4.

Other Terms
The complexities which arise in trying to understand the notion of linguistic
reference don't end with names and indexicals. Here, we will consider two further
sorts of terms that are often thought of as referential natural kind terms and
singular definite descriptions as well as whether the notion of reference can be
productively extended even to a range of terms to which it does not intuitively apply.

4.1 Natural Kind Terms

Putnam (1975) extended Kripke's views of proper names to so-called natural kind
terms. These are terms that refer (naturally enough) to kinds of things that are found
in nature. The kinds in question are kinds of the sort studied by scientists, whether
biologists, chemists, or physicists. They are kinds individuated by underlying
structure: a structure that purportedly explains the more superficial properties of the
kind. Thus, the expressions tiger, gold, and water are natural kind terms. Dust
bunny and cow patty are not despite the fact that they refer (loosely speaking)
to kinds of things found in nature. The traditional view of such terms sees them as
descriptive in content, where the descriptive content of such terms determines their
reference. That is, the kind is referred to in virtue of the fact that it satisfies the
properties expressed by the associated descriptive content. The motivation for such a
view is two-fold. First, it provides intuitive analyses in cases where a purely
referential account of meaning proves unintuitive; second, in contrast to an account
of the latter sort, a descriptive account of natural kind terms offers an explanation of
reference.
The intuitiveness of the descriptive view is brought out by seeing how it might
handle cases that a purely referential account of natural kind terms would have
trouble with. Consider, for instance, assertive utterances of the following sentences:
13. Furze is gorse.
14. Gnomes are mythical creatures.
15. Unicorns don't exist.
16. Fred believes that filberts, but not hazelnuts, are sweet.
(13) seems informative, (14) meaningful, (15) both meaningful and true, and (16)
appears to attribute consistent beliefs to Fred. A purely referential account of
meaning, according to which the meaning of a natural kind term is nothing other
than its bearer, would predict that the first of these utterances is trivial, the second
and third meaningless,[18] and that the fourth attributes inconsistent beliefs to Fred. In
contrast, suppose that we adopt a descriptivist account of meaning. Then, provided
co-referring terms can have different descriptive contents, and provided further that
empty kind terms have descriptive contents, we can explain the informativeness of
(13), the meaningfulness of (14) and (15), and the fact that (16) does not ascribe
inconsistent beliefs to Fred. (The explanations here parallel the descriptivist
explanations for (2)(5).)

But according to Putnam (1975), it would be a mistake to suppose that natural kind
terms refer via descriptive content inside the head of the competent speaker. I can
refer to such things as furze (gorse) and filberts (hazelnuts) even if the descriptive
content I associate with the expression in question is not uniquely satisfied by such
things indeed, even if the content in question is satisfied by (say) walnuts or
cashews. (This is basically the problem of ignorance and error.) Putnam made the
same basic point via a number of thought-experiments. Thus, I refer to elm trees
when I use the term elm; and I refer to beech trees when I use the term beech.
But the descriptive content I associate with these terms may well be the same
something like deciduous tree of some sort. Thus, it cannot be what is inside my
head that determines that to which I refer. Consider the famous Twin Earth
thought-experiment. Oscar and Twin Oscar refer to different kinds of substances
(H2O, XYZ) when they use the term water despite the fact that their narrow or
internal psychological states are identical, that (more specifically) the descriptive
content they associate with the term (clear, odorless, colorless liquid, that falls from
the sky and accumulates in lakes, rivers, and oceans) is the same. The moral is: the
reference of a natural kind term cannot be determined solely by what's in the head.
So, if meanings are reference-determiners, they are not in the head. (And if they are
in the head, they are not reference-determiners.)
This brings us to the Putnam/Kripke causal view of reference for natural kind terms.
It is similar to Kripke's account of nominal reference; indeed, it is more or less an
extension of that account. Reference is initially fixed at a dubbing, either by
perception or description of samples of some particular natural kind. The reference
is then to whatever has an internal structure identical to that of the samples. In the
case of water, this would be having the chemical structure H 2O. Speakers at a
dubbing are able to lend their reference to others via communicative exchanges, and
these others can then lend reference to still others. Speakers who are ignorant as to
the properties of the kind in question can nevertheless use the natural kind term to
refer to the members of the kind because underlying their uses are causal chains
stretching back to a reference-fixing.
Putnam thought that his causal account of natural kind terms could be extended
to artifactual kind terms as well. These are terms that refer to kinds of man-made
objects: pencils, clocks, telephones, and so forth. Putnam motivates his causal
account of artifactual kind terms by appealing to intuitive considerations that is,
to thought experiments. Suppose we were to discover that pencils are not artifacts,
but organisms. We would still call them pencils, and would be correct in doing so.
This shows that the reference of such expressions cannot be fixed via some
description of the form artifact the function of which is to
Perhaps. But that only shows (at most) that the description in question cannot be of
the particular form in question. Perhaps the relevant description is one of the
form: that which has such-and-such a function. There need be no mention of the
notion of an artifact per se. In fact, a descriptivist view, according to which the
reference of such terms is fixed by a function-specifying description, is intuitively
plausible. Why? Presumably, because artifacts are not individuated by anything
hidden, but rather by something transparent, i.e. their function. If function is
indeed transparent, it should not be implausible to suppose that reference is
determined by a description that specifies the function in question. Does that mean

that one must know the reference-fixing description in order to refer to the kind in
question? No. What it means is only that non-experts effectively defer to experts
who do know (and don't just theorize about) the relevant reference-fixing
descriptions. The question remains whether or not one can properly conceive of an
organism as having a function extrinsic to its own being (as in Putnam's livingpencils example). But again, one can easily modify the relevant description to
something like: that which purportedly has such-and-such a function. This would
allow for mistaken attributions of artifactuality.

4.2 Definite Descriptions

A definite description is an expression having a certain grammatical form: namely,
the form the F. For our purposes, the central question regarding such phrases is
whether or not a quantificational theory of descriptions Russell's in particular
is adequate to handle the data regarding what Donnellan has called the referential
use of descriptions. Some further background is needed to understand this issue.
Russell (1905) famously opposed both Meinong (1904) and Frege (1892/1952) by
claiming that definite descriptions are not genuine referring expressions, that they
are not logically proper names in Russell's terminology. In other words, their
propositional contribution is not (simply or at all) their denotation. Russell's
arguments appeal to intuitions (Russell would no doubt call them facts) about truth
value and meaningfulness. Thus, consider assertive utterances of the following two
sentences:
17. The King of France is bald.
18. The Queen of England has three sons.
(17) is meaningful, though certainly not true. As Russell himself puts it, it is plainly
false. Russell's Theory of Descriptions predicts that (17) is meaningful but false,
expressing a (false) proposition to the effect that there exists exactly one king of
France and that whatever is king of France is bald. According to Russell, (18) should
get the same kind of analysis as (17). So, pace Frege, (18) turns out not to
be about the Queen of England. Indeed, it is about nothing at all: for definite
descriptions are not referring terms, but existential quantifiers. More specifically, the
proposition expressed by the assertive utterance of a sentence of the form The F is
G is one to the effect that there is exactly one F and whatever is F is G.
P.F. Strawson (1950) claimed that Russell's theory was the result of overlooking
certain fundamental distinctions, including the distinction between referring and
meaning. Attend to these distinctions, and you will see that definite descriptions are
indeed referring expressions, not quantifiers. But this does not mean that they are
logically proper names, only that speakers use them to talk about particular
objects/individuals, not to assert that things of a certain sort exist. Thus, consider an
assertive utterance of:
19. The King of France is wise.
According to Strawson, such an utterance will be neither true nor false, since the
definite description fails to refer to anything. Indeed, nothing at all has been asserted

(or stated or said) by means of this utterance. On Russell's view, the statement is
false as it involves the false claim that there exists a unique king of France. The
meaning of the description, on Strawson's view, is given by a rule: one to the effect
that it is to be used in cases where there is a (contextually) unique king of France to
whom one is referring by means of the term.
Keith Donnellan (1966) thought that definite descriptions were pragmatically
ambiguous in that they had two different uses, and that these two uses were relevant
to what is said, to the statement made. One of these uses, the so-called attributive
use, was captured by Russell's theory but not Strawson's; the other use, the
referential use, was captured by Strawson's theory but not by Russell's. Or so
Donnellan claimed. To see the motivations for positing this sort of ambiguity,
consider the following case. Smith is found brutally murdered and it is claimed (on
account of the heinousness of the crime) that:
20. The murderer of Smith is insane.
Suppose that the speaker has no idea who the murderer is. Then, the description is
used attributively to say something about whoever (uniquely) murdered Smith
and Russell's analysis applies. That is, the statement is true just in case there is a
unique murderer of Smith and whoever murdered Smith is insane. But now suppose
that Jones is accused of Smith's murder and that the speaker believes that Jones is
guilty. In attempting to say something about Jones, the speaker comes out with an
utterance of (20). In this case, the description is used referentially, to pick Jones out
so as to say something about him. According to Donnellan, the statement is thus true
just in case Jones is insane even if he is innocent and the actual murderer
(Robinson) is quite sane. Russell's theory, according to Donnellan, cannot
accommodate the referential use, and so is incomplete at best.
Kripke's (1977) responds to Donnellan's argument by accusing Donnellan of
mistaking pragmatic facts for semantic facts. More specifically, Kripke accuses
Donnellan of confusing speaker reference for expression reference. Kripke claimed
that the referential use of definite descriptions was both genuine and interesting, but
was not properly semantic. Thus it was not relevant to Russell's theory. According to
Kripke, the truth value of:
21. The man in the corner drinking champagne is happy tonight.
depends only on whether the man in the corner drinking champagne is happy. This
is so even if the speaker intends to refer to someone else, a man in the corner who
only appears to be drinking champagne but who is in fact drinking sparkling water.
In such a case, the speaker may say something true (or false) about the individual to
whom he intends to refer. Nevertheless, the truth-value of the sentence itself will not
depend upon the properties of the speaker's referent, but on those of the semantic
referent: on those of the description's denotation, should there be one. Thus,
according to Kripke, Russell's theory of descriptions, though perhaps not without its
problems, is not undermined by the referential use of descriptions. Although many
have accepted at least the basics of Kripke's rejoinder to Donnellan, the debate over
the referential use over whether it in fact undermines Russell's theory of
descriptions continues unabated.[19]

2.2 Causal Theories

The causal theory was adumbrated by Kripke[8] (1980) as an alternative to the
descriptivist theory of nominal reference. The central idea underpinning this sort of
theory is that (the use of) a name refers to whatever is linked to it in the appropriate
way, a way that does not require speakers to associate any identifying descriptive
content whatsoever with the name. The causal theory is generally presented as
having two components: one dealing with reference fixing, the other dealing with
reference borrowing. Reference is initially fixed with a dubbing, usually by
perception, though also on occasion by description. Reference is fixed via
perception when a speaker says, in effect, of a perceived object: You're to be called
N. Reference is fixed via description when a speaker stipulates, in effect:
Whatever is the unique such-and-such is to be called N. (As noted by Kripke
(1980), the name Neptune was fixed by description, stipulated by the astronomer
Le Verrier to refer to whatever was the planetary cause of observed perturbations in
the orbit of Uranus.) After this initial reference-fixing, the name is passed on from
speaker to speaker through communicative exchanges. Speakers succeed in referring
to something by means of its name because underlying their uses of the name are
links in a causal chain stretching back to the dubbing of the object with that name.
Subsequent speakers thus effectively borrow their reference from speakers earlier
in the chain, though borrowers do not have to be able to identify lenders. All that is
required is that borrowers are appropriately linked to their lenders through chains of
communication. However, as Kripke points out, in order for a speaker
(qua reference borrower) to succeed in using a proper name to refer to the
object/individual the lender was using the name to refer to, she must intend to do so.
Thus, I may use the name Napoleon to refer to my pet cat, even if I first became
acquainted with the name in a situation where it was being used to refer to the
famous French general. The important point is that, in such a case, I do
not intend to use the name to refer to the individual the lender used it to refer to.
Instead, I intend to introduce a new name into the lexicon, one that just happens to
sound exactly like a name for the famous French general.
One of the most serious and enduring problems facing the causal theory of reference
(as sketched by Kripke, at least) is that it appears to be at odds with the phenomenon
of reference shift via error. Gareth Evans cites the case of Madagascar, once used
to refer to a portion of the African mainland, but now used to refer to the great
African island. Marco Polo was apparently the first speaker to use the name to refer
to the island. He was under the impression a misimpression that this was how
the name was actually used. The problem is this: when Marco Polo used the name,
he surely intended to refer to whatever was referred to by the person(s) from whom
he acquired the name. His intention was not to introduce a novel use of the name.
But the individual(s) from whom Polo acquired the name intended (by hypothesis)
to use the name to refer to a portion of the African mainland. How, then, did it come
to refer to the island? Evans goes on to provide an imaginary case that makes the
same basic point.
Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse
inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth

undeniably be the case that the man universally known as Jack is so-called because
a woman dubbed some other baby with that name. (1982, p. 301)
The causal theorist faces a dilemma here. First, she might propose that (contra what
seems to be the natural way of describing these cases) in each case a new name has
actually been introduced, i.e. Madagascar-2 and Jack-2. This would entail that
not every reference-fixing use of a name turns out to be intentional; sometimes new
names are introduced, and their reference somehow fixed, unintentionally.
Alternatively, the causal theorist can modify her view so as to allow for events
subsequent to the initial dubbing to affect what a given name refers to. Devitt (1981)
develops a version of the latter strategy by contending that a name is typically
grounded in its bearer in numerous perceptual confrontations after the initial
dubbing. As part of what grounds reference, these perceptual confrontations are
thus semantically significant and capable of effecting reference change over time.
The basic idea is that, given a sufficient number of such groundings over a sufficient
period of time, reference change may occur. Thus, Madagascar was able to shift
reference from the mainland to the island once perceptually-based groundings in the
island became established. The island was effectively dubbed Madagascar by
means of such groundings. (Note that this entails that Marco Polo was unlikely to be
the first to use the name Madagascar to refer to the island, since, although he might
have been apt to apply that name to the island, an insufficient number of groundings
would have obtained at the point when he was himself using the name.) And the man
known by all as Jack is not so-called because, years earlier, someone dubbed
another individual that name. He is so-called because numerous uses of Jack are
grounded in him.
Although the causal theory (as revised by Devitt) provides a plausible account of
nominal reference, its advocates still need to supplement their theory of reference
with a theory of meaning a theory that accounts for the fact that proper names
appear to have some sort of meaning or cognitive content. [9] On its own, the causal
theory of reference does not provide any answers to the questions of cognitive
significance that so bothered description theorists like Frege and Russell.