SANTOS v LLAMAS

COMPLAINANT: Soliman S. Santos

RESPONDENT:Atty. Francisco Llamas
A.C. No. 4749
Jan. 20, 2000
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
Letter-complaint of Santos dtd Feb 8, 1997:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place
of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997:
(originals available)

Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br.
224, QC
Annex B - "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
(not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C - "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of
the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which
provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be
a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM
(see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter complaint were:

o the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address
and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."
o a copy of the order, dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case
No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

RESPONDENTS COMMENT-MEMORANDUM:
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R.
No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing
is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent
was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
 Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set
aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had
only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but
only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready
to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly
insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is
reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

December 4, 1998 - the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

IBP FINDINGS:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited
that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is
still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP
by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such
was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
WICKER V ARCANGEL

PETITIONERS: Kelly R. Wicker

Atty. Orlando Rayos
RESPONDENT:Hon. Paul T. Arcangel
G.R. No. 112869
Jan. 29, 1996
Mendoza, J.

FACTS
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by
which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently
titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe.
Nov. 18, 1993 Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge
from the consideration of the case.

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver
the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios
Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one
hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise
appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty.
Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar
Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case
was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;

4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for
plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel
that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;

5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant
doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.

Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both
counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court.

OPPOSITION TO AND/OR COMMENT TO MOTION TO CITE FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT DIRECTED

AGAINST PLAINTIFF KELLY R. WICKER AND HIS COUNSEL:
o Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because
he merely signed the motion in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly
Wicker, who said in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised
him to have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new
judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos
knew who the judge may be and when he would appear.

December 3 1993 respondent judge held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment
for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in
citing them for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a
respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of
contempt.

RESPONDENT JUDGES COMMENT:

o alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as
petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia
Calcetas-Santos
o that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18, 1993
o that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the
young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition
o that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated
December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible remedies
o that after holding petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from
trying Civil Case No. 14048
 o that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is
untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his
client
o that by tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order,
petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him
o that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in
their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of
the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court
Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground
that he had a full grasp of the case.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are guilty of direct contempt

HELD:

o What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly
containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to
be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct
contempt.
o it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right
about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no
ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is
important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners liable for direct contempt.
o We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that
respect without which the administration of justice will fail.[8] The contempt power ought not to be utilized for
the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for
the dignity of the court.
o These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an
unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well
connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of
Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93,
precisely in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution. This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he
claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client
allegedly asked him to do.
o In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his
client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the
allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who
verified the same.
o To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young
man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew
who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new
judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge
had been personally recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out
were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for
inhibition.
o Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which
he could not overstep. Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based
on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
o Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins him to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on
similar conduct by others and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case.
o After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he
would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their
instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former
station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in
Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude,
a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of
good faith.
o WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of
imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the
petitioners.
IN RE ALMACEN

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-
27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
G.R. No. L-27654
Feb. 18, 1970

FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against
what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court.
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity."
His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."
In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated."
He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

BACKGROUND
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place
of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied.
He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion
for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a
minute resolution.
With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only
in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept
every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively
carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.

On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will
not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was
suspended indefinitely.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we
are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

A.C. No. 4018.

March 8, 2005

FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this
disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating
the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA
was resolved in favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him.

The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the
charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his
imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said
AO before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and insisted that
respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve
the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order. Respondent MR was denied with finality.

On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious threat to the
integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus,
nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue
TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in
said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of this case and penalized
with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the
part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very
strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, which pertained solely to the period of suspension from
the practice of law from a five-year suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this
Court.

ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.

RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease
to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member
of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however,
be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration
for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies
of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v.
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC

FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986,
and Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation
on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was
headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official
capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the
areas covered by the proclamations.

Violation of Rule 6.02: In the complaint, the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants
sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land when respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainants sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The respondent prevailed upon Miguel
Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents deceased wife.
As a result, complainants sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the DENR.

Violation of Rule 6.03: The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas
belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents
promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant
alleged that the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the
land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the
land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.

Violation of Rule 1.01: The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering
his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119.
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an
award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the
objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice
of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment, the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against
him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was
nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office
of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

ISSUE:
WON respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was
still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer
a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected
with.

RULING:
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. After a careful
evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss
the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer: A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously
held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their
private interests.

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong, we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest,
but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty
when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
In Vitriolo v. Dasig, we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of
extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we
found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office. Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano we found the
respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the
complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. Complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before LMB. By 1996, the
complainants sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the
DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of
the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective public office and
membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.These circumstances do not show
that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his
official duties. Since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land
does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken.
 Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father, do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by
the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation. The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters involvement was limited to being paid the
loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel
Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates
when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance [27] over the subject land was executed or on
October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo
decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to
finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel and the document entitled Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that
there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage
in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the
law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. [30] The last
paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the
power to influence the proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter
which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the
proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described private practice of law as one that
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public
as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on
Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant
to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been
resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, [34] when the DENR
gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals[35] and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after
finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court
to exercise its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,
[38]
until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the
first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions
warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02,
Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.