Both
is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must neces- premisses
sarily be predicated of all C.
We have already Barba^ra.
explained ^ what we mean by saying that one term
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

209

ARISTOTLE
40

TO Kara navros Xtyofitv. ofioicj^ hi Kol mI r^

Kara firjBevos rod B to 5^ B Kara iravr^

* fiv A

rod r, art ro A ovSVi r<^ F xmdp^u.

Et hk ro fiv irpunov navrl r(p fUatft ^ndpxti$ t6
8c fieaov

rw

firjSevl

axarut

oAk Iotou

vndfl)(i,

rwv oKfKJV ovSiv

ipoyKolow
t(rvfiPaivi, rw raOra ttvai' #reu yap murrl teal
fi'qBvl v8X(rai ro npurrov r<p iax^rt^ ^apxttv,
war our ro Kara fUpog ovrt ro koBoXov
yiyvrai dvaYKoZov fiffStvos Si orros apayKoiov
opoi roO
8ia rovrwv ovk coroi crvAAoyur/M^;.
navrl vndpxftv iaK}v dvBpumof Iinroi, tow /tiyavXXoyiafJLOs

Scvt ^<x>ov

dvOporrro^Xi$os.

OvS* orav

10

yiip

ro irpwrov T<p fUQtft

fi'qr

M^*

vndpxu ovS* ovrof^ ianu

rod
vnapx^Uf itrum^firf^^

fjLaov r<p oxdrtf) yirfitvl

dpoi

GvXXoyiofxoS'
ypafifiij
ypafifirj

iarpucq,
yMvds

Ka^oAov
rovro)
16

rw

fiii

^dpi)(i

irrumjfirf-^

odv ovrwv rwv

yikv

ax^jfiarL

opwv

iijXov

hf

ndr tarcu Koi n6r ovk iorai

ovAAoytaftdy, kou on ovros tc avXXoyta/ioG tow

opovs dvayKolov Xiv coff ctiro/icv, ok 6^ ovran
x<Jt)criv,

Et

8'

on

<rrat

ro
ro

ouAAoy10/109.

o /xv KaOoXov

iTpos rov rpov,

fo

rod

p,l^ov

orav

Qjcpov

rj

rwv

fiv

opatv 6 h* iv ^Upi

ro kolBoXov

KarrjyopiKOV

rj

tc^

rrpos

ortpftfriK^v,

8 iv p.pi npos ro cAarrov KarriyopiKOV,

dvdyKT] avXXoyiofiov ^tvai rcActov, otov Si npos

ro cXarrov
210

rj

Kal

aAAoi;

ntos

rjfftKnv

oi opoi,

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

iv

predicated of all of another. Similarly too if

Ceiarent.
predicated of none of B, and B of all of C, it follows
that
will apply to no C.
If, however, the first term applies to all the middle, aeand the middle to none of the last, the extremes
cannot admit of syllogism ; for no conclusion follows
necessarily from the fact that they are such, since it
is possible for the first term to apply either to all or
to none of the last, and so neither a particular nor a
universal conclusion necessarily follows
and if no
necessary conclusion follows from the premisses there
can be no syllogism. The positive relation of the
extremes may be illustrated by the terms animal
man horse ; the negative relation by animal man
is
is

stone.

Again, when the first applies to none of the middle, eband the middle to none of the last, here too there can
be no syllogism. The positive relation of the extremes
may be illustrated by the terms science line medicine ; the negative relation by science line unit.
Thus if the terms are in a universal relation it is

clear, so far as this figure is concerned,

will

be a syllogism and when there

when

will not.

there
It is

a syllogism the terms must

be related as we have said and that if they are so
related, there will be a syllogism.
If, however, one of the (extreme) terms is in a
universal and the other in a particular relation to
the remammg term, when the umversal statement,
whether affirmative or negative, refers to the major
term, and the particular statement is affirmative and
refers to the minor term, there must be a perfect
syllogism ; but when the universal statement refers
to the minor term, or the terms are related in any

clear also that if there

is

211

(2)

One

universal
particular
p^^^*^

ARISTOTLE
20 a

8c fitlCov fA axpov hr ^ r6
eXarrov B( to vno ro fUact^ 6y,
xmapx^rw yap ro fiv A nayrl Tp B, r^ ft^ B rwi
rw r. ovKOVv 1 <m Travro? icaTriYopta0<u ro
S6 iv dpxfj Xex^^v* dLvdyfcrj ro A rivi rtp V vndpxay*
Kal t ro fjLv A p.7jSvl roj B {mdpxt rd
B ruA
rw r, dvaymj ro A rivl rtv T fi^ V7mpXiv' wpiortu.
yap Kal ro Kara firjhticK; nuts A/yoftcv* okttc <jrai
avXXoyt(7p.6s r^Xtio^.
ofxolw^ hi Koi ci aMpurrov
17; TO Br KarrjyopiKov ov 6 yap avro^ toroi avA90 XoyiapM^ dhiopiarov rt kox iv fupi Xrf^ivros.
*Kdv hi npos ro IXarrov oKpov ro Ka66Xov rtdfj
^ KarrjyopiKov ^ arpr)ruc6v, ouk tartu avXXo'
yLGiMog, ovr Kara<f>ariKov ovrt dno^rucov ToG*
dSioplarov rf Kara p,po^ oyro^, oUnr c^ to yAp A
rivl ra> B vnapyet rj firf ^rrapxi^, T^
B wiuni
85 To> r xmdpxd' opoi rod vrrdpxtw Jtyafi6-^(i^
(f>p6vT]ais rod fi-q vndpxtiv ayaWv
t(i9 A^iaBla
UaXiv 1 ro fxv B p.rjhvl rat P, t^
A Tt*a
ra> B imdpxi ^ ft^ xmdpx^i ri firi iravrl vir4pxi,
ovh* ovrujs (rrai crvXXoyiafi6^
opoi XVk6v
tTTTTOS'
KVKVOSp XcVKOV ITTTTOy tc6pai
ol OI^TOi
8c Kal 1 ro AB dhiopiarov,
*
Oi5S' orav ro p.v irpos ra> fui^ovi oKpw koBoXov
yimqrai ^ KarrjyopiKov rj arprfruc6vt ro Si wpo^
ra> iXdrrovi arep-qriKov Kara yUpos, ovk lanu avX-

dSvvaTOv.

fiGOv

Xeyw

iarlv,

'

Tou

f.

Waits

ovrt.

Aristotle's wording is a little unfortunate.

He does not,
of course, mean that the relation of the major to the middle
or of the middle to the minor term b alwrajs that of gemn to

212

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

iv

other way, this is impossible. (By the major term Major and
I mean that in which the middle is contained, and by ^J.^g
the minor that which falls under the middle term.<^)
apply to all B, and B to some C. Then if DariL
For let
*
to be predicated of all means what we stated at
the beginning,^ A must apply to some C. And if Ferio.
appHes to no B, but B applies to some C, A must
necessarily not apply to some C (we have also defined
what we mean by to be predicated of none ^). Thus
we shall have a perfect syllogism. Similarly too supposing the proposition BC to be indefinite, provided
that it is affirmative ; for we shall have the same
syllogism whether BC is indefinite or particular.
If, however, the universal statement, whether ia^^~
affirmative or negative, refers to the minor term,
there will be no syllogism, whether the indefinite (or
particular) statement is affirmative or negative ; e.g.,
if A applies or does not apply to some B, and B appHes
The positive relation of the extremes may
to all C.
be illustrated by the terms good state intelligence
the negative relation by good state ignorance.
Again, if B applies to no C, and A applies to some, ie^^"
or does not apply to some or all of B ; in this case
too there will be no syllogism. We may take as
terms white horse swan, white horse crow. The
same terms will also serve if the proposition AB is

'

'

'

indefinite.

Furthermore, when the statement relating to the

major term is universal, whether affirmative or negative, and that relating to the minor is negative and
particular, there will be no syllogism, whether the
but merely that the predicate
comprehensive notion than the subject.
* 24 b 28.
species,

is

"

naturally a

more

24 b 30.

213

ARISTOTLE
28 b

dBiopiarov tc icoi iv fi^Pfi ktf^Mrrot,

B
A navTi ru> B vnapx*i, t6

Aoywr/xos

olov t TO fiv
6

Tivi TO)
Tivi

firj

^ t /X19 TTttKri vrrdp)(i' <^ yap or

xmdpxn to fUaov, romp teal woi^ teal
/xt},

vnoKtloButtnuf
dKoXovui^ai TO irpunov.
opoi l^ipov dvBpuyno^ Av#f<5v cFro ml
tov firj KaTrjYoplrai XVicafV 6 oiSpumo^ glXi^^Sw
KVKVOS Kol ^UjJV' OVKOW TO ^t^OV TOV fUv TrOUT^
Karqyop^lrai rov ht ovSv6i, utort owe Monu
ov8vl

yap

10

ol

/ii^Scvi
T<p B
ndXiv ro fiiv
imapxtro), to 5c B tu4 rip T fci^ vmifixirwt kqX
ol opoi aru>aav dtlwxov at'dpaf wos XttfHOv cfrs
^IXr^wuaVt atv firi KarrfyopiTtu Xttmwv 6 drdpaynost kvkvo^ kcu ;(ui!iv* to yap dt^^ uyor rov fihf
Trarros" Ka'rqyoplrai rov
ovhv6s.
"En inti dSiopiarov r6 nvi r^ F r^ B fti^
V7rdpxiv, dXrj6Vrai 5^ Koi ci fii^dm ^irdfp^t rau
c( fti^ TTovrt on Ttvi 01^ inrdpvci, }crf^$PTUt 5^
TotovTcov oocui' cooTc /xT^ocvt vnapf^ttv oC y/yvcTO*
<TvAAoyta/xoy (toOto ydp cipTTOt np6rtpov), ^avtpw
ovv oTt Toi oiJra>y c^civ Tovy opov9 oi5#f litrroi
ouAAoyto/idy ij*' yap av icoi ctti tovtoiv. ofioiufs
Se Sci^^^acTOi jccu ct to ca^oAov rtBtLri artpfif*

GvXXoyiafioi.

15

to

riKov.

15

Ovhi y idv dfjufxo rd Sioan^fiara Kara fUpof ^

Karqyopuccjs rj ar^pnqrucats , ij to fuv Karrr/opucw^
to <TTp7JTlKWS Acyi^TOi, "^ TO /ICV OOidpCOTOV
TO Sc hui}puTfivov, Tj dfufxit oBiOpurra, od#f coro*
ovAAoyta/io? ovBofiw^.
opoi 5c itocvoi mxvrca

AcUKOV

^CpOV

tTTTTOy,

{[oM)

VAcVICC^KAt^Off

<t>avp6v oiJv cV TcDv lp7}pJv<ov

S14

tats

iop

jj

avX'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

iv

minor premiss

aois indefinite or particular ; e.g., if

B, and B does not apply to some or all
of C ; for where the middle term does not apply to
some of the minor, the major term may be associated
with all or with none of the minor. Let us assume
the terms animal man white ; next as examples of
white things of which man is not predicated let
us take swan and snow.' Then animal is predicated of all the former, but of none of the latter.
Thus there will be no syllogism. Again, let
apply eoto no B, and let C not apply to some B ; let the terms
be inanimate man white ; next take as examples
of white things of which man is not predicated
swan * and snow.'
Inanimate is predicated of
all the latter, but of none of the former.
Further, since the statement B does not apply to
some C is indefinite, and the statement is true
whether B applies to no C or does not apply to all C ;
and since when such terms are chosen that B appUes
to no C, we get no syllogism (this has been stated
above ")
it is obvious that with the terms in this
relation there will be no syllogism ; otherwise there
would have been one with the terms which we selected.
There will be a similar proof if the universal statement
is taken as negative.
Also, if both the attributive relations are particular, (3) other
and both affirmative or both negative, or one affirma- tkm^^o*'
tive and the other negative ; or if one is indefinite and premisses;
the other definite ; or if both are indefinite in no oocase will there be a syllogism. Terms applicable to JJJ;;
all these cases are animal
white horse or animal
white stone.
It is evident, then, from what we have said, that
applies to

all

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

26 a 2.

215

ARISTOTLE
Aoyta/iOS' v rovrta

rovs

avayicf)

80

r&

^V^P^t

^*'

tinofAtr'

dXXcas yap ixom-uiv ovSofiw^ ycvvrrax. iijXov

Koi ori 7rdvT(^ ol v airip ovAAoyia/iOi rtXtuU
taf names yap hnrtXovvrai Sea tcuv ^f ^I^XV
XTl^OivTwv KoX oTi nayra ra. vpopXtmara Scurwroi
Sid TovTov rov oYTiiiaToj* KoX
TO p,r)0Vi KOt TO TiVi #COi TO

t6

(rx^fian tcar^

ovrw^

opov^

yap to
T4VI

fXTJ

Trayri

mu

VWafi)((U.

KoXuJ Sc TO T040i?T0V O^^/Ul ir/XtfTOM.

^fjrF
V. "Otov 8c to ovto r<ft fuv watrri tA t#
/Al^ScVi VTTQLpXtl* ^ iKOTtpip frOVTt ^ llTf^wi, TO fnhf
axfjfjui TO Totouroi' icoAto hvrpo^ fidaow
avTCj Acyoi to KaTrjyopovfivov QfiiSohf, atcpa hi
KaB* wv AcycTOi rovro, fuilov bi astpotf r6 np^
Toi p,aio KifjLvov, cAaTTOV S^ t6 noppwr^put roG
p,Gov.
rWerai hk to pAovv 4(09 fUr rwv QMpoa0L
npwrov 8c t^ diai.
TeActoy ftcv o^ ovk Karai avXXoyurfi6f fMofuof
ev Touroj Toi a;^/4aTt, 8ia^to9 8* larox koI koB"
6X0V Koi fir] KadoXov rwv opujv ovrwv. KaB6Xov
p.v ovv ovTtuv coTcu ouAAoyio/io^ orou' TO fuaoy
rw fxev navTi rut 8< firfitvt vmipxnt av vpos
oTTorepwovv tJ to areprjrucov aXXatg o ou8afu9,

M^

87 a

KaTqyopeiadw yap to

tou

/4v

fir/Stvog

roO

Sc S iravTos. cVct ouv dvrtarp^t to orc^ipucor,

OuScVt Toi
VTTOp^Ci TO N* TO 8< y
VOITI TW
S V7TKlTO' CUOTC TO
OuScVt TO* S* TOVTO yop
ScScLKTai nporcpov.
TroAtv ci to
rtp piw
lOTTtti^t TO) 8c S firjSevi, ouSc toi*
t^
oi$8ci4

V7rdp^(,.
* Toi

ydp to

216

ouSevt Tfp S, oi58^ to

A, Philoponus (?),
Trendelenburg : to H t<J> N BCdf.
TO

WaiU:

t^

r^ H miu,

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

iv-v

a syllogism in this figure has a particular conclusion,

terms must be related as we have described for
if they are related otherwise there can in no case be
a syllogism.
It is clear also that all syllogisms in this
if

its

figure are perfect (since they are all completed by

original assumptions) ; and that all kinds

means of the

of propositions can be proved by this figure ; for it

proves both universal and particular conclusions,
whether affirmative or negative. I call this kind of
figure the First.
V. When the same term apphes to all of one sub- second
ject and to none of the other, or to all or none of both, '^"^'
I call this kind of figure the Second ; and in it by the Position of
middle term I mean that which is predicated of both ^^ ^"^^
subjects ; by the extreme terms, the subjects of
\^'hich the middle is predicated
by the major term,
that which comes next to the middle ; and by the
minor that which is more distant from it. The middle
is placed outside the extreme terms, and is first by
;

position.

Now

there can in no case be a perfect syllogism

but there can be a valid ^ syllogism,
;
whether the terms are universal or not. If they are (i) Both
universal, there will be a syllogism when the middle unTeSi!
apphes to all of one subject and to none of the other,
whichever of the two subjects is negatived ; but in
no other case. E.g., let
be predicated of no N, Cesare.
but of all O. Then since the negative premiss is convertible, N will apply to no M.
But ex hypothesi
appHes to all O. Therefore N applies to no O (this
has been proved above ^). Again, if
applies to all camestres.
but to no O,
will apply to no O.
For if
applies
in this figure

i.e.
'

imperfect 24 b 22
In Celarent, 25 b 40.
;

ff.

217

ARISTOTLE
27

ov8vi

dpa

rw M' TO h4
ovSevl rw N

rrayri rtp

&wffpx^ v r^

vndp(i' ycyAn^roi yap miXa^

cVci & dvrtarfU^i to otc-

TO npwrov ax^jfJ^.
ovBe ro N owScvi r^ S Owapfti, war
cori 3J Scucvvrai
coTOi o at)ro; auAAayur/xo;.
15 ravra Kal ls to dBuvaTov dyovraf,
'Otl fiv ow yiyvcrat avXXoytOfiof ovtuk
Tiuv Tojv opcjv, tl>avp6v, oAA* 06 T^Xttot' o^ ydip
fiovov K Twv f cipx^y oAAa ical ^f SXXu hnr
TcActrat TO d>^y#fcubi'.
*Ea>' TO
TraiTOj rou N cal TO0 S #faf^
^XM rov vv*
Tiyoprjrai, ovk cotou auAAoyu7/i4^.
^atov dvdpumoi, T06 /i^ vndpxny
20 dpxciv ovGUL
ovoia l^i^v dpiOfio^- fUaov ovqIol,
ow&* ormv
fi'qrc rov N tnjr rov S firjSv6t tcarrjyoprfnu ro M.
opoi rov \mdp\iv ypap^rf-^t^o^havOpoamo^, rov
prjTLKov,

^X^

firj

vndpx^iv

<J>avp6v

opwv
25

{<pov

ypofifiij

o^

OTi dv

-j

XiSoi,

avXXoyuTfJLOi

ovroiv, dvdyiaj rov^ opov^

ct7ro/iv aAAa>;

koBoXov rwv

^^fiXD
^Xf^ <*^
yap ixdvrwv ov ytyytrai r6 dvay^

KOZOP,
TTpos rov Tpov "j KaB6Xov TO fjUaoy,
npo^ rov fici^co ytyrpru KaB6Xov rf iwrrrjyopiKU}^ ^ <rrprjriKw^, npo^ 5^ rov Ikdmn Karii
fjLcpog Kai dvriKtifUvu}^ rat KaSoXov (Xiyto Si ro
*E,dv 5c

orav

ficv

Se. which proves the conclusion.

Both CcMre and
Camestres are proved by Celarent.
' By assuming in each case the contradictory of the conclusion, viz., that N applies to some O, and oorobininff thb
with the major premiss. The resulting syllog^ns (in rerio

218

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

But ex hypothesi
to no O,
will apply to no M.
Therefore
will apply to no
applies to all N.
;
And since the
for again we have the first figure.

negative statement is convertible, N will also apply

to no O.
Thus it will be the same syllogism as
before." It is also possible to prove these results by
reduction ad impossihile.^
Thus it is evident that with the terms in this relation we get a syllogism, but not a perfect one
because the necessary conclusion is completed not
only by means of the original premisses but by others
;

as well.

and all O, aaIf, however,

is predicated of all
there can be no syllogism. The positive relation of
the extremes is illustrated by the terms substance
animal ^man the negative relation by substance
animal number (substance is the middle term). Nor
can there be a syllogism if
is predicated of no N
and of no O. The positive relation of the extremes eeanimal man ; the
is illustrated by the terms line
negative relation by line animal stone.
Thus it is evident that if there is a syllogism where
the terms are universally related, the terms must be
related as we stated at the beginning ; for if they
are otherwise related no conclusion follows by logical

'^

necessity.
If on the other hand the middle term is universally
related to one of the others, when it is in a universal
relation, either positive or negative, to the major
1.
term, and in a particular relation
the opposite sense
to that of the universal relation (by in the opposite

^.T

1.^.1
m

and

Darii) give conclusions

respective minor premisses.

27 a

which are incompatible with the

3.

219

(2)

One

and^one*
particular
premiss.

ARISTOTLE
;>o

TO KaOoXov arprjnic6, r6 ip
KarrjY^piKOv to fca^^Kov,
TO iv fipi artprjTucov), avdymj yiyvtaBax ouArtp
XoytayMv crrprjTiK6v Kara fjupo^. ci yap ro
fiv N ftryScvt rat Sc S rtvi imdpxi, dvdyKJj to N
rwl Tco S /ii7 xmdpx^^v. cVci yap airrurrpt^i to
tmdp(i to N* to
crTprjTUc6v, ov^vl Tut
yt
avTucLfji^vto9, 1 fjLv

fi^pt Kara<f>aTiK6v tl 8c

s&

uTTcVctro Tii^

T^ S vnapx^w wqt r^

tii4 ti^

oi)x vndp(i' yiyvrroi ya/> ouAAoyur/i^ SccL toO

nparrov ox^fiaTO^, wdXiv ci to ficK N trorri toi
toj 8 H Tiw fxtj irjTdpxi, dvdytcri to N Tt>4 T^ S
/i^ {mdpxtiv 1 yap navTi vndpxi KartiyopiTai b^
Travro^ tov N, avay#n} to
^oi TO
irovri T<jif S
vndpx^iv \mKiro Sc Tit^i fti^ vndpxtiV' koI tl t6

ti k

rw fjLv N Trarrt virdpxti T<ji &

fii^ vatrrl,
coTOi <7vAAoyia/i09 otc oi; irovTi toi to N* am^
8i(49 5* 17 aim;,
^dv hi tov fuv 9ravT<^ roO
8^ N fH7 7rcuT05 #faT7yo/>7TOu, oi5f /oTot avAAoy#<
opo4 {ak>v odata tcdpaf, (okxr Acvir^r
a/i09.

ovS* oray tov fikv fii^Scvo; toO hk

TIV05. opoi tou ^dpx^iv iipov ov<iiafiovds$ tov
ovoia cVun^fii}.
fi-q vndpxiv ^pov

Kopaf.

ovv dvTiKifiVov ]J TO KaBoXov Tip Kara

fipos, iipTjrax nor* iarai kox rtvr
oCk coroi
ouAAoyia/idy* otov 8 ofioioaxrjfiovti dtatv ai npo*
"Oral'

10

fjLv

TGOcty, otov dfjL^>6rpat, (mpirjTucal rj tcaTa^Tucal,

ovSap,ajs coTcu ovAAoyia/toy. toTwaav yap itpfumm
or^prp-iKal, Kal to

220

KaBoXov KiaBw

irpi^

t6 iut^O

Vu.

in Ferio, 26 a 25.
In point of fact it is the

same

syllogism.

There

no

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

sense * I mean that if the universal relation is negative

the particular relation is positive, and vice versa) to
the minor term, the result must be a syllogism which
E.g., if
applies to no Festino.
is negative and particular.
but to some O, it must follow that
does not applyto some O.
For since the negative statement is convertible,
will apply to no M.
But ex hypothesi
applies to some O, and so N will not apply to some O ;
for we get a syllogism by means of the first figure."
Again, if
applies to all N, but does not apply to Baroco.
some O, it must follow that N does not apply to some
O. For if it applies to all, and
is predicated of all
N,
must apply to all O. But ex hypothesi it does
not apply to some. And if
applies to all N but
not to all O, there will be a syllogism to the effect
that N does not apply to all O. The proof is the same
as before.^
If, however,
is predicated of all O oabut not of all ^ N, there will be no syllogism. Terms
to illustrate this case are animal substance crow,
animal white crow. Nor will there be a syllogism
when
The
is predicated of no O but of some N.
positive relation of the extremes may be illustrated ieby the terms animal substance unit the negative
relation by animal substance
science.
Thus we have stated under what conditions there
will or will not be a syllogism when the universal is
opposite in sense to the particular statement. When
the premisses are similar in form, i.e. both negative
or both affirmative, there will in no case be a syllogism.
Let us first take them both as negative, and let the eoviz., let
universal relation belong to the major term

real distinction
'

M
"

between

does not apply to

i.e. not of some

'

does not apply to some

'

and

all O.'
;

cf.

previous note.

221

ARISTOTLE

aKpOV, otov TO

to)

TO

fidXavXiwy

20

rod &

rw S

1 ydf) nairrl Toi

oi5Sm

xmapxit-v.

ouroj

N, TO

5i^

fil^^cW

navri

run. fiv

to

to

Si

Ttft

koI nairri

opoi ToG fiiv

v7Tdpxiv.

Ca>ov'

OTt XapTv, l TO
/at}.

T<p flV

vnapx^rcj- ii'Sex^rai

15 firi

E, Tttft

tcai fttfinv^

^ndpxft9

fiij

vwdpxiny odn
vnapx^i rtvi 84

WM

E vndpfti' oAA*
fiiv o^ ovk tyxoipti

to)

fti^&CM tiJ

^n^ictiro

rtA

Xafiibf fyoffS$

K 5c ToO ahioplarov htucriov' cVci yd/> (iAi^^nlntU

to

Tivt fi^

vndpxit

undpxiv TO

pir}hvl

np S

^dpxpvTO^

hi

ural

odic

iirjSA

ci

ovAAo*

ijr

yiGfios, <f>avp6v ori ovSi vCv tarai.

fortoaav

IlaAtp

Ka-niyopucax, koX

r6 KaB6Xtm

fUV N ITOVTi T^
^c S T(V( vnapx'iTw. tvS^x^rai 817 t^ N r^ H koI
7ravT4 icat /njScvt tmdpxtiv.
opoi tov /xi^Scvi iJr
dpx^iv XevKov KVKvo^ X160S' TOV hi nayrl ovk

15 KL(jdo)

OpMUJJS, oloV TO

carat Xaficlv Sta

TO!

ti7'

avrrjv alrlav rjvntp irportpoVg

oAA* K TOV dStOploTOV ScUCT^OV.

Et TO KaOoXov TTpos t6 cXottov dtcpov iotl

to
TU> flV S flT^ScVt TOi 34 N TlVt /il^

80 /cat

imdpx^t't ivhXT(u to
Sevt

Kopa^t
Sc

TOV

/X17

9S

Tfp

xmdpx^w

KarrjyopiKal

vndpx^Lv XcvKov
t,lOOV

opoi tov

vndpx^iv.

KVKVOS

ai

mii

fiiy-

XcvkovXaBos^^dpaf*

npordacis,

^a>ovx^^*

#coi 7r<ivT4

imdpx^w

'''^^

XiVk6v

opoi

{^'^'i^

tov

fi^

xmdpix^w XevKOV


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

M apply to no N, and not apply to some O.

N

Then

it

and for it to
possible both for
to apply to all
apply to no O. The negative relation of the extremes
may be illustrated by the terms black snow
animal ; but we cannot find terms to illustrate the
positive universal relation, since
applies to some
although it also does not apply to some. For if
applies to all O, and
to no N,
will apply to no
;
but ex hypothesi it applies to some. Thus it is not
possible to find terms under these conditions, and our
proof must be drawn from the indefinite nature of the
particular premiss.
For since it is true to say that
if it in fact applies to
does not apply to some
none, and we saw that when it applies to none there
is no syllogism, evidently there will be no syllogism
in the present case either.
Again, let us take the premisses as affirmative, and ailet the universal relation be the same as before ; i.e,
let
apply to all
and to some O. Then it is possible both for
and for it to apply
to apply to all
to no O.
Examples of terms where it applies to none
are white swan stone ; but it will be impossible to
find examples where it applies to all O, for the same
reason as before ; and our proof must be drawn from
the indefinite nature of the particular premiss.
If the universal relation belongs to the minor term, OEi.e. if
applies to no
and does not apply to some
N, it is possible both for
and for it
to apply to all
to apply to no O. Examples of terms where it does
apply are white animal crow where it does not iaapply, white stone crow.
If the premisses are
affirmative, examples of terms where the relation of
is

N
O

the extremes

where

it is

is

negative are white animal

animal swan.

positive, white

snow

223

ARISTOTLE
27 b
85

orav ofioitxTX^fiovti cSoif at wpoKadoXov 17 5' ^v /i/pcc, Iht oCSoft&i

ytyvcrat auAAoyta/ioff* oAA' ovS* i run iKoript^
vndpx^i rj firf vndpx^i, rj Tip fuv rtp h^ n^, n
(t>avp6v oiV,

rdaLS Koi

fi7)STp(i}^

TTCLVTOiv

17

yikv

iravTi,

rj

dBiopiarcji,

l^wovdvOporTTO^,

\Vk6v

opoi hi ttou^Oi
AciNr^r-{^lOT*-

dt/njxov.

^avcpov

28 a

e^^ciXTiv

o^

K rwv

tiprjp4vt$iv

on

idw rt ovruK

ol opoi trpos oAAtJAow? <u9 iXiyBri,

ytyvmu

(( dvdyKrj^, dv r* ^ ovXXoyum^i
dvdyKTf Touy opou^ ovrojs <X'**'' ^T^^W' hi kqI ori
navrtg dTXi^ ciatv 04 v rovrtp Ttp o^pjfUiTK OIM*
avXXoyiap,6s

Xoyujp,ol (7ravT9
fjLevwv TLVwv,

Tf

yap ^tTcAouvroi npoaXapifiavO'

vinrdpxi

roU

dpoit i( aioy*i^

StA roO oSv

vaTov htiKvvwfxev) , Kai on otJ y/yvrrm icaTO^TiMi^
avXXoyiafjLog Sui tovtov rov a^^ij/iaTOj, oAAd wdErrrP
GTp7JTLKOl, Kol ol KaOoXoV Kal ol ICOTcl fldpOS.
VI. *Eav 8c Toi ai^TOi to piy Tnurrl r6 hi fiiyScvi
vnapxT), ^ a/t^co TraiTi ^ fiTjhVi, ro fUv c^XW***
TO toioOtoi' KoAtii rpiTov, paov 8*
avT^ Acytu
Ka6^ oS dpxtxi) rd KarTfyopovpiva, dtcpa hi rd. Kat'
rjyopovficva, fici^ov 8* dxpov rd iroppumpov rov
fjLcaov, eXarrov 8c to iyyvrtpov nSerai hi rd
fJLCGov cfco jicv Twv aKpoiv <rxarov hi rfj Btati.
TcActo? fiv ovv ov ytyi'CTcu avXXoytapd^ ovh*
v rovTO) Tw axrjfiari. Swards 8' corou kcu koBoXov

iq

10

Tidevrax ay unoStad^, otov

dm

15

224

HrjS'

Mpm u. WaiU.

27 a 3-5, 26-33.
Aristotle has in mind the formula which he use* in L 18,

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
Thus

v-vi

I.

when

evident that

the premisses are

universal and the
we get a syllogism ; (3) other
nor again if the middle term applies or does not apply tions of*'
to some of each subject, or applies to some of one premisses.
but not to some of the other, or does not apply to all ooof either, or is related to them indefinitely. Examples q^
of terms which are applicable to all these cases are
white animal man, white animal inanimate.
Thus it is evident from the foregoing analysis that
if the terms are related to one another in the manner
described,^ a syllogism necessarily follows ; and that
if there is a syllogism, the terms must be thus related.
It is obvious also that all syllogisms in this figure are
imperfect (since they are all completed by assuming
certain additional premisses which are either necessarily impUcit in the terms or assumed as hypotheses,
e.g., when we prove our result by reduction ad impossibile) and that we do not get an affirmative
syllogism by this figure ; all the syllogisms are negait is

similar in form and when one

other particular, in no case do

is

whether universal or particular.

VI. If one of the terms applies to all and the other Third
to none of the same subject, or if both terms apply to PoSon of
all or none of it, I call this kind of figure the Third ; the terms.
and in it by the middle I mean that of which both
the predications are made
by extremes the predicates by the major term that which is the middle
and by the minor that which is nearer to it. The
middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by
tive,

position.^

Now we do not get a perfect syllogism in this figure

either

but there

will

be a valid

where P stands for the major,

middle term.

h2

for the

(i)

Both

syllogism whether uSverS

minor and S
"

i.e.

for the
imperfect.

225


ARISTOTLE
KadoXov rwv opwv ovrwv npof ro fUoot^.
KaOoXov fiv ovv ovTUiVt orav koX to FI koI to V
nainl rut S vno-pxT), ori rivl t^ P to FI xmdpiti
cf avayia)S' iirel yap avrurrpliUi ro Karrf^opuci,
{nrdpiet ro 2 rwl rat P, war* cwei rt^uiv muni
ro n rai 8c P nvl ro 2, avdytai to ft to4 t^* P
VTTapx^iv ylyverai yap GvXXoviafio^ 8ia rov itpwrov oxi]fiaros. <m 8c kcu did tow oSiWtoi; teal
/cat firj

20

KdGdai TTOuUf rrjv diroSct^iV* Ci yap dfL^

navri rip 2 imdpxi, dv Xrj^djj rt rutv ottw to
N, Totrroi KOi TO ll koX ro P vmipfu, wort rwi
Toj P to n vndp^i.
Kat av ro pv P travrl rip Y, r6 hk l[ /ii^Sm
tmdpxTf), ccrrat oruAAoyior/w oTt to FI nrl t^ P
ovx xmdp^i cf dvdyKJ)^' 6 yap aiVrdf rpSrrof rijf
aTToSeL^ews dvricrrpa<f>urqi rrj^ PS npordatcaf.
80 heixBeirj S* dv Kat 8td toO dSiWrov, Kc^dntp iid
rwv nporcpwv.
*Edv 8c to ftcv P p.-qSvi to 8^ fl nayri VTrdpXQ
rw S, ovK carat ovAAoyto/xd^. dpoi tou vwdpxtiv
^a>ov LTTJTOS dvdpojmoSt rov pri vrrapxtiv i<pov
dipvxov dvBpomoS' ovb* orav dfu^ Kara ptf"
Scvo? tou 2) Aeyi/TOt, ovk cotcu crvXXoyujpo^,
^ opoi rov xmdpx^iv l^ipov Irmo^ dt/wYOV, rov fM^
imdpxiv dvdpomos tTTTros dilnfxov' putaov di^mxp^*
Oavcpov ovv Kol v rovru) rtp ax^fuin rtdir
earai koI 'nor ovk corat ovAXoytorfid; koBoXov rww
opwv ovTWV. orav pkv yap dpxftdrtpoi ol opa wai
KarrjyopLKoi, corat ouAAoyto/idj oti tivi vrrdpxa
rtp

26

In DarU, 26 a 23.
This does not, of course, mean that the oondusioo ll
apodeictic, but that it follo^^ necessarily from the jiii iiilfl

226

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

vi

the terms are in a universal relation to the middle or

not.
If they are in a universal relation, when both P
and R apply to all S,it will necessarily follow that P applies to some R
for since the affirmative statement is oaraptL
convertible, S wall apply to some R, and so since P apphes to all S and S to some R, P must apply to some R
for we get a syllogism by means of the first figure.*
It is also possible to prove this by reduction ad imfor where both terms
possibile, and by exposition
apply to all S, if we take one of the Ss, e.g. N, both P
and R ^\ill apply to it, and so P will apply to some R.
Also if R applies to all S, and P to none, there will Feiapton.
be a syllogism to the effect that P necessarily ^ does
not apply to some R. The method of proof is the
same as before, the premiss RS being converted.*'
The result could also be proved by reduction ad
impossibile, as in the former examples.
If, however, R applies to no S and P to all S, there aewill be no syllogism.
Examples of terms where the
relation of the extremes is positive are animal horse
man where it is negative, animal inanimate
man. Nor will there be a syllogism when both terms bbare predicated of no S. Examples of terms where
the relation of the extremes is positive are animal
horse inanimate where it is negative, man horse
^inanimate. Here inanimate is the middle term.
It is evident, then, in this figure also when there
will or will not be a syllogism if the terms are universally related.
When both the terms are affirmative,^
there will be a syllogism to the effect that one extreme
;

'

This gives a syllogism in Ferio, 26 a 25.

loose and, strictly speaking, meaningless expression.
Aristotle should have said ' when both premisses are affirma*

<*

tive.'

227

ARISTOTLE

n b ro

OKpov Tw axptit, arav 3c artprjrutol, owe toroA*

orav 8* o /iv 7} arprjriK6^ 6 & caTi^7tJa(f , ^ov
fiiv 6 ficl^uiv yvrjru otc/xi/tckoj drtpof hi #<aTa<f>ariK6^, crrai avXXoyiafio^ ort riw ovx vnapx*i
TO cLKpov TOi dt<pwt tcLP 8* avdnoXiy, ovk <rrai.
*Eav 8* o fitv 2} kclBoXov frp6^ r6 fUaov 6 S*
v fMpi, KarriyopiKOfV fiv ovrutv d^t^fdw dvdytcfi
yiyvcadoi (wXXoyiauov, dy dmntpoooOv i kqBoXov

II
yap ro fiv r iravri rip 2< to
ro fl rivt t<J* P vndpxtw intl yap
dtrTurrpi^i ro Kartuftarucov , imdp^ti rd tw\
rip n, aHTT* CTTct to ftci' P weu^i Ty to 5^ ^
Ttl/t TOi n, KQt TO P TtW T^ 11 Vndp(l' OKITC
TO n rivl rp p. TTClAlV 1 TO fciv P Tm T<J TO
8 n Trarri vnapx^i, dvaytcri r6 11 to4 rat V
\mdpxLV' 6 yap avros rpdiro^ t^ airoSctfcciv.
<m 8* a7ro8rfflu #fai 8ia tou i&wdroo fccu t^

Twv

opojv.

CI

Tivi, avdyict)
10

16

JO

Kaddncp cVi Taiv npor^poiv.

'Eav 8* o /xci' 7} KarrjyopiKO^ d hi ortptfrvcdf,
KaOoXov Sc o Karr^opiKo^, orav /iv <5 iXirrow
^
KarrjyopiKos , <rrai ouAAoyur/zo^* Ci yap to P
Travrl rip 2 to 8c FI Tivi /xi) vndpxti, dvayKy) ro
rivi rip r prj V7rapxiv (ci yap nayri, koi ro r
navrl rip Z, koX ro W -navrl rip vndp(i' oAA'
ou;^ v7Trjpxv beiKwra^ 8c /ecu cu'cv t^ dnaytayrj^,
edv Xr)<l>6fj Tc rwv Z a to 11 /ii7 UTiapx^i)* otov 8*
o ftt^a>v tJ KarqyopiKo^, ovk iarai ov^Xoyiapuos,
olov ct TO /xcv n Tra^rt Toi to 8c P Tivi Tci
^7) tmapx^i" opoi rod navrl vndpx^iv Ipmjivxpv
k6Gi,

By

Darii in the

Se.

by converting the premiss RS, which agin ghret

syllogism in Darii.

228

first figure.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

vi

applies to some of the other ; but when they are

negative there will be no syllogism. When one term
is negative and the other affirmative, if the major is
negative and the other affirmative, there will be a
syllogism to the effect that one extreme does not
apply to some of the other ; but with the opposite
arrangement there will be no syllogism.
If, however, one of the terms is in a universal and (2) One
the other in a particular relation to the middle, where ancrone^'
both are affirmative a syllogism must follow, which- particular
ever of the two terms is universal. For if R applies ETiSnJs.
to all S and P to some S, P must apply to some R ; for
since the affirmative premiss is convertible, S will
apply to some P, and so since R applies to all S and
S to some P, R will also apply to some P,<* and so P
will apply to some R.
Again, if R applies to some S Datisi.
and P to all S, P must apply to some R. The method
of proof is the same as oefore.^ It is also possible to
prove this result by reduction ad impossibile and by
exposition, just as in the previous examples.
If one term is affirmative and the other negative,
and the former is universal, when the minor term is
affirmative there will be a syllogism.
For if R applies Bocardot
to all S, and P does not apply to some S, it necessarily
follows that P does not apply to some R.
For if it
applies to all R, and R to all S, P ^\^ill also apply to
all S
but ex hypothesi it does not. This can also
be proved without reduction ad impossibile if we take
some S to which P does not apply. But when the aomajor is affirmative, there will be no syllogism ; e.g.,
if P applies to all S and R does not apply to some S.
Examples of terms where the relation of the extremes
is universal and positive are animate
man animal
;

"

Barbara.

229

ARISTOTLE
28 b
26

dvdpomos

^ofov

rov 8^

firjSvi

auK tan

Xafituf

m^

5^ fi^*
\mapxi rat to P
P ru^ r^
t yap TTavrl to 11 roi 21 imdpxti to
S, Kol TO n rwl rw P tmdpiti' vn^KtiTO
firfitU
6pov9,

1 Tivl /xv

V7Tdpxiv.

oAA' axrrrtp ev roty np6rrpO Xrjirrtov'

dSiopLGTOv yap ovtos rov rivl

fiif

VTrdpxiw

tcai

to

xmdpxov dXrjdts ciircti' rivl fi"^ iwipj(W

Be
vndpxovroq ovk ^v avXXayuriMiAs.
fjLTjSevl
<f>avp6v o^ orn ovk cotcu <n;AAoyu7fU^.
'Eav 8* o arepTjTiKOS f KadoXov rwv opwv, oray
fjuev 6 fjLtl^ojv fj arpTjTuc6s 6 5^ iXdrrcjv #fOTT}yopiKos, cotcu avXXoyiafios' i yap to FI /ii^Scvi
Toi 2 TO 8c P Tti't V7rdpxi TO* , rd n tu4 toJ P
oi);^ imdp^ti, ndXiv yap tar at r6 rrpanav ajfifjui
rrj^ PS npordatcjs dyrtarpa^iari^' Snu^ bi 6
iXdrrcjv ^ artpryriKOs, ovk tarai ouAAoytafU^.
opoi rov vndpxtiv l^<pov dvOpatiros oypusm^ roO

90 firjStvi

86

vndpxtiv t^ipav eirtarqfirf^ypiotf i4aov h^

dfJuf>oiv TO dypiov.
Ov8* orav dp^>6rpOL artprjntcol rtScaaw, ^ 3*

fXT)

KadoXov 6 b' v puipti. opoi orav 6 iXdrrw

KadoXov
TTpos ro pUaov,
l^wc hrurrqfiri
f5
dypiov, ^atov dvdpcjnos dypiov orav 8' o ymHwv,
Tov fjiv fir) xmdpxtiv Kopaf ^;(uukAv#co'' tov 8*
xmdpx^iv OVK ari Aa/Sctj', ct to P nvi fitv hrdpxti
jToi S rivi 8e p,r] vndpxti (ci yap ro FI navri rtp

29* o fiv

* %.e.
is

cm. Cm.

on the assumption that the relatkm of the extremci

and negative.

universal

230


PRIOR ANALYTICS,
but

vi

I.

we cannot

find terms where the

and negative, since R applies

universal

relation
to

is

some S

it also does not apply to some.

For if P
applies to all S, and
to some S, then P will applyto some R.
But ex hypothesis it applies to none.
The explanation must be apprehended as in the
former examples ^ ; for since the statement that one

although

term does not apply to another is indefinite, it is true

to say that that which applies to none does not apply
to some
but we saw that when R applies to no S
there is no syllogism. Thus it is evident that there
will be no syllogism in this case.
If, however, the negative term is universal, when
the major is negative and the minor affirmative, there
will be a syllogism.
For if P applies to no S, and R Ferison,
for
appHes to some S, P will not apply to some R
we shall have the first figure ^ again when the premiss
RS is converted. But when the minor term is ibnegative there will be no syllogism. Examples of
terms where the relation of the extremes is positive are
animal man \^ild where it is negative, animal
science wild. In both cases wild is the middle term.
Nor will there be a syllogism when both terms are
taken negatively, and one is universal and the other
particular.
Examples of terms when it is the minor
term that is in a universal relation to the middle are OE'^

'

'

animal science wild, animal man wild. When

the major that is in this relation, examples of eoterms where the relation of the extremes is negative
but where it is positive
are crow snow white
terms cannot be found, since R applies to some S
although it also does not apply to some (for if P
it is

>

27 b 20, 28.

28 a 30.

In Ferio, 26 a 25.

231

ARISTOTLE
*

P
8

T^ 8^

Z, Kol TO

Tivl TO)

T^ ' ^WlCWTO

TCW

oAA* cV TO0 ahiopiarov htuer^w.

fir)SvC),

OvS* av Kdr(po9 rwl rut fUat^ vndpxD ^ f4

vndpxj),

6 /x^ vndpxrj 6 Bt ^^ {mdpxQt ^

rj

Tivl o fM7 navTi,

Aoyw7/Lu>9 ot^/xa>s>.
10

dvBpomo^

\Vk6v,

dBiopurrins, ovtc

rj

dilnrxpvXmvkov.

v^

ovv Kol v Toirry nj* ax^it^MTi

(t>avp6v

earoi Koi nor* ovk /oroi ovXXoyurfiSi, Ktd

l-)(6vTijJv

Twv

15

ovTtjJS

7rdvTS drcActy U7ii' ol Iv

XoyuTfJuyi

fj

{ndvT^ yap

uv^XoytOfiids, dvdytcii

^vtpov

^X^iv.

&n

ytyvrrcu ouA-

opcjv tuj iXl^fir^

AoyuTfto? cf dvayio;?, dv

rovs opovs

M^

ionu ouA-

ndvTW {<iw

h tcoivoi

o/)oi

l^wov

<J

tovtw

koI

6rt

t<^ o^pifUiTi

ouA

8^

rcAttoiWai frpoaXn^ipavo^

Kal on. avXXoylaaaOai r6 tcaddXov

ficvojv Tivcuv)

8ta TovTou Tov axT^fiaros ovk tarax ovr arp'rfTueitf

OVT KaT<uf>aTiK6v,
VII. A^Aov
20

orav
7]

/Lti7

/cat

oTt ev aTToat Tocy o;^/iaaiy

yiyxrqrai avXXoyujfid^, Konfyopuctuv fiW

arepTjTLKCJv dp.<f>OTpwv ovroiv

oXcos

ylyvrai

KadoXov

OTcprjTiKOv,

del

dvayKalov,

ylyvTai

Xrj<f>$VTOi

avXXoyiafios

rov

Trpos TO /Ltetfov, olov ct to fiV

15 rivl,

282

TO 8c

p,-qSvl

Tw r*

rwv

Spojv odShf

KarriyopiKov

8^

koI

roG aTtptjrucod
iXdrrovos

navri

dxpov

rw

dirrurTp<f>ofivcjv

rj

yap


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

vi-vii

applies to all R, and R to some S, P also applies to

the
some S
but ex hypothesi it applies to none)
proof must be drawn from the indefinite nature of
;

the particular premiss."

Furthermore, if both terms apply or do not apply

some of the middle, or if one applies to some and
the other does not, or if one applies to some and the
other does not apply to all, or if they are related to
the middle indefinitely, there will in no case be a
syllogism.
Examples of terms common to all these
cases are animal man white, animal inanimate
to

white.

Thus it is evident in this figure also when there will

or will not be a syllogism ; and that where the terms
are related in the manner described ^ a syllogism
and that

there is a syllogism
the terms must be so related. It is evident also that
all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect (since
they are all completed by assuming certain additional
premisses)
and that it will be impossible to reach a
universal conclusion, either negative or affirmative, by
means of this figure.
VII. It is clear also that in all the figures, whenever
we get no (direct) syllogism, where the terms are both
affirmative or both negative, there is no necessary
conclusion at all
but where one term is affirmative
and the other negative, if the negative term is
universal we always get a syllogism establishing a
relation of the minor to the major extreme.^ ^-^-i i^
A apphes to all ^ or some ^ B, and B to no C ; for if
necessarily follows

if

(3)

other

tions of

f["^oo-^'
lo-^, oi-.'

Cf. 27 b 20.
28 a 18, 26, 28 b 5, 15, 31.
The minor being the predicate and the major the subject.
Fapesmo in the first, Fesapo in the fourth figure.
^

**

Frisesomorum

in the first, Fresison in the fourth figure.

233

General

on"th?three
figires.

conclusion.

ARISTOTLE
ribv Trpordaeiov avayio) ro

rivi

rw A fit)

vndp)(Uf,

ofioiws hk Kanl rwv Mpcjv axnfidrwv dtl yap

yiyvr<u hia rrj^ avnarpoffn\s avMoy%ayu&i , h^/Kov
8e Koi oTt TO ahiopiorov avrl rov KarrjYOpu(o rov
v ficpci Tidefitvov rov avrov
iv d-rraai
so

avAXoyuyfi/ov

9roti/<7Ci

ax^pjoxnv.
(!>avp6v Be Kal on TraiTc; ol artXtts avAAoyur/xoi
rots'

ij
TcAcioiWcu 8id rov irporrov ajf^ftaroff.
yap
heiKTiKoti ^ 5(a rov dhuvdrov vpaivovrai ndvrts'
dfut)orepws 8c yiyvrrai ro npurrov ov^fia, StucriKws fJLv rXiovp.vwv, ort &td t^ ayrurrpo^iji
7rpalvovro ndvrtg, ^ 8' dvriarpo^ ro vpdnov
inoUi axfjp^a. Bid 5c rov d&wdrov StucwfjJvoMt,
ori rdvro^ rov 0ci;5ov9 o avXXoytafios yiyvrrai
Bid. rod npanov axi^fuxro^' otov iv rtp rfXtvrauf
ax^fiari, ct ro A Koi ro B rramri r<p T imipvn,
ort ro A rivi rut B vndpx^i' i ydp firfiv(, ro
B Travrl rat P, ouScvt rat F t^ A* cUA*
wurrl.

ofioiws Bk Kol cVi rwv oAAcui'.

"EoTt Bk Kal dvayaylv ndvra^ touj avXXoyiafiodf
ct? roifs cv rat npatrtp axm^a'ri KoBdXov avXXoyt'
Gfiovs. ol fikv ydp cv T<Ji 0vrpat ^avtpdv ort Bi*
iKLvojv TcActoiWoi, TrXrjv

ovx oftouoy irdyrS, dXX*

KadoXov rov artp-qriKov dvrurrpa/^ivroi,
ratv S* cv /xcpct Kdrpos Bid rrjs cty to dSuKiroi'
d7raya>y^S- ot 8' cv Ta> npatrip ol leard lUpos
CTrtrcAoOvrcu ficv irat 8i* avraw, art Bk Koi btd
ot

fikv

In either case

we get by conversion
.'.

234

In the second and third figures this

C
B

applies to
applies to

do
no

B
A

<loea not oppbr

to9CMntA(Perto%
simplj br

Is eflTected

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

vii

the premisses are converted it necessarily follows that

C does not apply to some A.** Similarly too in the
other figures, for we always get a syllogism by the
process of conversion.^ It is obvious also that in all
the figures if the particular affirmative is replaced by
the indefinite the result will be the same syllogism.
It is evident also that all imperfect syllogisms are ah
completed by means of the first figure. For all the "yUogSms
conclusions are reached either by demonstration or are
by reduction ad impossibile, and in both cases we get in the
the first figure in the case of those which are com- ^^^^ ^s^^^pleted by demonstration because, as we have seen, all
the conclusions are reached by means of conversion,
and the conversion produces the first figure ; and in
the case of those which are demonstrated by reduction ad impossibile because if a false premiss is assumed
we get the syllogism by means of the first figure.
E.g., in the last figure, if A and B apply to all C, we
get a syllogism to the effect that A applies to some
B ; for if it applies to no B, and B applies to all C,
:

'^

applies to no C.
But ex hypothesi it applies to all
Similarly too in the other cases.
It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms to the All
universal syllogisms in the first figure. Those in the redSbie^
second figure are obviously completed by their help, ^ ^^^
but not all in a similar manner the universal syllo- syllogisms
C.

gisms are completed by the conversion of the negative

statement, and each of the particular ones by a reduction ad impossibile.
The particular syllogisms in the
first figure are indeed completed by means of themselves, but it is possible also to prove them by means
transposing the premisses. AE gives Cesare and Felapton
IE gives Festino and Ferison.
" In Darapti.

235

gg^Je.^^''^

ARISTOTLE
29b

rov Svrpov crx^fiaros Scucvwoi 19 oMtwrop <ltrdyovra^, otov 1 to A navrl rtft B to 8i B rufl
10 Toi r, OTt TO A Tll't Toi V.
i fop firfSvl, rtf^ hi
B navri, ovScvl Toi F to B vndp(t' rotho yap
iGfiev 8id Tov h\n(pov ax^fiaro^. ofiotw^ hi Hoi
ct yap to
CTTt tou crrpTjTiKov arai ij ciTroSfi^i;.
UwScVt T<p B TO 3c B TIKI Tip T VnOpYti, TO A
Tti'i Ta> i
oux if^op^i' ci /oi) iravTi, Tfp d< li
p.Tih^vl xmap\i, ovScvi Ta> F to B vnap(i' roOro
16 3*
t^
TO fUaov axfjfML. war* circi oc uv
1J1;
p,aa) ax^fiari avXXoyiofLOi rrdvr^^ dvayoviru %/s
TOV9 V rip nparrw KaBoXov avXXoytafAovf, Oi 3c
Kara p.pos v rw rrpotrtp Cip rov^ i rip fUatp,
<f>avp6v ori Kai oi Kara p^po^ dva)($i)ourai tU
rovs iv rw npwrw axrjpari Ka06Xov avXXeytapov^
*>
or 3* v rw rpirw KaBoXov piv ovrwv rCrv ^pojv
vBvs 7nrXovvrai 3i* K(ivwv rwv av^Xoyiapwv,
orav 3' v ppi Xrji^wai, Sia rwv iv pipi ovA-

rwv

XoyiapAjjv

dvi^X^^^^
f5

cV rip Ttpwrtp axripari' ovroi hi

wart koI 04 iv rw rplnp

4 J Kivot>s,

axtjpari ol Kara pJpos.

ifKxvtpov oSv art, vdvrts
dvaxBijaovrai cty tou9 v rip irpwrtp

a^pan

KaBoXov avXXoyiapovs
Ot pv ovv rwv avXXoyiapwv vnapxwv rj pil
tmdpxiv SeiKvwres tiprjrai ttw^ xovai, koI KoJf
avrovs ol k rov avrov axrjparos Kai npos dXXi^Xoot
oi CK riuv ctc/xov axrjpdrwv}
VIII. ^Errel 3* rp6v iariv vndpxfUf vt ircu i(
*

236

Camestres.

i.t.

axfjfJMTWf

am.

d.

the universal syllogisms of the

96 b S4.
firat figare.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
of the second figure

if

I.

vii-viii

we employ

reduction ad

A
A

applies to all B, and B to some

appHes to some C. For if it
C, to prove that
apphes to no C, but to all B, B will apply to no C ;

impossibile

e.g., if

for we know this by means of the second figure.**

The proof will take a similar form also in the case of

For if
applies to no B, and
applies to some C,
will not apply to some C.
For if it applies to all C, but to no B, B wall apply to

the negative relation.

no

and

this

is

of the form which

we

described

as the middle figure.

And so since the syllogisms in
the middle figure can all be reduced to the universal

syllogisms in the first figure, and the particular

syllogisms in the first figure to the universal syllogisms in the second, it is evident that the particular
syllogisms (in the first figure) can also be reduced to
the universal syllogisms in that figure.
As for the syllogisms in the third figure, when the
terms are universal, they are completed directly by
means of the syllogisms mentioned above ^ ; but
when the terms are particular, they are completed by
means of the particular syllogisms in the first figure.
But these, as we have seen, can be reduced to those
mentioned above and therefore so can the particular
syllogisms in the third figure. Thus it is evident that
all syllogisms can be reduced to the universal syllo;

gisms in the

first figure.

Thus we have

stated, with reference to those

syllogisms which demonstrate that a predicate simply
applies or does not apply to a subject, how those of
the same figure are related among themselves, and
how those of different figures are related to one
another.
VIII. Since to apply is not the same as neces'

'

237

ARISTOTLE
SO

M^x^oBai vnapxtuf {troXXa

ov ftivroi i( dvaytaf^' rd 8'
ovT* cf dvdyKTfi ovS* vndpxi oXw^, M^xfrni
8* vndpxfw), ^Xov ori Kai avXXoyujfio^ tKdarov
rOVTlOV TpOS C<7TCU, Kol OVV OfloUnS CYOn'COl' TCUT
4^ uirapxOKrttN^
opcjv, oAA o fJLv ^ ovayKOUjJv o
oyoymys' vndpxiv Koi

yap vndpx^i

UO

fiiv,

S* ( vBXOflVWV,

*Fml fjLv ovv rCiv dpayKOiWV axt^oy o/iotci^ ;(Ci

rStiUvoMt
Kol 771 Twv imapxdvruiv utaavTu^s
rcjv opiMiv v T rw vndpxiv Koi rift i( OMOvin^
vndpxiv rj firj vndpx^iv ccmu re tcoi ovk ccnxu

y^

10

avXXoyiGfio^, ttXtiv Scoutcc rai npoatetioBai roc;

opo(; TO ff ovayioyy iWap;(Ci' ^ fi^ iwdptxnw* r6
T yap OTcprjriKov uxmvrto^ dynarpd^i, koI to
v oXu) lvai KOI TO Kara nayrof ^ioiut^ diny

Bwaofiev.

o5v rot? oAAoif riv oiJrw rpdmov 5ftT^ dvriarpo^TJ^ ro <rvfinpaapa

avayKOLOv axmcp cVi rou undpx^iy' v ok r^
fjLGw axT^fiari orov ^ to ica^oAov Kom/^riKOV ro
8' V /XC^l OTfprjTlKOV, Kol TToAiV cV Toi TpiTip OTOP
to /iv icaddAou KaTTjyopucov ro 8' cv P^P*^ artpt^
riKov, ovx ofioitos corcu i} dTr6St(iS, oAA* a>oyfny
iKdepLcvovs a> rtvi Kdrpov p,r) vndpx^i, Kara
rovrov nouZv rov avXXoyujfidv coroi yap omy-

*Ev

fi

10

fjL^v

Y^acTcu

Sia

note on 35 a 2,

25 a

5.

'Mb 6.

' Ine svllogisms in Barooo and Bocardo, when

are proved by reduction ad impottihih^ %j. by aflmmiiig tiM
contradictory of the conclusion which it is required to jw o
But the contradictory of an apodektls
(27 a 38, 28'b 19).
judgement is problematic ; and the combinatioa of an apo'

238

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

viii

I.

possibly to apply (because there Assertoric,

apply, but not necessarily ; aSd^^^''^^^
and others neither apply necessarily nor indeed apply problematic
*^^ g^^^at all, but it is possible that they should apply), it is
clear that the syllogism also is different in each of
these cases, and that the terms are not related in the
same way, but that one type of syllogism is composed
of apodeictic, another of assertoric, and another of
problematic premisses. **
If the premisses are apodeictic the conditions are, Apodeictic
roughly speaking, the same as when they are asser- foUow the
toric.
When the terms are related in the same way, rules for
then both in assertoric and in apodeictic propositions, syllogisms.
whether affirmative or negative, a syllogism will or
will not result in the same way. The only difference
will be that the terms will have attached to them the
words necessarily applies or necessarily does not
apply.'
For the negative premiss converts in the
same way,^ and we shall give the same explanation ^
of the expression to be wholly contained in or to
be predicated of all.'
Thus in all the other cases the conclusion will be Exceptions,
shown to be necessary in the same way as in an
assertoric syllogism, by means of conversion ; but in
the middle figure, when the universal statement is
affirmative and the particular negative, and again in
the third figure when the universal statement is
affirmative and the particular negative, the proof will
not take the same form.*^
must take examples of
that portion of its subject to which each predicate
does not apply, and draw the conclusion from this ;
for with this combination of terms we shall get a
sarily to

are

apply

'

or

'

many predicates which

'

'

'

We

deictic with a problematic premiss

conclusion (ch. xvi).

cannot give an apodeictic

ARISTOTLE
Kauos inl rouTuiy ct & Kara roO itmS^yrof iorvf
iicnBhf
avayKoios, kqX Kar Kwov rtvo^' r6

y^

oTTcp Klv6 ri iariv.

16

20

yiyucrai &

rwv avXXoyiOfuav

KdTp09 V TW oltClW OJflJ/XaTl.

IX. Xv/i/3aiWi bd irort koX 1179 Mpaf npordtmos
avayKaias ovotj^ dvaytccuov ylyvtoBai rov avXXoyti^
afiov, nXrjv ovx onoT^oa^ rvxV, dXXa rik np69
TO fieX^ov aKpov olov ct to ^uv A t^ B ii ovdyKtui
^XXj^irr ai vTrapvov (^ fir^ xmdo^v), ro 5< B t^
r imap^ov pLOvov ourtos yap ttkruiudvijav rmv
7rpoTdawv cf avdytcq^ ro A r<f> T vnapfti [rj oux
imdpi^i)' 7Tl

ovx

(rj

yap

^a/);fi)

<l>avp6v ori

Trayrl rip

cf <miyn^

to A, to &

Koi ra^

Tt rttv

vtmDxu

4ari,

i( dvdytaii coroi darpO

rourcjv.

!>

BP
Et Sc to fiv AB /xt; <mv avaytcaiov to
dvayKaZov, ovk cotcu to avfin^paafia dpaytauov.
t yap cm* <Tvp.p-qar(u to A rwi ra> B vndpx*op
cf dvdytcri^ hid tc tou trpurrov teal hta rov
rpLTov crxqp-aros* roOro & iptvSoi* ^i^)^CTai yap
roLovrov ^tvai to B a iyxwptl ro
iA,rjlbvl 6n'
dpx^iv. in Kal k rwv opatv <f>ai'p6v ori ovk ctrrcu
to avp.'nipaapxL dvayKoioVt olov ci to fiiv
41}
KivrjaLs, ro B ^<pov, c^* at h r6 T avOpamos'
^<pov jiev yap 6 dvOpojrros cf dvdyKffs iarl, Kwtirai
TO i,a)ov OVK eg avayKrjs, ovO
Q avfJputvo^.

80

>

.^.,

we have

in

TV ABC: ToBdiu.
<TTi

ABdu:

Baroco

loraiQfu

M necessarily applies to all N

M necessarily docs ooi apply to
some O.

240

;:

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

viii-ix

necessary conclusion. And if the conclusion is necessarily true of the selected examples, then it will be
necessarily true of some of the original term, since
that is identical with the selected example." Each
of these syllogisms is effected in its own figure.^
IX. It sometimes happens that we get an apo- An
^
deictic syllogism even when only one of the premisses Sajor'^
not either of the two indifferently, but the major ^on^^t-^eg
premiss is apodeictic e.g., if A has been taken as gives an
necessarily applying or not applying to B, and B as JJnciusSn
simply applying to C. If the premisses are taken in even if the
this way A will necessarily apply (or not apply) to C. premLs
For since A necessarily applies (or does not apply) ^irgt^^ure^'
to all B, and C is some B, obviously A must also apply (a)
(or not apply) to C/
FytgTiL
If, however, the premiss AB is not apodeictic, but
BC is, the conclusion will not be apodeictic. If it is,
it must follow, both by the first and by the third
figure, that A applies to some B.
But this is false
for B may be such that it is possible for A to apply to
no B. Further, it is also evident from a consideration
of the terms that the conclusion will not be apodeictic
e.g., supposing A to be
motion,' B animal,' and C
man.' Man is necessarily an animal, but the animal
is not necessarily moved
nor is the man. Similarly

'

we take

part of O, P, such that

necessarily applies
to no P, and substitute this for the minor premiss, we can
infer that
necessarily applies to no P ; i.e.^ necessarily
does not apply to some O. Similarly with Bocardo.
' Baroco by Camestres, and Bocardo by Felapton.
" The argument is fallacious, and Bekker's defence of it
(A.T.M. p. 39) depends upon a symbolism which obscures
the real issue. The relation of
to C cannot be apodeictic
unless C is necessarily some B.' Aristotle does not distinguish clearly between assertoric and apodeictic relations
c/. Introd. p. 190.
If

'

241

ARISTOTLE
to*

ofioiws Kal t OTtprp-ucov fiiy TO AB* ^ yap

avrf) anoSei^i^,
*E7rl rdfv v iUpi avXXoytafUMft^, 1 IU Tti
KadoXov coTtv dvayKoiov, koI to (Wftn^paafia <rrai

dvayKOiov, el Si to Kara fupof, odtc dfoytcawv,

ovT GTeprjTiKTJ^ ovT KaTrfyopitcfff ovarf^ T^y
KadoXov TTpordaeo}^. arvj 5^ trpumv ro KaBoXov
dvayKouov, Kal ro yikv A rravrX r<ft B imap^rut i(
dvdyKTj^f TO B rivi to* F xmap^4rw fi6vo*
40 dmyfoy 817 TO
Tiw t^* F inrap;^iv f cmiymyy*
TO yap r vrro to B c'oti, T<p
B troi^i to A'
iok VTrrjpxv cf awyioyy. ofioiws 5c mu 4 aTpnTuc6s
vrj 6 avXXoyiayios' "h yap aM^ ianu dndittfis,
ct to Kara fipo^ cotiv ovaynrcuoi',
larm t^
avfJLTTepaafia dvayKoIov ovShf V(if> o^iWrov <n;/x6 TTiTrret, Kaddirep ov6* iv roU koBoXov ouAAoyioyioSr*
ofiotws Sc KciTri TcDv arfprjTucwv.
6poi Konfovs
t,(^ov
XevKOv.
X. 'Etti hk rov hevTtpov ax^fiaros, mI fiv ij
oreprqriKT] nporaaCs iariy dvayKola, kqI to oruytrrcpaafia cora* avayKatov, ci 8* ij Karriyopuaj, <At
10 avay/catov.
cotco yap trpwrov 1} ar tpnrfTUci) dwoy^
*faia, Kot TO A T<p /xv B /xi^vt iv^x^oBw, rtff
Be r vnapxeTO) fiovov.
enel ovv dvTurrpi^t to
trrepTjriKov, ovSe ro B tw A ovSevt evS^xcnu*
ro 8c
TTtt^Tt rw r undpxei, cjor* ou8cv T^i F Tii
B evSexerai' ro yap V vno ro wrtp, waaurutt
Se Kal el irpos rw P reSeirf ro arepnrjrucSv' tt yap
16 TO
fiTjSevl rat T evSex^rai, ovSe ro T ovSw rtft
eyxoipei' ro be A navrl rat B vndpx^t^, oat*

o^

TO

* TiQi'vi]

242

A cm. B, Waits : habent post <tyr^ dfu.

Alexander, Philoponus, Themistiiut t^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

ix-x

also if the premiss AB is negative, for the proof is the

same.
In particular syllogisms, if the universal premiss is
apodeictic, the conclusion will also be apodeictic
but
if it is the particular premiss that is apodeictic, the
conclusion is not apodeictic, whether the universal
premiss is negative or affirmative. Let us first take
the universal premiss as apodeictic, and let A necessarily apply to all B, and B simply apply to some C.
;

(6)

fyUogi^Sl

Then
some

it must follow that

necessarily applies to
C.
For C falls under B," and ex hypothesi
applies necessarily to all B.
Similarly too if the
syllogism is negative
for the proof will be the same.

But

the particular premiss is apodeictic, the conclusion will not be apodeictic

for there is no impossibiHty involved (if it is not true), just as there was
none in the universal syllogisms. Similarly too in the
case of negative premisses.^ Examples of terms are
motion animal white
X. In the second figure, if the negative premiss Second
is apodeictic, the conclusion will also be apodeictic
la)^^'
but not if the affirmative premiss is apodeictic. First Universal
^
^^
let the negative premiss be apodeictic, and let it be
impossible for A to apply to any B, but let it simply
apply to C. Then since the negative premiss is convertible, it is also impossible for B to apply to any A.
But
applies to all C. Therefore B cannot apply to
any C for C falls under A.*' The same also holds
good if the negative statement refers to C. For if
A cannot apply to any C, neither can C apply to any
A. But A applies to all B. Therefore C cannot
if

" Cf. 26 a 22 note

15-23.

when one

i.e.

"

Cf. notes

and

for the fallacy see note

of the premisses

is

on 30 a

negative.

on 26 a 22, 30 a 15-23.

243

ARISTOTLE
sob

TrpwTOV

JO

yfyvmu yip t
ovk dpa ovSi t6 B Ty F*
dvTiarp(t>i yap ofWiw^.
Et 8' 17 KaTrjyopiKTi rrporaatV ^arw dvayKaia, o^k
vrro^Wrcu vdp
eorat to avfiTrfpaa^a dvavKoiov.
TO A navrl rw B cf dvayicny, r^i 5^ r /ii^Ocvi
imapxirui p.6vov. dvriarpcj^vro^ odv roO <yrpi-

ovScvl

rwv

(Txfjfia

T<i

o^/x^^^***

ndXiv.

TiKou TO rrpdnov yiyvtrai ax^jfui' B^ucrai h* v

rw irpwrto on fitf di-ayKala^ oiknj^ rrjf ^pdf to
fiel^ov oreprfTiKTJ^ ouS* to avfiwtpaafui corcu
dvayKoZov, coot* ovS* tttl rovrotv total i( dvdytnft.
96
"Eti 8* 1 TO avfiTT^paafid iarw arayiratbr,
av^patvi TO r Tivi Toi A fi^ vndpxttv if dvdytn^'
1 yap TO B Tci r firjofvl vndp\i (i( dvdyterK, oOM
TO r Toi B oyScvi vndp((i cf <ivayir;9' ro h4 yt
B Tivt Ta> A dmyKTy V7rdp;fci', fiTrcp #fal t^ A
rravrl tco B cf dvdytcq^ vTnjpvtv, uxrrt ri F dwfyio^
oAA* ouScv iccuAuci to A
aoTivt to) a fn7 vndpxiv.
TOIoOtOV At^^^I'QI OI TTG^tI to r A^S/jfCTOi VJT"Eti Kav opovs cV^c/xcvov

cti;

Sct^oi oti to ovfi-

dAAa rovruw
ovTwv dvayKaiov. olov crr(o to A ^tpov, rd 8c
B dvdpomo^, TO 8c r XVk6v, kou eu irpoTOocif
85 ofiolws lXri<f>Stoaav vhX(rai yap to (okn^ ftrjStvi
XcvKoj \mdpxiv. ovx vndp(i 817 ou8' d dSpumo^
TTcpaofia OVK

(mv dvayKalov

dtrXut^,

ovhcvl XcvKO), dAA* ouAC cf dmyKTTS" A'8/)frftu yif)

dvBpoiTTov yevioBai AeuKov, ou ftciTOi Cftiy 5r foiov
frqhevl Acu/coi vndpxiJ'
axrrt tovtcjv fiev ovtujv

dvayKaiov lorat to avfincpaofia, dnXto^

8*

oi5#f

dvay/catoi/.
81 *

'O/xoicu? 8* cf t *ccu

244

em

Toiv cv ficpci owAAoyi-

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

apply to any B, for we get the first figure again ; and

so neither can B apply to C, for the premiss is convertible as before.
But if the affirmative premiss is apodeictic, the
necesconclusion will not be apodeictic. (1) Let
sarily apply to all B, and let it merely apply to no C.

of the negative statement we

it has been proved in the
first figure that if the negative major premiss is not
apodeictic, the conclusion will not be apodeictic
Therefore it will not be apodeictic in the
either.
present example.
(2) Further, if the conclusion is apodeictic, it
follows that C necessarily does not apply to some A.
For if B necessarily applies to no C, C will also

Then by the conversion

get the

figure

first

and

But B must apply to

necessarily apply to no B.
some A, that is if
ex hypothesi must apply to all B.
Therefore C necessarily does not apply to some A.
should not be so
There is, however, no reason why
taken that C may possibly apply to all of it.

(3) Further, it can be shown by taking examples of

terms that the conclusion is necessary, not absolutely,
but given certain conditions. E.g., let A be animal,*
and let the premisses be
B man,' and C white
taken in the same way as before ^ for it is possible
that animal should apply to nothing that is white.
Then man too will apply to nothing that is white.
But this will not be so of necessity, for a white man
may come into being, but not so long as animal *
applies to nothing that is white. Thus given these
conditions the conclusion will be necessary ; but it
will not be absolutely necessary.
*

'

'

'

'

The same

30 a 23

principle
ff.

will

obtain in the case of

"

In 30 b 20.

245

ARISTOTLE
81 a

orav fifv yap -q artprjrucri nporaaif tciMXan

dvayKala, koI r6 avpLniftaoua ^ortu
^
avayKoXov orav hi 17 Ka-njyopuc^ koBoKov 1}
aTprjriPcrj Kara fiepos, ovk larai r^ avfin^paafia
(Xfuhv.

r*

KoX

dvayKatov. <rrat &17 npatrov 1} artfnp^ucii tc(^6Xov

t^i fiv B /xi/^cvi iv
T Kal avayKaia, koI ro
hexiadu) xmapx^^v, rtft & V rtvi vnapx^rw ivtl
ovv dvrurrp^t. ro artptjrucov, ovhi ro B tu>
ovBcvl v6xoir* av imdpxtv' to 5< yc
rtft V
imdpx^i' war <f dvav^n/; rwl rdfv V odx (rndp^ti^
ro B. irdXiv corcu rj Karqyopucfi Kn$6Xov T ttoi
dvayKoia, koI Kia6w npo^ rw h r6 xarrfyopuc^tr

A rm

10

TO A TTovTi Toi B ^f dvdyfOf^ ihrdpx^ rt^ M

r Ttvi fiT) V7rdpxi, art fiiv ovv vndp(t r6 B rtA
rw r, itavp6vf oAA* oi5#c i^ dvayKJi^' ol ydb <u$ro2
4 817

aovrax trpos r^v QTro^cc^tv oTircp cirt rwr

KadoXov avXXoyujfiwv.
*AAA' ou8* ( TO <rrpTjruc6v dpayKaZ6v iarw hf
fjiept, Xrj<f>dv, OVK corai to avfiir^paafta dvayKoZov'
Slcl yap rcjv avratv opojv ij dnoSti^iSXI. *v Sc TOi TcAcuTouic^ a;;^/xan ca^(Uov fi/hf
ovTWv rwv opwv trpos ro fjUoov koI KarrfyopucAf
*> dfi<t>OTepwv rwv npordataw, idv dnortpovow
f
dvayKOLOv, koX ro avfiTrtpaafxa coroi dvayKoZov
idv Sc ro fiev fj areprfrucov ro 8^ KarrjyopiKOV,
orav fjiv ro ortpmjriKov dvayKoXov f, koX ro
avfinepaafia arai dvayKolov, orav oi ro #caTrjyopLKov, OVK tarai dvayKoZov.
'Karcoaav yap dfKf>6rpax Karrjyopucai vparrov at
88 npordaeis, koI ro A Kal ro B navri rw V ^apxtrw,
dvayKatov 8' iaroj to AT. cVci o^ to B navri

16

opoi

'

246

vudpxu A.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

x-xi

particular syllogisms.
When the negative premiss (^
universal and apodeictic, the conclusion will also syllogisms.
be apodeictic ; but when the affirmative premiss is
imiversal and the negative particular, the conclusion
will not be apodeictic.
First let the negative premiss
be universal and necessary, and let it be impossible
for
apply to some C.
to apply to any B, but let
Then since the negative premiss is convertible, it is
is

also impossible for B to apply to any A.

But
applies to some C, and so B will necessarily not apply
to some C." Again, let the affirmative premiss be
universal and apodeictic, and let the affirmative
premiss refer to B. Then if
necessarily applies to

B, and does not apply to some C, evidently B will

not apply to some C ; but this will not be so of
necessity.
The terms to demonstrate this will be the
same as in the universal syllogisms.^
Nor will the conclusion be apodeictic if the negative
statement is apodeictic and particular. This may be
demonstrated by means of the same terms.
XI. In the last figure, where the (extreme) terms Third figure.
are in a universal relation to the middle, and both universal
premisses are affirmative, if either statement is syllogisms.
apodeictic, the conclusion will also be apodeictic.
If,
however, one is negative and the other affirmative,
when the negative is apodeictic, the conclusion will
also be apodeictic ^
but when the affirmative is
apodeictic, the conclusion will not be apodeictic.
First let both premisses be affirmative, and let both
A and B apply to all C, and let the premiss AC be
apodeictic.
Then since B apphes to all C, C will also
all

" The proof breaks down, being dependent upon the

* 30 b 33.
syllogism in 30 a 21-23.
* Actually none of these conclusions can be apodeictic;
cf. 30 a 23 note.

247

ARISTOTLE
>cai ro V rivi t^ B vnap(4i Sea to
ro KadoXov rtft Kara iiipos' war tl
iravrl rw V ro A cf dydyfcrj^ undpx**^ fcal to V
80 Toi B rivi, Kai rat B rivi ovayKolov ^nd^xiuf r6 A*
ro yap B vno ro V ariv. yiyvtrai ody r6 wo&ro
ofioLws & SciYdijarnu urol wl to HP
crx^fia.
iarlv dyayKoZov dvnarpi^i vap ro T rw A tiW,
COOT* ct navrl rat V ro B cf avdytcrf^ V7rapxi, Kai
rat A rwl vndp(i cf avdy#ojff.
BF
rioAt^' araj ro fiiv AT artptjriK^, r6
intl
85 Kara^ftariKov, dvayKoiov & to artptirufdv.
oi;y dvriarp^i rivl T<jt> B to F, to 5^ A o^Sm
r<ji
r cf d>^y#oyy, ou& rift B Tivi vndp(i ii
dvdyKT)^ ro A' ro yap B vtto to F ioriv. ct 5< ro
KarT)yopuc6v dvayKoiov, ovk cotcu to crv/iWoao/ta
carui vdp to BF fcarifvopurov cai
di'ay/caioi'.
40 dvayKalov, to AF <rrprjrtKW koi fr^ OMiyiailbr.
enel ovv dvriorp^i ro Kara^rtKOv, ihrdpftt Koi
ro r rivl rat B cf dvaynrf^, war* tl t6 fUv A
81 b firjhcvi ratv F to 8c F rtvt rwv B, t^ A rtwt rw B
ovx uTrdpfci* oAA* ou#f cf <mxy#riyy ScScuktcu yap A'
rat rrpatTot ax^jp-ari ori riji <rrp>rjrucrk npordau>i
to avfiiripaofia larai
firj dvayKaias ownis ouSc

rw r

vndpxfi,

dvTi,<rrp4<t>w

dvayKolov.

"En

10

opwv tit) ^avtpov, iarw yap

dyaOov, ro 8* c^* 4 B {[<pov, to & F
Xttttos.
ro fiv ovv dyadov vSXfrai firjS^vl timfp
vnapx^Lv, ro Sc l,atov dvdytaj navrl imdpx't^v' oAA*
OVK dvdytcq ^atov ri pLt) cfvcu dyaBov, inp V
8;^Tat ndv elvoj, dyadov.
^ ct fir) roOro hwarov,
oAAd to yprjyopvai t) ^adcuSctv opof O^rtov dvav
TO

ydp
248

/Ltv

Kciv 8id ratv

foiov hetcTiKov rourajv.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xi

apply to some B (because the universal converts with

the particular) ; so that if A must apply to all C,
and C applies to some B, A must also apply to some
B ; for B falls under C. Thus we get the first figure.
The proof vdll be similar also if the premiss BC is
apodeictic ; for by conversion C applies to some A,
80 that if B necessarily appHes to all C, it will also
necessarily apply to some A.
Again, let AC be negative and BC affirmative, and
let the negative premiss be apodeictic.
Then since
by conversion C apphes to some B, and
necessarily
apphes to no C,
will also necessarily not apply to
some B ; for B falls under C. But if it is the affirmative premiss that is apodeictic, the conclusion will not

be apodeictic. Let BC be affirmative and apodeictic,

and AC be negative and assertoric. Then since the
affirmative premiss is convertible, C will also necessarily apply to some B
so that if A applies to no C
and C (necessarily) apphes to some B, A will not
apply to some B. But this will not be so of necessity ;
for it has been proved in the first figure that if the
negative premiss is not apodeictic neither will the
conclusion be apodeictic.
Further, this fact can be clearly shown by taking
examples of terms. Let A be good,' B animal,'
and C horse.' Then good may apply to no horse,
but animal must apply to every horse. But it is
not necessary that some animal should not be good,
since every animal may be good.
Or if this is not
possible, let the term be taken as
waking or
sleeping ; for every animal is receptive of these
;

'

'

'

'

'

states.
"

The

reference

is

presumably to 30 a 32.
I

249

ARISTOTLE
ot^ oi opoi KoBoXov npoi to fuaov tlaiy,
norc arcu ro avfintpaofia dvaycaZov ci 3*
o fiv KadoXov o y
fi^pi, tcarqYoputwv fUP
ovTUiv anJu<f>orpwv, orav ro koB^Xou ydyrfrai tt**ay
a:w6*
16 Koiov, Kal ro avfiTrepaafia tartu ovayftoibr.
Sci^iS b* 7) avrij rj kou trportpov drrurrpi^
Kal ro v tipi KarrjYopiKOv. tl od avaycri to B
A {m6 to F iariif,
Trarri rto V {mapxiv, ro
avdyKT) ro B rwl rto A V7rdpxiv' ci 5c to B t^ A
rwl, Kal TO A T<p B rivl ihrdpx^w dvayKoZoi^'
avri(rrp<f>i yap. ofioiat^ 5^ iral ct T^ AT cTi^
dvayKalov KaSoXov ov ro vdp B vn6 r6 T iarlif,
Et hk ro v fi^pi ^arly ovayKoxov, oO<c iarai r6
corcu /oip t6 BF iv
avfjL7rpaafia dvayKoXov.
fipi re /ecu d>^y#catbi', to 5^ A wayri r& T
\map\4roit firj fjUvroi cf ovayin^* dynarpo/^dKUK
ovv rod BF TO npatrov yiyvtrai uxf)iJLa, kqx iJ fUv
16 Ka^oAou rrporaais ouk dyayKOia, ^ 8* A' /U/>ct
dvayKaCa. or 5* ouTa>9 txpuv ax npordati^, ovk
'^v ro iTviiTTtpaapxi dvayKoIov war* ovS* irri toJrwv. Tt 8c Kol K rwv opwv ^vp6v. orw yap
ro fiv A ypijyopai9, to 8c B 8tVow, id>* <f
8c TO r ^wov ro fiv oSv B Ttt4 Tuji F avdy80 #o; imdpxciv, ro 8c A Toi F ct^x^nu, kcu to A
Toi B oi5*c dvay^ccubi'* ou yap avaynci^ hinoxfv ri

Et

fjLcv

ctprjraL

v^

Kadcvbeiv

Tj

yprjyopvai,

ofioiws

auToii' opcov 8ci;^i977ocTou Kal ci

to

&

AF

f04
cti;

8ia Tciui'
cv f^p<*

Tc Kal dvayKoiov.
Et 8* d /xcv KarrjyopiKos 6 8c artpirgrucos
31 a 24 ff. ; it is of course equallv inTalid.
i.e. C applies to all A ; which by conTersioo give*
relation '
applies to some C*
"
*

250

tfat

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xi

Thus we have stated in what circumstances the

conclusion will be apodeictic if the extreme terms are
in a universal relation to the middle.
But if one term
is in a universal and the other in a particular relation,
both premisses being affirmative, when the universal
relation is apodeictic, the conclusion will also be
apodeictic.
The proof is the same as before for
the affirmative particular premiss is also convertible.
Thus if B must apply to all C, and
falls under C,*
B must apply to some A. And if B must apply to
some A,
must also apply to some B
for the
premiss is convertible. Similarly too supposing that
the premiss AC is apodeictic and universal ; for B
;

falls

under C.*'
however,

is the particular premiss that is

conclusion will not be apodeictic.
Let BC be particular and apodeictic, and let
apply
to all C, but not of necessity.
Then by the conversion of BC we get the first figure, and the universal
premiss is not apodeictic, but the particular is. Now
we saw ^ that whenever the premisses are thus related
the conclusion is not apodeictic ; and so neither will
it be so in the present case.
Further, this fact can
be clearly shown by taking examples of terms. Let
be waking,' and B biped,' and C animal.' Then
B must apply to some C, and may apply to C, but
does not necessarily apply to B ; for it is not
necessary that a particular biped should be asleep or
awake. The proof can be effected similarly by means
of the same terms supposing AC to be particular and
If,

it

apodeictic, the

'

'

'

apodeictic.
If,

however, one of the terms

"

is

positive

and the

Cf. previous note.

^ 30 a 35, b 1 fF.

251

(^)

s/uoSsais,

ARISTOTLE
'^ ^

Koi
3} to koBcXov orpftfTuc^ rw
to avfi7rpaafia tonu Amytciuoir
rat r /at/Scvi ^pW^ctcu, 1^ 5^ B Ttt4
1 yap TO
Toi r vnapx^i, ro A Tiw t<J* B oi^oymy ft^ vira^iy.
orav 3c TO KaT(uf>ariK6y dvayircubv tc^, ^ iratfoAov
01/ t} v fupct, ^ TO <rTfrqTU(6y Kara fUpos,
dUAa
coTOi TO crvfxnpaafia avayKouov. to fiiv
40rat)Td d /ecu iirl rwv rrpor4puw ipoviuv, ojpot h*
orav fiv ^ TO koBoXov KaTTfyopucw <mxyro2ov,

85

opwv, orav
di^ayicaM)!',

/*v

icai

o^

y^

Jcjiov
avdpomoi, fUatw dydparwof,
iyprffopais
cv fxcpci to Karriyopucov dvayKOtoy, iyp^

orav 8
yop<ns

iutovXvk6v

({<j^ov fiiv

y^

dwdyteJi

tm

AVK<^ V7rdpxiv, iypTfyopai^ 8* M^^frroi fti^SfW,

#cat ouK dmy*n7 Tivt {<^ /x^ xmapx^w iypn^yopaw),
8

oTttv 8^

8(7rouv

TO rrpnjTU(6v iv
Ki,vovpLVov

XII. Oavc^i'

{<{>ov,

oiJv oTi

ovAAoyto/xd; cdv

/X17

ok dMayKoToi'

fiVpci

{a>ov

Toy

fiiv

ij,

fUao}

xmdpx^^

^^*^ *<"^

dfuffortpcn <Laiv at rrpordfnis

xmdpx^iv, rod 8* ovayKCuov Ian kojl r^

irdpas fwvov avayKoia^ owrrfs- v dfi^OTcpoif S4,
Kot Kar<uf>aTLK(jjv koI artprjTucwv ovrutv rCw crvAXoyiapjCjv, ovayKTi rr^v vripav vporraaw opuoltuf
thai Tip avpLTT^pdapan (Acyoi 8c to opuoiav, ci fihf
vndpxov, vndpxovaav, ct 8' dvayKoiov, ayayKOtay)'
ware Koi rouro hr\Xov, art ovk coroi to ov/iTTcpacrfia ovr
dvayKoXov ov0* vndpxov cImu ^117
Xr)<f>dlG7}s dvayKaia^ rj vnapxowrrjs npordatj^.
Ilcpt fiv ovv rod avayKatov, irut^ ytyvtrai koI

iv Tip
10

16

(^

^ ^<^v iUaov d\ Waitz, iU (sed

in lilura) B:
lUaov t,wov Ad*: hL-novv yAoov n: fi^oor {^or C, Brkker:

om.

u.

252

C/. 31

87

if.,

b 20

ff.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xi-xii

when the universal premiss is negative

other negative,

and apodeictic, the conclusion

will also be apodeictic ;

impossible for
to apply to any C, and B
applies to some C,
necessarily does not apply to
some B. But when the affirmative premiss, whether
universal or particular, or the negative particular
premiss, is apodeictic, the conclusion will not be
apodeictic.
The rest of the proof will be the same as
before,* and the terms will be (1) when the universal

for if it

is

is apodeictic, waking
animal
being the middle term)
(2) when the
affirmative apodeictic premiss is particular, waking
animal white (for animal must apply to something
white, but waking may apply to nothing white, and
it is not necessary that
waking should not apply
to some particular animal)
(3) when the negative
particular premiss is apodeictic, biped moving
animal (animal being the middle term).
XII. It is evident, then, that whereas there is no Deductions
assertoric syllogism unless both premisses are in the foregoing
assertoric mode, there is an apodeictic syllogism even analysis.
if only one of the premisses is apodeictic.**
But in
both cases, whether the syllogisms are affirmative or
negative, one of the premisses must be similar to the
conclusion. By
similar
I mean that if the conclusion is assertoric the premiss must be assertoric,
and if the conclusion is apodeictic the premiss must

affirmative premiss

man (man

'

'

'

be apodeictic. Hence this also is clear that it will

not be possible for the conclusion to be either apodeictic or assertoric unless a premiss is taken as apo:

deictic or assertoric.

With regard, then, to the apodeictic mode of Probiematie

syllogism, how it is obtained and in what respect it sy^i<^gis"^*

On

this fallacy see

30 a 23 note.

253

ARISTOn.E
82 a

8ia<f>opav Xi npo^ t6 fJrmpjfor, tXpfirat

TO0 i^^fiMvav
O^cSoV LKaVCJ^. XIII. TTC/M
fiTa ravra X(yofiv Trorc koI irCt^ koI Sia rtywv
Acyeo 5* AWxF^84 ical ri
earai avAAoytauoy.
dya-vtcalov rtBarro^ 8'
ovro^
/ii7
ou
cVScxofx^vov,
imdpxiiv, ovScv coTOi &id roirr d&6varo (to yaf>
dvayKatoi' ofiwvvficj^ c^<X^a^ai AAMO|^iv). ^n 34
Toirr* iarl ro v^^x^t^*^^ ^optpov ix tw TSr <bpi>-

Tiva

20

<l>da0)v Koi ratv Kara^atutv rw oMrrttct^aimmr

TO yap ovK vSXrU uirapx^iv Koi o5iWror
\mapxiv Kox avdyKt) firj V7nipxw rjrroi raird iorw
oKoXovBil oAAtjAocy, wart ral rk ^rrura^fMMt
ri
TouToty, r6 vh4\rtu xmapx^iv ifoi oAr dSiWrof
V7rdpxiv Kai ovk ditiyKTj fiii vndpx*^* ijroi Ttwdra
carat -^ dKoAot;^otWa aAATjAoc;* Kara nuviiW ydip
iortu Sipa t6 /k17 ^ats"* ^ 1} dno^aU larw.
Scxo/xevoi' oi5*f dpay#ratbv KCi ri /ii^ cUayncouw
v8;(d/XVO|/.

80

2i;/x/3atVct

8<

TToaay

rd? Kara rd iv^x^oBai

TrpordaeLS dvTi(jrp<fKW dAAi)Aaif

A^yoi & ov rdf
KaratfKLTiKds tcus" dTTo^riKol^, dAA docu iraTO.

85

fJHiriKov exovai to ax^fia #card t^ avridtaiv, otov

TO ivSex^aOcu xmdpx^iv tlo cv<5;(ca^ai fii^ vndfix^^t
Kal TO TravTL vBXaai tC* v6XtaBiu iirfSt fcai
fl-q TTaVTL, Kal TO Tivl TU> flTJ TlVt* TOT odrW &
TpOTTov Kal nl Twv oAAoiv. cVci yd^ r6 ivBtx^
' ^a(9 A B
iraro^a^if
:

C/.

25 a 37.
* This is not proved by the precrdlng argument
It b
indeed implied there that unless antyireuW iw ^ii c<ir
apaymuov /ii7 vrrapxcu' it cannot be equivalent to tiitxit^o
imapxiw. But one would expect explicit proof of to important
a point, and I am therefore disposed to agree with Becker
i

254

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xii-xiii

I.

from the assertoric, we have given, broadlyspeaking, a sufficient account. XIII. Next we shall
state with regard to the possible, when and in what
sense and by what means we shall get a syllogism.
I call a thing possible if when, not being necessary,

differs

it is assumed to be true, no impossibility will thereby

be involved. ((I say not being necessary ') because
we apply the term possible equivocally to that
which is necessary.**) That this is the meaning of the
expression to be possible is e\'ident if we consider
For
the contradictory negations and affirmations.
and it cannot
it is not possible that it should apply
*
apply and it is necessary that it should not apply
are either the same or imply one another ; and so
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

it is possible that it should

apply and it can apply and it is not necessary
that it should not apply are either the same or imply
one another for either the assertion or the negation
That which is posis predicated of every subject.
and that which
sible, then, will not be necessary
is not necessary will be possible.^
It follows that all problematic premisses are conI mean, not that the
vertible with one another.
affirmative are convertible with the negative, but that

their contradictories,

'

'

'

'

'

all

which have an affirmative form are convertible

'

with their opposites

e.g.,
to be possible to apply
with to be possible not to apply and to be possible
to apply to all with to be possible to apply to none
and to be possible to
or
not to apply to all
apply to some with to be possible not to apply to
some
and similarly in the remaining cases. For
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

{A.T.M. 11-13) that the

'

argument'

is

the addition of a

well-meaning pupil. Maier {Syllogistik des Aristoteles,

i. 139-140) seems to evade the difficulty.

II.

255

ARISTOTLE
ovK <mv apayHoIov, ro 04 un 6ifVyKaBto9
firi vndpxiv, ^avtpov on tl cw^ytT Oi to
rw B vnapx^iv, ivh^rrm tcaX ft^ ifimfxiw iral
iravrl h^i^^^^ imapytw, koX itwnl iMxtnu

fiVOv

Y)(U)pl

A
40 t

S2h

vndpxtiv.

firf

<f>da0}V'

ofioiw^ 5^ Karri r&nf i^ /^P<' irarattal S* oi roiaOrtu

^ yap avrq a7r6^i(if.

irpordans KarrjyoMKol koI o^ artp/tfrucal' r6 yAp

evSexfoOai r<p ttvoi SfiotoK rdrTmu, tcoBdirtp
cAc^St; nportpov.
AiwpiafjJvwv 8^ rovrwv ndXtv Xlyofigv Srt to
vSXa6at Kara Svo Xiytrai rodnovs, va ^Uv to
<i>S cVi TO iroXv yivvtodai koX OioAf /vtcy to ayayKoXov, otov ro noXiovoBai dpdpunrov rj r6 a^d'
veaBai rj <f>diviv, rf 6Xu>^ ro v6vKOi ivdpx^
{rovro vdp ov avvx^^
<X** ''^ dpaytcaZoOia
TO fvrj act ctvou dvBpunrov, ovrot fUrroi d^Bpumau
n ^f dvdyKtj^ rj cu9 <inl ro noXv iaruf), Uor hi t6
aopiarov, o Kal ovrio^ Kai ^^ ovrtof humrd^, ctotf
TO paSi^iv ^(oov rj ro Pa&i^ovrof yt^ioBoi atumdt^,
rj oXcjs ro dvo ruxrj^ yiyv6fjLvo'
yAp fi^XAor

H^

10

oMw

ic

ovroj^ 7r<f>vKv

dyrurrpi^i fiiv ody

Kal Kara rds dvriKifUvas trpordati^ ixdrtpov rcjv
vSxofivwv, ov firju roy avrdv yt rpdnov, dXXA
ro /xev 7Te<f>VK6s tvai ra> ^tf i( ovdyKiK vndpxtiv
(ovro) yap ivScxerai firj noXiodcBai dvvpumov), ro
S*

dopiorov ra>

rj

^vavritv^.

/xt^Scv

/xoAAov ovruts ^ cccu^u>;.

25 b

21.
* The distinction is not drarly exprrmed^
aad
ttoAli^
to do with necessity.
In the former aoiK the imrtftritr fe
probable but not necessar>', and its opposH^ It thcrefbr*

Wi

improbable but not impossible. In tbe latttf Mate tly

is neither necessary nor more probAble tfiaii it&
See Introd. p. 191.

possible
opposite.

256

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xiii

not necessary, and that which is

not apply, it is evident that if it
is possible for A to apply to B, it is also possible for
it not to apply
and if it is possible for it to apply to
all B, it is also possible for it not to apply to all.
Similarly too in the case of particular affirmations ;
for the same proof obtains.
Such premisses are
affirmative, not negative
for the senses of to be
possible correspond to those of to be,' as has been
already stated.**
Having made these distinctions clear, we may Two senses
further remark that the expression to be possible ^ss'ibie
is used in two senses
(1) to describe what generally ^^? ?'^**^
happens but falls short of being necessary, e.g., a happens
man's becoming grey-haired or growing or wasting ^u't^no^
away, or in general that which is naturally apphcable necessarily
to a subject (for such an attribute has no continuous
necessity, because a man does not always exist
but
so long as a man exists the attribute applies to him
either of necessity or as a general rule)
and (2) to ^\y^^
describe the indeterminate, which is capable of happens
happening both in a given way and otherwise e.g., ^^'^^^^^^
the walking of an animal, or the happening of an differently.
earthquake while it is walking, or in general a chance
occurrence
for it is no more natural that such a
thing should happen in one way than in the opposite
way. The possible in each of these two senses, then,
not, howis convertible with its opposite premiss
That which is naturally so
ever, in the same way.
converts because it does not necessarily apply (for it
is in this sense that it is possible for a man not to
become grey-haired)
but the indeterminate converts because it happens no more in one way than in
since the possible

not necessary

is

may
;

'

'

another.

*>

257

ARISTOTLE
82 b

fiv
20

aopiarwv ovk <m Sea t6 ariucrov c2ku 7^

vxMnf

tiaov, roiv hk trt^vKorutv tart, kcu

XoyiayLOV, ov

fi-^v

Mc^o-

vvv

4nofivois'
tft

twB4 yt {ipfSotfoA.

o^

Tairra /xcv

/liUW

5io/>M7^>fafT04

Tolf

Xdyofuv n6r Koi rig icrai

TO aS^xfoBai

caTiv iKXafitlv

rj

yap

rc^

t^iSc

vndpxti

iM^cy &x4f

ro^

avTo xmdp\iv {j6 yap Ka0* ou r6

hX<jQaL rovruiv

rai TO

ou TO

rj

irpunov ovv

iMxtrai

to

A A^

arrffiaivti

Ka0* 06 M^x^^^"' ^'^yofBai, r6 hi KoSt

TO

AeyoiTO TO

rj

dartpov, ^ koJF od Xiyt-

A i>^x^^^

iyxojpttv ovbtv Sia^pi)'

rp

B
oiJ

TO

1T0X0S (TvXXoyiafio^' ouTU}

irayrl

t^ B t^

^awpor &n

natrrl

lira*fiv, ct

Sc^cToi, Kal Kod*

85

/y

avXXoyiafio^ 4k rCxv MtxOfidvoM^ vportinwv.

*E7rct 5c

k6ym

cl

Kal al GKhltii^ ytyvovTOL ntpH rii o^rtKH

or

ivS^xfoBai ^wdpxtn^*

Kaff*

3ixuf

o^ r^

ro

B A^

TO A, rli iarui koX

yap al nporaatii dfi^6'

Tpai XafiPdvovTOi Kara to

ci^j^co^oi, orav S^

The middk term is here treated

^n. Pott. I. 78 b 4, II. iL, 93 a S

proximftte cauwi
For the gencnl
sense e/. Met, VI. (E), ii.. XI. (K). vUL. An, P<mt. I. du
* There is no obvious fulfilment of this pronriie.
Jcaldo*

c/.

son refers to An. Pott.

258

I. viii.

ff.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xiii

There is no scientific knowledge or demonstrative

syllogism of indeterminate propositions, because the
middle term ^ is not established ; but there are both
in the case of propositions which are naturally applicable, and, speaking broadly, it is with propositions
which are possible in this sense that all discussions
and inquiries are concerned. There can be a syllogism
of those which are possible in the other sense, but it
is not usually required.
These distinctions shall receive fuller treatment
later. ^
Our present concern is to state in what
circumstances a syllogism can be drawn from problematic premisses, and what the nature of the
syllogism will be.
Since the statement that it is possible for one term Two senses
to apply to another can be taken in two different ment^' a^^*
senses, viz., either that it may apply to a subject to may apply
which the other term applies, or that it may apply
to a subject to which the other term may apply (for
the statement that
may be predicated of that of
which B is predicated means one of two things either
that it may be predicated of the subject of which B
is predicated, or that it may be predicated of the
subject of which B may be predicated
and the
statement that
may be predicated of the subject
of which B is predicated differs in no way from the
statement that
may apply to all B) it is evident
that there are two senses in which it can be said that
may apply to all B. First, then, let us state what
and of what kind the syllogism will be if B may be
predicated of the subject of which C may be predicated, and
may be predicated of the subject of
which B may be predicated, for in this type both
premisses are problematic ; but when
may be

259

ARISTOTLE
^ f*^ ^'
wot* air6 T&it ifUKO'
trxrjfiovojv^ dptcrtov, KaBantp Koi iv roit Smhs,
XIV. "Orav oSv r6 A ttovtI t^ B A-SAwu icai
TO B rravrl r<f> T, avXXoyujfWf Imtu r^u>f &n
tovto
40 TO A navrl rip T /8xcr<u (rndpYftv,
Knl>avp6v K Tov opiop^ov' TO yoD hnix^adoi ircurl
vndpxfi'V ouTOJS Xiyop.v. oimowh hk kox i to /iiy
A cv5x*Tou fii/Scvi tJi B t6 5^ B frarrl r^ r
TO A M4Xru ffti^Scvi t^* F* t^ yap ira^ o^ Tt^ B
cvScVcTcu TO A firi iv^YtaOai rovr ^, r6 M^T^
f aTToActTTciv rwv xmo r6 B MtxofUpwy,
'Orav h TO A imvTi rat B ?iWy7Ttu t^ 5^ B
Kad* o5 TO
dpxowra 1}

vndffxi

8*

vSXOfUvn'

r6

A IMx'F^*

hScx^cu

r, 5ta /iv tcuk ttkf^pjUvuw

yivo^To* av^Xoyuru^s, irri'
(rrp(ul>iarj^ hk rrj^ Br iraTa t6 Mixto&M yi'
yvcTcu o atVroj o<mp np6rpov. /ttcI yd/) M^j^rreu
pTjSvt rip

npordaiov

10

ou^ct;

TO B /xi^Scvi T<p
vndpx^iv {rovro
/xci*

iTtti^i T<J>

r
8'

V7rd/);(ii',

^'5<';(CTai jcoa

tlprjrai irporrtoov),
TO 8*
VQyri rtL

avros yt/vcTGu ox^AAoyur/io;. opoiwi 0 koa Ci ir/>^

dp^l>oroas rds trpordati^ ij dnd^ams rtBtiti fJUuA
TOV evoix^aOai- Acyco 8* otov i t6
Mn/x*t^b*
/ii^Sevi rcuv B icai to B p,T)Bvi rw F* 8ia /Uv ya/
Toiv LXrippLv<Aiv iTpordawv ovSis y/yifTo* ouAAoytoftoy, dvTiarptf>opLvwv 8* TroAiV o oiM; c<mu
CO? /cat TTp6rpov. if>avp6v ovv ori rrj^ diKK^datotf
rf,dp.V7J^ 7Tp6^ rO cAoTTOV OKpOV TJ TTpO^ Oft^OT/pa?
Tas" npordaeis rj ov yiyvrai avXXoyiafWS fj yiyvtmt
/iV oAA* ov rXU}S' K ydp rrjis dvTxarpo^rji
yiyv^rai ro dvayKotov.

15

20

woit^

wor* ti t4
B, iroAu' ^

260

6iAoto<rx^fUMi

A*.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xiii-xiv

predicated of the subject of which B is predicated,

one premiss is problematic and the other assertoric.
Let us, then, begin with the type whose premisses
are similar in quality, as in the other examples.
XIV. When A may apply to all B, and B to all C,
there will be a perfect syllogism to the effect that A
may apply to all C. This is evident from the definition
for we said
that to be possible to apply to
all
has this meaning. Similarly also if A may apply
to no B, and B may apply to all C, there will be a
syllogism to the effect that A may apply to no C
for we saw ^ that the proposition that A may not be
predicated of the subject of which B may be predicated means that none of the possibilities which fall
under the term B is wanting.
When, however, A may apply to all B and B may Firg figure.
apply to no C, we get no syllogism by means of the premisses
premisses so taken but when the premiss BC is con- p[?,^^'
verted in respect of possibility, we get the same (a)
syllogism as before.*' For since B may apply to no ^"loj^ms.
C, it may also apply to all C (this has been stated
above) ; and so if B may apply to all C and A may
apply to all B, we get the same syllogism again.
Similarly also supposing the negative sense to refer
to both premisses in conjunction with the sense of possibility.
I mean, e.g., if A may apply to no B, and
B to no C ; for we get no syllogism by means of the
premisses so taken, but on their conversion we shall
have once again the same syllogism as before. Thus
it is evident that if the negative refers to the minor
term or to both the premisses we either get no syllogism, or get a syllogism which is not perfect ; for the
necessary conclusion depends upon the conversion.
*

<*

'

32 b 25

fF.

'^

32 b 38-40.

32 a 29

fiP.

261

ARISTOTLE
*Eav

h*

rj

fxh koBSXov rdv trpor^attm

4i

hf

fUpl At7<^, npO^ fJLV TO /ICrfof OKpOW tCWwJvfff

mX yip
Tng KadoXov GvXXoyiafios ccrroi r(\t%oi.
rtvi r^i F, ri
navrl rut B M^x^rm, r6 hi
TO

rivl rto

vSXTai' roOro Bi ^avpo Ik toQ

woKiv CI TO
rOV l^XaB(U TravTi.'
/x7;5cvt T^i B to 8^ B Ttvi rwv V cvWvrnu
V7rdpxLV, avdyiof to A ii'btxtaOai run. rwv I frn

fb opLGfJLOV

ivBdxcrai

hk fn^nffTutii
dndh^iii^ 8* 17 oi>t^.
v tupi nporams i} hi tcoB^Xoo Kara*
olor to fjUm
rfj hi Biati ofAOtwt cxcixny

xmdpx^w
Xr)<l>(ffj

Tj

<l>artKri,
so

TraKTi

to)

^vd^X^^TOi

V7rap;(ii^8<i

ei^X^'''** M*^

7rpordawv ov yiyvrat
orpa<l>i<jr]^

Tivt

to)

T^ 6^ B TU4 T^ 1}
fi^ rflr MnfifUmm

^Vp69

hi rrj^ iv fxVpcc
vhX<yBfii

ovXXoyurfiif,

irol

drrw

rMrrof roO B

xmdpxtiv r6 a^r6 Icrrot

KoOdMtp iv rot^ If

GVfiiTpaap.a o fcai irpSrtpav,

8d
17

Eai' 8* 17 TTpO; TO /ict(0V OKpOP iv WpCl Al^^^

8 Trpo; TO cAaTTOv KoBoXov, iav r au/^ortpoA

nBokfw idv

tc <nrcpiptnu ^ay tc
idv r dft^tortpai aBiOpumi ij
Kara fiipos* ovhafuits cotcu ouAAoyiaft^* ovhiv yap
kcjXvi ro B vTrpriviv rov A #ccu ^117 KurtryopAf
<o a^at in Igcjv tu 8* V7rprivi to B toi) A, ciAi^^M
38 b to r* rovru) yap ovr navri ovrt fitfhtwi ovrt rofi
ovre f^LT) rivi ivh^xcrat ro A inrdpx^w, tlir^p dvrw*
arp<f)ovmv at Kara r6 ^vS^;(t^cu rrpordatt^ koX
ro B TrActooiv ivScx^rai -^ to A {hrdpYiv, en 84
#cai K rcov opwv <f>ayp6v ovrw yip ix
p
Kara<l>arLKal

fir)

6fJLoio<Tx^fiovs

Mf^

* iravrt (delete,

B: om. Bekker.
262

quod

cet.

omncs

fere

habent codd., ^/)


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xiv

If one of the premisses is taken as universal and

the other as particular, when the major premiss is
universal there will be a perfect syllogism. For if
may apply to all B, and B to some C,
may apply
to some C.
This is evident from the definition of
to be possible to apply to all.' Again, if A may
apply to no B, and B may apply to some C, it necessarily follows that A may not apply to some C.
The
proof is the same as before. But if the particular
premiss is negative and the universal affirmative, the
premisses being in the same relation as before i.e.,
if
may apply to all B, and B may not apply to some
C
we get no obvious syllogism by means of the
premisses so taken, but when the particular premiss
is converted, i.e., when B is taken as possibly applying
to some C, we shall have the same conclusion as
before,'' just as in the first examples.^
If the major premiss is particular and the minor

universal, whether they are both taken as affirmative,

or both as negative, or as dissimilar in form ; or if
both are taken as indefinite or particular in none of
these cases will there be a syllogism. For there is
nothing to prevent the term B from having a wider
;

extension than the term A, and not being coterminous

with it in predication. Let C represent the difference
in extension between B and A.
(Then there will be
no syllogism,) for it is not possible that A should either
apply to all or apply to none or apply to some or not
apply to some of C
that is, if the problematic
premisses are convertible and B may apply to more
subjects than those to which A may apply. Further,
this fact can be clearly shown by taking examples of
terms for the premisses are related in this way both
;

32 b 25

ff.

1.

24.

32 b 5-17.

263

g*)

j^^

syllogisms.

ARISTOTLE
ft

npordatwv ro irpanov rut iaxorift <fcU ot^Scvt

evhix^rai koI iravrl xmapxtiv avaytcaum, ipoi
Koivol ndvTCJV rod fuv vndpxttv i( itfoyinjs f^wr
XtvKovavdpumo^, rov hi fi^ M^XfoBiU l^fov^

TcDv

ix^vrwv TcSf
if yap roO
imdpx^^v ri rov cf avdytcK "^ rov ivStx^oBcu vas
rov fuv oi5v vndpxtiv kqx tqO
ioTi avXXoyiafjLOS.
dvayKolov ^>avp6v ori ovk iarw, 6 fUv yap Karai^rucos dvaiptirai rtp ar^pftructft, 6 hi artpntfrucog
rw Karafharucof AciVcroi &Tf roO hfh^x^aBai ttpoi*
abuvarov' ScSciicrai yap on oCrun
rovTO 8
ixovTUJv rtov opwv K(d nami rtp iax4^r(p t6 rrpunn^
dvdyKTj Kal ovSvi tvStx^rai vndpxtuf* wot* o4iC
dv flrj rov o^cyco^cu <niAAayioyi4$(* ri yi^
dvayKoXov ovk "fjv <v5;(o/i<it>v.
^aVp6v hk OTL KoBoKoV TiOV OpUiV OVTWV iw TtUf
vSxofUvats TTpordatoiv cUt yiywrai ovXXoytafM^
v Tw TrpwTW (Txrjfiari, koI Karqyopucwv Koi
crrcpTfTLKCJV omwv, nXrjv KarrjyopiKwv piv r{kiu>i,

^avp6v ovv TOVTOv Tov

rp6rtti3

opcov oTi oi)5i9 yiyvtrai ayXXoyiOfios'

10

15

H)

<rrp7jTt,Ka>v

8c drtXijs-

ro vb^aBai XapPdvttv /i^ iv rtHS

dvayKaioiSf oAAd Kara rov ^IptifUvav htopurpw'
iviore 8c Xavddvti ro roiovrov,
XV. *Edv 8' i} fUv xmdpxW ^ 8*

Act 3c

86

MXHf^

rwv

rrp^
aKpov ivh^x^oBax arjpawrj, rtXtioL r*
caovrai rravres ol orvXXoyiGpol koI rov ^v8;f0'^<
Kara rov clprjfievov htopurpov, orav 8' ij frp69 r^
XafjLpdvr)rai

ro

TrpoTCurcoiv,

orov piv ^

p,L^ov

* Since the premisses ffive contradictory conclusiom,

inference of fact or necessity can be drawn from tbcnu

264

no

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xiv-xv

I.

first term cannot apply to any and when

must apply to all of the last. Examples of terms
common to all cases where the first term must apply
to the last are animal white ^man where it cannot

when the
it

apply, animal white cloak.

Thus it is evident that when the terms are related
for every syllogism
in this way we get no syllogism
is either assertoric or apodeictic or problematic. Now
evidently there is no assertoric or apodeictic syllogism
for the affirmative is invalidated by the
in this case
negative conclusion, and the negative by the affirmative." The remaining alternative, then, is that the
syllogism should be problematic. But this is impossible ; for it has been shown that the terms are
;

way both when the first must apply to

and when it can apply to none, of the last. Thus
there cannot be a problematic syllogism for we have
seen ^ that that which is necessary is not possible.

related in this
all,

It is also evident that

when the terms in problemwe always get a syllo-

atic premisses are universal,

gism in the first figure, whether the terms are both

positive or both negative ; with the difference, however, that when they are positive the syllogism is
perfect, and when they are negative it is imperfect.
The term possible ' must be understood, not with
reference to that which is necessary, but in accordance
with the definition already given.*' Points of this kind
'

are sometimes overlooked.

XV. If one of the premisses is assertoric and the b. one
other problematic, when it is the major premiss that ando^n"'^
expresses possibility, all the syllogisms will be perfect probiemati:
and will be of the possible type in accordance with fi^ Boui
the definition of possibiUty given above ^ ; but p^^i^
* 32 a 18.
* 32 a 28.
32 a 18.
'

'

265

ARISTOTLE
tcaX oi aTfmruccX rum
ouAAoyta/KSv ou tou icara t^v bu>piafti A^Bcxo*
tL^tfytrv^
trovri
ficvov, oAAa Tou ftiyScj'i 5
vndpxew ct yap /i-nSevl tj fti^ wovri i( aniy#r7^,
ivhlx^cfdaL <f>afiv koi firj^vi koI utj ttovti i^dpycty.
'^^ A Tram r^ 'B, r6 ei B
*EvSx^<^^<^
TravTL TO) r KiaBw vndp)^iv iirtl o9y vrro r6 B
icrrl TO F rof Sc B waiTi v&<;(Tai to A, ^av^pw
on Kol T<J> r nayrl cv^cVctcu. ytyvcTOi b^ r^Xitoi
GvXXoyujfjLOS'
onoloas O^ cai artfnjTucrjs ovorjs

eXarrov, drcAci? t itdvrt^,

80

y^

85

Tfjs

AB

Ku

rrjs

rijs hi BF Kara^runjt,
ivStx^oBai rrj^ Si iwdpx^uf Xa^'
iwSdxtt^
PavovoTfg, T^tos> avXXoyujfio^ oti r6
40 firjStvl Tw F \mdpxiv,
M *Oti fici' oiJv Tou imapx^^^ rtS^fUtnv npo^ r6
(Xarrov aKpov tcAcioc ylyvovrtu avXXoyujp,oi,
<j>avp6v'
oTt 8' ivavriw^ rxovro^ ^aovrai avXXoyiGfjLol 8ta TOU oSiWtov htucr^ov dfia S* cora*
BrjXov Koi oTi aTcAciff* i} yo/) Sctftff oif ^t T5r
6 tXrjfifivwv TTpordatwv.
YlpWTOV 8c AcKTCOl' OTI CI TOU
OKTOJ dwyXT^
TO B ^Ivai, Kox hwarov ovtos rov
SuvoTOf tarai
TO B cf dmy/cijy. c<rrcu yap otn-co; ixovrwy r6
fikv <l>* <L TO
hwarov, to 8' c^* <fi to B o8wvaTov. 4 ouv TO /icv 8yvaTdv, ore 8inMTd' cZvoi,
dv, TO 8* dSuvaToi', or* oSvkitoi', ovk
10 ycvoiT*
dv yvoLTo, dfia 8* ci to
8uvaTdi' tcai ro B d8i/wiTov,
cv8c;^otT* di' TO
yVG$ai dvV rov B, C4 8^

npordGiiPS

fiv

A
A

" This is a mistake on Aristotle*8 part ; the aualMkaUioil

applies equally to the affirmative sjrllogtam*.
It Is due l
the fact that proof p#r impouibiU cannot establish both
values of a problematic premiss. See note on Si b
"
Cf. 25 a 37, 32 a 20.

266

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
when

I.

xv

the minor premiss, they will all be imperas are negative will not be possible
in accordance with the definition, but will be to the
effect that the predicate does not necessarily apply
for if it does not
to any, or to all, of the subject
necessarily apply to any or to all, we say that it may
apply to none or may not apply to all.*
For example, let A possibly apply to all B, and let
Then since C
it be assumed that B applies to all C.
falls under B, and A may apply to all B, evidently
A may apply to all C. Thus we get a perfect syllogism. Similarly too if the premiss AB is negative
and BC affirmative, the former being problematic
and the latter assertoric, there is a perfect syllogism
to the effect that A may apply to no C.
Thus it is evident that when the assertoric sense
refers to the minor extreme we get perfect syllogisms but to prove that syllogisms will result when
it is in the opposite relation we must employ reduction ad impossibile.
At the same time it will also
become apparent that these syllogisms will be imperfect ; for the proof will not be drawn from the
premisses originally assumed.
We must first observe that if when A is, B must
fect,

it is

'

and such

^'Jo^gj^J
atic,

minor

^e^toric.

B must

Proof that

if

necessarily be andAi?
possible.^
For assuming this relation ^ between
g^^^sjf^igo
and B, let us suppose
to be possible and B im- be possible.
possible.
Then (1) if the possible, when it is possible
for it to be, may come to be, but the impossible,
when it is impossible, cannot come to be and also
is possible and B impossible, then it may be
(2) if
possible for
to come to be apart from B ; and if
be, then if

is

possible,

'Cf. Metaphysics, IX. (0) 1047 b 14-30.

i.e. that A implies B.
<*

267

'

ARISTOTLE
84ft

16

yevdoBat, koI clmt* to yap yryoif^, arc yiymfw^

<mv. Set XafiPdviv fiif fi^vov /k t^ ysi4iyir
TO dSuvarov Kal Swarov, aXXa tfoi iv rt^ iXff^
Oevtadai koX cv rto xmdpx^iv, tcai oaaxftk aXActff
anoun ya/> ofiolw^ Ifcii
XdycToi TO SyvaTOv*

Tl TO Olios'

10

TOO
TO

A
B

TO

cfvOl

OUY

CU? A^cJ^ Ttl^Or

v^

taroA Set ^noAaphf' o^

ovTOS rod A
cVrtv ouSev cf d^y#nyy ci^ tivo; Ahxjj, aXXa
Svoii^ iXaxioroiv, otov orav cu ir^ionfacif oimiK
Ya}aiv wi i\'xOr) Kara rov avXXoy%au)&' tl va
TO r Kara rov A to 5< A Kara rov X, tcai to l]
KaTa Tou Z cf dvdyfOfi' Kai <t Sumit^ 8' ^Kartpaitf
Kal TO ovfiirtpaafia hwarov. wawo o^ c nc
06117 TO fiv A Taf irpordatif ro
B to avfir
ncpaafiaf avfifiaivoi ov ov fiovov avoyicaioti tov
ovto? Kol ro B clmi ai-ayKoZo^, dXXa Kol
bvvarov hwarov.
Toi^ou Si h^ivB^vroi ^vtpov &n tfftjSSo vf vmy
rdvros Kal fxrj dSuvdrov koI r6 avfifiaaKJ SmL
rrjv vn66aiv iJhvSos ccrrou koI odic dMfa7t0l
otov t TO A ^u5o^ p.v cWi 1x1^ /i/mPOi tt5i
ro,
0VT09 TOV A TO B COTi, Kai TO B IcmU llf(JlS09
fiv ov yiivroi, dhvvarov cttci vdp 5<5iirrcu or*
ci Tou
ovros ro B coti, iccu hwarov ovros rov
coTcu TO B huvarov, (moKtirax S< to
hv^arov
?vat, KoX ro B <rrax hwarov d yap dBwarov,
dfjLa SvvaTov corcu to avTo Kai dSvvaroy.
AtfoptCT/AcVojv hrrf rovrcjv VTrapx^rw ro
Toi B, TO 8c B TTavrl rat T cv8;((a0ai* <iy<yia;

SA

A am

*
is

The

reference seems to be to S4 b 18, but the

c/. 40 b 85. An, Post. 73 a 8, 94 a M.'
;

never proved

268

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv

to come to be, then to be ; for that which has come

must underto be, when it has come to be, is.
stand the terms possible and impossible with
respect not only to generation but also to true statement and to attribution, and in all the other senses
in which the term possible is used ; for the same
Further, we
principle will obtain in all of them.
is, B is
must not suppose that the proposition if
is
means that B will be if some one assumption
granted ; for nothing necessarily follows from the
two at least are regranting of one assumption
quired, as, e.g., when the premisses are related as
we said " with respect to the syllogism. For if C
of E, C must also be preis predicated of D, and

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

dicated of E. Moreover, if each of the premisses

Thus
is possible, the conclusion is also possible.
represents the premisses and B
supposing that
the conclusion, it will follow, not only that when A
is necessary B is necessary too, but also that when

A is possible B is possible.
As the result of this proof it is evident that if a Hence if a
hypothesis is false ^ but not impossible, the result polsibie,^^its
which is reached by means of the hypothesis will be Qo^j'^Jy^Sd'.
For example, if A is false ate the
false but not impossible.
conclusion.
is, B is, then B
but not impossible, and if when
For since it has
will be false but not impossible.
been proved that if when is, B is, when A is possible,
B will also be possible ; and since it is assumed that

is possible, then B will also be possible ; for if it

impossible, the same thing will be at once possible
and impossible.
Now that we have made these points clear, let us (^) ^^^T
applies to all B, and that B may minor
assume that

is

For the sense of

false

'

here see 34 a 37.

269

ARISTOTLE
o5v TO A wavTi rat F M^xtoBai wrdpYtu^, ft^i yap
hh^x^aBo), TO 8c B iravrl T<ji F KWfBia wf 4wm
6va r^ i
dpxov rovTo 8^ iltv8o^ fiiv ov fUrrm
H tWWTl
Cl O^V TO fJLV A ^-f) M^X^''^*' TW F Ti
vnapx^i rat F, to A ow wokti t^ B A'S/j^mu*
ytyvcTot yap avXXoyiafios 8ta tou rpirov ax^uarofi
oAA* v7rKiro navri ivStxtoBai vndpxiv' avdymj
apa TO A nayrl rtp F ivStxtaOoi' ^fvSov^ yap
reddvroi Koi ovk ahuvdrov to avfifiaZvov iarm
dhvvarov.

40

Mb

%.$.

it

not Implied by the origlfid premiH.

Alexander 185. 16-90: lifcker.

Cf.

A.T,M,Ut

If Aristotle meant this oonduakm to be ipoddcUc he Iti

inconsistent : cf. 31 b 37 ff.
Becker maats thet sinee
ivayiai Ls often used merely to indk^te the neoetMrj relatkM
of conclusion to premUses. ovk
may be med hen
in the same sense.
At licst the amoi^ity
unhappy. It
seems more likely that Aristotle
deoehred by hto omi
formula. See next note.
*

Mdvmu

wm

' Actually the a&sumptkin was that A applief to all B.

Probably Aristotle employs the we*ker form as beinr the
normal contradkrtory of A cannot apply to all B (are
previous note). The 8ub6titutk>n doce oot affect the aliaity
*

of the argument
' The form of the an^ment (and Its fiUlacy) oan be dearly
seen in the following example, for which I am indebted to
Professor T. M. Knox :
If(a)

and

to prove that (c)

Assume

Some

{b) substitute

..

(c), ria.,

graduates cannot be

the false but not impossible

All graduates are Pelkjws.

if) Some Fellows [cannot be] are not wise.
(e)

270

Fellows are
graduates may be Pelkme
All graduates may l>e

the contradictory of
(d)

For

AH

ib) All

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv

apply to all C. Then it necessarily follows that AP"bi ematic.

Proof
apply to all C. For let us assume that it cannot per ivipos'possibly apply, and let B be taken as applying to all (* )^ Both
C (this is false,<* but not impossible). If then A premisses
^^^^^tive.
cannot apply to (all) C, but B appUes to all C, A
^
for we get a syllogism by
cannot apply to all B
means of the third figure. But ex hypothesi A may
apply to all B. Hence it necessarily follows that A
may apply to all C for by making a false though not
impossible assumption we get an impossible result.**

may

'^

But

incompatible with
(a) All Fellows [may be] are wise

[. . since (c) is not incompatible with (a)

(d) must be incompatible with (a)].
.*. (c), the contrary of (d), must be true.
First it should be noted that the proof excludes the negative
values of (6).
It could only establish that no graduates are
necessarily not wise (c/. 33 b 29).
But it fails even to do
this.
The flaws in the argument are indicated by square
brackets. The first two have been noted above, and are
relatively unimportant.
In the third case the argument
clearly depends upon some tacit assumption, which Becker
{A.T.M. 53) formulates thus
Wenn G^i
Ggl unmoglich ist in bezug auf F^,
Gg^ dagegen moglich ist

dann ist Gj unmoglich

In my opinion his formula is too general and his examples

unsuitable for the case in hand. The assumption is rather :
If the conjunction of two premisses (d) and (e) gives a conclusion (/ ) which is incompatible with a given hypothesis (a),
whereas one of these premisses (e) is compatible with the
said hypothesis, then the other premiss (/) must be incompatible with the said hypothesis.
It will be seen that in our example neither (d) nor (e) is
in itself incompatible with (a).
The incompatibility only
becomes apparent when each premiss is examined in the
light of the other ; i.e., it is the result of their conjunction.
Thus Aristotle's assumption is unsound and the proof fails.
this

is

&

271

ARISTOTLE
S4 b

Sf Kol Sia rod mitrav axrjfUirt>9

r6 dSvvarov Blvra^ rtft 1* r^ B ^dpxiv'
troKri rift
yap TO B navrl rto T vn^xti rd S^

*Eyxo)pi
TTOiijaai
1
*

cVSc'xcTcu,

Kav T^

IMxOfro ri A*

trcu^l

oAA* \mKiro fiTj navTi tyx^P*^Act $ XafipavLV TO Tra^Ti vnofiY^Uf fi^ Kara
vpovov opiaavrast olov vvv ^ ^v r<JOc rtp XP^^
oAA* ciTrAcDs" 3ia roiovTutv yap irpordinwv Koi rws
10

avXXayiofjLovs

iroioOfitv,

XafiPavofjUvrjs

rrj^

yujfios'

itrti

npordatut^

ov6v yap laojs

icartL

odtc

ircuAwci

y r6

ianu

mni

tcai

vw

<rvAXo-

mrrl

Kivovfuvoj dvBpionov vndpxiv, otov l ^rj^v dXXo

KivoLTO' TO B Kivovp,voy >'&x<Tai woTri imrtpoAA* dvOpamov ouScvt limt^ cvW^CTOi. rn iarut
15

/xev trpwrov l^t^v, to 8^ lUaov kivov^uvov, to

eaxarov dvBpumo^' ai fuv oiV wpordatts 6fUHWi
l^ovoi, TO $ avp.7rpaafia dvayKoZov, odK Mtx^'

TO
S'

pvgmpb

I follow the traditional view that thb

ki
intended to oflTer an alternative /vr impotUril$ ptoot OT the
syllogism in 34 a 34-36.
If %i-e keep the
before, the argument appears to be t

The

premis^scs (p) All Fellows may be wlae

and (tf) All gradoales mre Fellowi

which are compatible with the oHgfnal pmnlmg (a)

{b\ give the conclusion (r) All gradoatet may be wlic,
which is therefore compatible with (a) and (6). HenoeC^
the contradictory of (c). is incompatible with (a) and (*), and
therefore false. Therefore {e) is true.
The argument only establishes the conclusion as a poMl>
bility, not as a necessary inference.
Hence Becker {A.T.M.
57) offers a different explanation ; ingmkraa but hardly
convincing
* This warning against temporal quafifications was no
doubt desiped to defend the fbregobig ^kwism amiml
objections in the form of the examples whkii foUow ui tiM

272

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xv

I.

We

can also exhibit an impossibility through the

by assuming that B applies to C. For
if B applies to all C, and A may apply to all B, A
may also apply to all C. But it was assumed that
it cannot apply to all.<*
We must understand the expression applyinff to Universal
all,' not as qualified in respect of time,^ e.g.,
now must have
or
at such-and-such a time,' but in an absolute qu^^S-^*'
sense
for it is by means of premisses taken in this tion.
latter way that we effect our syllogisms.
If the premiss is taken as relating to the present moment,
there will be no syllogism. For presumably there is
no reason why at some time man should not apply
to everything that is in motion i.e., if nothing else
*
were then in motion ; but the term in motion
may apply to all horses, and man cannot apply
Again, let us take the first term as
to any horse.
*
animal,* the middle as in motion,' and the last as
man.' Then the premisses will be related in the
same way as before, but the conclusion is apodeictic
first figure,

'

'

'

'

'

'

text.

The whole paragraph, however,

is

Ul thought out.

We have already seen that the major premiss above is treated

Presumably we are
as assertoric, now as problematic.
here to regard it as assertoric ; although the formula ovhkv
KtoXvei^ etc., points more naturally to a problematic sense.
If assertoric, the judgement 'everything in motion is a
man ' is certainly not universal but collective or enumerative.
But the fallacy of the syllogism in which it appears as major
premiss is due rather to the incompatibility of the two
premisses ; the conditions which validate the major exclude
the minor.
In the second example the conclusion all men may be
animals ' is the only legitimate inference from the premisses,
which are perfectly compatible. Aristotle apparently rejects
it because he expects a valid conclusion to state the full
and permanent logical relation between the terms which it

now

'

contains.

Cf. Introd. p. 188.

273

ARISTOTLE
t4 b

fievov cf avdyKtj^ yap 6 avOpamo^ i^pof^* ^avtpov

odv ori TO Ka06Xov Xrjnriov airXuti, tnX o^ XP^^
hiopit^ovras
rioAti' (JTio <rrprfriKr] Trporaai; tcaB6Xov

ij

AB

A fir)dvi t<J* B ^dpx^^y, ri

Be B Travrl MeWoBw vndpx^iy rw F. TOvrtMtv
ovv redivrwv dvaytcrj to A ivStytoPai fiiiSfvc Tip
TO

so Kttt lXrj<f>dcj

F
F

vndpxiv.

fiti

KtioBcj vndpxov,

TO
t5

ftev

rip

rivi

B t^
yap Mx^^^f t^
KaSdnep npSrtpov omyici; &^
vrrop^fcii'* yiyvrroi yap avXr

rovro hk
ToO rplrov ax^yuaroi.
ahvvarov war vS4x^r av ri A fiffiff^ tw F*
tjjcvhov^ yap rtShrro^ ahvvarov r6 avfifialvop.
oiJtoj ovv 6 avXXoytafjLO^ ovk i<m raO tcara r6ip
hiopiap^v vhxofuvov, aXXa roO /iv^Scvt i( av^n^
avrr) yap iariv 1} avrt^aat^ rif^ YvopJvff9 ^wor
Olatuis, MOr) \^p if dpdyKtj^ r6 A run, rtp V
vnapx^^v, 6 Sc oia rov dhwdrov avXXoyuifio^ rrjf
Aoyi<7fio9

&a

a\rnKipAv7)s arlv airn^da<vs.

ti

"Eri. hi Kol K rGiv Spwv ^avtp6v &n o^tc coroi

TO avp.-nipaapia ivBexofifvov, cotcu yap ro fuv
A Kopaft ro 8* ^' w B Siovoovficvov, i4^ w hi T
avBpwnos' oyScvt hr\ rw B to A thrdpxft, o^h^
yap hiavoovp.vov Kopa(' ro Bi B nayrl Ivhix^rai
rw F, navrl yap dvBpwntp ro biavoiaai' oAXa
TO A if dvdyicrjs ovSevl tcD F* ovk dpa r6 ovp.Tripaofia ivbxdp.vov.
oAA* ovS* dyayKoXov aci.

i,.

S4a86.

31 b 30

'

C/.

ellipse

274

that

teal

to

some

The conclusion is only asaertoric

1.
In the present pa.ssa|^ there Is dearly an
ovk aSworoif, which Jenkinaon ofcrlooka.

ff.

34 b

of

must apply

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv

and not problematic ; for man is necessarily an

animal. Thus it is evident that the universal premiss must be taken absolutely, and not as qualified
in respect of time.
Affain, let AB be a negative universal premiss, (") ^*J^
applies to no B, and minor
and let it be assumed that
that B may apply to all C. Then it must follow from ^fflr^^tiva
may apply to no C. For
these assumptions that
let us assume that it cannot apply (to no C), and
Then
let B be taken as applying to all C, as before.^
applies to some B ; for we get
it must follow that
a syllogism by means of the third figure.*' But this
Therefore it will be possible for
is impossible.
to
apply to no C ; for by maldng a false (but not impossible) assumption we get an impossible result.**
Thus this syllogism does not give a conclusion which
possible in the sense defined,* but proves that
is
the predicate does not necessarily apply to any of
the subject ; for this is the contradictory of the
assumption which we made, since it was assumed
necessarily applies to some C, and the syllothat
gism per impossibile proves the contradictory opposed
to the (impossible) assumption.
Again, it is evident from considering examples of
terms that the conclusion will not be problematic.

'

'

stand for crow,' B for intelligent,' and C

man.' Then A applies to no B
for nothing
intelligent is a crow.
But B may apply to all C ;
But A
for intelhgence may apply to every man.
necessarily applies to no C/ Hence the conclusion
Nor, however, is it always
is not problematic.

Let

for

'

'

32 a 18.
This excludes the possibility that A may apply to all C,
which would be implicit in a truly problematic conclusion.

275

ARISTOTLE
coTco
40

yap ro

h* >' <^

TO

fiv

Kivoufitvov,

dvepomo^.

vndpiti TO S^ B fravrl
ovK ccrroi to avfintpaafia

U avdyicrj

^rjS^va

avdytaj rtm.

rov

firjhVi

i(

o^

^trum^fuy,

dvayKoXor' od
&v$pcjnoy, oAA*

ydp

ori ro crvfin^paOfLd

i<m

KivtioBai

S^Aov

r^ 5i

fihodvA 4Mmfi r^
t<P T M^xtnu, teal

r6

dvay*^^ vndpxU^

fitXrtov rovs opov^.

owe

Xifirriov

St
I

hk ro arprjTiKOv rtBfj irpo^ r6 iXamm

dxpov hihXaB<u arj^uupov, i( aMt fiv rwif
iXrififUvcjv trpordatoiv odStU iarai tnfXXaytafid^,
'Elttv

ft

dyriaTpai^Urrf^ hi rij^ Kara r6 M/yny0a* irpoTaaco*? /oral, KaSdntp /v roif npdrtpo,

apx^rw yap r6 A navrl r<p B, r^ 8^ B ivS<x^a$cj
firjBfvl T<Ji r.
ovrat p}v o^ ^x^^itcuv rwv Zpu9V
oiSfv coTcu dvayKoxov' idy 8* dyrurrpa^ to
Kol Xrj4f>$fj r6 B nayrl rut T iv^xioBai, yiyrmu
avXXoyiUfids uxrnp npdrtpov ofiouoi yap ix^nxrw
Oi o/>oi rfi Biai, rov avrdv hk rpdrtov koX <rrpff'
rucwv ovrwv dpu^oripufv rw hioarri^rwv, 4dp ro
ftcv
firj tmapxi], to & BP fiffhfvi crS^x'O^oi

^-

BP

10

AB

8i*
avrwv yikv yap raw tiXrififUvwv
ovSap^s yiyverat ro dvayKoZov, dyrurrpa^Un^
hk TTJs Kara ro vS<;(or^<u npordatu}^ tarai
avXXoyia^S'
ctAiJ^co yap ro fiv A firjSvt rtp
aripxiivri'

16

vndpxov,^ ro 8c B evScxco^cu firjBcvl rtp F* hvd

ovv rovrwv ouScv dyayKoZov, idv 8* Ar-^^ to
navrl rip T vh\aBai, dnp iarlv clAtjO^s, ^

yLV

B
to

Sc

76

AB

TTporaais ofioiws ^XD*

^^^^i*'

o ovroff cotoa

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv

in motion
for let A stand for
and B
knowledge and C for man.' Then A will
apply to no B, but B may apply to all C," and the
For it is not
conclusion will not be apodeictic.
rather
necessary that no man should be in motion
Thus it
it is not necessary that any man should be.

apodeictic

for

'

'

clear that the conclusion proves that the predicate

does not necessarily apply to any of the subject.
But the terms must be better chosen.
If, however, the negative premiss refers to the (iii.) Major
minor extreme and has the problematic signification, ^n^**^^'
there will be no syllogism from the actual premisses negative.
assumed, but when the problematic premiss is converted there will be a syllogism, as in the previous
examples.^ Let A apply to all B, and let B possibly
apply to no C. Then with the terms in this relation
tliere will be no necessary inference
but if the
premiss BC is converted and B is taken as possibly
applying to all C, we get a syllogism as before ;
The same is (iv.) Both
for the terms are similarly disposed.
true when both the propositions are negative, if AB negative.^
is assertoric and negative, and BC has the sense of
For by means of the
possibly applying to none.
assumptions as they stand we reach no necessary
inference at all ; but when the problematic premiss
For let it be
is converted there will be a syllogism.
assumed that A applies to no B, and that B may
apply to no C. Then from these assumptions there
but if it is assumed that
is no necessary inference
B may apply to all C, which is true, while the premiss
AB remains the same, we shall get the same sylloThis is false. Knowledge cannot apply to man in the
is

'^

<*

'

sense that man is knowledge.

with emWiy/Ltov (cf. ch. xxxiv.).
significant.

"

'

Aristotle confuses imaTqfii]

The confession in 35 a 2 is
" 34 a 34.
33 a 7, 16.

277

ARISTOTLE
Mft

cdv hi fATf vndfixf^ ^*^

^
vavri rtp P Koi firj /i5^;(ca^cu firi vnofxtiv, ovk
coTOi avXXoyurfio^ ou5a/uu;, ovrt orc/mrwc^
ovarj^ ovT Kara^riKrj^ rfjs AB npordomttm'
QvXXoyujfiOi.

opoi 8c icoiM>i Tot; /xv f oi^xyifiT^

i<oovx^^'
w/tto.
15

''*'*'

H-V

vndpxtw

Xnm^

M^xtoBai XtvK6yC^mt

Oai^pov oiV ori KaBoXov rwv opwv Syrunf

riuv rrpordatwy, orov

%^XGBax

ij

^^ttof

QJcpQ

yiyvcTOU
ot fuv ^f avTwv ot 8' avTi-

Xafifidynrai

avXXoyujfjLOS , irXriv

irpof to
nporaois,

teal

al

Kdrpos KoX 5ia riv* airiop, tlmKa^uy.

*Eiav hi TO ficv KadoXov ro a iv /idpi Ai^^^
rwv hiaa-rqfidrwv, orav fikv ro 9pis r6 fUHav
OKpov KadoXov r0jj Koi ivhtx^LLtvotf, tlrt avro^Turov ctrc Kara4>ariK6v , r6 h iv fU/Mi itara*
^riKov KoX vndpxov, arai avXXoyiafio^ rdXttat,
u Kaddnp Kol KadoXov rcjv opwv ovrtuv. dtrd^tftig
h* ij avTi7 Tj Kal np6Tpov.
orav hi KoBdXov ^ikv
^ TO trpos TO yii^ov aKoov, irndpyov hk Kfd /ii^
cvSf^^o/xcvov, ddTpOV h* V /X^/Ki Kol rv8<;(0/xvov,
idv T d'no*j>arucaX cav re fcaTo^Tuccu rtdaknv
dyjf>6rpai idv tc 17 /xcv aTro^ruci^ 1} 8^ icara40 (fniTucj, irdvrut^ corrcu ovAAoyiafto; drtXr^' ^Xrp^
S6 b 01 fiv 8ta rov dhwdrov hi')firiaovTai oi. 5c hia,
Tf\s dvTitjrpo4tr)s r^ tow vhXaBai, Koddntp hf
Tols npoTcpov,
"Eorrai 5c ovAAoyuj/xoj 54a r^ dyTiarpwfnjg Koi
orav ij /icv KadoXov trpos ro /xci^ok dtcpov rdiaa
0

278


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv

gism once more." But if it is assumed, not that B

may apply to no C, but that B does not apply to
any C, there will be no syllogism in any case, whether
the premiss

AB

is

Terms

negative or affirmative.

common

to both cases and showing a positive apodeictic relation of predicate to subject are white
showing a negative apodeictic relaanimal snow

tion,

white

animalpitch.

Thus it is evident that if the terms are universal

and one premiss is assertoric and the other problematic, when the minor premiss is problematic, a
syllogism always results sometimes from the original
assumptions and sometimes after the conversion of
the said premiss. We have explained under what
conditions each of these two cases obtains, and for
what reason.
If, however, one of the propositions is universal (2) Major
and the other particular, when the major premiss is minor
universal and problematic (whether negative or particular
affirmative) and the particular premiss is affirmative
and assertoric, there will be a perfect syllogism, just
The proof is the
as when the terms were universal.
same as before.^ But when the major premiss is
universal, but assertoric and not problematic, and
the other is particular and problematic, if both
premisses are negative, or both affirmative, or one
negative and the other affirmative, in every case there
but some will be
will be an imperfect syllogism
proved per impossibile and others by the conversion

'

of the

problematic
examples.

We

shall also

version

premiss,

in

as

the

previous

have a syllogism by means of conuniversal major premiss has an

when the

Cf.

34 b

19.

"

33 b 33

ff.

279


ARISTOTLE
ovaa ro ivS^xtaBat

b arptrjTiKr\

nlow

Ka^ifidyfi,

Tw B vndpxfi rj
{hrdffxti, r6
hi B nvi rw r M^xfTtu firi 6mipXfiV' dvrurrpa<l>vros yap rov BF Kara ro Mix^aBai ytyvtrai

TO

fihf

Traio-i

av^Xoyiafio^.

fi'fj

orav 5^ ro fi^ 6nipxiv XofLpdyju

Kara fipof rtBtlaa, o^k caroi ouAAovto/AOf.

opoi roC flip \mapxiv XtvKOv ^atov X^*'^ ^^^
8i fA^ vrrapxtip XtVKOy {<JM>v nirra' biA yap roO

rj

10

dBiopurrov Xtfnrtov rrjp a'n6Si(w,

*Eav hi ro KaBoXov rtBfj npoq r6 iXarrop curpor

TO 8* iv fiipi rtpo^ ro /icc(ov, idv tc artpfjrtfc^
av T Kara^riKOv ^ov t' vhx6fUvoy idy 9
vnapxov 6rrorpovoGv, o^hofujjs tarai ovXXoytaft6gf
ovS* orav v fUpti rj d&iopurroi rtSwatv cu irpo^
raatiSf cit* cvScvco^cu Xofifiavovaai ctiO^ V7rdpxiy
lr* CKoAAo^, ov6 ouTco; coTOi auAAoyu7fu>s' dirc^
Scc^if 3'

17

ai>n7

rj

Karri

rwv

rtportpov,

opoi hi

Xivic6
AcvmSr

Koivoi rov fCv virapx^tv i( dpdy$crjs ifpo^

avdpomos, rod hi fii^ hfh^x^aBai iipO

to

flft

tfidriov.

^avp6v odv on rod fiiv rrpos ro /kiJov dxpov

KaSoXov ndivros dci yCyvrai avWoyiafios, tov
hi rrpos ro IXarrov ovhtnort oihafxwsXVI. "Orav 8* rj fiiv cf ovdyKrjs xnrdpxiiv ij tf
vhXadcu arjfiatyjfi rwv rrporaatotv, 6 fiiv avXr
Xoyujfios (rrai rov avrov rportov exdvraw rwv
opwv, KoX TcAcioy orav rrpos rw iXdrrovi ojcpi^
r&fj ro dvayKOiov' ro hi avfirrtpaafui Karrjyopucwv
C/.

280

26 b U. 27 b 20.


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xv-xvi

affirmative or negative assertoric sense, and the

particular premiss is negative and has a problematic
applies or does not apply to all B,
sense
e.g., if
for when BC is
and B may not apply to some C
converted we get a problematic syllogism. But
when the particular premiss is assertoric and negative,
there will be no syllogism. Examples of terms where
the predicate applies to the subject are white
animal snow
where it does not apply, white

pitch. The proof must be drawn from the

indefinite nature of the particular premiss.
;

animal

<*

But

the universal premiss refers to the minor

extreme, and the particular to the major, whether
either premiss is negative or affirmative, problematic
or assertoric, there will in no case be a syllogism.
Also when the premisses are particular or indefinite,
whether both entail a problematic or both an assertoric relation, or one the former and the other the
latter
under these conditions too there will be no
syllogism. The proof is the same as in the previous
examples.* Terms common to all cases where the
predicate necessarily applies to the subject are
animal white man ;
where it cannot possibly
apply, animal white coat.
Thus it is evident that when the major premiss is
universal, a syllogism always results
but when the
minor is universal there is never any syllogism of any
if

(3)

Major

mirJor"^^'^'

universal.

kind.

XVI. When one of the premisses has an apodeictic c. Syiio

and the other a problematic sense, there will be a f^^^ ^^^^^
syllogism if the terms are related in the same way deictic
as before
and it will be perfect when the apodeictic probiJLtio
premiss is attached to the minor term. If the terms Premiss.
;

'

33 a 34

ff.

In ch. xv.

281

ARISTOTLE
Hfe

Svrwv ruf opaw toC itSd^oBai koI od roO

tarai, koI Ka66Xov icaX fiif koBoXov
ri6fJLV(jjv, iay S* ^ ro fihf tcara^ruew ro S^
0 <JTpirrTu<6v, oToy fuv f ro irara^rucoF amyiraXbrf
row cv$f;(C(7^ai Koi ov rov u^ ^ndpx^ty, orov S^
TO arprjTuc6v, koX rov cmycotfou u;^ vna^vtuf
Koi rov firj xmapxnv, koX tcoBoXov koi 1117 KoiiXov
ro 5* v6XoBcu tv Tt^ ovp^
ru>v opuiv ovTcjv,
VpaufAan rov avrw rp6mo Xrinrdo otmtp hf
rots irporrtpov. rov 8* cf dyayioff /x^ viropvccy oi}#t
m corroi <7vAAoyu7ft<>f mpov yap ro U17 ^( cu^yin;;
urropX^^^ *f** '''o ^f dyKT^ /ii7 irmipx*w.
*Oti fi^ oiJv raro^ruftai' ovrwv rwv opujv 06
yiyvtrai r6 avp^ntpaafia avayKatov, ^avtpov. vw*
OLpx^O) yap ro A rrtxvri rip B cf avaytcri^, rh 8^
fihf

6napxiv

40

B v^x^^^

as a drcAi^s

ort,

irovTt r<p

F* coreu

81^'

ovAAoyta/io;

nayrl rw T xmdpx^w,
ori ^vS^x^'"'^'^ '''^
dreXrjs Ik rr]s aTToScifccoy S^Xok* rov avrofv

yap rponov Btix^^^fat ovntp Kairi rwv frp6rpov.

rraXiv ro p.v A cvStx^oBw navri r<Ji B, ro d<^ B
iTovri rw F vnapxcrot if avdyfcffs' coreu 8^ ouX6

Aovio/io; or4 ro
nayrl rip F cv8<x<^^'^ ^^)^'^
oAA* owx c^t vndpxi, Koi rcXfioy oAA* ovic drcA^*
cv^us yap CTTircActrcu Sid rdiv cf dpx^; npordaiwv.
Ei 8c U17 6fioioaxjjfjLovS ai nporaatis, arw
TTpwrov 1) arcprjriKti avayKoia, koI ro fiV
firjhcvl

10

navrl rw F
F vndpx^iv.

rw

hk
*

'

A
B

rw B

[cf avdytcrfsi],* rd 8^
/ii78cvi rdi
ci^c;^^<T^a>* avdytcrj 8^ rd

v^X&9a}

kujOw yap vnapxtiv

v7rKiro p,rjOvl

carat &^ B,

c^ oMaynts otti.

Waitx iariu ii
Cn, Alexander :
:

rj

navri

ev^Xo6at.
i :

rtvi'

o{^

A : vw^fvtv
vwiin^
Mym^i d.

carat

ityfitn

rj

cttci


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xvi

are positive, whether they are universal or not, the General

conclusion will be problematic, not assertoric ; if one tioS^**
premiss is affirmative and the other negative, when
the affirmative is apodeictic, the conclusion will
be problematic, not negative assertoric ; and when
the negative is apodeictic, there will be both a
problematic and an assertoric negative conclusion,
whether the terms are universal or not. The sense
of * possibiUty in the conclusion must be understood
There will be no
in the same way as before."
inference to the effect that the predicate necessarily
does not apply to the subject for not necessarily to
apply is not the same as necessarily not to apply.*
^?*^
that when the terms are positive ^^^
Now it is evident
premisses
^
,
the conclusion which we get is not apodeictic. r or universal.
must apply to all B, and B may IffirmaSve.
let us assume that
apply to all C. Then there will be an imperfect
may apply to all C.
syllogism to the effect that
That it is imperfect is clear from the proof ; for the
proof will proceed in the same way as before.^
Again, let us assume that
may apply to all B, and
that B must apply to all C. Then there will be a
syllogism to the effect that
may apply to all C
not that it does apply ; and the syllogism will be
perfect, not imperfect ; for it is concluded directly
by means of the original premisses.
If the premisses are not similar in quality, let us (&) One
first take the negative premiss as apodeictic
let aSf on?^*
us assume that it is impossible for
to apply to any negative
p^^'^^B, and let us assume that B may apply to all C.
Then it must follow that
apphes to no C. For let
us assume that it applies to all or some of C. Now
Then
it was assumed that it cannot apply to any B.
*

'

C/. 33

30, 84

27.

34 a 34

ff.

283

ARISTOTLE

o^Scvl
dmi<TTp<^i t6 arfnjTuc6, ov5^ ri B rtp
ev^fX^rat' to 8^ A to* F -^ ^f^yri rj rtpl frctreu
vnaf>\w war* oi^i^i ^ ov irayrl r^ V r6 H
ci^x^ir* OF imdpxtiv untKtiro Bi vnvri If

Qavcpov 8* OTi Kol roO ivh^oBcu /ii) vndpxfw

ylyverai ovAAoyur/io^, circp *cat roG ui) iWcifig^cii'.
iroAii/ coTcu n iicara^Ti#c^ nporaais avaytcata, kqI
TO fuv
10

5<

#(cU

ei^xia^a*

/xi^ocvi tcuk*

^dpxu^$ to

r xmapxirw

t( dvay#oy?. o /iiv
oSv avXXaviafJLOS corcu rcAcio^, oAA* ov top fii}
vndpxfuf oAAa tou i%^^a$<u firj unapx^w ^ T
ydp irpoToat; otrrcu9 iXi^^iOrf i) ano tov /iCiCovo;
ojcpov, Kox 19 TO a^vFOTOK ouK ^(Triv ayayciF* it
vop ^7Ttyrdirj ro A T(jt> P Tua* vnanx^tv, KCiTiM
TTOi^i TO*

Ta>

B MXa6<u

/ii^6cvi

^ira^vciv,

ov8^

5ta tovtcuf d8inaTor. ^cLv 8< irpof t^

cAexTTOvi aKpip TfBfj r6 <mp'rjTix6v, orav futw
ivS^xfCfOcu (rrificuirfj avAAoyca/io? Harai 8ia rwg
dyriarpo^yfj^, KaOdirtp iv Toiy np6rpQV, orav Si
vo^x^a6cu ovk lorax' oih* orov a/i^a> fi^
firi
T^ GrprjriKd fAti fj 8* vhxdfUVOv ro vp6s to
lAarroi'. opoi 8' oi avroi, row fUv undpx^w Acuicoi;

ts avfJLpatvi

so

X^^'

irirra,
Joioi'

'"'*'

m4 vnapx^iv XevKov i<po

'

TiM Bekkcri

TvC.

m^I^ oodd.,

Alexmader.

* The proof fkils because the Tmlidatiiiif syiloiri-^ni gives

not an apodeictic but an asscrtoric conclusion (cf. !iO a 15 ff.)
which docs not contradict the original minor premiss. It i*
curious that the contradictor}' of A applies to no C * should
be stated in the form ' A applies to all or sooietff C* Becker
*

284

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
since the negative premiss

is

xvi

I.

convertible, neither

But it has been assumed

Therefore B
that A applies to all or some of C.
cannot apply to any or all of C. But it was originally
assumed that it may apply to all."
It is evident that we can have a syllogism of the
negative problematic type, since we also have one
Let the affirmative
of the negative assertoric type.
and let us assume that
prenuss now be apodeictic
A may apply to no B, and that B must apply to all C.
Then the syllogism will be perfect, but it will be
can

apply to any A.

not of the negative assertoric but of the negative

problematic type, for the premiss which relates to
the major term was assumed in this sense ; and we
cannot employ reduction ad impossihile. For supposing that we assume that A applies to some C,^ while
it is still assumed that A may apply to no B, no
impossible conclusion is obtained by means of these
assumptions. If, however, the negative is attached
to the minor term, when the sense is problematic,
there will be a syllogism by conversion, as in the
but when the sense is not
previous examples
problematic there will be no syllogism ; nor will
there be one when both premisses are taken as negaThe terms
tive and the minor is not problematic.
where the predicate applies
are the same as before
animal snow
where it does
to the subject, white
animal pitch.
not, white
'^

{A.T.M.

p. 44) aro:ues plausibly that the expression represents the expansion of an originally indefinite premiss
'
applies to
^ This being the contradictory of the conclusion (A applies
to no C) which it is hoped to establish.
The resultant syllogism will be the
C/. 35 a 14, b 1, 7.
same as in 35 b 38 ff.

"^

285

'

ARISTOTLB
T6v avTOv hi rponov c^ci Kanl rutv hf lUpi
av^XoyiafJuov orav yap f ro <rrpnrfru(6v OMiyicaZor,
Koi TO avfJL7rpaafjLa cotoa tov /x^ vrrapx^iv. otov

TO

fiiv

firjSvl

Tiw rwv

rwv

B Mtx^rai

imapx^w to

ei^x*^"*" vndpxiv, avdytcrj r6

TIV4 Tcuv r fi^ unapxtiv. ci yap wavri vndpx^^
r<p hi B ftl^ScVi v5X<TCU, Ou5^ TO B Ou3cV T(}>

hk

^vS^x^TOi vTrdpxtiv war* tl t6

(mdfyxti,

oi^m rw F

t6

nayrl rtp T,
/i^x'TOi* oAA* vw*

4Kiro rwl /i^;^a^cu.

40

'Otov bi r6 tv M^V** ifaTo^TUf^i' ovoyicaibv ^

ro hf rw artpnffrvcw avXXoytafiw, dto r6 BF, ^
TO ica^oAov iv T<p tcarrjyopu((l, olav r6 AB, oiJic
coTOi Tou V7rdpxiv avXXoyiayj&i' dir((Sci{i( 5' 1}
airr^ ^ kqI ^tti t<5v trp6rpov,
/dv 8^ t^ ft^
Kad6Xov T^ irpd; to IAottov axpov,^ rj KaTO^rucov rj arprfru<6v, ^vScxo/^t^v, to 5*
M^/x&
avayKoZov [trpoi rtp fullovi wptp]* cvk arxu
avXXoyuTfiCs. opoi hi tou fuv ^irapxtw i^ ovayKt^
J^wov XevK6v avdpwiro^, rod
hSix^adai
fi-fj
l^<pov XVk6v
orav h* ovayKoiov f r6
Ifidriov.
KaB6Xov ro h* v tipi hS^xSfKVov, <rrfprjrucov
fjLv ovros rov KadoXov rov fUv \map\iv opoi (<pov
XfVKov KOpaf, rov 8^ /X17 xmdpxiw ^wov
\vk6v mrra, Karau^rucov hk rov yuv vnapxiy
^wov XcvKov KVKvo^, TOU 5^ /i^ ev5;(ca^(u (ak>v
XevKov x*^^
Ou8* OTOv dSiopiaroi Xr)<ft$aH7iv ai irpordaLf

10

ri IXoTTor axpotf *ez optimis Hbris* WaiUt

uolgo.
wpos . . . ixpof om. Adf, aecL Waits.

tucptp
^

286

r^ iXimm

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xvi

The same

principle will apply to particular syllo- ^j^^^^

the negative premiss is apodeictic, and one
the conclusion will also be of the negative assertoric ^emm"
cannot apply to any B, and B may
type. E.g., if
does not
apply to some C, it must follow that
applies to all C, and
apply to some C. For if
cannot apply to any B, B too cannot apply to any
applies to all C, B cannot apply to
and so if
;
any C. But it was assumed that it may apply to
gisms.**

When

some.''

When

(viz.

BC)

in the negative, or the universal premiss (viz.

AB)

the particular affirmative premiss

in the affirmative syllogism

apodeictic, the con-

is

clusion will not be assertoric. The proof is the same

If the universal premiss, whether affirmaas before.*'
tive or negative, is problematic and relates to the
minor, while the particular premiss is apodeictic and
relates to the major term, there will be no syllogism.
Examples of terms where the predicate necessarily

where the preapplies are animal white man

dicate cannot possibly apply, animal white coat.
When the universal premiss is apodeictic and the
particular problematic, (a) if the universal is negative,
examples of terms where the predicate applies to

the subject are animal white crow, and where it

(b) if it is
does not apply, animal white pitch
affirmative, examples of terms where the predicate
applies are animal white swan, and where it
cannot possibly apply, animal white snow.
Nor will there be a syllogism when the premisses

" Aristotle passes over the case of particular syllogisms

with both premisses affirmative.
" The proof fails as in the corresponding syllogism at
36 a 7 ff., because the validating syllogism does not give the
"
required contradiction.
Cf. 36 a 19-25.

287


ARISTOTLE
^

Kara fUpos, ovh* oimcK /<Mtu <ruASpot Si KOivol roO ;iV imapx^w (^oiM

afitf>6rpai

Xoytauo^,

avQfHjjitos, roO ^i) vndpYtOF Itftonf^

XevKov aifwxov, kqX yap ro {<^i/ nvt AmK<p #ca2
70 Acu^cov aji/njx(p rivi koI dixLyKoZov vndpvtuf ica2
OVK ci'ScVcTai vrrdpxiy Kam tqu iv^x^oBoi
OfjMiws, cuorc 7r/>o9 antu^a wnJaifUM oi opoi.
Ocu^poi/ ot^' <V rcuv ipTifidvutv on 6fioius
ixovTcjv rtjv opoiv v t Toi vndpxtiv Koi cr to4S
avayicoiot; yi/Kcroi t iccu ou ylyytroA av^Xoyurpji^,
nX^v Kara pMv ro virdpxtiv ri^c^CKi/f rw artpi^
ruerj^ trpordatv^ rov c'&<;(ca^at ^v 6 avAKoyurpioti
Kara Si r6 dvayKolov rrj^ <rrpffrucTif koI rov
h^xto6ai Kol rov prt vndpx^iv. [hrjjXov hi Koi
ori ndvT^ arcAeiy oi avXXtrytapol Koi on Tf-

15 Acvicoi/

so

V,

\ioOvrai hid rCtv npoipr)fU%\ov ox^parwv.Y

XVII. *Ev hi rw hvr^pip crx^pan &ra plh

XapPdvtoaiv dp^drpai al npordattf',

ou$<i9 tarai ovAAoyiafw^. otrrc KarrjyopiKwv oirri
<rrprjrucu>v ridpvwv oirre KaOoXov ovrt irand
/v8^;(cor^ai

ij fxiv
vndpxtiv tf h* ivh^x*^^
pJv Karat^rucrj^ vndpxtiv ar^pai'
vov<rqs ovh'nor
lorait ttis hi orpTtrucfjs rrk
KadoXov act. rov avrov hi rpdnov koi orav ^ pi

pjpos' orav hi
80

arjpatyj),

rrjs

cf dvdyKTf^ 1^ h* ivhtxfoOai XafAfidvrfroA rCrv

npordaecjv, Set hi koI cv rovroi^ Xapii^dptw rd
v TOC9 crvpncpdcrpaoiv vhx6pVov iaarrp iv roii
npdrepov.
^ seel.

Maier.

This sentence is quite out of place here ; it seems to be

copied from 39 a I (Nlaier. SyllogUtik, II. L 176. note 2).
33 b SO, 34 b 27, 35 b 3?.
*

888

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xvi-xvii

I.

are taken as indefinite or both as particular. Ex- (3) Both

amples of terms common to all cases where the ^JSniSo
particular.
predicate applies to the subject are animal white
man ; where it does not apply, animal white inanimate. For it is at once necessary and impossible
animal
should apply to some things
both that
which are white, and that white should apply to
some things which are inanimate. Similarly too if
so the terms are valid
the relation is problematic

'

'

'

for all cases.

Thus it is evident from the foregoing analysis that

a syllogism does or does not result from a similar
relation of the terms in assertoric and in apodeictic
propositions ; with this quaUfication, that, as we
have seen, if the negative premiss is taken as assertoric the conclusion is problematic, while if the
negative premiss is taken as apodeictic, the conclusion is both problematic and negative assertoric.
[It is also clear that all the syllogisms are imperfect,
and are completed by means of the figures already
mentioned.]
XVII. In the second figure, when both premisses Second
are problematic, there will be no syllogism, whether aSrai
they are affirmative or negative, universal or par- observaticular
but when one premiss has an assertoric and
the other a problematic sense, if it is the affirmative
premiss that has the assertoric sense, there will
but if it is the negative
never be a syllogism
universal premiss, there will always be one. The
same holds good when one of the premisses is
assumed as apodeictic and the other as problematic.
We must understand the sense of possibility in
the conclusions in these cases in the same way as
**

before.

'

**

K 2

289

ARISTOTLE
Mb
npufTOV oZv htucrtov

15

^i

ovK ayrurrp^^i to

hf T<p iv^Xo^ai ortprvriKOv, cXov l t6

iMy*^i8/;(CoAu
rai fir)hvi rw B, ovk avdytaj koI to

rw A. KtiaBw yap rovro

koX h^ix^oBui
vnaDXiv. ovkouv intX avriarp<fovaiv <u cv r^i /vo<x*a^cu Kara^dati^ raii
ano^doiai Koi oi A^oyruu Koi ai ayrurctftCMcu, to

fii/Scvi

TO
4f>

37

B^ B

/ii^S^vi T<j>

r<p

^K^^cTOi

firfiwi

^napxnw, ^afp6

Kol rrayri ^mm^octo ay t6 3 rtp

i^a^ctv.
roOro 3^ ilf<fSo^' od ya^ c^ t^Sc t^>3c ircu^
cmS^ctcu, Koi TC^Sc r(^i5 ai^yiraibi'* war* otJir

on

dvrurrp^^i to arprjru(6v.
"E^ri 8* ou5^ #ccuAtAC( T^ /i^ A T<J> B iMYtoBai
firfitvi, TO 8^ B Tivl rwv A ^f eWym/ff u^ 6napxtv,
otov TO /i^ Acvrov ffovTi dvdpumcj evo^xtrai /X17
vndpx^w {koI yap imapx*w), dvvpamcv 8* ovic
oAi}^^;

ciTTcti^

cos ^vScxcTOi fiY^Scvi Av#r<p* iroAAotr

8* avay(aZbv ou#c

yap cf a^y#oys ov^ tmdpxti, to

1*

1^ Cv8;(0/il^V.
*AAAa firfv ovB* K rod dBwdrov 8cix^v|acTcu
dirriorp<fov, otov ci ris d(ia}0iv, intl ^JkCoo^ r6
v8;i^a^(u TO B rw A fxrfBtvt \mdpxW, dXtfdis r6
fiif vhXadaA firf6vl {^idais yap koa ano^amg),
ci 8^ TOVT*, aXr)d(^ ( dvdytcrf^ rtvt rwv A to B
*

The meaninif <^

imxtifirtrai

rtry doubtftil, bat

contradictories * (Jenkinson) most surely be wrong ; no

proposition b convertible with its cootFsdfctorjr. Nor
indeed b a proposition conrertible with its oootraiy < but
since B a
and B e
are contrary propos^ons in the
assertoric mode, it b natural though inaccurate to describe
them as such in the problematic mode (Alexander Ml. 19).
Since the only other problematic propositions which are
convertible without change of quanti^ are the sub-contraries

S90

'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xvii

of Negative
we must show that there is no conversion
problematic
-j^
11
^-L
premiss
e.g.,
that
it
problematic
AA premisses
negative
the
may apply to no B, it does not necessarily follow convertible.
that B may apply to no A. Let this be assumed First proof.'
Then
i.e. let us take it that B may apply to no A.
since affirmations in the problematic sense convert
with their negations, whether contrary or opposite,
and since B may apply to no A, evidently B may also
for it does not
apply to all A. But this is false
necessarily follow that if one term may apply to all
of another, the latter may also apply to all of the
former. Therefore the negative (problematic) statement is not convertible.
should not possibly Second
Again, there is no reason why
^^^
apply to no B, although B necessarily does not apply
any
apply
to
white may not
to some A. E.g.,
man (for it may also apply to every man), but it is
not true to say that man may apply to nothing
man necessarily does not
for
that is white
apply to many white things, and (as we have seen ^)
the necessary is not possible.
Furthermore, this type of proposition cannot be Third proot
shown to be convertible by reduction ad impossibile,
e.g., if it were to be claimed that since it is false
that B may apply to no A, it is true that it cannot
apply to no A, since the latter statement is the
contradictory of the former ; and if this is so, it is
therefore A
true that B must apply to some
;
First

<

'

'

'

<*

B i A and B

o A, and since these are at least verbally opposed

each other {cf. 32 a 32-36, and II. 63 b 23-28, I suggest
Alexander notes
that they are meant here by avriKdiMevcu.
this possibility (222. 2-4), but without much favour.
* 32 a 28.
* Sc. as an inference from the proposition '
may apply
to

to

no

B.'

291

ARISTOTLE

14

to

B* roOro 8'
oSin^TOV.* od yap cc /117 /iW;(rnu fiTScvi t^ B
T^ A, dHiy#oj rivl vndp)^iy, to ydp fii^ /iS/yco^cu /z^Scvi 5ix<^ A/ycrcUy to fiiv c& ^( cu^ym^f
rivi V7rdpxi, to 5* Ci i( dvayiof^ rtvl fjJi ^dpyt^*
TO yap i^ avdyta^ tu4 twv A /ii^ 6ndpxow odi
dXTjd9 inTv 09 fravTi M^x^''^'^ M^ ^mipx^w,
\mdp\iv* wart koX t6

uxrrrtp ovSt

rtvi roir

t6 rt%n xnrdpxpv <f

avaym^ cm

iravA

tv^Xtrai xmdpx'iiv. ci 01^ Tt; dfioiri, iwtl ovK

ivS^xtrai to F T<p A vayrl vndpxtiv, 4( cu^ym^
rivl fit) vndpxtiv avro, ^vSoi av XofifidtfOi* oa^

yd/> vndpxti, oAA* oTt

Sia rovTO
16

^fuv

^ytiocf

iratrrl

01)

i( dwdytctff iwdfxti,

ivb4xto0<u,

/X17

rt^

rravTi

c^c;(o/ivoi', cu; cv

opx^ BujpiaafiMV, 06

^f di'dyiojs' Tw U7rdpxiv oAM

avdyKTi^ rivl firj vndpxtw Xrjrrriov'

TO

to

wart

vndpx<iv r6 r i( di^ym^ rtA

xnrdpxtw dyrlxtiToi koI to cf dvdytnjf rtvl fiij
imdpxiv' ofioiws 3c r<u T<p tvStxtoBai firfityi,
A17A0V oi^i' OTi irpo; TO oirrai^ ti^XOfiCVCW cal

MtxttrOai

fiovot^

to ^f
rourov
oit^tv avfipaiyti a3iWror, war* od
\ri<f>Bivros
yiyvtrai avXXoytofios. ^avp6v oSv Ik rutp ififj'
fivwv OTi OVK dyTurrp<^i ro OTtprjTucov.
Toi^ou Bt btix^tvro^ KtiaBcj r6 A rtp ficr B
ci^cxco^cu
rfj^

/xijScFi

rwv B-

roim>
^
o^vKtrov* uolgo.
^

cm. AC.
om. AL

' ft6*o

'

Koi

5'

T<J>

dtrrurrpo^S ovk

Travrl.

nfol*

bia yikv oSv

ccrrcu iTvXXoyuifids'

o^i

ror.

Maieri rwr B.

ccpi/TOi
revro

I'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
must also apply
<The reasoning

xvii

I.

some B

but this is impossible.

;
unsound,) because it does not
follow that if B cannot apply to no A, it must apply
For there are two senses in which we say
to some.
that it is not possible for a predicate to apply to
none of a subject, viz. (a) if it necessarily applies to
some, and (b) if it necessarily does not apply to some.
For it is not true to say that that which necessarily
does not apply to some As may not apply to every A,
any more than it is true that that which necessarily
Thus if it should
applies to some may apply to all.
be claimed that since it is not possible that C should
apply to all D, it necessarily does not apply to some,
the assumption would be false ; for it does apply to
all, but because in some cases it applies necessarily,
for this reason we say that it is not possible for it
Thus to the proposition A may
to apply to all.
apply to all B is opposed not only A must not
apply to some B but also A must apply to some
B
and similarly with the proposition A may
apply to no B.'
Thus it is clear that we must regard as opposed
to that which is possible or not possible in the sense
which we originally defined,^ not only that which
necessarily applies to some, but also that which
and if we do
necessarily does not apply to some
this, no impossible conclusion follows (in the foregoing example), and so no syllogism results. Thus
it is evident from what has been said that the negative
(problematic) premiss is not convertible.
Now that this has been proved, let it be assumed a. Both
that A may apply to no B, but to all C. Then there P^Xem'will be no syllogism by means of conversion ; for it atic.
to
is

'

'

'

'

32 a

18.

293

ARISTOTLE
&

ydjp art

ovk avrurroi^i

ovO Sia rov

M^X^^'''^
t^opvetv.

dbwarov

Y^

^^ TO

oXtjj^ S* ci

oAA*
17 roiavrq trpoTaaii.
rtSivro^ yap roO B warr^

Toi

#coi

muni

koI pLrfiA

eoTt avAAovuTfu$9 S^Aoi^

&n

rov (vhdx(rBai av coy (Sia to firf^rripay rwv irpty

40 raaoiv iXrj^ai iv rw vndpxiy), fcai o^rof
^
t?
KaToufMTiKos "5 ortpriTuc^- ovSrr/pox 8' iyjauaptl.
Karoj^riKov fiv yap rtBhnos htix^rfot rcu Scd
TcDv o/Kuv OTi ouK ivo^x^TOA vnapxtw, <rrfnirucoO
& OTi TO ovfintpaofAa ovk iv^x^H^*^^ ^^* o'ti/*
fcotoi' iariv.
<rrat yap ro pAv A Acvicoi' to 5^ B
avdporrros c^' 4
F 47nroy to &i9 A, to A^vkok,
c^';(Tcu t4> fi^ fravri T<ji> Si prfStvi vrrdpxfiy$
dXXa TO B rof V ovrt vnapvtuf ^i^'ycTOi ovt
art piv ovv vnapxfu^ ovk yxQ>pi
^17 tnrap;(iy.
^avp6v, ovSci; yap limof dvOparrro^' oAA* 01^*
prjS^va iTnror
h/h^xtoOai prf ^apxtiv, dvdyKri
10 dvBpamov tyai, r6 5* dvayKoZov ovk ^v
pvov. OVK dpa yiyvtrai (rvXXoyurpo^.
'OpoUo^ Si hixJBi^Tai Kal dv avdnaXiP rtBj
TO aTpriTtK6v, Kav dpj^mpai Kara/^rucaX Xif^
duxTW ri arprjTiKal' Sia yap rCtv ovtcjv Socj
<rrai 17 aTroSci^i;.
koI orav 17 phf KadoXov ^ 8*
v tLpi, rj dp4f6rpai Kara pipos ^ aScoparroi,
16 %! ouaxCiS dXXws cvScxcTot pTaXapiv rds vpo'
fc

y^

warn]

fi^ watrrl

vw6fix*tp] nif

Mc^^

Maier.

vwapxtuf

Makr.

the major premiss AB.

* The sense is clearly wron^. This premiss must be intended
to contradict the conclusion (B may apply to no C) which it
is required to establish.
The true contradictory would be
*
B must apply to some C ' ; this when combined with the

i.,

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xvii

has been already observed that such a premiss as No

this
Nor, again, will there be a results!
is not convertible.
for if it is
syllogism by reduction ad impossibile
assumed that B may apply to all C ^ no falsity results,
because A might apply both to all and to none of C.
In fine, if there is a syllogism with these premisses,
clearly it will be problematic, since neither of the
and this
premisses is taken in an assertoric sense
syllogism will be either affirmative or negative. But
for if it is assumed
neither alternative is admissible
to be affirmative, it can be shown by examples of
terms that the predicate does not apply to the
subject, and if to be negative, that the conclusion
Let
be
not problematic but apodeictic.
is
**

'

B man
may apply

white,'

'

'

and

'

horse.'

Then A,

i.e.

white,
to all of the one and to none of
the other ; but it is not possible either that B should
or should not apply to C. That it is not possible
that it should apply is evident, for no horse is a man.
But neither is it possible that it should not apply ;
for it is necessary that no horse should be a man,
and the necessary, as we have seen,*' is not possible.
Hence no syllogism results.
There will be a similar proof if the negative is
taken with the other premiss instead, or if both
premisses are taken as affirmative or both as negative
for the proof will be drawn from the same terms.
The same holds good when one premiss is universal
and the other particular, or when both are particular
or indefinite, or for any other possible combination
major premiss would g:ive A may not apply to some C,'
which is not incompatible with the minor premiss. Maier's
emendation gives the right sense, but it has no support from
Mss. or commentators, and is at best a clumsy and unnatural
* 32 a 28.
form of expression.
*

ARISTOTLE
roac&f*

y^

del

rmv air&v

5ui

iforai

rdatwv

Kara ro ivhixtadai
ylyyercu avXXtyyiafios.

opatv

i)

odotlt

rt$fUUf

XVIII. E^ ET i} fih imfipxiv^ 1} V IM^aeoA

7^9 ^^ KaTTjyopucrj^ vTrdfix^iv rwUnii
T^9 hk arp7tTiKTJs ti^Xa$ai oihtttvr coroi ovAXoytayios, ot/rc koBoKov ratv opotv ovr* iv lUoti

10 <rrjfiaivi,

rCiv QxnCiV opojv.

hixadai

orav

S'

i}

/4^v

Kara/^riKt)

iv

0 artpnrjrudi virdpxtiv, jfancu ouAAo-

ik

ctAt^cu yap to A ry uev B firfin

vndpxdv rw bt r nayri ivS^x^auai. dvrtarpa*

tftyi(rfi09.

o^ rov aTprjTucoO ro B r(ji> A odom

^dp(i' TO
A iravTi Tu> F ivthfyt'ro' ylyvefru
h^ <rvXXoyiafJL6^ mi A'W^fCTO* to B /it/^cW to) T
^ivTO^

hid rov irpanov ox^fiaros.

6p.oUas

iccU ci ir/>^

r0irj rd artfrrjntcdv.
0
*EIav 8' dfuf>dT(p<u iikv uxn (mprjrixal, orj^ialiTf
8*
fxh^ fiii undpxiv ^ 8' c^;((7^ai /xij wr-

Toi

1}

opYCiv, 84* avroii' /xJv tcuv ttXrjfi^tifov ovSh^ avfi'

paLVi dvayKolov, dyrurrpa/^Un]^ hi rrjs Kord rd
cvSexco'^cu
S5

'npoTdaQJ9

yiyvtrox

avXXoyioiid^

on

B t^ r

cv8<;(Tou yLrfievl vndpx^iv, Kc^dnp \

Toiy 'np6rpov' corai yap TroAtv ro irpCnov ox^fia,

ro

idv

8* dfi<f>drpai tc^okti KarTjyopucai,

CTvAAoyta/xo;.

^-dvBporrros ,

ovk cotcu
opoi rou ftcv VTrdpxiv vyUia ^t^o
rov hk fitf vndpx^iv vyUia hnroi

'dvOpiono^.

Tov ainov hk rpdnov

40

(rv^Xoyiuficjv.

S96

orav

fthf

cfci

Kdni rwv iv

f^p^*^

ydp ^ to Kara^rtKOV

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xvii-xviii

of premisses ; for the proof will always be drawn

from the same terms. Thus it is evident that if both
the premisses are taken as problematic, no syllogism
results.

XVIII. If, however, one premiss has an assertoric b. One

and the other a problematic sense, when the affirma- anTon"
tive is assumed as assertoric and the negative as problematic
problematic there will never be a syllogism, whether fi^iSoth
the terms are taken as universal or as particular,

i/>
The proof will be the same as before, and drawn
from the same terms. But when the affirmative is
1

premisses
universaL

problematic and the negative assertoric there will

be a syllogism. Let it be assumed that A applies
to no B but may apply to all C. Then if the negative
premiss is converted, B will apply to no A. But it
was assumed that A may apply to all C. Therefore
a syllogism results by means of the first figure," to
the effect that B may apply to no C. Similarly too
if the negative be attached to C.^
If both premisses are negative, one having a
negative assertoric and the other a negative problematic sense, no necessary conclusion results by
means of the assumptions as they are but on the
conversion of the problematic premiss a syllogism
results to the effect that B may apply to no C, as in
for once again we shall have
the previous example
the first figure. If, however, both premisses are
taken as affirmative, there will be no syllogism.
Examples of terms where the predicate applies to
where it does
the subject are health animal man
not apply, health horse man.
The same principle will also obtain in the case of (2) One
particular syllogisms. When it is the affirmative parucuiar.
;

34 b 19

ff.

35 a 6

fF.

297

ARISTOTLE
I

^A

vmxp)(ov, ctrc Ka06X(w ccr* iv f^p*^ Aiy

^,

ou^U

c<rreu avXXoyujfjLSf {roOro S* ofioiwf teal Sia

opaw Sc^mrreu

airroiv

rwr

roiy irp&rtpov), &ray hi r6

aTpnfruc6v, corcu 5ta rrjs avTiarpo^ifS, caBdvp

fiiv rd SeakoBoKov
t6 fiif
vndpxiv, ( avrwv fUv raty npordatwv autc tarai
TO dvayKoZov, dyTurrpa^^vro^ 5^ roO ivUx^oBai,

ndXiv iav oft^tu

hf roi9 Ttp^tftov.

OT^/xaro

rrprfTUc6.

Xtj^Ofj,

KaBdirtp iv roii np6rpov, tarai avXXoyuifid^

fUv f to ortprjrtMOv iv fUpi 5<

ovK ^OTOi avXXoyuifiOf ovrt tcara^rudf^

*E>dv hi (nrdpxpv
Xrj^djj,
10

ovT arprjTiKrjs owrrf^

Srrav

rrj^

Mpas

irpardatiMH' otJ^'

Xrj^watv dIMpurroi, rj Kara'

dno^rucal, rj Kara p>ipo^. drMti^i^

ofi/^ortpai

^rucal

rj

cumj KOi Oia rotv avrcjv opcjv.

XIX. *Edv 8*
fUv i( avaym}; ^ 5* ^vS/^^a^oi
rwv rrpordatwv, rrj^ fuv arprfrucfj^
arjfiaiyj)
dvayKola^ ovarf^ corou avXXoytafiof oi) fiovov ori
vhXTa*, firi \mdp\iv oAAa koX om ovx vrrdpytt'
Ktiadoi yap to
TTJs 8c Kara^rucrjs ovk tarai.
A Tip p.v B i( dydyKTji firjSm ^ndpxtw, Ttp
17

"fj

8c

navri vSXaBax.
TO B

aTprfTiKrjs oi)8c
so

8c

rravrl Ttp

Tou npwTov

vSXT(u

dvTurrpa^iarii

T^

ci^8c;fCTO'

o^

yiyvmu 8^ iriAiy
^t to B

o^fTj/iaroy o ovAAoyia/xo?
p,r)Bvi

ou8' v7Tdpxi>^ TO

VTrdpx^iv oifKOuv

vndp\iv.
oiJScvt

to

8^

to*

dfta 8^ 8^Aov ori

TcDi'

Toi

rrjs

ouScvi vndp^i' to

F.

KtioOu)

p,rjlSv\

vwap^ti Cn, Bekker.

yop

ivh^xfrai

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xviii-xix

is assertoric, whether it is taken as

universal or as particular, there will be no syllogism

statement that

can be proved by the same method and the

as before)
but when it is the negative,*
there will be a syllogism by conversion, as in the
previous examples. On the other hand, if both
propositions are taken as negative and the negative
assertoric is universal, no necessary conclusion will
result from the premisses as they stand, but when
the problematic statement is converted there will
be a syllogism, as before.
If the negative statement is assertoric and taken
as particular, there will be no syllogism, whether the
nor will
other premiss is affirmative or negative
there be a syllogism when both are taken as inor as
definite, whether affirmative or negative
particular.
The proof is the same and is effected
by the same terms.
XIX. If one premiss is apodeictic and the other c. One
has a problematic sense, when it is the negative and one
premiss that is apodeictic, there will be a syllogism, problematic
not only to the effect that the predicate may not (i) universal
apply to the subject, but also that it does not apply ; (J)'^^*'
but when it is the affirmative premiss, there will be affirmative
no syllogism. For let it be assumed that A neces- ne^tive
Then premiss.
sarily apphes to no B, but may apply to all C.
by the conversion of the negative premiss, B will
and it was assumed that A may
also apply to no A
apply to all C. Thus once again by means of the
first figure a syllogism results to the effect that B may
apply to no C.^ Moreover it is obvious also that B
does not apply to any C. For let it be assumed that
Then if A cannot apply to any B,
it does apply.
(this

same terms

^^^

Sc. universal.

C/. 36 a 15

ff.

299

ARISTOTLE
Ma
TO 5c
15

Tov avrov

&

Toi

ry

Bartpov

B M^x^^^

r<^ fiiv

i(

virapx^rui

travTi

<rrcu ya/)

i^apj(ii'.

5c to

dvOpanros i^*

to

fxcv

5c to

avdytof^,

Acvicw ^'

S*

ivhXrai

cf

dvay#n;y.

m
ouic

/Xv

UTTO

evScxctr^oi

In hk koX
r vndpxiV'

T(j>

ti7

Toi

TO
Sc

clvtU

^f

dMty#07y

TO 8c

iyprjyopo^ to 5^

^<pp

Sc

eyprqyopos ^wov.
wrapx^i-v, ciTTcp

tj

he

t^

iyxeopZ

artpr^'

raivrwv

ovbiv yap Kca\vi

T<ji

ftCV

VOMTt

cf dmyo;s tmdpxiv, otov

KivrjGis' rat fiev

kLvtigis,

800

icvtcvtp

^v5cj(ca^a4 ovif

ovSc tou dvayicau>v* to yap dvay^

p,riv

KiyJvwv TO

88 b a

roO

^vpcv to yop

(JWpaivv,

fJLV

ouv

if dpj^orlputv dvayKaiwv

Tf

TiKrjs

TO

/icv

Mptimtp

dvOpamos o^5cv2

ci'Sc^dficvoi'.

'AAAa
KoZov

TO

oti

ovAAoycafto?

^v

cal

firfivi,

4^

to 5^

#n;#noj'

AcvK^i' KVKv<p p.P cf dvlyioyy (mdpxii

40

oiJ#c

ovTca^ o^ tXovrwv rwv optav ovS^U ianu ouAAoyt<7/xo5* avfiPaivti yap t^ B tw F ^f <Wyfi;j
fti7

t&

ir/>o;

urariTyo/HJifdi' oiayiifotov

cuSe^ofitvov, icai to

/i7/5cvi

hk rporrov 8i;f^7j<7rroi koX Ci

coTw TO

rioAtt^

rwv T iwl

^iKiro l\^x*^^^*

to ortprjTiKov.

re6irf

8*

vndpxi Ttw rofv F, r6

vh4xT<u' oAAd irovri

ci

{a>ov t6 5* i^*

yap iyprjyoport cf

<miy#ciy5

koI

ndv to

ov^

rod

TTCirrt

ivB^x^rai,

<f>avp6v

o^

ori

fiij

ovnos xovtojv dvdytaj xmdpX'^^'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xix

and B applies to some C, A cannot possibly apply

to some C.'* But it was assumed that it may apply
to

all.

also be effected in the same way

supposing that the negative be attached to C.
On the other hand, let the affirmative statement
let A
be apodeictic and the other problematic
possibly apply to no B, and necessarily apply to all
Then when the terms are in this relation there
C.
for it can so happen that B
will be no syllogism
necessarily does not apply to C. E.g., let A be
white,' B man and C swan.' Then white necessarily appUes to swan, but may apply to no man ;
and man necessarily applies to no swan. Thus
it is evident that there is no syllogism of the
for we have seen ^ that the
problematic type
necessary is not possible.
Nor again will there be an apodeictic syllogism
for we saw*' that an apodeictic conclusion (only)
results when both premisses are apodeictic, or when
the negative premiss is apodeictic. Again, it is
possible, with the terms taken in this way, for B to
apply to C. For there is no reason why C should
not fall under B in such a way that A may apply to
wake.g., if C were
all B, but must apply to all C
for that which is
animal and A motion
ing.' B
awake must have motion, and every animal may have
motion, and every waking thing is an animal. Thus
it is evident that there is no negative assertoric
conclusion either, since with this arrangement of
terms the conclusion is assertoric and affirmative.

The proof can

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

This

is

fallacy.

Cf. note

on 36 a

15.

32 a 28.
30 b 7, 31 a 21.
"

301

ARISTOTLE

nh
ovS^

rwv

avTUCifUvuv

'O/iOAOx hi Scix^^CTOi

ft

'Exxv

5*

tcara/^aotunf f

icoi

6fioio<rxrjfjLOVg

war*

avdwaXt rtBtlarfq

waiv

al

nparaatii,

arfnjriKafv fiv ovoutv aX yiyvtrai auXXoytafio^

rda(jj^, Kaddirtp iv roiy irporpov.
10

TO

Tip fih^

ciAi/^ai ydp

^( avoyioyy /x^ vnapxtiv,

r^

wou^i

axfjfJM.

T<jii

Kov

r
l

B r<ji> A ovScvl vnapx^^ ''^

A^x**"**' yiyvrrai 8^ t^ vpanow
npof r<p T T*6lfi r6 ortpfrjruc6

npordatittv ro ^ikv

hi

waadrcaS"
rtBakrw, ovk lartu ouAi*
rov fUv ya/> fii^ vndpxfiM ^ roO i$
dpaytcji fi'tj vnapx^iv ^avp6v on ovk iarax hiii
r^ fi^ c&A^^oi ortfnfTucipf nporaaw fv/fr iv rtp

*Eav hi

16

KarrjiYopucai,

XoyioyiOi.

^apx^iv
fiijv

^if/JT*

rw

i( avdytaj^ vndpxti^,
firi

oAAa

vndpxt^v' i( tivaym/;

ro B rip T ovx \mdp^i, olov

rdlrj AcvKOV i^* ^ hi roB KVfcvo^ r6^
t TO puv
hi r dvBpcanos. ovh4 yc rofv dyrucifUvtJV Karw^.
^>daU}v* CTTCi hhiKrai ro B r<p V i( avdy9C7)
ovx vndpxov. ovk dpa ylyvtrai av^Xoytapos oXatfi
'Opuolws 8' cfci Konl rwv iv fUpi ovAAoyMX/Kijr^

yap OVTCJ9
to

ovhi rov ii'hXoBai

x6vT<x)v

Alexander, Waits t ^iotmm.

Alexander, Waits : man^mMtm mil iwu^Agmm
Ain^faifoumf A'BCum: iyn^atrmttm A*t i
^ rfgti<r d:

'

irara^crrciir n,

$cQTai^dirf<0

n:

SOS

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xix

I.

Nor again is there a conclusion which takes the form

of any of the opposite statements." Therefore there
will be no syllogism.
There will be a similar proof if the affirmative
premiss occupies the other position.
If the premisses are similar in quality, where they ^JJp^fg^'g^g
are negative a syllogism always results on the negative.
conversion of the problematic premiss, as before.
necessarily does not apply
Let it be assumed that
Then on the conto B, and may not apply to C.
version of the premisses B applies to no A, and
may apply to all C. Thus the first figure results.
Similarly also if the negative statement relates to C*
b?^^
If, however, the premisses are taken as affirmative,
there will be no syllogism. It is evident that there affirmative.
will be none of the negative assertoric or of the
negative apodeictic type, since no negative premiss
has been assmned, either in the assertoric or in the
apodeictic sense. Furthermore, there will be none
for with the
of the negative problematic type
terms in this relation B will necessitrily not apply to
C ; e.g., if is taken to be white,' B swan and
C man.* Nor can we conclude any of the opposite
affirmations, because we have shown that B necesThus no syllogism at
sarily does not apply to C.

(<>)

'

'

'

'^

all results.

The same

will also

in the case of parhold good

has proved that in each of the three modes a

negative conclusion is impossible ; he now adds that the
corresponding affirmatives are also impossible {sc. because
an affirmative conclusion can only be drawn from two
" Aristotle

affirmative premisses).

the minor premiss is apodeictic. The problematic

originally negative, but becomes affirmative by
conversion.
* By the examples just cited.
^

i.e.f if

premiss

is

803

(2) Particu-

larsyllo-

gisms.

ARISTOTLE
2:>

onw

fihf yap fj to ortpffTuco^ KoBokov t koX

avayKoiav, ael avXXoyiOfto^ iarax koX roO iv
hXoQ<u KoX rov fi-q imdpxiy {anohtifi^ S^ hUi
T^ ayrurrpo^i:) , orav & to Kara^riKoy, ouS/TTorc* rov avrov yap ro6nov Sc;f^iJ<rrreu
koI
iv TO?? Ka^oAov, icai 5mx tJJj' atVroiv opcui'.
OuS* orav d/i^OTc/xu XrMwai Kara^aTura/* ica2
yap rovrov n airr^ an6^i(ig fj koI np6r(poy,
Orcu' $ a/x^OTcpoi fuv <7Tc/>77T(irai kq06Xov S^
KOi avay#cau& 1} to /ii^ vndpxny armaiyovoa, hC
iarai t6 ayayteaZoy,
avrCfy fuv rdty tiXrjfifUvojv
dyrurrpa^unis Bi riji Kara to ^vStx^oOai vp<y
raauts ar<u GvXXayiafiC9 tcoBav^p y toc;
nportpoy,
*Eav h* api4)6rpai dBiopiOTot ^ iy uApti rtdwaw,
ovK tarai mfXXoyiofxo^' dn6Biiif a 1) oMj mi

to

wk

Sid rdv

atVrcui' opcuv,

rwy tiprjfitvufy Sm rrk flip

koBoXov nStfi^ytj^ dvayKoia^ a<2
yiyytrai avXXoyiafid^, od fidyoy roG Mix^aOat
fx^ vrrdpx^iv dXXd iccu tou uij wrdp^ttv, rfjf Si
Kara^TiKTJs ovS^nart' icat oti rov avrdv rpdnop
ivovrwv v r rois dvayKaiois kcu iv toij vndpx<fvai
Oaw/>oy ody

#r

artprjTiKrj^ rrjs

40

t9

yiyvrai tc kcu ov ylyvrai av^Xoyiapuo^. hijjKay

8c icoi oTi 'irdvr^ aTcAct; ot avXXoyiafJLOi, Koi on
TcAcioOi^GU Sid rojv 7rpoipTifjUv<tfv axrjfidrQjy.

notes on S6 a 15. 38 a 34.

38 a W-b 4.
38 b 13-83.
< C/. 36 b 13-18.
C/. 36 a 15. 38 a 34. b 96.

fallacy

ef,

<

SO*

Actually by the

first

figure onlj.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
When

ticular syllogisms.

T.

xix

the negative statement

is

universal and apodeictic, a syllogism will always

result to give both a problematic and a negative
assertoric ^ conclusion (the proof will proceed by
conversion) ; but when the affirmative statement is
imiversal and apodeictic, there will never be a
syllogism. The proof will be effected in the same
way as in universal syllogisms, and by means of the

same terms.^
Nor will there be a syllogism when both premisses
are taken as affirmative. The proof of this also is
the same as before."
When, however, both premisses are negative, and
that which has the non-attributive sense is universal
and apodeictic, although there will be no necessary
conclusion from the assumptions as they are, when
the problematic premiss is converted there will be a
syllogism, as before.
If, however, both premisses are assumed as indefinite or particular, there will be no syllogism. The
proof is the same as before, and is effected by means
of the same terms.
General
Thus it- is evident from the forec^oinff analysis deductions.
...
,
1
(a) that when the negative universal premiss is taken
as apodeictic a syllogism always results, giving not
only a conclusion of the negative problematic type
but also one of the negative assertoric type,^ but
when the affirmative universal premiss is so taken
a syllogism never results ; (b) that a syllogism results
or does not result from the same arrangement of
'^

...

terms in apodeictic as in assertoric propositions.

It

obvious also that all these syllogisms are imperfect,

and that they are completed by means of the figures ^
already mentioned.

is

305

ARISTOTLE
XX. *Ev hi rqt rtXevToua ax^fion ral dlft^ordpwv ii^yoyuivtov koX Tm ertpaf 4<mu ouA*
OTov fikv oiv vh4x^aBaL arjfuuvoHnv
Xoyujfi6s.
ai irpoT64ii9, fcal r6 avfiir^paafia iarai h^^xpfivov' Kol OTOV ij fihf M4xo^ ^ 5* ^mp)^cv.
orcLv 8* ij fr/pa tc^ dvaycaJa, iop fih J iraTa^Tuc/j, ovK laroA r^ avuir^paafui ovt ivay
10 KoZov ovB* vndpxov, iop 8
f ortprfruc^, roG fi^
V7rdpxiv tcnai avXXoyta^LOf, KoBdntp koI iv roi?
i

nportpov.

kqX hf TOVTOts 6fioiui to

Xfftrriov ok

npunov tvotxdfietftu, teal r6 A

TO B YTovTi r<ji r h^x^^*** imdpx^i. ircl
oi^ dvTiarp^i to ftaTo^TWC^
fUpovs to
''ExrraKrav

u KOi
3^

ivh^xoiT* Qv*
8^X*^<** TO 8^
10

MF

Ttvi t^ B
WOT t TO fihf A iravTt rtf) V A>r rivt rwv B, fai t^ A tu4 tw B /r-

irovTi T(p

r M/yrnu,

icol Tti

S^rroi* ytyi'CTai ydip t^ npumv ajAfUL. koI Ci

B
TO ftv A h^x^rai ^rjSvi rut V ^nipxtw t6
travTt Tw r, avdyKti to A tiv* tw d iMx!^o9ai
fxif vndpx^iv coroi yap iroAiv t6 TrpuVrov 0)^fia
8ia T^y dynarpo^irjs*
ci 5* dp^crrtpai artpnrfntcaX
r6ir}<ray, ^( avrunf fuv rtov tlXt^ynUvwv odc
ccrrcu
to dvayKotbv, dvriarpai^uTUfv hi rwv
7rpOTdawv ccrrcu ovAAoyio/xo^, KoOdirtp iv TOi^
frpoTcpov. & yap to A #cai to B T<p F ivhix^rai
/A17
vndpx^iVt idv fJLraXr)<^$fj to ivhix^oBai ftif
\mdpXWt ndXkv tarai to nparrov oxrjpuix hia rifs

tft

dvrurrpo^njs*
0

Ei 8* o fiv coTi #ra0oAov tcDv opcuv 6 h* iw fiip^t,

Tov avrov rpdmov ixdvrwv rcjv opurv ovntp hn
*

S06

/*^

cm.

cett.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xx

I.

XX. In the last figure when both premisses are

problematic, and also when only one is problematic,
there will be a syllogism. When both the premisses
have a problematic sense the conclusion will also
be problematic, and likewise when one premiss is
problematic and the other assertoric. When, however, the other premiss is apodeictic, if it is affirmative, the conclusion will be neither apodeictic nor
assertoric ; but if it is negative, there will be a
negative assertoric conclusion, as before.** In these
syllogisms also the sense of possibility in the conclusions must be understood in the same way as

Third

^^^
remarks.

'

before.^
First, then, let
let

both

and

the premisses be problematic, and

possibly apply to all C. Then

since the affirmative statement is convertible as

particular, and since B may apply to all C, C may
Thus if may apply to all C,
also apply to some B.
may also apply to some B ; for
and C to some B,
may apply to no
we get the first figure. And if
C, and B may apply to all C, it necessarily follows
may not apply to some B ; for again we shall
that
have the first figure by conversion. But supposing
that both premisses are assumed as negative, there

a. Both

problem-*
^jV^niversai
syllogisms.

be no necessary conclusion from the assumptions

but when the premisses are converted
for if both A
there will be a syllogism, as before
and B may not apply to C, if we substitute in each
case the expression may apply,' we shall have the
first figure again by conversion.
If one of the terms is universal and the other
particular, there will or will not be a syllogism with

will

as they stand,

Cf. 36 a 15, 38 a 24, b 26, 40.

33 b 30, 34 b 27, 35 b 32, 36 b 33.

307

(2)

Particu-

g^ms.

ARISTOTLE

^1

rod V7rap\iv /orat T koX o^k corai crvXXoytafi^.

MXaB(x} yap t6 fihf A nam rw P r^ 8^ B rvA
T<p r vndp)(iv' <TTai hrj rrdXiv r6 rrpunov a^fia
rfjs iv fUpi 7rpoTdG<jJS avrurrpa^Unns* tl yap
r6 A vavrl r<p F to 8^ F rivl tcov B, ri A rwi

w rwv B

BF

rtBtlf) to
vS<x*Ta4. Koi ci trpo^ T<ii'
ira^oAou, oKTairra;;. 6fu>iu>g 3c iccu ct to ficv
ortprjTucov tirj to 5^
Kara(f>aTU(6v' tarai yo/)

AF

BF

to trpunov <fX^pLa SiA r^? hmarpo^i

El 8* afi<^6rpai arpriTiKal rtBthfoav, rj juv
KaOoXov ij 8'
M^/>ct, 8i* avToii' /z^ Taii^ ctAi^ftp,vwv ovK larai GvXXoyiOfio^, avrurrpaJKiOmv V
iroAiv

KaOantp cV toij iTp6r.po.

'Otov hi afjuf>6Tpai oBiopurroi ^ fl^ t^P*^
Xq^a>atv ovk ccrrcu <7i;AAoyu7fiof icul yo^ trcu^i
ovayKT; to A tcJi B #cou ^ijScvi fMl^fiv.
o/xk
Tou 67rdpxiv ^tfioth-'-di^pumofXafKiv, row
imdpx^w lirrro^'ivSptMmtK XtvKov, fUa9 Xiuk6,
XXI. *Eav 8^ ij ficv vndpx^iv i) 8* ^vh^toBat
rwv npordatwv, r6 fi<v avfitr^paafia
ayjfialvj)
l^arai ori ci^^ctcu #c<u ovj^ oti vndpxi, ovAAoytofio; 8* cotcu tov avroi' rponov ixovrwv rCrv
opcjv ov KoX v rois 7rp6Tpov,
taruHjQV yap
arai,

10

15

irpanov Karrjyopucoi, Kal ro pikv A vavrX rtp F

^apx^rta to 8< B iravrl tvSex^oOw tmdpx^w.
dvTiarpaif>(VTo^ ovv tov BF r6 npunoy cotcu
o^^/xa, Kal to av/xntpaafia oti vb4xrai t6 A
Ttvi Toiv B iJ7rap;^civ otc yap i^ cripa rwv irpO"

r^i)

C/: 98

T^ Cdfn.

529 a .

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xx-xxi

I.

the same arrangement of terms as in assertoric

syllogisms." Let it be assumed that
may apply
to all C, and B to some C. Then by the conversion
of the particular premiss we shall again have the
for if A may apply to all C, and C to
first figure
some B, then A may apply to some B. The same
will be true if the universal statement relates to the
premiss BC. Similarly also if the premiss AC is
for conversion will
negative and BC affirmative
again give us the first figure.
If both premisses are assumed as negative, the
one universal and the other particular, there will be
no conclusion from the assumptions as they stand,
but on their conversion we shall have a syllogism,

as before.

When, however, both premisses

are taken as
be no syllogism
for A necessarily applies both to none and to all of
B.^ Examples of terms where the predicate applies
to the subject are animal man white
where it
indefinite or particular, there will

does not apply, horse man white. White is the

middle term.
XXI. If one of the premisses has an assertoric b. One
and the other a problematic sense, the conclusion aM onT^
will be problematic, not assertoric, and a syllogism problematic
will result from the same arrangement of terms as [i^Both
in the previous examples.^
First let the terms be premisses
Universal.
A
^^
n
n
o
positive
let A apply to all C, and let B possibly
apply to all C. Then the conversion of the premiss
BC will give us the first figure, and the conclusion
that A may apply to some B
for we have seen ^

r-i

* i.e. terms can be found (as in the

to exhibit both these relations.
In ch. XX.
:

examples which follow)

*

33 b 25-40.

309

ARISTOTLE
rdatcav iv rtft npantft a^tfr^/iari arifiaiyoi ^rSc^^aBu, KoX TO avfintpaafia i^v 4tSY6fiVQ,
6iioUis
hi KoX 1 TO ^Uv Br xmaoxw ro
oBaX, Kol l TO flkv
OTtpTfTUC^ t6 hk BP
Karqyopucov, vndp^pi S* anoTpovouVf d/i^orcpcu;
ivhx6fiVOV tarax to avfintpaofui' yiyvtrai yap
art rik
to wdkw TO irpunov a}njfui, ScBcucroi o
h'ipas vpcmiatoK tMxtoBai arjiuuvovafjs i^
Ci
ouVr<p iroi to ovfin^paofAa ioTox /yocyofuvov.
hk TO [^vSc^^/iCHOI^]' OTtfr/JfruCOV Ttd^ilJ wpoi TO
tXarrov axpov ^ iroi a^i^ XtM^irj aTpnfrucd,
Si* avTW fuy Twv KttfUvojv ovK coTcu nfXXoyurii6s,
u dvTurrpa^kdvTtJV 5* c<rrcu, KoBdiup iv Tor wpdrpo,

U KT M^-

AV

Ei

O*

^V KoBoXoV TWV TTpOTOatCJV

17

lj

fupi, KaTTfyopucufv ftiv o^otav dfn^or^patr tj Trjg

fikv KaB6\ov oTtpffjTucfii TTJii S* /r fufpci tcarw^

^TiK^,
0

TTovrcy

coOTC

ouMf Tp6nos

ioToi

tC^ avXXoytafuii^

y^

ittpaivovTOi Sia roO rrpwrov <rx^fiaTO^

^avtpov ori roi; M^&$ai Koi od toO

vndpxeiv <rrcu o* ovAAoyuifu^;.

c^ 8* ij ft^
KaTOMTuct) KaOoXov i) 5^ OTc/nTTur^
f'^P*^*
rov aSuvarov coroi 17 diroScc^tf.
vnapxTw yap
TO fJLv B navTi Toi r, TO 8< A MXo6cj Toa Tiy
r /X17 vndpxiv' avdyKfj &17 to A vh4x^^*'^ ^^
Tip B fci7 tmdpxiv.
1 ydp iroin'i t^ B to A

V7Tdpxi i^ dvayKT^s to 8i
V7rdp;^iv,

TO

trovrt Ta>

B irorri to) F iccitoa

F ^^ dvayto)^ virdp^i

(tovto yap S^ctirrai frportpov)' oAA* \m4KiTO TUi

vhX<70ai pri
40 a

'Otov

3*

{mdpx^w.

aSiopioTOi -^ cv ficpci XrfiffdaHJW ofi<f>6Tpai, OVK iarax avXKoyiapuos.

dtroScifty S* 1}

810

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxi

that when one of the premisses in the first figure

has a problematic sense, the conclusion is also problematic. Similarly too if BC is assertoric and
AC problematic ; or if AC is negative and BC
in both cases
afiirmative, and either is assertoric
the conclusion will be problematic, for again we get
the first figure, and it has been shown that in it when
one of the premisses is problematic in sense the
conclusion will also be problematic. If, however,
the negative problematic statement is attached to
the minor term, or if both statements are taken as
negative, no syllogism will result from the assumptions as they stand, but on their conversion there will
be a syllogism, as before.
If one of the premisses is universal and the other (2) One
particular, when both are affirmative, or when the particular
universal is negative and the particular affirmative,
the syllogisms will be effected in the same way ; for
all the conclusions are reached by means of the first
Hence it is evident that the conclusion will
figure.
be problematic, not assertoric. If, however, the
affirmative premiss is universal and the negative
Let B
particular, the proof will be per impossibile.
apply to all C, and let A possibly not apply to some C.
Then it necessarily follows that A may not apply to
some B. For if A necessarily applies to all B, and
B is still assumed to apply to all C, A will necessarily
for this has been proved already."
apply to all C
But it was assumed that it may not apply to some.
When both premisses are taken as indefinite or
The proof
particular, there will be no syllogism.
:

om.
*

30 a 15-23.

n, comm., Waitz.
om. AC Bekker.

311

ARISTOTLE
aurfj

teal

OpOtV,

'!

'

XXII. E^

ft

10

iv Tocf koBoXov, koa hta ro auraif

iar\ 17 ft^ orayira/a rCtv npard'

^i^YOu'i^, K'aT'T^pcxttfv fi^ Strrtjav rwr
opcov acl roO cm^ccT^ai ecrreu ouAAoytofi^, orov
S 2J ro fxv Karriyopucov to h artfprjprueiv, iav fUp
^ TO Karat^TiKov dvaytcatoVt toO Mix^oBai fti^
vndpxiv, <dv 8c t6 aTfpy}[Tuc6v, koX tov iMx^adm
vwdpxiv KOi TQV fth intapxtuf rod o i(
fxrj
ovayKijf uf) uTTopx^iy ovk tarai avXXoyiafiofp
(recoil

ft'

S*

wtmtp

ovo* v Tolg ctc/xm; a;(i7f&a9iv.

"EtOTUHJOM 817 Kann/ofHiCOi vparro ol opM,

1&

TO

p.v

Sf

teol

unapx*Tiu <f <miyici|( t6

irrti
[nji r]* norri ivbtytoBw vn6pxiv
Trai^i rai

oSv TO fiiv A voirri Tip V ayaycii, to &( F Turl ry

B ^V^^CTOi, ICCU TO A TCM TO* B Mx6flVO
MOTOi Kol ovx irrapxp^' ovrtu yap oiWir t v hA
rod irpcoTov frxjwartig.
ofioitja^ 5^ ^tx^rfatTot
Koi l TO fUv dV rt$irj dvayKaxov t6
AP

iv^XOflVOV.
TloAii' corco t6 pkv KaTTjyopucov to 5^ OTtpn^

TiKov, dvayKoZov 5c to KarrfyoDucov, koX to putp

10

ivh^xioBo}

p,7j^Vi

Tcui^

vndpxiv to 8c

frayrX vnapx^TO) cf <mi/#ci};. coroi 8n TroAiv to

vpdnov ax^fui, #ccu [yap]* 1} oTCpi^Tuoj nptrram^

v84x^o9ajL <rqfuuvi' tfxiv^pov ovv

(rru vBx6fJLvov oTC

Taact? cV T<p irpwTtp axrjfiaTi,

ii ijv

#ccu

oi trpo^

to avfiwpaapa

cvScxofzcvof.

Et

8*

i}
*

TcSi'J

818

6m to avfintpaapa

yap avnos cxoicv

ra>

<rrpT]TiK7f TrpoToot; cmiyicaia,

r onu BCdfu X habcnt

T^ Cmii.

post

to ovft*

trarri nra.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxi-xxii

the same as in the case of universal syllogisms,*

and is obtained by means of the same terms.
XXII. If one of the premisses is apodeictic and the
other problematic, when the terms are positive the
conclusion will always be problematic
but when
one is positive and the other negative, if the affirmative statement is apodeictic, the conclusion will be
negative and problematic, but if the negative statement is apodeictic the conclusion will be negative
problematic and negative assertoric ^
there will
be no negative apodeictic conclusion, just as there
was none in the other figures.
Thus let the terms first be positive, and let A
necessarily apply to all C, and B possibly apply to
Then since A must apply to all C, and C may
all C.
A
-n
11
apply to some U, A will also apply, in a problematic
and not in an assertoric sense, to some B
for we
have seen " that this is the consequence in the first
figure.
The proof will be similar also if the premiss
BC be assumed as apodeictic and AC as problematic.
Next, let one statement be affirmative and the
other negative, the affirmative being apodeictic and
let A possibly apply to no C, and B necessarily apply
to all C. Then we shall again have the first figure
and the negative premiss has the problematic sense.
Thus it is evident that the conclusion will be problematic for we saw ^ that when the premisses are
is

c.

One

and^on?
problematic

DF6II11SS

-r

(i)

Both

SSveSaf.
^"^ ^9^^
premisses
affirmative.

in this relation in the

also problematic.
If,
"

first

figure the conclusion is

however, the negative premiss

is

apodeictic,

No such proof appears in the passage indicated (39 b 6-25),

but the reference there (11. 9-10) to the terms of the preceding
chapter shows that Aristotle had in mind the section 39 b 2-6.
* C/. 40 a 30-32 infra,
35 b 3836 a 1.
36 a 17-25.
L
313

W One
a..d^ne^^^

"Jf^j^

ARISTOTLE
ndpofffia aTtu teal on Mtxtnu run /i^ vwdpxtut
Koi ori
rw F ^17
K^laBta yap ro
{miipxfi.

o^

u>

imdpyiv i( opdyicri^, r6 S^ B irarri Mfytotfoi.

dvTiorpaif>dyTo^ o{^ roO BF Hora^arueoO t6 npi^
rov OTai (Txfjfui, fcal dyaytcma ij OTepi/ruc^ irp6*
raai9. St o ovtco^ ttYov al trporrAati^, owipiupt
r6 \ rui T ical h^xiavcu rwl firi \mdp')(iv koI fn
vndpxfw, oxrr Kai t^ A t^ B dvaytcrj rivl fiv
OTOV 5^ TO arnrjruc6v rt&n npo^ t>
vndpxiv.
iXarrov djcpov, ioM iuv h>oxpfivov, corcu ctuAXoyiapo^ p.ra\r)<f>0iarK rifi irporrdatw^, KoBdntp
fV rot 9 vpOTtpov, coy 0* dvayKoiov, owe lanu' ircu
yap vayrl dvdymj Koi ot^^m hf^xtrai vndpx^w^
opoi rod vavrl inrdfrxtw tmvoi Imrog KaBvS<ai^^
dvOpitrnos, rov fUf)6vl vttvos itmos iypnrjyopatf-^
1

dvOparrro^.

40

rw

6pim
6 fuv KoBdXov
npos ro pdaov- Karrfyoput^iw pJtv yi^p
b ovrojp
dfi^ortpatv roO M^x^oBat K<d od roO
vndpx^tv <rrai crvXXovuTfio^ , teal &rap r6 pkv
Kara^rucdv, dyayKCuai^
arcprfTiKOv XT)<f>9n ro
8 TO Kara(f>ariKov. orov 5c to artprjrucov dvay'
KoXov, Kol ro Gvp.npaapa tarai rov pr) vnapYtiy
b d yap avros rpOTTO^ tarax rrk 3f i!f ceo; koI KaBoXav
Kal pT) KaddXou riov dputv ovroiv dvdyta^ yap hid
rov TTpwrov ax^paros tcAciovo^cu rous ouAXoyio/ious", tooTC Kaddncp v Kivoi9, Kai i-nl rovro^v
dvayKoXov avpirinriv,
orov & to artprjrucov
KadoXov Xrf<f>$v reOfj irpd^ ro iXarrov ojcpov, idv
'OfiouiM! Sc (41 f<u 1

^6

h* hf fi4pi

36 a 83, where see note.

example.

* Se. in the present

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxii

there will be not merely a negative particular problematic but a negative particular assertoric conclusion.
For let us assume that A necessarily does
not apply to C, and that B may apply to all C. Then
the conversion of the affirmative premiss BC will give
the first figure, and the negative premiss is apodeictic.
But we saw" that when the premisses are in this
relation it follows not merely that
may not apply
but that A does not apply to some C
and so it
must also follow ^ that A does not apply to some B.
When, however, the negative statement refers to
the minor term, if it is problematic there will be a
syllogism after substitution of the premiss,^ as before ;
but if the statement is apodeictic there will be no
syllogism ; for A both must apply to all B and must
apply to none. Terms to illustrate the former relation are sleep sleeping horse man ; to illustrate
the latter, sleep waking horse man.
The same principle will also apply if one of the (2) One
(extreme) terms is in a universal and the other in a parScSar.
particular relation to the middle term.
If both statements are affirmative the conclusion will be problematic and not assertoric ; and also when one is taken
as negative and the other as affirmative, the latter
being apodeictic. When, however, the negative statement is apodeictic, the conclusion will be negative
and assertoric ; for the proof will take the same form
whether the terms are universal or not, because the
syllogisms must be completed by means of the first
figure, and so the result must be the same in these
as in the former examples.**
When, however, the
negative statement, taken as universal, refers to the

''^

"

^6

ue, the corresponding affirmative premiss.

d
C/. 40 a 25.

315

ARISTOTLE
10

fihf

hf^x6nvov,

dyrurrpo^ij^, iop
)($rj<jr<u

r^

avWoyuffto^ Sea
dvayKoXov, ovk tarat,

Itrroi
8*

S-

5< rov avrov TpOTrov ov koX hf toI^ tcoB^

oXov, Kcu Bia rutv axnutv opwv,

^avp6v
ira>;

icai

o(iv

Kol v TovTi^ r<p ax^fuiTi nort

^oTOi <n;AAoyio/i<^,

wore toO vndpxiv,

drcAci9, teal

an

teal irorrt

icfu

rov ci^j(ca^a4

BrjXov hi teal art navrtf

rcAcioOvroi

5i<L

tov

npanw

ox*?*

/iaro9.

XXIII.

Qn

ovXXoynofiol

axi^fian
to

/i^

o^

04 iv Tovroc? TOcy

rcAciotVrcu Sia

rail'

koBoXov crvXXoytafiwy Kal

dydyovrai, BrjXov ck rdty tipnfjfUvwv

ira9 avAAoyu7/i09

otmnf

cfci,

vw

ax^fiam

r^)
tls

on

nparrtft

rovrovi
5*

anXuts

iarai ^avtpow,

orav Bix&fj fTos ytyyofitvoi 8ta roihtav tiv^ roir

'Avoyioy 8^ irooav aTroSct^iv

t5

*fal

frovra crwA-

6wdpxov rt rj fiij imapxpv S^urvwcu, kcU

TouTO ^ KaOoXov ^ icard fipo^, frt ^ Scurruroi; ^
cf \mod0<M}S' rod S' cf vnoStatws fupos to 8*d
ToiJ d^vmrou.
npanov ow i'n<tfi4v 7Tpi rdtv
Scurrucdiv* Tovraiv yap hi\Bvrojiv <l>avp6v arai
tcai irt rtav tls ro dBwarop teaX oXcof rwv if

XoyiOfJLOv

fj

VTTodeaccj^.
to

Et
Scot TO A #caTd Tou B avXXoYurauBajL rj
vndpxov rj firi vTrdpxov, dvaytcq Xafieiv ri icard
rivos. t fXv o^ ro A Kara rod B Xrjif>$irj, ro cf
dpxrjs arax iXT)fifjLvov. ct 5^ Kara rou F, ro hi
S16

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxii-xxiii

if it is problematic, there will be a

by conversion but if it is apodeictic, there
The proof will be effected in the
will be no syllogism.
same way as in the universal syllogisms, and by means
of the same terms.
Thus it is evident, in this figure also, when and in
what circumstances there will be a syllogism, and
when this will be problematic and when assertoric.

minor term,
syllogism

It is also clear that the syllogisms are all imperfect,

and that they are completed by means of the

first

figure.

XXIII. It is evident, then, from the foregoing

analysis that the syllogisms in this figure are completed by means of the universal syllogisms in the
This holds
first figure, and are reducible to them.
good of every syllogism without exception, as will at
once be evident when it has been shown that every
syllogism is effected by means of one of these figures.
Now every demonstration and every syllogism must
prove that some attribute does or does not apply to
some subject, and that either universally or in a particular sense.
Further, the proof must be either
1

All syiio-

fff^tedTby
the three

Ostensive
And DVPO*
theticai
Proofs.

ostensive or hypothetical.
One kind of hypothetical
proof is proof per impossihile. First, then, let us deal
for when we have shown the
with ostensive proofs
conditions which govern these, the facts will also be
made clear with regard to proofs by reduction ad
impossihile and to hypothetical proofs in general.
Supposing, then, that it is required to draw an Ostensive
inference that the predicate A applies or does not Requires
apply to the subject B, we must assume some predica- premisses.
tion of some subject.
Now if we assume that A is
predicated of B, we shall have a petitio principii. If
we assume that A is predicated of C, but C is predi;

317

ARISTOTLE
40b

r Ktxrd /XT7SCVO9, fj^* oAAo irar* iKtlvov, ftyfi^

Kara rod A mpov, ovS^U torou avXXoyurfi6s' rt^
yip tv Koff ivoq

o^Sh^ avfifialptt i(

Xrf^$fjvai

dvdyKTjs' vj<jT npoaXrprrtov koI r4pav np^raatv.

*ay fUv oiV

A,

#rard rot?

Aoyia/iOF ovShf
40

coTcu Sia rav

r6

Xrfif>$fj

Kara roO

rj

KcoAuci,

ovS* orov t^
fnfj

oAco;

ya/>

ori

iTTOfiv

$rfYopiais'

rdatwv

fiiv

tariv,

fiif

Xrj^^rros
Totff icar*

yap

rvXXoyujfios anXats ^k npo*

6 8^ npo^ r6S ovAAoyuTfi^ ^k r&if

rovS irpos r6^

ainov
10

Aa^('
p/rfT

firjhiv

ov^vort

np6^ Kdrpov ^ct iwuy

npos roSt 7rpaTdawv, 6

TO

rr4p<p,

B avXXoyf

oiStlf

eoTcu ovAAoycoftof aXXov Kar* aXXov

Ttvoy fUaov,

irwdnrji S^

vpo^ r6 B, ovS* ovrw^ tarai npo^ r6

Ofia;.*

<AAo

B mW

vpo; fUvroi t6

ttXrjfifititjjv.

aXXtf), koI rovro Irtpip,

41 AraKcttx>

Kar* <{AAov

frcpov, ctitu fi^ owA-

hi.

rouSe vpos ro^t 81a raw

rrpordotijafv,

nporaaiv

firjSiv

dnapvovpevovs ,

rf

oStWror 8c

np6i9

fiyr Karrjyopouvra^
'naXiv

rod

npof to

Koivov XafipdvovTra^ dXX* iKaripov 28ia

arra KarTjyopovvras ^ ajrapvovfUyovs' war AiyirfJLaov dfx<f>oTv, o <nn'difti rd^ Karrfyopla^f

Tcov Ti

i7Tp <rrai
^

S18

rovS irpos

rd^

av^Xoyiafidf,

avXXoytafi6i] ovXXoyurfi6f ntO

Bfii.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxiii

cated of nothing, and no other term is predicated of

C, and nothing else is predicated of A, there will be
no syllogism
for no necessary conclusion follows
from the assumption that one term is predicated of
one other term. Hence we must also assume another
;

premiss.

Now if we assume that A is predicated of another Need for

term, or another term of A, or some other term of C, Srm.^
there is nothing to prevent a syllogism
but if it
proceeds from these assumptions it will have no
reference to B.
Again, when C is connected to
another term, and this to another, and this to yet
another, and the series is not connected with B, in
this case too we shall have no syllogism -with reference
to B.
For we have stated " the general principle that
we shall never have any syllogism proving that one
term is predicated of another unless some middle
term is assumed which is related in some way by
predication to each of the other two
for the syllogism in general proceeds from premisses, and the
syllogism relating to a given term proceeds from
premisses relating to that term, and the syllogism
proving the relation of one term to another is obtained
by means of premisses which state the relation of one
to the other.
But it is impossible to obtain a premiss
relating to B if we neither assert nor deny anything
of B
or again one which states the relation of A to B
if we cannot find something common to both, but
;

merely assert or deny certain attributes peculiar to

each.
Therefore we must take some middle term
relating to both, which will link the predications
together, if there is to be a syllogism proving the
relation of one term to the other.

25 b 32.

319

ARISTOTLE
8'

TOVTO

u t6 r

rod

^ a/x^
axrjfJMTa,

M^x^rat rpiyw^

#f

(^

aTT/yop^oavros',

y^

A
#f

#rard Toi? F)* 'roOra 8* iari

^vpov on

roH

koX

or' ofx^oiv,

tA

tlfn^iUva

iravra avXXoytafiw avayfn|

yiyvco^cu 5ia rovrwv rwo^ rutv

so

r6

^ ro F

6 yap

axflfjuxratv.

a&ros X6yo9 ttal *i 5ia vXn6vwv awdirroi vp69

TO B* ravT6 ycip arcu o^^^ kcu inl t& woAAtor.
*Ort fihf o^ ol ScurriKOi Trd^rr? mpabmmoA 8c^
ra)v 7rpOifyqfi4vwv ox^fuiratv,

^ai^p6v

on

S^

ircU

TO dStWroi', 8^Aoi/ coTOi Bia tovtow. wavrtt

yap ol 5ia tou dBwdrov irtpalvovrt^ to /uv i/kvSos
ovXXoyifovrcu, t6 8' ^f <''f'X4^ ^f inodtatut^ 8c*Oi is

#fVtAOtWIV,

OTCIV oSin^Tc^ir

^dacj^ rtOtiarif, olov

Sta TO yiyvtoBox to

&n

Tl

Tfjt

OVflfiaiVJ)

daiSfifLrrpof

ircptTTo

ioa

i)

OITi-

^uifLtrpos

Toty

<^>ruM(

to fUv oi^ 2aa yiyvtoBai ra

ntpirra Tot; dprlois avXXoy i^ovrai, r6 h* cUru/xfurpov cfvoi T17V hiap,Tpov cf \mo0iatu>^ 5curvv*
avfifJLcrpov tc^cuti};.

0 oiKTtv,

^1

tlfvSo^

avfipaivti hia rrpf

avri^aw*

TOVTO yap ^v to hia tou a&waTOv fTvXXoyiaxiadai,

TO S^tfoi Tl oSiWto*' Sea rfiv cf af>X^ un6d'
aw, oHST litfx Tov ^IkvSov^ yiyvtTai avXXoytafios
B^iKTUco^ V Tols 19 TO oSuvaTov anayofUvoif , t6
6 8' cf c^X^S" cf vnoBa<i}9 Scufwrcu, tows' 8^ 8KTucovs 'np6rpov vnoyLv on 8ia tovtojv ircpcuvovrou TcDv oj^rffiaTcav, ^Vp6v on koX ol hia toQ

For the proof see Euclid,

and Menge).

820

EUnunU,

x.

app. 97 (Heiberg

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxiii

Since, then, we must take some common term which The differrelated to both, and this may be done in three ways, binaSs
of C and C of B, or C of both, of the
viz., by predicating
or both of C, and these are the figures already give the
described, it is evident that every syllogism must be ^^^^^^
effected by means of one of these figures ; for the
is connected
same principle will also hold good if
is

B by more than one term

the figure will be the

same also in the case of several terms.
It is evident, then, that ostensive proofs are
carried out by means of the figures already described.
That proofs by reduction ad impossibile are also carried
out by their means will be clearly shown by what
follows.
Everyone who carries out a proof per impossibile proves the false conclusion by syllogism and
demonstrates the point at issue ex hypothesi when an
impossible conclusion follows from the assumption of
the contradictory proposition. E.g., one proves that
the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the
sides by showing that if it is assumed to be commensurable, odd become equal to even numbers." Thus
he argues to the conclusion that odd becomes equal
to even, and proves ex hypothesi that the diagonal is
incommensurable, since the contradictory proposition
produces a false result. For we saw that to reach a
logical conclusion per impossibile is to prove some conclusion impossible on account of the original assumpTherefore since in reduction ad impossibile
tion.^
we obtain an ostensive syllogism of falsity (the point
at issue being proved ex hypothesi), and we have
stated above that ostensive syllogisms are effected by
means of these figures, it is evident that per impossi-

with

* i.e.

clusion

to
is

show that the contradictory of the required conincompatible with one of the original premisses.

l2

321

Procedure
JJ[^JJi
proof.

ARISTOTLE
dSiWrou

avXXoyiafjtol

(rxfifidriov,

vnoB^a(ja9'

rovTW Saorrai rtav

Sia

dtaavrw^ hk kqX oi aXXoi v^vrti ol i(

dwaat yap 6

/liv

avXXoytaiAOs yc-

^oyvcTcu npo^ to firoXmifiav6fJLVov , ro 5' i(

41 h

ofioXoyw

iTp<uytrai hi*

5^

ct

tout'

aXrjBis,

QvXXoyiafAov

hijXov
6

w^ anas

air6Si(a^ fcai

ylyvtaBax

ax^fiaTwv,

^XV

rtvo^ aXXffs vno$4aWt.

ndaav

avdytcrj

7rpOiprjfiPwv

rj

hia

rpuHtv

8^

rot^rtw

vdrra

rCw

hix04rrot

t< ovAAoyta/io; ^TrtrcActrai BiA toO

TTparrov (Tx^fAaTOf #cai aydyrrai f 4y roiW v roi^r^

ica^oAou ovAAoyta/ioiA;.

XXIV. 'Bri

T A* atmi^i Scl Kan/jyopuc^ rtmi

ruiv opojv c^mi #ceu to

roO KaBoXov ^
Kip.vov,
10 T17V

ri

oi)#(

KaBoXov undpx^iv dyv yap

iarai avXXoyujfio^

rj

TO cf opx^y oiTiJacTCU.

Kia6<A}

fiovaucqv rfhovrjv tvai airovhaiav.

o^uoaftcv i^Sot^c hax airovSaiav,

ov irpof to

Ci ficv

yap
odr

irpooBtis t6

p,'^

iraaav, ovk cotcu auAAoyia/xos* t &c two, rjSovriv,

t /LtV oAAt^V, 0|)5V 7r/>Off

TO tCtipCVOV,

1 8*

OVT^

Tairnyv, to cf dpxfJ9 XoLpfidvi.

MdAAov 8c ytyrcTOU ^vp6v Iv toIs hiaypap-paaw,

15

olov OTt TOU laOGK^XoVS toOl ol TTpOS TQ Pdatl,

eOTOJGOV 19 TO KVTpOV rjfypAvai <U

322

AB.

ow

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxiii-xxiv

syllogisms will also be obtained by means of these

The same is true of all other h)rpothetical
proofs ; for in every case the syllogism is effected with
reference to the substituted proposition, and the
required conclusion is reached by means of a conBut if this is All incession " or some other hypothesis.
true, every demonstration and every syllogism will be processes
effected by means of the three figures already de- ?re ^^^^^^
scribed ; and this being proved, it is obvious that syllogisms
every syllogism is completed by means of the first fj^^ ^^^^
figure, and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in
bile

figures.

this figure.

XXIV. Further, in every syllogism one of the in every

terms must be positive,^ and universality must be(r)aUeSt
involved.
Without universality either there will be ^^^ premiss
no syllogism, or the conclusion will be unrelated affirmative
to the assumption, or there will be petitio principii. one^premlss
Suppose that we have to prove that musical enjoy- ma>t be
commendable. Then if we postulate that
enjoyment is commendable, unless all is prefixed
If we
enjoyment,' there will be no syllogism.
to
postulate that some enjoyment is commendable, then
if it is a different enjoyment, there is no reference to
the original assumption
and if it is the same, there

ment

"^^^"^^

is

'

is

petitio principii.

The point can be seen more clearly in the case of Example

geometrical theorems.
E.g., take the proposition Geometry.
that the angles adjacent to the base of an isosceles
triangle are equal.
Let the Unes A and B be drawn
The

process referred to belongs rather to dialectic reasonOne's opponent is induced to concede that the proposition to be proved is true if some other proposition is true
the latter is then proved syllogistically.
* i.e. one of the premisses must be affirmative.
*

ing.

323

ARISTOTLE
Urrjv

r TJ A

tW

an

AV

ytaviav rg BA fi'ff 6Xu>f

taas T^y rotv i^fUKVKXiatv, Koi naXiv
/x^ ndaav npoaXafiwif rfjv to rfn^uarof,

XfifLpavoi rrpf

dfiuHW

r^

ujutv

ovawv rwv

to atfyrjpnrjfitywv ftray

thnu

tcai urwv
rdy EZ,* t^ i(
ano rwv tautv lawv

oXljv yutvujjv

raj" Aoitra;

dpxrjs curTjacroi, iav /ii7 ^ofijj

ura AciVcatfcu.

dnjiaipovfidvcjv

^hiVp6v ou oTi iv dirayrt 5<i ro tca66Xov uTrnp*

X^^t '^ ^^ "v^ M^ Koi^oAov i( awdyrtaw ruw opam

KaBoXov Scucwroi, to S*
f^P<^ '^^^ oimos- icd
Dceivoif, a><rr* cav /i^ ^ to avfiiripaaua fcaB6Xov,
Kai Tov^ opouf avdytcn KaSoXov h'ai, av 5* ol OfXH
kqJBoXov, fv^Ytnu ro avfirrtpaafia fitf ttvai koB*
6Xov. 5^Aov O^ teal oTi CI' dnavri avXXoYiafuv ij
dfi^OT^oas rj rrjv iripav nporaaiv Ofioiay avavfCfj
Xiy<a 8* 06 ftivov
ylyvtavfu T<j) av^trtpdaftan.
GTprqTucjv,
tvai
rj
dXXd koI rtp
T<p Kara^Tucqv
iiri'
dvayKolay ^ xmdpxpvaav ri iv^)(pfA/hmv.

tt

ao

oMas Korqyopuis.
^Hivp6v hk Kol dnXujs iroT* corcu koI v&r* ovk

QKoj/aaBau, hk Set koX rdq

TAcEZ]racp<kToiyEZn: T^ j^d't acd. W>it.

* Aristotle

seems to imply the

are radii of a dncle

88i

fiirure irivea

hoe.

A and B

the c^rd which Joiat tlim lomt the

base, as thry form the oqnal aidcB, of
an iso&ccles triangle. K and P are
the angles (between the mlU and the
chord) at the baae of this triable.
AC and BD are the angles formed
by A and B with the drciunfereaoe
(not with the base, as in the Oxfbid
translation), or rather with the tanruts to the drcumfereoce similarly
are the angles formed by
and
the chord with the drcnmliereDoe. This

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxiv

to the centre." Then if you assume that Z AC = ZBD

without postulating generally that the angles of semicircles are equal, and again if you assume that
without also assuming that all angles of
ZC =
the same segment are equal, and further if you
assume that when equal angles are subtracted
from the whole angles the remaining angles E
and F are equal, unless you assume (the general
principle) that when equals are subtracted from
equals the remainders are equal, you will be guilty

ZD

of petitio

prtjicipii.

Thus it is evident that in every syllogism universality must be involved, and that a universal conclusion can only be proved when all the terms are
universal, whereas a particular conclusion can be
proved whether the terms are or are not all universal
so that if the conclusion is universal, the terms must
also be universal, but if the terms are universal the
It is clear also
conclusion may not be universal.
that in every syllogism one or both of the preI do not
misses must be similar to the conclusion
mean merely in being affirmative or negative, but
;

in being apodeictic or assertoric or problematic.''

must also take into account the other forms of

We

predication.*'
It is,

however, evident both generally when there

angles of semicircles or ' of

all the commentators and
Waitz's interpre16. 31.
is supported by Euclid III.
tation, involving the excision of ras EZ in 1. 20, is less

interpretation of the phrase

the same segment' is given

'

'

by

satisfactory.
" This is inconsistent with the view, stated in 38 a 15-25,
that an assertoric conclusion may be drawn from one apodeictic and one problematic premiss.
" i.e. any other form of predication which appears in the
conclusion must also appear in at least one premiss.

325

(3)

At

least

must'S^or
^^^*"'
j^

conclusion.

ARISTOTLE
II

S6

earoi avXXoytafiS^, Koi w6ir hwar^ irai fit^rc

r/^tos", Kox art ovAAoytaftou oKroy ovayitalov ^0^
Touy opov9 Kara riva rutv iprjf.i4vwv rpSmutv.
XXV. A^AoF hk KOX om ndaa dn^tfif <mu
hia Tpiwv opoiv KoX ov nXi6vo}V, iav firj St.* dXXtav
Kol aXXujv TO auTo avfxntpaafia yiyvrfTQA, olov r6 E
koX
htd, Tc rcov
kqX 5ca rw FA, ^ hia rw

AB

40

A r*

KOX

HP

4t cfveu KOiAtAfi),

AB

yap fitaa rwv aiMir tMh^

Tovraiv 5' oprtuv ot^ tig dXM irActov?
(irXiUo

ciatv oi avXXoytofxoi'

ri

vraXiv

orov ^ledrtpov rtav

AB Sea (7vAAoyu7/ioi; Ar;^^ (otoi' rd A Sc^ rtjn^

AE K"a2 TToAii' t6 B 8ia TcDi' Z0), ^ t6 fih^ hrayury^,
TO & av^Xoyiayup.
A

ciAAa

ifol

oirrcoy

irAc/ovf 04

av^Xoyiapoi' TrActoi ya/> rd avfintpdapxiTa iariVt

otov TO TC
KCU TO B KU TO F. Ci 5* Ol^ fl^
nXftovg oAA* 1:?, ovTw fiiv ^vSc^ctcu ycWo^oi 5id
TrActOMoi' t3 atVrd avfintpaapa, co^ 5^ to F Sid
rwv AB dSwaTor. corco yap to E oviintTTtpa"
ap.vov K Twv ABFA.
ovKOVv dydytcTj rt avrcav
oAAo Trios' oAAo ctA^^oi, TO fih^ wg oXov ri 5* cos
p.4po^' rovro yap S^ucrat 7rp6rrpov, on ovrof
(wXXoyiafioO dvayKoZov ovrcos rtvag ^X'^^ ''
OpCJV.
OVTtOS fTpOS TO B.
tOTW
i'XVTiti OVV TO

10

avTwv ovfnrtpaafia. ovkovv rjroi t6 E

rj TtDv FA ddrtpop fj dXXo ti napd ravra.
koI ci
flV TO E, K TWV AB fJLOPOV OV Cil^ 6 OvXXoyUJfJLOi
apa

15

Ti cf

tnl

AF

supra lineam add,

Bn

onu A.

C/.

28*

<*..

as an immediate conclusion from two ftimple

40 b 30.

826

16,

note
pr<-

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxiv-xxv

will and when there will not be a syllogism, and when

the syllogism will be valid " and when perfect
and
that if there is a syllogism the terms must be related
in one of the ways already described.
XXV. It is clear also that every demonstration will
be effected by means of three terms and no more
unless the same conclusion is reached by means of
different combinations of terms
e.g., if E is conand B and from
cluded both from the propositions
the propositions C and D, or from
and B, A and C,
and B and C (for there is no reason why there should
not be more than one middle between the same terms),
but in this case there is not one syllogism but several
and B is
or again when each of the propositions
and E,
obtained by syllogism {e.g., A by means of
and B by means of F and G), or one by induction and
the other by syllogism
but here again there will be
several syllogisms, since there are several conclusions,
viz.. A, B and C.
If it be granted that these are not
several syllogisms but only one, then the same conclusion can be reached by more than three terms in
this way
but it cannot be reached as C is by means
of A and B.^ For let E be the conclusion reached
by means of the premisses A, B, C and D. Then
some one of these must have been assumed to be
for it has
related to some other as whole to part
already been shown that where there is a syllogism
Let A,
certain of the terms must be so related.'^
then, be so related to B. Then there is some coneither (1) E, or (2) one
clusion from these premisses
of the propositions C and D, or something else apart
from these. (1) If it is E, the syllogism could be
;

A
A

*'

^ Sc. and therefore the premisses

relation.

must exhibit a similar

327

Three term;

^^quired foi
^.emoustra-

ARISTOTLE
Us

FA

rd 8^

oAov TO
rjToi
10

fifpo^,

cus*

r6

&ar

l fihf Xi ovru>s

8*

rj

rwv

Harm

AB

Bdrtpov ^ oXAo rt irapcL

rj raiv AB Sartpov,
^

to

radra,

tcax

irAU>V9

aovTtu oi avX^oytafiol,

rat^o Sta
5*

oAAo

ouAAoyur/tol np6s aXXrjXavf.

^;^ T^ r

r6

tr/>^

^S/;(rro

Kpwl$ijJ9

Elh* ^K

ratv

AB

fi^

firj

rwv rxHOvrwv

rtvos aXXov

rj

ooi^

mI Si

fti^

froutv cniA-

c5<yr

Xoytofiov, fidrrjv tarai ttXrjfxfuva, i

rj

cuf

opcuv ntpaivtaOai ov/i/So/vci* cZ

frAciovciiv

r iropd raOra, 9rAcu>u( cooi^nu koI

airroi Oi

otmi>9

l fiy

t^ /i^ c^

clvoi

rt koI ii iKtlvutv, kqX

hrayurytji
x^^^P**^*

r6E oAA' oXAo n y/yvrctt

FA ^ roirrcuv Odrtpoif ^

ix 8i rwv

ovfiir^f>aafia,

dAAo nofxi raOra, nXtiovs r Oi ovAAoyoa/iOi ytyvoi^

ircu ou rou vrroKifUvov vn^Ktiro yap c&oi Toii

roi

rov avAAoyioj^v.

ci 8i

firfihf uvfiir^pacfia, fidrrjv

0

/ii7

^^

'"'''

TA

avfi'-

rov ( dpx^s ttvai rov avXXoytafiov*

war <f>avp6v ori ndaa dnoStifis >cal nas ovX*

patvi kqI

firi

AoyuT/iof coTCu 8ia rptwv

8*

TovTov

opwv

7r/)OTaay), ci

fir)

49 a

6.

{ol

yap

W9

koI iK Bvo

rpci? opoi Bvo

npooXafiPdvotro, HaBd'np v rot^

cf dpxfjs iX^xOrjt npog

XoyuTfjLwv,

fiovov,

ovTos ^avtpov, hijXov

irpordatwv koI ov nXtiovwv

36

y^Y*'^^^'^

tc ttXrj^ai avra

<l>avp6v

T17V

odv cu;

U. by

rwv avXXoyw owAAoyi-

rcAcuuaiv
ci'

a>

conversion

84 b 23.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
drawn from

A and B

alone.

I.

xxv

And (i.) if C and

are

be some
either (a) E or one of the
conclusion from these too
propositions A and B or (h) something else apart
from these, (a) If it is E or one of the propositions
A and B, either there will be more than one syllogism,
or it follows that the same conclusion is reached byseveral terms in the way which we saw" to be possible.
(6) If, however, the conclusion is something
else apart from these, there will be several syllogisms
which are unconnected with one another, (ii.) If, on
the other hand, C is not related to D in such a way
as to produce a conclusion, they will have been
assumed to no purpose, unless with a view to induction or obscuring the argument or some other such

in the relation of

whole to part, there

will

object.

Again, (2) if the conclusion drawn from A and B

not E but something else, and (i.) the conclusion
from C and D is either one of the propositions A and
B or something else apart from them, more than one
syllogism results, and these syllogisms do not prove
for it was assumed that the
the required conclusion
syllogism proved E. And (ii.) if no conclusion follows
from C and D, it follows that these propositions were
assumed to no purpose, and that the syllogism does
not prove the original assumption. Hence it is
evident that every demonstration and every syllogism will be effected by means of three terms only.
This being evident, it is clear also that every Every syiic
syllogism proceeds from two premisses and no more ceeds from
unless ^sg^Jonw
(for the three terms form two premisses)
some further assumption be made, as we said at the
beginning, in order to complete the syllogisms.^
Thus it is evident that if in any syllogistic argument
is

329

ARISTOTLE
fifl aprtai law eu nponiattf Si* Af yfyi^mu
t6 ar)^7T^paafjLa to kv/hov {ana /df> rtm^ oPutBtv
avfJLnpaafuiT<jjv avayKoZov tyai npoTdaii), odrof
6 X&yos rj ov ovAAcAoyurrou rj nXtiui rwv hrayKoiuiV

(TTiKt^

ttk

Kara fuv oSv ras tcvpias Trpordatis Aofi/SayofjJvwv rcjv ovXXoyiayMiv, dira^ i<rrai avXXoytafi^
K TTporraatiuv fiiv aprrUov if opatv Si ittpirrutv hn
yap nXfiovs ol opoi, rutv npordatwv. corcu bi Kol
rd cfVfinpdafiara rifuarj rCw itporaatittv, orav 84
hia npoavXXoyuTfjuuv ntpaiyrpai ^ h*a nXuovwv
ota rta FA), to
fiiawv [/ii^j* awfyow (olov ro

AB

rwv opcav waavrupf 4vi 67rtp4(ti rcLff

(^ yap cfcu^rv rj V to ^oor rtSi^amu

fihf nXijSof

Trpordattf
^^

6 7rapp.'ni7rrojv opof, dftSoTtpiog 5< avfifiai^ti

iXdrru} cf^tu Ta 8ia<mj/iaTa rutv opuw, ai 5<
rrpordatis loai roiy Sta<mJ/i<unv), oO alvTOi ict a/
/iv dpTiai eooiTxu ot 8^ ttc/htto/, oAA* ivaXXdf,
oral' /xv eu Trpordati^ dpriai, wtpirroi Oi opoc, ^rov
S* Oi opoi dpTUH, TrrpcTTOi cu irpoToatis {dfia

y^

>&

r<p op<f> fjua vpoarWcTOi irporaais, dv OTrodevow

irpooreBjj 6 opos), dxjr CTrct cu ^uv dpruu ol bi

irapaXXdrreiv rrjs avrfj^

Ta hk avfinpdafiaTa
ovKtri rrfv avrfiv cfci rd(iv ovt npos iWff dpovf
ovT npo^ Tay npordati^' v6i yap opov npoanBt^
iXdrrw
ficvou avfincpdcrfxara npoartStfarrai
TTcpiTTot

dvdyKT)

^aaif,

npoaO(<To>s

yiyvoyJvnqs

'

^rojv npoVnapxovToiv optav

*

^1^ ova. n,

*
* Sc. in

SSO

As

Trpoy

ftdvov

secL Waits.

in sorites.

the simple

syllo^n.

yap t6v

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxv

the premisses by which the conclusion proper is

(I say
proper because some of the earlier
conclusions must necessarily be premisses) are not
even in number, then this argument either has not
been proved syllogistically or has postulated more
premisses than are necessary for proving the hypo-

raached

'

'

thesis.

Thus if syllogisms are considered with respect to

their premisses properly so called, every syllogism
will consist of an even number of premisses and an
odd number of terms
for the terms are one more
than the premisses. Moreover, the conclusions will
be half as many as the premisses. But when the
conclusion is reached by means of prosyllogisms or of
several consecutive middle terms" (e.g., the conclusion
AB by means of the terms C and D), the number of
the terms will exceed that of the premisses, as before,
by one (for each further term which is introduced will
be added either externally or intermediately to the
sequence, and in either case it follows that the intervals are one fewer than the terms, and there are
as many premisses as intervals)
the former \vi\\ not,
however, always be even and the latter odd, but
alternately when the premisses are even the terms
vidll be odd, and when the terms are even the premisses
will be odd
for wherever a term is added one
premiss is added as well. Thus since the premisses
were ^ even and the terms odd, their numbers must
change accordingly when the same addition is made
to both.
But the conclusions will no longer preserve
the same numerical relation either to the terms or
to the premisses
for the addition of one term v^dll
increase the number of conclusions by one less than
the original number of terms, since it ^vill form con;

331

Prosyiiogo^^Jes*'^^

ARISTOTLE
taxorov ov
#fOi

rod^ aXXovs
avfxndpaafia, npof
np6<rKirai to A, ciJ^wy
<TVfinpdafiaTa hvo np6aKirai, r6 T irpof to
iroct

irdvra^t otov ct ra

ABF

Kol TO npo^ TO B. ofiouo^ #cd7ri Ta>v oAXcuv.

TO fi^aov 5 napfim7rrj[j, rov avrov rpoirov
irp6i va yap fjL6vov ov noiiJQti ovXXoytafLOP, Start
-noSu irXtUi) ra avfintpaafiara Koi rCm opuw lonu
Kol tQv irpordawv,
XXVI. *Err4 5' typ^uv ntpl wv ol avXXoytafiOi,
Kol nolov iv iKaartft oYiyfuxTi koI noaaxofS 8<^Kwrai, ^avtpov ^fjuv tori koI miav vpdfiXtffui
o^^ctroi' #coi noiov cuetrij^cipiyToi'* to fUv yap iv
irXeUxn ax^fjuun kcu 5ta nXiiovujv irrwototw irepcuv6fjLvov pq^v, t6 B* iv IXdrroat iccu 3i* iXar^
icav 19

r6vo}v Bva7riXiprfroTpov.

To fUv

oiv Karo/^rufov t6 koB^Xov

Kk

rov

npwrov ox^fiarof Stucwrai ^ovov, K<d bta rovrov

px}va\tos' TO hk arprjruc6v hid rt roO npwrov kcu

Sta rov fi^aov, koX Sia uiv rov irpurrov ftova^^*

Bi rov pJaov Bi)(ws' ro 5* h^ p^P^^ Karo/^ruc^v Sta
Tou rrpiorov koi 3ta tou Itrxdrov, povax^
8ui TOU irpunov, rpi\Cjs Bk hid rov iaydrov. ro hk
aTprjruc6v ro Kard pApos v dnaai roig ax^paai
htucwrax, nXrjv cv /xcv rat npwro) dnaf, cv hi Toi
ii)pa<p KoX rw iaxdrtp iv rep pkv hi^^
^^ Bi
s

M^

rpiX^'
43 a

OoVCpOV OlJv OTl TO KodoXoV KaTTfyopiKOV #fOTOOfccvoocu pev ;(aA7rcuTaTov, ovaoKcvamu hk p^'
OTOV. oXaj9 8* *OTiv dvaipoOvri p4v rd KodoXov rcav

832

Barbara.
Cesare and Camestres.

>

Cdarent
*

DarU.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxv-xxvi

E.g., if
elusions with all the terms except the last.
is added to the terms A, B and C, two
the term
further conclusions are added ipso facto, viz., those
severally to
which are given by the relation of

other cases. And even

if the term be introduced intermediately, the same
for the term will form a conclusion
principle holds
with all the rest but one. Thus there will be many
more conclusions than either terms or premisses.
XXVI. Now that we understand the scope of the
syllogism, and what sort of proof can be obtained in
each figure and in how many ways, it is also evident
to us what kind of proposition is difficult and what is
easy to deal with ; for that which is concluded in more
figures and by more moods is easier, while that which
is concluded in few^er figures and by fewer moods is
harder to deal with.
The universal affirmative is proved only by the first
but the negafigure, and by this in one " mood only
tive is proved both by the first and by the middle
figure
by the first in one ^ and by the middle in

and B.

Similarly too in

all

two ^ moods. The particular affirmative is proved

by the first and the last figures by the first in one
and by the last in three * moods. The particular
negative is proved in all three figures, with this
difference, that in the first figure it is proved in one ^
mood, while in the second and third it is proved
respectively in two ^ and in three ^ moods.
Thus it is evident that the universal affirmative is
the hardest to establish and the easiest to overthrow.
In general, universal propositions are more open to
<*

'

Ferio.
*

Darapti, Disamis and Datisi.

"

Festino, Baroco.

Felapton, Bocardo and Ferison,

333

Relative

dtfficu"^ of
Pr2i^'s

types of
proposition

ARISTOTLE

mil yap

/^/>t P9<u'

ifv fArjbtvl

rwt

ical rJ

ft'ff

vndpxfj dyrjprjrof rourtov 8^ r6 yhf rivX fi^ h^

6

dnoQi rot;

Kol yap

rovro

koI

1 irayrl

h*

ro hi

firiSVt

iv roii

ct

run, dn)/>7rou r6 ^( <V>XV^'

hrl hi rCm hf fUp^k

^ v hvo <r^p.aaw.

fiovaxo}^,
10

axrjfiaat Scuoorrou,

rov avrov hi rpoirov KatrX ratv artprjrucwy'

Bvalv,

nayrl

rj

5<ifavra ^ndpx^uti

/xi^Scvi

rj

Karaaicva{okTi hi p^ai rd iv h^P*^'

Y^ ^

'^^^

irXtioai <rxrjfiaai Kal 8cd trXi6vcjv rp&nattf,

on

*0Acu9 T ov Set Aav^cLvciy

rd koBoXov

3i* oAAt^AoiK ccrri #rcu

dvaaicciK(aai /i^
rCtv hf fUpti

hta,

Kal ravra Sid rtav KaOoXov, KaraaKtudaaji h* odtt

fori htd ratv
15

Kara fupo^ rd koBoXov,

hi

dfui hi hijXov ori Kal rd dyooiccvdfccy

roOr' tOTiv,

COTl TOV KaTa4JKvdZlV

o^

Ilto9 fiiv

8i* iKtivcav

p^v.

ylyv^r ai nd^ avXXoyiafidi

ccu

TToaoiv opcov Kal rrpordatutv, koX ira>y ^xovaCtv

hid

npoi

dXXi^Xa^, Ti hi TToiov np6p\r)fia v iKoartp a)(ijp.aTi

Kal TTolov V TrXtioGi KoX noiov V cAarroai SctKvurai, hrjXov Ik

to

XXVII.
riBcficvov
Xrjipofjicda

Ylta>S

act

lprjfi,vwv.

V7TOpl^<JOfJLV

auToi

avXXoyiofuvv, Koi Sid

Ta? ncpl iKaarov dpxd^, vvv

vpdf TO

9it>id;
TJht]

iA

the premisses

c/.

43 b S6.

ohou

XeKrdov

Mn chs. xxiii.-zxTL

4cibS&,
*

S34

twv
hi

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxvi-xxvii

for the proposition

refutation than particular ones
refuted not only if the predicate applies to none,
but also if it does not apply to some of the subject,
and of these alternatives the latter can be proved
in all three figures, and the former in two of them.
Similarly in the case of negative propositions ; for
;

is

is refuted not only if the predicate

but also if it applies to some of the subhave seen" that this can be proved in

the hypothesis

appHes to all
ject, and we
two figures.
tion can only

But in particular propositions the refutabe effected in one way, by showing that
the predicate appHes to all, or to none. For constructive purposes, however, particular propositions
are easier, since they can be proved in more figures
and by more moods.

We

must not fail to observe the general principle

that whereas propositions can be overthrown reciprocally, the universal by the particular and the particular
by the universal, universal propositions cannot be
established by means of particular ones, although the
latter can be established by means of the former.
At the same time it is obvious also that it is easier
to overthrow a proposition than to establish it.
The foregoing analysis ^ clearly shows how every
syllogism is effected, and by means of how many
terms and premisses, and how these are related one
to another ; and also what kind of proposition is
proved in each figure, and what kind is proved in
more and what kind in fewer figures.
XXVII. We must next proceed to describe how

Construc-

we

syllogisms.

ourselves shall find an adequate supply of syllogisms to meet any given problem, and by what
method we shall apprehend the starting-points
appropriate to each problem ; for presumably we
'^

335

ARISTOTLE
ov yap

ijl6vo

avXXoYiafiwv,

Imas ^1
aXXa koI

rrpt
rrjv

y4vat9 $capaf ruf

hwofutf 4c*^

^^

rufv Syrwv ra fUv <m roiOiha

Kara firfiv69 dXXov KarrfyopelaBai aXrjBukS
Kad6Xov {otov KA/cui' Koi KoAAta; koI r6 koB*
tKOOTOv Kol alaBrjT^v), Kara hk rovrtav aXXa {koI
yap dvOpumoi koI {<pov Kartpo^ rovrcav iarC^' rd
0 &' avra fuv icar* dAAo;v Karrjyoptirai, Kara 5^
rovrcav oAAa vp6rpov oi) Karrfyopirai' tA S^ koI
aiVd aXXu)v koI avrwv mpa, olo avOpumoi
KoAAiou KOi avBpitmov l^^tov, ori fUy odv Ivia rwv
ovrwv #caT* ovSyos W^u#c \lyoBax ^i)Xov rwv
yap ata^rfrdfv ax^Bov Kaaro iari rotovrcv wart
fii) KarrfYopla6ai Kara firfiv^, nXfpf wf KorA
u avfiPp'qKa9' ^afLv yap irorrt ri XtvKov iKtvm

'AiroMrrcjv

aKTT

YiWKpdrriv clMOi kox ro irpootov KoAAiov.

KoX

40

7rl

on

hk

ro avw nopvofjLvoi9 urrarou irorc, vaXiv

Kara fUv odp

povfjiV' vw 5* aro rovro KifjLvov,
rovrwv ovk larw ano^t^oji Karriyopovfitvov rpov,
irXfjv 4 firi Kara S6(av, oAAa raOra Kar* aXXuw
ovb ra KaB* tKoara Kar oAAoiv oAA* crc/Kt Kar
Kwwv. ra 8c fiTa(v hrjXov W9 afi^orp<t>s cySc^crou* Kol yap aura Kar* aXXcav Koi oAAa Kara
rovrcjv Ac^^o^ctcu, koI o^^cSov ol Xoyoi Koi ai
QKkltis eu7i

fidXurra vpl rovrcav,

8S6

An,

Pott, I. zix.-xziL

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xxvii

I.

should not merely speculate about the formation of

syllogisms, but also possess the capacity to construct

them.

Now all existing things either (1) are such that Three
they cannot be truly predicated in a universal sense pSSibies.
of anything else (e.g., Cleon and Callias and anything
which is individual and sensible), but other attributes
can be so predicated of them (for each of the two
examples just quoted is a man and an animate
or (2) are predicated of other things, but
being)
or
other things are not first predicated of them
(3) both are themselves predicated of other things
*
and have other things predicated of them (as man
animal of man). Thus
is predicated of CalHas and
it is obvious that some things are naturally predicable
of nothing, for broadly speaking every sensible thing
is such that it cannot be predicated of anything
except in an accidental sense for we sometimes say
That white thing is Socrates or That which is
approaching is CalHas.' We shall explain elsewhere "
that there is also an upward limit to the process of
for the present let this be taken as
predication
assumed. It cannot be demonstrated, then, that
anything else is predicated of this class of things,
but they are predicated
except by way of opinion
of other things. Individuals, on the other hand,
are not predicated of other things, but other things
are predicated of them. Things which are intermediate between universals and individuals, however,
for they both are
clearly admit of both processes
predicated of other things and have other things
predicated of them. It is with this class of things,
broadly speaking, that arguments and inquiries are
chiefly concerned.
;

'

'

'

337

ARISTOTLE
**

^1 h^ ray npordfr^i^
Xafipdviv,

v7ro6^fii'ov

opiafioik re xai

ooa

fura rouTo oaa

tTrtrai

^Koaraw dSfws 4k-

trcpi

avro

trpwrov

rw

npdyfiart, Koi ir6XiP oTf

TO npdyfia dxoXovOl, koI ooa

{mdpxiv oU

h* aiVro

fti^

fti)

V^';(rrat

ivBdx^raA

o^k

Sia TO dvTiOTp^^iv TO <rrffrjru(6.

teal rCrv
tMt9

tirofUvtov

o^iy

iKXrjtrrioi^,

Buitptr^QV 8i

Saa tc iv r^ ri iari

teal

ooo

tSca teal 6<ra co^ avfiP^PrjKSra tearrfYOptrfU, teal

rovrwv nota ho(a<rrucc^ Kal

10

rous

teal

iarw, 9lra

iSca tow vpayfiarof

dX^cco!

rota iraT*

oato fxv yap av nXiidvatv roiovnav tvnopfj nst

Bdrrov hnvS^trai

avfjLnp<iafUvrt, oo<p 8'

of

cLAiy-

Btaripwv, fioAAov diro3<tfci.

Aci

5*

^xXtytw

fi'^i

ra ^nd/xcva

dXXoL Ti TToa^i dvOpanrtp cttctcu* 5id

oXov 'rrpoTdawv 6 avXXoyiafid^.

IS

6vro9 dSrjXov

Sc <f>avp6v.

KaBoXov

o^oUo^

17

S*

yap rwv koB'

dStoptarov p,h^ odit

npdraai^, hiwpiapivov

cVAc/rrcov

mu

CTreroi 0A019, 8td T17V tlpTjfi^vrjv alriay.

'n6fivov

olov

rj

pjovauc^

fiovov dnXcj^ dKoXov$iv,

so Tco^o/Ltc^a* icoi

S3S

oTy

naaav

ayro

adro S^ rd

ov XrjTrrtov oXov iTaQax, Xty<a

dvQpwTTw ndv ^wov

dXXd

oAA' ooa

Tivi,

otov fi^ ri rivl dvOpwinp

oXtx} rut npdyfjiaTi firtrai,

5' orbv

^numjfirpf^

Kaddntp

teal

irpty

yap dxprqarov Bdrtpov koX dhwarav,

ndvTa dvBpwnov

lvax

ndv

{^ak>v

rj

BiKOioavrrjw

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxvii

Now we must select the premisses connected with Method of

each problem in the follo^\dng manner. We must set preinlsses
itself, its definitions and all its ^y ^^^'^^fl^f
the subject
down (1)
J
V /
consequents
properties, (2) all the concepts which are consequents and ante'cedents,
of the subject, (3) the concepts of which the subject
is a consequent, and (4) the attributes which cannot
apply to the subject. We need not select the concepts to which it cannot apply, because the negative
premiss is convertible. We must also distinguish
among these consequents those which are included
in the essence, those which are predicated as properties, and those which are predicated as accidents ;
and of these we must distinguish those which are
supposedly from those which are really associated
with the subject, for the greater our supply of the
latter, the sooner we shall arrive at a conclusion, and
the truer they are, the more convincing will be our
'

proof.

We

must select consequents not of some part but

of the whole of the subject, e.g., not those of some
for it is
individual man, but those of every man
from universal premisses that the syllogism proceeds.
Thus when a statement is indefinite it is uncertain
whether the premiss is universal, but when the statement is definite this is quite clear. Similarly we must
select only those concepts of the Avhole of which the
subject is a consequent, for the reason just stated.
But we must not assume that the consequent is con*
animal
I mean, e.g., that all
sequent as a whole
man,' or all scientific knowledge
is a consequent of
of music,' but only that it is a consequent, without
qualification
as indeed we express it in a proposition ; the other form of expression (e.g., every
man is every animal or probity is all good ') is
;

'

'

'

'

'

'

339

ARISTOTLE

&

dtrav ayaB6* dAA*

CTrcroi,

in iKtwoo t6 warn

A/ycTcu.

ra

ciro/icva Set
/ii)

Xa^lv, ra

fiv r<p ca^oAou in6fJLva

cVdficva ovfc iK\Krov iv rovroi^ (tJXtprrfu

yap v iKivoi^' oaa yap iutw koX avBpamw tnerai,

teal oaa /xi^ wrapxti oHiavTWf), ra hi ntpH Kaar9
tSca Xtprriov tan yap drra rtp ciSci Sta irapd r6
yivo^' aydyKtj yap roif Mpois cSScoiv iSta drra

Oi^
ao

3i7

Tfp

yap,

avdytcrj

KadoXov iKXncrio ctf

otov

npixofivop,
Ci

iifxp

oti

Ctpow, koI

olKv6rtpa hk ravra

TOW avOpamov iKKoytf^,

TO

t^ iroXib iv6fitva <col

to noXu npopXrjpArafv
#cai o <7vAAoyu7/ioy #c tcDv coy Ctrl to troXv npo
rdawv, rj iratjwv ^ nvwv' Sfiouw yap iKCurrov r6
Affirrtov & Kol

ofs"

ts

ctrrroi nd

cu^pamof*

avBpomot axoXovSti r6

Tovrois" aTTtujiv axoXovOtiv.

rifs

enmu

rwv yap

tntrax'

cuf ^iri

cuj cwl

GVfitr^paafia toT? dpx<u^.

"Et* Ta ndaiv n6fiva ovk KXKr^ov'

cotcu avAAoyu7fu>9 cf avrcuj'irofivoif

That
;

oOy

fiovkofUvons

fiv

ntdess (for purposes at argument) b probablj

recognised as possible in modem logic

it is

but

yap

air lav v rois

COTCU hijXov.

XXVIII. KaraaKvdiw
true

oi5

8t* ^j* 5*

it is

Literally

starting-points.^

' i.e. of both nugor and minor terms.

This would glte
syllogism in the second figure i^nth two affirmatiTe prembMS,
' 44 b 90.
from which no conclusion follows.

340

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxvii-xxviii

and

impossible.** It is to the antecedent that

every is attached.
When the subject whose consequents we have to
apprehend is included in some wider term, we must
not select the consequents or non-consequents of the
universal in dealing with the particular (for they have
been apprehended already in considering the unianimal are conseversal, for the consequents of
quents of* man,' and similarly with non-consequents),
but we must apprehend the consequents which are
peculiar to the individual. For there are some properties which are peculiar to the species apart from
the genus, since the other species must also have
some properties peculiar to them.
Nor again should we in the case of the universal
term select the antecedents of the subordinate term ;
we should not select the
e.g., in the case of animal
antecedents of man,' for if animal is a consequent
of man,' it must be a consequent of all these concepts as well. They belong more properly, however,
to the selection of concepts associated with the term
man.'
We must also apprehend those concepts which are
usually consequents of our subject, and those of which
for the syllogism of proit is usually a consequent
positions about the usual is also drawn from premisses
which are usually true, either all or some of them
for the conclusion of every syllogism is similar to its

useless

all

'

or

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

original premisses.^

Further, we must not select concepts which are

consequents of all " the terms, because they will not
produce a syllogism. Why this is so will be clear
presently.**

XXVIII. When we wish

to estabUsh a proposition

S41

ARISTOTLE
40

Kara tivo9 oXov rov fUv icaTaa#ccua{oftM>v fiXiwni

rov ciy ra v7roKifiva, Koff dtp auro tvy^^pMrn,*
Xy6fiVov, oS 8c Set KaT7fYOpiaBiu, oaa roirrut
rovrcuv 1} rawrcJi', avdyKtf Bartf>o
nrar av yap
rp^ 8c ll^ oti rrayrt oAA* ort?
dartpoi {mapxfiv.
ro&rujv raiJrcJrJ
TiVL, oU irrcu iKartpov' 1 ydo
avdyicn nvl vnapx^w. orav 8c /n78cvl 8/jj vrrdp^
<^* /xcv ov Oct xmdpxw,
imapvci
Yciy, <^
YCiy,
cfe ra /ttcJ/icvo, ^

44 A

Oct

an vndpyiy^

cfroftcva.

is

rovriov

a un

yap

ci

ovrutv

rwv avratv

ovtotm^

ivStxrnu Baripip 6drpov vndpxW%

yLyvrax ydp oW fuv 6 iv rip npurrtp oxijftart
avXXoyuTfioi, ori S* 6 iv rtp pAatp. ccLy 8^ rwi itm

pcjvovv, ou8cvt

10

^ndpx^iVf

4*

vrrdpxtiy,

/X17

H^ ^^
&

/ti7

f^4 iWapycci', oTf cTrercu, o 8c

ain'6t> ^dpx^Uf' ti ydp

8woTai'

15

tovtm)V iri raur^v, dvdyKri riA firf vndpx^tv.

MoAAoi' 8* tocos' <58* lorat tcSv Acyofici'aiJ' tKotrroi^
Aavp6v. ^orco yap ra /icv /iro/zcva to) A c^* cSv
B, oU 8' avro CTTcrot c^' cui^ F, a 8^ /ii^ cv8^^CTCU
ai)rJ> i^opyctv c^' <uk A* TroAti' hk r^ "R rd pev
vndpxovra <f>* oU Z, oTy 8* avro CTrcrot 1^* oTj H,

a h

ow

p,rj

vBXf^ox avT<p
iarat rwv

ravTo

^ m, Wailx.
rd iinntva, ^
oodd., sed ^
pro 3
*

^* '^ f^
Z, dvdymj to A

<V* ^^^

rivl rutv

a]

* tis

' Off

U 5ci
M A^

/i^

vvnpxtv om. WftHs, habent

om. AB'Cdu.

Barbara,
Darapli.
Ccsmn,
* Camestrcft.
converting the major premiss in Cesare or the minor
'
Camestres.
Kdapioa.

*
*

in

vndpx^^

S4A

By

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxviii

about a subject as a whole, we must consider (1) the How to

subjects of which the predicate which we are trying ^ne^hod of
to estabUsh is actually asserted, and (2) the conse- selection to
quents of the subject whose predicate we are required problem^
to establish ; for if there is anything which is common
to both classes, then the predicate must apply to the
subject." If we are trying to estabHsh that it appHes
not to all but to some, we must consider the antecedents of both terms ; for if anything is common
to both classes, then one term must apply to some
of the other.^
When it is required that one term
shall apply to none of the other, we must consider
the consequents of the subject, and the attributes
which cannot belong to the predicate,*' or conversely
we must consider the attributes which cannot belong
to the subject and the consequents of the predicate ^
for if any term is the same in both series, the predicate term cannot apply to any of the subject
for a
syllogism results sometimes in the first ^ and sometimes in the middle figure. If it is required that one
term shall not apply to some of the other, we must
consider the antecedents of the subject and the attributes which cannot apply to the predicate
for if
anything is common to these two classes, it must
follow that the predicate does not apply to some of
the subject./
Perhaps the several rules stated above will be Summary of
clearer if we express them in the following manner. goLg*^^'
Let the consequents of
be designated by B, the rules.
antecedents of
by C, and the attributes which
cannot apply to
by
again, let the attributes
of E be designated by F, the antecedents of E by G,
and the attributes which cannot apply to E by H.
Then (1) if any of the Cs is the same as any of the Fs,
;

A
A

343

ARISTOTLE
44

nam-l ru> E vndpxtiv ro fiv yap Z trovrJ rot E,

TO 5^ r nayrl r^ A, aJorc napri rtp E to A. tl
8^ TO r Kol TO H rair6v, dvdyicrj rwl raw E t^ A
vndpxfW' rtff fiiv yap T to A, rtp S^ H to E vairrl
aj(oXov$l,
ci 8< TO Z #cai to A toutov, ovScvl
\map^i iic irpoav^XoytaiAOti' iml yap
Tftur E TO
ovriorp^^i T^ rrprfTuc6v koX ti^ Z t^ A Ta^TOir
ovhtvl ruiv Z vndp(i t^ A, t6 & Z irovri T<p B^
ravTOv, ovStvt rwv E to A
TToAiv ci t6 B #cal TO

to

trovri. Tip* 5* i^t* 4*

xmapiii' TO yap B Tiji pAv
ovScvi vndp(i' rauro yap i)v t^i Q,r6 Si
TO
ko* to H rainw^
ovScvt Toiv E V7r^^;(cv. ci Sc to

&

to

TO A Tivi Tcoi' E ovx inrdpiti' rtp yap H owjf

^dp((i, oTi ou5^ TO* A* TO &^ H ^crriv viro t3 E,
oxrrc Ttvt TOW E o^ xmdp^ti, % hk rtp H ro 3
ravrov, dyrarpapjivos tarai avXXoyuTpo^- r6 phf
yap E* T^ A vndpiti nayrl to yap H r<p K,r^ Sk
E T<p B (TavTo yap ^v rtp H)* to 5^ A Ttji E trayri
fih^ ovK avdytof ^apxW, rtvl b* dvdytcq Sta r6

avrtarp<l>iv rfj icaOoXov Karrjyopuf. rrjr itara fUpos*

^ai'f pov o^ art ct9 Ta npottprjfUva fiXtvriim

Karpov KoB* Katyrov npSpX-qpn' SiA ravrcav
dnavTs ol avXXoyuipjOi. Bl 5c icoi rwv enofi^vufv,
Kol ols CTTCTO* tKaorov, 19 ra trpCna kox ra KaOoAov pAXiara pX7Ttv, otov rov /xcv E /xoAAoi' ct;
TO KZ Tf 19 ro Z p^VOV, rov 5^ A 49 TO KF tj 49
TO r ftovov. 4 ftv yap rw KZ ^dpxi ro A, ic<u
T^ Z Kai rw E V7rdpxi' i bt rovnp /xi^ cvctou.

y^

40

44 k

S44

rw

corr.

E AB-CdV

Af ;
:

ri Bdun.

H BM'fmn^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxviii

all E
for F applies to all E, and C
A, so that A applies to all E. (2) If
C and G are the same, A must apply to some E.
For A is a consequent of all C, and E of all G. (3) If
F and D are the same, by a prosyllogism A will
for since the negative proposition is
apply to no E
convertible, and F is the same as D, A will apply to
no F but F applies to all E. (4) Again, if B and H
for B will apply
are the same, A will apply to no E
for B is ex hypothesi the same
to all A, but to no E
as H, and we assumed that H applies to no E. (5) If
D and G are the same, A will not apply to some E.
For it will not apply to G, inasmuch as it does not
apply to D. But G falls under E, and so A will not
apply to some E. (6) If B is the same as G, there
For E will apply
will be a syllogism by conversion.
to all A, since B applies to A and E to B (since B is

A must

apply to

applies to

all

same as G). It does not necessarily

however, that A applies to all E, but only
that it appUes to some, because the universal is convertible into a particular statement.
Thus it is evident that in the proving of every
proposition we must consider the foregoing relations
for it is by these that all
of subject and predicate
syllogisms are determined. Moreover we must consider especially those of the consequents and antecedents of each term which are primary and universal;
e.g., in the case of E we must consider KF rather
than F alone, and in the case of A we must consider
KC rather than C alone.** For if A applies to KF it
appUes both to F and to E, but if it is not a consequent of the latter, it may still be a consequent of F,
ex hypothesi the
follow,

<

KF

and

KC

are universals which include

F and C

respectively.

545

Terms
considered
*

^^^^

versai form,

ARISTOTLE
iyxtjp^l

l'!i

errtodai. opLoLut^ hk koX ^* cSr aiM

OKtirriov tl yukv yap Tot? irpanxHf, teal

r$ Z

<LcoAoi;^ct

viro TafJra

iyxwp^l.

.',

A17A0V 3< KOi oTi Sia

rc2>v

rpuhv opwv koI rum

hvo nporaatwv 1} aK^ts, teal S*a rwv v/xxipi}^ifUvwv <rx>)tio.rwv ol CFvAAoytafUH v<^<ff.
fcwrai yap vinipx*tv ftcv vorrt rw R ro A, Stop
10

Tai r iroi Z Toi>Tdr t Xtf^B^.

roOro 5' coroi
fUtnv, OKpa 8^ TO A rai E* yiyvcnu o^ r^ npuncft^
axyjtJM. rtvl S/, oror t6 F icol ri H Xrj^^ To^rdr*
Toi>ro Sc TO iax'^Tov axfjfJLa, fjJaw yip to
yiyvcrtu, /xi/Scvt 8/, orov to A icai to Z tovtoi'.
oirrcii & #cai to irpatrov ax^fia koI to fUaov, r6 fUv
vpCnov on ov^vi T<ji Z i^af>x* to A, ivp
dvTurrp^i to <rrpfiriK6y, to Sc Z irovTi Ty E,
ov6m rtp
r6 5^ fi^aov OTi TO A Ti^ fuir
E

Tovro 8^ TO axarov n^fia*

#c(u TO H TttvroK ^.
TO ft^ ya/> A ouS^vt t<S H vndpfti, to 5^ E ncarrl
*

T<?

H.

<I>a^p6p odv

on

SicL

tcDv vpoiprifUvotp crj^fid-

on ovk ^icAcmt^ot
to firfi^va yiyvtoBcu. avX"
Xoyiofiov cf aiVra>v. KaTaaKvdl^w fuv yap oXtas
ovk ifv c T(2>v iiroyuevwv, dnoartptZv h* owe h^
hdx^Toi 8ia Tou vaaw itropJvov' hti yap Tj yubt
m
ihrdpx^w rw 8^ fiif ^inipx^iv,
!
-JO*
u
7 18, b 23.
'^ C/. 43 b 36.
-

rmv

ol ovAAoytcr/iOi Trovrcj, kox

ooa

TToatv cttctcu, 5ca

5i6

i..

from two affirmative premis&es which

state the auddk

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxviii

Similarly we must observe the antecedents of the

term in question ; for if it is a consequent of those
which are primary, so it is also of the terms which

under these

but if it is not a consequent of the

be so of the latter.
It is clear also that our inquiry is carried out by The metho<
means of the three terms and two premisses, and that pr^eSs b"
are effected by means of the three ^^f ordinar
all the svlloffisms
o
niiGS or
For it is proved (1) that syUogism.
figures already described.
A applies to all E when one of the Cs is taken as
identical with one of the Fs. This will be the middle
term, and the extremes will be A and E. Thus the
first figure results.
(2) That A appHes to some E
when C and G are taken as identical. This is the last
figure ; for G becomes the middle term.
(3) That
A applies to no E when D and F are identical. In
this case we get both the first and the middle figure ;
the first because A applies to no F (the negative
proposition being converted) and F applies to all E,
and the middle figure because D applies to no A
but to all E. (4) That A does not apply to some E
fall

former,
:

it

may

still

'

G are identical. This is the last figure,

apply to no G and E will apply to all G.
Thus it is evident that all syllogisms are effected by Conse.means of the figures already described, and that we akmeare
must not select consequents of all the terms," because useless for
when
for

and

will

no syllogism results from these. For we saw ^ that

there is no way at all of establishing a proposition
from consequents," while on the other hand refutation

is

impossible by means of a common consequent,

it should apply to one term but not to the

because
other.**

as a

common

figure).

consequent of both the extreme terms (second

* Sc. to

give

a negative

conclusion.

S4n

sySoSfm,

ARISTOTLE

ao

Ooycp^v S^ Kol Sri al oAAoi ok^Jki^ rCtv irord

rd? cVAoyds" d;^tbi irpoq r6 noiiv avXXoyujficv,
olov ci rd inofifva Karip<a roura <mv, rj ci o(p
eirrrai rd A cal /X17 ivhixtroA Tip C, ^ ooa iraAif
m4 ^YX^P^^ cVar/pa> vndpx^tv' ov yap yiyMTtu
ri /xv ydp ra hr6fLa
ovAAoyia/xd; $id rotrroyv.
ravrd, otov ro B koI r6 X, to fUaov yiyvrnu (rxjJt^A
Karrjyopixa^ cxov rdf irporcujcif

Ci 5* o2ir cirrroi

to

d /X17 ^>^';(CTa4 r<p E, oloy to F jou rd 0, rd

wpunoy oxfifJLO, frnprfrucfp^ fy>v n^ irpdy rd li^r
4 5' doo /ii^ /vS^^i^rrca
rov axpov vpiraaw,
Karp<p, olov rd A iccu rd 0, <rrprjrueai dfc^diroi

Tcpcu oi irporautii,

rj

r^

npo/rtp

ri

hf rip fuatp

ax^fiari* ovrto^ 5* od$afui>s' /oroi avAAoyur^idf.

A^Aov 8<

r^

Afol

on

diroid

ravrd Xrfwriov ra irard

irriaKt^w, kqI odx onoia hrpa

iWpafrov fUv ori rov fUaov

44

x4p^ 4

IvovrSa^

ri

3^ fjUaov ovx Tpov oAAd rovrdr 3ci Aa/3ccv. cfra

CF dams' toi avpfiabtti yiyvtoBai avXXoytapLOv r^

Ai^^^vcu vayria ^

fi'fj

r^ avrtp ^napanayra dyaj^^yjcroi

fvS\6fifva

Xiv, etc rod; npoipr)fivov^

cc rd B #rai rd Z cvavrai ^ fii^

hS^xfrai rtp airr<p vnapxtw Herat fUv ydf> rotnwr
Xr^vro)v av^Xoyujfios on odScvt raw E rd A
vnapx^t oaA ovk g avrwv oAA #c rov npoiprf^
fUvov rpoTTOv TO yap B ra> /a<v A fravrt r<^ S^

rp&novs, otov

^infiXtilfif,

S4

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxviii

It is evident also that all other methods of investi- other

gation which proceed by selection are useless for ,g^i^Jion
producing a syllogism ; e.g., (a) if the consequents of are also
"^ ^
both terms are identical, or (6) if the antecedents of
and the attributes which cannot apply to E are
identical ; or again (c) if the attributes which cannot
apply to either are identical ; because no syllogism
For (a) if the conresults from these conditions.
sequents, viz. B and F, are identical, we get the third
figure with both premisses affirmative ; (6) if the
antecedents of A and the attributes which cannot
respectively, are identical,
apply to E, viz. C and
we get the first figure with a negative minor premiss ;
and (c) if the attributes which cannot apply to either
and H, are identical,
of the terms A and E, viz.
both premisses are negative, either in the first or in
the middle figure. In these circumstances no syllo-

gism at

all is possible.

we must apprehend which of it is for

the terms that come under our survey are the same, between th<
and not which are different or contrary ; firstly, J^J^^g"^*
because the object of our investigation is to discover that we
^^'
the middle term, and the middle term must be taken ^^^
as the same in each premiss, and not as something
different.
Secondly, even those examples in which
a syllogism happens to result from taking attributes
which are contrary or which cannot apply to the same
subject, will all be reducible to the types which we
have already described ; e.g., if B and F are contrary
or cannot apply to the same subject. For if we take
these terms, there will be a syllogism to the effect
that
appUes to no E, but the conclusion will be
drawn not from the terms as they stand but from the
type described above." For B will apply to all A
It is clear also that

349

ARISTOTLE
ovSvi vndpi^ii war* dvaynn;

U!l

toiW

c&oi rd

rivl

B Kod H \i,^ iyxcml r<p oiVr^

implvai, on rwl rwv E oiJ^ \map(ti to A' iral yip
ovTws TO fUaov torax axfjfJLCL' ro yap B t<J /i^ A
0.

10 rcciv

8^ E* ov nvi* vndp(i,

irairrl Toi

B
1*

ro

iroAiv c/

tqutoi' twx cr^xu

TO
to

iroi

ratv

TO

rwv 0.

war avdvinj to
u^ h^v^aOai
ovo^ Bui^ipti ^

t3 ya^

T<^ aiVr^ t^ird^^^civ

c&cu* wcut^ yap cUiprro^

Mrxoyjtva rw vvapx^**'*
t
Oawpov luv o^ on, f ai^Tc^i' fiiv Totmuv t3k
tivi tcuJtok

Tcl /ii}
:

r6 Z hfoyrta, toiMv tim cZmu to

Tov ouAAoyia/ioi' yryKfotfcu Sta rovrwv.
ovfi^ivi Srj Toip oiniA}^ imaKomoOtn wpoatntpX4niv aXXrjv 3^v rrp Apayttataf
r6 Xav$d^w
5', ci*

>

TO

B TOiv

rifr

fcoi

jTOi

ra^Mrrjra TtBv

rw9 0.
hk rponrov t^own
Ktd

XXIX. Tov ai^Toi'

^SiWtov ayovrry ovXXoytoiJLoi

ydp

tttd ol tU r6
roH^ SciKTUfoij- *f<u

yiyvoi^o* 5ia tuik tno^vutv koI ofe

koX t} ovn^ tn^Xf^is v ofu^clw'
o yap hucvvTai BU(r ixuf^ teal Oia tou o^tWrov
coTi avXXoylaaaBajL hia rwv avrwv optuv, kox 6 Bia
oj^roi

circTcu K6,rtpov.

TOV a3uyaTou

teal hueruc(of' otov

on

vndpxi,

0 CSrCi

TO

B TTOl^i

TiUnf

wrdp(i- oAA* ov5evt oir^pycv.

rajv

Tm

ro

A.

ouScm

Ktlodw yap rwl ovopvciv* odieofhf

Tijll A TO d^ A TtVi Toir , TO B T

virapx(' Ci ya/> /^i^^cia Tcur

>

EB*u*

to

ircUiy

fo

t^ 5^

U oolgD.

oJrmWaiUt oMW codd.

<!i>lyi| 8*. W Bna. Walts
V^ ACdfta.
*

44al.
850

^m

-^1

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxviii-xxix

but to no E, and so B must be the same as some H.

Again, if B and G cannot apply to the same subject,
there will be a syllogism to the effect that A will not
apply to some E. In this case too we shall have the
middle figure, because B will apply to all A but not
to some E, so that B must be the same as some H.
For the statement B and G cannot apply to the same
subject is equivalent to B is the same as some H ;
has been assumed to designate all the
since
attributes which cannot apply to E.
Thus it is evident that no syllogism results from the
foregoing methods of investigation as they stand,
but that if B and F are contrary, B must be the same
as some H, and in this way the syllogism is obtained.
Thus it follows that those who consider the problem
in the manner which has just been described are looking for a further method of proof than they need,
through overlooking the identity between the Bs
and Hs.
XXIX. Syllogisms which employ reduction ad im~
possibile are governed by the same conditions as
for they too are effected
those which are ostensive
by means of the consequents and antecedents of the
two extreme terms. The method of investigation,
for that which is
too, is the same in both types
proved ostensively can be established per impossibile
*

'

by means of the same terms, and vice versa e.g., that

A applies to no E.^ For let it be assumed that it
appUes to some. Then since B applies to all A, and
A to some E, B will apply to some E. But ex hypoAgain, it can be proved that
thesi it applies to none.
A applies to some E for if it applies to none, and
:

* The relations of these terms are

eh. xxviii.

still

as assumed in

351

The same
apply ST*
syllogisms
Tstabiished

^^^'^p^^'

ARISTOTLE

If

rwy H {m^Lp(% r^ A* lUM

oyuoltm hi kox iirl t& dXXwv
TTpopXrnuiTwv' dti yap tarat koI hr dmunv rj ita

40

i*c rwv hrofi^vwv Ktu off

^
WTat KaTpOV.
Koi KoS* Ikootov npopXrjfAO. i) oMf Qxi^JHS
5ci#rrura>s> r PovXofUvtft av^Xoyiaaadai koI ck* t6
aSwarov ayayctv* k yap rwv avrwv optov a^ju^6^
Tpai al (lYroSct^cis" olov i ScScurroi firfStvl vnap'
yciv r^p E TO A, 6ri avfAfi<uvi Koi ro B rwl rwv

YTovri

rw H,

fra^rt

\nrf\p\v.

ovSfvt

rov dotnuirov ScCftp

iatf Aik^j r^ fUtf E

rw hi A frovTi vwapx^uf ro o, ^appc ir%
r^ E ni A ^ndpftt. mUiv htucmcws

xmapx^Wt &np o^tWror*

4f k ftv^Scvi

oibvl

Btpiivoi^

E fitfStvl vwdpx^uf, ^iroSia rou ddiw^i^rov ^t^^v^

crrreu ot^Scvt vrrdp)(ov, ofioUa^ hi Katn rwv aXKu/y
iv dnaat yap dpdytnj tcoivor rwa Aa/3ctv opov oAAor
rctfv vnoKipJvwv, npo^ ov arai rov iJKvhoOi 6
uvXXoyiGfios, war* dtrrtarpa^unfs ravrrfs rifs
5* iripas ofLoiws
npordatwf
^XO^^*'!^*
Ti#co9 c<rrai o avXXoytofxos hia rwv avrwv opw.
hia^pi yap 6 8ucruc6s rov ct; ro ahovarov on iv
fiv rw h^ucriKw kot aXrfiui afL^orpai rlBvrai
al npordatis, cv hi rtp U ro ahworov ^lfvhws
rf fuo.
Tavra fiiv oiV OTttt ftaXXov ^ca^p^L Sc^ Toir
rrropJvwv, onrav irpl rov oBtWrou Xtywfitv vGv hi
avXX^Xoyiarai r6

xmapxtw

ra>

rtvt

^^

rm

10

roaovTOv

u htiKTucws

rjpXv

urw

hrjIXov,

ori ci? Tai>rd* pXrrrr^otf

r povXofxtvw avXXoyi^taSai koI is r6

*

To^rd COIT.

u.\a replaced

U%

C
by

raSha oodd.
its

II. xir.

oootradictorj.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxix

will apply to no
applies to all G,
but ex
;
Similarly with all other
hypothesi it applies to all.
propositions ; proof per impossibile will always be
all cases by means of the consequents and
antecedents of the extreme terms.
Moreover, in every problem the procedure is the
same whether it is required to employ an ostensive
syllogism or reduction ad impossibile
for both proofs
are effected by means of the same terms. E.g.,
supposing that it has been proved that A applies to
no E, because (if A applies to some) it follows that B
also applies to some E, which is impossible
if it is
assumed that B applies to no E but to all A, it is
evident that A will apply to no E. On the other hand
if the conclusion that A applies to no E has been
reached ostensively, if we assume that A applies to
some E, we can prove per impossibile that it applies
Similarly too in all other examples ; for
to none.
in every case we must take some common term (other
than those which have been laid down) to which the
syllogism proving the false conclusion will refer, so
that when this premiss is converted" (the other
remaining unchanged) the syllogism will become
ostensive by means of the same terms.
For the
difference between ostensive proof and proof per
impossibile is that in the former both premisses are
assumed as true, while in the latter one is assumed

possible in

as false.

These points will become clearer in the Hght of

subsequent remarks when we are discussing proof
per impossibile.^ For the present let us take it that
that we must have regard to the
so much is obvious
same terms whether it is required to prove a conclusion
ostensively or to employ reduction ad impossibile.
In
:

25S

ARISTOTLE
46k

^ hi

dbvvarov ayayct^.

roig oAAoi? avXXoytayuoii

rots ( vnodtatcjs, otov oaot urard furaXrfifHy ^

Kara iroi^rrjra, hf rots unoKi^ivois o^k ir rots i(
apx^js oAA' v rots firaXafiBai'OfiJvoi9 cortu ij
aKiijtiSt

rponos 6 avros

h<

to 7riaKt/taa$ai

rrjs

Bi Set koI BccAcu'

impXalffots.
ol i(

noaax^

uno6ata>sAciVoarroA uhf
tKoarov ratv nfMpXrifKirati
kqX oXXdv rponow 4vta ouAAoyum*
ovrws, ton
0004, rovrtoy, otou rd KaSo^v bia rqs icara fjJpos
intPki^Kuts ti v7ro$4awf. i yap ra F #ccu ra
ravra itj, fiovois Bi Ai^c&i^ rocs'
rd vvapxiv

o^

S6

murri dv r<p

ouScvi

to

rd

i^srdpvoi* ircu irdAiv ci

Tai^rd, /idpoiF 8^ toiv

Toil'

rd

r6

vnapfti.

rd

A mu

/ton^yopoiro,

dn

^ovtpov oiv art

icai

ovr cjs 'mpX7Trdov.

Tov avrov & rp6irov koI inl rCw opayKaiuv col
rwv vBxofJLvcjv' 17 yap aMi GKtjns koX Sid rtja
avrwv opcjv corcu tq rd(i rod r* Miv^oBai kojL
rov vnapxw 6 avMoytofios* Xr^nr^ov d* iirl rtjiv
ivBtxofuvQtv Kol ra fitf imdpxpvra hwara 8*
koX 8id rovrtov yiyxmapx^iv ScScufTcu yap
vcTcu d rou vSx^&9ai avXXoyiafios.
ofLotws ^^
efct Kal CTTi TCUV oAAo^ KOTTfyOpUOV,
.^
4>ai^/>dv 01^ CK Ttiiv tpTjfUvwv ou fiavov on
yx<Ji>pl Sia ravrrjs rrjs oBov yiyvtadat, ndvras rovi
ovXXoyiGfjLovs, dAAd Koi <h% Si' dAAi;; oBvyarrov,

K>

C/. 41 a :.
*
fortiori or aiudogica] arguments (AJexander 984. 19).
* t.g.^ the hypothesis In the inunediately foUovii^ ex' S3 b
amples, that
applies to
only.
ff.
,

'

854

t..

propositions expressing a
that of necessity or possibility.

modal

relation other than

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxix

the case of other hypothetical syllogisms, however,

such as involve substitution " or a qualitative
relation,^ inquiry will be concerned not with the
terms originally assumed but with those which are
substituted, while the manner of investigation will
be the same as before.
must, however, consider and analyse the different types of hypothetical
e.g.,

We

syllogisms.

Every kind of proposition, then, can be proved in Method of

way described above but some can be estab- ?ersafrom
Ushed syllogistically in another way also. E.g., uni- particular
versal propositions can be proved by the method of ^th?h^
the

investigation proper to the corresponding particular

conclusion, with the help of a further hypothesis.*'
For assuming that C and
are identical, and E
applies to
only,
will apply to all E ; and again
assuming that
and
are identical, and E is predicated only of G, it follows that
will apply to no E.
Thus it is evident that we must consider the problem

f^^J^^J
hypothesis.

way also.
The same method

in this

applies also to apodeictic

and

'^^ method

of selection
11
,.
n
i?
xir
problematic syllogisms
tor the process or inquiry is is the same
the same, and the syllogisms will be effected by means
^^^H
of the same arrangement of terms, whether it is
problematic or assertoric. In the case of problematic
propositions, however, we must include those terms
which, although they do not apply, might possibly
for it has been shown ^ that the problematic
do so
syllogism is effected by means of these also. The
same principle will hold good in the other modes of

predication.*

Thus

evident from the foregoing analysis not

syllogisms can be effected by this
method, but also that they cannot be effected by any
it is

only that

all

S55

ARtSTOTLE
yap avXXoyiafiof h^umu bid, rtpos rOm
ox^yArwv ytyi^/xvo$>, raSrra 8* o^
8i* oAAoii' crvaraBrjvou nX^ StA rwv hro^

diras fihf
40

npoifnifjJvutv
iyX(M>pi

UBfUvcjv Koi oh
vpordatis

tcai

cTTcreu ttcaarov ^k roiSrwv

1}

row fUaov

Xrjdtis,

Xoytofiov ^YxufpZ ylyvtoBoL hi

war*

y^

ov^

al

avX-

oAAfCur.

XXX. *H fuv

oiv 6S6^ Kara trdvrwv ij avn^ <ccu

wtpX ^iXooo^iav Koi wtpl rixy^ oirocoyow ureu
/ia^/xa* Set yop T<i i^a^>)^inti teal oU vndpxa
npl ttctirfpov^ adptlv, tcoX rovrwv cuy irAcurroiv
^7ropiv, Kol rairra hiA rutv rpiiav Spojv airofrci^,
dvaaKvdl^ovTa p,kv wSl, icarcu7iccva{ovTa 3^ Ml,
Kara ftcv dXt^dtiav ix rwv Kar* <SAi{^Uxy Sca^
ytypapLfidvcjv vndpxiv, is Bi rot^f StoAc^crtirovf
10 ouAAoycoj^iov; K rwv Kara h6(av trponlaU}V,
Ai 5* af>xcu ruiv ovAAoyurfuDv KaBoXov fUv
tiprprrai, 6v rpano r* cxoinn kcu oi' rponov 3cC
^pcuctv avras, orrco; /xi^ pXiirwftv is dnavra rd
Acyoftcvo,

iy

fiiyS*

avcu7#(fiMi(o^(,

rawra rara<7irva{ovr<p

ftrfi^

rar(U7Kfua(oKrcV tc

ic<u

icard

rj rivoy #co2 dvaaKX}d^ovrtf dn6 trdvrwv rj

Tivwv, oAA* ci; IXdrrw kqX wpiOfUva, iro/T Kaoro
hi cicAryciv rc5v ovrwv, olov ttc/m dyo^oO ^ iin^

u navros

'ISioi' 5c #ca^* Kdarqv uj}v al irAcurrcu.

Sd
rds /xcv ap;(ds' rd; ircpi iKoarov ifineipias iarl
irapahowai. Xeyw 5* olov ri/v darpoXoyuctjv fuv
*

larooror

mu, Bckker.

3tat Alexander.

WaiU: OUf

t^. the premiatca.

850

codd.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxix-xxx

For it has been proved that every syllogism is

by means of one of the figures already deand these cannot be composed otherwise
than by means of the consequents and antecedents
of the terms in each particular case
for it is from
these that the premisses are formed and the middle
term discovered.
Hence a syllogism cannot be
effected by any other terms than these.
XXX. The method, then, is the same in all cases, The
not only in philosophy but in every kind of art or h?id8*for ail
study. We must look for the attributes and subjects branches
of both our terms, and supply ourselves with as many ledge.
as we can
and then we must consider them by means
of the three terms, reftiting in this way, establishing
in that
when our object is truth, working from terms
which are arranged to express a true relation, and
when we require dialectical syllogisms, working from
other.

effected
scribed,

plausible premisses.
The principles ^ of syllogisms have now been de- The general
scribed in general terms, both how they are consti- now^iSen*

tuted and how we should look for them ; not by stated,

considering all that is predicated of the terms in
question, nor by considering the same attributes
whether we are establishing or refuting a proposition,
nor whether we are establishing it of all or some or
refuting it of all or some ; but by considering a hmited
number of definite attributes.
must select with
regard to each particular thing that is, e.g., with
regard to goodness or knowledge.
Most of the principles, however, which are con- but in everj
nected with a particular science are peculiar to it. knowSige
Hence to convey to us the principles connected with of tiie facts
each particular science is the task of experience. I Sde dwnw>
mean, e.g., that it is for astronomical experience to stration.

We

357

ARICTOTLR
Ma
to ifxirttpiav rrj^

yap

dcrrpoXayunj^ iirum^fjtfi^ }erf^4vTtup

ratv ^aivofUvtav

i#(ai'a>(

doTpoAayi#c(u

aTroSct^et^.

aXXriu onoioyoOv c;f4

^fjLrpov

$^

^^

npl

ffol

ivianjfirjv.

Xr)^$ij

yjSnrj

wouh^ ^p6v.
Ka^dAov fUy oiv,
iK\lyiVt
10

''*

riyyri^

ra vnapxoyra nfH lKaarov

ra^ dnoSi(ti9 iroi^AWf t^Ju^vHtw.
ci yap p-r^hkv Kara r^ taropiav irapaAci^</i} riuv
aXrjOwg xmapx&vrwv roi^ npdyfiaatp, cfo/Kr trept
dvatrros oS fuv lonv ano^t^is, ravn^v cvjpcty sect
d'noSiKvwai, oS 3^ firi vi^uKtv dw6&t(ii, roirro
ov

atOT*

ovrw^ 6p^^<mv al

ofiouos

tXpfffrai,

cAY}Ai^a/xv v

Set

cyj^cWr*

rp6no rd; nparaatK

8i*

dtcpiPtlaf

TJ npayfuiTtq, rfj ntpX

S^

r^

5i-

8ca-

XXXJ. *Or4 hk i) Sm Tttiv ywiw himpaLS yuucpov

ion rijf tpr)fUvrf9 fuBoSov, pfbiow ibthf
tori yap ij Siaiptatf otow ia0v^ atMayuffi6^' S
n
fiv yap 5i h(l(ai airirai, avXXoyilmu S^

rt fiopiw

t6

npcjTov 8' auTO rovro ^XcAif^ci Todt

XpuilUvovs avrfi irdvras, koX 7Ti0iv cVc^^cipow CJS
ovros hwarov npl ovaias awoSctf w yiyvtadax kox
Tcuv dvu}Bv.

roO Tt arw war ovrt 6 ri iv^x^rai av^Xoyioaudai hiaipoufi^vov^ (wUaop, ovrt on ovrw^
ivh\ro aKTTTcp lpiJKafiv. iv fiv o9v TOi? ano40

4t k

Sei^eaw, orav Sep

TO fieaov,
^

84* oi5

iiatpovft^vt

avXXoyiaaaSai vndpx^iv, Set

ylyvrcu 6 avXXoyiOfios, Koi

nm,

AleicandcT,

Topie$, I. xhr.

S5S

"fjrrov

WiU
^'^

*^^'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxx-xxxi

convey to us the principles of astronomy (for it was

not until the phenomena had been thoroughly apprehended that the demonstrations of astronomy were
discovered) ; and the same applies to any other art
or science. So if we apprehend the attributes of the
object in question, it will at once be in our power
for assuming
readily to exhibit the demonstrations
that none of the true attributes of the objects concerned has been omitted in our survey, we shall be
able to discover and demonstrate the proof of everything which has a proof, and to elucidate everything
whose nature does not admit of proof.
The foregoing is a rough description in general
terms of the way in which the premisses should
be selected. We have considered this subject with
detailed accuracy in our treatise on dialectic."
XXXI. It is easy to see that the process of division
by genera ^ is a minor instance of the method described above
for the division is, as it were, a weak
syllogism, since it begs the point which it is required
to prove, and always reaches a more general conclusion than is required. In the first place this fact
and
had escaped all the exponents of the process
they tried to insist that it is possible to effect a
demonstration of substance and essence. Hence they
did not understand what syllogistic conclusion can
be reached by the process of division, nor did they
realize that it can be reached in the way which we
have described. In demonstrations when it is required to prove syllogistically an affirmative proposition, the middle term, by means of which the
syllogism is effected, must always be subordinate to
;

Criticism

^atonic
definition

"
ff.,

The Platonic method of dichotomy.

Politicus 258 b ff.

Cf. Sophist 219 a.

359

by

ARISTOTLE

'fj

hi huiipm^ To^vavrlov /SovArnu- r6

yi^ mBiXon

Xnfifiopti fi^aov,

"EoTcu yap Itftov fUv c^* od \, to hi $vrjr6v i^*

oS B, Koi adavarov i^* oi V, 6 5* avdptmro^, ov rov
opov Sci Xafiiv, i4>* o^ TO A. avoy 5^ Cfpoy Aa/i/Sowt ^ ByrfTov rj adavarov rolrro &' iorof, ^ om fi
A, atrov cli^oi ^ B ^ F. noLAiv ro a^pumov <Ua
Stoipovficvos' TiJ^croi {6^ c2mu, cS^rc ftaro toO
A ri A Aofi/Sdlyct V9rapx<^t*'* ^ M^ ^^ ouAAoytOj^i^
10 ccrrtv ori to A ^ B -^ f* otraF lorreu, <SoTf t^^
ft

dvBpamov ^

$vrfT6v

/iiv

^ d^rfroTor ayayicaor

ovK dvayKotov, iXX* atr^nu'

rovTo a ^v o cSci ovAAo/utoo^.
iroi w6Xaf
e4fivos TO ficv A {<^v eyrrr6v,
vnoTTOw, d^* oS hi TO r avowf, rov 5' Mpuntov t6
A, coooimo9 Xofifiavti to ;i^ A ^TOi
T^f B ^
Tw r &ai (airov ydip C4^ Ovrfrov rj vwwowf ^
iftrotn^ ^OTt), #(aTd 6^ roO A to A (t<^ 7^^ ijfBponimf
cZixu,

{[<iKH'

BvtfTou hi

ifoShir^B

BmjTov c&'ai ^a/3rv)* oKrr* ^jr^ rpw^ fiir i|

^wov ipdyKT) t6v avOpumov, irr6mov
h* OVK ovdyKfj aXXa Xofifidptf rovro h* ^v o cSci
CGU rovrov hr^ rov rporrov act huw
to irctAiv hi(ai,
povfUvois TO fiiv KoBoXov mffifioM^t avroZs fUaov
XafLfidyw, KoB* 06 5* cSci Sc^oi #ccu to; huu^opas
OKpa. TcAos" Sc on Toi>r* coriv dvdpamof ^ o Tft
troT* ov ^ TO i7iTovfivov ovhiv Xtyotfut oo^V, ciSoT*
dvayKoXop etvai' koI yap rifp dXXrjy oSov troiotVnu
15 nSxrav, ovhi Ta? ivhexpfUva^ ^nopiaf viroXofi"
PavovTS imdpxiv,
iti)Ov

OTTOuv ct'Oi

300

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxi

the major, not a universal which includes it ; but the

process of division requires the contrary procedure,
since it takes the universal as the middle term.
be animal,' B mortal,* C imFor example, let

man,* whose definition it is required

to find. Then the exponent of division assumes that
every animal is either mortal or immortal, i.e., that
everything which is A is either B or C. Next, continuing his process of division, he takes man to be
an animal, i.e. he assumes that A is predicated of D.

mortal

'

and

'

The

svllogism, then,

C,* so that

will be either B or
Every
necessarily be either mortal or

is

man must

'

'

immortal. But that he is a mortal animal is not a

and this is the
necessary inference, but is begged
very point which ought to have been proved by
syllogism. Again, taking A as mortal animal,* B as
as man,' he assumes
footed,' C as footless and
as beiore that A is included in either B or C (since
every mortal animal is either footed or footless) and
(for he assumed that man
that A is predicated of
Hence man must be either a
is a mortal animal).
footed or a footless animal. That he is a footed
animal, however, is not a necessary inference, but is
begged ; and this again is the very point which ought
Since they into have been proved by syllogism.
variably divide in this way, it follows that they take
the universal term as the middle, and the subject to
be defined, together vidth the differentiae, as the extreme terms. Finally they make no definite statement such as is necessarily valid to the effect that
man, or whatever concept they are examining, is
so-and-so ; for they follow the other method throughout, without even suspecting that the available facilities for demonstration exist.
;

'

'

361

'

ARISTOTLE

11

^avp6v 8* on oth* avaaKtvdtmi ravrff rjf fM^

66^ arw, ovT ntfil <TVfipprjK^rt>f rj Ihlov crvAXoyiaaxjBai, ovr trtpX ytyovs, ovr

TO nOTtpOV CoSc
10

aavfifierpo^,
fjirrpov

rj

Xoyurrcu

71

^ov ya/>

davfip.rpov,

on

A</377
i}

l)

^tOfUTpOf

art aTroF /i-^o;

rj

avfi"

8^ hiafierpo^ firJKO^, avXXt"

davp^urpos ^ avf^urpo^ ^ Sid^urpo^.

&< Ai^^^icrcu aavfifutrpov^ 3 c8<i ouAAoyuyaa^oi

ci

Ai/^rcu.

oucapal(rr5cifcu*

Sea ravnjf 8' oiVc iorw.

ts

iv ofy ayvo^titu

Cu3 Xi, oloV ip*

i^

^a4V

yap ^8^ ouny^

r6 davftfM4rpo ^ a6fifLrrpo

oiJ A, /A^*fO? B, ^idfurpo^ V.

OavcpoM oi^ art oirrc 7r/>o9 ircurav atctilnv apfi6^i
oU fioXurra hoicl
Hji Irfrqatw^ 6 rpS'irog, ovr*

^^'

npintM, hf roiiroii Arrl ;(p^<n/ior.

TiKoi'

*EI#(

ira>;,

40 fiXrjfia,

^a9p6v in rwv

XXXII.

47

/i^ oi^ ai drroStiftt^ ylyvo^rrai

Kcu ct; irota fiXtirr^ov koB*

tKcumv

irai

irpS'

lpfffi4vuv,

rico; 8*

dvdfofKv rouf avXXoyiOfjLaus i

rd npoipr)fi^va crxrjfiara, XeKr4o dv tirj fter^
raOra' Xoinov ydp fri roCro rrjf OK^Itttu^, tl yap
Tjjv

Tc yVOw tCjv av^Xoyiopuiv dcutpolfuv koI toO

VpujKtv xoifLv Bvvofjuv, cTi hi Tov^ yyvrip^vov9

6

QvaXvoifiv i9 TOL npoipt)fjJva axT^fiara, T^Xof air

e^ot ^ ^( ^PXl^ rrpddcais. ovfipT^crat 8* dfia koI
TO, TTpoTipov lprjfiva TT^fiatovoBiu Kol ^avt-

panepa
*

lv<u

ori ovtcjs c^Ci

Apparently the
processes in general.

S6

word

is

8id riav vvy Xex'

here used to

mean

iafcr^siSSa]
^* ' *^'
'

"

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
r It is evident that

by

this

I.

xxxi-xxxii

method

it is

impossible

either (a) to refute a proposition, or to draw an

inference (b) about an accident or property, or (c)
about a genus, or (d) in cases where a question of
fact is uncertain, e.g., whether the diagonal of a square

incommensurable with the sides. For if one

assumes that every linear magnitude is either commensurable or incommensurable, and the diagonal
is a Hnear magnitude, the conclusion is that the
diagonal is either commensurable or incommensurable
and if one assumes it to be incommensurable,
he will be assuming what ought to have been proved
by syllogism. Therefore proof is impossible ; for
this is the method, and by it there is no proof.
A
stands for commensurable or incommensurable,* B
for Unear magnitude,' C for diagonal.*
is

is

it

'

evident (1) that this method of inquiry

not adapted for every investigation, and (2) that
is useless even in those cases for which it is supposed

Thus

it is

be especially suitable.
Thus it is evident from the foregoing account by
what means and in what way demonstrations are
effected, and what kind of attributes should be taken

to

into account in each type of problem.

We

XXXII.
must next explain how to reduce Reduction
this menS^to
syllogisms ^ to the figures previously described
part of our inquiry still remains. For if we examine syllogistic
^'
the means by which syllogisms are produced, and
possess the ability to invent them, and can also
reduce the syllogisms when constructed to the
figures previously described, our original undertaking will be completed. Incidentally our previous statements will be further confirmed, and their
accuracy will be made more evident, by what is now
;

363

ARISTOTLE
9rfaofitvwv'

yap

5ci

OfwXoyovfUvov

ro aXrjBti avro iaurt^

trdy

ttvax ndyrjj.

o^

YlpdfTov fiv

ra; hvo irporaatts

hi nipda6ai

rod (rv^XoyuMyuov (p^ov yap tls rdk

fUifoi SicAciv rj ra tXdma, /Ki(a> S4 ra ovyxcif&CMi
fj i( ctfv), cfra aicofrciv nortpa hf oXtp koX nordpa
ixXofifidi^iv

hf tUpi, KoX l

u rtdlvra r^v

(Lpj^

fjcff

Iripav.

iXrifA^dvai tUw,

yap tt^

iviort

a:M

Kod^ko^

npoTfivatrrts rqy iv ravrj) ov Xapfidifovau^t oSr%

ypoj^vTt^ ovr
Ttlvown,

84*

ipurrutvrt^'
5*

cSv

^ ravras

av

tXBjj Tif 19

o^K

ro

fiiv

dn^ov to

5*

a^aiprriop iuff

Toy hvo wporaati^' dvtv yap ra6rtmf

oimoy

^pamjfUvovs

firi

moi

3o(ou(n auXAoyi{[ca^cu 5ia r^

rai

oyayiccudir r avfifiaivtuf
Xrf<^lrj

ct

oMayicauuy iropa*

vtwv ficv 01^ p^Siov iScty ro cv^/y,

$ Aov^ovovai

tft

n rcuv

lUmv ovayaycu^ rovy

Xoyovs*

wpo-

OKmriov odw

novaiv, oAAa $ fuiTTjv ipurroKJi.

Ti trtpUpyov c^^irrai #cai
>o AcAccirroi, ircU

fihf

aSrat wfpau^vrai irapoAct-

iK rtav

f(ifUvajv, otov

ot^uxy avaipovfidvrjt

fiij

dpaipta6U

ouatov^ ^ atv o cortv avaipovfUvwv koi ro 4k

rouTwv <f>dipGBai' rovrwv yap r^dhrrutv ovayKoiaif
pv TO ovaias fjUpo^ c&oi ova&oy* ov ftipf ouAAcAo*

yturai hia rtov tiXr^fifUviuv, oAA* dXXiinovat npoTdaiS.

ndXiv

ct

avSpamov ovros ovaymj

*

S64

i<pov ttvai

^yoynr Adno.

In this case the terms.

C/. Tapio, VIII.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
to follow

for every truth

I.

must be

xxxii
in all respects

self-consistent.
First, then, we must try to select the two premisses The pro^^
of the syllogism (since it is easier to analyse into the SJ nghwy
chosen,
greater than into the smaller parts," and the composite is greater than its constituents), and then and^proconsider which is universal and which particular, Jf^f^^g^'
supplying the missing premiss ourselves if only one
has been assumed ; for both in writing and in
argument people sometimes, while stating the universal premiss, fail to mention the premiss contained
in it, or they state the immediate premisses, but
omit to mention the premisses from which they are
inferred, and unnecessarily ask for the concession of
must consider, then, whether anything
others.
superfluous has been assumed, and whether anything
necessary has been left out, and we must posit the
latter and reject the former until we arrive at the
two premisses ; for without these we cannot reduce

We

arguments which have been suggested in the way

described above.^ The inadequacy of some arguments is easily seen, but others escape detection and
appear to have a syllogistic force because some
necessary conclusion follows from what is laid down :
e.g., if it were assumed (a) that substance is not
destroyed by the destruction of non-substance, and
(6) that if the constituents of anything are destroyed,
that which is composed of them also perishes ; for
if we posit these assumptions it necessarily follows
that any part of substance is substance, yet it has
not been proved syllogistically by means of the assumptions ; the premisses are deficient. Again, if
something animate must exist if man exists, and
substance must exist if something animate exists,
865

ARISTOTLE
0

Kol {aM>v ovalav, dvBpanrov ovro^ avtrytcrf

oMatf

cZmi* oAA* ovTTut GvXXiXoyiaTcu' ov yap txovaw at

npordatif

cuj ttnofuy.
toIj toiovtoi^ Sta to <miy'Awarcofic^a 8'

OV/i/SouWiV X

ICOiC^ Ti

T<^l^

KifUvUfV, OTi ICCU

ouAAoyur/io; cUyiaiu>y ianv*

ovoyicaibi'
s

9rd9

(TuAAoyiom^^* d fiiv

'^ <{

inl nXiov hk t3

yap

avAAoyui]piot

ovayKOiOv, ro h* avayKoiov ov nay <foAXo-

yiofios,

WOT* ovK

ft ri avfiPaiyti n Biwr

wv

riMtir

wipaTOV dvdytiv v6ui, aXXa npatrov Xrpniov ras

hvo npordafiiSi

fVSt ovrut

SuxipT^QV tli rovs opov^t

fUaonf Si dtriov ruiv opcav rov ofn^ordpois Ttuf

yap t6 fuaov ^9
awaat rocf ax^fuunr, iia^
^^fX4V ovv Karrjyop^ koI Karriyopijrai r6 pJacfV, ij
auTo fi<v Ka-rqyopj aXXo 5* iKwov dirapt^rjfrai, to
npordatai

40

Acyd/ivoi>*

opfiytcrf

dfi4^oT^pais ^rrdp^tw iv

irpufTO

coTCu ox^fiA' iay Si

teal

t<arqyop

icai

r6 fUaav ^dv S* 6XXa iKt^vau

to ^cv awapt^fjrai to 64 #wit^

dirapvfjroi dir6 rtvo^,

KOT tjryopfiTaif ij
to <Txarov' ovrw yap cfj^cv /v tKoarta
ofiotws Bi iccu cav fii^ KoBdXov
tTXTJfiarL TO fUaov.
iLoiv ai irpoToacif* d yap aurd; huipioyuoi roQ
if>aifp6v oSv ca$- cV a Adyc^ /i^ Xtytrai
fUaov.
ravTo irXeovaKig, ori ov ytyvmu tTvXXoytOfto^' oi
riyopfjrai,

10

yd/) ftXrfTrrat fUoov.

OTa>
ei'

a;^fuiTi

rtVt

htti 8* fyofiV iroibr

nepalverai

rGtif

TO KadoXov koI v notw ro iv ^pi,

\mr

866

^ icch

npopXTjfidrtaif, iral

25 b 35, 96 b 36. 8 a

Ig.

^app^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xxxii

I.

substance must exist if man exists

but the argument is not yet a syllogism, because the premisses
are not conditioned in the way which we have de;

scribed.

We are misled in these examples by the fact that Not every

something necessarily follows from what has been ^wch^vea
laid down, because the syllogism is also necessary, a necessary
^^"
But necessary has a wider extension of meaning isT
than syllogism,' for every syllogism is necessary, but syllogism,
*

'

not everything necessary

is

a syllogism.

Hence

if

something follows from certain assumptions we must

not immediately try to reduce the argument to a
syllogism
we must first grasp the two premisses,
and so proceed to analyse them into their terms, and
posit as the middle term that which is stated in both
premisses for in all the figures the middle term must
be present in both premisses. Thus if the middle
term both is and has a predicate, or is itself a predicate and has something else denied of it, we shall
have the first figure
if it is a predicate and has
something else denied of it, we shall have the middle
figure
and if other terms are asserted of it, or if one
term is denied and the other asserted of it, we shall
have the last figure
for we have seen" that the
middle term stands in these relations in the several
;

figures.

versal

Similarly too if the premisses are not uni-

middle term is the

evident that if in any
not stated more than

for the definition of the

same as before. Thus it

argument the same term

is
is

once, there is no syllogism, because no middle term

has been taken. And since we now comprehend
what type of proposition is proved in each figure,
in which figure the universal proposition is
i.e.
proved and in which the particular, it is evident that

367

ARISTOTLE
w^ o^K

i9 dmarra ri. ox^fMra fiXtrrr^ov, aXX*

KQXJTv npoPMiyuaroi 19 to ouctiO,
ioa. h* iv
rrXtioai 7rpaJvrai, rg rov yiiaov Biatt yywpiovfuv

TO

axfjfia.

XXXIII.

lloXXajcis uhf odv airaraadai avfifialvti

Tov^ QvXXoyicfiovg hia t6 ovayKoZov, tjoirtp
iprjT<u Ttportpov, ivior bi napa t^v 6fioi6rnjra
rijs rCxv oputv 0/acais' ontp od xp4 XoLvBdtftw ij/ior.
oXov tiro \ Kara rov B A/vrrcu koI ro B Kara toO
r* 5o(cM yap av ovru^ tYOvrufP rdrv opatv ttvai
auXXoyiofxo^, ov ytyvrroi S our* dvayKoiov oi)^v
ovrt avXXoyuTix6f. iarw yap c^* <p A to act thnu,
i^* a 5^ B hiovar/ro^ *ApiarofUvrf^, ro S* c^* <j^ F
n^ A T(ji> B &ndpx*u^' dtl
*Apiarofi4vrfs- aAi^(
7rpi

10

yap iort biavonjr6f *Apurrofi^Yrf^. cUAa fa4 t^ B

nrtp V' 6 yip Apurrofi^^ tori ScoKmrt^ *A^aropJvn^, ro h* A rw V oux VTrdpvtr ^ffapr6f ydp
* Apioro^i^vr^
ov yop* iyiyvtro aviXo'
ovrws Ixovrwv rwv opwv, dXX* IScc KaB^Xov
rhv AB Xrj^Sfjvai irpdraaw, roOro 3^ i^tvSos, ro
d(tovv vdvra rov SiovoT/Tov * ApioroyJvfjv del thai,

ioriv o

ytapuo^

iftdaprrov

ovros

Aptarofitvov^

IIoAiv eoTco TO

80

fjiv

t<y <L

MucKoXos, ro

h*

^*

wB

TO ^c4>cfiovatKOi MucKoAo;, c^* o) Sc t3

o^cu aupiov. dXr)6ts 617 to B tov F KarrryoptiV'
6 yap MucKoXog tart fiovirucos MuckoAos* oAXo. koa

ro

A rov B* ^tipoiro yap d avpiov fiovaucos Mur^

47a

81.

oiS

ydf ]

ouic

ofM n Bekker.

WaSO.

cease to be cultured. The example ii unhappily

chosen, since * cultured Miccalus* is a oarrover tenn than
'
Micoedus * unqualified, aiid therefore cannot properly stand
* ..

368

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xxxii-xxxiii

I.

we should not take all the figures into account at any

given time, but only the figure proper to the proposition in question.
Where the proposition can be
proved in more than one figure, we shall identify
the figure by the position of the middle term.
XXXIII. It often happens, then, as we have Some argualready said,** that we are misled in our consideration J^ough not
of syllogisms by the sequence of a necessary con- syllogisms,
elusion
but we are also sometimes misled a fact fi?Kght
which must not be overlooked as the result of a ^ ^ *^
similar arrangement of terms, e.g., if A is predicated
of B and B of C. For it would seem that with this
relation of terms there is a syllogism, although no
necessary consequence or syllogism results. Let A
stand for always existing,* B for Aristomenes as an
object of thought and C for Aristomenes. Then it
is true that A applies to B, because Aristomenes as an
object of thought always exists. But B also applies
to C ; because Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an
object of thought. Yet A does not apply to C ;
because Aristomenes is perishable. For no syllogism is produced, as we saw,^ by the above combination of terms
to produce a syllogism the premiss AB
ought to have been taken universally. But it is false
to postulate that all Aristomenes as an object of
thought always exists, since Aristomenes is perishable.
Again, let C stand for Miccalus, B for cultured
Miccalus * and A for perishing to-morrow.* Then it
is true to predicate B of C, because Miccalus is
cultured Miccalus. But it is also true to predicate
of B, for cultured Miccalus may perish to-morrow.*'
;

as a middle. In the previous example * Aristomenes as an

object of thought,* being a kind of universal, is a legitimate
middle.

369

ARISTOTLE
K

icoAoy*

iari

r6 h4 y

roO

np&rtpov

rtft

iroAof fiovaucd^

rovro

Ztf

rovror

Mur^ipr<u avpunr tq&tov hk fJj

yap

oi)

on

0cuSo(.

:r01H*I

dXrfS^f tcoBoXov

Xrj^^VTos o^K ^v avXXoyiafiof.

o^

Avrri fihf

"fi

dndrrj

ytyvmu

iw

rw mp^

Hucpov ws yap ovSh^ hia^pov tmtp r66t t^^Sm

40

toSc rt^ ttovti inapxtiv avyxtopoOfUl^,

TLoXXoKis hi huultvOa&ai av^'nat
TO* TTopd TO fi'^i KoXws Kri0a&ai Towy ^raTo ti^t
cri] vyUia, t6
nporaaw 6pov9 olov ci to fiiv
u7Tapx^y

rj

XXXIV.

5^>' <^ By6aos, ^* <^ S^ r Mpanrot, ^ iXtiSkt

yap tlntiv ori r6 A ou5cvi rut B cvMxcnu vmipxtiv
(oi)8c^i^ yap voac^ vyUta inrdpxi), teal naXw on
TO B trayri np V vnapxi {irds yap dvBpumo$
8Kruc6^ v6aov). 5<^icv ay odv avfifialvtw firfio^
d$pcanw M^aBai {rfUiop {mtipxiv, rovrou h*
aSno TO u^ KoXut^ ^KtctiaOoi rav^ 6pou9 teara r^
ioXl(w, hri ^uraXrfi^B^VTwv rwv Kara rd^ cfcty oiW
<rroi avXXoyuTfJLo^, otav drri fUv rrjf iyt^iaf ^l
rtdtif) TO vytaxvov, dvri 5^ rrj^ v6aov to voodA<
ov yap dXrjdts ctVciv toy oi5#f M^x^rai rw voooByti
TO iJytaw^iv vndpiai, rovrov S^ ui^ Xr^ivroi od
ylyvtrai avXXoyujftos ,
oi5k

16 o*

dBtWTOv

4 ^ij

cv6<';(crai

tou v6<x^tt** toOto

yap fii^Scvt dvOpamtp

vndpx^iv vyUtav,
WaXiv ini rov fUaou o^/iaTos
^IfcvSog' riiv

yap vyUiay

ofioiuti

if6a<p yuv ovSfA*a

B navrl ivhdxrrai undpx^ty, uxjt

ovSm

arai to
dvOpionw
dvBpumtp

,u;26a30.
.!

This should

The reading

^0

strictly

be a problematic premiM.
an apoddctic c

v^oo implies

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxiii-xxxiv

Thus the case is

it is false to predicate A of C.
the same as before, because it is not universally true
of cultured Miccalus that he perishes to-morrow
and unless this is assumed there is, as we saw," no
But

syllogism.

This mistake, then, has its origin in a slight disfor we assent to the argument as though
;
there were no difference between the statements
this appHes to that and this applies to all of that.'
XXXIV. It will often happen, however, that we Fallacies
are entirely misled through failure to set out the fJuityS^terms properly in the premiss: e.g., supposing that Ji^^o^^i* o'
A is health,' B disease and C man.' For it is
true to say that A cannot apply to any B (since health
applies to no disease) and again that B applies to all
C (since every man is Hable to disease).^ Thus it would
seem to follow that health cannot apply to any man.
The reason of this is that the terms are not properly
expressed in the proposition, since if we substitute
for the respective states the objects corresponding
I mean supposing
to them, there will be no syllogism
that the healthy is posited instead of health,' and
the diseased instead of disease.' For it is not
true to say that being healthy cannot apply at any
time to the diseased ; but if this is not assumed, no
syllogism results, except of the problematic type.
This is not impossible, since health may apply to
tinction

'

'

'

'

'

no man.
Again, in the middle figure the fallacy will occur
health cannot apply to any disease,
in a similar form
but may apply to every man hence disease does not ^
:

'

cannot apply.* This

38 a 13 ff. Either

in

is

inconsistent with Aristotle's doctrine

a careless mistake, or we should

it is

read voaos.

371

ARISTOTLE

teal yap vyltiav koI v6ooifl

kcu ayvouiv, kox oXujs rd ivarrltl
rtp atVrip v$;(crou xmapxtiv, oAA^Aoif 8' 6jMvQroi

avfiPalvti r6 i/KvSo^,

KoX

inurrrjfirjv

rovTO

yap

5* ovofioAoyov/xcvov roi; npoipnfjfUvoii' Srtt

Tip adrtp

nXtiw ^B^x*^^ umipx^tv, ^S^x^rt^

^avp6v otV

nylyvmu

amun

ir

BivTwv yap rwv Kara ray

^c^aSos*.

roihiHS

avarrj

mip6. rrjv ruiv opcav ticBtaw firraXff^

SijXov

o^ on

ffci$-

<Mh^ ylyrrmi

icard rd; roiavraf

npo^

rdatis d<i to Kara n^v cfiv dvri rrjs Iftwf fura^

XrjTrTov Kol Btrlov opov.
XXXV. Ov ScJ hk ro^ opov9 omI trjriw <W
aofiar* tKridtadai' wo^Xajcii yap laoirrai X6yoi otp
Si6 XQ^''^ dvdytuf rovt
o^ jcciTOi ovofia
roiovrav^ atfXXoytafiov^. iviort Bi Kai dnardadai
avfAfi/jarxu &td

n^v roiovrrpf

afUawv iarl avXXoytapL&i

^* a>

rpLyuivov, i^*

{ijnyau', otov

iarw rd
h^

&n

ra/

A hvo opBal, r6

laooKtXd^.

rw fU

8td r6 B, rtp ht B ovk^ti 8t'

vndpxti t6
oAAo* Koff* auro yap ro rplywvov Xi 5uo SpBds,
war* ovK arai p-laov rod AB diro^ucroO ovto^.
^Vp6v yap ori ro fitaov ovx ovrw^ oci Xrjvrtov
cu? Todc Ti, a^\ fvioTC Aoyoi', oircp avfipaiyti Kam
rov XexOfvros.
XXXVI. To hi vndpxiv to rrpamm rtp fidtnp
40

u o^ r

* {..

S7

an

rtfoof f

ry. 39 a 14-19.
represent them by single words.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxiv-xxxvi

In the third figure, however, the

for health
and disease, knowledge and ignorance, and in general
any pair of contraries may apply to the same object,
but it is impossible that they should apply to one
another. But this is inconsistent with what we said
apply to any man.

fallacy results in respect of possibility

above,** for it

was

laid

down

that

when

several things

apply to the same thing they may apply also

to one another.
Thus it is evident that in all these cases the error
for when
arises from the setting out of the terms
we substitute for the states the objects corresponding
to them, no fallacy results. Thus it is clear that in
such premisses as these we must always substitute for
a given state the object which is in that state, and
posit this as our term.
XXXV. We should not always attempt to set out Terms canthe terms by name,^ because we shall often have beexp^*8^e(i
expressions for which there is no accepted name, in a single
^^
(Hence it is difficult to reduce syllogisms of this kind.)
Sometimes it will happen that we are actually misled
as the result of such an attempt ; e.g., so as to suppose that there can be a syllogism of propositions
which have no middle term. Let A stand for two

may

'

and C for isosceles.*

right angles,' B
Then A applies to C because of B, but it is not because of any other term that A applies to B, for the
triangle of itself contains two right angles, so that
there will be no middle term of the proposition AB
although it is demonstrable. For it is evident that
the middle term is not always to be taken as an indias happens
vidual thing, but sometimes as a formula
in the example just quoted.
XXXVI. We must not assume that the first term
for

triangle

373

ARISTOTLE

lOlOT

tcai

Tovro

itft

dtcpt^

cA hi

Xofifioput^ ut9

<ici

tear*

rod fUaov Koi rovro rov taxo^rou [koX hrl roB

fiij mrapxw S' waavTwsY oAA* oaaxyn to ttvq^
Kiyrai koI r6 oAi^cf tlwtiy

aiM

rotnw

roOro,

oUoBai xp^ afffxaa^tP koI r6 ihr^>)^civ. oZbr

Sn ru/p ivayrCtov iarl fda iirtan^^ri' Hono yap r^
A TO /uov tvaL iuurrqfiTfy, ra tvayrui oAAi^XcKf
^* o^ B* TO
A 7^ B xmapx^i ovx i*fS ra ivatma
r6 fdttP (hm avrutw intan/ifirjw, <iAA* Srt aXrjSit
^
l7rtv KOT o^rcDv /xioy hai airwv hnanjfiyiP,
ra;(cof

^vfxfiaiyti 8* ar<

/itfv

XiytoBai ro hk fuaov
olov ci
1}

^I

iirl

tou fUaov ro tr/xifro|

rod rptrov fi^ XiytaBaum

CTO^ux ^oTiv ^iTum^fiY;,

1}

TO0

ao^tla [^7rt<mJ/iiy],* avfin^paafia

iarw

7riarT^fjLfj'

OTv^fii},

ro

yuev

8^ dyo^oy

$ ao^ia iorlv hriarrnai,

1}

8* <iya^oo forly

6n

rov aya0o0

ou#c Ibni'

ori Bi r6

^mn
fiif,

fUaov enl rov rptrov Xfymu, ro 5 vpunop iwi

rov fi4aov oi5 A^ymu* otov ci rod iroiov irayr^s
iarw inum^fir) rj ivavrlov, ro 5' dyoBov xal ivaP'
rlov KOX noiov, avyintpaapa /icv on rov ayaBa^
<mv inurrqfirf, ovk art 5c r6 ayoBov tnum/jfUf
ovS ro notoif oC^ ro cfovrtor, oAAfd r6 dyaBi
loravra.

pAoov

art hk or
iirjr

icara rov

mi

rrpCrrttv

Ka,ra Torf

vpdmm

rptrov ork ficv Xeyofjuvov dr 3<

Xcyofievov olov
i^i J-

prffTt

rovro Kara rov rptrov, rov

.5

ct

oS eirum^fui
*<muBdtker.

<rrtp,

m
*

fu!^

roJroti
^ ^-^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxvi

applies to the middle and the middle to the extreme * The terms in
in the sense that they will always be predicated of ^gg^^^ay
one another or that the first term will be predicated stand in
of the middle in the same way as the middle is pre- than'^the
dicated of the last (the same caution applies also to nominative.
negative predication).
must suppose that the
expression to apply has as many different senses as
there are senses in which we say that a thing is, or
that it is true to say that it is. Take, e.g., the statement that there is one science of contraries.^ Let
stand for there being one science,' and B for things
contrary to one another.* Then
appUes to B, not
in the sense that the contraries are there being one
science ' of them, but in the sense that it is true to
state of them that there is one science of them.

We

'

It happens sometimes that the first term is stated

of the middle, but the middle is not stated of the

term e.g., if wisdom is knowledge, and wisdom

concerned with the good, the conclusion is that
knowledge is concerned with the good. Then the
good is not knowledge, although wisdom is knowledge.
Sometimes the middle term is stated of the third, but
the first is not stated of the middle ; e.g., if there is a
science of every quaUty or contrary, and good is both
a contrary and a quality, the conclusion is that there
is a science of the good ; but the good is not science,
nor is the quaUty or the contrary, although the good
is a quahty and a contrary.
Sometimes neither the
first term is stated of the middle nor the middle of
the third, while the first is sometimes stated of the
third and sometimes not. E.g., if there is a genus of
third

is

minor term.
that both members of any given pair of contraries
health and disease) are studied by the same science.

i.e.
*

{e.g.

i.e.

375

ARISTOTLE
iarw ^wumjfiti, avfin^paafm
roC ayoBoO tan ydvo^* KarrfyofKinu 5* od5^

y^K>9> rot; h* ayoBov

&n

u Kar*

3* oS iarw inurrri^fj, yivo^

dya^ou
<mv cVionJfiiy, avfind"
S*
Kara fUv h^i roO
rayoBov
ar%
y4vo^'
paafia &n
OKpov KaTffyoptirai to irpanov, tear* iXX-qXutv 5* od

ov^v6s,

ct

iarl roOro, rov

Xfytrcu.

toO ft^ ^wd^x'"'

Toy avrov &^ rp6'nQ kcI
ov yap ati <7i|fuuMi r6 /117 vwapxv^ ro8c

Xrfnr^ov,

Wr^^
ttJSc

tcunrfots

dpa

T^

cJyOi

oAA* ^l^tOTC T^

Tf

in ovK

iraXi

rj

S^ o^k

arifittav

arjiutov 6 ylkuii,

on

ion

6fioluf9

&tU

fi'^

iari Kurfyjtioi

urrw

o^

y^Xurros fUw

Icm

ytviatun y4vOii, iT^oi^

rj

Tf^yfi yiins'

atf^tiov,

tft

T^,

To08 ^ i^Jt lySf, olov

8'

war* <A

arffulov,

tciy rxKS SXXoii

ii!

oooif ovoipcrrai to npopXrifui rt^ XiytoBal n<us

npo^ auTO TO yivos,

iroAiv

on 6

K<up69 ovk

um
^

XP^vos hitMMf' Bttp yap Kmp6^ fUm ion, XP^^'^

OVK Han S^lttir StA r6 fi-ffihf c2mu Bttp w^^Xtfum.
Btr4o Koipiiw kqX xP^*^ hiovra koX
opovs yuh

y^

Biov, rfjv 8^
40

iravTojv,

an

jcA^oci?

rmv

vavrla,

ro

touj

ftv

ovofidrwv, olov avBpttrnos

hiirXoLaiaVt

ayoBifv

fj

olov ro laov,

on

rj

ayoBov rj tvayrlwv, rag

Kara rdy tKaarov wrcoacif

ovk avBpumov

yap on rovrw,

^0

Xrjnrdov

aTrXHt^

8c 7Tpordai^ XrjTrrtov
rj

Kara rrfv rov <5w

yap rovro Xiyofitv Kara
opov^ ail Brr4ov Kara ras

npoToaw

fJMros irrtoaw,

fj

&n

rovrov, olo^

rovro, cXav to tvvtov

i}

opw>v

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxvi

that of which there is a science, and there is a science

of the good, the conclusion is that there is a genus of
the good ; yet nothing is predicated of anything.
But if that of which there is a science is a genus, and
if there is a science of the good, the conclusion is
that the good is a genus. Thus the first is predicated
of the extreme term, but the terms are not predicated
of one another in the premisses.
The same must be understood to apply to negative
does not
does not apply to
'
predication ; for
is not
but sometimes there is no
always mean
of
'or for Y.* Take, for instance, the statement
there is no motion of motion or generation of generation, but there is generation of pleasure ; therefore
pleasure is not generation.' Or again there is a sign
of laughter, but there is no sign of a sign ; hence
laughter is not a sign.' Similarly too in all other cases
in which the proposition is refuted by stating the
genus in a certain relation to the terms of the proposition. Again, there is the argument that opportunity is not the right time ; for opportunity belongs
to God, but the right time does not, because nothing
must posit as terms opporis convenient to God.
tunity and right time and God,' but the premiss
must be understood according to the case of the noun.
For we maintain as a general rule which applies without exception to all examples that whereas the terms
must always be posited in the nominative case (e.g.,
man * or good or * contraries,' not of man or
*
of good * or of contraries '), the premisses must be
understood in accordance with the case of each term:
either in the dative, e.g.,
equal to this,* or in the
genitive, e.g., double of this,' or in the accusative,
e.g., 'that which strikes or sees this,' or in the

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

'

877

ARISTOTLE
iriirrti

raSvoyui tcarA r^v npirnutw.

XXXVII.

T<J h*
V7rdpxt9 TtJSf r^Sc tnX to
aAT7^cw<7^cu To3 #card rowSc To<7airro;(ai^ Xrjrrr^ov

oaaxuts ai KaTqyopiai
rj

anXuts, cri anXas

TO fi'fj vndpxtiv,
hiopurr^ov P^Xnov,

io*ca*

XXXVIII. To
Xdyw

lU<n^.
rfj^
ift

Koi ravra^

nv

rj

ofioiats Sc

hnatcrnriov b^ ravra

8* rrrapaUmJio^Sii4PO iv raZ^

#c2

npo-

olo l ^hniro auXXoyurfiot oft

ttnan/jfirf in AytMv, r6 Srt

i*

hucaioawrj^ iartv

aya^oi'

yap TO

dya06v irpos r^ npom^ dtrioy. iarta

fj
7narq^ri ori ayoi^oi', ^^' <^ 3^ B dyadov,
oAi^c; to0 B
hi T hucaioawTj.
to Sri
tj

c^* <^
KarrjYopijaai, tow

dyoBov

10

hi^frrjinxu,

^ aviuti'nXtyyJvQS'

yo^ aya^ov Ot&v

cirumj/iiy

on

tov F, i) /a/) SacoiOOYA^

oircf> dyadov,
ovtw yikv oiV yiyvmu omoAxioi;*
ci 8^ Trpo? Tof B rtStif) r6 an iyaB6if, o^k Itrrmik*
TO fih ydp A #coTa rov B dX9f$is l^rtu, ti^
B
KtiTtt ToC r o^K dXrjBt^ ioTfU' ri ydp dyoB^ &n
dyadov KarrjYopdv rij^ hucauxrwrj^ ^vSo? #fou ov
awerov. oyuolws 8c koX ci to t^yuivoi^ hti^x^tin an
dXXa. koI to

coTiv i-niGTrjTov
ts

ov,

rj

fj

dyo-Bov,

dvBpcjiros if>daprr6v

rj

rpaytXa/^os^

alaBrjrov' v

jj

fifj

dwaai yap

* Uteimlly * goat-deer *t
oonventkNial emnple of
fabulous animaL C/. Plato, Rtpublie 488 a, Aristophanes.

Fro98 937.
* t.4. it

878

b known

not to exist

Thb

seems to be the tnM

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
nominative,

e.g.,

xxxvi-xxxviii

I.

man is an animal

or in any other

way in which the noun occurs in the premiss.

XXXVII. The statements that X applies to

Y and Various

true of
must be understood in as many
difFerent senses as there are distinct categories ; and
the categories must be taken either in a particular
or in an unqualified sense, and further as either
simple or compound. Similarly too with negative
attribution.
These points, however, call for further
consideration and more adequate analysis.
XXXVIII. Any term which is duplicated in the
premisses should be attached to the first extreme and
not to the middle. I mean, e.g., that supposing we
should have a syllogism to the effect that there is
knowledge of probity that it is good,* the expression
*
that it is good or qua good should be attached
stand for knowledge that
to the first term.
Let
good and C for probity.' Then
it is good,* B for
of B, for there is knowledge
it is true to predicate
of good that it is good. But it is also true to predicate B of C ; for probity is identical with one form
of good. Thus in this way an analysis can be effected.
Supposing, however, that the expression * that it is
good be attached to B, there will be no analysis ;
for
will be true of B, but B will not be true of C,
since to predicate of probity that it is good that
it is good is false
and unintelligible. Similarly
too supposing that it be proved that the healthy
"
is qua good an object of knowledge, or that a unicorn
is qua non-existent an object of knowledge,^ or that
a man is qua perceptible perishable ; for in all

that

is

'

meaning. So^aarov, as imaginary,' makes good sense, but

it has very little authority, and I have followed Waitz and
Jenkinson in rejecting it.
*

879

the^Steg^^j^.^

Syllogisms
qualified

premisses.

ARISTOTLE

IH

roi( hrucarrfyopovfUvoi/S npo^

axptp rrpf itraya"

rtft

BinXoHTiv Brrlov,

OvX 4 aMi

hk Biaii tuv optav otqm ait\u>i

ovXXoyioB^ KoX oray to8<

otoy
0

oTov

rayiiBav
art

itnarrjTov^

rl ov,

TOW

on

t6

8^ TO

^ r

ya/> i<^*

apa

tnurrrffiTj

rij^

&lov

ov

Komfyopiw,

i}v

ti* cMrrr ircU

on

ora^f

to

aya^cW.

yh^ hrum^firj

A roO

tov F^

F. lorroi

aya66v' ^v yap r6 rl
S^ to or yJoo

on

inurrqfiri

<ff

^AAa koX to

rl o%r

rayadoC

atcpi^

/a4v

H^

ro

rx^

orjfiMiov ovaiaf.

KtjX itpos r(p

kqI

anXu^ im^

fciv

hk}^ 6v

trtif, X/yctf T*

tti^fi^

ct

tana yap ro

roO rivos ovrof

oAi;^^;

tft

i^ ^

<SAA*

tj

fidaov Btriov ro 6v, ft 8*

ayodov, r6 il .

on

iirtQrrjTOv

aya$6v

h^ucTot,

OTijr ov

trj

rj

TO ^v anXw^ koX

fiij

Stf

M0fi

r6 rl Sv

cA<x^' ovc ay ^v ovXXoytafioi on tarut inurn^firi

rayaBoG on ayaB69, oAA* oti 6v, oto c^* ^ t^ A
k 7rurti^^rj

^avp6v

on

6v,

o^ on

<j>*

iv

at

rots

ov, c^'

iv fUpei

dyo^oi',

avXXoyuifUHS

ovrta^ XrjTrr^ov rov^ opov^.

XXXIX.

Aci hk KOX firaXimPdytv a ro avro

bvvarai, ovofiora arr* ovoyuarwv kox Xoyovs ayri

*

imua ni twf

n oodd.

om.

Boethluft, Watti.

* L$, nuOor.

880


PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxviii-xxxix

instances of supplementary predication the reduplication must be attached to the extreme ^ term.
The arrangement of terms is not the same when a
syllogism is proved without qualification and when
the proof relates to a particular thing or sense or
condition ; I mean, e.g., when the good is proved
to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved
If it
to be an object of knowledge that it is good.
is proved to be the former, we must posit as the
middle term * that which is ; if to be the latter,
with the qualification that it is good,* we must posit
as the middle * that which is something.'
Let
stand for * knowledge that it is something,' B for
*
that which is something ' and C for good.' Then
it is true to predicate
of B, for ex hypothesi there is
knowledge of something that it is something. But
it is also true to predicate B of C, for that which C
represents is something. Hence it is also true to
predicate
of C. Therefore there will be knowledge
of the good that it is good for ex hypothesi the expression that which is something refers to the thing's
particular form of being.
But if we had posited that
*

'

'

as the middle term, and had connected in

a proposition with the extreme term the unqualified

which

is

'

expression that which is ' instead of that which is

something,' there would have been no syllogism
proving that there is knowledge of the good that it is
had stood for
good, but only that it is, e.g., if
knowledge that it is,' B for that which is,' and C for
good.' Thus it is evident that in syllogisms which
are thus particularized the terms must be taken in
*

'

'

this

way.

XXXIX. We must also substitute

stituting

word

for

word and phrase

equivalents, subfor phrase, and

381

ARISTOTLE
ft

i'l

\6yo9V KoX ovofJLa koI X6yov, Koi act dvrl rtw XSyou
rowofia XoLufiavtiv p^wv yap 1} riuv opaiv Ik^cok.
otov 1 firfiiv hia^pi cttrciv r6 tWoAiyirror rod
So(aarov /xi^ ttvai y4vo^ i) /*^ tXvai ontp viroX tfitr ^v
ri TO So^curTOv (ravrov yap to arjfxxuvofuvov) , avrl
rov ^ovov rov Xc)fiivTo^ r^ jJiroAiprTw koX r6
hoiaxrrov opovs Btriov.

>

XL.

'Eirci 8* oi5

to ttvai rr^v rfiovijpf

r6 iyoBov, ovjt
ofioiot^ drriov rovs opous, oAA* c^ fUv iarw o
avXXt}Yurfi6i on 17 rfBovri rayoBcv, rayoBov, 9I
h* ort aya06, ayaBov. ovrvji Kani rwv a^Xutv,
XLL OvK OTt hi. TCLUTW OVT* cll^Oi OVT* CilTCiy
6n Jt r6 B t^mxpvci, rovrtp Trayrl t6 A xmapx^t,
KoX TO cfttrciy TO i^ iroKri r6 B ^m^^ffx^i, koX t6
trayri ^irapxti' ovShf yap KtMtXiki to B r^ F
{MipYfiy, fJLrj natrrl W. olor coroi to B koXSv t6
S^ r XVk6v.
C4 81} Acvuro) T(V( vndpYti fcaXSv,
dXrjBis ifrZy ort rat XtvKw ^napx^i koXov' aXX* od
TToyri taws,
ci ftiv o^ t6 A rifi 3 vv<ipYi, fiji
murrl hi KoSt o5 TO B, ovr* ci trarrt t(^ V r6 d
otrr* Ci uovov vndpxi avdyKxi ro A, ovx on od
novrl, oAA* oiit* vnapxiv, ci 5^ koS^ oj^ ov to B
XeyrfTOi dXrjBc^ rovrtp iravrX vndpxi, avpfi'qaT<u
TO A, Kod* o5 nayros t6 B AeycTOi, fcaTa rovrou
nayros XeytoBai. ct pufvroi, ro A Xiytrxu koB* oS
ov TO B Xfyrfrai Kara iraxn^, ov&kv KutXui rip F
vndpxiv ro B, fiif mivri hi ro A tj oXcas fiji
V7rdpxtv. v hh rots rpialv opois SijAov ori r6 kou
5 ro B, navros ro A Xtytadai rovr* ion, KoBt

ayadov koX t^

1ft

TaiWi'

^^n-i

thfoi rfpf 'ffiov^

IS

8e, Indefinitely.

888

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xxxix-xli

interchanging word and phrase, but always prefer- tJJn^oJ^*

ring the word to the phrase, for this makes it easier equivalent
to set out the terms. E.g., if it is immaterial whether J^ th?^'
we say the conceivable is not a genus of the imagin- terms.
able * or the imaginable is not identical with some
part of the conceivable ' (for the meaning is just
the same), we must posit as terms the conceivable
and the imaginable in preference to the expression
*

which we have quoted.

pleasure is a good
JJ^^^^
the good are not identical, the definite
terms must not be posited identically in both, but if *^5i' be """'^
the syllogism is to prove the latter we must posit ignored.
the good,' and if the former, good.* So too in all
other cases.
XLI. It is not the same, either in fact or to say, ^*"^^ g'.
that A appHes to all of that to which B applies, and tion^' a^?^
*^'
that A applies to all of that to all of which B appUes ; l^^^^^""^
for there is no reason why B should not apply to C, which b
'^^^''
but not to all C. E.g., let B stand for beautiful '^

XL. Since the

and

pleasure

propositions

'

is

'

'

and C for white.' Then if beautiful

some white thing, it is true to say that

applies to
*
beautiful
all
white.*
presumably,
to
applies to white,' but not,
Thus if applies to B, but not to everything of which
B is stated, then whether B applies to all C or merely
not apply to all C, but
applies to C, not only need
If on the other hand
it need not apply to C at all.
applies to all that of which B is truly stated, it will
is stated of everything of all of which
follow that
*

'

stated.
all of which

If,

is

however,

is

stated" of that of

stated, there is no reason why

should apply to all C or indeed apply to C at all,
although B applies to C. With regard to these three
is stated of all of which
terms, then, it is clear that

is

S83

ARISTOTLE

B Xiyrrcu, Kara iramjjv XiytaBnA icol

KoX tl tUv Kara irain^ to B, xai ro
ovTcoj* ^ 8^ fiii icord rrovTtk, oi)f avviyia; t6 A

10 oataif

r6

TO A.

16

Ov Set 5' oiea^^ ira/>d t6 hertB^o^fd ft avp^

Pcuvw aronov ouScv yap 7rooaxp<jouBa rw t6S t
hfu, oAA* w<m(p 6 ytwfurarf^ rnv rroSialay koI
tvBtiay tv/mSc koX airAarn cZUu A<yct oOic oCaa^f
oAA* ou;( otmt;; XF^^'^

^^

^'^

rovru/v auAAayi(((-

Koi oAAo 7rp6( ToOro ts f^poi vpoi oXov, i(

ovSvos rwv TOiovTwv hucvvaiv 6 htucvvufw, wart
%%o\;hk ytyvrrcu auAAoyia/iOf.
r^ h* itcriBtoBmi
ovTU) )^pc6/i<^a wanp koX r<p aloBav^nBai, r^
fuufOavoifra Xlym^rtt' ov yckp ovn9 cur cuv rovratw
r* airoScix^t^oif uxrmp i( Af 6 ouX*
odx

Mv

XLII. Mi^ XaofBavina

8* i^fiay

on

iv -no

axm^

avXXoytafuft odx dinarra to avfintpdafiara dc* cwif

a;fi{/xaT<Jj curiv, oAAa ro fih Sea rovrov to 8^ 8i*

oSv on Koi rAi dvaXuQis ovrw

hrtX 8* ov irav irp6pXrjua iv anavn
ox^ftari dAA' iv Kaar<^ rtrayyJva, ^avp6v Ik rov
avp.TTfpdafiaros v at axT^pan IrjTrjrtov.
XLIII. Tovs T irpo^ opujpov rwv Xoywv, ooo*

ciDlXov.

hijXov

noajfT^ov,

10

wpos Tt Tvyxat'ovat ButXr/fjJvoi rwv iv rw optp,

npos o SietXiKrai Oertov opov, kox ov tov anavra
Aoyov* ^rrov yap cnffifi-qaerai rapdTra$ai 8id ro
'

Cf.

884

An,

O&MT

Pott. 76

B*df.

Mti, 1078 a 80.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xli-xliii

B is stated means A is stated of all things of which

B is stated.' And if B is stated of all, so too is A
but if B is not stated of all, A is not necessarily stated
'

of

all.

must not be supposed that any absurdity results

from the setting out of terms. We do not base our
argument upon the reality of a particular example ;
we are doing the same as the geometrician who says
It

that such-and-such a one-foot line or straight line or

line without breadth exists when it does not, yet does
not use his illustrations in the sense that he argues
from them.* For in general unless two things are
related as whole to part and as part to whole, the man
who is trying to prove something can prove nothing
from them ; and hence no syllogism results. On the
contrary, we (I mean the student) use the setting out
we do not
of terms as one uses sense-perception
use them as though demonstration were impossible
without these illustrations, as it would be without the
premisses of a syllogism.
XLII.
must not overlook the fact that not all
the conclusions in the same syllogism are effected by
means of one figure, but some by one and some by
another. Thus it is clear that we must conduct our
analysis accordingly.
And since not every proposition is proved in every figure, but certain fixed types"
are proved in each, it will be evident from the form
of the conclusion in which figure the inquiry should
be conducted.
XLIII. With regard to such arguments as refer
to a definition, whenever they are directed to prove
some one part of the definition, that part to which
the argument is directed, and not the whole formula,
should be posited as a term (for so there will be less

The setting
SS^Jged^oT^
illustration,

Semonstra**-

We

n2

S85

'

The several
ofTslng??

compound

may

be

jr^J^^^^J^
figures.

Choice of
gy'j^gjs'^g

used to
definitions.

ARISTOTLE
Ma
u fiiJKOS'

olo tl r6 uSctfp ifScifcv

om

vyp6v inn6, t6

vSwp opou9 Bmov.

iTorov Kol TO

XLIV. Tin

hi Tovy ff v7ro$aWf cntXXoyioftous

ad ntiparicv arayciv* ov yop arw iK rw

o2bv

ct

yap

ov

dvdyf^v.

viro$4tivos,

ivairrUuv,

avXXoy%afioO

5ia

ov StW/u^ rt;

hrurrfuLrp^

firfi*

fdatf

fiia ft^

vyuwov

kqI rov voawSov^'

r6 avTo iyutvov

Ion

icoiTOi

&ri S*

Hav
ofua,

ipayritaw^

yap

Icrroi

&n fihf oiV o^k

ivavruMtv Mn^u^ hrM"

intan^ri ovk tarty

OMiyiccaQr*

o/ioAoycty

rcui^

&a-

voawStg,

Ta>v

trttKTXor

Ilia

Sucnu*

mu

cImu, cfro

XtyBthi &ri o^K lari ndaa} hwf^u^

olov rov

Ktt^Uvtttv

b^tyfi/^mtr

Aoyiaftov dAA* ^{ {mod4atw^.

oAA*

ot)

5/5ucrai.

oi^

rovrav

fihf

ouA-

aiv adm

tariv dvayoyciv, ori h* ov yJa

StW/uf tarw o9to^

yap

itcivo 8* vir60aii.

lacj^ koI

^v atMoytafiS^,

'Opuouof 5^

m pOAVOfi^vcav'
oAAa r^v

odSi

/liv

inl rtov hia rov

teal

y^

cif

dSiWrov

r^ ohwarov anaywyriy tart

(avXXoytafup yap Scucwrcu), $drpov 3* ovjc

i( vnoStatcjf yap ntpaivtrai,

irpoiprjp,vwv

Xoyi^aaaOai

w /AMI

art

irc-

rovravs a^K cortr cmiAuctyf

cv

iarw

hia^povai ht rum

Kivois /iv Sci

npoBiOfio^

ay Sc^X^
3iWfU9 ran' ivavriutv, Koi inumyitfv tlvat, rqv
*

ci

fi^XAci avpu^rfatvp, olov

iwtMnKToi A*Bc*

^oS^urr<u AVrMfm.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xliii-xliv

due to the length of the term):

shown that water is drinkable Hquid, the
terms posited should be drinkable and water.'
likelihood of confusion

e.g., if it is

'

Further, we should not attempt to reduce Hypothetlhypothetical syllogisms, because it is impossible to ^smrcanreduce them by proceeding from the premisses laid ^of b
down, since they have not been proved by a syllogism,

XLIV.

but have all been admitted by agreement. E.g.,

suppose that, after assuming that unless there is
some one potentiality for contraries there cannot be
one science of them, you should then argue that not
every potentiality is for contraries, e.g., for the healthy
and for the diseased, for if there is, the same thing
then
will be at the same time healthy and diseased
it has been shown that there is not one potentiaUty
for all contraries, but it has not been shown that there
It is true that the latter must
is not one science.
necessarily be admitted, but only ex hypothesi and not
The latter arguas the result of syllogistic proof.
ment, then, cannot be reduced, but the argument that
there is not one potentiality can for presumably this
actually was a syllogism, whereas the former was a
:

hypothesis.
Similarly too in the case of arguments which are
These too cannot be
established per impossibile.
analysed.
The reduction ad impossibile can be
analysed, because it is proved by a syllogism ; but
the rest of the argument cannot, because the conThese types
clusion is drawn from a hypothesis.
differ from those described above in that in the former
if the conclusion is to be admitted some preliminary
argument is necessary, e.g., that if it be shown that
there is one potentiality for contraries, the science
which studies them is also the same. But in these

887

ARISTOTLE

u
10 k

avrqv- hrravOa hk koX fi'^ npohtOftoXoyffadfLtvfH

avyxoipovai hiA r6 ^avtpov tvai r6 ilt0S<K, otov
Tcdcwnyy rrj^ biafi^rpcv avfifidrpov r6 ra ntptrra
laa tvat roiy aprioi^.
rioAAoi S^ KOI moot ntpalvoyrai i( ^oBdcraf,
oth ^vtuK^tlfaaBai oci iccu SiaarifLrjvai KaSapcj^.
TiKCS* fiiv o^ ai BiO/^pai Touratv Koi noaaxo^
ylyvtrtu to i^ vnoBdatots vartpov ipovfuv yvv &t
ToaovTOV rjLuv iarat ^avtpov, ori ovk <mv dyaXikiy
Ls TO, oyw/iara rovs tchovtow avXXoyiafjLovs' cal
Bi rjv curiav, ci^KOficv.

XLV. 'Oaa

10

S* cv irActbat

^ ^

ax^fuun dc6(yimu rutw

dardpip avXXoy%a0jj, iarw

ipayaytw rov avXXoyurfi^v 9I9 dampov, oIof tov
iv rCt rrpojrrw ortpirfrucov ciy r6 hfirpO koX top
iv rw yJat^ <C9 r6 npuntjir, ovx dnayra^ 64 <iAA'
Movf. Karat 8^ ^vtpov iv roX^ trrofUvoif. c/ yap
^tyScvi Ttp B r6 6^ B trayrl rw V, r6 A
T^
oi^Scvl r<J* r. OVTW iikv o^ TO wtHorov axfjfui, iAtt
B* dyrurrpa^ r6 arpriruc6v, to pdaav rrai fiS
ov^vl rip hi T trovri \mapxi.
yap B T<S /iv
oyuoiws ht KOX C4 yLTi KaOoXov dAA* cv /^jP<i o cmA/ii}5cvi Tip B to Sc B
Xoyiofios, otov i TO /x(v
nvi rtp r* dvnarpa^vros yap rod ortprfTucov to
fuaov iarai irx^fia,
Tcjv 5* cv rw &vr4Mp avXXoYUffua oi pLk
KadoXov avaxBrfoovrai ci9 to npurror, rdiv 3* <y
npoPkrffidrtMfy,

fipi

drpo^

iofii75Vi Toi

hk

fjLOvav.

There

CcUrcnL

888

is

arw yap ro

irovri

vndpxov.

C/. 41 a

A rw

p.kv

i<.

no such descriptioa to

ayrurrpa^>4vrol^

vhkh we

can

refer.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xliv-xlv

examples the conclusions are admitted even without

a preliminary agreement, because the fallacy is
obvious
as for example that if the diagonal of a
square is taken to be commensurable, odd numbers
are equal to even ones."
Many other conclusions also are reached by hypothesis, and these require further study and clear
explanation. What their differences are, and in how
many ways a hypothetical conclusion is effected, will
be described later.* For the present let us regard
this much as evident
that it is impossible to analyse
such syllogisms as these into the figures. We have
explained why this is so.
XLV. With regard to such propositions as are Reduction
proved in more than one figure, if a conclusion is gf/jj',' from
drawn in one figure, it is possible to reduce the syllo- one figure
gism to another figure; e.g., a negative syllogism (5)*Piret^'^*
in the first figure
can be reduced to the second,** flguieinto
and in the middle figure not all, however, but only
some of them * ^to the first. The principle will
be clearly seen in the following examples. If
applies to no B, and B applies to all C,
applies to
no C. In this form we have the first figure. But if
the negative proposition is converted, we shall have
the middle figure
for B applies to no A but to all C.
Similarly too if the syllogism is not universal but
;

*^

particular, e.g., if
appUes to no B and B applies
to some C ; on the conversion of the negative
4
proposition we shall have the middle figure.
Of syllogisms in the second figure, those which are (2) Second
^^
universal can be reduced to the first figure, but only fif^
one of the two particular syllogisms can be so reduced.
Let
be taken as applying to no B but to all C,

See next paragraph.

ARISTOTLE
o9v roO OTtpfrp^KoG t6 npwrov arai axfj^^^' t6 fih
B ovScvl r<ff A, ro B^ A nayri rift V \mdpii.
iav hk r6 Karrjyopueiv fj np^ rip 3 r6 hi artpnrf
riK^v npo^ rat V, npanov opov Brriov r6 T' roOro
yap ovhvl rip A, ro hi A navri r<p B* oNrr* o^8ci4
ovS* apa r6 B r^ T oiChvl' arr%r
tf r<p B TO r.
orpi^i yap ro anpfjriK^v, cav h* iv f^idpti f 6
avXXoyuifios, orov fiiv fj r6 artptfriKOV npo^ r<p
/ic^oM dtcptp, dtmxl^ijarrai tit r6 vpisncv, otov <i ro
r TUfi- dynarpai^Strot yap
fjnfifA T^ B T^
rod artprjrucoiO ri irparrov <rrai ayfjpA' r6 fUv y6p
to B ovScvi rtp A.ro hi A rwi rtp r.
&raw hi r6

yap

Karrjyopu(6v, oO( avaXvBijatrai, cto t r6

r<p
D vayrl r^ hi T o^ iravri' ovrt yap Wj^croi

fuv

ayriarpo^v r6 AB, ovrt ytvofUvris iorax avXXoyiapjii,

IlaAiv oi iu iw rip rpirtp ax^^fJMrt odtc ayoAi/^ifs

aoKTOA iravrc; c^ ro irpCrrav, oi h* iv rtp vpwnp

navri tU ro rpirov. ^napx^ot yap r6 A vatfA
rtp B, TO 5< B nvt rtp F.
ovkow intthri ovriarpl^i ro hf fi^pi Karyiyopuc6v, ^irap(n to V rtvi,
rtp B' ro hi
nayri vrr^pxev, atart yfyvmu r6
koX ci trrtprjrucds 6 avXXoyuffjL^
rpirov <r^pa.
cooourox* avrurrp^^i yap ro v fupi tcarqyopucov^
(ooTc to /x<v A ouScvi r<p B to & r riA undpfti,

40
1

ft

Twv

h* v rat rtXevraitp a)f7}/AaTi avXXoytapujiitf

ovK diaAurnu tls ro vporra, orov /ii^

KodoXov r$^ ro orpfrjruc6w, oi 5* oAAoi nayrS
dvaXvovroA. Kar7jyopi(J0(o yap navrof tow F t^ A
Kol TO B* ovKoGv ayTujrphJHi r6 F npos Kdrpo9
ls pLOVos

399

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlv

Then on the conversion of the negative proposition

we shall have the first figure for B will apply to no A,
but A will apply to all C. But if the affirmative statement is attached to B and the negative to C, C must
;

for C applies to no A, and

first term
hence C applies to no B. Therefore B
also applies to no C, for the negative proposition is
convertible. If, however, the syllogism is particular,
when the negative statement is attached to the major
extreme, the syllogism can be reduced to the first
figure,
for example, if A applies to no B but to
some C for on the conversion of the negative proposition we shall have the first figure, since B applies
to no A, and A applies to some C. But when the
affirmative statement is attached to the major term,
the syllogism cannot be analysed
e.g., if A applies
to all B but not to all C. For the statement AB does
not admit of conversion, nor, even if conversion took
place, would there be a syllogism.
Again, syllogisms in the third figure cannot all be (3) ^*
^
resolved into the first, although those in the first can third.
all be resolved into the third.
Let A apply to all B,
and B apply to some C. Then when the particular
affirmative statement is converted, C will apply to
some B. But it was assumed that A applies to all B,
and so we get the third figure. The same also holds
good if the syllogism is negative for the particular
aflirmative statement is convertible, and so A will
apply to no B and C to some B.
Of the syllogisms in the last figure only one cannot (4) Third
be resolved into the first figure, viz. when the negative ^^ ^*
statement is not universal. All the rest can be so
resolved. Let A and B be predicated of all C. Then
C will convert into a particular relation with each of

be posited as

to

all

S91

ARISTOTLE

*I

la

10

war* Urnu
47ri pUpov^' vmifix^i dpa run rt^ B.
TO itptuTov axfjfia, i r6 fuv A trayrl rw V r6
Bt r nvt rwv B. #fo2 ci to fUv A wavH rt^ T
r6 b^ B Tivi, 6 cuJro? X6yo^' dvrurrp4^i yAp
vpo^ T^ r TO B. ^av &< TO fihf B woMrri Toi r t
S< A rivl T^ r, vpwroi opos B^rlo^ to B* to yap
B murrl Ty T to Si F rwl r^ A, iZart to B rtvi

A.

r4*

^cl

rtvl T(p

5*

dvTurrpi^

iv

i*^^> ^<^

xmapiti,

Koi ci artpTjfTiKOi 6 avXXoyiafiis, KodiXov rujm

opwv oyrwv, ofuUun AiyirrtfW. vnapx^rot yap to B
iravTi T<ji> r TO &i A ^i^Sm* oOkoum tivi t^ B
F, t^ &i A ov&cvi t^ F, ot* emu
fUoov r6 F. Ofiouof hi Kol mI to fiiv <rrtpnjruc^
t(a06Xov r6 54 irarMpM(^ /r fUpf r6 fih /d/> A
oi^ScfI to* F, Td 54 F Tivi
B ^7rdp(t. car 5*
A^ fUpt Xrf^dfj r6 OTfpnru(6v, ovk tarai atAtKnr,
olov 1 TO /iV B irOI^{ T^ F t3 54 A TM^ /111
tm(pvf avnorpa^lvro^ yap roO BF dfM^^Srtpai oZ

U xrtrapiti t^

tw

fo

9r/>oTaaciS'

cooityu #caTa fUpos*

ori irpo? to ai^uciv ls oAAi^Xa

npos T<p Aarrovi aicp<^ nporiuns
ayTurrp7Tra iv a^v^orrlpons rois axoiuuii.' ravrq^

Oavcoov 5c

^ra ax^jfuiTa

U yap

#cou

i}

firaTi6fUin)s

rj

yA.rafiaai^ ylyi'To.

V T<p fuauf axT^fian artpos fi4v <u^

Aurroi arpo9 8* otJic dKoAucTOi cif to rpiror, ormr
.

TitfV 5*

ydp ^ TO ica^oAov ar9pnfruc6w, avaXverai' u

yap TO A fitfifvl Ttt> B T^ 54 F tiW, dfi^^rtpa
ofioiuf^ ayrurrp^ffffi vp6^ r6 A, worw to fthf B
ov5<vi T^i A, t6 54 F TW* pAaop apa to A. ortw

/xv

to

Se. first

mnd

thhtl.*^'^

Jv.Vii

llr.- '.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlv

applies to some B. Thus

applies to all C,
and C to some B. The same principle holds also if
applies to all C and B to some C ; for B is convertIf on the other hand B applies to all
ible with C.
to some C, B must be taken as the first
C and
term ; for B applies to all C, and C to some A, so
and since the particular
;
that B applies to some
will also apply to some B.
statement is convertible,

these terms.

we

shall

Therefore

have the

it

first figure, if

A
A

Also, if the syllogism is negative, provided that the

terms are related universally, it should be treated in
the same way. Let B apply to all, but A to no C.
Then C will apply to some B, and A to no C, so that
C will be the middle term. Similarly too if the negative statement is universal and the affirmative particular
for A will apply to no C, and C will apply
If, however, the negative statement is
to some B.
taken as particular, there can be no resolution e.g.,
if B applies to all C, and A does not apply to some C
for on the conversion of the premiss BC both the
premisses will be particular.
It is also evident that for the purpose of resolving
the figures into one another the premiss which is
attached to the minor extreme must be converted
for we have seen that the change
in both figures
from one to another takes place by the substitution
;

**

of this premiss.
Of the syllogisms in the middle figure, one can be
resolved into the third figure and the other cannot,
(1) When the universal statement is negative, resoluapplies to no B, but to some
tion is possible ; for if
C, both statements alike are convertible with respect
and C to some A.
to A, so that B applies to no
is the middle term.
applies
Therefore
(2) When

(5)

^^

S9S

Second

fhird!

ARISTOTLE

5^ TO A murrl rtp B rtj S^ F tis4 fitf vmi^>XD' ^*^

HoToi dvdAuaif ovSrr/pa yap rtaw vpvr^ommf itc
rfj^ oPTurrpo^rjs k<MXov.
Kal oi Ik rod rplrov S< (rxT^ftaro^ ai^aAvtfifaomu
Ci TO fjJaov OTfJLV ^ KoBoXov ro artfrriTucov, cXo tl
TO A /ii^Scv^ T<Jii r, TO 5^ B
^ troKTr icoi yap t6
r T(p ^i4V
OV&Vt T<j^ S< B TtVi VWOpftl. iow
hrl fupovi fj TO ortprfrtMoy oi;r ovaAv^^croi* oi;
ycip B^CTOi ayrioTpo^nfv to or
oao^TUodr.
OoMTpoi' o^ on Oi ai>ro^ ouAAoyioyioi
Janr
XiSovTxu hf TO&roii roif trx^fuunw otiMp
<^ t^
npdnov aytXvovro, koI on r^r t^ upomir oyf^
Twv avXXoytafiwv dvayofi^vwv o5roc /i^poc ZtA roB
abwdrov ntpalvovrai.
Huts fuv odv &ci tous* <7vAAo/u7/iovr ovayriy. mu
OTi oU'aAvrra* Ta oxiJ/iaTa cZc aAAi}Aa, ^avtp^ Ik

Tm

^^

40

o^

aW

it k

'

trwv lpnr)yJW.
XLVI. Aio^jpci hi

i Tip icaTaa(cua{tfcy ^
avaaKciHxCciv to vTroXofifiS^iv rj ravr^ tf enpam
arjfiawtiy ro firi cti^u roH rcu clyoi fn^ toOto, oCdt

10

TO /i^ c&oi Acvc^ T(Ji ttvai fifj Xitm^, od yip

ravrov <n]fjLalvi, ovS* Horiv An6^aat9 rod Aa^
Xvtc6v ro ttvoi fitf XfVKov, dXXa ro firi ttvai Acvr($rj
Aoyos" $ Toirrou oSc.

to SiWtcu fioBiitw noof ro

con Xcimcoi' tr/>Off to cotut
ou XevKov, Koi ttfiararok rayaSov npos t6 cvioraTcu TO ovk dyaSov. to yap imlararai rdyaB6w
rj ariv errurrdfievo^ rdyad^ ovShf hut/^pi, ouSk
TO hvvarai PaBl^w rj ion hwdpL90S fiahHtw
'Ofu>ui>s

hwarai

oi)

yo^

c;(4

/3a^'{eiv

T<ji

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlv-xlvi

to all B, but does not apply to some C, there can be

no resolution ; for neither premiss is universal after
conversion.
The syllogisms of the third figure can also be (6) Third
resolved into the middle figure when the negative gfcond?^
statement is universal, e.g., if
applies to no C and
B applies to some or all of C ; for then C will apply
to no
but to some B. If, however, the negative
statement is particular, resolution will be impossible,
for the particular negative does not admit of conversion.

Thus

evident

it is

that the types of syllogism

(1)

which cannot be resolved in these figures are the same

as those which we saw could not be resolved into the
first figure
and (2) that when syllogisms are reduced
;

to the first figure these alone are established per

impossibile.

then, from the foregoing account

syllogisms should be reduced; and also that
the figures can be resolved into one another.
XLVI. It makes no httle difference in establishing 'X is not
or refuting a proposition whether we suppose that Jot*m3in
not to be so-and-so and to be not-so-and-so mean the same as
the same or something different
e.g., whether
not yV^^^^
to be white means the same as to be not-white.'
For it does not mean the same ; the negation of to
be white is not to be not-white ' but not to be
white.' The explanation of this is as follows :
He can walk is to he can not-walk as it is
white is to it is not-white,' and as he understands
the good is to ' he understands the not-good.* For
there is no difference between he understands the
good and he is understanding of the good,' nor is
there between he can walk and he is able to walk.'
It is evident,

how

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

395


ARISTOTLE
ilk

axm

hwanu

/Safety o^K
ri o^k ion, 5tWyufvo^ PahHiv ravro oij/iaiVfi koX <m ^wdfLVO^
od PaSif^tv rj /xi) pahl^tiv, raCrd yt ofM vn^pfti
ravrtft (o yap avro^ Sinxxroi koX fiahil^tw koX /i^
to Pa&iiut,
Koi rttO
t(ai CTrumj/uuv rayadov
dyadoG iorC^' ^ai^ h^ koI dnd^am^ o^ vwdp'
KoX rd oi^urcifMua, ov

Hart SuvdfLtvo^ Pabt^tiv.

tl

o^

^(ownv td dyTiK(fivat dfLa r^ adrilt. wttirtp o9if

ov ravrd iari t6 fi^ iirlaraoBai rdyoBhv inX
ivloraaBax ro fiif dyaddv, ovS* c&<u fi^ dyoBov Koi
raiv yap opd \oyo9 idy
ftvai dyadov ravrov,
Bdrtpa -j mpa, mu ddrtpa. ov^ to thai fi^ toov
yap vwdciral rt, r^
KoX T^ yi^ tlvai taov T<p
ovTi fi^ uTOi, Kal roOr iari t6 dnaair ry 8*

fit)

i&

ovS^,

o^

hi6i7tp

laov yukv

ri

dyujov

ot) itdv,

urov 8*

Loov vav,

"Eri TO coTiy ov AtfVKOv

a^

(vXw

tmopx***
XtVKdv, coTO* fvAoK* TO &^

to ftJAov

oi)^

**
fii^

#fcu ow#c

cart Xcvkov

y<*P *<"* fvAov ov

AcvKoi' (vXov OlW

&rt o^k tan raO

tl odv
dno^aai^.
dyaOov
tariv
r6
ovk
dyadov
tariy
Kara navros ivos rj ^dais rj arro^at; dXrjBi^, ci fny
t&r%9 dvo^aats, hijXov at^ Kard^auis dv ira>i <ii};

dvdyin;

85

(u^v

cZhu.

wart ^avtpdv

Kara<l>daa>9 3^ Trdarf^ dfrd^aals iart' teal ravrifg

OVK toriv OVK dyadov.

cotcu t^
"E^ci hk rd(iv nqvht rrpos aAAiyAo.
ttvai dyadov i<f>* oS A, to ht firj tlvai dyadov i^^ o5
B, TO 8c thfoi fAT) dyadov i^* oS T, vwo to B, to 5<
nco^l di|
firf tlvojL fiTf dyadov ^* o^ A, vnd r6 A.
dpo. TO

'_

S96

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlvi

Hence the opposite statements, 'he cannot

he
he

walk,'

not able to walk,' are also identical. If, then,

means the same as he is
is not able to walk
able not to walk,' these attributes will apply at the
same time to the same subject (for the same person
can both walk and not walk, or is understanding both
of the good and of the not-good). But an assertion
and its opposite negation do not apply at the same
time to the same subject. Therefore just as not
to understand the good and to understand the notgood are not the same, so too to be not-good and
for if one pair
not to be good are not the same
of corresponding terms in an analogical group is
Nor is to be not-equal
different, so is the other.
for the former,
not to be equal
the same as
that which is not equal,' has a definite subject, viz.
but the latter has none. For this
the unequal
reason everything is either equal or unequal, but not
everything is either equal or not equal.
Again, the statements the wood is not white and
are not appUcable to the same
it is not white wood
subject ; for if wood is not white, it will be wood, but
that which is not white wood is not necessarily wood
Hence it is evident that it is not-good is
at all.
not the negation of it is good.' If, then, either the
assertion or the negation is true of every single thing,
if the negation is not true, clearly the affirmation must
But every affirmation has a
in some sense be true.
negation and therefore the negation of the affirmation in question is it is not not-good.'
Now these terms are related to one another as
follows.
Let A stand for to be good,' B for not to
be good,* C for to be not-good (this falls under B)
and D for not to be not-good (this falls under A).
*

is

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

897

ARISTOTLE
vndp(i ^ TO A ^ T^ B, Kol <Miii Tip odrtp' teal tj
r6 r rj r6 ^, Koi <Mvl r<^ avrw. KtaX w to F,
t avdytaj to B ircarrl ifrapx^iv.
ci yap aXrfii^ i'ni
oTi oiJ XfVK^v, fcal &n ovk lari Xrvtc^ dXriO^^'
aBwarov yap dfui c2xu XtVK6v Koi ttvai ^^ XivKOt^,
rj ttvai (vXov ov Xtwcov koI ttvai (vXov XtvKOV war*
C4 fitf
Kard^aaii, ^ ano^aan vnap(i. rift 5^
th t6 r owe (Ui* o vop oA&tff fiTi (vXoVt ov^ (vXa
coTOi od XitVK^v, ardnaXuf roiyvy, ^ ro A, r6 k
noMrri,
Tf yap to F ^ t6 A* ^c2 h' ovx otiv rt
cKfia cZmi /ii^ XtvK^v KoX \tvK6v, t6 A vw^pfn,
iraTcl yap rod ovro^ XtvKoO aXrfii^ cfirfcr Sn odtc
loriv oi XtvKov. Kara & rod A oi napr6f r6 A'
10 jraTa yap rov oXu>^ fi-fj ovros (vXov ovk dXrfi^^ r6 A
lnlV, WS COTt (vXo^ XfVK^V* waT TO A oAi^^/ip, r6
S* A OVK aXrfiis, on (vXov XiVKOv,
&^Aov 5* &rt
Koi TO AF o06<vi Tip ainip koI to B kqX r6 A
40

"fj

iMxrrai rwi

*Ofioioai 8*

rtp

a^tp vndpfai.

c^oiKn

iroi

oi artpfTfatu trpoi

t^

KOTTfyopla^ ToviTy t^ $4ai, laov i^* o6 ro A, oOir

taov ^* o^ t6 B, dytaov c^* o6 V, o6k avuror

^f

10

oS A.

Koi cirt 7roAAt5v B4, a>v rots fikv iir6px^ ^^^ ^

OVY U7rdpxi ravTO, 17 fi<v ano^^ams 6puoiu>s dXrjSgi^
oiT av, OTi ouic cart Acuird Trcu^a ^ oTi ovk ion
XevKOV Ikootov' on 8' coriv ov Xivkov tKoarov ^
travra iarw ov XtvKa 0c 0809. opuoiuj^ 8c kou tov
coTi nav ^ipov XevKov ov to cotiv ov XevKov airay
i<pov aTTO^oat; (a/x^co yap 0cv8i9)t aAA<i t6 ovc
^

S98

ov post ft^or add.

ft*

tupra liocwn B* : dd. CL

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlvi

either A or B will apply to everything, but they

can never both apply to the same subject ; and either
C or D will apply to everything, but they can never
both apply to the same subject. Also B must apply
For if it is true to
to everything to which C applies.
say it is not-white,' it is also true to say it is not
white ; since it is impossible that a thing should at
the same time be white and not-white, or that wood
should be not-white and white so that if the affirmation does not apply, the negation will.
But C does
not always apply to B for that which is not wood at
all cannot be white wood either.
Conversely then
D will apply to everything to which A applies for
either C or D must apply ; and since it is not possible
to be at the same time not-white and white, D will
apply ; for it is true to state of that which is white
that it is not not-white. But A cannot be stated of
all D ; for it is not true to state of that which is not
wood at all that it is A, i.e., that it is white wood.
Hence D is true, but A, that it is white wood, is not
It is clear that the combination AC too can
true.
never apply to the same subject, whereas both B and
D may sometimes apply to the same subject.
The relation of privative to positive terms in this
system is similar. A stands for equal, B for not equal,
C for unequal, D for not unequal.
Also in the case of plural subjects to some members
of which the same attribute appUes while to others it
does not apply, the negation can be predicated with
that not all things are white, or that
equal truth
not everything is white ; but that everything is notwhite or that all things are not-white is false. Simiis not
larly the negation of every animal is white
every animal is not- white (for both statements are

Then

'

'

'

399

ARISTOTLE

JI'I

ni 8^ hrfXov Srt Tptm

fOTi irav ^wov XtvKOv.
TO tOTiV Ol) XVk6v KOi OVIT /oTI XeVtCOl^,

15 Ol^flOtVCt

s&

Koi TO fi^ Kard^am/f to 5' atr^^omf , ^a^tpov oi

ot)x ^ aiVros* rp&no^ to(; Scurvi^voi Kartpav, cJov on
S av fi ia}ov oifK cm Xvk6v rj IvS^x^rai /i^ ttvoi
XVk6v, koX OTi dXriBii inlv fir^ Acukov toOto yap
oAAa to /x4v aXtfOis ciirciv
^<rrti^ cIku fiij Acvkoi'.
coTi AcvKOi' 4T fih X(vk6v 6 ouTOf Tpowof KanaFi
GKvaQTU<w^ yap ofi^ hia row vparrov htUwra^
aXTIH^'*'^' '''^ /P aXri$s r<p iarw opoiwt rdr^
Trnu* Tov yap aXfjBis ciVco' Acvicov ov to oAi^^t
Civco' U17 AcvKOir ano^oais, oAAa to ^17 oAi^^;
ar<u^ dXrfSi^ tlviv 6 Sm
ci
cZircu' Xtvtcoy.
i avOpumos powjiKov tlvai ^ /n^ ftotNrun^i' thfoi, 8
OP "j l^wcv X tf ir riov rj ctroi uovauc6v t) thmi p^

pownKw,
jj

TO^

ipr}p^v<wf rp&iTQV^ tjkU'

^Tov ovroK oq; t^

'ATrAiuff 8'

fii)

ti<tu

/iouour^r
iraTd

u^

j.

koX to

(Mnr.

Toi a^tp p^ tvhtx^aBax iroyrl tk ( OLvdy^

uartpoVt KoX TTOALV TO r Kol TO A woavTutt^
itol fiij dyrurrpd^y, tf<u rtp
cm/TOi 8i Toi r TO
B TO aKoK0V&TfOl KOji OVK aVrUTTplJlfi' Kol T^
KoX TO A Cv5J(CTai T^i OlM), TO 3^
ICol
pV

40 cT/za
I k

to

KoX 8/5currai.

a^Bpamos atnoKaxurruco^ Scucwroi

^ ov

#079

r
i

OVK ev5<x^T(u.
ri/MUTOI/ flV Ol5v OTi

^>arp6y'

crrci

yap

opdytcq^, 4 & to
^

'..

400

riA

T<j>

trovrt

oiJic

TO

Toiv

A VnU* MM
FA $drpov i(

ci^Sc^rTXtt

to

hia r6

IvroA JenkinsoD ; knwoodd.

hrrrai
fwtnu r^ A c, Bekkcr.
:

ABC

the uses of the two expressions are parmlkl.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlvi

but * not every animal is white.* And since it

*
clear that * it is not-white and it is not white
differ in meaning, and that one is an affirmation and
false)

'

is

the other a negation, it is evident that the method of

proof is not the same in both cases viz. to prove the
statement that whatever is an animal is not white, or
may not be white, and the statement that it is true
for this is what to be
to say that it is not-white
not-white means. But the same method of proof
appHes to the statements that it is true to say that it is
white, and that it is true to say that it is not-white ;
for both are proved constructively by means of the
ranks with it is <*
first figure, since
it is true
for the negation of it is true to call it white is not
it is true to call it not-white
but it is not true to
call it white.'
If, then, it is to be true to say that
whatever is a man is either cultured or not cultured,
assume that whatever is an animal is either cultured
or not cultured, and the proof is accomplished.
That whatever is a man is not cultured is proved
destructively by the three moods already described.*
In general when A and B are so related that they
cannot apply at the same time to the same subject,
yet one or other of them necessarily applies to everything ; and when C and
are similarly related, and
A is a consequent of C, and the relation is not reversible
then D will be a consequent of B, and this
relation will not be reversible. Also A and D may
apply to the same subject, but B and C cannot.
(1) That B is a consequent of D is evident from the
following proof. Since one or other of the terms C
and D necessarily applies to everything, and C cannot apply to that to which B applies, because C implies
:

'

'

'

'

'

"

Celarent, Cesare

and Camestres.
401

ARISTOTLE
aweni^ptw r6 A, to

hi

koI

fi^

M^oai

avTw, ^Vp6v ort t6 A axoXovBijati. miXu^

intl T^ji A TO r ovK ayrurrpi^i, voyrl hk r6 V
ri TO A, vhXrai to A rai to A t^^ atVr<^ vndpxtmr
TO B4 y B Koi r6 V o^k M^^f^*
''^ awoMO^
T<^

10

r t6 A' av^ifialvti ydp ti <i5iWrov.

odv om oi^ rt^ tk r6 B dyTtorp^it
iYxwpl ofia to A rai t^ A ^wApx^w.

Xov$iv

rtf)

^avp6v
iirinp

'Lvfifialyti b* iviorrt

opatv

koX iv

dnaraoBai SmL r6

fiavtiv 6f>dw^

otov ci TO

&v

A mu

fi'^

rfj

roiwirQ nifti

tA ayrtxtlfLfva

rtijv

Aofi-

ovoyio} v<urn Bdrtpav vndpx^u^,

h fiif Ivh^x^rai a^ui rtp avr^,

^ fi^ Bdrtpov, Bdrtpot^' Koi
to A uHjavro}^, ^ bi r6 T, mwrl
ovfJifii^tTai yo^ ^ r6 ^ r6 B
r6

ivdyKTi S* ^mipx^iv,

ndXiy TO
circTcu
10

mil

r6 A.

^nofix^^ ^i avdyKfi^, ontp iari

ffttOhof.

tlXif^Bw

yap diro^acns rwv Afi ^ /^* <p X, teal irdXiv rwv

FA 1} c^* 4* ^' dvdyta) ^17 weu^J ^ t^ A ^ to Z,
^ yd^ T^v ^ooiv ^ T17V dwo^aaiv koI ndXiv rj to
r "5 ''^ ^ ^doi^ yap 9coX dno^aai^' koX i^ r6 T
IS rravTi ro A ^6KtTai' Jkjtc <^ to Z iravrl t6 0.
iroAiv CTTCi Tcuv ZB irou^i ddrtpov koX rwv 0A
cooatn-cuSt (ucoAou^ci hk rip Z to 0, Ktu. r^ A
dKoXov$i^i to B* Toirro yap lafitv, ct opa Tuji
r TO A, Kol T^ A TO B. rOVTO b^ ^v8o9* <UciroAiv yap 'fjv v roZs ovtcjs xpvGW 1} oKoAot^oif.
0 ov yap iGCDS dvdytcq navri to A ^ to Z, ow5< to
402

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

xlvi

cannot both apply to the same subD will be a consequent of B.

Since the relation of C to A is not reversible, and

A, and

and

ject, it is evident that

(2)

applies to everything, A and

either C or
may
apply to the same subject. B and C, however, cannot,
because since A is implied by C, this gives us an impossible result. Thus it is evident that the relation
of B to
is also irreversible, since it is possible for
and A to apply at the same time.
It happens sometimes in this arrangement of terms
also that we are misled because we do not rightly
select the opposites one or the other of which must
A and B canapply to everything, e.g., as follows.
not apply at the same time to the same subject but
where one does not apply, the other must. Again,

C and D

and wherever C
are similarly related
implied ; then it will follow that where
(which is false).
applies B necessarily applies
*
and B, and
Let F be taken as the negation of
as that of C and D. Then either
or F must apply
to everything, since either the assertion or the negation must so apply. Again, so must either C or G,
applies
since they are assertion and negation. Also
ex kypothesiwhere C applies. Hence G applies to everything to which F applies. Again, since one or other
of the terms F and B applies to everything, and
similarly with
and D, and since G is a consequent
for we know
of F, B will also be a consequent of
;
this." Then if
is a consequent of C, so also is B of
D.* But this is false ; for we saw that in terms so
constituted the reverse consequential relation obtains.
The explanation is that it is presumably not necessary
that either
or F should apply to everything, nor
applies,

is

'

C/. 52

4-13.

403

ARISTOTLE

'HI

ttk

Z 4

rd Z.

rod yAp ayoBoO ro ovk

av

raM

8' OTi

o{h* o^k

T^ B*

ayad6v.

TO

01)

Y^

iorw a7r64aai9 toO

^y^6v dn64Kiaii'
OVK ayoBov Tw oirr' dya^ov

ofioiut^ hi

koI tvi rwv FA* cu

^datis al ttXrififuvat Svo

404

ttaiy.

y^

airo-

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

I.

F or B should do so

F is

xlvi

not the negathe not-good ;

and the not-good is not identical with the neither
good nor not-good. The same is true of C and D.
In both cases two negations have been assumed for
one term.
that either
tion of A.

for

The negation of the good

is

405

B
I.

ifeM

40

*Ev iroaoi9

fJL^v

o9v ax^^iaai koI bia nouav tdd

noawv npordatwv Kol n6rM teal ndf^ yiywroi

avXXoytafi6s, tn 5' tU noia pknrriov aa<nccva{oi^n
icaroaKcva^ovn, icoi irwi 8ci (ttcik vtfX roO
'npoKitUvov Koff omoiovoOv fudo&ov, tn hk Sea

ft icoi

iroLa^

6!^v Ai^0Ofu0a rd;

'Eirrci

5* ol

trtpi curcurrov

apx4^t

V^

fUv Ko^oAoti rciin' ouAAoyta/uuv iaw

fUv Ha66Xov w6rrS <Ul irAc^

Oi S^ icard fi^pos, ol

avXXoyiJ^ovrai, rw 5' /v ft/pci oi fihf iran^yopuroi

irAcuu, Oi 5* ciTro^Tucoi rd avfin4patrfia fi6ov. al
fifv

yap oAAcu irpordaci; avrurrpt^vaiv,

i}

5^

ayriorpt^i- ro hi uvfintpaafta rl
Kara rivos iarw wa6^ oi fih^ aXXoi avXXoytafiol
10 frAcuo auXXoYiJ^ovTOi, otov ci to A S/Scurroi irovri
r<jii B ^ rivi, Kol TO B rtvi rtp A dvayicotov vnap^
XCiv icoi t fiT/Scvi to) B to a, ou& to B ovScvi t4*
A (tovto 8* mpov Tov fiiTpoa6v)* mI hi rtvi fiif
^rrdpxi, ovK dvdytcrj #ceu to B tu^ t^* A fiif thrdp'
X^^' cv$;(Tai yap navrl undpxw.
arfnjTUcfi ovic

t.#. premisseA.
C/. 43 b 36.
Because the relation of subject and predicate
C/. 95 a M.

406

it

BOOK
I.

We

II

have now explained in how many figures a book

ii.

syllogism is effected ; also the nature and number of of sylloothe premisses by which it is effected, and the circumgj^^^gj,
stances and conditions by which it is governed, arguments.
'
Further, we have explained what kind of attributes
should be considered when one is refuting and when ciis. i.-xxvL,
one is estabUshing a proposition, and how to set xxxL
about the appointed task in every given method of
approach ; and further by what means we are to
arrive at the starting-points <* proper to each case.
Now some syllogisms being universal and some Syllogisms
particular, those which are universal always give more^than
more than one inference ; but whereas those parti- 9^^'
cular syllogisms which are affirmative give more than
one inference, those which are negative give only
the conclusion. For all other premisses are convertible, but the particular negative premiss is not ; and
the conclusion consists of an attribute predicated of
a subject. Thus all other syllogisms give more than
one result : e.g., if
has been proved to apply to all
or some of B, B must also apply to some
and if
;
it has been proved that
appUes to no B, then B
appUes to no A. This is a different conclusion from
the former.^ But if
does not apply to some B, it
does not follow that B also does not apply to some
; for it may apply to all.*"

S?7

407

ARISTOTLE
Aim; fuv oSv kow^ trdyrtov atria, rwv tc koB'
6Xov Koi rwv Kara ^upo^' corn hk ntpX rwv
KadoXov Kol dXXcjs iiTiv. ooa yap rj uiro ro fUaov
rj xmo ro avfintpaofid iartv, anavriMtv <rrai 6 avro^
ouAAoyia/ios", tav to fuv cv T<p fUa<p ra h* v rw
n avfinfpdafxart rSn' olov ci to AB avfindpaapa 54a
rov r, ooa vno to B ^ to F iariv, ovoyio; #caTd
Sktp t^ B
navrofv X^aBai r^ K* u yap r^ A
t6 5^ B /v T<^ A, ttaX TO A ^<rr<u /r t^' A. inAiy
16

;T0E^0Aa)TJ>rT05^r^TUlA. KoItoE
iv Tip

<rrai,

n (TvAAoyia/io;. ^i

o/iota>9 5^

r<xl

6
uw^

t artprirucdf

S^ tou htintpov ov^/iaToj to

TO avp.7Tpaafia povov cotou avAAoytaao^flU' o2by <{

TO A T<ji B ^i^Scvi T<^ 5^ r vavri, avpvtpaapa or%
Ci 3i7 TO A xmo ro F <ot4
ov6vl rip r TO B.
^Vp6v on ovx vwdpx^i avr<p r6 B. toc; 5* vni
so TO A oTi ovx vnapxi ov hriKov Sea tou ovAAoyio/iou.
t^ A* ^AM
Kalroi ovx v7TapXi rtp E, c^ ccrrtv
TO pkv rtp F /iiyScvt ^dpx^iy r6 B Sia tov otiAXoyujpov S^ucrai, r6 tk rtp A prf undpxfuf
<mi7ro3Urrov iXrfTrrai, war* oi5 8ui toi' ouAAoyioyuov Gvpfiaiyi to B t4> E pri tmapxw.
w 'EfTi 5^ ruiv v fi^pci Twv fUv xmo ro avpirtpaapa
ovK arcu ro ovayKdiov (ov yap yiyvtrax avXXoyi*
ap69 orav aurrj Ai)^^ V ppi), rwv 5' viro t&
puiaav earai navrtov, nXriv ov 8ta rdv avXXoyiapop,
olby 4 TO A Travri t^ B to 5c B nvi tip F* toO

iM

'.:.

t.

mkidk term.
points out ad loe. that in Cameitrea nothing
inferred about subordinates to the middle term.
.J;*

Se. as

^ Waits

400

can be

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. i

This reason, then, is conunon to all syllogisms, both Another

^^ ** '""
universal and particular ; but with respect to universal syllogisms it is also possible to give a different
explanation. The same syllogism will hold good of
all terms which are subordinate to the middle term
or the conclusion, if these terms are placed respecE.g., if
tively in the middle and in the conclusion.
must
is a conclusion reached by means of C,"
be stated of all terms which are subordinate to B or
is wholly contained in B, and B in A,
C. For if

AB

D
D will also be contained in A.

Again, if E is wholly
contained in C, and C in A, E will also be contained
Sinularly too if the syllogism is negative.
In
in A.
the second figure, however, the inference will only
hold good of that which is subordinate to the conclusion.
E.g., if A applies to no B but to all C, the
conclusion is that B applies to no C. Then if D is
subordinate to C, it is evident that B does not apply
That it does not apply to terms subordinate
to D.
to A is not shown by the syllogism, although B does
not apply to E if E is subordinate to A. But whereas
it has been proved by the syllogism that B apphes to
no C, that B does not apply to A has been assumed
without proof; so that it does not follow by the
syllogism that B does not apply to E.^
As for particular syllogisms, there will be no necessary inference concerning the terms subordinate to
the conclusion (since no syllogism results when this
premiss " is taken as particular), but there will be
one which holds good of all terms subordinate to the
middle, only it will not be reached by the syllogism ;
e.g., if we assume that A applies to all B, and B to

The conclusion of

the original syllogism, which

now

becomes the major.

409

ARISTOTLE
Ma
fiv

0 Tov

yap (mo to F rMvTOi ovk

8* vno TO B ionu, oAA* ov
ofAouJi Bi Kanl

fivov.

u k fiv

rwv

<rrai ovXXoyurfAO^,
hi6.

r6v npoyyV9j'

d^Xutv ox^fiaTWV tov

yap vno to avfin^paafia ovk cotcu, Bartpov

coTOi, 7rAi7v ou hia tok avXXoyiafiO,

f koI

/ra^cSAou ^f (miTroS^urrot; rrj^ irponrdatut^

pAaov ihtuoano' war*

rf

h*

iv TOi&

ra \m6 to

ovS* iKl <rrai

teal

rj

nl TOVTtOV,
II.

'Eari

fjLv

o^

TOff npordatif Si'

0vS<if ,

<TTi 8'

oKrrc

TO 8 avfiw^paafta
iK

ilfvStov 8*

TO0 yo/)
^i' 8*

8ttJTt

fUv

T171'

aXr)$s

<m

c&oi

8* ciMrrc

aXrfBrj rijv 8^ ^fV&rj'

rj

i/kvSos i( avdytcrf^,

oiHv

o^K /oTiv

^ic

^cvScov auAAoyui;^!^*

8i"

cuTtov ^v rois liro^Uvoii Xt'^Btfarrai.

mparrov

o^ ori ( dXrjdwv oux otov tc i/kv^os

fjLv

ovXXoyUjaaOai

15

rj

^hc^u^ Mrr' a^rfBtii

ovAAoyur/M^,

OVK 01% ^^vSof ov^XoytooaOcu,

coTiv aXrjB^^, nXfpf oi) 8c4^i <iAA' on*

c( oAi^^cDi' fAv

10

OVTW9

cSi' <$

avayKf) ro

h^ai.

oiJv

dXrjBes tvai,

hrnvQw

tlvai,

rov

hrjjXov.

firi

tl

yap tov

A okto;

ovro^ dt^yKri r6

p:^

aXriBh iari ro A, dvdyKtj to B

rj ovpfi'qceTai ro auro dpa thnu tc

^V) otc 8< #rciTu

#ca4 OVK lvai- tovto 8* a8tWrov.
TO A cf? opos" {mokr^^BriTO} v^\QBax
Tii^off
ovroj cf ovayioys' ti avpfialvtiv' od yd/) oloi' tc* rd
fiiv yap avpfiaXvov i( dydyKtjs ro ov/iirtpaofid

rw

Except Baroco, Bocardo

410

and DiHunis (Watts

57 a 4a-b 17.

ott

53aS4).

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
some C

11.

i-ii

be no inference concerning
subordinate to C, but there will be one
not,
with regard to that which is subordinate to B
however, by the syllogism already effected. SimiThere will be no
larly too with the other figures."
inference concerning that which is subordinate to
the conclusion, but there will be one concerning the
just
other subordinate, only not by the syllogism
as in the universal syllogisms the terms subordinate
to the middle are proved, as we have seen, from a
premiss which is undemonstrated. Thus either the
principle will not apply in the former case, or it will
apply here too.
II. It is possible for the premisses by which the
syllogism is effected to be both true, or both false,
or one true and the other false. The conclusion,
however, is true or false of necessity. Now it is
impossible to draw a false conclusion from true
premisses, but it is possible to draw a true conclusion
only the conclusion will be
from false premisses
true not as regards the reason but as regards the
It is not possible to infer the reason from false
fact.
premisses why this is so will be explained later. ^
Firstly, then, that it is not possible to draw a false
conclusion from true premisses will be clear from the
;

for there will

that which

is

True and
missed^'

True

Snnoryfeic

is, B must be, then

following argument. If, when
^q^JJ^j
cannot be. Therefore if
is true, B
if B is not,
must be true otherwise it will follow that the same
thing at once is and is not, which is impossible. (It

has been
that, because
posited as a single term, it is possible for any necessary inference to be drawn from any one assumption,
The necessary inference is the
for this is impossible.
conclusion, and the fewest means by which this can

must not be supposed

411

ARISTOTLE
It k

wv hk toOto yiyveroi iXaxumav Tpcis- Ojpoi

5c Sca<m;fAara Koi vpordaiis. tl oiv oAi^iMf
wovri
&^ t6 P to B,
oi TO B ^Trapx^i r6
olov rt roOro
TO r dvaym] to A vndpxtiv, kcu
0eu8os> tvar dfia yap vmipfti ravr6 Kol ot^
oxmtp v Ktirai, hvo nporraati^
^dp(i. TO odv
*OTt, Si'

8vo

o^

avAAi;^cu7eu.

oyiolw^ hk koX itrl rwv <rr(pfirucwv

cotiv
i( aXri6w Sctfoi ^uSof.
yap
ov
Xr
*Eic 0cuSctfV 8* aXrj$i l[art avXAovuraa^ai #r(u
dfJL^xrr^pwv rCitv npardawv iLmvSwv oitawv kcu

t^

^uas^,

raurrjs 5*

oux onortpa^

ctijvcv

oAAa t^9

idvntp oXrjv XaftfiaMrj il^vSij' fiij JAijy 0<

ianv dnoTpaaouv,
"Earw yap to A oA<f Tto V vwapxo ruhf 5^ B
/xY^Scvt, fiiy5^ TO B T^ r* ci'^^frTat S^ Toi?TO, otov
XWu} ouScvi (a>ov, oSSi A/0O9 o^ScW dv$purrr<p' idv
oiJv Ai/^^ TO A Trai^t t<J> B #fol t^ B nayri rip P,
TO A trayri rtp P (rndp^ti, utar ^( dpu^oo^ i^aMv
dXri6s t6 GVfin^paafxa (nd^ yap dvBponm (4^0*4
<oaatrra>9 hk koX to artarjrucdv ari yap rtp P /i^rc
TO A {mdpxiv iirj^Vk p-rfTt to B, to p,^oi A
T^ B TTOin-i, ofoi' tdv rwv avrwv dputv Xr)<^vrcjv
fiGov rBfi 6 dvBpwrros' Xldtp yap ovrt ^<pov ovt
Sctrrc/ws-/

XapfiavofUvrfs

dvBpoiTTO^ ovhevl vndpxi,

40

dvBpwnw

&

nam

^atoy.

fUv imdpx^i Xafirf /ii^Ocvt xmdpxtiv, at

Sc firj {mdpxi travri vndpxtw, in tJKv&Cfv dfi^lv
dXr}6s COTGU TO avfinpaafui.
ofioiut^ Si Scix*
^T^CTOu #cai idv iiri ri tlKvbrjs iKoripa Xrj^Bj,
aKTT* idv a

412

'.#.

aXXk

rifs

6in4pas

om. Bu, Jeakinsoo.

contrary to the true premiss.

C/. 54 4.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. ii

be effected are three terms and two connecting

If, then, it is true that

relations or premisses.)
applies to everything to which B does, and that
must apply where C
B applies where C does,
does, and this cannot be false ; otherwise the same

attribute will at once apply and not apply. Thus

although
is posited as a single term, it represents
the conjunction of two premisses. Similarly too with
it is impossible to prove a false
negative syllogisms
conclusion from true premisses.
It is possible to draw a true conclusion from false How true
premisses not only when both premisses are false ^n be
but also when only one is false, not either one in- ^jl^^^igg
differently, but the second, that is if it is wholly premisses.
false " in the form in which it is assumed ; otherwise
the falsity may belong to either premiss.
apply to the whole of C, but to no B ; and .^.^g^^^P^
Let
This is possible e.g., animal versai
let B apply to no C.
and stone applies to no (Y^elth^^'
applies to no
stone
applies to all premisses
man.' If, then, it is assumed that
Thus the ^^'^
will apply to all C.
B and B to all C,
conclusion from premisses which are both false is
true ; for every man is an animal. Similarly too
with the negative syllogism. For it is possible for
to apply
both
and B to apply to no C, and yet for
to all B ; e.g., if the same terms as before are taken,
*
with man as the middle term for neither animal

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

nor man applies to any stone, but animal appHes

Thus if it is assumed that that which
to every man.
applies to all applies to none, and that which does
not apply applies to all, although both premisses are
false, the conclusion drawn from them will be true.
A similar proof will also obtain if both premisses
'

'

assmned are partly

'

false.

413

ARISTOTLE
^v5o09 owrq^, otov rij^ AB, ovic tanu to
X4yw 5*
avfJLn^paaua dXrjdtf, rrj^ 5^ BF iartu,
oAt;v iltVoij rffv Ivavriav, cXov ci fiiTScvi vndpxpm
corrcu
irovTi ctAT/irrcu ^ ci nayrl fiiiScvt 6ndffYfW,
yoip TO
Tw B /xi^Scvt {mtipx9y to
B t^ T
navri. av hri r^v fiiv BF nporaaw Xdfiw dXrj&rj
Tfjv 8^ to
^t;5^ oXrjv, koI Travrl ^7rtipxiv tcJ
B TO A, oSiWtov to avfiTrdpaaua aXrjSis ctitu*
10 ovSvi vof) V7rfjpx rdv F, ciircp <^ t^ B, ui^ScW r6
B mxyrX rt^ F. ouoiw^ 8* ou8 ci rd
A, TO
t4> B iravTi vndpxti koX to B t<J> F travrlt ^i^^Bn
8' ij /xv TO BF dXri&^i nporraaii iff
t6
ilfv&rf^ oXrj, Koi fii}8m a TO B to A, to ov/nr^m*
a/io iltvSo^ coTTOi* trarrj yap vndp^ti t^ F to A,
1* Cfrircp Ji T^ B, troi^i to A, to 8c B varri rtp F.
oXrf^

Ad

^avtpov

o^ on r^

iJKvSov^, ^<v T*

T^y

8*

Mpa^

frvfi-nipaayui.
*>

npumj^

oXtf^ Xa^LfiavofUvrff

nfttTo^TMc^ ^<lr Tf OTtpimif^,

aXrjOov^, od y/^'rmu aXrjoif r6

fiij

oXrj^ 8^ XofipaPOfUvrfs iltvSoOs

tcJ /i^ F narrl ^ntipm rt^

nayrl rut T, otov ^^v KVKva> iihf
ttolvtI XevKw ht nvl, to Si XiVKov nayrl kvkv<^, ^oy
Xrf^>6^ TO A navrl Tot B koI to B irayri T(f F, r6
navri ru) F vndp(i oXrfBdts' nds yap kvkvos
oyuoluis Sc #fai Ci ortprfrucov irj t6 AB*
iofov.
yx<*tpi yap to A Toi /icv B tiw vndpx^iv Toi 8c F
p.rjOvi, TO B B natrrl Ttv F, oToi' l^ipov tivi Acvicoi
X^vt 8' ovBfit^f XevKov S Trdoff X^^* ** <>'''
Xrfi^cirj to fiiv A firfScvl toi B to
B irarrt to* F,
TO
ovSvi T<^ F imdp^i, dp 8* ij fUv AB irp<^

yap t^

coTOi.

Ci

TO 8^

TivC,

15

AB

&

414

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

ii

however, only one of the premisses posited is

when the first, e.g., AB, is wholly false, the
conclusion will not be true
but when BC is wholly
false, the conclusion can be true.
I mean by wholly
false
the contrary statement, i.e., if that which
applies to none is assumed to apply to all, or vice versa.
For let A apply to no B, and B to all C. Then if the
premiss BC which I assume is true, and the premiss
AB is wholly false, i.e., A applies to all B, the conelusion cannot be true
for ex hypothesi A applies to
no C, if A applies to nothing to which B applies, and
If,

false,

(")

9"

"tliS!^^

'

Major
feise,

minor

t^-

B applies to all C. Similarly too if A applies to all

B and B to all C, and the premiss BC which has been
but the premiss AB is assumed in
wholly false (viz., that A applies to
nothing to which B applies)
the conclusion will be
false
for A will apply to all C if A applies to everything to which B applies, and B applies to all C.
Thus it is evident that when the first premiss assumed,
whether affirmative or negative, is wholly false, and
the other premiss is true, the conclusion which follows
is not true
but it will be true if the premiss assumed Major partly
'"'
is not wholly false.
For if A applies to all C and to J^t'
some B, and B applies to all C, as e.g. animal
applies to every swan and to some
white,' and
white appUes to every swan
and if it is assumed
that A applies to all B and B to all C, A will apply to
all C, which is true
for every swan is an animal.
Similarly too supposing that AB is negative ; for it
is possible for A to apply to some B but to no C,
and for B to apply to all C as, e.g., animal applies
to some white but to no snow, but white applies
to all snow. Supposing then that A is assumed to
apply to no B, and B to all C, A will apply to no C.

assumed

true,

is

a form which

is

'

'

'

'

415

ARISTOTLE
'
0

<5Ai7% ^ hi BV SXitf ^^wv9i^. wmit

yap KuMn rd A ry B
KoX rw r iravrl imdpxtv, to fUvroi B /ii/Scvi ry F,
olbv ooa Tou avrov yivovs thnr) fi^ vn* oAAv^Aa* r6

Tootff oXrj Xrf4&^

crvXXoyiafi6^ dXrj&i^' aiSh^

yap

itpoy Kol

iTrrrtp

ouScvi avBpionip.

uB

t6B

Kol

Koi avBpatfntp vndpx^i, Imros b*

murrl tip
o^ ^V^^ "^

ia

vayrl rtp F, dXrfSis tarai r6 av/xw//>a-

tlKvSov^ oXrji ovarj^ rfj^

Cfjui

BF

npordau>i,

'OfAOiWi Si Kol <rrprjrucij^ ovarfi rifs

/8^cTai yap to

rdoftj^'

/iTjSw ^ndpxiv,

firfi^

t6

AB

/x}t rtp

firjUA

-rip

npo-

fii/jrn

rip

F, alov

Toiy ^f aXXou y^i^>t;; cSScoi t^ y/ioy r6 yap f^or

povaucjj ovr larpucj ^apx^i, ovS* tj fAOvauc^

* oirrc

Xt^hno^

larpucfj,

rov b

Kal
<rrai
f

odit

rov phf

prfStvl rtp

murrl to* F, aXrjS^f tarat r6 avfiir4paafia,

l /i^ SXrj

0cu% BF dXy inC n, koX a{hwi

1}

ovSiv yap iwXui

to avpurtpaapja dXfi$ts,

r^ B

vnapx^w, to fidrriH
B Ttvi T<Ji F, otov TO yri'05' tw cJSci ica* t^ Sco^opf
TO yap ([o>ov traiTi avdpamtp Koi murrl frtlip, 6 5'
avBpwnos Tivi 7re2[<p '^c^ <'^ iravrL Ci oiV to A
TO

Kol

#f04 rip

oXut

10

TravTi rip

irovTt Toi

F vndp^r

Kal to

iravrl

oirp

rw F

Xij^tirj, r6

*0/iota>9 S< #ccu OTcpT/TuoJy OWT179

Taaccaj.
T^i

evhcx^rai yap ro

/xT^Scvi

yap
416

^tpov

\mdp\iv, ro y^vroi

TO yvo9 rip i( dXXov ytvovs

ovr

<f)poyi^i

0X1)6^9

T^ AB

irpo*

t^ B

ftifrc

/iifrc

rwl

rip F, clo

ciSct fcot hioi^op^'

ouSc/xi^

^irapx^^

ro

ovrt

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
But

if

the premiss

AB

which

is

II. ii

assumed

wholly

is

true, and BC is wholly false, we shall have a true

For there is no reason why
conclusion.
should

not apply to all B and all C, while B applies to no

C as is the case with all species of a genus which
animal
are not subordinate one to another ; for
applies to both horse and man, but horse applies
Thus if A is assumed to apply to all B,
to no man.
and B to all C, the conclusion will be true, although
the premiss BC is wholly false.
Similarly too when the premiss AB is negative.
For it is possible that A should apply to no B and to
genus does not apply to the species of another genus.
no C, and that B should apply to no C as, e.^., a
For animal applies neither to music nor to medicine,
nor does music apply to medicine. If, then, it is
assumed that A applies to no B but B applies to all
C, the conclusion will be true.
Also if the premiss BC is not wholly but only
For
partly false, the conclusion will again be true.
there is no reason why A should not apply to the
whole of both B and C, while B applies to some C ;
as, e.g., the genus applies both to the species and to
the differentia ; for animal apphes to every man
and to everything that walks on land, while man
applies to some things which walk on land, but
not to all. Supposing, then, that A is assumed to
apply to all B, and B to all C, A will apply to all C
which, as we have seen, is true.
For
Similarly too if the premiss AB is negative.
it is possible for A to apply to no B and to no C, and
yet for B to apply to some C as, e.g., the genus does
not apply to the species and differentia of another
for
animal applies neither to thought
genus

Major true,
JJi^^[
false.

'

'

'

'

'

o 2

417

Major tme,
^JQor partly

ARISTOTLE

ift

T<ji> B TO 6^ B nturri rtft

xmdpi^i' rovro 8* ^k aXrfii^.
/^/x( ouAAoyia/i^Iii' M^x^rai kqI
'Em 5^ T<Sv
&*
rfjs irpamj^ npordattos oAiyy ovirrjg iIkvSovs rfj^
eripas dXr)6ov^ aXtjOts c2>xu t^ avfin^paa^, fcal
cVt Tt i/ftvSoih oCoTfs rijs noarnjs rfj^ 8* ir4pa<i
dXrjOov^,* Kou rn^ yhr dXrfdov9 rrj^ 3' iv fiVpct
lUvSoth, fcai a^i/^or4pu9 ^fvS^. adhh^ yap kcjrat fUv B fiffStvi vnofxtuf n^
Xvi TO
F rwi,
Koi TO B T^ r riyt, clov ^i^tov oiofUi^ X*^ Xtvtctp
h^ Ttvi xmapxtit '^<^ "tj x^^ XtvKi^ rwi.
ci
fUaov TtBtiti ^ X'^ vpunov S^ r3 {(por, moI

TO fUv A
r, ou&vi T<p r TO

XrjiftdtiTj

fiT/Scvt

10

o^

1ft

Xrj^irj TO fi^
oA<^ T(o
vndfixf^ t^
Toi r. i} ucv ABSX^^'^^.;^

TO

avfintpa/Tfjia aXrjdtf.

ical

ical

AB

npordatat^' iyxcjfKi yap ro

to*
rw Si V rwl /in undp)^t, to
fUvTot B TiVi Toi r unapxiy, otov to (oioi^ aydpamaf
av TTovTi tmopyci Acvico; o< Tivt oinr CTrrnu, o o
avupcjTTOS Ttvi AcvK^ imdpvci' uhft
ci fUaov
rtO^vros Tov dvBpwmnt XrMttrj ro
firfitvi r<p B
vndpx^w to 5c B Tivt Tfji F i^ap;(tv, dXrjdis tanu
TO GVfnTpaafia 0cv8ot^ otxn^ oAiyy T175
vpoToaccof.
Kcu Ci CTTi Ti
npdraaif, iami to
1^
Gvp,7rpaafjLa dXrjdds' ovS^v yaf> KcuAuci to
mu
T^ B #fat TO* F Ttvi V7rapxw, koI ro B rw F
UTTopvctv, olov ro ^wov rivl KoXtL kcu rtvi uuryaXip,
KoX ro kqXov Tivt fiydX(^ undpxfiy, iav ovv Xrf^vj
ovarfs rrj^

fUv
10

M B tu4

^ Br <U^,
ar^ptfrucfj^
ofioiws W

oJ^i vnapxiv

AB

^u5^

AB

Tm

418

4X^ef>Gt] oAiTf dXii^oOs nf, Bekker.

oirv] ov crrorc prcli Bekker.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
nor to

whereas

speculative,'

'

II.

ii

thought

applies to

some of that which is speculative. Supposing, then,

that A is assumed to apply to no B, and B to all C,
A will apply to no C and this, as we have seen, is
;

true.

In the case of particular syllogisms it is possible tSiSarsyibe true both (i.) when the first logisms.
premiss is wholly false and the other is true
and
(ii.) when the first premiss is partly false and the
other is true and (iii.) when the former is true and
the latter partly false and (iv.) when both are false.
For (i.) there is no reason why
should not apply to Major
no B but to some C, while B appUes to some C, as, SiS^inor
e.g., animal applies to no snow but to some white,' true.
and 'snow 'applies to some 'white.* Supposing,
then, that snow is posited as the middle term, and
animal as the first, and it is assumed that A applies
to the whole of B and B to some C, AB is wholly
false, but BC is true, and the conclusion is true.
Similarly too when the premiss AB is negative.
For
it is possible for A to apply to the whole of B and
not to apply to some C, and yet for B to apply to
some C, as, e.g., animal applies to every man, but
is not a consequent of some
white,' and
man *
applies to some white ; so that if man is posited
as the middle term, and it is assumed that A applies
to no B and B applies to some C, the conclusion will
be true although the premiss AB is wholly false.
(ii.) Also, if the premiss AB is partly false, the Major partly
'^
conclusion can be true.
For there is no reason why Jru.'
A should not apply both to some B and to some C,
while B applies to some C as, e.g., animal applies
to some beautiful and some large,' and beautifor the conclusion to

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

ful

'

applies to

some

'

large.*

Thus

if

is

assumed
419

ARISTOTLE

ft

T^ A nayri ri^t B teal r6 B rivi ra F, i) lUw AB

irpomoi^
re 0w8i79 ar(u, 1} 5^ BF dXtfVi/f^, koI
Kol irrwft ffr ucfji
TO avfinpLafJLa aXrj$s. 6fiouo9
airoi SpH
oixrq^ rrj^ AB TrpomiatcJS' ol

y^

iaoyrai kcu uHjavrtos KiiUvoi trpo^ rfpf

HcOiv

ianu to

dXrj0s

TO

^ fUv

4*

T^i fiv

r<JLi

AB

iXftB^ iiSi

ouScv yap KwXuti

T rwi, koI to

avfiir^paofia.

oAoi

vndpxW

atrdSciffi^J

BF ^cv^,

rtp bi

/xiiSm vnap)(tiy, otov ^tpov

Kvtcvtgt fiv

Ti fUXavi 6 TtW, a;#(vos- hi oJ&cvi fUXiun,'

ct

nayri T<ji> B to
#co4 to B rivi t^ F, oAi;^i( CffTOi TO avfurdpaafia t/rnvSoCi ovroi to BF.
'Ofwuof hi Kal artpffTuefji XofifiayofUvrf^ rij^

Xrf<^irf

mu^

war*

AB

irporraatcaf.

/y^^cupci ydip

rd

ti^ /lir

fti;-

F Tu4 /it^ T^mip^iv, to /i^rroi B fiiT^^cvi

oriov T^ y!fw TO* ^f oAAou y^vovf ccSct

Scvt Ta> $

F,

Ta>

roU avrov ci!5<n* t6 ya^ (ojor

owvi vnapx^i Acvuroi & tivc ov,' o 8*
dpiBfios ouScvi ActiK^p' av oiV fUtmv rtOn 6 apiBfi6i,
Kol Ai;^^ TO flV A fll/^CVt T<p B TO 5< B TiW T^
F, TO A rivt T<ji F oi);^ \nraja^i, ontp tJv aXn^is'
iceu Tcp avfLpPritt6rn

lA

dpiBfju^ fiiv

KoX
*>

ri

Kat

fiv

AB

irporaais dXr)urjs,

1 erri t& tlfv6rj^

1^

ij

Sj

AB 0t^;

BF
5^

^vOik.

iccu

1;

oF

ovocv yo/> iccuAuci

T<ji B Tcvi jroi r<ff F Tivi inrapxnw tKartpip,
TO
TO 5^ B fJLr^vi rtp V, otov i tvavriov to B rw V,
afuJHjj 3c av^^firiKora rut airrw yh^f t6 yap ^otov
rtvi XVKto Koi nvl yiiXavt irrapxt^, \(Vkov h*
o^vi fUXavi, av o^ Xrjifidfj to
rw B icol
to B nvl to) F, akT)0^ ccrrcu to ovyLntpaayua. koX
arprqriKrjs 8c Xafifiavo^Uvrjs riJ9 AB cjaavrwi' ol
coTOi TO ovfiTTtpaafxa aXrjOiS'

A nam

420

rm

ov Philoponus

(?),

Jenkinson :

nW oodd.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

B and B to some C, the premiss AB

be partly false, but BC will be true, and the conclusion will be true.
Similarly too if the premiss AB
is negative
the terms will be the same and will be
related in the same way for the purpose of the proof.
(iii.) Affain, if AB is true and BC false, the conT^.u
-UAA
elusion can be true,
ror there is no reason why
should not apply to the whole of B and to some C,
while B applies to no C as, e.g., animal applies to
every swan and to some black,' and swan applies
to no black
so that supposing that A is assumed
to apply to all B and B to some C, the conclusion will
be true although BC is false.
Similarly too if the premiss AB is negative.
For
it is possible for A to apply to no B and not to apply
to some C, while B applies to no C
as, e.g., a genus
does not apply to a species from another genus, and
does not apply to some of an accident to its own
species
for
animal applies to no number and
does not apply to some
white,' and
number *
applies to no white.* Thus if number is taken as
the middle term, and A is assumed to apply to no B,
and B to some C, A will not apply to some C which,
as we have seen, is true.
The premiss AB is true,
and BC is false.
(iv.) The conclusion can also be true if AB is partly
false and BC is also false.
For there is no reason
why A should not apply to some of both B and C,
while B appUes to no C e.g., if B is contrary to C,
for
and both are accidents of the same genus
animal applies to some white and some black,'
but white applies to no black.' Thus if A is
assumed to apply to all B, and B to some C, the conclusion will be true.
So too if the premiss AB is
to apply to all

will

i'i_.

Major tme,
minor falsa

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

421

Both
fake!^^*^*

ARISTOTLE
Ha
yap auTol opoc koI (jooovtw^ tc^^ooktcu

np^

rffw

ccrrcu

ro

an68t(t.v.

Koi o/i^or/pcuv hi
0

^v^v o^<a

rw fih^
avfirrtpaafia aXrjd^s' iyx<^pt yap t4
^i^Scvi
fir)hvl rCi hi r rwl vnapvtiv, r6 nivroi

T^ yA'oy Tip cf oAAou yivov^ cJSci ical

rots cScoi roi9 avrou* C<poy yo/)
dpidfjLw yLv oi^Scvi XiUKot hi rwi vfrdfiYti, koI 6
aptduos ouScvi A<v#r<jii. /av oSv Xtf^Sjj ro A irayri
^rw D Kcu TO B rm r^ F, ro fUv ov^W/MtOfta
OAJjOds, al hi npordoiis a/t^ ^cvSci;.
'Ofioitjj^ hi Kol <rrprfrucTJi ouatjy r^ AB. ou5<v
yap KcuAtACi T^ A t4> /av B oA^ (mofix^w rw hi F
rua firi vnapx^ty, ^i^ ro B fitfhtvi Tip V, clov
{<pov KvtOHp p4v muni fUXavi hi ran oAx ^rrdpX'^*
> tcvKvoi 8* ovheA fjUXavt' war* l kij^it} to A
M k fj,rjhvi T<p B ro 5^ B rivi r<ii F, r^ A rm tw F oiJ^
vrropyci.
ro uhf o9v avfin^paofia akffi4i, ai hi
Toi r, ofof

r^ avp^PriKOTi

III. *Ev hi ro* fitatp OYTjfiari nayrot^ ly^wpiZ

hia ilfvhwv dXrfdis avXXoyiaaodai, kou dfi/^ortputv
rcui/ npordatoiv oXutv *livhwv XapBavofUvwv [koI
nl rt cicarcpay],* icoi r^j p.iv aXnSoOs ttjs hi

i/fvhovs

owrrji

fjJyriSp fcal ci

oXrjs,

6noTpaaow UKvhovs nBt"

ap.^>orpai ini ri

10

^vois,

teal ci

tf

dnAcu; dXTjSrjs 17 h* itri

il^vhtfi, tcai tl 17 puhf
oXrj il/vhrf9 17 3* cVi rt oAi}^^, kcu cv roi9 kovoXov
KCU cVi rcuv cv fipt avXXoytafUJV.
i ydp ro
roi fiiv B /iiT^cvi virapxti. Tip hi F

fiiv

4S2

r(u

These words,

iKoripas omitlenda cL Jenkinson.

if

not inserted

by

error in antSdpstkm of

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
taken as negative

be posited

will

II.

ii-iii

the terms will be the same and

same relation for the purpose

in the

of the proof.
The conclusion can also be true when both preto apply to
For it is possible for
misses are false.
no B but to some C, while B applies to no C ; as, e.g.,
a genus does not apply to a species from another
genus, but applies to an accident of its own species ;
animal applies to no number but to some
for
white,' and number applies to no white.* Thus if
is assumed to apply to all B and B to some C,the conclusion will be true although both premisses are false.
Similarly too if
is negative ; for there is no
should not apply to the whole of B
reason why
and yet not apply to some C, while B applies to no
C ; as, e.g., animal applies to every swan but does
not apply to some black,' while swan applies to
no black ; so that supposing
to be assumed to
does
apply to no B, and B to apply to some C,
not apply to some C. Thus the conclusion is true
although the premisses are false.
III. In the middle figure it is possible to reach a Second
true conclusion by false premisses in every combina- (i^uni[if each ^':rj'*\g
tion
(i.) if both premisses are wholly false
^^ ^^^^
is partly false ;] (ii.) if one is true and the other

'

'

'

AB

'

(iii.) if
wholly false, whichever is falsely assumed
both are partly false (iv.) if one is absolutely true
and the other partly false and if one is wholly false
and the other partly true ^ both in universal and
;

in particular syllogisms.
(i.)
^ ^

If

animal
A applies
to no B but to all C,as, e.s.,'

^^

the wording in ch. iv, are at least tautologous with (iii.), and
spoil the analysis.
* This case is not treated in the discussion which follows.

423

Both
premisses.

ARISTOTLE
66k

hk navri,
av h^vrluts rtBuknv al nporaoti^ khX Xtf^Sn^ ro
A rut fi(v B navri T<Ji 8< F /iTyScrt, ^k il$viCjv oAufv
rcjv irporaatwv aXrjBts coroi r6 av^itripatryji,
oyLoiois S^ Kol ct r<(t fuv B travri r^ hi T ftijScvt
vndpxi TO A' 6 yap ovroy corcu auAAoyur/ios-.

travrl, oXov (ak>v XiBoi fihp ovScvi ctnroo

0X17^7^*

01^ V yo^

trai^i i^ap;fv,

icaiAuci

ri fuvroi

to

ncoi

r^ B

/it;3ct4 roi

itcu r(p

F,

otiO

F
r6

y^vos Toij fi^ (Jtt' oAAijAa cSScoiv* to yap {<5*ov ffol

ircu^ icoi avBpumw, kqX oi^U dvOpcayro^
iTnroS' iav oSv Xrj^Bfi r6 J^axiv tcD filv irayri rat hi

to iTrir^

vndpxiy, 17 /xv oXrj ^fV&fjs <rrai 1} 8* oXrj

Kol TO avfintpaa^ aXrjdis vpos ^nort'
p<ltovv rtdtyros rod <rrprjrucoO.
Koi C4 1} rr4pa ini Tt ^kv^s 1} 5* ct<7 0A17
firjBvi

0iXq6^]i,

iyxwpi yap to

* aAi;^7jy.

Toj 8^

wovri, TO fUvTOi

A t^ /mv B tu4 vYropxciy

B /ii/Scvi Ty F, oHw i(pO

XwKtIt /XV TIW KOpOKi hk mUTtL, KoX t6 AcV^C^

oi)8V(

Kopatci.

firfitvX

T<ji>

cVt Tt 0t>8i79

17

iav

o^

Xtf^Bj r6

oXip \map\iv,
8*

AF

fikv

A r^ fU B
AB nporauif

oAij aAi;^7}y, icoi

to avfind'

Koi lurariBt^Uvov h rov arfn)'

rucov woaurojs' hia yap rwv avrutv opwv rj dirO'
8i^i9.
Kol 1 17 #caTo^Twci7 nporoGis irri ri
ovbiv yap
iltvSrfs Tf 8c arprjrucrf oXrj dXr)di^,
KOiXtki ro A rw fiv B rivl tmapx'^w T<p 8< F oXtp
firj V7Tdpxiv, Koi ro B firfBvi rat F, olo to ^atov
X^VKW /XCV rivl TTITTQ 8* OvB^fJU^, Kol TO AcVKOV
oXat rip B
ovSfiia irirrji' war cov Xtf^B^ r6

90 paofjLa

8i

dXr)ds.

424

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iii

applies to no stone but to all horse,' if the pre- wholly

* ^'
misses are taken in the contrary sense and
is
assumed to apply to all B but to no C, although the
premisses are wholly false, the conclusion from them
can be true. Similarly too if
applies to all B but
to no C ; for we shall get the same syllogism.
'

'

(ii.) So again if one premiss is wholly false and the p wholly

other M'holly true
for there is no reason why A one true
should not apply to all of both B and C, while B Premiss,
applies to no C
as, e.g., a genus applies to co-ordinate
animal applies both to every horse
species ; for
and to every man, and no man is a horse. Thus if
animal is assumed to apply to all of the one and to
none of the other, one premiss will be wholly true
and the other wholly false, and the conclusion will
be true, to whichever of the two terms the negative
is attached.
(iv.) So too if one premiss is partly false and the One partly
other wholly true. For it is possible for
to apply onrtrue
to some B and to all C, while B applies to no C ; as, premiss.
animal applies to some white ' and to every
e.g.,
crow, and white applies to no crow. Thus if
is assumed to apply to no B but to the whole of C,
the premiss AB will be partly false, and AC will be
wholly true, and the conclusion will be true. Similarly too if the negative is transposed < ; for the proof
will be effected through the same terms.
So too if
the affirmative premiss is partly false and the negative
wholly true. For there is no reason why A should
not apply to some B and yet not apply at all to C,
while B applies to no C ; as, e.g., animal applies
to some white but to no pitch, and white applies
to no pitch ; so that if A is assumed to apply to the
;

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

.., if

'

'

the minor premiss

is

'

negative.

425

ARISTOTLE
imdpxtw rathk T

Ar

firjStvt,

iff

fUv

AB

Mn

0cv5^,

TO avfin^paafia 0^17^^?.
^cvSctf^,
Ka2 tl dfu^OTtpat eu npordati^ <Vt
coTOi TO avfin^paafia dXrjdt^. ^y^cupci ydp t^ A
Kol r(f} B ICU T(ft r TtVt VTtdpXtW, TO 5^ B ftl^Scvt
Toi r, ofov (a>ov tcQx XtVKtfi run, koI fUXavt rivC, r6
8^ XVk6v ovOvl jUXavt, ap odv Xtf^S^ t6 A rw
yLv B iravrl rt^ 0 V fiTfivit a/i^ fUy al nporrir
aci9 CTTt Ti ^cuScif, TO & ovfin^poafjui aXrjBtf.
ofioiw^ 5< Kcu furartdtioTjs Ttjs artpvirttcfj^ Sea tum*

ij

0A17 dXrj6h^, Koi

40

66

cu)Ta;i' oputv,

Oovcpoi' 5^

iral

Ttfy

'^P^^ ovAAoyiOftoir'

to A rtp fUw B trovri r^ hi T

rwi inapxtiv, koI t^ B t6i> P tim /i^ ^irdp^wf, olbv

ovS^

ya/> urcuAuf i

Tiw AcvKoi
10

fiw&vi

^dv oSv r^Bfj to A rCt fihf

V To4 imdpxfty, 4 f**^
tlfvhi^, ^ h* iv lUpl oXrfi^,

ou;^ tmdpfti.

^dpxttv

KadoAov rrpdraat^

rtv hi

oArj

Kal TO avfin^paofia dXtjO^s'ClaavTCJS hi Koi tcaTa^Tucijs XofifiayofUtnri^

AB* tyx^P^^
Tii'i firj
19

y^

'''^

xmdpx^Lv, koX to

rfis

B fiT;$vi Toi i
T Tivt fi^ vndpxfiv,

Toi fio'

oZby TO

rip

i^i' ou5vt diltvx<{),

irndpyti^ KoX TO wlnrxov ovx

Acuicai

v7Tdp^i

5^ Tivt

otf;(

rwt X(VK<p,

cav ouv Tc^ TO

r<p fiiv B irovrl t^ hi V runifif
frfx^TcuTts^ i} icatfoAov oAiy
vndpxiv, ij fiiv
0ev5i79> 17 &
dAi;^!/?, iccu t(^ avpiirpaapa.

AB
AF

dXrjds,

Kcu T^y
10 p.pi

o^

4S6

ft<v

^vhov^.
vjrapxti

KoBdXov dXrfSoGi r6iori^ rrj^ h* cr

ovhiv yof) koiAi^c to a pfrirt rat B

m, Bekkers ov

C, Jeakintoot om. ABC'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iii

whole of B but to no C, AB will be partly false and

AC wholly true, and the conclusion will be true.
(iii.) The conclusion can also be true if both pre- Both
misses are partly false. For it is possible for A to ^?Sy^ false
apply to some of both B and C, while B applies to no
C as, e.g., animal applies to some white and
some black,' but white applies to no black.*
Thus if A is assumed to apply to all B but to no C,
both premisses are partly false, but the conclusion is
*

true.

'

'

'

Similarly too if the negative premiss is transproof being effected through the same

posed,** the

terms.
It is evident that the same also holds good of
For there is no reason why
particular syllogisms.
should not apply to all B and some C, while B does
animal applies to
not apply to some C
as, e.g.,
every man and to some white,' but man will not
is taken to apply
apply to some white.' Thus if
to no B but to some C, the universal premiss is wholly
false, but the particular premiss is true, and so is the
conclusion.
taken as
is
Similarly too if the premiss
for it is possible for
to apply to no B,
affirmative
and not to apply to some C, and for B not to apply
applies to nothing
animal
as, e.g.,
to some C
inanimate and does not apply to some white,' and
inanimate ' will not apply to some white.' Thus
if
is taken to apply to all B and not to apply to
will be wholly
some C, the universal premiss
will be true, and the conclusion will be
false, but

'

'

'

(?)

Par-

syllogisms.
^^^ojjy^"^
false,

minor

^^""

'

AB

'

'

AB

AC

true too.
So too if the universal premiss
For there
particular premiss false.
"

is
is

true and the

no reason why

Cf. previous note.

427

Oi) Major
false.

ARISTOTLE
Ma
/xY^e

rw r

o^Scvi nt<jdat, to fuvroi

nvi rw

fi^ vndpxiv, olov {a>ov ou&cvt apiSfitft ovS* o^^rv^^oi,

^dv odv rtufj

#cai d dpiBfio^ rivi oj^tv^to ovx firerai.
TO A Toi /xv B firfi^vl Ta> & r Till', TO fiv avfintpaa^ia coroi aXrfSi^, koI ^ koBoXov nporaaif dXrj&rii

Kol KQTa^TilC^ S^

Y^

o^
ao

T^

Ka$6XoV

ri6fliVfK

'^ '^^ '''^ ^ '^^ '''4' ^

iyX^P^^
xmapxiuf, ro yulvroi B TtW t<J# i /x^ Ivtadai,
olov TO ycixx T<{> ciSci KoX rn Su/^p^' ro yap i<ftov
navTi avOfxlmtp koI oXt^ ^<s<P cttctcu, avBpumoi 3*
ov navTi ir{<p* omtt* ov Xrj^$fj ro A r^ fiiv B oKtp
vndpx^w rtjj hi r rwi firi vnapxtiv, i) /icv koBoKov
nporacrti aXrf^^
h* iv tUpK ^u&i^, r6 hk

ataavTut^.

iff

avfin^paofux d}ifj$4f.
OawpoK Si Koi ori ^( afx^or^ptav ^fttvb&9 iarai
koX
r6 (rvfin^paafia aXrjBt^, tintp ^ii^)^rnu r6
rp B Koi rw V oA<^* vndpx^tv, ro fUvroi B rvA, rw

iirtavoi,

fi-fj

Xri*ft0^vro9

yAp toO

r<^ fiv

vnapxt, al fiiv npordatif

oft^OTcpoi JfvSis, ro $ ovfitrtpaafia aXrfits*
'OfMoiuts 0 Kol KarrjY^pucrjs ovarf^ riji koBoXov
TTpordutws rrjs 8* v yL4pi artprjrucfj^
iyxo^p^l
yap ro
ru> ficv B /htScvI t<j> 5c F iravrl ira6<u,
#cu TO B nvi T<jt> r firj vndpxtiVt olov ^(ftov cVt8*
(rrqiJLII ftv ovStfuq, dpBpatnw & ircu^i cwrroi, ij
iiTian^^rj ov navri ovBpomtp.
cov oiJi' Xrf^Brj ro
Toi ftcv B oAo* iWop^^tv rat 8c F Tivi fi^ ira$ai,
at /xv 7rpordai9 ^eu8is-, to 8^ avfin4paafia

/XT/Scvt

rtf)

Si

riyi

40

dXrid4^.
>

oA^]

488

r<^

/Uv

r^

ii MT^**^ foi^ Boethius,

ct JenldoMa.

'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. iii

should not be a consequent of none of either B or

C, while B does not apply to some C ; as, e.g./ animal
applies to no number or inanimate thing, and
number is not a consequent of some inanimate things.
Thus if is taken to apply to no B but to some C, the
conclusion and the universal premiss will be true,
although the particular premiss will be false.
Similarly too if the universal premiss is taken as
affirmative.
For it is possible for
to apply to the
whole of both B and C, and yet for B not to be a
consequent of some C
as, e.g., the genus applies to
the species and the differentia ; for animal appHes
to every man and to all that which walks on land,'
but man does not apply to everything that walks
on land so that if is assumed to apply to the whole
of B but not to apply to some C, the universal premiss
will be true and the particular false, but the conclusion will be true.
It is evident also that the conclusion drawn from
premisses which are both false can be true, since it is
possible for
to apply to the whole of both B and
C, and yet for B not to be a consequent of some C.
For if
is assumed to apply to no B but to some C,
both premisses will be false, but the conclusion will

'

'

'

be true.
Similarly too if the universal premiss

is

affirmative

and the particular negative. For it is possible for

A to be a consequent of no B but of all C, and for B
not to apply to some C
as, e.g., animal is a consequent of no knowledge but of all man,' and
knowledge is not a consequent of all man.' Thus
if A is assumed to apply to the whole of B, but not
to be a consequent of some C, the premisses will be
false, but the conclusion will be true.
*

'

'

429

(i")

Both

Fa^il^^^^

ARISTOTLE
IV. 'Earat S^ koI iv
ft

t/tvS<jjv

aXrfiis,

teal

rtf^

^ax^rep ax^fian hta

d^^Kyr^panf

ifKV^w o^awv

iKartpa^, koX rtfi fUv Mpag

dXrjdovs oXf)^ rfj^ 5' iripa^ ^cvSoO;, tcaX r^ fUv
iitL TL flfvSovi riji 8* oXfis aXrjdovt, koI avanaXuf,
Kol oaayCis dXXuts tyxiMtptl furaXafitUf rac vpordoXujv Kol

ais.

irl

ov^v yap

kcuAucc fu/frt r6

/i'^rc

r6

fUyroi A nvi to* B

vndpxtw, otov ovr* dvOpufrrof oiht ntl^or (Mtvi
wjfvxfp lirtnu, av6ponro^ fUvroi rtvi irf{<ji vndpxfi'
cav o^ ^V^^ ^o A KOi TO B iroio-i rijii P vnapxtiv,

lofiiT^cvi

rift

vnapx^^*')

al luv npoTaaii oAoi ifK\jhU, ro hk avfiwipaafia

aXqBtS' oMTavrwi hi teal rfjs fUu or^fnfriKrjis rifi
\khk Kara^ructft oCatf^.

4yxtM>pi

y^

to fUv

vnapx^u^ r6
A natrrl, teal r6 A rufi
r<p B fii^ vndpx^iy, oto ro fUXii odSvi KVtOHif
i^v 8^ TrtUTTi, Kol TO {<pov oi5 troi^l ft4Xavi' war
av Xrf4^$^ TO fUF B TTovTi Tji r TO 8c A firjSvt, t6
10 A TiVi T^ B o^ vndpfti' Kol ro fUr ov^n^paafia
dXr)d4s, oi 8^ 'trpardaif i/ki^U.
Kol ci cVi Ti txar^pa ^vhri^, tonu ro avfiv^'
paxTfia oAtj^cV. oi58o' yof) iccuAtAct Kai ro A Koi ro B
Tivi TO* r VTrdpxfty* f<u r6 A ru% rtp B, otor ro
Aeuicov KOi TO KoXov rivl ^{(hv indpxti, koX r^
u\vk6v rivl KoX^. av o^ rc^ ro A teal ro B
navrl r<^ T vndpx^^t <** fiiv npordatis ivi ri
^tvSls ro 8 avfinpaafui dXif$4i,
teal irrtpfi'
ovShf yap
rucffs 8c rij^ AV riBtfjUvrf^ oyMtotq,
K<oXvi ro fiv A rivl r<p V fiif U7rdpxu^ ro 8^ B
rivl tmdpx^iv, Kal ro A rtp B fi-fj natrri undpxtp,
4S0
/lY^Scvt rtft

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iv

IV. In the last figure too it will be possible to Third figure.

reach a true conclusion by means of false premisses verJS'
(i.) when both premisses are wholly false, (ii.) when syllogisms.
each of them is partly false, (iii.) when one is wholly
true and the other wholly false, (iv.) when one is
partly false and the other wholly true
and vice
versa ; and in all i>ther possible combinations of
premisses. For (i.) there is no reason why, although () Both
nor B applies to any C, A should not apply whoiiy^^^
neither
to some B : as, e.g., neither man nor that which ^*^^*
walks oh land
is a consequent of anything inanimate, yet man applies to some things which
walk on land. Thus if
and B are assumed to
apply to all C, the premisses will be wholly false, but
the conclusion will be true. Similarly too if one
premiss is negative and the other affirmative. For
it is possible for B to apply to no C, and A to all C,
and for A not to apply to some B as, e.g., black
appUes to no swan, and animal to every swan, and
animal does not apply to everything black ; so
that if B is assumed to apply to all C, and A to no C,
A will not apply to some B and the conclusion will be
true although the premisses are false.
(ii.) So too if each of the premisses is partly false, (ii.) Both
the conclusion can be true. For there is no reason paruy false
why both A and B should not apply to some C, while
A appUes to some B as, e.g., white and beautiful *
apply to some animal,' and white to some beautiful.'
Thus if A and B are taken to apply to all C,
the premisses will be partly false, but the conclusion
will be true.
Similarly too if AC is taken as negative.
For it is quite possible that A should not apply to
some C, and B should apply to some C, and A should
not apply to all B
as, e.g., white does not apply
;

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

431

ARISTOTLE
80

o^

otov TO XfVKov TUfl luHft

rivi vn(ipxi, teal

r6 XevK6v

av

X'r)^Bj

TO

fiV

^ndflx^i, r6 S4 iroA^r
oi^ iroprl

/xi^Scw

rcjJ

ofi^OTtpai fiv al irpordatis

iirl

KoXot' war*

r^ 5^

^^cvftcip,

vayri,

t6 8^

cvtiTT^paafia aXrfi^^.

Qaavrioi & koI

S5

fUv

rrj^

^cuSoiV

8Xri^

rtj^ 8*

navrl rtft T IvtaBox, ro fjLtyroi

rv^
vndpx^iy, otou f^t^v kcu Xtwcov worn
KVKVi^ nrrai, to fjJyroi ^uh>v ov vayrl vndfX!^
XfVKw. r0vrwv oiV oputv rovrwv i^ Xiff^$ t6
KGU TO

Tip

/xi)

B oXiMt rtft r vndpxfuf r6 A SXta^fifi Cw^firm^,

fUv Br oAiy <rrai aXrf$rfi rf S^ Al oXj; iftVOfjf,
Miroi TO ovfinipaafAa aXn$i. ofJuUo^ S^ $cai tl r6
liiv BF 0CU&O9 TO 5^ AF aXrfiis' oi yap airroi 6poi
fiv

iff

Ci

K(jj\vi

oA^
t

dfi^OTcpoi XafipdvowTo KortL^arucai' oihkw

r6 ^Uv B TroKTi Tcp F na$ai, t^

KOi

yap
otov

MA

i^irapx<^ 'f<^ '''o

tcvKVw [u4vj* vayri

fi^

Tivi

(4^*

t^ B vnapxW,

M^^

8*

o<^0i4

Kai TO yulXav imapvti tivi {^k^* wot ov

XrH^&n TO A #fa4 to B iravTi tw F tmaovciy, ij /a^
oAij ^vo^, iccu -nd
BF oAiy dXridris rj B^
oviinlpaapia aXrjdts*
ofioiws 5c icol Tn;
X'q<^larjs aXrfdov^- Bia yap tcm' ain'tui' o/xiM' ^
icvKVip,

AF

AF

a7ro3(^i9.

ndAii' tt}; /xv 0A17; dAYy^oUf ouoi^f

r^

8* cirt

0v3ou;. eyxo}pi yap to fuv B troKri to* F vini^

Tivi Toi B, olov 5i9n>vr
;(' TO hk A Tiw', ifcu TO

WaiU.

om. Bnfu. Boethius, Waits.

scd.

These are not the same terms as before

488

they are derived

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iv

some animals, and beautiful applies to some,

and white does not apply to everything beautiful
so that if A is assumed to apply to no C, and B to
all C, both premisses will be partly false, but the
conclusion will be true.
(iii.) So too if one premiss is wholly false and the
other wholly true. For it is possible for both A and
B to be consequents of all C, and yet for A not to
as, e.g., animal and white are
apply to some B
*

to

'

'

pne

and one S-ue

Premiss.

'

("i.)

'

consequents of all swan,* yet animal does not

apply to everything white. Thus these terms being
posited, if it is assumed that B applies but A does
not apply to the whole of C, BC will be wholly true
and AC wholly false, and the conclusion will be true.
the same
Similarly too if BC is false and AC true
terms [black swan inanimate] will serve for the
purpose of proof. So too if both premisses are
assumed as affirmative. For there is no reason why,
while B is a consequent of all C, and A does not
apply to the whole of C, A should not apply to some
*
B as, e.g., animal applies to every swan, black
so that if
to no swan, and black to some animals
A and B are assumed to apply to all C, BC will be
wholly true, and AC wholly false, and the conclusion
Similarly if the premiss AC which we
will be true.
assume is true for the proof will be effected by means
of the same terms.
(iv.) So affain when one premiss is wholly true and
,
1 ^
x^
i-
-ui
r
"D X
the other partly false. For it is possible tor B to
apply
to
and
for
A
apply to all C, and A to some C,
to some B : as, e.g., biped appHes, but beautiful
*

'

'

<*

'

'

'

'^

ini

'

(according to the scholiast on 189 a 5-11) from the lost commentary of Alexander, who saw that a fresh set of examples
was needed.

433

(iv.)

One

true and one

partly false
premiss.

ARISTOTLE
noprl diSparmp, KoXiv S* ot) vturri, mu r6
KoXov ran, hiwohi unapv^^* ^^^ <^ ^V^^ '^^
A Kol TO B oXw rJi r V7rap;(ti', ij /i^v BP oXrj
oAi^^iW 1} 5^ A r cVt n ^fv&Tf^, T^
avfintpaofjta
dXrj$^. ofioiw^ bi Kol T^f fih^ AT aXrjdoC^ 1*179 &
BF i/teuSov^ im ri XafjLpavofi/vri^* iitrartBhnwv

/iV

IS

&

yap

Kcd rfjs
1} diro^ifif.
icara^riKffi ovari^. iml
yap iyx<i*pi to fUv B oXtp rip V vndpxnv to S^
nvi, Koi otov ourco; CYOHJiy ot) nayrt rip S ro A,
^av ^ri^>^ ro fUv B oAtp rw F ^napYtu^ r6
A
fti^Scvi, ij fi^ artpfirucfj hti rt ^^wji^, ij
oAy) aXrjBrff Koi ro avfin^paofia,
miXuf ^ni MScurrcu ori tow /xir A fiTf6vi vviLpycvros rtp F to0
5^ B Ttvi YXtopl r6 A rutl r^^ B u^ ^dpxtu^,
rG)v axnuiv oputv tartu

fiV <rrprfrucrj^ rrj^ 5^

to

V Mpa

ts

^avpov
rv79 M.

on

$cal

BF ^^

rrk

ptkw

T ^pcvioOr

AF oA^

dXi^i^

ovai;^

^yX^P*^ ^ avfiw^paofia

Vdv vap Ai^^^ to /x^ A /iifScW

t6 5c B imm^, 1} /i^ AF
cUb;% 1} 5^ B
*
CTri Tl ^CU$1^.
Oavc/wv S^* #rai ^nl rwv Iv fi^pt ov^Xoyiofiwy
OTi ndvru}^ coTOi 8ui tfKV^wv aXrfit^. ol yap avroi
opot Xrjnrtoi koX orav Ka06Xov iLaiv al npordati^,

lvai dXrj$4^.

'

ol fiV v rots Karrjyopixois Karrjyopixoi, oi 5* iv

Toiy arprfruc6ts orpirjriKoi.
ovhkv yap Sto^pci

vndpxpvros navri Xafiiv tnrdpxfw, u rwt

vndpxovTOs KadoXov Xafitu vndpxW npos rrpf rutv
opwv Kdatv, ofioiws St Kol cVi rwv artpvfTuniy.
^avtpov odv oTi av pcv "j ro ovfintpaxTfia t^tOSos,
dvdytcq cf wv 6 Aoyoy t/fvSrj ttvai rj irdvra ^ hna,

fXT^Scvi
*

iS4

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iv

does not apply, to all man,' and beautiful applies

and B are assumed
to some biped.' Thus if both
to apply to the whole of C, BC will be wholly true,
partly false, but the conclusion will be true.
and
Similarly too if the assumed premiss
is true and
BC is partly false ; the proof can be effected by a
*

'

AC

AC

rearrangement of the same terms. So too if one

is negative and the other affirmative.
For
since it is possible for B to apply to the whole and A
to some of C, and when the terms are thus related
A does not apply to all B, if B is assumed to apply to
the whole and A to none of C, the negative premiss
will be partly false, but the other will be wholly true,
and the conclusion will be true. Again, since it has
been shown that when A applies to no C and B to
some C, it is possible for A not to apply to some B,
it is evident that when AC is wholly true and BC
premiss

partly false,

be true.

it is still

For

if

B to all C, AC will

possible for the conclusion to

assumed to apply to no C, and

be wholly true and BC partly false.
is

It is evident, then, that in the case of particular (2) Parsyllogisms also it will be possible under any conditions syuiSsms.
to reach a true conclusion by means of false premisses.
For the same terms are to be assumed as when the
premisses are universal affirmative terms in affirmaFor it
tive and negative in negative syllogisms.
makes no difference to the positing of the terms
whether we assume that that which apphes to none
applies to all, or that that which applies to some
Similarly too in the case of
applies universally.
negative syllogisms.
Thus it is evident that whereas if the conclusion why it is
is false the grounds of the argument, either all or premisses
:

54 a

1.

435

ARISTOTLE
orav h* aXfj6^9, o^k avdytcyj aXri$s c&Oi ovrt rl
ovrt irdvra, oAA* tart fitf^vo^ ovrttf iXrfdoBf ttSr
40 cv ra> avXXoyiaiuff ro avfimpaafia Suolatt tvai
VI k aXrfii^, oi5 yL^v <f avdyia^,
axriov S* on orav hvo
XD ovTCj npos aXXrjXa wart dar^pou wroi i(
avayKfjs ttvai Odrtpov, rovrov uri oyrof fikv ov5^
6drpov <7Tat, oirroi S* ovk at^ytaj tlvai Odrtpov,
rov 5* avrov oyros cai firi oito^ dhuvarov i(
avay#n79 thnu ro avro. Xiyw h* clov rov A ovros
XtvKov ro B ttvai fUya i( dydyfcq^, jcoi fiff ovros
XtVKoG rov A 7^ B tlvai fUya <( dvdytcrf^. orwf
yap rovhi ovroi Xtwcov roC A ro& (Myin; fUya
ttvai ro B, fuydXov ht ro$ B StfTOf ro V ft^i
XfVKdv, dvdyKTf, ci to A Acvkok, r6 T fi^ ttvai
fcal orav hvo ovrwv Bar4pov avros avdytcn
10 XfVKOv,
Bdrtpov ttvai, rovrov fi'^i ovrog dvdytnj r6 A fitj
rov
ttvai.
B /ii) oi<T09 fJuydXov ro A ovx oUv
re AcvKov ttyai. rov Si A u'fi ovrog ^Vkov, mI
dvaytcrj ro B lUya ttvai, av^ipoivti <f dvdyKri^ rov
B /xcyoAou yiti oktos avro ro B ttyai yuiya. rovro
15 S* dhvvarov ct yap ro B fii} fori ii/iyo, ro A ovk
coroi AcvKov cf dvdyiais, ci ouv fii^ ovros rovrov
XevKov ro B corou ftiya, ovpfiaivti, Ci t^ B /ai}
^OTi yiya, th^ai fUya, a9 hid rpuav,
V. To 5c kvkXw KOi c( oAAt^Acui' htucwoBai ion
r6 hid rov ovp,rrpdafiarof Kai roO dvairaXiv rij
ft

10

Karriyopia rrjv Mpa Xafiovra vpdraaw avp.7Tpd'

rrjv XoimjVf rjv iXdfifiaytv iv 0arp<o <tuArtp F irarA
XoyujfAW' olov 4 cSci hi(ai on r6

vaaSai

* us. premiss.
*

c/.

Because A stands for the coi\Junctkm of two

S4 a 16-24.

4^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

iv-v

false, when the conclusion is

not necessary for all or any of the grounds
to be true but even when no part " of the syllogism
although it does not necessarily
is true it is possible
follow that the conclusion should be true. The
reason for this is that when two things are so interrelated that when the first is the second must be,
when the second is not, neither will the first be but
when the second is, the first need not necessarily be.
For it is impossible that the same thing should
7iecessarily be whether the same determining factor
does or does not apply. I mean, for example, that
it is impossible that B should necessarily be great
both when A is white and when A is not white. For
when, if this particular thing A is white, this particular thing B must be great, and if B is great C
cannot be white, then if A is white, C cannot be
white. And when, if the former of two things is,
the latter must be, if the latter is not, the former. A,
cannot be. Then when B is not great, A cannot be
white. But if when A is not white B must be great,
it follows of necessity that when B is not great B

some of them, must be

can yield

true,

conclusion.

it is

itself is great.

But

this is impossible

for if

is

not be white. Thus if

B is to be great when A is not white, it follows that
if B is not great, it is great, just as though the proof
were effected by three terms.*
V. Circular or reciprocal proof consists in using Method of
the conclusion and the simple conversion " of one rSprSaf
premiss to demonstrate the remaining premiss, which p^^^^*
was assumed in the original syllogism
as if, for
example, supposing that it was required to prove
that A appHes to all C, and this had been proved by

not great,

will necessarily

ue. the premiss with subject

and predicate interchanged.

437

ARISTOTLE
V7nipx*^$ cScc^c 5^

TO

A rw3

M,

ToO B, yraXiv c/ 5tfurvi&x Srt

to fiiv A rw V vndp)(t

trrrdpxft, Aa/3cuv

B, Kai TO A Tip B (trp6Tpov 8* cW15 iroAii' cXa/3e to B t4> F i/9rc(p;(civ) ^ C4 on t^ B T<p F

Sci ScZfcu vndpxov, i Xdfioi to A fcaTa tou F, ^
i^v avfi7Tpaafjux, to S^ B Kara tov A uiro^ccy
(irportpov 8* 4Xrf^$ri avdnaXti^ r6 A tcara roO B).
oAAcii; 8* ouif ^OTiv i( aXXi)Xwv ^t(ai,
cfrc yip
ao aX\o fuoov Ay^tcu, ou ia;icA<^ (ov8^ yap XofLfidvtrai rCtv oi^tcui'), citc Totn'coy ti, cmiyin; ddrpO
fiovov c& ytip a^i^cu, Taim> <aroi avfiwdpaafia, 8c
TO 8^

Tiji

rrcpov.

t&

*Ev /x^v oj^ TOis* fii^ Amurrp^ouotp i( oMafro''

8<urrou T^ Mpaf 7rpordctu>f yfyi^rrtu 6 avX*
Xoyiofios' ov yap tariv airoSufax StA rovrutv rwv
ofHiiv ori Tip fitoip TO rpLrov vwdp^n ^ rp npwrtp
TO fUaov.

v 8<

avntrrp^^vaiw coTi ndyra

A kcu TO B ral

TOiff

Bucvvvai 8i* oAAi^Aoiy, otov tl to

40

F avTiarpli^vaw

BBixj9w yap ri
t6 AB 8ca tc tow
avfi7rpdafiaTos <al hia rrjs BF Trporoacax <unaarpa^urqs, uHjavruti hk koX to BF 8ia tc tov

TO

AF

oAA^Ao&r.

8ia fUaov rov B,

M avfinpdafiaTos
p^vTj^.

Set 8^

aTroSctfoi*

ical TroAiv

Koi

rrj^

ttJi^

tc

Tatmuy yap

AB nporaatw^ atrrtorpap^"
Koi rrpf BA np6raaw

FB

eU^TroScurroiS'

cc;(/>^/xc^a

F imapx^W
KoX TO F TTOJ^i Toi A, <7vAAoyU7flO; COTOi TOU B
TroAiv cdv Xrj^Bj to ftcv F irarrt T<p A
5 irpos TO A.
TO 8c A TTOvrt Ty B, travTi T<ji B to F dvdy$cri
fjLovcus.

489

cav

oiJv

Xrj^&j to

irojTi Toi

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

it were then to be proved in turn that

applies to C and C
applies to B by assuming that
whereas in the original
to B
to B, and therefore
syllogism it was conversely assumed that B applies
to C ; or if, supposing that it is required to prove
applies
that B applies to C, one should assume that
as the predicate of C, which was the conclusion
whereas in the
before, and B as the predicate of

means of B,

original syllogism it
is predicated of B.

was conversely assumed that

Reciprocal proof

impossible
assume a different
is

any other way. For (1) if we

middle term, the proof will not be circular, since none
and (2) if we
of the same propositions is assumed
assume any of them, it must be one only for if both
are assumed, we shall have the same conclusion as
before, whereas we require another.
Thus where conversion is impossible, one of the
premisses from which the syllogism results is unfor it is impossible to demonstrate
demonstrated
from the given terms that the third applies to the
middle or the middle to the first term. But where
in

and B and C are

conversion is possible, i.e., if
convertible with one another, they can all be proved
For let AC be proved by means of the
reciprocally.
middle B, and AB again by means of the conclusion
and the premiss BC converted, and BC also in the
same way by means of the conclusion and the premiss
AB after conversion. We must, however, prove the
premisses CB and BA ; for these are the only premisses of those which we have used that remain undemonstrated. If, then, B is assumed to apply to all
C and C to all A, we shall have a syllogism giving
the relation of B to A. Again, if C is assiuned to
apply to all A, and A to all B, C must apply to all B.
439

ARISTOTLE

10

vnapxtiV' v dfi^ordpois hif rovroi^ roi^ ovXXoyi'

ayLoU ij FA np6raai9 iXriirrai avano^ucro^ (at
yap trtpai ScSciyfUvoi ^mxv), utar av ravTrjv
dtraaai
iaovrai hthtiyyMroi hi
diroBi(o}fjLv,
oAAi/Aciiv.
idv odv Xr)^$j to V nayrl rtp B #rai ro

nairrl

rtft

xmdpx^w, d^if^ortpoL re oi npordati^

Xniifidvwrnu, ical r6 T ri^ K

anohBiYiJLfvai
ovdyicri

vndf^w.

Oovcpov ovv &rt iv

KVKXtp Kol
15

8t*

a7ro5iifci9> A'

fiipoif tocs-

dmarp^^ovai

M^x^'Toi yiyvtoBoi ray

ToTy a\Aoif tuj nportpov i7ro^v.

dXXi/jXcov

QVfifiatyi hi Kol iv rovrois avrt^

r^

Scurvu/Wyyi

XpfiaBaL irpos rfiv oTroScif iv* to fiv yo/) F card roO

Scorwnu Xtf^^vro^ rod F
Kou ro B tcard roO

10

F irard tou
hid
TOVTUfv Scucvirrai ra/v frpordotwv, atart rtp avfi"
n^pdafiaTt \p!}yLda irpo^ rijv dfroScifiv.
Kara row

XlytoBai, ro 8^

'Ent hi rwv artfrrjTucaiv avXXoyiayujjv cuSc

Scucvuroi cf oAAi^Aoiv. <rrcu rd fikv B wavri r^
F xmdpxov, TO hi oi^M rCtv B* avfintpaafui art
ouScvi rwv F. i &17 ttoAxv hti avfiirpQMfaai&ai
ro

ts

ori TO
fiV

ov8cv rtuv B, o veUoi iXafitv, iarai r6

rw F rd 8^ F frayri rtp B* otmu yap

firfievl

dydnaXiv

17

trporom?.

avfincpavaaBai, ovkI^

ct

8*

on

6p,ouo^

rd

roi

ScI

dyriaTp7rTov ro

AB yap avrri npdraai^ ro B firjhvi rtp A koZ

TO A /iT^Scvt
B imd^)^iv), dAAd Xffirrto, ^ r6
ao A /xitScvI vndpx^i, ro B iravrt vndpxiy.
<mo r6
A ftiyScvt Toiv F xmdpxov,^ onp ijv rd avfin^paufiOt
(17

r<Ji

440

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

Now in both these syllogisms the premiss CA has been

assumed without being demonstrated the others
were already proved. Thus if we demonstrate this,
they will all have been proved reciprocally. If, then,
C is assumed to apply to all B, and B to all A, both
the premisses assumed have been demonstrated, and
C must apply to all A.
Thus it is evident that circular and reciprocal demonstrations can only be effected where conversion
;

in the case of other syllogisms they can

possible
only be used as described above. In these also it
happens that we use the very thing which is to be
for
proved for the purpose of the demonstration
we prove that C is predicated of B and B of A by
assuming that C is predicated of A, and we prove that
by means of these premisses ;
C is predicated of
so that we use the conclusion for the purpose of the
demonstration.
In negative syllogisms reciprocal proof is effected as Reciprocal
The native
to no B.
Let B apply to all C, and
follows.
conclusion is that A applies to no C. Then if it is syiiogisma.
appHes to no B,
required to establish in turn that
which was assumed before, we shall have the premisses
applies to no C, and that C applies to all B ;
that
If, on the
for in this way the premiss BC is reversed.
other hand, it is required to establish that B applies
to C, the premiss AB must not be converted again as
is the
before (for the premiss B applies to no
is

'

applies to no B ') ; but we must assume

as *
that B applies to all of that to none of which applies."

same
Let
<

A
A apply to no C, which was the conclusion before,
is guilty of petitio principii
required to be proved.

Aristotle

what

is

this is exactly

441

ARISTOTLE
Ma
8i n)

ai

aLvdyKT)

A /xnScvi, to B ttXrMw frovrl

o^ ro B treu^i rtft l vndpxip,

vnofixtuT'

''Uar rpuov ovrtjjv t<turr<fv avfivipaopui y^yovt,

Kox TO ievKXta airc^ucvwfu rovr* tan, to ovfLirt'
t5 paafjui Xofifiavovra koX cbwraAiv rrjpf Mpav vporaaiv n^v Xoaripf avXXoyHtoSai,
*Efri 5< rwv v fUpi avXXoyiOfui^
fuv
KaBcXov irp6Taaw ovic <<rrtr airoSciifai Siii Teuv
Mpwv, rriy 5^ card fUpo^ ccrriF.
fiir oA' oiJ#f
/oTiv dtrodt((u rriv KaB6Xov ^vp6v to uhf yap
Kad6Xov Sfurwrcu Bia rwv koBoXov, to oi avfi'
tripaa^ia
ovk tori koBcXov, Ztl 8* Ik rov
40 av^npda^Tos Sctfcu koI rrk Irtpas npordattoi
M k (^i oAio; ou3^ yiyrcTou avXXayiafios aarnarpa<^urqs Tfjs wpordaa^s' iy i^P^^
dfx^6rpai
yiyvovrai <u nponunK)' lifv h hn fupovs lortv.
ocociy^cu yap r6 A fOTd tik^ tou V Bia roG B.
^^ oor ^i'f^Bjf r6 B trayri t^ koI to avfin^paafin
to
/i^ny, TO B Ttvi Ta r vndp(i' ylyvrrai
TtpoTTOV trxrjfxa, koI r6 A fidaop.
Ei 5^ ortprfTucos 6 ovXXoyiapos, r^v fihf tcaB6Xou
trp^raaw o^k tori Scifeu, Si* 5* koX rrp6>Ttpov

r^

Y^

y^

iX^xBri' rrpr 8* cv fi^pci

arpa^
10

TO

to

rivi

AB
fiTi

uxmip

<mv*

i^

Kaitl ra>v

vndpxti, ro

rivl

opolws ayrt'
KodSXov* dov <^

xmap^iv

dXXuff

yap ov yivKCTcu auAAoyu7/xos Sea to airo^rucqv

cfvcu

Tnv cv

/x^'^c

VI. 'v 3c
>

Si*

* <*dv

uolgo.

44

T<jj

2 Buhle: iii.

vporaaiv,
Sci/r^M^ ax^fioTi to fUv icaTa

Xvwoui.

AHxanfo*. /&r |.^ or B*.

Ou Bekkcr.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
and let it be assumed that
none of which A applies.

II.

v-vi

applies to

all

of that to

Then B must apply

to

allC.

Thus each of the three propositions has been

inferred as a conclusion ; and that is what circular
demonstration is, viz., to assume the conclusion and
the converse of one premiss, and so infer the remaining premiss.
In particular syllogisms the universal premiss
cannot be demonstrated by means of the others, but
the particular premiss can. That the universal
premiss cannot be demonstrated

is

evident

Reciprocal
^rtUiixiar
syllogisms

for the

universal is proved by universal premisses, but the

conclusion is not universal, and we have to draw our
proof from the conclusion and the other premiss.

Moreover,

the premiss is converted no syllogism at

because both premisses become parThe particular premiss, however, can be
ticular.
demonstrated. Let it be proved, by means of B,
that A is stated of some C. Then if B is assumed to
apply to all A, and the conclusion stands, B will apply
for we get the first figure with A as the
to some C
middle.
If on the other hand the syllogism is negative, the
universal premiss cannot be proved, for the reason
explained above. But the particular premiss can be
proved, if AB is converted in the same way as in
universal syllogisms
viz., to the effect that B applies
to some of that to some of which A does not apply."
Otherwise no syllogism results, because the particular
premiss is negative.
VI. In the second figure the affirmative statement
all

results

if
;

Cf.

58 a 29 note.

44S

Reciprocal
proof in th

ARISTOTTLE
ion

4>aTuc6v o^K

Betfcu bia rovrov roO rpStrov, tA

to ^ihf o9v Karrfyopucov ov

o/x^or/pa? tlvai rdr npordatu

Bi arprfTtK6v ^oriv.

Stuanmu

5ia to

fitf

Kara^rucdi' to yap avfin^paafia QrpifjTuc6v i<m,

TO KarrjYopucov ( apj^ortpiov iStucwro Kara*
^rucwv TO h aTpnrfTitc6 coSt Stuanrrai, inap
X^'TO} TO A navTi toj B T<p 5^ F firfifvi* avfiir^paufta
10 T^ B ot}8m T^i r/ ^ov o^Xri^T^ B vokW t4> A
jJiTttp;(oi' [t<P 8< r /iiyScvi]/ cutlym; t^ A ^i/Scvi Ty

r {map\W

ylyvtToi yap to htvrtpov <TXfina (jUaov

TO B). i hi TO AB OTtprjTixov iXi^^Bii ddTpo

& Karqyopucov, to npurrov 4mn axijfui, ro /acv
yap r TToyrl rtp A to 5c B ov3<^ t<^ T, Shot
ouScvi T^ A TO B* oj5* apa to A t^ B. 5f^ /lir
o^ Tou avfAntpdafiaros ical Ttjt ^ua^ irpordtnoff
od yiyPTCU. avXX(y^fi6i, npoaXai)^$4iafj^ 5' Mpaf

^Hv $ firj KaBdXov 6 avXXoytafjLO^ fj, i} /itv cy

oA^ irpoToais ov Scucwroi (Bid t^v avrfjv cuTM&r
wurjvntp lnofiv Kal trpdrtpov),

'^

S* iv

/Wpci

Kwrai oroM fj to KaddXov Karrfyopucdv. 6napx^ci9

yap TO A iravTi rw 3 Tut Bi V firi munx' avftiri"
paapxx BP. idv o^ At;^^ to B travTi tw A Ty
Bk

ou

Trayri,

to

twI tw

ovx {nrdp^ti (fidaov

B). i S* coTU' If #(a^oAoi; aTprjTucq, av Sci;^^?/acTOi 17

irpdraais dyriOTpanftivTOi roO AB*

AF

j5

yap

rf dfu^oTpag rj Trjy cVcpav npdraaw

drro^Tucfiv, unrr ovk cotcu avXXoyi"
oAA* dpuoiw^ Scix^iJacTcu <os iccu cVi Tai

GVfJipaLVi

ylyvioBai

apuds.
^

ri^ hi

iirfifvi

Cm ct in

marg. B* t cm. oeL

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

vi

cannot be proved by this means, but the negative second

statement can. The affirmative statement cannot be ^^^^
proved because the premisses are not both affirmative
for the conclusion is negative, and the affirmative
statement can only be proved, as we have seen, by
premisses which are both affirmative. The negative
statement is proved as follows. Let A apply to
The conclusion is that B
all B, but to no C.
applies to no C. Then if B is assumed to apply to
for we get the second
all A, A must apply to no C
figure with B as the middle term.
If AB has been
assumed as negative and the other premiss as affirmafor C applies to
tive, we shall have the first figure
all A, and B to no C, so that B applies to no A, and
therefore A to no B. Thus we get no syllogism by
means of the conclusion and one premiss, but we
shall have a syllogism if we assume a further
;

premiss."
If the syllogism is not universal, the universal
premiss cannot be proved, for the same reason which
we have explained above ^ but the particular premiss
can be proved when the universal statement is affirmaLet A apply to all B, but not to all C. The
tive.
conclusion is BC. Then if B is assumed to apply to
all A, but not to all C, A will not apply to some C.
The middle term is B. If, however, the universal
premiss is negative, the premiss AC cannot be proved
by the conversion of AB for it follows that either
one or both of the premisses become negative, so that
there will be no syllogism. It can, however, be
proved in a similar way to that which was used in the
i.e., if it is assumed that
case of universal syllogisms
;

**

i.e.

the converse of the conclusion.

*

58 a 36

ff.

445

ARISTOTLE
SSb

KadoXov, ^av

Xrjif>$^ t^

r6

rtA

fti)

vndp^

t6

rwi vndpxtv.
VII. *Eml 8^ roO rpirov OY^fiaros irav liitw
al irpordatis Kad6Xov Xrj^waiv, ovK
(vhtx^rai hl(ai Si* aWi^XufV' to uh^ yap koBoXov
H^htiKwrai 5id rwv koBoXov, to b iv rovrtp avfi'
^vtpov ori oXw^
wipaaiia dci Kara lUpos,
OVK ct^xcTOi Scifcu Sia ro&rov roG ax^fxaro^ rtiy
KoBoXov vp6rtuny. iop 5* tf fUv f koBoXov ^ O
iv ^pi, voT^ /iv <<rrai trori 5' ovk iartu, oror
fiv o^ dfu^ortpai iran/yopurcu As^^oxn mu to
uro^oAot; yhnrjTox npof rw cActTTom &icpa), iartu,
ortuf hi np6^ Bar4p<^, ovk coroi.
^napx^rw
r6
iravri r^ F r^ 5^ B rtW* av/tiMpaaua r6
40

afJL^6r(pcu

axm

y^

^av oiV' Ay;^^ r^ P travH r^ A &napxOf,

r6 fih r SVScurrai rivi t^i B ihrdpxoi^, r6Bib riA
icaiT04 avaynoy, ci t^ F nW T<j)
TJi r ou S^MCTOi.
B, iftti TO B Twi r<p F imapx'iiv. oAA* ow TaiJroK
(rri To3 T<^ KoX To3c Tca5c virapvccv, oAXd
npooXrjirrtov ci toSc tiw T<ji>d #cot Bimpov ru%
r<pS' rovTOv & Xrf^4vTOf ovKdn yiyvrroA ^if rod
ovfinpdafiaTog teal rrjs Mpas vpordaun 6
<7vAAoyia/xo9. 1 &^ t^ fiv B uxw^i t^ F to 3 A
Tu4 T<ji F, COTCU ^ifoi TO AF OTOV Xtf^S^ TO fUv
F troiTi tA B vndpx^w to 5c A to^i. ci yof) to F
7ran-t Toi B to 8c A Tivt rw B, <iiayioy to A tw4
Toi F vnapx^iv {jUaov to B).
Kai otov jJ t} /iO' #faryyopun7 ij 8^ arprqruci/j,

AB.
10

14

JO

ita^dAov

8*

i}

Karrjyopucj, hi)firiarai

ij

r4pa,

vnapxerw yap ro B Travri Toi F, to 8^ A nA

fiTj xmapxiruf GVfnrpaGfui ot* to A Tiv* Toi B ovx

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. vi-vii

A applies to some of that to some of which B does

not apply .<
VII. In the third figure, when both premisses are Reciprocal
assumed as universal, reciprocal proof is impossible ; furthird
for the universal statement can only be proved by ^8"^*^means of universal statements, and in this figure the
conclusion is always particular ; so that it is evident
that the universal premiss cannot be proved at all by
means of this figure. If, however, one premiss is
universal and the other particular, reciprocal proof
vdW sometimes be possible and sometimes not. When
both premisses are assumed as affirmative, and the
universal relation is attached to the minor extreme,
but not when the universal relation
it will be possible
For let A apply to
is attached to the other extreme.
;

B to some C. The conclusion is AB. Then

assumed to apply to all A, it is proved that C
applies to some B, but not that B applies to some C.
It may be urged that if C applies to some B, B must
but X applies to Y is not
also apply to some C
we must make the
the same as Y applies to X
further assumption that if X applies to some Y, Y also
and if we assume this, the sylloapplies to some X
gism is no longer effected by means of the conclusion
and the other premiss. But if B applies to all C, and
A to some C, the premiss AC can be proved after
assuming that C applies to all and A to some B. For
if C applies to all B, and A to some B, A must apply to
some B. B is the middle term.
When one premiss is affirmative and the other
negative, and the affirmative premiss is universal, the
other can be proved. For let B apply to all C, and
The conclusion is that A
let A not apply to some C.
all

if

C, and

is

'

'

'

Cf. 58 a 29,

9.

447

ARISTOTLE
v7Tcipxi,

^av o^v npooXr)^0^ to

F nam

Tip

inr

tivI rw T firi imapxutf (Uao9

dpX^iv, dvaYtrrj ro
TO B).
oTov 8* 17 aTp7fTucrj KoB^Kov y^rtjfnu. ov
Scimntu 17 iripa, ci /X17 oitrrup cVi Tciuv irpirtpov,

iav Xrj^Bjj at tqGto Ttrt

vndpxiy, otov tl t6 fiiv

/ii^

vnapy(H ddrtpcm rwi

A firfitvi r^ V r6 b^ B
rivt' ovftir^patTfia
ri A TUi t^ B o^ ^ir^ivrt.
<iv o^ ^vi*^ <L r6 A rtvl u^ unj^x^i to F
Tii't i^ap;(ii', <ii^yin} to F Tin tcuk B vndavffw.
toaXAoi? 5' oi)#c /oTii' avnarp^^ovra r^ koBcXov

TrpoToatv Sctfeu rfjv

QvXXoytauos*
^avtpov odv

on

Mpav'

ouSofuos* yd/) corcu

iv fuv Tcp npatrtp ar^jfAan

TOU T/HTOV

1)

3i*

ToO WpUfrov yiywrai. o^^fuiTOf.

caTi|yo^Mxov ^uv yap
oiaoy Tou avfinf>aafiaT09 StA rov irptxrrov, artpTp-iKov 5c &cd Tov ca)^aTOV' Aofi^Bovrroi vap oj TOtrro
fii/Scvi Oartpov nayrl imdpx***^'
f^i'V
tcaOoXou fUv otrros rov avXXoytofioO hi* avrot? re
Kol Sid TOU npwrov ax^aarof, oray 8* /y H^Pt, Si*
avTou TC fu TOt? co^faTow. /v 5c Toi Tpir<p 8i*
to* rpirw kqI
40 avroi; irai^cy.
<f>av(p6v 5^ icai on
oAAl^Acui' Sflf i( Sul TC

CcU Oitt

^ ^

81'

aurw' ytyW/xcvoc ovAXoyto/tOi

^ ovK CMJt Kara T171' kv^Ao^ Sclfii' ^ aTcAci;.
k
VIII. To 8' dyTurrp^w corl td luranB^irra
TO ovfinepaafia noulv rov ovXXoyuTfiov ori ^ ro
oKpov rip fia(p ovx imdpiti ^ Toim> rip rtXanaup.
dvdyKTj yap rod avp.npaafiaroi avrurrpaj^hnxK
KoX rrjs Irdpas fi^vovor)^ nporda^u^ avaApla$ai
To> p.ia(t} ol

58 a 29, b 9, S7.
C/. 58 b -7. 59 a 6-14.

* t..

448

fMYf

changing

its

quality, with or without

change of

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

11. vii-viii

does not apply to some B. Then if it is further

assumed that C applies to all B, it must follow that A
does not apply to some C. The middle term is B.
But when the negative premiss is universal, the other
cannot be proved, unless, as in the previous examples,**
it is assumed that where one term does not apply to
some, the other does apply to some. E.g., if it is
assumed that A applies to no C, and B to some C, the
conclusion is that A does not apply to some B. Then
if it is assumed that C applies to some of that to some
of which A does not apply, C must apply to some B.
It is impossible in any other way by converting the
universal premiss to prove the other, for in no case
will there be a syllogism.
Thus it is evident that in the first figure reciprocal The figures
proof is effected both by the third and by the first re%JScai
figure
by the first when the conclusion is affirmative, P^oof*
and by the last when it is negative for it is assumed
that where one term applies to none, the other applies
In the middle figure, when the syllogism is
to all.
universal, reciprocal proof is possible both by that
figure itself and by the first figure ; when it is particular, both by that figure and by the last. In the third
figure all proofs are by the figure itself. It is also evident that in the third and middle figures such syllogisms
as are not effected by these figures themselves are
either incompatible with circular proof or imperfect.^
VIII. Converting a syllogism consists in reversing Conversion
the conclusion and so constructing the syllogism that k>^sms.
either the major extreme will not apply to the middle
For if
or the latter will not apply to the last term.
the conclusion is converted and one premiss remains
;

'^

quantity. The same meaning attaches (in this

following chapters) to ' converting.'

P 2

and the two

449

ARISTOTLE
Ik

rqv XoiTnqv ct yap Scrrai, Koi t6 avfin^paafui liarai,

Sio^pci hk TO ayrucfifidvuts rj ivayruoi dyrurrpd'
^iv TO avfin^paofia* oi) yap 6 cu^ro; Yiyvmu
avWoyuffios KaTput ovrurrpa^A^op* hirjXa bi
roth* CffTOi Sia twi' iTTOfUvcav {Xiyta h* ayrtsnloBtu
10

fUv TO

TTOKTl Toi

^vam-uo^ hi TO

OU TTCU^l

ir<xKri t<}>

tcol

ovSfvi

t6 TUa T<p O^Sci^,

teal to tivi t^* o^

rtvl &mipxiy).

ILaro) yap Bt^iyp^vav r6 A KarA roO V 8ca

tl hri r6 K Xrji^tlv firfirvi rtD V
B irairrl, oi$Scv2 Toi F 6ndp(i to B,
&7Tdpxiv Toi
IfOl 4 TO /Xtl* A fil^ScVi Ty r TO 5< B TTOVn T<J> P,
TO A od Trayrl rw B koX oi^} oKuas ovScPi* od yo^
cScuovTO TO Ka&oKov hta rov tax^rov axf^fuiTOf,
oAcuf 8^ T17V voof Tfp fMi{oia aicp<^ npOTotnv oitc
arw avaaKvaaai koBoXov Bta r^ amtrrpo^ijs'
dci yap oyoipCiTou &4X tou rpirov ax^ftaros* avaytcri
yap irpoi to co^aTov dxpov dfi^ortpa^ XafiUf rat

fjJaov rod B.

1&

<o

irporaai9.

Kal

<rrfpirfr c6s

6 avXXoyujfid^

<jjoavrti>f.

ScScr^o^ yAp TO A /iT^$vt toi V xmapxftv 8ia to<?

B. ovKoOv iav Xrj^Ofj ro A rw V Trayrl ^dpxtiv
rat Si B /ittScv/, ovScvl tcDk P t^ B ^dpfti* teal
1 TO A KOi TO B 7ra>^i Ta> r, ri A Tm Ty B*
oAA' oi)5V( vrrfjpx^v.
ft

*Eav 8' dirrucifivto^ avrurrpa^ ro ovfintpaafia,

Kol ol auXXoyiafJLoi dyTUCifLVoi Koi ou koBoKou
aovrai' ylyvtrai yap 17
nporaais p fUpti,
w<TT Koi TO avfin^paafia eoroi caTd fUpos. ccrm*
yap KarrfyopiKos 6 avXXoytafAOS, Koi ayriarp^4*

Mpa

Cf, J)4

JnUrp, 17 b 1

89a
450

1.

&

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. viii

as before, the remaining premiss must be invalidated ;

for if it is to be valid, the conclusion must also be
It makes a difference, hovi^ever, whether we
valid.

reverse the conclusion in the contradictory or in the

contrary sense ; for we do not get the same syllogism
by both modes of reversal. This will be clear from
the following explanation. (By the contradictory of Contradicapplying to all I mean not applying to all,' and of ^n^trary
applying to none ; whereas the conversion.
applying to some
contrary of applying to all is applying to none,' and
of applying to some is not applying to some.') **
Let us take it as proved, by means of the middle First figure.
is stated of all C.
Then supposing verSi^"
term B, that
that A is assumed to apply to no C, but to all B, B will syllogisms.
apply to no C. And if applies to no C, but B applies converskm.^
will not apply to all B ; but it does not at
to all C,
all follow that it will apply to no B, for, as we have
seen,^ the universal statement cannot be proved by
the last figure. In general it is impossible to invalidate the major premiss universally by conversion,
because the refutation is always by the third figure,
since we must assume both premisses in relation to
the last extreme.
The same also holds if the syllogism is negative.
Let it be proved, by means of the middle term B, that
Then if is assumed to apply to
applies to no C.
And if and
all C, but to no B, B will apply to no C.
will apply to some B ; but ex
B apply to all C,
hypothesi it applies to none.
If, however, the conclusion is converted in the (2) Contracontradictory sense, the syllogisms will also be con- converaion,
tradictory, and not universal ; for one premiss becomes particular, and so the conclusion will also be
particular.
For let the syllogism be affirmative, and
*

'

'

'

'

'

'

451

ARISTOTLE
M a6w

ovKoOv

ovTuts,

5^

firj

navri

oi5

rw T ro

Bi

navTt, T^

o/xouo; S^ Kal </

yap TO

rii'i

TO

Tiyl

rep

r^

T^

oi)

irayrt

travTi T<p V* teal ct

iravrl,

ou)^ iW/>fci, oi);(

dvAa>; ouScvi'

A T^ r Ttvi TO &^ B n<arr{,

^M^^t ''^ ^ "f"^ '''^ B vinipfti.

*Efr2

rt^

ri /x^

to A od iravri r^ B.
OTtpTjTitfos 6 ovAAoyuj/i^.
c2
F vndpxi T<p 8^ B /ii^dcW, t6

fihf

a^Xn

r^ V

8^ Tuv /y

ft^jp<^

ovAAo/ur/iJ)!'

#(a2

uHmp

iv

orov /uv

dmuctifih'Wi dvTtarp^^nffrai to avfintpaafia dvoi'

poOvTOi dfi^6Tpcu 04 npoToott/s, orav 5' ivavrUtts
M ovSrr/pa. ov /d/>
avfifiaJyti, icaB^wtp hf Tois
KoBoXoV, aVUpiV iXXtiwOVTOS TOV aVfA1tfni9fUlTO^
icaTa Ti^v dvTMrrpo^v, oAA* ov5* oAoy; cuuip^ti^.

5cSix^ ydf> TO A
Ay;^^ to a fii^ScW
T^

t4>
*

T<J)

T<Ji

TtW

avcufWirvTai

icoTa Ttvos* Tou r.

o^

oi^KoOv dv

^rmpxtiv t^ 5^
imdpiti' KoX l r6

T<p

wavri, ovS^vi Tfp

ofi^OTCfxu.

cdi^

5*

Twi,

iM:tfiv\

to B-

ivayrui}^

omtt'

dyri-

OTpa^t ovSertpa ct ydp to A Tivt T^tV fii^ xmapx'

T^ 5^ B navri, t6 B tvA t^ F ovx vrrfipf^i* dAA'
.

ovmo

ovcufKiTOi TO ^f dfiX^t /i5/;ffTu yd/) TtW

Ttvi /x^ wmpytty,
8< feaB6Xav
dAa>^ ouSc ytyvrrcu (TuAAoyiafcds*' ci yd/>

vndpx^iy xai
Tfjs
10

t^

AB

Tivi Ttuv F firj imdpx^^ to 5^ B Tiii

fihf
vvapx^^, ovBtripa koOoXov twv 7Tpordaiav, o^ioiuK
8c Kal i <mprjTuco9 6 auAAoyu7/u>s' C4 fuv yap
TTOvTt T<p F vndpxtv, dyaipovmxu
X7fif>6iri TO

TO

dft^oTcpou, ci & Tvi ovStTtpaoiri}.

452

dirdScifi^
^

"*

5*

i]

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
let it

II. viii

be converted in the sense just described.

Then

A does not apply to all C, but applies to all B, B will

not apply to all C. And if A does not apply to all C,
but B does, A will not apply to all B. Similarly too if
the syllogism is negative. For if A applies to some C
if

but to no B, B will not apply to some C it will not

apply absolutely to none. And if A applies to some
and B to all C, as was originally assumed, A will apply
;

to

some B.

In the case of particular syllogisms, (1) when the b. Parconclusion is converted in the contradictory sense, syUogLms.
but (2) when it is con- Refutation
both premisses are refuted
verted in the contrary sense, neither premiss is re- by^ontra^
futed.
For the result is no longer, as it was in the ^jjj.*^^' ^"*
universal syllogisms, a refutation in which the con- contrary
conversion.
elusion after conversion lacks universality ; on the
contrary, there is no refutation at all. (1) Let it be
proved that A is stated of some C. Then if A is
assumed to apply to no C but to some B, A will not
apply to some B. And if A appHes to no C but to
Thus both premisses are
all B, B will apply to no C.
refuted. But (2) if the conclusion is converted in the
contrary sense, neither is refuted. For if A does not
apply to some C, but applies to all B, B will not apply
to some C. Yet the original assumption is not yet
refuted, because it is possible to apply to some and
yet not to apply to some.
As for the universal
premiss AB, no syllogism at all can be obtained to
refute it
for if A does not and B does apply to some
C, neither premiss is universal. Similarly too if the
For if A is assumed to apply
syllogism is negative.
to all C, both premisses are refuted ; but if to some
C, neither is refuted. The proof is the same as
;

before.

453

ARISTOTLE
tOa
1ft

IX. *Ev

rw

rto hvr4pip ox^J/iaTi

fA^i^ovi aKpo} irportunv

n^

ovk arw

lUv

nf>6f

ovcPUftr hffu^

07rorpojaow rw ayrurrpo^rjf YtyvofUirrjf'

llortu ro avfinipaafui Iv rip rplrw ox^/iariJ
r^ o,
KoBiKov 8* o^K
iv TOvr<f avXXoytafiiit.

rujj^,

act

yap

Mpav ofiolw^

tq avrtarpo^ (^y**^
ououos, 1 fiv cvoKTUos avTUTToi^nu, ivoyTtw^,
1 8 ayru(ifi4V(o^ t avrucifi4v<jj^)
irayrl rw B
f /ii^Scvi'Tnapx^'ra} yap ro
B vani r^ F
avfi'npaafui BF. ^dv oi^ ^^7^^
vndpxiv teai ro AB fi^>77 to A iroyri np F vnapl hi r6 B
(ci* ViyifTOi /op r6 vp&rov ax^fia.
murri rw F to oi A firjSvi rw F, ri A ou noMtri
rip B' oxfjfui r6 rxanm,
iip 8' OMrrufttfUvwt
avrurrpoMfm r6 BI^, 17 fiht AB 6fMoiw^ btix^ ifatroA ,
tl yap r6 B rtvt rip V r^
1} 8^ AF arructifUywf.
Si A firfivl rip r, r6 A rwi riL B o^x vJi^pfci.
fnlAiv ci T^ B Tn^ Tp F TO 8^ A vavrt rw B, r6
A Tivi rw T, COOT* omxcifi/Mo^ ytyrrreu o ovAAoavoxprffooiuv

TO

10

^^^

oftoiLJi 8c 8c;(^77aTai c(u Ci ovaTraAir

xptv at npordais.
Ei 8' coTiv cirt pipovs 6 GvXXoyiafiOf, ivavrlws

yujfioi,

rov av^nrtpaaparoi ov8T/pa

t4>
7rpordawv apaipirai, KoBavttp ou8*

pukv avriarpif>op4vov
Sft

TCtfi^

vpwrtp ax^pan, avriKipLvoK 8' apuf>6rpai.

kUj6w yap ro A rw pkv B ^i78i4 wirapx*w
F Tivt* avpiUpaapa BF. ^ov oi5k rcftj to B twI
Toi F xmdpx^iv koX ro AB P'^VTJt avptripaapa arai
Sri ro A rivl rip F ovx vndpx^i. oAA* ovk avfipff)'
TOt to cf apxr^' Mrx^rat yap rtvi vrrdpxftv koI

^^

99 a 16
*

454

</.

59 b

u. refuted.

15.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

ix

IX. In the second figure, in whichever sense the 5^'^^'^'^

conversion is effected, the major premiss cannot be second
for the conclusion will ^^^
refuted in the contrary sense
always be obtained in the third figure, and we have
seen <* that in it there is no universal syllogism. The
other premiss, however, can be refuted in the same
sense as the conversion. By in the same sense I
mean that if the conversion is contrary the refutation
is in the contrary sense, and if contradictory, in the
contradictory sense.
;

'

For example, let A apply to all B but to no C. The

conclusion is BC. Then if B is assumed to apply to
\vill apply to all C
for we get
all C, and AB stands,
to
the first figure. But if B appUes to all C, and
This is the last figure.
will not apply to all B.
no C,
If on the other hand BC is converted in the contradictory sense, AB will be proved ^ as before, but AC
For if B applies
will be refuted by its contradictory.
will not apply to some B ;
to no C,
to some C, and
and again if B applies to some C, and to all B, will
apply to some C, so that we get a conclusion in the
contrary sense. The proof will be similar also if the
premisses are in the opposite relation.
If, however, the syllogism is particular, when the
conclusion is converted in the contrary sense, neither
of the premisses is refuted, just as neither was refuted
in the first figure " ; but when in the contradictory
For let it be supposed that
sense, both are refuted.
applies to no B but to some C. The conclusion is
BC. Then if B is taken to apply to some C, and AB
does not apply to
stands, the conclusion will be that
some C. But the original premiss is not refuted ;
for it is possible both to apply to some and not to

^^{^^J^^^^
^^ ^sisms.

59 b

3960

1,

60 a 5-14.
4^55

Particular

ARISTOTLE
\mapYw, iroXu^ ct ro B ru4 t^ P icai r6 A
rwl Tiff r, ovK 0TO4 (TvXXoytOfAOs* ovhtTtpov yo^
KodoXov ru>v ttXrififLtvcav war ovk araiptlrxu ro

40 fiif

0 k

AB. iav h* avrurcifiCKtfff ayrtarpd^Tfrai, avaipafkf^

rat afi^6rpai. ct yAp r6 B irai^l r<i F to
/xi73v2 T^ B, ovScvl Ty r T^ A* ijr 5J rwL
ir6Xi
4 t6 B TTovrt Tw r ri 8^
rvn rw T, rtA rt^

hB

r6 A.

i)

a^

8* dir<$8c{i9 #cal

ro ira^<SW

iraTTyyopufOv.

X.

'Etti 5^ rod rpirov ax^uaros Srav fUv ^mivQvriarp4^0A ro avfinipdafia, ov^rtpa rtDr^
nporaxrtutv outupcircu kot ovStva rufv ovAAoyi^,.
Gfiatv, orov 5* ayructifUvutf, au^6rpai fcal i^^
aTToaiv.
hbi)(6w yap ro A rwt. rt^ B \mafx^
fuaov 5* ctAi^^tdctf ro F, iortoaav hi kq$6Xo al

rluis

10

A nW

odtcow Voy Ai^^^ ro

r^* B ft^
indfix*^ ro 5j B warri r^ F, o6 Wyvrnu ouAAoyu7uo9 roO A kqI rov F. oi^* ct ro A r^ ft/^
B Tivt fjLtf ^mipxti np 5^ F navr(, oi)c licrnu rod B
#rm rov F ovAAoyur/Ao^.
^fioiwi S^ Sccx^YTorrai^
#rai e^ /xi^ koBoKov ai trporaati^.
^ va/> aii^oripof'
nporaatif,

i&

avdyfcrj

10

Kara

fi^pof tlvai Sid

r^

ivrurrpo^rjs,

rd ^ca^dAov woo^ rai Harrow dxp<p ytyvtoBai'

ovroi 8* ouic riv avMoytufios ovr* iv r<p irptLrff
ov^iari ovr* v r<ft yilaw.
Edv 8* dyTiKifUvofs avriarpl^trirait al wpord'
oei; dtxujpoin^af dn/^6rpai.
Ci ydp rd A fti^Scvi
to) B to oc B TTcuo-i r^ F, ro A ovSi% rut F* vrdAu^
ci TO A Tcji fiv B /A7;8m T<p 8^ F novri, ro B od8cM
r^ F. KOi Ci 17 CTc^Mi fitf KodoXov waavrwis tH
*
.

arrurrp44^ai Philoponus
codd.
*

456

(?),

Jenkinsooi

jmar^l^au rm

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

ix-x

II.

apply to some. Again, if B applies to some C and A

some C, there will be no syllogism for neither of
the assumptions is universal. Thus AB is not refuted.
If, however, the conclusion is converted in the contradictory sense, both premisses are refuted.
For if
B applies to all C and A to no B, A mil apply to no C
whereas before it applied to some. Again, if B
appHes to all C and A to some C, A will apply to
some B. The proof will be the same too if the universal statement is affirmative.
X. In the third figure,
when the conclusion is con- Third figure.

Refutation
.1
..-I
J
the contrary sense, neither premiss is re- is not by
verted
futed in any syllogism but when in the contradictory ^^^^?^
sense, both are refuted in all syllogisms.
For let it be by conproved that A appUes to some B, and let C be assumed cSfJersUm.
as the middle term, and let the premisses be universal. (D 'Q
^^^
Then if A is assumed not to apply to some B, and B to * ^"^
apply to all C, we get no syllogism relating A and C.
Again, if A does not apply to some B, but apphes to
all C, there will be no syllogism relating B and C.
There will also be a similar proof if the premisses are
for either both premisses must be
not universal
particular as the result of conversion, or the universal
statement must become attached to the minor extreme and under these conditions there is no syllogism, as we have seen,** either in the first or in the
middle figure.
If, however, the conclusion is converted in the conFor if
tradictory sense, both premisses are refuted.
A apphes to no B, and B to all C, A will apply to no C.
Again, if A applies to no B but to all C, B will apply
to no C. The same also holds if the other premiss is
to

m
.

26 a 17-21, 27 a 4-12.

457

ARISTOTLE
Mb

yap TO
t&

rivl rtp

rto Si

nrjSvi r<^

ro S^

rivi

r ovx vndpfti' i Bi r6 A rw
r navri, oi^Scvi rQ T r6 B.

'Ouoiw^ 8^ Kcd

aTfrrjTuca9

r&
fiv

V, t6 A
B firfivl

S trvAAoyumoy.

tivi T<p
SbixiBw yap TO
fi^ vTrapYov, <mia
airo^ruc^ o2 t^ AT*
h KaTqyopucov fikv r6

BF

Srav fiiv oi^

ovTta yap lyiyvTo 6 ovAAoyiofto;.
TO tvopTiov Xr)^Bfj r(p avftvtpdafiari, ovx tartU
ao

auAAoyu7/xof .
Tip r,

TO A
Kol rov

ci

yap to

ct

rivi t<^

to St

B muni

^ avXXoyta^iOi rov A Ktu roO V,

r<p B Tip h4 r
ovK ^ tow

ovK

ot)8'

rtvi

fi'qSvi,

ouXAoytafuk* cuorc oi)ir dvaipoGitrai ox

iroorAattf,
orwf hk t6 itrrunifLtPov, avatpowrat.
4 yap r6 A mufrl r<p B teal r6 B rw V, t6 A
rrayrl rat V' dXX* ou5cvt vTnjp^fv.

tram-l r<p

dXXa navrl

r<p 8i

^7rrjif)(V.

irtiAir tl

r6

ft'rjSv{,

to

ofioitjjs

5^ Scurvirreu kou

fi;^ ira9<$Aov cioiv ai Trpordatt^.

od8cvt r<p F*
ci

ylyvmu yAp t6

AF Kad6Xov Tc icol aT(pnriTue6v, Sdrtpov S' ^ir{

fUpovs Kol KaTrjyopiKOv. c/ /i^ otJv t6 A wavrt
0 Toi B TO S^ B TIW T<jj F, TO A Ttvl Ttp F ovfjifiaiyti'
oAA' ou8cvi W7r^p;fcv. TroAti^ ci to A mivri t^* B
61 a roi 5^ F fll^ScVij TO B OvScVi Ty F* KIT0 & T4ia.
ci 8c TO A rivi r<p B ircu to B rwi rat F,
otJ ytyvcTOi ovAAoyur/xx^* ouS* ci to A Ttvi t^ B
Toi 8c

fiTjSevi,

ov6* ovrco^.

coot* iKtivonq /icv

ovoipotWoi, oirrco 8* oufr dvaxpaurrai ai irpordtM^.

<I>aue/x>K oiv Sta tCjv (iprjfjUvwv nio^ avriarpif>0'
fUvov rov avp.npdapMro^ v tKOXirtp ax^fian
yiyverai av^XoyiapLOS , koX

458

8 b

1-4,

irdrr

15 a

hnsTrion^

10.

Tg

rrpiO'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

not universal. For if

applies to no B, and B to some
will not apply to some C.
C,
And if
applies to
no B, but to all C, B will apply to no C.
Similarly too if the syllogism is negative.
Let it (2) in.
does not apply to some B, and let syfiogisms.
be proved that
BC be affirmative and AC negative ; for this, as we
have seen,** is how the syllogism is effected. Then
when the contrary of the conclusion is assumed, there
will be no syllogism.
For if
applies to some B, and
B to all C, there is no syllogism, as we have seen,^
relating
and C. Also if
applies to some B, but
to no C, there is no syllogism, as we have seen,^
relating B and C. Thus the premisses are not refuted.
But when the contradictory of the conclusion is
assumed, they are refuted. For if
applies to all
B, and B to C,
will apply to all C
whereas before
Again, if
it applied to none.
apphes to all B, but
to no C, B will apply to no C ; whereas before it
appUed to all. There is a similar proof also if the
premisses are not universal ; for AC becomes both
universal and negative, and the other statement
particular and affirmative.
Thus if
applies to all
B, and B to some C, it follows that
applies to some
C ; whereas before it appHed to none. Again, if
applies to all B, but to no C, B will apply to no C ;
but the assumption was that it applies to some. If,
however,
applies to some B, and B to some C, we
applies to some B
get no syllogism ; nor do we if
but to no C. Thus in the former case the premisses
are refuted, but in the latter they are not.
Thus it is evident from the foregoing account (1) Summary of
how syllogism is effected in each figure when the obta^ed in
conclusion is converted, (2) in what circumstances the cts. vUi.-x.

m a 30-36.

27 b 6-8.

459

ARISTOTLE
on iv uhf T^
rov fUoov koI roO iax^rou
yiyvovTOi ol avXXoyurfioi, teal 1} fiv npo^ rifk
iXdrrovi dKpu> act Sta rov fUaov apfup^rtu, ^ h^
npos Tip fiiCovt hta rov iax^Tov hf
np hVT4(taf
hia rod nparrov Koi roO iaxorov, tad ij yJtv npi^^
rw iXdrrovi dtcpw ocl ZiA rod nparrov erx^fuirof,
1} S^ i^pos r<p /i^opi 5id rov iax^rov iv hk rxp
rpiTip oca rov irpunov koX Sux rov tuaov, koi
^
fUi' npos r(p pui^oyt Sea roC irputrov ati, rj hi irpos
r<p tXarrovt Bia rov fUaov.
XI. Ti fUv oSv iarl ro avrtarpi^w iral mug.
v Kdortp ax^fiart Koi rig yiyvrrai avXXoy%ffpAfl
rooci

icoi

9r(^*

arTuctifUvot^, kqI

npa/rtfi 0)fi{fuir 3ta

10

ift

^avtpov.
'0 hk

roG d&vrdrov avXXoyurp6g SetSrav

ayri^aotg rtSfj ro$ avfiwipd^
Ofiarog Kol wpoaXr)^>$fj iAAiy np6Tamg, yfyf^mu 8^
v diraai rolg a^paaw- opoujv yap 4an rff aTttrrpo^t nXriv hta^ptt Toao Oror &n ayr%arp4^rtu
phf yYyrjfjJvov rvXXoyumoO Koi lXfjufUv(a0
ap<f>oXv rtav irpordatutv, dvaytrai S* ig aowarov
r> ov irpoofioXoyrj64vros rov avruciLLvov irpdrtpov,
oAAd (Inw^pov ovrog on dXrjOtS' oi 5* Sooi d^iolatj^
xpvaiv v dp^oiv, koI 1} avrq A^^^ Ofc^or/poMr^r
otov ci TO A r^i B TTorri {ntdpyu, uaow oi ro V^
dv vncr$fi ro \ fj fAtf vayri rj fifjhtin, rw B
xmapx^Wt rtp hi F navrl, ontp ^ dXrfiig, ibvymy
0 TO r Toi B
^ firfhcvi fj fiTf irfurri &napxw- rovro
h* dhvvarov, uKrrt ^dhog ro ^irorfB^v' dXr)$ig dpa
ro dvructfiVov, ofiouag hi koI
r&v dXXam
10

Kwrai

hia

fi4v

iff

* i.. the concI(i<iion

whose contradictorj

premiss for the process of reductioo.

460

aMuined

m*

;;

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

x-xi

conclusion is the contrary and in what the contradictory of the original premiss, and (3) that in the
first figure the syllogisms are effected by means of
the middle and last figures, and the minor premiss
is always refuted by the middle figure and the major
by the last ; in the second figure they are effected
by the first and the last, and the minor premiss is
always refuted by the first and the major by the last
and in the third figure the syllogisms are effected by
the first and middle figures, and the major premiss
is always refuted by the first and the minor by the

middle figure.
XI. Thus it

is

evident what conversion is, and how

and what the resulting

effected in each figure,

syllogism is.

it is

syllogism per impossihile is proved by positing proof j)r

the contradictory of the conclusion and assuming an ^^^^^^
additional premiss.
It is effected in all three figures, with con^^''^'
It is similar to conversion, but differs from it to this
that whereas we convert after a syllogism
extent
has been effected and both premisses have been
assumed, when we reduce ad impossihile the contradictory statement ^ is not first exphcitly admitted,
but is manifestly true. The terms, however, are
similarly related in both, and the method of assumption is the same for both.
E.g., if A applies to all B,
and C is the middle term, if we suppose that A does
not apply to all or applies to none of B, but apphes
to all C, w^hich is ex hypothesi true, C must apply to
none or not apply to all of B. But this is impossible ;
therefore the supposition was false. Thus the opSimilarly too in the other figures
posite * is true.
:

* i,e.

the contradictory.

461

ARISTOTLE
aXlfuLranf'

oaa yap ayrurrpo^v

S^mu,

ttal

r^

Sea Tov d&uvdrov avXXoytofiov,

Td ft^ ovv oAAa npopXi^fiara nopra Sf/jcwroi

u Sta TOV oBwdrov iv iracn toij (rxrjfiaat, t6 8^
KaBoXov KarrjyopiKov iv /xcv Tip fUatp koI t^ rpirtp
^ucvurai, iv Si r<p nparrtp ov htucwrcu, i^voirciaOw yap to A T<p B firj nayrl rj /ii^Scri ^ndp)(W, teak
irpoattXtf^oj oAAiy np6raat ovtntpufdtvoOv, 4lr
)rw A vcuni ^rro^c cv r6 F rT< -ri B murri r^ A
ourcu yap av ciiy to ttpGnnv axfjfia.
i fUv oiV
uTTc^KCiTCu

firi

iravri

6ndpxtiy to

Tip

B,

oiS

>^-

avAAoyta/io( oitortpwOtvow Tr^q irpordatuii

XafiPavofii'r)it i & firfitvl, OTav fiv ij BA npoo'

I k y>>rrai

wXXoYuifi6^ fUp coTOi Tol; ifmvSovt, od

Stuonrrai 5< to npoKifitvo. i
t^
fti^Scvt

^ri^Ojj,

ft

y^

t^ A, t^ A cii^vi Tip A.
Tovro 5* <rrcu a5tWrov* ^uSo9 apa to /iiTdcvi t^
B TO A vvrdpxw. dXX* o^tc ti to firfivl ^uSo9 to

r<^

TO

nayrl dXqd^S'

TravTi

^dv S*

1}

PA

ov ytyvcTOi
nayTi Tip B

irpoaXrj^iSj,

auAAoyur/xo;* owS* otov vnortB^

firi

TO A uwop^fciv ctfOTC ^ap6v on t6 iroi^i vndpxUf

ou Scurvtrroi
t^ nparrtp o^fiaTi Scd Toi?
aSuuaTov.
To 8^ yc Tiw Kol t6 firjSfvl koI frfj nayrl SciKvirrai.
u7roKta$w yap to A firjSvt rip B vndp^
X^f'V* TO 8^ B ctAT^^ctf Trai^i rj rwl Tip T.
ovkoGv
dvdyio) TO A p.rjSvl rj fi-q nayrl t^* T vndpxuy.
TOVTO 8' ahwoTov (coTcu yap aXr)$is koI ifnxy*p6
14 oTt navrl vndpx^i Tip V to A),* coot* ct TOvro
fl/vSo9, avdyKTi to A TtA Tip B vndpxtw*
toy Si
i6S

10

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xi

examples which admit of conversion admit

for all

also of inference per impossihile.

All other propositions are demonstrable per im- Universal

three figures, but the universal affirma- propSsitkma
tive, though demonstrable in the middle and third cannot be
Let us reduction
figures, is not demonstrable in the first.
suppose that does not apply to all, or applies to none, j? J^ ^"^^^
of B ; and let us also assume another premiss relating
or that
to either term, either that C applies to all
B appUes to all ; for in this way we shall have the

possihile in all

Now if we have supposed that A does

first figure.
not apply to all B, we get no syllogism, to whichever
but
of the two terms the assumed premiss refers
if we have supposed that A applies to no B, (1) when
BD is further assumed, although we can argue to a
false conclusion, the point to be proved is not demonFor if A apphes to no B, and B to all D,
strated.
A will apply to no D. Let this be impossible. Then
;

But

A
A

apphes
appUes
B is true. (2) And if CA is further assumed,
we get no syllogism, just as we get none when A is
assumed not to apply to all B. Thus it is evident
it is

false that

to no
to all

'

appUes to no B.

is false, it

if

does not follow that

'

the universal affirmative proposition is not

demonstrable per impossihile in the first figure.
The universal negative proposition, however, and
the particular, whether affirmative or negative, are
demonstrable. Let A be assumed to apply to no
B, and let B be taken to apply to all or some of C.
Then it necessarily follows that A appUes to none,
or does not apply at all, of C. But this is impossible
(for let it be true and evident that A appUes to all
then if this is false, A must apply to some B.
C)

that

loTo;

...

TO

uncinis interpunxit Waltz.

4.63

Proof of the
PffirSfve,

ARISTOTTLE
Ik

npo^

T^i*

Xrj^Bfj

ij

Mpa

vp^rtunf, ot^K

avAAoyM7/A09* ovS* orar t6 Ivayrlov

H^

hnxu

av^itrtpd'

Ofian vnoTd^, otov r6 rtvl /ai) vnapf^w. ^avfp^

odv on TO dymctifjLivov {moBrriov.
IloAiv (nroKtlaOija r^
tu4 rt^ B vndpxtw,
0 ccAv^^oi 5^ ro r watrri rtft A.
wdyf^ o^ ri V
Twl Tift B vndfix*^' Touro &* corw d&twaTor, cSrrt
i/ftOSo^ TO ^TTortddp* ci 3* otrrctff , oAi^^^ rd fUf8p|
^Tra/>)^iv.
ofioiutf bi mil c^ artpftfrufi^ iMfi^ r^

FA.

c/ S*

i)

np6i rt^

fS^Tirroi

np6mmtf,

odtc

coTOi (TuAAoyujfio;.
tor S^ to ivavrlov &mn0,
GvXXoyiafiO^ lUv
kqX t6 aZwaTQ, oi ScZ*
KWTQi hi. TO npoTtO^. vnoK^UiBw yap vatfrl

hmu

TO A vn(ipxUf, teal t6 V r^
tlXri^Bm am
o^KoOv oniy^n} t6 T ffotrri Ttjt B vfrQp)(iy, toOtq
B* ahvvaTO, woTM ^fti&of to murrl r^ B to A
inapx*uf, oAA' oimtm yt ayayircubv, c2
warrl,
fiifScvl ^apx<iv.
6fAouoi hi Koi cj trpo; t^ B

to

Arj^flrj

Mpa

Trp6raaiq-

avX^oyum&f fc^

^oroi KOi t6 o^iWror, o^k ovoi^iTcu o

ctMrrc TO arrucciucvov vnoBtTiov.
Wpos hk TO firi imyrl Sctfcu vndpxov

i}

y^

^v^cok,

Ttjt B Td
{modTov trovTi vndpxiv' ct ydp t^
irain'i t^* B
fcai TO r wayrl t<^ A, to F fra^ri Tip B' war*
TOVTO oSlWrOf, l^vSoS TO ^Or$V, OfUHWS 34
Kat t 9rpo9 T<p B cAi^^^ i) CTfjpa np6r<unq. koX
1 aTpfrfnK6v ^v to FA ci<mvTa>y fcol ya^ oimtf
yiyvTfu avXXoyurp^,
^av 5c trpof toi B ^ t6
aTpirjTuc6v, ovhiv Scurvirrcu.
car 54 fi^ irarri

ts

>

rwBC, Waitxt WA.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xi

But if the other premiss assumed is attached to A,

there will be no syllogism ; nor when the contrary
of the conclusion is assumed, viz., that A does not
apply to some B. Thus it is evident that we must
assume the contradictory of the conclusion.
applies to some of the
Again, let it be supposed that
B, and let C be assumed to apply to all A. Then C negative,
must apply to some B. Let this be impossible, so
that the supposition is false. But if this is so, it is
true that A applies to no B. Similarly too if the
assumed premiss CA had been negative. But if the
premiss attached to B is assumed, there will be no
If, however, the contrary proposition is
syllogism.
assumed, there will be a syllogism and an argument
per impossibile, but the proposition is not demonLet it be supposed that
applies to all B,
strable.
and let C be assumed to apply to all A. Then C
must apply to all B. But this is impossible ; and so
But it is not ipso
it is false that A applies to all B.
facto necessary that if it does not apply to all, it
Similarly too supposing that the
applies to none.
other premiss assumed is attached to B ; for there
will be a syllogism and an argument per impossibile^
but the hypothesis is not refuted. Therefore we
must assume the contradictory of the conclusion.
To prove that A does not apply to all B we must and of the
suppose that it applies to all. For if A applies to all negative!^
B, and C to all A, C will apply to all B so that if this
Similarly too
is impossible, the supposition is false.
The
if the other premiss had been attached to B.
same also holds if CA has been taken as negative ;
But if the
for in this way too we get a syllogism.
negative proposition is attached to B, there is no
demonstration. If, however, we suppose, not that

465

ARISTOTLE
40

dXXa

xmapxtiv {rmntB^, oi Scarwrcu irn od

rivl

cZ yap 7^ A rwl rtp B ro

A, rwt r^ h r6 T ^mip(i, ci o^
dSiWrof, ^IkOSo^ r6 tii4 ^hrdfixtu^ rat B

iravrl oAA* ort ov5cvt.

es

8c

Trat^i roj

Toirr'

TO A, axrr* aXriBh r6

^VTos
nvl
sn^v

fA4v wrfjpix^,

^oBtaw

oi' cii;, i7rc/>

>w

o^oi'

B*

T<jii

imyrl.
10

rwl

i( aXijBwy fi^

8* ^OTU' dXffS^s,

cixrr*

ftfj

o^

odx

17

0Vadai'

oi) irofMi

<m ^fvSo; owAAoyuravnapxi yelp to

A Tm

tf

oMf

cc

firi

^datf

ij

fitf

t^

vwapxiiv

a^u^ow an6St(is.

^Mk

hnyriam

dno^oaif, dvdyfcfj
mxXiv

fi^ ^wdfiX!"^ t^)

r6 Amueti*

oStw

kqX to a(iufM hSo(o.

citrroi
rj

Ttn

diraai Toiy QvXXoytOfUHf

ci

an6^<un9, Sci^^/i^ro^
rfp^

KarA^aatv

0X17-

Ti&r^aw aXrfiVaBQi rfpf

ano^aaw.

to

vavTiov ouScr^pco; ap^wrrti aftoOv' ovt

yap

KaTd<f>aatv, vBo(ov to
8*

^ni)f>)(w.

Tai^ro to Tun,

oi) Ti^

yap TO avayicalby
ydp #raTd mwTo^
ort

fcai ci

yap

narrl vwofxtt^,

fifvov xmoBtrlov

15

A r^ B

oOy ivoBtr^ov rtA iMIp^^cy, <SAAa

ofioujjs

^avpov

Sct-

yap

avfipaivn to <l5tWT0ir ^^i)8o( yap

&tu(vuocfi<v* Ci

Kol

o^

5*

tovtov

^rfitvl.

TrpoaovcupciTOi TO dXrjd4i' to

avayK<uov,

ovT

ct

Moiov

to

a^uoooi

Ttfy

/xi^Scvi tlfvSo^,

u>s Ci

dartpav

to murri aXrfi^s,

^v^,

an

6dTpo

oAi^^cV.
10

XII. <Pavp6v odv oTt v

4^

tw

wpcoTfp oxifjum

-ri

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xi-xii

all, but that it applies to some B, what

not that it does not apply to all, but that
For if A applies to some B, and
it applies to none.
C to all A, C will apply to some B. Then if this is
impossible, it is false that A applies to some B, and
therefore true that it applies to none. But by this
for the supposition
proof the truth is refuted too
was that A applies to some and also does not apply
Moreover the impossibility does not
to some B.
result from the hypothesis for if it did, the hypothesis
would be false, since a false conclusion cannot be
drawn from true premisses but actually it is true,
because A applies to some B. Thus we must suppose,
not that A applies to some B, but that it applies to
all.
Similarly too if we should try to prove that A
for since
does not apply to some B
not to apply
to some and not to apply to all are the same, the
proof will be the same for both.
Thus it is evident that in all syllogisms we must in all cases
suppose not the contrary but the contradictory of JJ?^^9'
the conclusion for in this way we shall secure logical of the connecessity, and our claim will be generally admitted, musl^be
For if either the assertion or the negation of a given assumed.
predicate is true of every given subject, then when
the negation is not true, the
it is proved that
and on the other hand if
affirmation must be true
it is not maintained that the affirmation is true, the
claim that the negation is true will be generally
admitted. But the claim that the contrary statement
for it is not a
is true meets neither requirement
necessary consequence that if it applies to none
it applies to all
is true, nor is it generally
is false,
admitted that if the one is false the other is true.
XII. Thus it is evident that in the first figure, Reduction
is

applies to

proved

is

'

'

'

in the

467

ARISTOTLE
fiiv

npoPXrjfAara imvra htucwrai 3ta roO

cEAAa

JtBwdirov, r6 5^ Ka$6Xov iraro^rtiror

o^ BtlKnmA.

iv h^ T(p /i^ooi KQx Tip iiTxarat nal roOro Scurrvroi.

Kta6cj

t5

yap to

irovrl t^*

fi-^

6jrdpXt9, l\if^Sw

vnApx^iv to A. ookoiV ft t^ fuv

B /A17 TravTi T<p 5^ r vtuni, ov noinl tJi B to P.
TovTo 5* a&f&vfirov' iorw yt^ ^apyfiv &n notrrl
rto B ^(ipxti TO r, ai9TC ^^viiSor rd iwotnlfitvov,
8^

T<ji

irai^i

aXrjdh &pa r6 itnvrX ^n^pixtw.

id

M t^ Iwatmov

avXXoYtofio^ fUv iarat leal r6 iZvvaroiF,

ScurKifTOi to wportBlv, tt yap r6
fiyfitA

{nrtyrtBfj,
0 oi; fitjv

T(p

T^) 5^

a5viaTor,

ciKTTff

tronri, ou^cia

^^fu8of TO

t^ B tA

M^T^^

F* Toim>

^v^fgiffiy.

ovK ct toOto 4K0Sof TO woptI dXffSdt'

*0t 8^ nvl rtp B vndpxi r6 A, ^irotctiuBia r6
firiSvl T<ji
6

vwdpxtv. Tip 8^

8*

oAA*

irorrl vnapx^rta.

dvayin^ oiJv to F fArfivt rip B* oktt* 4 ToOr'

dhwarov, oMiyici} t^ A nvi T<p B vnapx^w. iov 8*
{mortBfi TCM ^17 V7rap;(ciy, Totrr* Icmu* av^ ^nri
Tou npwTov oj^fxaToy.
riaAiv vnoKtMo} T^ A Tiw tJ> B vndpx^OF, r^
8^
T(p

f(i78vt

40 tlfv^os

*Otc

vmxipxiTo.

V7rapxiv,

/ii9

TO xmoTtOhf'
8'

avdyto) oiv t6

aXXa murri

oi)8cvt <^>a T<p

urrfjpxti^,

to

tii4

atart

vnapfti.

vnoKfiadw wayri
9ihvndpxiv TO* 8^ F /ii^ScW.
dydytctf od r6 F
/iT^Scvt Ta> B V7r(ipxiv.
roGro 8* o8waTOV, aJor*
oAt^^cs* TO /i:^ navri vndpx^iy.
^avp6v oSv on
ou wcu^i TO

468

Toi B,

mSr* i<mk Jenkinaoot

r^i/^*

iormu

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xii

other propositions are demonstrable per second

^^^'
the universal affirmative is not so demonIn the middle and last figures, however,
strable.
even this is demonstrable. Let A be supposed not Universal
^'"^ ^^^*
to apply to all B, and let it be assumed that A applies *
to all C. Then if it does not apply to all B, but
But tliis is
applies to all C, C mil not apply to all B.
For let it be evident that C applies to
impossible.
Then it is true
all B, so that the supposition is false.
that A appHes to all B. But if we adopt the contrary hypothesis, although there will be a syllogism
and an argument per impossibile, the proposition is
not demonstrable. For if A applies to no B, but to
But this is impossible
all C, C will apply to no B.
and so it is false that A applies to no B. But it does
not follow that if this is false, it is true that A applies

whereas

all

impossibile,

to all B.

When A

applies to some B, let it be supposed that

apphes to no B, but let it apply to all C. Then
C must apply to no B. Thus if this is impossible, A
must apply to some B. If it is supposed not to apply
to some, we shall have the same result as in the first

Particular
^ffl-^^^ative.

figure.**

Again, let A be supposed to apply to some B, but

apply to no C. Then necessarily C does not
apply to some B. But originally it applied to all, and
Therefore A will apply
so the supposition is false.
let it

Universal
"^s^txve.

to no B.

When does not apply to all B, let it be supposed

Then C must apply
to apply to all B, but to no C.
But this is impossible ; and so it is true
to no B.
does not apply to all B. Thus it is evident
that

61

b 39

ff.

Particular
g^*'^'

ARISTOTLE

&a

nayrts oi avXXoyuffiol y^ytfoyrai

i

XIII. 'Ofio(at9

roO fUaou

Kol hia rov iaxf^rov,

KtioOut

F nayrl' ro
yap t6 a Twa rw D /117 VTrdpx*^ to
dfM A TiW rut r ouv ^apYi, ci ody roCr aSvvarov, 0ci>8<K t^ rtviuri (miffytw, &ar dXtfi^f r6
vtrorcdg uyjIUn. ^wdnrw, avXXonavri.
iav
yuifi6s nh^ ioroi koI to dStWror, 00 ocufWTOi
TO -npoTtSiv' ^av yap t6 Ivavrlov ^hroTff^, ravr'

10

coTOi*

dntp

ifrl

rdf irporrtpov.

undpxiv aurrj Xtftrria

IJLJjIotvi

r.

4i

oAAd

rtph rohkT rwi t^ B, to

Ci oiH'

ToGro ^uSo9,

a^arfiit

p^

r6 Tua

c ydlp Tii

tnroBtoii.

r6

od

murn rw

Tiri t4>

vfnu>xciv.
>*

Tffi B im^px*^ ^6 A, ^wxHCtioBw

ccAn^oi & #fai t^ F ttovti t^ B
MipXO^' ^'^o^ ovaym^ t^ F tu4 to A vnapx^u^.
aXX ouScvi &rrripxpf, w<rT ijffCios to4 tui B vnap
Xiv r6 A. cov 0' OncT0 murA r^ B Mipx^w
to a, ot) ScunvTcu TO nportSlv, oAM wp^ to fii^

*(>ni 8' oi)&cvi

Tivi U7ra^;^<(>',

to

7rUTi virdpxiv avrrj Xrjrrria

1)

^rr^Stai^,

yo/>

waiTi Tcji B koX to F tivi T<p B, t<^ A vndpx^i

rivi r<p F* toDto S^ ov#c iji', oxrrc thtC^of t6 noyri
undpxfw tl h* ovTWi, dXri$9 to firf vayri, iav 5*
V7TOT0^ Tlvi V7TdpXty, TOVT* COTOi* KOi CITl TWI'

TO

7TpOLprjfJL^VWV .

Oai'cpow 01^ oTi cv axroai TOi? Sa tov

o&Wtov

oi;AAoyu7/xot9 to OKruccificvov vno$TOV,

*

ravr* <ara n

&ijXov S<

Jcnkintoo t mBr* iarm.

* L0. that all types of propositioo can be prorcd ptr unpottibiU,

470

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
that

all

II. xii-xiii

the syllogisms can be effected by the second

figure.**

XIII. Similarly they can all be effected by means ReducUon

of the last figure. Let
be supposed not to apply figure. ^^'"^
to some B, but to apply to all C.
Then A does not Affirmative
apply to some C. Then if this is impossible, it is Schul^^*
false that
does not apply to some B, and so it is
true that it applies to all. But if it is supposed to
apply to none, although there will be a syllogism
and an argument per impossibile, the proposition is
not demonstrable ; for if the contrary hypothesis is
adopted, we shall have the same result as before.*
This hypothesis must be chosen to prove that
applies to some B.
For if
applies to no B, and C to
will not apply to all C.
some B,
Then if this is
false, it is true that
applies to some B.
When A applies to no B, let it be supposed to apply Negative
to some ; and let C also be assumed to apply to all B. tion^^^

Then

must apply to some C. But originally it

applied to none ; and so it is false that A applies to
some B. If
is supposed to apply to all B, the
proposition is not demonstrable ; this hypothesis
must be chosen to prove that
does not apply to all.
For if
applies to all B, and C to some B,
applies
But before this was not so ; therefore
to some C.
applies to all B ; and if this is so,
it is false that
it is true that it does not apply to all.
But if it is
supposed to apply to some, the result will be the
same as those which we have described above.*'
Thus it is evident that in all syllogisms per impossibile it is the contradictory assumption that must

"

62 a 28
61

ff.

39.
second figure.
*

The

case

is

not treated separately under the

471

ARISTOTLE
tk

Koi &Tt iv rtp fUaw trx^iMon Scumtfro/ iwik t4

Karoi^rucov koI iv rp (rxart^> t6 kqB6X[>v.
80

XIV. Aio^pci 19 cif TO ahvaro dfroS<t{if ri};

SciKTur^ r<ji rtShnu S povXrrtu ai^ai^i dxrayowaa

Ci9 oftoAoyovficvov i/KvSof'

hi 5urrun7

apxtnu

Xofifidvovai fiiv oiV

ii ofioXoyovfjuvun^ $4otfU}
dfuf>6rpcu hvo npordatif SficXoyovfUva^- oAA* 1^
/uov /xiv rovrtav
^v i( wv 6 av^^oyujfi6t, 1)

a&

avrl^aaiy roC uvfiirtpdofuiroi.

koI
v6a fiiv ovK dydyKTi yMufXfuir ttvai to avfini'

/xtav $

'n7'

hi avayfci) (09 oiWr loTty.

Bui/^pi 5' oii&cv ^ooiv

irc/H afufKHv.

40

'Arrav hi r6 ScurruroK iff/)a4Jt$fii'oi' *fal hiA rod

Scij^^i^orroi, koX r6 hia roO dhwdrtw

oSwaTov

inuf fuv yip 6

vpantp axruAan y^vrjrai, ri.
fitotp tj T(Jj io^drtp, TO /A^

hucTucap^, hia rutv ovruiy opurv,*

6S

ouAAoytofiof

T(^

dX7)$4s coTOA 4v Tip

ortpitjTuccv A

T<jii

^aai

5* iv

Tti

8^ miTiTyopurov iv

rw piaw

r^

6 avXXoyuifWf, r6
dXrjOi^ v r(p irpcurtp M.
rwv vpopX^fidratv orav h* iv rtp iaxdrtp 6 auAAo/ia/K^, t6
<rxdra>-

orov

fj

mmwv

aXrjOis iv rat irporrfp koX rtp

^Tuca

iv Tip

TTpfifTip

ra hi

/ua^, to

fw

#caTO-

arpfrjrnKa iv rtp fiiatp.

"EoTtu yap hhiyfJUvov t6 A /ai^Scvi tj prf mun-i

B hia rov nptttrov crj^/iaToy. ovkovv 1} fiiv
vnoOeais -^v rivl rat B xmdpxttv to A^ t^ 5^ F

rp
10

'

^^r.

ABC

Zpttm, oitc iw rote avrotf

>T;^^^^^^r

uoigo.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
be made.

II. xiii-xiv

the affirmademonstrable in the middle figure

It is also clear that in a sense

tive proposition is

and the universal in the last figure."

XIV. Proof per impossibile differs from ostensive Proof pr
proof in that the former posits that which it intends com^re?
to refute by reducing it to an admitted fallacy, with osten^^^^ ^^^^
whereas the latter proceeds from admitted positions.
but
Both indeed assume two admitted premisses
whereas the latter assumes those from which the
syllogism proceeds, the former assumes one of these
and one which is the contradictory of the conclusion
and in the latter the conclusion need not be known,
but
nor need it be presupposed to be true or not
in the former it must be presupposed not to be true.
It makes no difference, however, whether the con'

the procedure is
is affirmative or negative
the same in both cases.
Every proposition which is established ostensively
can also be proved per impossibile, and vice versa, by
means of the same terms. For when the syllogism *
will appear
is effected in the first figure, the truth
the negative in the
in the middle or last figure
middle and the affirmative in the last. When the
syllogism is in the middle figure, the truth will appear
in the first figure with respect to all propositions.
When the syllogism is in the last figure, the truth
affirmative in
will appear in the first or the middle
the first, negative in the middle figure.
For example, let it be proved by the first figure
that A applies to none, or does not apply to all, of B.
apphes to some B,
Then the hypothesis was that
clusion

'^

62 a 23-37, b 5-9, 14-18.

the reduction ad impossibile,
i.e. the ostensive syllogism.

* i.e.
*

473

Reduction
dfrect^roof
^y Baroco.

ARISTOTLE
I*

XafiPdvro rc^ fiiv

ovTW yap

watrrl

t^tr^pyciy

r^

Si

6 av^XoyutiJu^ koX t6
to y4acv OYfjfia, tt r6 V ry
ahvvarov. rovro
fuv A iravrl r<p 5^ B firfiA ^wnf^^i' mx ^aytp6
K rOVTWV DTI OvScVI TOI B fMlpYCi t6 A.
u '0/xoui>; $ Ku ci /ii) novTi Mcurroi vtrdpyov.
n fiv yap un6$*aii iari nayri vnapx**^, to
C
B ov nayrC.
tXafifiavtro rtp yAv A vavrl t^
Koi Ci arfnfTuc6v X^ifiavoiro r6 PA waavrun' Ka\
yap ovTto yiyvtrai to ^Uqov ayyi^*
llaAii' hhi^w run vmipx^^ rtft B r6 A,
1} fUw
B ^Xoftfiiyrro
fo odv ^7r6$ai9 H'l^^ vndpxav, to
marrl rtp V iMlJpyfiV Kai to A ^ irovri ^ rtA r^ F*
toOto hk r6 liiyiftir
ovTijj yap itmu to oSiWtov.
o;;^fia, ci to A icaX r^ B iroKrl rtp F* iral ^limp^
K rovTUfV art avdytcri r6 A Twt r& B vnApx^w,
ofiouitf Si ral Ci TtW t^* F hf^lfi ivfipxP^ r6
B J TO A.
riaAiv v Tip pAatp ax^pari StStiX^ot to A irovri
T<p B vndpxov.
ovKoCv 1} ucy tnr6$ais ^v /x^
7r(UTi Toi B TO A i^opyciv, ctAmrTOi Sc to A troKn
rat i KOI ro 1 vavri rtp 1>* ovtoi yap caroi to
dotWrov.
tovto 5c to vpCnov ar^ffta to A
ao Ttavrl rtp F #cai to F mxvri tu> B.
OfiOiWf Si Koi
i rivi Sc'SciKTOi vndpxov' 17 fc^ yap ^n6$ins ^v
/xTjScvi rai B TO A inro^ctv, iXrf7rrai S^ to A
iravrl rat F cai to F tivi tw B.
ci 5^ <rrprfTiK^
6 avXkoyiayu&^ , 17 ^liv vnodtm^ ro A rtpt r<p B
^apx^iv, cZAt/tttcu 8< to A firjSvi r<p F irol r6 F
tt TravTt Toi B, oKrrc yiyi^Tou to npumv axr^yua,
icaX
Ci /ii7 KadoAov o ouAAoyia/xo^, oAAa to A Tivt r^ B
ovSVi'

iyiy^^tro

Sc^iicTOu

474

fii^

VTTdpyiv, waavr(as

vn6d<ns liiv

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xiv

to apply to all A but to no B ;

was how the syllogism and the argument per
impossibile were effected.
But this is the middle
figure, if C applies to all A but to no B
and it is
evident from these premisses that A appUes to no B.
Similarly too if it has been proved not to apply to
all.
The hypothesis is that it applies to all, and it
was assumed that C appUes to all A but not to all B.
The same also holds supposing that CA is taken as

and

C was assumed

this

negative

for in this case too

we get

FenoCesare.

the middle

figure.

Again,

let it

be proved that

Then the hypothesis

is

that

it

applies to some B. ceiarentapplies to none, and JJ.*Dmmis.

and
to all or some

B was assimied to apply to all C

A
of C for it is in this way that the proof per impossibile
This is the last figure, if A and B apply
will result.
and it is evident from these premisses that
to all C
;

must apply to some B.

Similarly too supposing

is taken to apply to some C.
or
Again in the second figure let it be proved that
Then the hypothesis was that
applies to all B.
does not apply to all B, and the assumptions were
that
applies to all C and C to all B
for it is in this
way that the proof per impossibile will result. This is
applies to all C and C to all
the first figure, when
B. Similarly too if
has been proved to apply to
some B. The hypothesis was that
appHes to no
applies to all C
B, and the assumptions were that
and C to some B. If the syllogism is negative, the
hypothesis was that
applies to some B, and the
assumptions were that
applies to no C and C to
The same also
all B, so that we get the first figure.
holds if the syllogism is not universal, but it has been
proved that
does not apply to some B ; for the

that

A BarocoA Barbara,

A
A

475

ARISTOTLE
t

yap w<WT4 T^
firjS^vt Tiff

TO

Koi r6

vwafix*iy, ctAiprcu hk r^
B* otmu ydip

V run r^

h
r6

npanov av^fta.
o

' ruf rpirat ax^fiari ScSccx^ ^^

wayrl
ovKoOv 1} fi^ vnoStatf ^ /i^
vndpxfiv.
t6 F iroKn
TTovTi Ty B TO A undpxiiv, cJAi/irroi
trorri T<Ji F* oirrcu yap corat t^
T^ B Koi TO
dovvarov. rovro hi to trpunov irxTJ^ia, <oa<u/rwf
St Koi fl iiri t&vo; 1^ dvo5ci{if ^ fuv yap vw6$<ns
firjSvi rtp 3 r6
vndpxw, ttXtfirrai 5^ to F tu4
ircuTi rw F.
Tip B #(04 TO
C4 hi artprjiTucos 6
tim rw
vndp'
avXXoytafjLOf, vwoStoi^ fuv r6

rioAiv

Tw B

I k

5i to F tc^ fih^
nayri' rovro Si to pJaov o^f^fia.

yciv, cL^Ttrroi

>41)0va

T<ji

5^

ofUHWf Si Koi
ci fii^ #ca^dAou ii airc$&ci(c9.
ufro^at; /lir yap
10 ccrroi navri rtp B r6 A inapxtw, CL^ifirra* 3^ t6
F T(p fi^ A firfitvi rtp Si B rttfl' Totffo
r6
pAaov axfjpa.
Oavtpov oiV OTi SuL Toir oiVrc^v opcin^ koI Sccir*
TU(a>9 cart Scucvuvcu rwv vpopXri^rutv K<urro9
Ucal Sid rov dSwdrou],*
opiouj^ S* l<rr<u kqX

15

6vro> rdtv avXXoyujfUjav tls dSwarov

oTrayctv cv Tot^ ttXrifipJvoiS opois, orav ^ dvrtr
KifUvTj nporaais rp avfintpaa^Ti XjijMn.
yU
0ucruciv

aimM avXXoytapol rois Oid, rijs

dprurrpo^ij^, ukjt* vBvi ixOfAtv iccu Ta ov^MiTa
5t' atv KauTov eoTai.
noM wpipXr^ta
S^tAot oA'

yvovrax yap ol

10

Scucvtrrou

Kar

dpj^oripov^ rot^ rpairovs, Sui t

koI StucriKuf^, Kai ovfc M^xcroi

rov dSwdrov

X^pil^^aBai rov trtpov.

XV. *Ev noitp Si ax^fiari art i( dyructipJyufv
>

476

ra2

^5w>Tov

om. AC, Wails.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
hypothesis was that
the assumptions were

and C to some B

applies

xiv-xv
to

all

B,

and

that

for in this

II.

appHes to no C,
way we get the first

figure.

Again

in the third figure let it

applies to
do'es

all

B.

not apply to

applies to

all

be proved that

Then the hypothesis was

all

A
A

that
B, and the assumptions were that

B and A

to

all

for it

is

in this

way

and this is
that the proof per impossibile will result
the first figure. The same also holds if the demonstration proves a particular conclusion, for then the
hypothesis was that
applies to no B, and the assumpto all C.
tions were that C applies to some B and
If the syllogism is negative, the hypothesis was that
applies to some B, and the assumptions were that
C applies to no A but to all B. This is the middle
Similarly too if the demonstration proves a
figure.
the hypothesis will
particular negative conclusion
be that A applies to aJl B, and the assumptions were
that C applies to no A but to some B. This is the
;

middle

figure.

Thus

it is evident that each of these propositions

can also be proved ostensively by means of the same

terms.

Similarly too if the syllogisms are ostensive

be possible to employ reduction ad impossibile

by using the terms already taken, if we assume the
premiss which contradicts the conclusion. For we
it will

get the same syllogisms as we obtained by conversion

and so we have at once the very figures by which each
one will be effected. It is clear, then, that every
proposition can be proved in both ways, both per
and that neither method
impossibile and ostensively
can be separated from the other.
XV. In which figures we can and cannot draw a
;

Conclusions

from

477

ARISTOTLE
nporaatcjv avXXoyiaaaBiu koI hf noup odtc ^aruf,
Xiyw S* dyrtsftifidvat c2mu
Karat ^avtpov.

a5*

TTpoTdais
vovrl

r|f>

rirmpoi, cla r6
worn, koI ri
t6 nvt r& od rivi, Kar* dXi^uuf

icard fihf rfjp Xd(ty

ouScvt, koX to nayji r<p od

rtvl T<p ovSvi, teal

hi rpU' TO

yap

nvi. rtp

avTueirai ftovov,

Ka06Xov, TO

ov

rm

rovrutv 5*

murri rat

M^^

#card

t^

X/fiy

hnyrias fUv ra$

vwApx^w {oIop t6

omtoov imar^ifif tlvat, owovhaloif rtp firfitftiaaf

tvai ano uSaiav), ra^ &* aXXa^ ayructipJva^.
'Ev fikv o9v rtp vpurrtp ax^yMri o^ iarw 4(
dirTucifi^vta npordmofw <7uAAfl7to|i^
iroro*

o^

^ruco^ ovrt itno^'nK6^,

40

fcarai^arufif fiiv &ft

oft^or/pa; Set tcara/iaruc^s cImu rdf irportfottf^

al 5* ayrucifivai ^am^ koI dn6^aavs, or^pfrfTiK
h ori <u fuv ayrtxtipLfvaL to ovt^ roO adroG
KarrfYopovai tcax dwapoOrrai, ro 5* Iv rtp nptitnp
fjUGov ov Ac/fTOi icar* dfi^oat, aXX* intivau i^
oAAo anapvirai, adro hi aXXov teoTrfyoptirai'

rw fUaw ax^fian

*Ev hi

fcai

itc

rwv

arructi"

fiJvwv Koi K Twv ivavriuiv it^^xrnu ylyrtcBai

ovAAoyta/iow.
coroi yap dya^iv fiiv i^* ad A,

hi c^' ad B koI V,
l htj irdaav intOTTovhaiay tXafie koI fnfitua^, to
r^i B

7TurrqfiTj
OTT^/iijv

irayrl

ft

vndpxti koI

T<Ji

ovhvi, onrrc to

B t^ F

apa cVumj^i; cvumji^i} iariv.

ndaav Xafiw onavhatOM rr/v
iarpucrjv fivi anavhaiav \afi' rw fuv yap B varri
TO A rat hi T ovhvi, ataT ij rls Vw mj i fffiff o6k
ouScvi*

ot)6/AU&

Ofiouo^

hi

478

KOX

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xv

conclusion from opposite premisses will be evident opposite

from the following analysis. I hold that there are
four pairs of premisses which exhibit a verbal opposiand applies to none
tion, viz., applies to all
applies to all and does not apply to all ;
applies
and applies to none ; and applies to
to some
some and does not apply to some
but only three
of these are really opposed, because the opposition of
appHes to some and does not apply to some is
only verbal. Of these the universal premisses applies
to all and applies to none (e.g., all knowledge is
good and no knowledge is good ') are contrary ;
the other two pairs are contradictory.
In the first figure, then, a syllogism from opposite First figure.
premisses is impossible, whether it be affirmative or
negative. An affirmative syllogism is impossible
because to produce it both the premisses must be
affirmative, and a pair of opposite premisses is comnegative
posed of an affirmation and its negation.
syllogism is impossible because opposite premisses
affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject, and in the first figure the middle term is not
predicated of both the others, but something else is
denied of it while it is itself predicated of something
else ; and the premisses thus formed are not opposed.
In the middle figure a syllogism may be obtained Second
^^'
both from contradictory and from contrary premisses.
For let
be good,' and let B and C be science.'
Then if we assume that all science is good, and then
that no science is good, A applies to all B and to no C,
Therefore no science is
so that B applies to no C.
Similarly too if after assuming that all
science.
science is good we then assume that medicine is not
good ; for
applies to all B but to no C, so that the

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

479

ARISTOTLE

10

li

arai iirurrjft'n. teal c/ rtf> fiiv T vovrl r6

ra
8^ B /ii^Scv/. tart hi r6 flip B iwurr^fui r6 hi V
larpucfi r6 hi A vtitSAi^s" ovhtulaof yip itrurrfiiiyff
tmikffpw Xaficav ttXri^ rum hiumftyp^ thmi
hta/^pi hi rod miXai rtft ini rwv opww
ihr6Xffiffw,
dvrurrp^^oBai' trpimpov fUv yap np6f rw B, vOr
teal ay fj hi fiii
hi npos r<p r r6 Kara^ru(6v,
KoBoXov ^ irtpa nporaaig utaavrut^' a<t yap ri
fi4aov iariv o dno Bartpov fuv ano^ruedn Xiytrai
Kara Oartpov hi irara^ruccuff.
*0oT* /i^xfTOi rdtrructi^iMva ntpaivtoBai, irAi^
ovK ati ovhi irovrco^, oAA* iav ovrws IxD
^'^

ro pAoov WOT* fj ravra tlyai ^ oXo vpos l^poioAXco; 5* (iSiWTor* ov ya/> iaorrai odhofiwf ai
npordtnif oCr* hmrriax our dyTuc ifLtvai.
ao
*Ev hi r^ ^pi'rfp <rx^fian jcara^arur^ fiiv

oHhimn i<mu

i( armmfi/Mtfr irpoalrtop tcaX hti ToO

nparrov oviJ/iaTo;, ano^Tuc69 3* larai, irol
Ka^oAov KOI fiii Ka$6Xov rurv oputv Svrwv. Harta
yap <7r4<rr^/iw d>* oS ro B tcai T, varpuc^ h* i^* od

avXXoytafi6f

rdatwv hia

t5

rfjv

tlpmUrrp^

oiv Aapoi ndaav larpucfiy intanjfArpf teal

tman^'qv, ro B muni rtp
ctA?/^ icax ro T ovhvt, war tarai rif ^irurrnurj
ovK iTurrT^firi.
opolw^ hi koX ov fi^ tcoBoXov
^V^*^ V ^A' nporaat^' i yap iari rcy larpuc^
7rurrq^r) teal vcUiv fiTjhfJua larpueii inurrrjfirj,
avy^alvi imarri^7j rtva fi^ ttvai imar^prfw.

A.

/ii^Sc/xuiv iaroucriv

to

toi

hi

hfavrlai

KaBoXov
ax

rwv

piv

tr/xyraactf,

oparv

iay h*

XapficLvofUvotm

iv pipi

dyriKflpxvai,
^

i80

BA ABC

Waits:

AB notgo.

artpot

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xv

particular science of medicine will not be science.

applies to all C but to no B, and B is science,
Also if
C medicine and belief ; for after assuming that no

we have now assumed

that a parThis differs from the former

example in being converted in respect of its terms ;
for in the former example the affirmative proposition
was attached to B, but now it is attached to C. The
same will still be true if the other premiss is not unifor the middle is always that which is stated
versal
negatively of one term and affirmatively of the other.
Thus it is possible to draw an inference from
not always, however, nor under
opposite premisses
all conditions, but only if the relation of the terms
included under the middle is that of identity or of
whole to part. No other relation is possible otherwise the premisses will be in no sense either contrary
science

is

belief,

ticular science

is belief.

or contradictory.
In the third figure there can never be an affirmative Third
^'^*
syllogism from opposite premisses, for the reason
but there can
stated in the case of the first figure <*
be a negative syllogism, whether the terms are uniLet B and C stand for science, and
versal or not.
Supposing then that we assume that
for medicine.
allmedicine is science, and that no medicine is science
then we have assumed that B applies to all A, and
C to no A, and therefore some science will not be
Similarly too if the premiss
which we
science.
for if some medicine is
assume is not universal
science, and again no medicine is science, it follows
The premisses are
that some science is not science.
contrary if the terms assumed are universal, but con;

BA

tradictory if one

term

is

particular.

63 b 33.
Q 2

481

ARISTOTLE

Act Bi icarovocu^
dvrucftfifva
fr

Xa^ifidi^nr,

M^x^rat
warrtp

anovSalop ttvai

fihf

aShw rA

tiirofiv

frdaay

miXiv /iijScfuov
rj rtva /x^ cnrouSauty (aire/) oi)( cScu^c AoWorrci^f
coTi 5c 5i* aAAa;v ipum)fidTOf auXXoyiaaoBai Bd'
inum^firp^

rtpov,

w^

rj

*Enl h^
40

i1

tcai

Toirucoif iXix^fl Xafita^.

rp^^

teara^datwv oa dwr%04ati9

TCtfT

^(axoi^ (Wfifiawti rdyTu(t(fiva Xofifidvfw, fj warrl

Koi firjStvi, ^ vavrl koI /x^ rtayrt, r^ ru% kqI /ai^Scm^

M k fccu

rotm> dvriarpUm hrl ruw 6piu, olo r^

'

nayrl rep

B r^

S^

fiiyScW,

^ r^

F worn n^

fj r^ fMv iravTi t^
/a^ momi, koX
ToDro dMrrurrphjfai ttard ra^ Spoof, dftolwt
5^ Kol hri ToO rpiTtJv ax^fiarof wart ^aytpdv

fJLrfSVi,

froLAiv

* oao)^ci>^
roil'

re

icoi

/y itomm; ax^fuurw iv6Xrai Sea

dmuifUvtMf

nporduwy

ytv^aOai

avXXty

ytofjiov.

^avtpov b^ Kid on ^k i^vidf fUy iaru^ dXfjB^

ovXXoyiaaaOai, tcaBdwtp tiprjrtu np6rtpo, ite

Ttav din'ucifivwv
10

avXXoYiGfjLOf

dyadov,

fir)

ovk tariv dil yap ivoyrioi 6

ytyvmu

rtft

cZitu dyoBdv,

itpdyiiari' 6to ca
fj

ct i^ftov,

fAt^

iarw

Iwot^, h*a

TO cf dvTt/^datcjs cZmu rw avXXoytofiov kox rovf

V7rOKlfLVOVf OpOVf ^ TOI^ OVTOVS tlpOA ^ T^ fl^
oXov Tov h^ y^pof' ^ffXav hi KoX orn iv rois irapaAoyMr/xoiy ovS^v #ccaAuci yiyvtoBox rff^ wroSiutoit
oXov ci cori Trc/Hrroj', /i^ cfw TTtpirrdv'

u dvri<f>aaLV,

K yap Tcuv

OKTi/ccifiO'cuv

Topic*. VIII.

482

I.

irpoTdawv ivavrios

CI.iL-iT.

ijv

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xv

It should be observed that while we may assume

the opposite propositions in the way described above,
as we said that all science is good, and again that no
science is good, or that some science is not good (in
this case the contradiction is not usually overlooked),
it is also possible to establish one of the propositions
by means of further questions, or to assume it as we
have described in the Topics.'*
Since there are three forms of opposition to an Possible
affirmative statement, it follows that there are six tions'of'
ways of assuming opposite propositions. The pre- opposite
p'"""^*^*
dicate can be said to apply to all and to none, or to
and each of
all and not to all, or to some and to none
these pairs can be converted in respect of its terms :
e.g., it can be said that A applies to all B but to no C,
or to all C but to no B, or to all of the former but not
to all of the latter ; and this again can be converted in
respect of its terms. Similarly too in the third figure.
Thus it is evident in how many ways and in which
figures a syllogism can be effected by means of opposite
premisses.
It is evident also that whereas we can draw a true Opposite
inference from false premisses, as we have explained Snnoryieid
above,* we cannot do so from opposite premisses
for te
^
the resulting conclusion is always contrary to the fact
e.g., if a thing is good, the inference is that it is not
good, or if it is an animal, that it is not an animal.
This is because the syllogism proceeds from contradictory premisses, and the terms laid down are either
the same or related as whole and part. It is clear
also that in fallacious reasoning there is no reason
why the result should not be the contradiction of the
e.g., if the subject is odd, that
original hypothesis
For we have seen that the conclusion
it is not odd.
;

4SS

ARISTOTLE
4

fe

avXXoYtofiot' Jaw odv ^afiff rtHanirat, ioroi rrj^

V7roB4aws dyrl^aati.
Act b^ icaravoiv art ovrw fUv odK iorw hmnta
avfJLnpdva06ai 4( hf6f avXXctytofiav, war* cImu t6

fo

avfintpaofxa t6 firi cv ayaBiv dyaSov ij aXXo

Toiovrov, iav firj v0v9 ^ npdraan rouLvrr) Xr)^$^
otov ndv l^o}ov Xvc6v Uku Ktu fit} Xvk6v, riw oT
dvBpwnov ^utov oAA' ^ npoaXaPtiv btl T17F dyrL^aaw
(otov art iTooa inumyiri vncXtflni^ clra Xafiiv Sn
ri tarpucfj inurrrifir) fUv iortv ovScfi/a 5* ^noX'tfilftfg
waiTp ol XYxoi ytyvoyrat), v in hvo avXXoyuriilii^
war B* ttvoi ivayria Kor aXtfitiov rd tXrffif/Jva
ovK (rri 6XXo rp&nov rj toOtov, tcoBdntp ipnfru
irp6rpov

XVI. To

to

6*

dpxd alri0$9$ ral Xa^Lfidv^m

iw y/rti XafiiXv, iw rt^ fi^ dno^ucvwoi
TO npoKUL(vov, toOto hi hruTVfifiautti iroXXax^'

ion

fidv, tiff

yap

tcai

ct

oAok

firi

ouAAay^ntu,

fro! c^ 8i*

dyvw-

arorripwv ^ dfioiutf dyvtMrrutv, t<al l 8id rcDi>

vartputv rd npdrtpov ij ydp dndStifif iK wurro^
rpwv rt KoX npor4outv iariv. rovrwv fut^ oHv
oih^v iari rd curcuTacu rd ii dpxft^' <*^* ^^^
fuv Si* avTwv vi^Kt yvutpHtaVai rd 5^ Si' dXXut

<u fiv

yap apxai

St* dXXutv),
*

vwoXifilns

OTOV

di

fATf

B^n\ Waits
*

|ii)

ra o vno rat ^X^S

avrou yvuMrrdv Sc* avrov

avrutv,

rd* Si*

imi\^^

ro] r^

|fti^

$cmi

o^

iw6^^f^u ttolfo.

nf, oorr. cu.

can produce an (affiitnatire)

This has been shovn to be
fi^re (63 b S3) and in the third (6i a 90), while the Moood
figure cuiDot give an affinnatire

* L*.
elusion.

4M

:
;

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xv-xvi

II.

resulting from opposite premisses is contrary to fact

therefore if we assume premisses of this kind, we shall
obtain a contradiction of the original hypothesis.
It should be observed that it is not possible to infer a contracontrary conclusions from a single syllogism so that cannot be
the conclusion states that that which is not good is f"oJJ^two
good, or any other similar contradiction (unless the premisses
contradictory form goes back to the original premisses, inherent in

every animal is white and not white and then

we must either assume the
is an animal ')
contradictory statement as well, e.g., assume that all
science is belief, and then that medicine is a science,
but that no medicine is belief (as in the process of
or we must draw our conclusions from
refutation)
two syllogisms. There is no other way, as we have
said above, in which the assumptions can be truly
e.g.,
'

'

man

one of them.

contrary."

assuming the point at issue conits widest sense) in

take the expression
failing to demonstrate the required proposition. But
there are several other ways in which this may happen
for example, if the argument has not taken syllogistic
form at all, or if the premisses are less well known or
no better known than the point to be proved, or if the
prior is proved by the posterior ; for demonstration
proceeds from premisses which are surer and prior.
None of these procedures is begging the point at

XVI.

sists (to

Beffffinff or

issue.

Now some things are naturally knowable through

themselves, and others through something else (for
principles are knowable through themselves, while
the examples which fall under the principles are
and when any
knowable through something else)
one tries to prove by means of itself that which is not
;

485

Petuio

ARISTOTLE
inmipjj hucvwai, r&r* alrttrai r6 4( ipXV'
rovTO o MOTi fUv ovrw iroiccv coot* tiSt^ ifuaaoA
TO 7rpoKifiPov, MfytToi St tcol /UTafidirraf hr*
40 oAAa irra rwv nt^wcortuv Si* itctlvoo ttucwoBfu
I Smx roimuv anohtucvwax ni ^f iLpxfl^t **^*' ' ''^ A
ScixvuoiTo 5(a Tou B TO S^ B Sia rov F^ r^ 5^ F
nt^vKos tirj htucwoBiu tta rov A* ovfifiaSt^ti yip
avTo Bi avToO to A Sfiicvvwu tov; ovrw ovXXoyi*
{ofifMovf.
09r^ troioCatv ol Tap iro^nAAiJAov; o2j
ypd^iv XavOiivouai yap avrol feuroAf
ftcvoi
TOioimi Xofifidafoirrts ovy o*^
^hro&ctfoi fii^
TI9

ovocuv Tcov vapoAAi^AcM^* <Sor ovfifiautti tocp oimu

ouAAoyt^ofi^KMS^ 9(00709 thok My%w^ Ci terror
#fOOToi'54 Jirav coroi 3t* a^roO yi%tfOT<Jr*
omtp obvvarov.
vno^^^f t rip Vi
Ei o^
aSifAov oktck oti ri
opolan 54 irol on r^ B, oitocto t^ B indpYtiv r6
A, oirircu BrjXo ci to A' <ipYg a^T4Teu, dXX^ on odK
anoStiKvum 5^Aoy* o^ yap apx4 awoSfifccoy to
oyuoUit^ ahvfXov.
ci fi^vroi ro o tr/>o( to F otmo;

omu

lA

oKTrc Tairroi' ctrai, ^ S^Aoi' ort aynorp^^ovaWf^

vndpvti Bartpov dartpot, t6 iv apYQ OiTtiTOW
^kcikuv
icGu yap av on np B to A tmdpxti.
Scucvuoiy Ci dyrurrpt^oi' vw 34 Toi>ro KcoAufi, oAA*
ov;^ o Tpanos' ci 54 ToOro iroOi, to tpr)ptvo a0
rroiol KoX avTurrpt^oi 5ia* Tpujjv.
oHjavrw^ 54 ray

^(
rj

&

>

SU] ik

8.^ C*.

* #.^., that the hitrrior opposKe anglet are equal,

parallrlisni of
linea.
Se. than the point to be
"'*
^. a premiss ; ^. 53 a S.
' Se. as gtmis to
Assuming that
and are not eoorcroble.

Um

drpcnds upon the

486

which

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
knowable by means of

itself,

II.

then he

xvi
is

begging the

point at issue. This may be done by directly postulating the proposition which is to be proved ; but we
may also have recourse to some other propositions of
a sort which are of their very nature proved by means
of our proposition, and prove the point at issue by
is proved by
means of them e.g., supposing that
B and B by C, and it is the nature of C to be proved
by A ; for if anyone argues in this way it follows that
he is proving
by means of itself. This is exactly
what those persons do who think that they are drawing parallel lines ; for they do not realize that they
are making assumptions " which cannot be proved
unless the parallel lines exist. Thus it follows that
those who argue in this way are saying that any
given thing is so, if it is so. But on this principle
everything will be self-evident ; which is impossible.
applies to C, and Petitio
Thus if it is uncertain whether
equally uncertain whether it applies to B, supposing wTeTfi)
applies to B, it is not yet ^^^ '^^J'
that anyone claims that
clear whether he is begging the point at issue, but
for that
it is clear that he is not demonstrating it
which is no less uncertain ^ is not the starting-point
If, however, the relation of B to
of demonstration.
C is such that they are identical, or that they are
clearly convertible, or that one applies to the other,**
for he could
then he is begging the point at issue
also prove by these premisses, if he were to convert
As it is, the conditions *
applies to B.
them, that
method
of argument does
although
the
this,
prevent

'^

But if he were to do this, he would be doing

not.
what we have described,^ and proving reciprocally
by three propositions. So too supposing that he
/

65 a

1-4.

487

ARISTOTLE
TO B ixp r Xapfiavoi imfx*^$ ^ioluf ShiXow
OM Kol c/ r6 A, ovmo r6 ^( ^fiX^ o/rrcrcu, oAA*
o^K andtlKViHTw. iav 5^ ru^riv f r6 A Koi B

to ci

fj

Tw dvTurrp^^w

rj

rtv

dpxrjs OiTCiTOi Bia rriv

na$fu

oMiv

apxfji ri hvvarai ctpi/Tcu

t&

ScurvuMcu TO

Kl

o^

fitf

hi

avTov

T<Ji

to A, ri ^f
to yap i(
to di* o^roO

curituf'

tf^Liy,

on

hfjXcnf,

^arl t6 A' dpxfj airtioBtu r6 Si' a^roO

5* ^orl t6
firi Si* aiVrov SitAoi", toOto

Scurvtntu t6

Btucvwai orov <^iOia>9 oSr^Aofv oktoiv toC Sci5i* oS htiKwrai rj rift ravrd rtjt avTift
9orj r<ft TttiVr^ TOi^ auroif vwapx^w, iw fuy Yy fUoift
ox^/mTi tccd Tpirtp dfi/^<n^pa>f Sy M/yorro r^ iw
/ii7

KWfUvov Koi

dpxS airtToBat, iv &

Tc Toi

t5

rplrtft

koI

t<j>

miTT^yopiiru) aiAAoyuiyi4>

vpom^' orav

5* ^wo^Turo^f',

orav TO ai)ra ano tou aim>v, koI o^x 6iu>lw^

dfx/^6Tpai <u npordatii (cooovrcuf hi tcai iv r^
fUaw), hid TO fiii dyrurrpi^w rw^ opovt Kara roi^
dnoif>aTuco^ av^oyuffio6s
*E)oTi 5^ TO
^fXO *^t<y^

^ M^ TCU5

5f tifcoi Ta #caT* cUij^ciov oimof ^^ofra, /v 5^

a^'*

roU

hiaXKrucols rd Kord Sofov.

XVII. To h
^u5oS-,
*

firi

O TToAAoiCir

irapd
TOiC*

rovTo avfifiaum rd
Ao/Oif tUp&OfLtV Xiyt,

64bS!-*4.
the minor or in the major promlM.
Because Uie aeoood figure does not pcmiil afimiatlfv

* t.. rither in
*

syllogisms.
' Sc, * or the

same predicate is denied of kSentkal subjects.*

The terms of a ncfrative premin are not oonvertible, and
so tlie convertible terms must be those of tbe affirmativ*
488
'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xvi-xvii

should assume that B applies to C, although this is (2) the

no less uncertain than whether A does he is not yet premiss
begging the point at issue, but he is not demonstrating Sfnown^^*^'
If, however, A and B are identical, either because than the
it.
c'^<5i"s^^they are convertible or because A is a consequent of
B, he is begging the point at issue, for the same reason
as before for we have explained above ^ that to beg
the point at issue consists in proving by means of
itself that which is not self-evident.
If, then, to beg the point at issue is to prove by Howpctitto
means of itself that which is not self-evident i.e., fScurs'in
failure to prove, when the proposition to be proved g^^ri^"^^
and that by which it is proved are equally uncertain,
either because identical predicates apply to the same
subject or because the same predicate apphes to
then in the middle and third
identical subjects
figures the point at issue can be begged in either
way ^ in affirmative syllogisms, however, it occurs
only in the third and first figures.*' But when the
syllogism is negative we have petitio principii when
identical predicates are denied of the same subject,^
and it does not occur in both premisses indifferently
(and the same holds good of the middle figure), since
the terms are not convertible in negative syllogisms.*
In demonstrations the point which is begged rein diapresents the true relation of the terms
lectical arguments it represents the relation which is
commonly accepted.
XVII. The objection this is not the cause of the 'False
fallacy,' which we are accustomed to use frequently objewtion*"
;

therefore the petitio principii must be in the negaThis whole section is involved and inaccurate.
In point of fact petitio principii can occur (1) in Barbara
(major and minor) and Celarent (major) ; (2) in Camestres
(minor) ; (3) in Darapti and Felapton (major).

premiss

tive premiss.

489

ARISTOTLE
Ma
40

irpunov fidv iartv iv tocc

^ t^

a&tfi"aTor

ouA-

icwTo rfj Ci9 r6 ahvvaro, otht yap fu)

n^i^oat
ipti TO od napa roOro, oAA* &n ^rM6f
irt0fi
rwv itporrtoovt oSr /r rg Scurrvot^* od

y^

"En
ft

10

5'

^rav dinup$n

n Scurrurtu^

twi'

ABP,

ovvapA

t6 Ki^uv9 ytyitnfnu
6 avXXoyiafi6f. t6 yap fi^ rrap^ roOro Wywo^iu
T6rt A/yo/xcv oroy aimpB4vroi ro<uT9U uofoh^ ^[mm
ntpcuyrfToi 6 avXXoytafi6t, &np odtc wrtp hf mif
htiKTucoli' avoAptBtUrq^ yap rift Bimtits iM* 6
npoi TavTfiv coTOi ovXXoyurfAOf, ^avtpi^ O&r &r%
cV TOif ci( TO ahvaro Xiymu t6 /gif a^ roOro,
Kou oTott oihun fyn npo to odiWror 4 if ^^IK'k
vnoBtats wart koI o&njt koI ^i^ otfa^ rwirift
ovSty i^rror avpLfiaJb^w t& <i5Wror.
'O fco' o^ ^wpctfTttTor tpoirof /crW to0 ^^ ira^
r^v Btaiv ttvai t6 ^^08or amy
r6^ vnoff^atuK
(UTvvatrro; ^ aird
fUata^ npi^ to ^iWtot ^
ovAAoytofu^, oir</> tiprfrai xal iv TovuroTf
to yap
TO avacTtov <of amov nBtvcu rotho iarw, olo %l
ovc coTtv tinttv Off

dM

n^

PovX6fivo^ Sci{<u

on

aavfipuiTpos

hidpLtrpo^ iwi'

Tov ZfjtttfKX Aoyor htucvwai, dn ovk tan

KivlaBai, Koi tU toOto curayoi to ci^iWtoi'* ov&aio/ua9 yap ov^ofLij awt^i^ ^^'^
i/kv^os tj
Xipolri

EL

167 b 91 ff.
iUesitimate to try to refate a hypotJiiiii bf
reduction when tjfie impotdbte oonriiwhwi doot aot dcpead
upoD that h^-pothmia.
C/. PAyric, VI. fau
b 10

Soph,

!.#.

it

is

490

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xvii

is met with primarily in syllogisms raised

involving reduction ad impossibile
it is there used to
^^ff'pgj.
contradict the proposition which was being proved by impossibUe.
reduction ad impossibile. For unless our opponent
comtradicts this he will not say this is not the cause
of the fallacy ; he will protest that there was a
false assumption in the earlier stages of the argument. Nor will he use the objection in an ostensive it is not
proof, since in this one does not posit something ostenswe"^*
proofs.
which contradicts the conclusion.
Further, when something is refuted ostensively by
means of the terms A, B and C, it cannot be maintained that the syllogism does not depend upon the
assumption ; because we only say that something is
not the cause when even if it is refuted the syllogism
This is not possible in
is concluded none the less.
ostensive syllogisms ; for when the hypothesis is
refuted the syllogism which is related to it will no
longer hold good. Thus it is evident that the objection this is not the cause is used in reduction ad
impossibile when the original hypothesis is so related
to the impossible conclusion that the latter results
whether the hypothesis is valid or not.
The most obvious form in which the hypothesis is The
not the cause of the fallacy is when the syllogism co^ugjjjn
proceeds from the middle terms to the impossible may be
conclusion independently of the hypothesis, as we connected'^
with the
have described in the Topics.^ This is to posit as a hypothesLs,
.!
i'
cause that which is no cause " ; as it someone wishing
to prove that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable were to try to prove Zeno's argument that
motion is impossible, and were to use reduction ad
impossibile to this end ; for there is no connexion in
any way at all between the fallacy and the original

in our arguments,

'

'

.1.1.1.

J.

^^

491

ARISTOTLE

Mk

oAAos' hk rpimof 0I miwi

f fUi^ thf
rfj ii apx^*
TO dhvvarov r^ vncBdati, /4^ /i^yrm ot* itcnlvf)v
roirro yap iyxutpu yi4adak itaX hn to
crvfifiaivoi.
(XKU Koi
r6 Ktirw XofiBipom 76 4fPWj(A , olbr
i TO A T^ B nf ciTOi inofix^ rd
B T^ r TO
r TOi A, ToOro 8^ tifj ^Odof , rd B t^ A vir<^

15

X^w

<i

yap d^ip$^yro^ roC

/ii^^^

^rrw

ihrd(-

YOi to B rep r Koi TO r T^ A OVK Ol^ COl Tl^ ^M'Sov

Oia r^v ^f opX^ i^(^aiy. rj wiiXiP cT tic /vi tu
<mu Aofi/SflutH T^ awfx^^ ^'^ *^ r^ jikv
t^ B
T(p &<
TO E urai T(^ TO Z, ^^iioof A* cii} to

to

WMr ^

vudpxi rut A r6Z' ttai yap ovrmt

^(rfvr
TO oSvKiTor ^iNa4pc^49i^ r^r 4f ^ ^irt g 4*0-

cti;

*AAA^ Set Yrpo9 Twk /{ ^^3f4^ Ip^m ^t rim i%w t^

aStWTOi^* omtf yap /otoa S^ ti)r ^ftMtow^ ofbr
t& /ri fi^ TO irclTtii Xa^ifidpom t6 avn(it trpif ri
KarrjYopovfitvo rw 6pot- tl yda d
rop ri A
Toi A vndpxtiVt d^ipfBivm^ roC A od^c/n iartu to
rrrl S^ r6 arui, ira^ oiJ icarnyopctTm* i
ilfvSo9.
ydp Tw B fi^ iyxatptl r6 Z vvopg^civ, a/^aipiBivro^
rod B ovKiri cbnu to o^vitiTor. 6ftouis Si irai
40 (rrepi/rucciiv tcui' auAAoyunMtfr ^rroir.

Oavcpov oi%r oTi ToO aiwdrov ^tf wp6f rodf i(

apxrj^ 6pov9 oKTo^ od wapd rnv $4ai avftfiajpti to
rj ovS* ovTw^ aci Sea rnp imddtaw anu
ilttvSos.
TO t/ivB<}S' Koi yap ci /xi^ rqi B oAAa np
M0fi to
vndpxiv, r6 Si K rw r tad roOro r^ A, icei

OVTW fl4vl TO qSiWto^'* OflOtOtf bi Kol

t6 OPM

Mm

t^ working towmrds

or

term.
* UM. that

49t

away fhm tbe ~ mmI wibccnl

applies to D.

Se. In

Uk

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xvii

We

have another form when the impos- or (2)

connected with the hypothesis, but ^thlt!^
does not follow because of it. This may occur whether
"^*
J"*^
one regards the connexion in the upward or in the upSnit
downward direction,^ e.g., if A is assumed to apply
to B and B to C and C to D, and it is false that B
for if when A is ehminated B none the
applies to D
less appUes to C and C to D, then the fallacy cannot
be due to the original hypothesis. Or again, if one
regards the connexion in the upward direction, e.g., if
A appHes to B and E to A and F to E, and it is false
assertion.

sible conclusion is

that F applies to
for in this case too the impossible
conclusion will follow none the less if the original
hypothesis is eliminated.
The impossible conclusion must be connected with
the original terms, for then it will be due to the hypothesis.
E.g., if we are regarding the connexion in
the downward direction, the impossible conclusion
must be connected to the term which is the predicate.*
For if it is impossible that
should apply
to D, when
is ehminated the fallacy will no longer
exist.
In the upward direction the connexion should
be to the term of which the other is predicated.*
For if F cannot apply to B, when B is eliminated the
fallacy will no longer exist.
Similarly too if the
syllogisms are negative.
Thus it is evident that if the impossible conclusion
is not related to the original terms, the fallacy is not
due to the hypothesis. Indeed even when the conelusion is so related, the fallacy will not always be
due to the hypothesis ; for supposing that
had
been assumed to apply not to B but to K, and K to C
and C to
even so the impossible conclusion *
;
remains. Similarly too if one takes the terms in the
;

To avoid

tionof Fais<

Cause the

mu8t"^^

f^^jJe
original

P'"^^^^

Even so the
may^sometimes be
*

^'

ARISTOTLE
Xofipdvovn rove opovi, coot*
10

cim

6rrof koI /i^

ttai

ovTo^ rovTou avfifialvti t6 aZwarpv, odtc Sy

TTOpa Tfiv dtaiv,

TO

fj

otrrof

firi

cfii

rovrov M^T^*'

to i/Hv^ot adx ovrm ^aiprriov war

^jrrov ytyvta^ai

oAAov ridfUvQV Qviipalvtw to oScWtov^ oAA* oroy

a/^aiptdfyroi ronrrou 5ia Ttuv Aoiir^ npor^atati^

ravTO rrtpaiyrjnu dSvvaTot^,

avfiPaiytiv

fiii(iiv <rrlv
lA c;(Ci

r^
1}

T^pas*

^(rrt

cf^u ^vSci(*

GV^XoyiayL6s

rwv tTTovw

itc

louti

hi

Kivii}v

Mpa

aA]|tfuiv

S^ Sia rutv

fMr o&r

1)

yap oCk

iral

AEZH,

iff

dfn^O'

^ if'Mfi

tovtwv

Std

n iartnk

napa rcvro 6 X&yos' t6 yc^

ntpaiPovToi' utart irap* itctivww

TO {WfintpaafLa koI to i/hvSos.

XIX. IIpo; 3c TO
rrjprjrdov,

ti^v

cV nXtt^nav, 6to Ti fihf

*lfvho^t 'foi

Tt (TVfifiaiyti

y^yrcTOi iropd t^

rwv 5vo wpordatiop ^

ovAAoyiOfi^.

^f

i *

rwv A6, TQura

Kol

A<(yof

yc^

fj

rovTwv (ivaym;

tq)v Si^,

/x^

iraTounAAoyi{oi?ai yap#">

orav dvV rwv <rvfinpaafidTwv pwT^

49^

oMp

wapaXXi^Xovf avfintimuf koI

^v%

i//vSos.

CK irAcu>>^>' 9rdf

15

^^ciTSof

ivroi rrj^ itcrof koI c4 t^ rplyutvim

XVIII. 'O hk

/c

nXttov^ opBcs Sucm'.

irpunov

to

toiM

nXuavwv vm)B40W

Sia

Srwro, ola

iirtl

5Sbll-5.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xvii-xix

upward direction ; so that since the impossible conclusion follows whether the original assumption holds
or not, it cannot follow from the hypothesis. Probably the fact that when the assumption is eliminated
the fallacy results none the less should be taken to
mean, not that the impossible conclusion follows
when some other assumption is made, but that when
the original assumption is eliminated the same impossible conclusion results through the remaining
premisses ; since presumably it is by no means incon- since the
gruous that the same fallacy should follow from ^r/fSlow^
several hypotheses, e.g., that the impossible conclu- from more
sion parallel lines meet should follow both on the hy^thSis.
hypothesis that the interior is greater than the ex*

'

and on the hypothesis that the sum of

the angles of a triangle is greater than two right

terior angle

angles.

XVIII. Falsity in an argument rests on the first Falsity in

statement which the argument contains. Every ^^g^^^enta.
syllogism is drawn from two or more premisses. Thus
if the false argument is drawn from two premisses,
one or both of these must be false for we have seen "
that a false conclusion cannot be drawn from true
premisses
but if it is drawn from more than two,
e.g., if C is proved by means of A and B and these by
means of D, E, F and G, one of these higher propositions must be false, and must be the cause of the
<falsity of the) argument
for A and B are inferred
by means of those propositions. Thus it is from some
one of them that the conclusion, i.e. the fallacy,

false

results.

XIX. If we are to avoid having a syllogism con- Counterstructed against us when our opponent, without dis- howto '
closing the conclusions, asks us to admit the grounds escape,
495

ARISTOTLE
rov X6yo, onti^

ov yiyvrrcu, fUao

ofiot

T7ipiv

roM^

S*

iarl

iv

nut

irpfO*

r^ wXtOfdtag

npos fmurror ovitmipmaiaM,

TO fUao, ^avtp6v itc ro$ c^S/mu ntHO ip
<u; 5< 5ci

Xy6fivov,
to

So$^ 61^

fiii

iKdarw

roGro S*

ScurKi/roc.

o^^Tj/iart

iJifiOf

od

Ai^crcu 5ia TO CiS^MU ndts vw^xOtP ritf XSyo.

Xp^i &* omp ^fuKirrtoBai wapayydXXofitv diro*
KpivofUvot^, a^Todt inixfipoOyraf Vipda$ai Xap

Bdvtiv.

afiara

8*

rovro
fitf

laroi npa>rov, ^ay r^ avAWpd^

npoavXXoryilutvroi dXX* tlXtni^Umnf

f,h%biaifft^rA

avaytcaUatv d&rfXa

ipurr^ dXX*

^ fidXuna

a^Moa.' olbr I^tw 5^Dr

Kara to0 Z* |Uba BFAE.
r6 A r^ B, iroi w^A^y /ai^ <i ni

QVfiTTtpaiytaBai r6

&i o^
40

fc

ipandif ti

To^ r, oAA' <i

rw

o^iryytf^

T6^rwE,

Kai ovTw TQ Aoiira.

kov

^4*

tcdwtira

lr6Br^r,

cw fUoov ytyrrfrai 6

avXXoyuifioi, cnro rov i4aav apx^iidai' fidXtara,

yap ay oimu Aav^oMtM

XX.
opctfi'

jccu

'Etrci S'

dwoKpt^ofuvov.

y/yvcTcu avAAoyc<7fu>r

nor*

odtc

KpuTWv (otov
^

tj

TTJt

iwi>

ix^yrwp tSt

^vtpow koa

nor* caroi

moM rwv fUv ydp

ivaXXaf rtBtfihfijav rutv awofih dno^Tucfj^ rrjt hi jcaro*

tirrcu

avYXU^povfidvcjv

iXeyxof*

iftm* B*C*t tA tJ<M oolfo.

C/.

496

r^

XOfuv v&rt koI

40 b

941 a M.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xix-xx

of his argument, we must be careful that we do not

grant him the same term twice over in the premisses ;
since we know that without a middle term there
cannot be a syllogism, and the middle term is that
which occurs more than once. In what way we
should watch for the middle term with reference to
each conclusion is evident from our knowledge of
what form the proof takes in each figure this will
not escape us, because we know how we are maintaining the argument.
This same procedure against which we have been and how to
warning students when they are on the defensive in them,
argument they should try to adopt unobtrusively
when they assume the offensive. This will be possible,
firstly, if they avoid drawing the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms and leave them obscure, after
making the necessary assumptions and secondly, if
the points asked to be conceded are not closely associated, but are as far as possible unconnected by middle
terms. E.g., let it be required to establish that A is
predicated of F, the middle terms being B, C,
and
E. Then we should ask whether A applies to B ;
and next, not whether B applies to C, but whether
applies to E, and then whether B applies to C
and
so on with the remaining terms.
If the syllogism is
effected by means of one middle term, we should
begin with the middle
for in this way the effect of
the concession will be least apparent.
XX. Since we comprehend when and with what Refutation.
combinations of terms a syllogism results, it is evident
also when refutation will or will not be possible.
Refutation may take place whether all the propositions are conceded or the answers alternate (i.e. one
being negative and one affirmative)
for we have
;

497

ARISTOTLE
^TiiriJ^) yx<^pti yiyvtaSai iktyxQW iff yip vvXXoyuffio^ teal ovrta k(u ^icu*m9 i)(6iF9WP li^ Spmi
10

WOT*

TO KtflVOP

tltj*

^VOPTtOI^

avayKrf yiyvtaBoi iXtyxov' 6

T^

y^

OVIAtftpdoiMartf

ikiyx^

im4

ahuvarov yiyvta^ai IXtyxw' o6 yap ^ avMirytafiit

ndvTWV rwv oputv <mfnfTucufP ovtwv, wot oJS*

yap tKr/ypi, ^tiy<r*; avXXoy%4ffA^

<i
avXXoytofiov S* owrof owe dvdyfcji gXtyx!^*

M^

l\yx^'
16

tvai,

uHjavrws
icpioiv <V

ccu

ci fiffSiv

oA^' o yap avros

rtdtixi

i<rrai

Kara

ri^v

r^

diopuTfi^ iXtfyxp**

ayXXoyiaiUfC.

irai

XXL

iMfifiaumi S' Mvrt, ico^oirvp Ir r| McNi

oputv anarwiuBa, irou mrra ri)r ^m6Jltf^

rwv

rrfv anarqv, otow tl M^yrrot rd

nXfiooi npwroii* vwdfiirtuf, irl <rd ftiv Xt}aMvai
Tiva Kol oUoBoA fmSm (hr6pxtt, r6 h^ tAitm,
taroi
r6 K rtp d koI r^ V KolBt aurd ^<iff)^,
rtL fUv B
Koi raOra travrc r^ A d>oa&TWf' 4I
Trai^i oSrrcu ivdpx^^ *<*^^ roGro r^ A, rJ# S^
TO
r T^ A firfStvl Kol rovTO ixjl A naurl, roC avrov
tcara rairroi' ifct /vMrnJ/ii^i' iccu ayvoioy, naXiy Ci
T19 dnarqdtl'q vtpX rd k rrjs avrns avaroixias,
oJov Ci TO
xmdpx^^ ^<^ B, toOto & toi F kox to
r Toj A, xmoXa^ipdvoi
irovTi t^ B ^dfX^iM
to
/cat TToAtv /xT/ScFc rat F* Ofia yo^ cZvcTOi tc mu o<$x
VTToAT^rrxu vndpxty. dp* oiV ou&cv oAAo o^ioi ix

yiyvaBai

y^

tft

t.. a syllofrism may hare both prrmitiei aAraMtiv* or

one affirmative and one neffatire.
*

498

41

6.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xx-xxi

seen that a syllogism results both mth the former and

with the latter arrangement of terms.** Hence if the
admitted proposition is contrary to the conclusion,
refutation must result, since refutation is a syllogism
which proves the contradictory conclusion. If, however, nothing is conceded, refutation is impossible
for we have seen ^ that when all the terms are negative there is no syllogism, and therefore no refutation
For refutation necessarily implies a sylloeither.
gism, but a syllogism does not necessarily imply
refutation.
So too if the answer posits no universal
relation ; for the same definition will apply to refuta;

'^

tion as to syllogism.**
XXI. Just as we are sometimes mistaken in setting How error
out the terms, so it sometimes happens that a mistake judgements.
occurs in our thought about them ; e.g., if the same
predicate may apply to more than one subject immediately, and someone, knowing one subject, forgets the other and thinks that the predicate applies
For example, let
be applicable to B Two
to none of it.

and C per se, and let B and C apply in the same way
Then if he thinks that A applies to all
to all D.
B and B to D, but that A applies to no C and C applies
to all D, he will have knowledge and ignorance of the
same thing in relation to the same thing. So again
supposing that someone should be mistaken about
terms in the same series,* e.g., if A applies to B,
B to C and C to D, and should suppose that A applies
he will at the
to all B but on the contrary to no C
same time know that it appUes and not think that it
does so. Does he then actually profess, as a result
;

41 b 6.
both premisses.
terms contained in the same genus and subordinate
one to another. Cf. Bonitz, Index Arist. 736 b 33.

i.e.

i.e.

**

499

examples
of contrary

"^

ARISTOTLB
rj
o iitUrrarai, rovro
A r^
iniararxu yap irat^ mi

rovTcjy

fti^

^woXapifidptw

Mi^pfjan Sa to6

B,

(o;

r^ KaBoXov TO rar^ M^P^

eVurraroi,

oAa/9

rotrro

a(iOi

/i^

ca^or*

^ cc

vncXa^ifiiittw

6np dhvvarov.
'E^rt 5c rou np6rpo XfxB{rro$, fi ft^ /ir r^
ovr^y <7v<rroi;(ui9 to fi4aot^, tcuff itt6mpo fUv rufw
fUauiv dfi^OT^paf ra^ trpor^wit odte iyxtaptl
vnoXajifiavtiy, olov t6 \ rtft fUv B warri r^
T
firjBvi, ravra 5* Oft^OTcpa wavrl r^ A.
ovfAfiawu

yap
t

anXufi

Tj

rj

iiti

n^To A

rd

B
S^

vnoXa^ifidvti

4vavrla Xn^tfinptaOai rif9

^apxtw rd

npcimfv -np&mow,

yap

vvd^^i, wwrrl
B T^ A oOc

A TO A olScr* war* tl iraAw J* ''^ I*

ouTQi TO A i^iro^civ, a> T^ B rtvx vntipxttf
rovTfft ovK ouTOi TO A vnopx^u^.
T^ hi wfuni
Oi6fivov ai TO B voAiv TU fifi oUc^OA ^ ri B ^
aYrAcu; ^ CTTi Ti ivamltw iarlp.
oTt Ta>

#fai

/xi^Sci'i

Ovrw fUv o^

oi%r

/i8/;(rr(u

vwoXafi^-

ttaff

Karpov h ri)v fuav ^ icaTd Bartpov JifL^or^paf

ov^v KotXikif otov TO A natrrl rt^t B icai to B t^
A, Kal ndXiv TO
fiff^vl rtft P.
0fu>ii yap 1}

TOuztPn^ ciTraTiy irol cu;

10

olov 4 Toi
iravTi,

TO

OTt TO

A
oJ

TTtti^i to*

TO

anarwfuBa ntpi ra

mivri to

wrapxtt t^

tmop^ci.

xnTQ.p\i navTi, dt&

oAA* ou5v KcoAiAci ayvoctf to

TO

fiv

600

cc

8uo op^ai TO

P on

8* c^* <^

W
o^

h^ lUp^

Tp

Ttf otScr

KoX &Tt rt^ P.

lUrrw, oto cl
TpcyBMMor to 5*

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxi

of this, that he does not think that which he knows ?

applies to C through B,
For he knows in a sense that
as the particular appUes to the universal ; so that he
professes not to think at all that which he in a sense
knows ; which is impossible.
With regard to the first case which we mentioned," itisimwhere the middle term does not belong to the same ^ how^
series, it is impossible to think both the premisses opinions
e.g., to really
with reference to each of the middle terms
applies to all B but to no C, and that contrary.
think that
for it follows that the
both the latter apply to all
first premiss is contrary, either wholly or in part, to
applies to
the other. For if anyone supposes that
all of that to which B applies, and knows that B applies
Hence if,
applies to D.
to D, he knows also that
applies to none of that to
again, he thinks that
applies to
which C appHes, he does not think that
some of that ^ to which B applies. But to think that
it applies to all of that to which B applies, and then
again to think that it does not apply to some of that
to which B applies, implies a contrariety, either
absolute or partial.
Thus it is not possible to think in this way ; but Error arises
there is no reason why one should not think one to^reiate^*^^
premiss with reference to each middle term, or both knowledge
e.g.., think that
particular
premisses with reference to one
applies
applies to all B and B to D, and again that
f^dS oTthe
to no C. Such a mistake is similar to that which we universal.
make with respect to particular things. E.g., if
will apply to all C.
applies to all B and B to all C,
Then if someone knows that apphes to all of that to
which B applies, he knows also that it applies to C.

But there
that

is

C exists

no reason why he should not be ignorant

:

e.g., if

A stands for

two right

angles,'

501

ARISTOTLE
15 it^*

alo&rfTov rpfyoitpov' hrokAfioi

y^

Ap

rif

TO r, ciSciiff ort trap Tpiyta99 ixn Mo

opBd^t woB* a^ia Ciiffrrai teal clyBWijcnrt ra&Hw. r6
yap c^SrKZi nav rplyiMtvov &ri Mo ^fBoXi oOv d9rAot?v <rriVt dXXa ro /i^ Tfp Ti^r KoBiXov <X'^
tnum^fiTjv TO 5 7171^ Ko^* KaaTX). ovTW iiv oCv
d>S TJ KoBokoV ot& TO T OTi Mo SpBoi, Off hi T^
KaB* KaaTOv ovk olScv, Jxrr* o^ i(n ras iwavrSai,
teal 6
*0fioiu}9
Tift Mivutyt Xoyog ori 1)
ovSofLov yap avifiaumi vpofiaSffais avdfLyrjoif.
tnurraoBai ro tcaB* tteaarov, oAA* a^ia rjj hnytayfi
ttvai

^r^

Aaft/3avciv T17K TUfK tara fit'po^ aturrrifiip^ uttrmtp

cna yap tvBvs ufi^tw, ola &n

opayvwplliovra^,
hvo opBal^, iav ciScofuv art rpryawor. 4M'0((#f

icai eiri

rwv

aXXufv.

Tfi fiiv oV ica$6Xov OtwpoOfitr r^ /r fUpi, rj

8* oucci^ ot)#f io/xcv, oxrr' M^xrrat Kal i na r aa Bai
rrX^jv ovk Ivavriw^, oAA*
^X***'
KadoXov dnaraaBai S< r^ rard lUpoi.

ntpl avrd,

M^

""^

o^ KoX hrl rwv rrpotifrrniivutv ov yap

Kara to fUaoy dndrrj rrj Kara rov avX^
XoyuTfiov iTum^^jj, 01^* 1} kou itcdrtpem rutit
'OyLoiois

ivavria

17

* 1^.

a given dniwiiup or other repccaeoUtioo of * trianfle.

kTM>wlrdfrp of trie partknUr nb)rct.
That is the unircnai rale may be lUJOffmkaed apart from
spi-cial knowledge of all the particular inttanora of tt. Ignorance of the latter is not imxNnpatible vtth knowledge of the
* i.4.
*

former.
' Plato, 3/eiio 81.
The point of the comparlaon il that
on the Platonk riew the study of partksdan reavakcBt our
latent knowledge of the unirersal.
*

Sc. of ini mediate apprehcn&kM).

'

66 b 20-30.

502

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
B

for

triangle

'

and C

for

II.

xxi

sensible

triangle,' ^

because a man might suppose that C does not exist,

although he knows that every triangle has the sum
of its angles equal to two right angles
so that he
will at once know and not know the same thing.
For
to know that every triangle has the sum of its angles
equal to two right angles has more than one meaning ;
it consists either in having universal or in having
particular knowledge.^ Thus by universal knowledge he knows that C is equal to two right angles,
but he does not know it by particular knowledge ;
and therefore his ignorance will not be contrary to
;

his knowledge.*'

Similarly too with the theory in the Meno ^ that The

learning is recollection. For in no case do we find doctrine of
that we have previous knowledge of the individual,
^rlg^^'
but we do find that in the process of induction we
acquire knowledge of particular things just as though
we could remember them for there are some things
which we know immediately e.g., if we know that
is a triangle we know that the sum of its angles is
equal to two right angles. Similarly too in all other
;

cases.*

Thus whereas we observe particular things by

universal knowledge, we do not know them by the
knowledge peculiar to them. Hence it is possible
to be mistaken about them, not because we have
contrary knowledge about them, but because, although we have universal knowledge of them, we
are mistaken in our particular knowledge.
Similarly too in the cases mentioned above. ^ The
mistake with regard to the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained by the syllogism, nor
are the suppositions with regard to the two middle

503

Error

may

the faUure
^'jf'^*'^^'
misses^ia


ARISTOTLE
97

ft

ovSef S^ teoMti tMra teal on

vndpxti koI n^Xat toCto rtp V,
xmapx^w ro k rt^ T, eXa fo ndaa

ficGCJV vnoXrftffi^.

TO

oXu) rat

85 olrjOrjvai

firf

aroKos koI avrrj -^lovof otfoAu tcvUf

ravrrjv' ov yap cVurrareu on t6 A r^ ^ fii| owrwart S'QApr
deojpcjv TO KoB* Karpo,
Kol Ci
TO fi(v otB^ TO Si fAti otB^v dna ni^^^ nu* Smgp
cxoiHTiv at Ka66Xov npo^ ra; urar^ I^P^ hmrr^fiat*
rjfiiovos

67 b

ouScv yd/>

Tcui'

aiaOrjrdfv i(at rrjf aluO i^tUft ytp^^

ov ^^aOrifUvoi 7V)fx^MMyMr c^ /i^

^adoAou Kol rtft X*^ ^^ olK^iav hi^arf^tfif,
oAA' oux w9 rw hftpytlv,
r6
Maratadai
A^ycrai rpixwf, rj atf rg Ka$6Xov rj Off r o^Wlf
irj d)9 rw lvpyiv, axrrt koX r6 i^varfo^i too*
fivov iafiv, ovS*
6US-

T(p

y^

avraxiJti^.

OuScv
rairro,
#fa^*

01%^

7rAi7>'

KO>\vl KoX CiS^MU KCU ^yttT ^jodtti ITCpi

imtp avfifimh^i r<u r^
l

ouc tvayriufi.

Kar4pav lS6n n^K np^raaw Nol

|i(

^<af/i-

npoTcpow vnoXimfiavatv yap ir^cr tiji' ij^ovov oi5*c ej(i TT^v #faTd to h^pytu^ hnan^ipf, iM*
av Std T17V imoXri^iiv tvavriav awdnjv r hrurr^jn'
ovAAoyta/idy yap ij rtxivr^ dirany rg KaB6Xov.
'0 3* vnoXoififidvufv TO d/a^ cImu ikok^' cfro*

/xcvo)
10

'

have seen, but

if we are not now aware of the

not exercising that knowledge.
* This apparently means that
if the crvDT hi
really contrary to the man's kBowledae, he
know not only that all mulca are sterilebot ak
are sterile, and his judgement that the particular w^tf
foal would depend syllogistfcally upon the latter nmiihl

504

"

w
oli!^ we
1

We mav have knowledge of puticuUr object vhkb

are

la

lo

PRIOR ANALYTICS,
terms contrary.

There

knows both that

II.

xxi

no reason why a

is

man who
B and

conjunc-

applies to the whole of

applies to C should not think that

A does
again that B
not apply to C
e.g., if he knows that every mule is
sterile, and that X is a mule, he may think that
is in foal
because he does not comprehend that A
applies to C, unless he considers both premisses in
conjunction. Hence it is clear that he will also be
mistaken if he knows the one but not the other and
this is just the relation of universal to particular
knowledge. For we do not know any object of sense
when it occurs outside our sensation not even if
we have actually perceived it except by universal
knowledge together with the possession, but not the
actuality," of the knowledge proper to that object.
For there are three ways in which we can be said to
know an object by universal knowledge ; by the
and in actuality.
knowledge proper to the object
:

Hence we can be

said to

many

be mistaken in as

different ways.

Thus there is no reason why one should not both

know and be mistaken about the same thing only
;

The

error

Jfontm^

not in a contrary sense. Indeed this is just what to our

happens in the case of the man who only knows the ^^
premisses in disjunction and has not previously considered the question
for in supposing that the mule
is in foal he does not possess actual knowledge, yet
at the same time this supposition does not make his
mistake contrary to his knowledge
for the mistake
contrary to knowledge of the universal is a syllogism.*
On the other hand he who thinks that the essence Real conof good is the essence of bad will think that the same {^"q^J^^'

reality,

however, his error depends not upon syllogism but

upon faulty perception.

505

ARISTOTLE
67 b

TO avro xmoXrf(inu ayoBut &u ical KWt^, IotM

yap TO fiv dya$a ^ttm 4^* a6 \,r^hi ttntt^ thm

ot B, TToAiv hk TO ^yaBifi elm ^* o6 T. /v2

Tairroi/ unoXap.payi to B irol r^ P, ffoi <2m
TO r TO B tmoAij^cTOi, KOI itoXu^ T^ B tt& A cfmt
waavTws, anrrc KOi rd F ro A . momtp yap l i(r

16 <l>*

ouv

oAt^^c; ko^* oJ td
to #cai

^oTo ToO r T^

r^ B irai raT o6
A aMf$h
o^rc*

t}*^*

tid

tml

v4 A,
t0

^ioi<i>r
Kol
mroAoftjScii'ctv.
to0 flmt* rairciB
yap om-os roO V Kal B, Koi w^Xut to B koI A ii2
TO r Toj A ravTov ^' wart teal ^vl ro^ Sof^iV
dp* oiv toOto fUr aa^yHoio^, mI rm
ofjLouoS'
TO npwTov; oAA* ukok
^<!toc, T^

^uo

ts

Pdviv riva

koxw tUm ri Ayn$i^ &i,

80

W |t^

irttTA

yip ^yx^^p^ Tofl^ ihroXap,pdyiv.

lnia9(irr4o hk toCtq ^Afior.
XXII. 'Otov 5* avTurrpd^^ ra Itrpo, ^prf ygn icol
TO /icooK avrurrpi^u^ wpot dfi^^. <^ ydp ri A
Kara rod V 6ta rov B On^px^i, #/ itntarpd^t !
vndpxi, at ro A, irayri r6 V, tetd t6 B r^ K
dvrurrp^ifKi, Kal vrrdpxi, ^ t6 A, mrri r6 B
fiGov rov r, Kal ro V r^ B dynarp^t U, fUoau
rod A. Kai cVi tov /117 vndpx^iy utowhmt, ctm^ i
(WfiPPrjK6s'

rroXXaxuff

B Toi r vndpxti rw hi B ro A inii im4piX!^i, cM

A ru> T ovx imdp(ti. i ^ r6 B T^ A ^mKal rd T rw A dprxorpi^t. iarw yip t6
arp<fKL,
36
TO

ro

There

The

'

i..

506

is

do obrkwa rtktrute citiKr Imic r fai L ft.

is not diMhArgrd in the lofkaal vorka. bl

ohiifration

have the same extcnsioo and mtm

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxi-xxii

the essence of good and the essence of bad. m8t rest

stand for essence of good,' B for essence of m^^pprebad,' and C again for essence of good.' Then since tension
he thinks B and C to be identical, he will also think practically
that C is B, and again in the same way that B is A, ^^credibie.
and therefore also that C is A (for just as we saw" that
if B is true of C and A of B, A is also true of C, so it
Similarly too in respect of
is in respect of thinking.
being for we have seen that if C and B are identical
and again B and A are identical, C is also identical
with A. Therefore the same holds in the case of
Is this then a necessary consequence, if
opinion).
one grants the original assumption ? But presumably
it is false that anyone should think that the essence
of good is the essence of bad, except accidentally ;
for there are several senses in which this may be
But we must consider this question in
thought.
greater detail.^
XXII. When the extreme terms are convertible,*' Conversion
the middle term must also be convertible with both (i) Affirmaof them. For supposing that A applies as predicate *!^ ^y^^o*"^*
to C through B, if this relation is convertible and C
applies to all of that to which A applies, then B is
also convertible with A, and applies through C as
middle term to all of that to which A applies
and
C is convertible with B through A as middle term.**
e.g., if B (2) Negative
So too when the conclusion is negative
^^ 8isms.
applies to C but A does not apply to B, neither will
A apply to C. Then if B is convertible with A, C will
For let B not be applialso be convertible with A.

thing

Let

is

'

**

The

syllogisms are as follows

(6)

BaA
CaB

(c)

CaA

(a)

(c')

CaB
AaC

(a)

AaC
BaA

(a')

AaB

(6')

BaC

(6)

(c')

507

ARISTOTLB
87 k

vrrdpxov rtfi A* ou$* dpa ri F* vrt yi^

TO B imr\pxv. tcaX c^ rep B Tti P hnurrpi^t,
^tnutrof to B.
KQx rw A} airrtarpt^i' Koff oS
^imarp^^, kJl
Kal TO r. /coi f i T^ r npof r6
TO B" avTurrp^i \ifpoi ri A].* f yip r^ B Ti
r, a 8c TO A TO
ovx undpx^i. fOi u^0 roCr^.
drro rov avfiTrtpdafiarof apxtrai, ra o ^IXXbl oC^
t
ofioiut^ Kol cVi Tov KarnYopucoO au^XoyiofioO,
rioAiv ci TO A Kol TO U avrunpi^wL tnx to F icol
TO A ut<ravrus, amurri h* oMCyiny nd
^ ti^ F
ovtok liftc iZam irarfi
vndpxiv, icflu r^ B ca4
Odrtpoy imdpx^w. inti yap ^ to
t\^ B i
TO r TO A, myri
r^
17 to F mi
4iat
4>avp6v oTi rcU t^ B ^ Tii A voarri nol oAr 4|aft*
otoi' / T^ dy/vTTov o^^bpror moI rd ikfmmafm^
dyevTfTw, avdytcri to yo^^fMi^or ^^op
irol t4
<f>6apTov ytyot^vai' hvo yap avXXeyuntcl o^tcnrrat*
irdXiv ci won^ fi^ t^ A ^ rd B iroJ ri F ^ Tid A,
o/ia 8^ firj vrrdpvu, i dvrurroi^i r^
Jfol to F,
Kac TO B kqX to a dyrurrpi^i. u yap
/lA
vndpxi TO B <p rd A 5^Aoi^ on r^
ihrapx<i* <(
firf

y^
A

ft

10

o^

t^

nA

t A)

>

T^

ayrurriH^,
Jcnkin^oo.
*

* ri
A, ri
AB'Cnnif.

A>B*cut r^
ira

T B)

f4

PadBs.

iwrwrp^m <mi

fit

AB. PhUopomttT PMlMt t4

.

AeC may be proved hj a tjUofinn

*
cf.

B>,

m^

t4

r.

f
*

bi

CuDeatrcs, bat

the followinfr note.

seems better to keep the us. mdinf r^ A

A TO B on the authority of PaciM. Hit
requires a proof that no A is B ; and whercaa Ua
is ^nerally condemned as too oooiplioatod,
tej
* It

accept TV

508

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xxii

A ; then neither will C be applicable, for B

was assumed to apply to all C.** Moreover, if C is
for
convertible with B, it is also convertible with A
where B is predicated of all, so too is C.''' Again, if
C is convertible in relation to A, so too is B for C
apphes to that to which B applies, but does not apply
to that to which A applies. This is the only example
which starts from the conclusion the others differ in
this respect from the affirmative syllogism.
Again, if A and B are convertible, and likewise Conversion
C and D, and either A or C must apply to everything, exhaustive
B and D must also be so related that one or the other aitemaFor since B applies to that to
applies to everything.
which A applies, and D to that to which C applies,
and either A or C but not both at once must apply to
everything it is evident that either B or D, but not
both at once, must apply to everything. E.g., if the
ungenerated is imperishable and the imperishable ungenerated, that which has been generated must be
perishable, and that which is perishable must have
been generated ; for we have here the product of two
Again, if either A or B (but not both at
syllogisms.*'
cable to

once) applies to everything, and likewise either C or

and C are convertible, so are B and D. For
D, if
applies,
if B does not apply to something to which

Celarent oifered by modern

Hence although the proof which
is A.
verse, viz. that no
is C, is unattainable by
the MS. reading implies, that no
disposed to agree with Waitz and Maier
syllogism, I
that Aristotle bases his argument simply upon the interchangeability of the convertible terms B and C. So in the
expositors only proves the con-

am

next example also.

* Since this example illustrates the case which follows and
not that which precedes it, either the text or Aristotle's thought
appears to be in disorder. Hence it is hard to say what the
*
two syllogisms ' are ; but cf. the next note.

509

'

ARISTOTLE
lb

b TO

y^' wart

A, Kol t6 V' Arrurrpd^i

Koi A.

TOVTO

8*

i^

t4

dhvvaro,

"Orav 5^ TO A oXtft T(Ji B iroi ry r ^ir^XS ''^

'^
/iT^Scvof oAAov #car7yof7raA, inrdfiXD
^

Tnurri

r<f

yap Kara
to

A rai B arrtorpi^w hnk

BP Xiyrrai r6 A, teartfyO'

V, avdytcrf ro
fxovtuv

pirai Si TO

rw

ncoi ai>n^

a^roO

irai

ro^ F, ^ampiif
m4 fwif vAi)r

A rcu r^ B Xtx^^troA

ort #ca^* a>K nd

aim>v TOW A.
JloAiy oTov ro A iroi ro B
r^ V ^im^y^,
dyriarpt^ 5^ t^ F rc^ B, opdytnif r6 A aa^
ra> B vndpxtw i^^l yap iroKri ro* V t6 A, r^
F TOi B 8a rd ayrtarpi^ut, irai r^ A vorrt r^
B vndp(n.
'Orav hi Svouf oyroiy r^
roO B tuprrwrtpoif
f, ovrwy dyT%KipAviM9, tctu ri A ro6 F jto^rfrwi,
i alprwrpa rd AF nur BA, r^ A r^ A a^ptrBJ

S^

15

r^pov.
ao

6fioCua9

dvriKtiVTOi) ,

ci

B r^ F

Koi ro

o/Aotcu9 4>VKr6v

AF

roi;

BA.

^cuirroy* ^jrartpov

huvKTw- oKTrc

tirci

BA

5< /idAXov,

iTol

o^

yv^ ^Kcrr^^
rd il^A^c* nk

ot^

Tf 4M^^<if

t6 A roO
^rror ^tmcrdv' rd
ydp cAarroi' rw IXdrrovt dvr^crrtu. aiprurrtpO
hk TO /it{ov dyo^dt' kcu tXarro^ murdr ^ r^ Aarror

Kat ydp dv rd

A
t5

A irol ^UKr^ t6 B
t6 F ro^ A {tcai yip ruSha
odv ro A rip A o^uhws aiprrdf^,

yap ftuuirr^ r6

(avrixcificva yap), icoi

ofioito^ 'fjoar.

aipranpov, koI rd

dya^di'

row

AF* vw

8*

rd drrop dpa rd BA
oiW corty. rd A dpo

#c<u /i({ov froucov icol

alpTorrpov rov

510

tl

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II. xxii

applies to it ; and if
applies, so does C,
since they are convertible.
Therefore C and
both
apply at once ; but this is impossible.**
When applies to the whole of B and of C, and is other

clearly

B also appUes to all C,

and B must be convertible. For since A is stated
only of B and C, and B is predicated both of itself
and of C, it is evident that B will also be stated of
all subjects of which A is stated, except A itself.
Again, when A and B apply to the whole of C, and
C is convertible with B, A must apply to all B. For
since A applies to all C, and C by conversion to B,

predicated of nothing else, and

will also

apply to

all

^nv^ersion

B.

and B, A is Preferof two opposite alternatives

preferable to B, and similarly
is preferable to C, eSfna.^
if
and C together are preferable to B and
to- tions of
For A is as much to aitemagether,
is preferable to D.
be pursued as B is to be avoided, since they are **^^^*
opposites ; and similarly with C and D, since they
Then if is as much to be chosen
also are opposites.

When,

to be avoided as C ; since each is

equally with each to be pursued or avoided respect-

as

D,

is

as

much

AC

Therefore the combination

is equally
desirable with the combination BD.
But since
is
preferable, it cannot be equally desirable, for if so,
would be equally desirable. And if
is preferable to A, B will also be less to be avoided than C ;
and
for the lesser is opposed to the lesser extreme
the greater good and lesser evil will be preferable to
ively.

AC

BD

the lesser good and greater evil. Therefore the

combination BD vdll be preferable to AC. But in
" Sc. ' and therefore B applies to all D.
Similarly
Therefore B and
applies to all B.
are convertible.'

511

ARISTOTLE

if

68 a

alpranpov too A,

kqjL

F ipm

t6

toi9

^rrof

<f>VKr6v,
40

El &rj cAoiTo wac 6 iputw itorA T^ l|ptf r^ A

TO ovTc*>^ ^''^ atart YapiitoBoA teal r6 fk^ x^fK^'
oBai TO ^^ oj^ r, rj TO )fa/H{<i^ T^ #4*
^ ''^
TO fiY) Toiotrrov cfrai o2br j(a^/i(cotfcu t^ ^* o^ B,
5^X01^ oTt TO A t6 TotoOro umi 9ipfn6rpi iorm
rj TO ;(apiaaa^<u.*
t6 dpa ^tXdo&OJi
O mtoht

68 b

r^ m

alpTwrrtpov urard ro*" ^pcora.

Tov, ^Oi

WAof

XXIII.

JJpttK

oite

lonr

i)

fUv oi ixgmrw ol fym irara rof

r6 ^^^^^^^y 4 o^<v<^<^(h'
5* od ^mmhot oj S6A0cVMroi imi
4^vtp6v'

lvai,

yiyvo%rrai

dnXcj^

f^v,

TO apa ovMiKU

Toiho.

ip^ 6

l\itn

dvTurrpo^i
10

iSXXo

nciu

vw

dXXA

<rxrifidTW,

iffTUTovr

av

num^

irj

Sid avX^oytofwO

0/ f^fT^piMol tcmi

Jtoi

^ mat^ jmntamiik yJi^

iwarra y6p u uMn Suft m^ 4j

leal

Ac rr/oir*

i( inayojyijf.
iarl kqI 6 i( iwayuyljf
avXXoyiQ^oi TO Sid toO Moov BdTtpot^ ^Mpotf tu
/ica^ ovXXoyuixiaBai, olto ca tcmt
yUoa^ Td o,
hid ToC r Sclfoi to
r^ B ^ir<(^^u^ omi> ydp
noiovfida Ta; cVaycayas*. oZov corctf rd
fuuepo'
SO/SiOl', TO 5* >* <2 B T^ XO^l^
4^, ^* <^ r

"

ff

*Enaywy^ fUv oZv

AT

^KTOTcpor mf. Bckker

o^frwrt^ot 4

* For the distinction betwvtn

tive reasoning c/. 34 2i.

512

i>

^ f<fy

miTffT? sad

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xxii-xxm

II.

Therefore A is preferable to D, and

be avoided than B.
If then every lover under the influence of his love
would prefer his beloved to be disposed to gratify
him (A) without doing so (C), rather than gratify
him (D) without being inclined to do so (B), clearly A
that the beloved should be so inclined is preferable to the act of gratification. Therefore in love to
have one's affection returned is preferable to intercourse Math the beloved. Therefore love aims at
and if affection
affection rather than at intercourse
is the principal aim of love, it is also the end of love.
Therefore intercourse is either not an end at all, or
only with a view to receiving affection. The same
principle, indeed, governs all other desires and arts.
XXIII. It is evident, then, how the terms are All
conditioned as regards conversions and as represent- ^eliach&d
ing degrees of preferability and the reverse. We either by
must now observe that not only dialectical and o? by^'^
demonstrative syllogisms are effected by means of ^^^^^^^^Q^the figures already described, but also rhetorical ^
syllogisms and in general every kind of mental conFor all our
viction, whatever form it may take.
beliefs are formed either by means of syllogism or

fact

it is

therefore

not.

is

less to

from induction.
Induction, or inductive reasoning, consists in estabbetween one extreme term and the
middle term by means of the other extreme e.g., if
B is the middle term of A and C, in proving by means
for this is how we effect
appUes to B
of C that
stand for long-lived,' B for
inductions. E.g., let
that which has no bile and C for the long-Hved
lishing a relation

'

For rhetorical arguments

r2

cf.

An.

Post. 71 a 9-11.

513

Rules for
i^^i^ction-

ARISTOTLE
fXm hSmrn mo^ KtX
V ^1^ Mpx^^ ^ A-

TO Kad* tttaarw fuuep6fit,

Ittttos fcal Tj^iiovof,

rtft

bj

iXXi iml t6 B,
fioxpofiuHf,*
YOV X^V*'* ^**^* VW^fXtl Ttft V. tl oA>
ayTiarp4i>i to F ty B nfoi fci^ vwtmUn r6 lUow,
vp^
S6 avayKT) to A r<p B Cndfix^at' Mcurrm
roov OTi ay Svo dm. Tcp o^r^ ^V^plffl <U p^
0aTpov avrufv ayrtarpi^ r6 wpo^, in r^ drri'
QTfK^vrk HoX $6rpo vwdp(i rut KQtniYOfmf
yjvwv. 5ci hi voco^ t6 F to ^f im^rrtm Ttwr ica^
Kaarov avyK%^iifC* 1} va^ ^gaw)^ did w^amm'.
'Ecrrt S* o TOiotmK cruXAoyio|if r^T W^ti npi irfli
0
<ro6
dfidaov nponiatutf' utv ^iir yo^ ion f mo9
ficaov o (TuAAoyurfUK, iv
fi:j iart, 6i ^wayotyrf^.
jcoi rponoy rtv^ iMrruntmi if ^Wttytf/^ ti^ ouASm Tt>0 fi4otm r6 iirpO r^
AoyuTj^^i^' o fiiv
5cd ToO rpirop r6 Arpor t^
ts T^T<^ 0ucvvau^,
^vati fiiv o^ npirtpot mi ym^ptfuurfpot
fidao).
6 bta ToO fUaov avXXoyuipi69, 'fjfiik 5* ivapyiompos
6 hia rr^ hrayaryij^.
XXIV. TlapaStiypa 5* /crriir Stop ry fUa^ t6
dxpov vndpxov htix/^ Sea roO 6iioiov r^ ^'^'
40 Set Sc #cai TO fi4cmv rtp rptrtp Kol t6 v/x^ror rij

nav yap t6 dxoXov

TO

fXTf

y^

y^

iff

I
C/.

berr,

X)i#

Pari.

^iimmI.TO a fO,TTl5-b

II.

and should probftbhr be esdaco.

* U, B. which U the middle term ot the Indoctloa.

Is
the sentence which foUovt, Arirtotle
la afaid (m Jtakkh
on points out) two trUo^ium t
(CaA^CaB,
la
.*. BiA) and one
after the coo tci atou of
In Barbara
(CA BaC*.BaA); but in thcM li itill called the
and C the cctreme term.

OM

hm

614

DMpU

BC

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxiii-xxiv

individuals such as man and horse and mule.** Then

applies to the whole of C [for every bileless animal
But B, not having bile,' also applies
is long-lived].^
to all C.^ Then if C is convertible with B, i.e., if the
middle term ^ is not wider in extension,
must apply

For it has been shown above * that if any two

to B.
predicates apply to the same subject and the extreme
is convertible with one of them, then the other predicate will also apply to the one which is convertible.

We

must, however, understand by C the sum of all

the particular instances
for it is by taking all of
these into account that induction proceeds.
This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or
immediate premiss.^ Where there is a middle term,
the syllogism proceeds by means of the middle
where there is not, it proceeds by induction. There
is a sense in which induction is opposed to syllogism,
for the latter shows by the middle term that the
major extreme applies to the third, while the former
shows by means of the third that the major extreme
Thus by nature the syllogism
applies to the middle.
by means of the middle is prior and more knowable ;
but syllogism by induction is more apparent to us.^
XXIV. We have an Example'^ when the major
extreme is shown to be applicable to the middle term
by means of a term similar to the third. It must be
known both that the middle appUes to the third term
;

induction
wTth'^*
syUogism.

68 a 21-25.
Induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the
universal proposition which stands as major premiss for
purposes of inference.
" Because the abstract logical process is from universal to
particular, but the human mind proceeds from particular to
universal.
Cf. Met. VII. (Z) iv. 1029 b 3-12.
Cf. An. Post. 71 a 10, Rhet. 1356 b 3.

515

Proof by
E^a^^piS"

ARISTOTLE
69 KaKOV, TO
*^'

<S 5^

&

B Vp^

rd

6ft6pOVV <iMUf>ciOPAu

ScZfoi ore r6 BrfPaioit noXtiuh^

Tcof art TO wpo^ Towy 6fi6povt

9^$W9,

*A^mu>vr p^ khfiiUtm. t6

5*

tmt^ hm, XfV-

w^Xmth^ KOtW^*
TovTov 5< nCtrris itc rutif 6iuhm, otatt 9n Bftfiaiott
6 npos ^wKiS iwtl o&r TO wp6f tWf J$i4famt
irpor BfiPaiovs 9p6t i$i6paift iari,
KOicov, TO
mmm^.
^vtpov oTi TO wpos Srifiaiovf

woX^A

oTi fiv

oiVT^Br^rffOAT^A vv^Mi 4*m^'

{ofu^ yap iar% wpof ro^

10

iT6Xtpo), teai Srt r6

<nnaW)^o' o wo6f ^wirclr

ifyrfrl^ni

l$i6p 9m t

A T^ A

(OiAfaif |4p ;

w^AciiOfl|*

fo

t^

rw B tWpvf t oa ToO A ^tj^^i/iii im t^ cMt'

^ rp&nw Kop ft &^ irAiA0r T\r dfiOMsi' 4 '^('V^
.

WMt r6 d^po^,
^aytpiv oiv ort to wap^^yptd iarw aCm <ur
fi4poi npo^ oXoy ovrt atg iXo wp6t f^pof JiXX* uk
y^pt>s irpoii M^poff* orw^ ^4*4^ f^ j ^*^ TatVr^,
ycytxMTO Tov fUaov

IS

yvuipniov hk BartpO. kox hioiipti rrfi iwofwyV

on 1] /iv ^( diroKroiy tuip arofutm to mttpom Atlicvucv

vndpxtw

rtp fuaip

tcai

wpis t6 4jtpO ov

awrJTrrt rov ovXXoyiafLOtf, to 5^ ic<u

10

awf^mru

cu

u^

Ty
^aut to
vndp)(0 rtp Si ^oyot^ to p4aov
wrjXov fUv, ofiouos ci -murrov ^ ftAAor to0 cn;fi-

XXV.

*AiTayaiyi7 5' iara^ oroy

TrpdtTov hijXov

fj

* Ejwmple proceeds nrithir (Mke iadacttai) tmm ptrticakr to general, nor (like sylloplMi) omv WiM. km hmm
ooe co-oitmuite pvticuUr to notfccr.
68 b 97-9.

010

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxiv-xxv

applies to the term similar to the

be bad,' B to make war on
Athens against Thebes
neighbours,* C
and
Thebes against Phocis.' Then if we require to
prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be
satisfied that war against neighbours is bad. Evidence
of this can be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that
war by Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since

and that the

third.

first

E.g., let

'

'

war against neighbours is bad, and war against Thebes

against neighbours, it is evident that war against
Thebes is bad. Now it is evident that B applies to
C and D (for they are both examples of making war on
neighbours), and A to D (since the war against Phocis
did Thebes no good) but that A applies to B will be
proved by means of D. The same method \^ill obtain
supposing that our conviction that the middle term is
related to the extreme is drawn from more than one
is

similar term.

evident that an example represents the Example

whole or of whole to part, but with^yuc^
of one part to another, where both are subordinate to g'sm and
* "ction.
the same general term, and one of them is known.**
It differs from induction in that the latter, as we saw,*
shows from an examination of all the individual cases
that the (major) extreme applies to the middle, and
does not connect the conclusion with the (minor)
extreme ; whereas the example does connect it and
does not use all the individual cases for its proof.
have Reduction (1) when it is obvious Reduction
XXV.
that the first term applies to the middle, but that the ^ oSnbi.
middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet greater
^*^*"^*=y*
nevertheless is more probable or not less probable
are
not
many
than the conclusion ; or (2) if there

Thus

it is

relation, not of part to

<'

We

69 a

7.

ARISTOTLE
Kol rov fitaov' ndvrwf yap iyyvrtptm c2m4 OKf^-

tTrurrqfirj

on

hiSatcrw ^aj>^*

S'

ij

iprn^

TO Br Tou Ar, anayuf/^ iartP' /yyt^rcpov vo^ rot;

/ininurraaBai hia to wpoattXif vOA ,
anj^i;^ nftortfiov owe fyarmis.

ovTWS *yyvrcpor rov caS/mu.

rrrpayanfiitavaji, t6 5* /^* <p
5*

I k

y ^ Z

m^icAor- c^

ToC

EZ

n^ AP

oIop Ci to

ccn

ti^yy/w^i^ior, to

^y |^Mv tUi

lUmm,

niaroTtpov ^ r6 BV roO AV fttjr* ^Xtym ra fu'aa,

ov Xtyw dnayury^* <M* ^rov i^ao fj r6 BP*
inurr^fj yap to TotoOror.
XXVI. 'EMtrmaif 8* /oTi wo6raait wporda^i
ivayria.
hia^pti S^ t^ wporaatu^ Sn -m fUv
varaaw iv^x*^^'^ cIkcu hrl n4povf, lifp
*P^
Toaiv rj oXtoi oiW ciS^ct(U i} otW
Tocf tcoBcXotf

avAAoyiafu>i9.

O^pcTcu 5^ 17 otrrcuns ^i^t^ mu

5ilo oyilftdrwv, hixw^ fiv on ff koBoXov n hf Upi wottm.
varaais, k Svo Si ax^fff^drw^ in OMrructififvai
^pavToi TJ npordati, ra 5* arrunifa/tva cr nft

&^

> wpowi^jf^vai,
Pacius, Tricot

rV AT]

AT r^

According to the theory ot Hippocrates of

Soph, BUnck, 171 b

518

yoofc^^ ^ A > r

15.

BT,

QiIm i ^.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

xxv-xxvi

II.

intermediate terms between the last and the middle ;

for in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to
knowledge. (1) E.g., let A stand for that which can
*

be taught,' B for knowledge and C for morality.*

Then that knowledge can be taught is evident but
whether virtue is knowledge is not clear. Then if
BC is not less probable or is more probable than AC,
we have reduction for we are nearer to knowledge
for having introduced an additional term, whereas
before we had no knowledge that AC is true.
(2) Or again we have reduction if there are not
many intermediate terms between B and C for in
this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.
to square,' E
rectilinear
E.g., suppose that D is
and F circle.' Assuming that between E
figure
and F there is only one intermediate term that the
*

'

'

circle

becomes equal to a
^

we should

rectilinear figure

by means

approximate to knowledge.
When, however, BC is not more probable than AC,
or there are several intermediate terms, I do not use

of lunules

the expression
tion

BC

reduction

immediate

is

'

nor

for such a

when the

proposi-

statement implies

knowledge.^

XXVI. An

objection

is

a premiss which

is

contrary

It differs from the premiss in

to another premiss.
that it may be particular, whereas the premiss either
cannot be particular at all, or at least not in universal
syllogisms.
An objection can be brought in two ways and in
two figures in two ways because every objection is
either universal or particular, and by two figures
1
j.1.
1
T
'i*
because objections are brought in opposition to the
:

And

therefore reduction, which is a

is out of place.

J.

method of approxi-

mation to knowledge,

519

Objection
*^^^-

objections
particular oi
universal;

they can be
raised in

ARISTOTLE
e9k
orxxv

yap

aJ^%AM>frQ

martX ^moff^w, iimmd^uBa it^

r^ itkij^
ihrdpx^r ro^ttm

o^

<wSvi

rj

firjBtvl

K rod trpwrrmt ojpjiAarof rd

oTi Ttvl

an^firfy, ^^*

cj^

fft^ Ar
<&B* ^Hv
^varria' Mpcmimm^t 34 |ite

olo itrrw r6

rou iaxoifov.

to

ai>n^ rcur dKrurci/i/rwr

avruc<(fiixi,

oWf

M
U tiW

fUoir

Morraroi, tA

ytyvrroA to

/pttrr fo^

vpuno9 ox^^iOy ^

fo

rov yvoHTTov kqX ayvwarov oi /m* roOro hi r^

rplrov Kara yap toi V, roB ywwoto fi mmi iypw'
oTou, no fiiv ivarrfa cIma <iA]y^, rd hi fUta^ aitA
IloAiv

^it1

r^

OTMpiffT cSjf

afioOvros yap fi^ cImu filop

ndirrwv rwp awT%K%^Uput9 if
01)1-17

wporAotu^ woaihwf^
Twr ^m^rMur j At
ruwr Jwy^& ^

iymtoB irm MMMpftovf

To9 wpturov, t6
rvf^

X^yofLfv, olo

oiV tr<unxo

ii

Tii /ir
itc

TpiTov o;;^/iaTO$'.
*>

roQ
!

yap /v noat koBoXov fUv AiiiirfjitMT

irpoi to koBoXov twv wportunfUmmf r^

'AirAiu^
ovayici}

tvavTuov,

(otmo

wavTwv ccVorm Twr ^mira^WMvr fiiM

to nparrov ttvai axfjfia, fUoop yAp

5* ai^xyKi^

yiyvTai to koBoXov irpo^ to /f o/^X^)'

npo^ o <m KoBoXov koS* oi kfytroA

IS B4,

Becaaae the aecond fifure gjtm only

8k>ns; 98 a

520

7.

^
1)

M^i^

wp^

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvi

premiss, and opposites can be proved only in the first the first
and third figures." For when our opponent claims figures!
that the predicate applies to all of the subject, we Objection
object that it appUes to none, or does not apply to affirmative
some. The former objection is brought by the first p^^^'^s,
figure, and the latter by the last.
E.g., let
stand
for to be one science,' and B for contraries.'
Then
when it is premised that there is one science of contraries, the objection is either (1) that the same science
does not treat of opposites, and that contraries are
opposites so that the first figure results ; or (2) that
there is not one science of the know able and unknowThis is the third figure ; for to state of C, viz,
able.
the knowable and unknowable, that they are contraries, is true ; but to state that there is one science
of them is false.
So again in the case of a negative premiss. When and to a
it is claimed that there is not one science of con- prfm^ss?
traries, we reply either that all opposites or that
some contraries, e.g., the healthy and the diseased,
are studied by a single science. The former objection is raised by the first figure, and the latter by the

'

third.

The general rule is that in all cases one who is Rules for
raising a universal objection must state his contradic- J^fvefaai
tion with reference to the universal including the
terms premised e.g., if it is claimed that the same
science does not treat of contraries, he must maintain
that there is one science of all opposites. In this
way the first figure must result for the universal
which includes the original term becomes the middle.
But when the objection is particular, the contradiction must be stated with reference to the term which is
included by the subject of the premiss as a universal
;

521

and
Sbject?on8.

ARISTXyTLB
raatf, otov yvcjaToO teal dyreMyrov |ft^ ti^v oMjfr
^vatrrla tea06Xov wp6f raOra (irai yty^trat
TO rpirov ox^/ia* y.iao yip t^ hf lUpti Xnifiap6'

ra yap

fivov, otov

TO YvuHrr6v

yap <m avXXoytaaaBoi

t6 ^yMPoror).

icai

rt>dim:mio,

itc

if

Af

roi&rum iccX

toras CKOToacif TnxttpoOfUP Xiyu^.

8i^ ttal iit
flOWJV TOVTWV TcitfK OjmfkaTWV ^pO^MT* Ir /i^<04f
yd/> ot avTuccutrvoi avAXoytofUH {JUa yip roC ftVoov
ov#r ifr cara^Turoi().
'En & Kop X&yov 5/oiro wXf^OKOf i& Ua to6

fUaov
&

ax^ifiarof, iio cc

iij\

hoiyi

ni

A Tt^ B iM^

&* oAXcuf npor^otum h^ifkot^' 06 i$Z

ir dUAa
iKrpinaBai rkv haraotp, dXX*
4'ampa^ ^X*^
rrfv

mpav

M^

irpcfraow.

&^

ircu

r^ ai|fwior

^ n^Qg

toiJtow to{? a;ip{/iaTor odir l^nr.

'EnMnrrrrr/ov 5^ iral irr/M nfir dAXtfl^ hot^ummk

otov ntpl rwv iic roC ivavrion koX toB iuUo9
Tov Kara S6(av, Kal c/ r^v /f /i/pcc /ir roiO wptarmf

ml

roC fUaov ovpai^ Xifkb^,

hi kqX arjfi4lo ov ravrov iorw^
oAAd TO /iv uc6s tan nporamt h6ofot' 6 yip CMff
jrl TO noXv laaaiv ovrut ytyvofitvof^ rj
^^ Vsy*^

T^i* OTtpfnTudiv iic

XXVII. Euro9

ft

/ivov

fiuTiv

TOUT 4^CoGras

arjfiio

oi'

hi

in

oi,

fii^

povXmu

87.
The arjnimrt b

iaru^ coro^, ofer nd

r6 ^tXily roug ipt0fUifO'
emu vporaatt anoStycruci^
Toirr'

ri

AaC BcC,

pends upon the Talidity of the

.-.

Be\.

Rut Ihb de-

m^or AaC, whkh

proofl^

Wt

'

9/'

70 a S4

RhM.

ff.

II.

The remark b breferaol botw

XXT.

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvi-xxvii

must be stated that the science of the knowable and the unknowable is not the same, for these
are included in contraries as a universal ; and the
third figure results, for the term which is assumed as
particular, viz. the knowable and unknowable, becomes the middle. It is from the premisses from
which it is possible to argue the contrary that we try
to infer objections. Hence it is only by these figures
that we try to raise them, because in these only are
opposite syllogisms possible, since (as we saw <*) an
e.g., it

affirmative result cannot

be obtained in the middle

figure.

Moreover, an objection by the middle figure would

e.g., supposing that it were
require more argument
applies to B on the ground that C
not granted that
This can be clearly shown
is not a consequent of B.
by means of further premisses ^ ; but an objection
ought not to pass on to other considerations, but to
display its further premiss immediately. Hence also
is
this is the only figure from which proof by signs
impossible.
must also consider the other forms of objection,
viz. objections from contrary or similar cases, or from
received opinion ; and whether particular objections can be drawn from the first or negative objections from the second figure.*
probabihty is not the same as a sign,
XXVII.
The former is a generally accepted premiss for that
which people know to happen or not to happen, or to
be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability : e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that
sign, howthose who are loved are affectionate.
ever, means a demonstrative premiss which is neces;

Difficulty

bythr^^
^^^^^^

'^^

*^

We

<*

This question

is, I

believe, never discussed.

523

a prob?^fshld
from a

sign.

ARISTOTLE

ydip 6rrof iarw ii a$ yo^rvarwpam y4ywH r6 wpSeyfia, ra^fm

<n}fii6 *<m raO yfyoW<a ^ &.
*Ei^t;/iT7fxa u^ oJW iarl oMaywit^ i( fjic rfiW

avaytcaia

^ Mo(tK' oi

fi^viw np6Tpa
10

Jf

iv rt^ npofTift

rj

tf

utt

^ r^ 1^^

4^

wt

15

rift

rpirw,

/^Xa ix^u^ CK

otov TO fUv Siffu Kvavaop iiA t6

Tov npufTfw axtifiarof' fUao yap t6 yLla fytcr*

T^ A K&w, t6 B
fr'
9M9}
TO B art ol ao^oi owoviaitH, ricrrajror
baio^, Bio. roC tfixarvio, #^* w A to ovooSotor,
^1^* j; Ii <H oo^'. #^'
^ r IliWtur^k. <SJb|^
Cai TO A KfU. t6 fi TOI? r JCaTIMMM*, Al^ vo

y^

if ^

Y^^it^tt

y^

T^ 5^ KVi oTt (ux/mI Std ro6 lUocm wvijiimrm

hf^rm raSg tnMWonm
povXtrai c&oi* /irc
cjXpov, ixoXov^i hi irai Ts^rn, SfSfl)(lbft lBir4
^( ictWi. T^ e&^ra^ ^' o^ T^ A, T^ in^tir ^' o^
B, ywri if o6 r.
*Eav /iv ofV ij /ua X<X^ wp^rom^, (nyi4Sor
y^yvrrcu fiovov, iav hi KOi in MJpo wpoakfMf,

y^

'

16

ovAAoyio/xos* otoi' ori IliTTaicof iXofBiptof^ Oi yp

^iAoTiftoi Xv6ipiOi, Htmucos Si ^tX6nuos' fj
TToXiv OT4 Oi ao^oi a/o^', niY-Tcuco;
ay6or,

y^

10

oAAa #rai ao^os

f
Ouroi fiv oiV ycyvoKHu avXXaytaiAoip irAi|r ^ /i^
Sid Tou vparrav ax^fiaros oAirrof , or oAiy^^ ^
(jca^dAov yap iarw), 6 Si Sio. rod iax^r mf Amh^^oc,
* If

rrfermbk to one phrnoflBenoa Ottljr,

I if to more than one, ts value ii a

necessity

5S4

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvii

sary or generally accepted.^ That which coexists

with something eke, or before or after whose happen^
ing something else has happened, is a sign of that
something's having happened or being.
An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or Enthyin just ^T^s in^*
signs ; and a sign can be taken in three ways
as many ways as there are of taking the middle term *^ t^'"
in the several figures : either as in the first figure or
E.g., the proof
as in the second or as in the third.
that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by

the first figure ; for the middle term is ha\dng milk.'

stands for pregnant,* B for having milk,' and C
woman.' The proof that the wise are good
for
because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.
stands for good,' B for the wise,' and C for Pittacus.
Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C only,
we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas
we formally assume the former. The proof that a
woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended
for since sallowness is a
to be by the middle figure
characteristic of women in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that
she is proved to be pregnant. A stands for sallowness,' B for being pregnant and C for woman.'
If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign a sign may
but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we ffet a ^f 5 ^n5^
syllogism,^ e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because gism with
those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus suppressed^
loves honour or again that the wise are good, because
'

'

'

Pittacus

In this

is

good and

a syllogism in the
is

also wise.

way syllogisms can be

true, since

it is

first

but whereas
be refuted if it

effected

figure cannot

universal, a syllogism in the last

Refutabuity

^raS^from
^igns in

the several

!>ucni:-i!

Strictly

figures.

an enthymeme.

525

ARISTOTLE
TOt

Kov aXrfiU
ov yap
oAXou;

ii

^'^

r6 avfiwdpmoiam, BtA r6 |<4

Uimuc^

owovioAtK, 9tA roBfo iml

tWt

oo^ik. 6 hi U, ToB pkhmt

u (Tx^fiaro^ dfl teal wiimMK hSm^iof oO/irart yip
ylywrai ovX^oyurfAit ovrwt MtFrtm r& iptmtov yap 1 1^ tcvovoa dtxpd, o>XP^ ^ '^ ^ temuf
ovayio;

dXifBituh^ o^ hf ^Mm^W im^pfyli

amUuHs* hta^opas o lx9^fOi r^ ijpyAar*
*H S^ ovTiMi htAiprrdait t6 oiyifSor, rodrum U

avdyfcrj raimf.

roi^

Ttk

'

TO fuaov TtKfii^puMf knwr^tm {t6 yi^ rtMfM^ptm^ ri

MtSivai noioS^ ^curiy comiu, To*o&ro 5^
a

y^

To
aiv
10

fti^ara md

pAaov), ri ra fih^ ^r rwv oMptm^ 9i|^Sa Acrr^or

TO &* ^K roO lUtnv rcirfiyjpior* Mo^^raror
Kal /ioAtara ^tfik^ r^ 8A to0 wptirw9 JX'ijpiari.
5^ ^uoioyuui^HTtV 3v wi rA>

a^

ivrw

tC tif

t^

firrafiaXXtiP to (ni>;ia irai

Miv

^h^Xh^ ^^^

^voiKQ, ion noBi^fiara {pnBatv

loctf ftavour^
""^ ^iof ij^
fierap^pXrjK^ ti
'h'X^* ^^*
coTi rouTO r6 na$of, oAA* otoi' ^py^
huBvpuai

y^

t^

rwv ^voi

KurriiOuv).

ci

"^

tcHM

Tf 8o#f6|

ICOi

* If the siirns of an tnthjmtmt in the ini tfw InM,

the conclusion is ineritablc. AristoCjc doct aot flMHI Uwft
the conchision is universal, but that the ttaHcmBlf f tbt
major premiss implies the raliditT of the miaor ttM eoads*
sion.
The example alb th<Me who lore
r, cte.) qudbed
for the third flfrure contains no unirerMl pvmriM 9t i%a

ho

and

a univenal coodiukm.
when both premivsca are afirawtWc
may be dasatfied
invArtabk (Ut Ifwt) Mid

fails to establish

i.e.

Signs

6S6

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvii

figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true,

because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant
to our purpose." For if Pittacus is good, it is not
necessary for this reason that all other wise men are
good. A syllogism in the middle figure is always and
in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation ^
for it does
not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow,
and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant. Thus
truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the
ways which have been described.
We must either classify signs in this way, and regard Alternative
their middle term as an index ^ (for the name index th^names
is given to that which causes us to know, and the f^s^ and
^
middle term is especially of this nature), or describe
the arguments drawn from the extremes ^ as signs,'
and that which is drawn from the middle as an index.*
For the conclusion which is reached through the first
figure is most generally accepted and most true.
It is possible to judge men's character from their Use of
physical appearance, if one grants that body and soul estimating
change together in all natural affections. (No doubt character
after a man has learned music his soul has undergone ancef^^^
a certain change, but this affection is not one which
comes to us naturally I mean such affections as fits
of anger or desires among natural excitements.) Supposing, then, this is granted, and also that there is
one sign of one affection, and that we can recognize
;

'

'

'

'

refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name index may
be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or
(more probably) only in the first, where the middle is dis*

'

tinctively middle.
**

Alternatively the

2nd and 3rd

figures,

name

'

sign

'

may

be restricted to the

and may be replaced by

'

index

'

in the

first

527

ARISTXTTLB

fu0a ^iKnoymi/iorrcW.
^OfdyfOf

tnnulcm

ircu

n-

OMyiprfgyfir

ri w^0at,

ToM

Koi ^XXo rt {^or.

4

tfol

i^

ai Ittoa ^Ln^Spf 6 iatdpi^moi

If44 Jpa

t<d

aiyutor* h^ yap

Mr

To^avr rttOr' ^ioW, ! Iwupdyiil^i ruirfia

oij^ui cfvXXifiu

To6 r tQ C^pr 4

M Suo ^i 0ui aSbr T^ y^of

4AV M
m rtpc,

)^

o^ ;Av

ttml

hi4p(m

iZavgp tiwBafur \tfw,

2AA^ y^Mi

O^ to4 y^'

ydp iirnp

c2ra4

SMr Von

Srt oXou Y^voyt

ao TBiO,

^.

cf

art rou iri rov Xtotrrot tquto

TO

1^

oCor ^ A^r if^^MCor

Tw4 ^[^<^. imI

olr
fthf fyo f^
H^'

&rw^ r6

'Exrri hf^

li/SmtiF

#4 ^^^^ ^^'

^ 7^ Mjp^bf

wfum lam r^ Af^pdwmj,

^vaur/viMtpaiftlit

ry*

Ty wptin^

ax^fiart r6 fi4at> irp fth^ wpwrtp ifcptp inurrp4*

^w,

ToC 5^ Tplrov thrprtu^Uf

^ odm. Waitas

tcai fuj

WCitwdL

oirrurrpi'

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvii

the affection and sign proper to each class of creatures,

we shall be able to judge character from physical
appearance. For if a peculiar affection applies to
any individual class, e.g., courage to lions, there must
for it has been
be some corresponding sign of it
assumed that body and soul are affected together.
Let this be having large extremities.' This may
apply to other classes, but not as wholes
for a sign
is peculiar in the sense that the affection is peculiar
to the class as a whole, and not to it alone, as we are
accustomed to use the term. Thus the same affection will be found in another class also, and man or
some other animal will be brave. Therefore he will
have the sign for ex hypothesi there is one sign of
one affection. If, then, this is so, and we can collate
signs of this kind in the case of animals which have
only one peculiar affection, and if each affection has a
sign, since it necessarily has only one sign, we shall be
able to judge their character by their appearance.
But if the genus as a whole has two peculiar affections, e.g., if lions have courage and a readiness to
share, how shall we decide which sign of those which
are peculiarly associated with the genus belongs to
which affection } Probably if both affections are
found in some other class not as a whole, that is, when
of the classes in which each of them is found certain
members possess one but not the other. For if a
man is brave but not generous, and exhibits one of
the two signs, clearly this will be the sign of courage
in the lion as well.
Thus it is possible to judge character from the
appearance in the first figure, provided that the
middle term is convertible with the first extreme, but
is wider in extension than the third term and not
;

529

ARISTOTLE
^%, clo d^la t6 A, tA ^pamj^ f^^Y^^
if o6B.T6Bi r Xiutw,
54 T^ r ra B wfUFtl,
dUa Kol tOAoif ^U r^ B,r6 K wmrl tad 0^
<jS

890

PRIOR ANALYTICS,

II.

xxvii

stands for courage, B for

convertible with it e.g., if
large extremities and C for lion. Then B applies to
all of that to which C applies, and also to others,
applies to all that to which B applies, and
whereas
Otherwise
to no more, but is convertible with B.
:

there will not be one sign of one affection.

581

'*!

lU

;;

4^

INDEX
(Ccrf.= Categories,

Int.=On Interpretation, '^Pr.s Prior Analytics)

Accident 43b8, 46b27

dental

)(

acci;
essential qualities

23bl6
Action lb2T, 2a3, llbl-7
Actuality 19a9, b3, 21bl5,
23a8, 67b3-9 ; and necessity 23a21 ; prior to potentiality 23a22
AiFection lb27, 2a4, 9a28lOalO ; and quality 9a28,
bl2, 10a9 ; admits of contrariety and degree llbl-7
natural a.s 70b8 ;
and
signs ib, 12-38
Affirmation defined 17a25,
19b5 ; )( negation 2a5,
llbl9, 12b6, 13a37-b35,
18a34,
16a2, 17a8, b38,
19bl2 ; a. and negation of
contingent, possible, necessary. Int. xii., xiii. ; a. and
contrariety ib. xiv.
See
Contradiction, Negation
All, to be predicated of

24b28, 25b37, 26a24, 30a2.

See Wholly
Alteration a kind of motion

15al4 ; different from all

other kinds ib. 24 ; change
of quality

15bU

Analytics (Prior)
quoted
19b31
Apodeictic )( assertoric and
problematic
premisses
25al,29b29; a. syllogisms

APr.

I. viii. ;
apodeicticassertoric syllogisms i6. ix.-

apodeictic-problemsyllogisms ib. xvi.,

xix., xxii., 36b31, 39a8
conditions of a. conclusion
30al5, b7, 32a7, 38a36 ;
selection of terms for a.
syllogisms
45b28.
See
xii.

atic

Necessary
Aristomenes 47b22
Article, definite

49blO

Assertion )( negation 62al3.

See Affirmation
Assertoric )( apodeictic and
problematic
premisses
25al, 29b29;
a.
syllo-

gisms

APr.

I.

iv.-vii.

assertoric-apodeictic syllogisms ib. ix.-xii. ; assertoric - problematic

syllo-

gisms ib. XV., xviii.,

36b29, 39a7
Astronomy 46al9
Athens 69al

xxi.,

533

IKDEX
BcniM

ttwpoliil !

iiiitoMirtu
oalnnr
CallUft43*fT
CaUipfMtt 16^1
CafMkdty, Mteml. kind of

Cmm CbO.
Caliiifk

QiMM

iibl. 4bil
hr^ leltfl.

CM.

Jbll.aat
ytafaaoiialfft

iibl7rrqaat.
lOblfi oTaciiMiaad
aibctlMi libit aad a>
iimin Ifbl^Mi
Ify

liavri

labUi
Itelf.

kati

of

ihSmiId fnIK

Mbi.JA,fUt.
Problnnatk

lorin

llaSSt

KoMlmnr ITbl.M.

Mi^

MC

St>
Ibia.
at. fttell. flSbail, 40,
tela. SI t mad tnMi and
fBk^ ItaM <^. b7).
I>>f7,
flail, bit,
1

17h, Malts 61
rxprraskNM ltaS&, Ibl. xtU
xiiL
in ptaof p^r immm9ihil4 4lmi\ tUlt, bit,
:

5S4

idLi

AM.

p-

CiraUar praoCi tn
meal

Ilbl0

on:

Mi

labS. !

ChATMUT iaimUlm tmm

pamnun WM-Ji

dhMnd

coatrarta talfll iai. IT.

llbM-ltaifti aaaaalianr
of Mbrtaaca
ar ^T

INDEX
b25, 32a29, 36b35-37a31

and reciprocal proof 57bl 9,

of syllogisms
;
)( reduction ad impossibile 61a21 ;
of terms APr. II. xxii.
7a20
6b28,
Correlatives
false c.s 6b36 ; coining of
32, 58a 13

APr.

II. viii.-x.

names
existent
tion

for

ib.

7b 15.

Counter-syllogism

7a5 ; coSee Rela-

APr.

II.

Anima quoted

16a8 ?)
43b2 ; unity of
17al4 ; arguments relating to 50a 11

{De

Dialectic,

treatise

on;

see

Topics
)( demonstrative
premiss or syllogism 24a22,
46a9, cf. 65a35 ; d. ques-

Dialectical

tion 20b22
Differentia lbl7,

3a22, 33,

46b22
Diminution 15a 14
Disposition 6b2, 8b27, 35,
9a3, 10b3, 32, lla22
Distribution of subject 1 7bl2,
20a 12
Division by genera APr, I,
xxxi.

Definition

substance
Degree, not
3b33 ; in quantity 6al9 ;
in relation 6b20 ; in qualin

10b26 ; in dispositions
32 ; of action and aflFection llbl
Demonstration 24all, 25b27,
40b23; )( syllogism 25b29;

Enthymeme 70a3-b38
Equality 6a26
Equivocal lal
Error APr. II. xxi.
Essence 43b7, 46a36

ity

Essential

ib.

23b 16
Even and odd
41a27, 50a37

no d. of indefinite propositions 32b 18 ; of substance

from
and essence 46a36
dewhat is prior 64b32
;

monstrative )( dialectical
24a22, cf. 65a35, 68blO.

See Proof
Denial, 12b6, 16a2, 17a25;

)(

accidental quali-

ties

Example APr.

numbers
xxiv.

II.

induction 69al6
Exposition 28a23, cf. 30a9
Expression 17a 17
)(

Extreme terms in first figure

25b36 ; in second 26b37 ;
in third 28al5.

See Major,

Minor

see Negation

Derivative terms lal2, 10a27

Destruction, a kind of motion

15al3
Sophisticis Elenchis quoted (as Topics) 65bl6
Diagonal of square incom-

De

sides
with
mensurable
41a26,46b29, 50a37, 65bl7

False but possible propositions

34a25

no

false

conclusion from true pre62a5;

53b7, 11,
misses
true conclusion from false
Sremisses APr. II. iL-iv.
se

Cause ib. xvii.

argument

Falsity in

46. xviii,

535

IKDRX
^/V.
A.

I. ir4U

sir.

4UIS.

unrL

t oirfy
44liT.

app> iMwi

5m

FkK.

octoimIc Tnlfo
I.

Uttrcs^

hr:, (I

mrtt

tie)

iiow

tiw

f^m faW

tofX A.
proei to

It. tt.i'

fX A. w^ mflBt

CUQIVfllafl
In f.f. A.

TlloyMM

Of
Ttit.

ti

^^^r ^^^^HiS v^K^^^

^^HM%

^J*

ffliBtoi
ffliBtodNrrii4taOT

fMi
W- bfn^vaito
fltoltolig

pfmiJMin CSbf 1 1 m4
tlom to W9i iigm

CMltwArtorf

For

Fwhu9

to-

I/.

I1^

.1
|iiiiiiiwHtoi

ktoiif

tails
IM4^

ItolSt andcrfw;

kill MMflMldrj MtotoMB toUi ppe

dinihir oT cte* ttiOi
rrlathre llaaSt aad CMtrarr qulilir lUIStfOod
And vil ft* gmcra l4aMt
g.^prter to tptttea Itoft

will iKi. fcpit y. 4iitff t

dIvUcNi br VLBira A^t. L
CStSMiclj

4>bas

5S6

KM

mcttioas 4lbl9^

tvbi^

m
fftaM.
i

ffUlf.
ITbtl. 47ltfit

M^

i>it%
4IM4^
il

Mf^
I

;;

INDEX
no previous knowledge of
i.s 67a22
Induction 42a3, 24, 67a23,
68bl4; )( syllogism 68b32
)(

example 69a 16

individual

uses all

68b28,

cases

69al7
Intermediates 12a2, b28, 13a7
Isosceles triangle

Knowledge

41bl4
8b3,

relative

Ila24,b27; ahabit8b29;
object of k. prior to k. itself 7b23 ; k. and thought
paruniversal,
66b29 ;
ticular, actual 67al7, b4
I/ikeness peculiar to quality

llal5
lyine continuous Sal

parts

Necessary events 18b6, 15,

19al8
contradictory of
;

'

it is n.'

ference 24bl9, 26a3, 47a23,

53b 18, 57a40, 62al2 ; no
n. inference from one assumption 34al7, 40b35,
53b 16 ; n. )( impossible
22b4; )( possible 22bll,
23al7,
32al8, 28,
29,
33bl6, 21, 27, 37al5, b9.
38a35, cf. 32a20 ; relative
necessity 30b32. See Apodeictic

Negation

affirmation
)(
llbl9, 13a37, b2, 27, 34 ;
a simple proposition 17a9,
25, 62a 13 ; contradictory

APr.

Lunules 69a33

All

Non
first

figure

in second 26b37 ;
;
See Term
in third 28al3.

26a21

Meno quoted 67a21

Miccalus 47b80

Middle term, in first figure

25b35 ; in second 26b36 ;
function
in third 28al2
;

41a3, 47a38-bl4, cf.

44b40 ; necessary for syllogism 66a28
Minor term, in first figure
26a22 ; in second 26b38 ;
of

in third 28al4
Motion Cat. xiv.

kinds of

15al3
Natural
tions

32b7,

70b8

I. xlvi.

None, to be predicated of
24b30, 25b40, 26a27. See

of ib. 17
Ix)ve 68a39

Major term, in

Int. xii., xiii. ; n,

n. in;

and actual 23a21

16

affec-

propter hoc; see False

Cause

Noun

16al, 13,

Int.

ii.

simple )( composite n.
16a22, b32 ; indefinite n.
16a30, 19b8 ; cases of n.s
16a33 ; )( verb 16b8, 19 ;
expression 17al7 ; as
)(
subject 19b6

Number

4b23, 30

Objection APr. II. xxvi.

premiss 69a37 ;
not
)(
raised in second figure
69b30. See False Cause
Odd and even numbers
41a27, 50a37
Opposition discussed Cat. x.;
contraries,
relatives,
of
privative
and positive,

537

vmi
llltanM 10U4,

Ilbl7,t4. I{
of
3lblA. UblSi

iuifi.

JPr.U.
r

MOii
ftnt
Md

ouft

pfovHl

oiilir

la

temi

llilid

at, iirf-Aiii
tl. in,

oCiMimWki4i
oC

!>.

Id

pw

ivlllMi

m%t%,

8m

Fbitkkr |ithi MaUi

IwMbaic Mtsfv oT Mbl,

ouVudi, iHnkr

Id nrlbli

pw iMiUv*
cooirartlble JSft7

tuUrrml

pw

luvvltdgr

67af7. SA
PricFplloo
(imw-) Tb8S*
6bl2, Jtel
Perfect jrlkgiMM hi inl

isUtt, MslT.bMi
noi la the 9eaamd tTal, c/l
M4t Qol la the iMtd
fiinire

Pfil*o

pnad^

APr, XL

xtL, 40b!, 4lba. 13.90.

^. 4teSS. bll. 1

5S8

STaM^M.

suit

INDEX
24a22-bl2

assertoric,

apodeictic,
problematic
25al ; affirmative, negative ib. 2

two required

syllogism
42a32, 44b6, c/.

40b36,
53b20,

for

66a 17 ; one must be affirmative 41a6 one must be

universal, ib. ; one must
be of same mode as conclusion 41b27
selection
of p.s 43bl, 47al0.
See
;

Starting-point
Priority, four (five) senses of,
Cat. xii.

Privation

and

opposition,
)( posi-

llbl8; privatives
tives 12a26-13a36,
Probabilitj; 70a3

Problematic

and
25al

52al5

apodeictic

)(

premisses
p. syllogisms APr.

assertoric
;

I. xiii., xiv., xvii.,

xx.

p.-

syllogisms ib.
XV., 36b29, xviii., 39a7,
xxi. ;
p.-apodeictic syllogisms ib. xvi.,
36b31,
xix., 39a8, xxii. ; conversion 32a29, 36b35, 37a33 ;
selection of terms for p.
syllogisms 45b29
Proof, ostensive )( hypothetical 40b25, see Deassertoric

monstration ; p. per impossibile, see Hypothetical,

Reduction
Property 43b2
Proposition 16a2, 17a2, Int.
V. ; contains truth and
falsity 17a3; simple, single
)( composite, many 17a8,
15, 20,

20bl3

requires

verb or tense 17a9

con-

trary 17b4, 20-18al2 ; contradictory 17a25-37, bl7 ;

universal, particular, indefinite 17b2-16. See Pre-

miss
Prosyllogism 42b5
Quality, a category lb26,
29 ; discussed Cat. viii.
qu. and habit or disposition 8b27 ;
and contrariety 10bl2 ; and natural
capacity 9al4 ; and affection 9a28, bl2, 10a9 ; and
form or figure lOall
and contrariety 10b 12
and degree 10b26, llal4

and

likeness llal5
relation lla20, 36

and

Quantification of predicate
43b 17
Quantity, a category lb26,
28 ; discussed Cat. vi. ;

continuous
)(
has parts 5al5 ;
secondary or accidental
5a39 ; has no contrary
5bll, 30; )( relation 5bl6;
and equality 6a26
discrete

4b20

Reciprocal proof,

APr,

65al9
Recollection 67a22
Reduction APr. II.

11.

v.-vii., cf.

xxv.

ad impossibile 27al4, 28a7,

23, 29, bl4, 17, 29a35, bo,
34a3, 36, b2, 22, 35a40
(36al), 36al0, 22, 36, 37a9,
35, 38a22, 39b32, 41a22,

45a23-46a2, 50a29, APr.

II. xi.-xiv., a kind of hypothetical proof 40b26;
)(
conversion 61al8 ; )( os-

539

proof .iiV. ILslv4

of tvUoglHM ftbl,
40bir. 4IM^^IV. L shp. i
r. of h vpollMtlDol oyfli>'
irHow AOOli t r. Id frllr.

^.

^IV. ll.si.i biAll

nuilt dbMH

ofMAwbl

mi

fonM Ai^, I.
HrfllUttPJI^/V. U.
iriitk*

Oil BlLt

14bttt bi

ss.t

RdoEoiro fUjoii tIM.

fi

Gal.

itliroMiit

vtt.1

qwuillty dblti odHills

of ooolmhrty ibIA

aUi

omI

*8.lff. Ilbti
il]rllSQ.Mt

<

tloa libit,

Mt

N
BtolK

DBOMOllT 9
lib

wckm

SetentiiekwMiii,

pmdii.dofloi>^
oiMvlaric)
v4Pr.
(problemotle) B^rlU

I.

puowiiftitt

<

MOHiMi^nib'

(podcidiB
xix.

problKOBBlic)
tfvc oomoNmIoim
bi ILULt
bi A.
qfoHI'
t cuo t tii

Aon

Mnibi.faLi tyll igiiii

non opfMMite ptMBbocs bi
CSblOi M> oBK:t>oa> bi
I

fa90(

^ratbiikM

Srntenoe lent. iol. Iv^ X PVOpocitioalTat

MO

Sbidl

Ml

iiijbwlilijblt,

tA.bft|</.lHaii..ait

;;

INDEX
movers 23a24 ;
secondary = species or
genus 2ai4, b7, not present
in a subject 3a9 ; whether
relative
8al3
s.
and

Third figure, relation of

terms in 28alO
gives
no universal conclusions
29al6, 59bl5; syllogisms

differentia predicated uni-

29b 19, (apodeictic) 30a7,

celestial

vocally 3a33 ; demonstration of 46a36

Syllogism defined 24b 18
demonstration 24a28,
)(
25b29 ; perfect )( imperfect s. 24b22, 25b35, 26b29,
27al6, 28a4, 29al5, 30,
33a20, 34al,42a33; valid
27a2, 28al6, 41b33
s.
hypothetical 40b27, 41a38,
45bl5, 50al6-b4; all s.
reducible to first figure
41 b3 ; general rules of s.
APr. I. xxiv., XXV. ; conof ib. xxvii.,
struction
xxviii. ; and logical neces-

47a23-bl6

sity

apparent

or faulty s. APr. I. xxxiii.,

xxxiv. ; )( induction 68b32

Tense 16bl7

Term

defined

term
41b6

must

24bl6 ; one
be positive

three terms only

;
demonstration 41b3642a31, 44b6, c/. 53bl9 ;
faults in setting out APr.
not always exI. xxxiv. ;
pressible in one word ib.
may occur in
XXXV. ;
oblique cases ib. xxxvi. ;
duplicated or qualified t.s
in

i6.

xxxviii.

of

49b3;

substitution
in same
t.s

See Major,
Middle, Minor, Premiss
Thebes 69al
series 66b27.

(assertoric)

APr.

(apodeictic

APr.

I.

vi.,

assertoric)

(problematic)
(assertoric - proble-

I.

XX.,

xi.,

matic) xxi., (apodeicticproblematic) xxii. ;

true
conclusions from false premisses in ib. II. iv. ; circular proof in ib. vii. ; conversion of syllogisms in ib.
X. ; syllogisms from opposite premisses in 64a20 ;
objections in 69bl ; signs
in 70al3, 16
Time, a category lb26, 2a2 ;
continuous 5a6 ; parts of
relative
ib. 26;
priority in 14a27

UblO

Topics quoted 20b26, 24bl2

(46a30), 64a37, (i.e.. Soph.
Elench.) 65b 16
Tragelaphos 1 6a 1 6 ; see Unicorn
Transposition of subject and
predicate 20b 1

Truth and falsity depend on

combination 2a7, 13b 10,
16alO, 17, 18a26 ; in contradiction 17b23, cf. 13b2
and contrariety 13b 13,
in proposi
23b27, 24b6
tions 17a3, 19a33, 23a38
;

and present
and future ib. 33

and

past

18a28

truth self-consistent 47a8

no false conclusion from
true premisses 53b7, 11
true conclusions from false

541

INDEX
AFt. IL %A9^

UmI. aMii

Mi

. tlt, 411
Unksoni
Uallsr

IM

flf

<rMiingobu
UnKriMl
tmnaar

liilriliHi

tfblOi

M MM

ltail.tOBi .

Mia.htT.

4lbt. 4inii
Id
iubiih(i

partlciiUr

br

aBi I
or

iMi|

itMntt

UnhroQillmMlatt
ZcAoSbl

frn^ttd

Omti

Britmim ly IL ft R.

CtA.

^ibl4

of libit I
A. I9t pvt oT

OulT

Vbto

mwM

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ii
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Ckbbo IH lUrvBucA. Db I bbiiw, 8
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la

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Cawujiah, Pbo Mbbii. Pbb fiwn,

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LobIk el Lord.

Placoo.

Ckbboi LnrTBBi yo

AmoBH &aWlMarfL tVcln

ftummt, W. (Hjraa WMbbm.

SVob.
Ckbboi pMiumcB. W. C A. Km,
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LarrBBf to

CicBBOi

mmnam

Hmmfwtm, Pbo P&aboo.

S. IL

WbMl

Ckbbo Pbo CAaenM, Pbo Lbbb Mamua. Pbo CuMvtfo

Pbo llAUBto. H, hmt flodfBu
I

BAtiBo.

R. GBfttoer.

Pbo

Mimb^

Ib PIiibi.

Pbo Sbbhh^ Pbo

Ljbamo. Pto
Ckbbo i Pbo QonMno, Pbo

CoBTBA Rt*u^*. J. H. Pi
PBoSapno, I VATtvtvw. R.
fCKxao) lUnroBKA a llBBmtcs._H^
t

CmBBO I TBBCVIAB B fBlAI HW J.

G. GrMBVood. tViiiL
Ckbboi Vkbbsvb Obatiobi. L
Clavinab. M. PiBtiiBav. ff Vok.
RooncA
H. IL Ail^
Db
Rb
Db
ABBoaiBBk
CoLDMSLUi
K. 8. PWBtar. I. HcflMr. SVolk
CrBTios. Q.
HiBTOBT or Albxabbbb. J. C RoMk i Vtk.
rvomtM. E.&l>^ialm BadCoMiBBNBPL J.CBbII^
.

FBoimai t Stbatbbbmi awb Aobbbbbib. CL WL BbbmII

bim) M. B. UdStwdtm.
R. HbIbkl f Vsli.
Fbovto t CoBBBWOBOBBCB.
Gxixro*.
IloftAcs

C
Ooa AVD EpoBBib C E.
J.

Rotfe.

S Vok.

BbbmIL

HoRACK Satibbb. RrtsTiBB. Abb Pubihi. H*

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VAvnum Ihjycem. J. H. Moabf.
Vabo t D LtmvA Latwa. R. O. KaL f Valik

TcafTvtxiAv

a R. FaliiiBifti

VtMii.

ViTsvTiOTt

tVoli.

Dm AmamnwmwmA. W.Otmmm. V^

Afttiai TATtm. S.
AUA Os TBS Katvss or
t

^-*i^

A. F.

SVok.

aaA^Mt.
AwKmrxm, H. Wdr5iik. i Vli.
Auirao, Asua* aw rnmiBjni

Lcrtvat.

BcMMraiiaF.aFota.

Aou4oo. SlrJMMiaF^Miw tVk

AfoiAomot Umamtm. R.
S*Hk
Tub A^orrouc KAmnk Kteopp Ukiu i Vk.
AfTtAv'* KoMAs llMTfoav. lluiiM WUta^ 4 VIa.

AftATtA.

Qf.CALUMuatm,

Abivtotls Abt or lUnBoaKi J. H. t

AattToTtAi Atwomav CoVVftTVTtOS,
Viarvn akd Vicai. H. IUaih*ak
ABirran.i Gma*Tio or AvwAtA. A. 1*
AmnvTtM t MsfAnmKB. H. Tmicmurk. f Vok.
AuvTonst MKTvoaoi^ooiCA. H. I). P. Lmu
:

AunoTLB
**On

lltMM Wofto.

W.

S. Ufltt.

lodhrWbfe

WiodA.**

Abototls

**
t

Ob Hi
HteoMMMMAM Bnno.

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VotVlL C.
mwrwiM Vfe. tX and X.
Gcrr. VoLXL F. R. Waltaa.
HldiB. fl Vate.
R.
Dioopf

aa

Umm

'

tyiwIattoM jiwrlMd by g> Onry. T Volk

EviiiBiiM* W. A OMnoMT. v Vmi^
Way. 4 VoAi. VarMtrMM.
B(;mnnB. A.
KItmm
KvtmmtvBt EcrtaMAvncAL Hwroar.
OttlMA. ValL
J. R.

&

Galbv

0 Ts NiiYmA& W^cwnm^

TnGansAMMtMV.

A. J.

W.

R. l>Mo^ #Vakk
Poava (Tanootttaa. Rmmk. M4

Twa Cfanc Borouc

J. M. ritiwdi,
Gaasa Eiaav avd lawaaa wrni

iUlmoMk. tVoK
Gaaw M ATWMUtttcat

HCTODonm. A.

W aaa.

I>.^d^

laarllMiM

"

f Vaia

4 Valic*^'"

HtrroniATai aso t FaAansvia or HManwaafc.

JoMa and K. T. Wttbtaykm. 4 Valk
lloitaat luAA. A. T. liwmy. ff Vok.
HoMsa t OimaMr. A. T. Mam^. f Vali.

W. U. H

laiaaa
ff riiHw
Vaa llaak. S Vali.
laocaATaa. Gaotya NoHIa aad
8t. Joks Hawaarawa t BAmiAAM *vs loAtAaM. Raa. O. IL
Woodward and lUroU Mattiaflf.
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UKoa

Voh. I-Vll.
JvuAW. WttMOaaa WrMtf. S

V^

ivHMdbyJ.M.EdmoiMfet HlFAarffman &CiiAi.

LooAa. 8 Vok. Vok. I-V. A. U, Hamaai VaL VL
Mariwd
K. KUborni VoL Vli. M.

LrcorMBoa. <Y. CAixiMACHaa.

LraA Gbabca. J. M. Edmaadt.
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IN

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HnroBY or AvutAtA.

A. t* I^Mfe*

A. IL

LATtM AffTNOM
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B. B.

LOMDOX

WUXAAM USINKMAX)! 1X9

iWf.

rAWBKtOOt,

MAAVAAO

OMIT.

PASM

Aristotle.

PA
3B93

The Organon; Categories on .07

interpretation; prior
C6
analytics.
v.l

t=_