OPEN FORUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF

LAW IN CHINA

ROUNDTABLE
BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

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 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
DAVID DREIER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK WOLF, Virginia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON SMITH, Oregon
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
DAVID WU, Oregon BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*
LORNE CRANER, Department of State*
JAMES KELLY, Department of State*

JOHN FOARDE, Staff Director

DAVID DORMAN, Deputy Staff Director
* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in the 108th
Congress.

(II)

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 CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENTS
Seyet, Kaiser, the Uighur American Association, Woodbridge, VA ..................... 2
Marsh, Terri, human rights attorney, Washington, DC ....................................... 3
Cooper, Timothy, Worldrights, Washington, DC ................................................... 5
Huang, Ciping, given by Wei Wu, the Wei Jingsheng Foundation, Wash-
ington, DC ............................................................................................................. 6

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS
Seyet, Kaiser ............................................................................................................ 22
Marsh, Terri ............................................................................................................. 23
Cooper, Timothy ....................................................................................................... 25

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Ciping Huang, executive director, Wei Jingsheng Foun-
dation and human rights chair, Independent Federation of Chinese Stu-
dents and Scholars (IFCSS), Washington, DC ................................................... 28
Prepared statement of Kery Wilkie Nunez, Washington, DC .............................. 31

(III)

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 OPEN FORUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE
OF LAW IN CHINA

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.,
in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde [staff
director] presiding.
Mr. FOARDE. On this beautiful fall afternoon, we do not have as
many of our staff colleagues as we like. I am sure that some will
come along in the next few minutes to join us.
But on behalf of Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa, the chairman
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [CECC], and
our co-chairman, Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, as well as the
individual Commission members, I would like to welcome all of
you, and particularly our four panelists, to this issues roundtable
of the CECC.
Todays roundtable is conducted in the Open Forum format. We
try to do this once or twice a year to permit people who have things
to say about issues in our mandate on human rights and on the
rule of law in China the opportunity to speak for about 5 minutes,
offer us a written statement for the record, and then, as we do with
our other roundtables, and also hearings, have a chance for us to
ask questions and hear answers from the individual speakers.
We have four speakers today representing a variety of points of
view and issues. I will introduce them all, and then individually be-
fore they speak. We will let you go for about 4 minutes, then I will
tell you that there is 1 minute left. That is your signal to wrap up
your presentation.
Inevitably, it is hard to say everything that you want to say in
5 minutes, because it is not a very long time. But we will try to
give you the opportunity during the question and answer period to
catch up any of the issues that you wanted to mention and did not
have the opportunity in your main statement.
Our speakers this afternoon are Mr. Kaiser Seyet from the
Uighur American Association, Ms. Terri Marsh, a human rights at-
torney, Mr. Timothy Cooper from Worldrights, and our old friend
Huang Ciping from the Wei Jingsheng Foundation, who had travel
problems this afternoon and is probably not going to be able to join
us in person, but a colleague is going to read her statement for her
into the record. We welcome you and thank you for doing that.
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Let us go right to the statements then. We normally work wall

to window, so we will ask Mr. Kaiser Seyet from the Uighur Amer-
ican Association to begin, please.

STATEMENT OF KAISER SEYET, THE UIGHUR AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION, WOODBRIDGE, VA
Mr. SEYET. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. Thanks for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the
Uighur community in the United States.
My topic today is Escalating Refoulement of Uighur Refugees.
The Uighur American Association is deeply concerned about the
rising number of peaceful Uighur dissidents being returned to the
Peoples Republic of China [PRC] from other countries.
Although media attention has raised concerns about the deporta-
tion of Tibetan refugees from Nepal and caused governments to act,
no such attention has been paid to the escalating phenomena of
peaceful dissidents being returned from Central Asian states and
Pakistan under pressure from the Chinese Government.
Before the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
[SCO] Chinese diplomats would bring accusations of criminal
wrongdoing against Uighur refugees and seek their deportation.
Wanted posters in Chinese and the local language were posted on
the streets in many cities.
The pressure employed against the refugees and their place of
refuge can be summed up with this excerpt from a 1996 internal
Chinese Communist Party document.
Limit the activities of outside ethnic separatist activities from many sides. Bear
in mind the fact that Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are the home bases for
the activities of outside separatist forces. Through diplomacy, urge these countries
to limit and weaken the activities of separatist forces inside their border. Take full
advantage of political superiority to further develop the bilateral friendly coopera-
tion with these countries. At the same time, always maintain pressure on them.
Considering the ethnic separatism activities outside the border, carry out all nec-
essary dialog and struggle. Strengthen the investigation and study outside of the
border. Collection information on the related development directions of events, and
be especially vigilant against and prevent, by all means, the outside separatist
forces from making the so-called Eastern Turkestan problem international.
The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document Central Committee
(1996) No. 7. Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bu-
reau of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in
Xinjiang.
When the SCO was formed, official contacts started in the Cen-
tral Asian war on terrorism. At that point, the campaign against
East Turkestan separatists had not been internationalized, but
dissidents quietly continued to be arrested and returned to face im-
prisonment, torture, even death, just for leaving the Peoples Re-
public of China.
After the events of September 11, 2001, and the beginning of the
U.S. war on terrorism, Chinese Government officials began to
equate the peaceful expression of thought with terrorism. In many
official Chinese Government statements, terrorism, and separatism
appear side by side as crimes to be fought.
The criminalization of peaceful ideas is not condoned by the U.S.
Constitution, nor any international body or agreement, yet such a
tactic is used to repress dissidents in countries that neighbor the

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 3

Peoples Republic of China. The entire process should be viewed as

an extension of the Chinese Government police state.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that no State Party
shall expel, return (refouler), or extradite a person to another
state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
The Uighur American Association recommends that the U.S.
Government, in its official dealings with Central Asian states, in-
cluding Pakistan, Nepal, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, reinforce
the ideal of the rule of law, namely the principle of non-
refoulement with regard to people escaping persecution and oppres-
sion from the Peoples Republic of China; raise concerns about the
treatment of refugees and their rights as guaranteed under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; raise the issue for forced
repatriations, the abuse of human and civil rights before the proper
U.N. bodies; and press for meaningful reform and change within
the Peoples Republic of China such that so many do not feel com-
pelled to flee their homeland.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Seyet appears in the appendix.]
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much for your statement.
Next, we would like to hear from Ms. Terri Marsh, a human
rights attorney. I understand you are here representing Falun
Gong.
Ms. MARSH. Yes.
Mr. FOARDE. Please.

STATEMENT OF TERRI MARSH, HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEY,

WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. MARSH. Thank you. Thank you for having me here.
The talk is entitled, The Rule By Law in China Today and its
impact on Falun Gong.
According to Jerome Cohen in his The Plight of the Criminal
Defense Lawyers presented to this Commission on July 26, 2002,
Chinas entire criminal process is in need of radical reform.
In his view, A radical, long-run political restructuring would be
necessary to bring the PRCs criminal process into compliance with
even minimal international standards.
A cursory look at Professor Jerome Cohens piece allows us to see
that there are basically two problems that he identified. On the one
hand, he notes how the practice of criminal law in China itself vio-
lates the body of law, that is, the Constitution, the penal code, pris-
on law, police law, and so on.
One example would be that interrogation of arrested persons and
torture is, of course, prohibited by both the Constitution in China
and by police law, and nonetheless it is fairly commonplace in
China for persons who have been arrested, and most notably Falun
Gong practitioners, to be tortured.
On the other hand, and in addition to the violation of Chinese
law, the Peoples Republic of China typically promulgates adminis-
trative orders, notices, regulations, explanations, and the like
which create exceptions to the already drafted rules of law.

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These exceptions put disfavored classesfor example, Falun

Gongat a disadvantage for securing the rights the state acknowl-
edges that they have. Again, examples abound. I welcome you to
look at the printed copy of my statement.
Just to mention one, which is supported by a handout that is out-
side. Falun Gong practitioners are denied access to legal counsel by
an announcement which was promulgated by the Judicial Bureau
of Beijing City. There are lots more examples, some of which I will
turn to in a few moments.
These two types of defects in China are highlighted, although not
in reference to China per se, by Ronald Dworkin in his landmark
book, A Matter of Principle, in chapter 2, where he distinguishes
between two conceptions of the rule of law, both of which are con-
spicuously absent in China.
The rule-book conception, and I am just going to read you a
quote from Dworkin at this point, insists that
The power of the state not be exercised against individual citizens except in ac-
cordance with rules which are explicitly set out in a public rule-book, which is, of
course, available to everyone.
The government, as well as ordinary citizens must play by these rules until they
are changed in accordance with further rules about how they ought to be changed,
which is also to be set forth in the rule-book.
This narrow conception is not concerned with substantive justice,
but rather with rules.
There is a second formulation also highlighted by Ronald
Dworkin in chapter 2 of A Matter of Principle. The second formu-
lation permits us to further evaluate state law to see if it is
consistent with minimal international standards of law, but more
importantly it allows us to distinguish, for example, between a rule
of law, and then the rules promulgated, for example, by the Nazis
during World War II.
This latter formulation additionally illustrates how, in fact, what
is packaged in China as a rule of law is in fact a rule by law.
I will just give you some examples in China of how this works.
For example, in terms of promulgation of orders, notices, and what-
not which create exceptions which prevent people from benefiting
from the existing law, we know that by order of former President
Jiang, the police arrested Falun Gong practitioners in April 1999
without any legal basis.
Then the former president himself defined the crimes retro-
actively by trying to persuade the French newspaper, Figaro, that
Falun Gong is, indeed, an evil cult.
Then in October, the legislative branch passed out the infamous
anti-cult law to legitimate the illegal arrests by outlawing Falun
Gong.
Finally, the Supreme Peoples Court, instead of ruling on cases,
expounds on the nature of Falun Gong by issuing a notice declar-
ing, at the behest of Jiang, that Falun Gong is indeed an evil cult.
So we can see from this that Falun Gong practitioners are guilty
prior to their trials.
I guess I should apologize a little bit for failure to utilize my time
well.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Marsh appears in the appendix.]

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Mr. FOARDE. That is all right. We can come back to other points
that you have during the question and answers.
Next, let us call on Mr. Timothy Cooper from Worldrights. Per-
haps you would tell us a little bit about your organization as you
get started. It is very interesting. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY COOPER, WORLDRIGHTS,

WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. COOPER. I will, indeed. I want to express my appreciation to
the Commission for allowing non-governmental organizations
[NGOs] to come before it to testify on critical issues of human
rights in China.
I am representing here today the family of Dr. Wang Bingzhang,
who was recently sentenced to life imprisonment in China on
charges of espionage and terrorism. They extend their appreciation
to this Commission and wish that, in fact, they could be here to
testify.
Dr. Wang Bingzhang is known as the father of the overseas
democracy movement. He has been associated with it, in fact pio-
neered it, some 20 years ago. He was trained as a lung surgeon.
He studied at McGill University, earned his Ph.D. there in coro-
nary arterial research. He decided not to practice medicine, and
famously stated that medicine can only cure a few patients, but
cannot cure the disease of a nation.
He ventured into Vietnam in June 2002, to meet with a number
of labor leaders associated with the ever-rising labor movement in-
side China. He went there to, in effect, try to make a marriage, a
union if you will, between the pro-democracy movement and the
labor movement inside China, to marry the head of the democracy
movement with the body politic of the labor movement, a reason-
able strategy in light of the need to amplify the numbers com-
mitted to the pro-democracy movement in China.
Once in Vietnam, he did, in fact, meet with a labor leader in the
town of Mongcai, which is on the border of Vietnam and China.
After that meeting was complete, they noticed that they were being
followed.
They went back to their hotel to retrieve their baggage so that
they could depart that area of the country as soon as possible. They
were, at that point, accosted in the hotel lobby by plainclothes Viet-
namese policeor people who posed as Vietnamese policeand
were taken into a van under false pretenses.
They were told they were being taken to the police station in
Mongcai, but in fact were taken to the outskirts of town, to the
Beilun River, which cuts between China and Vietnam, where a
boat was waiting for them.
They were beaten, particularly Dr. Wang Bingzhang, taken on
board this boat, and taken over to the China side where they were
met by an entirely new group of individuals, about 10 men.
There had been about 10 men in the lobby, most of whom spoke
Vietnamese, 2 of whom spoke Chinese, most interestingly. They
were greeted by this new set of people.
It was noted that one of the original captors had a picture of Dr.
Wang Bingzhang in his possession that he proudly showed to the

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others to confirm Dr. Wang Bingzhangs identification, and they

were handed over to this new group.
They were then blindfolded, bound, and taken to a hotel for
about a week where a $10 million ransom was demanded of the
three Chinese dissidents. No stranger idea, I think, could be put
out there than a kidnapper demanding such a high ransom from
Chinese dissidents. If one is associated in any way with the Chi-
nese democracy movement, one understands clearly that it is vir-
tually penniless.
Having no money, the dissidents offered the contact numbers,
their cell phone numbers, for their family and relations back in
America, France, and elsewhere. Those individuals were never
contacted.
About a week later, the new captors took them to a temple,
bound, still gagged, and left them. Mysteriously, several minutes
later, the Chinese police arrived and said, We are here, we are
rescuing you. But instead they were immediately detained. They
were never released. In fact, from that point on, they met a new
form of detention.
They were then held incommunicado for about 512 months while
the Chinese Government emphatically denied that they had any in-
formation whatsoever about their whereabouts.
Finally, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi were released, but Dr. Wang
Bingzhang was put on trial for espionage and for terrorism.
He has denied his association with any of those activities. He de-
clared himself wholly innocent. In fact, when the United Nations
Arbitrary Detention Committee looked at this case, they came to
the same conclusion, that the Chinese Government had offered no
proof whatsoever that Dr. Wang was associated in any way with
either espionage or terrorism.
Indeed, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared
that the Chinese Government had arbitrarily detained these indi-
viduals, that the detention was a violation of international norms,
and that Dr. Wang Bingzhang should be released.
Speaking on behalf of the family, we implore the U.S. Congress
to pass a joint resolution on his behalf. It is high time that the
United States stood behind a man who has committed most of his
adult life, certainly the best years of his life, to the cause of human
rights and democracy in China. We would simply ask that the Con-
gress look at this issue and determine its resolve, and pass a reso-
lution on his behalf. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper appears in the appendix.]
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper.
Our friend and frequent contributor to our open forums, Ms.
Huang Ciping, cannot be with us because of travel problems, so her
colleague is going to read her statement.
But would you introduce yourself for the record, please?

STATEMENT OF HUANG CIPING, GIVEN BY WEI WU, THE WEI

JINGSHENG FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. WU. Yes. Ladies and gentlemen. I am speaking on a state-
ment of Huang Ciping on behalf of the Wei Jingsheng Foundation
and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars.

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The topic of the speech is No Press Freedom in China After

SARS.
Early last spring, the Chinese press got unexpected world atten-
tion because of SARS. World opinion had increased hope for Chi-
nese press freedom. The sad reality is that China has not gained
more press freedom since SARS.
In June 2003, the Chinese Communist Party criticized more than
10 newspapers and magazines. Afterward, some sensitive articles
had to be killed before publishing. The prohibited topics included
SARS, the North Korean nuclear crisis, the nuclear submarine ex-
plosion, and the Zhou Zhengyi corruption case in Shanghai.
Also, in the summer the government clearly stated prohibition to
discuss certain issues, such as modifying the Constitution, political
reforms, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement.
China has a long way to go toward real press freedom. The root
of the problem lies in the system, which has been there for over
half a century under the CCP rule. The following facts are some
of our highest concerns.
First, there is no real private press in China and no independent
journalism under the one party system of the CCP. The registra-
tion of a publication is very complicated. The government, at any
time, can easily crush a newspaper if it violates government regu-
lations, or just displeases some officials.
Second, Internet censorship. In China, many Web sites are
blocked. The government has over 300,000 Internet police, 50,000
of them work directly for the National Security Department.
Liu Di, a Chinese college student, has been detained for months
because of some essays she published in a chat room. One-third of
all foreign mails went through inspections beyond even targeted
mails, and phone tapping is public knowledge in China.
Third, brave journalists and liberal editors often get in trouble,
and some are put in prison just because they report the truth or
speak from conscience. In fact, Chinese journalists are the direct
victims under the Chinese Communist rules. Many of them have
lost their freedoms, or even lives.
Fourth, to survive, one must speak the Partys tongue. Keep the
same tongue with the Party, is the first rule for all Chinese jour-
nalists.
Fifth, China has been reported to be the second worst country for
freedom of press and speech. The biased, misleading, even false in-
formation serves only the Chinese Governments agenda. On sen-
sitive issues, only the government has the right to decide if the
news can be made public.
Sixth, the Chinese people do not trust the news if it is presented
by the Chinese Government. Chinese people do not have faith in
the Chinese Government. They know that their government cheats.
Chinese people usually rely on the BBC, Voice of America, Radio
Free Asia, or other overseas media.
Finally, foreign investment and Internet will not bring free press
to China. On one hand, many argue that foreign investment will
bring freedom, including freedom of the press to China. On the
other hand, the Chinese Government pointed out that the news
media is a special enterprise that does not allow the rule of who
invests in it owns it.

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The government specifically stated that the news media is a

State enterprise which applies to all newspapers. A similar idea
applies to the Internet. The Internet and advanced computer tech-
nology has become the tool for government monitoring and suppres-
sion of dissent.
It is a shame that U.S. companies such as Yahoo! cooperate vol-
untarily with the Chinese Government. It is more a shame for
Western companies to work closely with the Chinese Government
to create the Golden Shield which helped make the Chinese Gov-
ernment policing of the Internet the best in the world.
Here, we urge the freedom- and democracy-loving American peo-
ple and the U.S. Congress to examine these issues and to prevent
moneymaking deals when the price is the Chinese peoples human
rights and freedom.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Huang Ciping appears in the ap-
pendix.]
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu Wei, on behalf of
Huang Ciping.
Thanks to our other panelists this afternoon. It is very important
for the Commission, and the Commission staff, particularly, to get
to know people who are working on human rights issues for promi-
nent NGOs and to hear the information that you have, and the ar-
guments that you have put together.
So, having an open forum like this is particularly useful. The
transcript of it is widely circulated among the commissioners, and
we appreciate your spending the time not only to come this after-
noon, but to prepare.
I am going to give you just a minute to catch your breath while
I mention a couple of administrative matters.
Our next major public event of the full Commission is a hearing
on September 24 entitled, Is China Playing By the Rules: Free
Trade, Fair Trade and WTO Compliance. This hearing will look
into the commercial rule of law and WTO compliance part of our
mandate.
The hearing will be on Wednesday, the 24th at 10:30 a.m. in the
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 419. Chairman Jim Leach
will preside.
In addition, on Monday, September 22 at 2:30 p.m., we will have
an issues roundtable on Internet Freedom and Free Flow of Elec-
tronic Information in China. I do not have a room to tell you yet,
but please continue to consult the CECC Web site at www.cecc.gov.
On the Web site, you can sign up for our mailing list if you want
to get e-mails with these announcements from us.
Also, our statute requires that we file a report on the activities
of the Commission and on human rights and the development of
the rule of law in China every year. The report, formally, is due
on October 9 every year, but for reasons of scheduling we try to re-
lease it a little earlier than that.
Again, this year, we hope to release it at a press conference on
October 2, which I believe is a Wednesday, right? Yes, a Wednes-
day. Again, I do not have a room for you yet, but we are working
on that. We will make a public announcement about the avail-
ability of the annual report.

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Of course, it will be available in PDF format on our Web site for

you to download freely during the year if you should need it again.
I would like to go now to the question and answer session and
allow each of our speakers to amplify their thoughts a little bit,
and perhaps answer some questions I have jotted down here while
listening to your testimony.
Perhaps I would start with Mr. Kaiser Seyet, please. Can you
give me an idea for the record of the amount of cross-border travel
that there is between the Xinjiang area where Uighurs mostly live
and the surrounding countries?
For example, some of the ones that you mentioned. Is it a com-
mon thing, in other words, for people legally and normally to cross
borders to trade, or to visit family? Does that happen?
Mr. SEYET. It is not very common. All cross-border visits are for
business, for travel, or to see friends or family. This is all con-
trolled by the Chinese Government.
Mr. FOARDE. So if you were a Uighur and you wanted to travel
across border to one of the neighboring countries to, say, trade, you
would need to get an exit permit, is that what you are saying, from
the Chinese Government?
Mr. SEYET. Yes. You would have to have a passport and exit permit.
Mr. FOARDE. So the Chinese Government can restrict the num-
bers of passports that are issued, for example, to Chinese nationals
of Uighur nationality, and also control the exit permits.
Mr. SEYET. Yes. Recently, the Chinese Government published
that they made it easier for people to apply for passports and exit
permits, but they have special rules and laws for the Uighur mi-
nority to get passports.
For most people, if you are under 40, it is very hard to get a
passport across borders. Usually, from what I know, to get a pass-
port usually takes 2 years from application to approval.
During these 2 years, the Chinese Government is going to check
your background, if you have had any political problem or any
other problems against the government, or anything.
Mr. FOARDE. Would the same questions be asked of a Chinese
national of the Han nationality who might be living in Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region?
Mr. SEYET. I do not think they have the same problem because
the separatism and terrorism campaign only focuses on the Uighur
nationality. I do not think the Chinese people have as hard a prob-
lem as the Uighurs.
Mr. FOARDE. So at least as far as you know, if a Han person
wished to get a passport and an exit permit to visit a neighboring
country for trade, that would also be much easier than it would be
for a Uighur, is that correct?
Mr. SEYET. Yes.
Mr. FOARDE. All right.
Do you or your organization have any specific evidence of specific
Uighurs that have been sent back from neighboring countries after
they had gone across the border to ask for political asylum or shel-
ter, or refuge of any sort?
Mr. SEYET. Yes, sir. We contacted some people who returned
from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan, and also Amnesty

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International reported such things documented on their Web site

that we can provide to you.
Mr. FOARDE. So you have names and places? That would be very
useful for us to have that information. If you could provide it, it
would be very, very useful.
Mr. SEYET. I will.
Mr. FOARDE. Can you give me an idea, generally, what happens
to people when they are brought back to China after having been
expelled from the country that they have gone to?
Mr. SEYET. Usually they are held in a private, very secret place.
Nobody knows what jail they are in. The Chinese authorities do not
inform their relatives or friends. They torture them and ask what
they did outside China.
Mr. FOARDE. But, again, do you have specific reports of that sort
of behavior happening?
Mr. SEYET. Yes.
Mr. FOARDE. All right. We would be interested in seeing that as
well.
Mr. SEYET. Also, Amnesty International has a report on the tor-
ture, and some of them are sentenced to death. Some disappear
without any information. We do not know if they are alive or dead.
Mr. FOARDE. And their families have not been in touch with
them. Have they been able to get legal representation, as far as
you know?
Mr. SEYET. I do not think they can get legal representation.
Mr. FOARDE. No lawyers, you think.
Mr. SEYET. No.
Mr. FOARDE. This is, unfortunately, not an unusual practice.
Let me ask a couple of final questions. Did the people that you
are knowledgeable about who went home after being expelled forc-
ibly from the third country, did they try to apply formally for asy-
lum in the third country or did they try to contact the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees when they were abroad?
Mr. SEYET. Some of them applied in the third country for asy-
lum. Some of them applied to the U.N. High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees. During this time, there was intense pressure from economic
and political forces in central Asian countries, those central Asian
governments helped transfer those people who were requesting
asylum.
So, from 1999, most Uighur people thought they could seek asy-
lum in Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan, but because of
Chinese Government pressure, all of them were handed over to the
Chinese Government and they were brought back to China.
Uighur refugees do not ask for U.N. help because that takes a
lot of time. In those neighboring countries they do not have status,
they do not have a source of income. So, the Chinese Government
finds it very easy to find them and take them back to China. Also,
those countries are helping the Chinese Government to send them
back to China.
Mr. FOARDE. Let me ask a final question. You mentioned in your
statement the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We are all very
interested in this group and how it may be operating in practice
across a broad array of issues, not just the human rights issues
that we are interested in in the Commission.

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But do you have any evidence that there are formal agreements
that have been reached between the Chinese Government and the
governments of the neighboring countries that are part of the SCO,
under that umbrella, to automatically send back potential asylum
seekers to China?
Mr. SEYET. On the SCO, they have contacts. When they formed
the SCO, they say it is to address economic, political, and other
border issues. They especially mentioned whether those countries
were going to stand against terrorism and separatism? They are re-
quired to send over people and give the names to the Chinese Gov-
ernment, and their country can give them back names of terrorists.
So, there is like a cooperation.
Mr. FOARDE. At least there is a statement about cooperation.
Mr. SEYET. Yes, a statement.
Mr. FOARDE. But do I understand you to say that, as far as you
know, there is no formal agreement between the Chinese Govern-
ment and any other government on this, no formal treaty or other
bilateral agreement, just the statements that have been in public,
SCO documents?
Mr. SEYET. I think there are statements in SCO documents.
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. That is very useful.
Let me turn to Mr. Cooper, if you do not mind. Dr. Wang
Bingzhangs case, of course, has been a case of great concern to the
Commission and to our commissioners. I think when you see our
forthcoming annual report, you will see a serious discussion of his
case.
But I have some questions, just for the record, that will help us
with facts. When did Dr. Wang leave China? Did he emigrate to
Canada directly, or how did that work?
Mr. COOPER. Yes, that is correct. I think he left at the end of the
1970s and emigrated, as you say, to Canada, and then went to New
York shortly thereafter in 1982, I believe. 1981, 1982.
Mr. FOARDE. Other than the circumstances of the kidnapping, de-
tention, and subsequent arrest and trial of Dr. Wang, is there any
hard evidence that the PRC authorities were informed in advance
of the plans of Dr. Wang and his confreres to go to this place and
consult with the labor leaders? Is there any evidence that some-
body leaked that information?
Mr. COOPER. Well, I think there is certainly evidence that some-
body leaked that information by virtue of the fact that he ended up
being accosted in a hotel room and carted across the border river
into China. How that happened, I do not think we will ever be able
to say with a 100 percent degree of certainty.
I think it is fair to say, however, that in light of the unholy ter-
ror that an alliance such as the one that I described between the
labor movement and the pro-democracy movement would have been
struck in the minds of Chinese authorities, I think they would have
stopped at virtually nothing to put a stop to the incipiency of that
idea, that endeavor.
Mr. FOARDE. You anticipated my third question, which is basi-
cally, why would the PRC go to so much trouble for a small group
of dissidents? I think the answer is that it is potentially a much
larger group. In fact, I think it is correct to say that one of the
things that worried the Party and government structure in the

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spring of 1989 was that you had this potential marriage between
intellectuals, students, and workers.
Mr. COOPER. That is right.
Mr. FOARDE. The only other part of the equation that makes the
Chinese authorities even more anxious, I guess is the polite word
to use, is when you have religious groups involved as well.
Mr. COOPER. We have had ample witness of it in recent years,
I am afraid to say.
Mr. FOARDE. I assume, and we have all assumed, that the plain-
clothes men that detained Dr. Wang and his group in Vietnam and
got them across the border were security agents of some sort. But
is there any formal evidence of that? I mean, anybody declaring
themselves or showing an ID card, or anything like that?
Mr. COOPER. Yes. We have looked at that as closely as we can.
All we can say for certain, is that two of the members of that secu-
rity force in plainclothes spoke with Chinese accents, one Mandarin
and another provincial accent right across the border. So, that is
as close as we can say that they were linked to China.
But I think it is sufficient to say that that group then took them
to the Chinese group of captors within 15, 20 minutes, and that the
boat was waiting for them, that the van was outside the hotel, and
there was an elaborate planning process through which this kid-
napping occurred.
That took a degree of planning and sophistication that I think
required sufficient funds and ample intelligence to suggest, as the
ultimate life imprisonment of Wang Bingzhang rightly suggests,
that there was a commitment on the part of the Chinese authori-
ties to get this man, to bring him into China, and then to secure
his confinement for here and ever after.
Mr. FOARDE. Do you have any sense that the type of meetings
that Dr. Wang was having, or trying to have, along the border
there with PRC-based activists, whether they be labor or other
types of activists, is fairly common? In other words, is that hap-
pening a lot? There would be a group, in other words, conceivably
of security agents paying special attention to the border area for
that reason?
Mr. COOPER. Not to my knowledge. This was, I think, a rarified
example of cutting-edge activism. I do know that there have been
cases of cross-border kidnappings in Korea in the northern areas,
but this was the first time, to my understanding, that a Chinese
dissident had ever been taken from a third country and carted back
into China.
Mr. FOARDE. My understanding is that there is a fair amount of
cross-border kidnapping for ransom, but it is a purely criminal con-
duct or enterprise, not related to anybodys political beliefs.
Mr. COOPER. Yes. Hence, the idea that there might be perceived
to be some legitimacy in describing those actions as kidnapping.
But the fact remains, no family member was ever contacted about
a ransom demand. That, I think, dispels that theory.
Mr. FOARDE. This is the first time that I personally had ever
heard of any activities by overseas-based democracy activists trying
to work through Vietnam to have this sort of contact with people
based in the PRC. So, I agree that there is not much evidence that
it is common.

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All that suggests that there was a leak of some sort, and this
was kind of an organized, state security operation to grab these
people, snatch them, and take them across the border into some-
place where they could be put into police custody.
Mr. COOPER. To say it succinctly, I think he was sold out and set
up. I think thats the only explanation for how this came about in
such a calculated and efficient manner.
Mr. FOARDE. One thing that I wondered a bit about the U.N.
Special Rapporteurs report, is whether they were privy to any for-
mal PRC court documents or transcripts in making their decision.
Mr. COOPER. Yes. That is an interesting question. Not to my
knowledge. I have seen the material that the PRC sent to the Arbi-
trary Detention Committee, and there was no information about
that.
Mr. FOARDE. There was just a formal response, not a copy of a
court transcript or anything.
Mr. COOPER. A formal response from the Chinese Embassy, I
think, in Geneva, the Chinese mission in Geneva. It is possible
there is a deeper layer there that I did not see, but I can say that
I have no knowledge of it.
Mr. FOARDE. It is probably a good conclusion no matter what, but
it would be interesting to know if they had based that conclusion
on anything else.
Mr. COOPER. Have you seen the rapporteurs report?
Mr. FOARDE. Yes. Yes.
Mr. COOPER. All right. You have seen it.
Mr. FOARDE. I have not read it personally word for word.
Mr. COOPER. I have copies of it if you need it.
Mr. FOARDE. I have skimmed it. We have been studying it very
carefully at the staff level at the Commission.
Mr. COOPER. All right. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. FOARDE. This is very useful. We are all looking at what we
might do for Dr. Wang. Just one last question. What is Dr. Wangs
nationality at the moment?
Mr. COOPER. Well, that may be an area of legal contention and
concern. I think it is safe to say that he is a permanent U.S. resident.
Mr. FOARDE. So he has a green card.
Mr. COOPER. Right.
Mr. FOARDE. Meaning his nationality stays as PRC, but he has
permanent residence in the United States.
Mr. COOPER. That is correct.
Mr. FOARDE. Well, as you know, as somebody who used to do this
as both a consular officer and a diplomat for the United States
abroad, the legal basis for making representations about detainees
is much stronger when it is your own national and when both coun-
tries are parties to either a bilateral consular convention or the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations.
It is more difficult when the detainee is a permanent resident,
but still retains the nationality of another country, for example, in
this case, China. But there is a moral basis on which to ask for
help, and particularly when family members and relatives are U.S.
citizens.
The State Department frequently goes in and says, Look, we
recognize that this man is not our national and that we may not

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have a legal right to have access to him or to demand anything

under the Vienna Convention. But he is a long-time permanent
resident, he has friends, family, and relatives who are U.S. citi-
zens.
There is a relationship, and therefore we feel we have good cause
to ask about his whereabouts and ask for access, and the other
things that you might ask for for a citizen. I think that has been
done in the case of Dr. Wang, unfortunately not successfully. But,
very useful. All right.
Let me go on to Ms. Marsh. First, a comment, then a question.
Your initial presentation talked very eloquently about the problem
of the Chinese authorities violating the PRC law and Constitution,
as well as international human rights standards and norms.
I just wanted to comment that this theme is something that you
will see woven throughout our forthcoming annual report, because
it is, at a high level of abstraction, one of the chief problems from
a rule of law point of view.
In many cases, the PRC has good laws, sometimes state-of-the-
art laws. But, on the one hand, the ability of individuals to enforce
their rights is very limited, if present at all. At the other level, the
authorities frequently just ignore, look the other way, or have the
exceptions that you talked about carved out of these things.
I would like to ask a question that you alluded to a little bit, but
it would be useful to have your views on it in a broader way.
What, in your mind, accounts for the virulence of the PRC Gov-
ernments reaction against Falun Gong since, let us say, April
1999?
Ms. MARSH. That is actually not an easy question to answer. I
have certainly heard lots of explanations from various people closer
to the situation than I. My sense is that the principles upon which
Falun Gong is basedthose are compassion, truthfulness, and for-
bearanceI think probably, especially the compassion, are very
much at odds with the need for the PRC to control the population
through the state-run media, the propaganda machines.
There are all sorts of ways, some of which were certainly men-
tioned in my talk, that China uses to control the people in China.
You cannot control people who prefer compassion, truthfulness, and
tolerance to advancing up the political ladder.
You cannot control people who are willing to be arrested and tor-
tured. My understanding is, from the study I have done of the Cul-
tural Revolution, of Tiananmen, and then this, is that if Mao
Zedong starts the Cultural Revolution and somebody did not like
it, no matter high up he wasand there are many examplesthey
were just arrested and tortured. So, many high-ranking officials of
the Communist Party were tortured. They are not alive any more.
There are so many in house detention.
So, to me, it was just not possible for Jiang Zemin and the Com-
munist Party to maintain control over China with all these people
liberating themselves with these noble principles.
And it is sad, because these are the principles, to me, that are
really constitutive of our humanity. These are the best that we can
be. So to see those principles trampled upon because of a need to
control people, it is very sad.

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Mr. FOARDE. Is it not also true that, at least in the early 1990s,
there was both formal and tacit government support for Falun
Gong.
Ms. MARSH. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. FOARDE. And a great number of government officials, mem-
bers of the Peoples Liberation Army, and what have you, were
practitioners of Falun Gong at some level?
Ms. MARSH. Yes. It was so popular. I mean, that is what is so
amazing to me, is that members of the Politburo, Jiang Zemins
family.
I mean, everybodythis is what I have been toldwas practicing
Falun Gong, because it is based on ancient traditions of China, the
gigong practice. It comes from an ancient cultivation practice and
it really resonates in China. So, everybody was practicing it.
There were awards given to Li Hongzhi, the different Chinese re-
search societies were constantly acclaiming his books, they were
the most popular books being read in China. Everybody was out
there in the morning doing the exercises.
In fact, for about 2 years1997 to 1999Jiang Zemin, who I
think almost single-handedly started this persecution, although it
certainly garnered support from elsewhere, told the Public Security
Bureau to investigate Falun Gong, thinking that doing so would
produce what he wanted. They did an enormous investigation and
they said, No, there is nothing wrong. They are fine. They do not
break the law, they do not do this. . .
So, it was popular. Through the ordinary sort of legal channels,
Jiang could not stop it. That is why I think you had so many excep-
tions and all these notices and administrative orders, and so on
and so forth.
Mr. FOARDE. So do I understand you to say that, as far as you
know, the investigation into Falun Gong by the senior Chinese
leadership predated the March 1999 demonstration?
Ms. MARSH. Absolutely. Jiang Zemin had 2 years in which he
was trying, through legitimate channels, to stop and stifle Falun
Gong, and it did not work. Then he gave a speech in April 1999
before the Politburo and basically just said, This is what is going
to happen. We are going to get rid of Falun Gong, because they are
a threat. He connected them to the West and to the United States,
and all this kind of silly language. People opposed him.
And I do not know these Chinese names, but the Premier [Zhu
Rongji], I think, himself was totally on the other side, and met with
the practitioners and said, Do not worry, this is not going to hap-
pen, you are not going to be banned.
But then Jiang Zemin, I think he had some high-ranking person
in the Chinese Communist Party arrested and tortured badly. Then
all of a sudden the Premier became silent and everybody became
quiet because of memories of the Cultural Revolution. I mean,
there is fear. I wonder myself, how would I fare under torture?
Mr. FOARDE. It is a very difficult question. Certainly if you look
at any of the harrowing, but great books that have been written
about Cultural Revolution experiences, it is very difficult for me as
an individual, and I am sure a great many people, to understand
how you would tolerate such treatment. It is very difficult.

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Let me ask you. If the particular anti-Falun Gong campaign was

associated with Jiang Zemin, is there any reason to believe that
the new leaders that have now arisen and been installed by the
Party would either have less interest in a very aggressive persecu-
tion of Falun Gong, or possibly even would see the campaign as
something that belongs to the old regime and try to back away
from it?
Is there any hope of that?
Ms. MARSH. That is also a very difficult question and I am hardly
an expert on politics in China. But it seems to me that it is conceiv-
able that, if we could find a face-saving way to stop the persecu-
tionI mean, the United States would have to play an active role
in thisin which we could somehow approach the new regime and
not force them to retract everything, because they are probably not
prepared to do that, but find some way to just kind of stop talking
about it. Just, let us stop talking about it and just let the people
out, and so on, and so forth. That is a possibility.
But my worry or my concern is, Jiang Zemin is still powerful.
There is so much inter-politicalI mean, I am reading the
Tiananmen Papers now, and it is just so complicated as to who
is what and who is on which side, and so on. Jiang still does exert
some power.
So, I think there needs to be some waning of his power, and per-
haps that will happen. I know he is not popular with the Chinese
people, but that does not seem to matter.
Mr. FOARDE. So it is hard to say whether or not there is any
hope.
Ms. MARSH. It is hard for me to say. There might be persons
wiser than me who can say. But I know that I was personally try-
ing to talk to some of the aides in Congress. Again, this was about
6 months ago. Senator Bidens chief aide, and I think he was also
Senator Kerrys aide.
I was suggesting that we might at least look into a face-saving
way to stop the persecution, because obviously face-saving is so im-
portant in China. To have to say, Well, we made a mistake, I
think that might be expecting too much.
Mr. FOARDE. Or we did it because the Americans forced us to do
it.
Ms. MARSH. Right. Something. Very, very sorry. Something to
save face, but to stop it. I did file this lawsuit against former Presi-
dent Jiang and against quite a few other officials, so I am very
close to the details of the persecution.
It is very hard to know completely with your heart, your mind,
and your soul to know that this is going on every single day, every
single minute of the day, and just go about your business. It is
hard. It is very hard.
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you so much. This is very useful.
Ms. MARSH. Thank you.
Mr. FOARDE. Let me turn to a question or two to Mr. Wu Wei.
Again, I do not want to put you on the spot because I know you
are standing in for Ms. Huang. So, if you do not feel comfortable
answering a question, by all means tell me and we will save it for
her for the next time, because I am sure we will be seeing her fre-
quently, as we always do.

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But I did want to go back into the themes in the statement about
SARS and about the lack of freedom of the press, and how that in
many ways exacerbated the seriousness of the SARS crisis last
spring.
Some medical experts say that SARS may, in fact, come back this
fall. There is even more concern because, just in the last couple of
weeks, local authorities in several places in Guangdong have per-
mitted the sale, again, of civets and other animals that have been
associated with new and different types of retroviruses, including
the SARS virus.
So my question really is, given that they have just had this expe-
rience where the government was very embarrassed because the
epidemic spread very rapidly, and it was the lack of information
that made it spread so widely and the suppression of information
that was already available to journalists, is it more likely or less
likely that, if SARS has a resurgence this fall or this winter, that
the same sort of repressive muzzle will be put on journalists that
want to report the facts about outbreaks and what have you?
Mr. WU. Yes, sir. Well, let me start to tell you a personal story.
A friend of mine who is an Italian student was in China, in Beijing,
studying Chinese back in the spring of this year.
He and his Chinese friend did not know about SARS until the
day when he received an e-mail from his family in Italy, and phone
calls as well, to question about, what is going on in Beijing on the
SARS issue? So, he certainly woke up.
He went to the Internet and checked, I suppose, English or
Italian language online newspapers and discovered the SARS cri-
sis. He went back to his Chinese friend and told them about the
SARS crisis in China. None of his Chinese-educated friends, college
students, believed him. So, that is the degree of censorship and
brainwashing in China, in Beijing, among the top university students.
Now, your question is about the future, I guess, what is going to
happen this fall?
Mr. FOARDE. Will there be the same type of restriction on report-
ing SARS information?
Mr. WU. There is no crystal ball. We cannot predict that. But we
can say, in fact, the new Chinese leadership is the same as we saw
before. That is, they have tightened, again, the information circula-
tion. So I suppose and I expect the Chinese news media to not be
reporting on SARS, as they did during the spring.
Mr. FOARDE. So it is more likely that we will see more of the
same instead of learning the lesson.
Mr. WU. I suspect so, sir.
Mr. FOARDE. Unfortunate, indeed.
Kaiser Seyet, Terri Marsh, Timothy Cooper, Wu Wei, thank you
for spending your time with us this afternoon.
If you would like, since we have a couple of minutes, I would in-
vite you to make a final statement to sum up the things that you
would like the people who read the record to remember.
Maybe we would start with Mr. Seyet, if you would like.
Mr. SEYET. You asked me how long it takes Uighur people to get
a passport. Just for example, for my family, I have been here in
the United States for 612 years. My parents started applying for

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a passport 6 years ago and they have not gotten anything from the
government.
My mother is just a housewife. She does not do anything polit-
ical. My dad is an electrical engineer and has nothing to do with
politics. But it is because I am active here politically, so they have
not gotten a passport yet.
The second thing, about SCO, China has been pressing very hard
on Central Asian countries. It is like, in Central Asian countries,
China does not hesitate going to the addresses and arresting people
by themselves. It is like a part of the Chinese terrorism police can
go there. Sometimes they can arrest people by themselves and take
them to China.
The Uighur refugee problem is worse in Europe. People have
been denied seeking asylum and have been returned due to Chi-
nese Government pressure. We would like the U.S. Senate and
House to pass a resolution to help Uighur refugees.
If they do not give asylum, just do not give them back to China.
China is also a member of the Security Council. They are not obey-
ing the Convention on Refugees as a signatory. So, we would like
to mention this to the Chinese Government to press and to not to
torture and take them back and execute them. Thank you very
much.
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. Very useful.
Terri Marsh.
Ms. MARSH. Well, first, I would like to say that Mike
Jendrzejczyk. I cannot pronounce his name.
Mr. FOARDE. Mike Jendrzejczyk. The late Mike Jendrzejczyk, un-
fortunately.
Ms. MARSH. The Washington director of Human Rights Watch/
Asia said, Cloaking the campaign against Falun Gong in rhetoric
about the rule of law does not give any great legitimacy to Chinas
crackdown on Falun Gong. He urges that the ban and the crack-
down be lifted and everybody be released immediately.
I would supplement his remarks by urging everyone, not only the
Commission, who knows quite well in this area, but the U.S. Gov-
ernment and the U.S. Department of State, I would single out the
Administration, the Bush Administration, the U.S. Department of
Justice, that all of us need, together, to do what we can to stop the
persecution in China and to do what we can to seriously promote
a rule of law in China as opposed to a rule by law.
I think that by permitting China to continue to cloak the rule by
law in a rule of law, we really foster an environment for the cul-
tural revolution, for the tragedy of Tiananmen Square and for the
latest crackdown against Falun Gong. Thank you.
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. Also very useful.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. COOPER. Again, I want to express my appreciation to the
Commission, and to you in particular, for taking the time to listen
to the dire case of Dr. Wang Bingzhang. I would like to remind the
Commission that, even at this very hour, he sits in solitary confine-
ment in a 44 cell. He is not going anywhere. He is facing life in
prison for crimes he did not commit.

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The Chinese Government offered no evidence whatsoever to

prove their case that he committed any act of espionage, any act
of terrorism. There was simply no evidence provided at all.
The accusation, for instance, that he attempted to organize the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Thailand was utterly refuted
when an AP reporter called the Terrorism Department of the Thai
Government and asked whether or not they had even heard of Dr.
Wang Bingzhang, and they said, Absolutely not.
We do not know anything about these charges, anything about
these suspicions. These were fabricated, trumped up charges that
have no bearing to reality in any way, shape or form.
The United Nations probed this case. They determined that Dr.
Wang Bingzhang did not have any knowledge of the charges
against him, did not have the right to legal counsel or the right to
review his own arrest and detention, and that after the date of his
original detention, he did not benefit from the right of the pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to adequate time and facilities for
his own defense, the right to a fair trial by an independent and im-
partial jury, and on and on it goes.
There is no question that he was run roughshod, that he was set
up by, we assume, the Chinese authorities, since that is where they
would most liked to have seen him, and that he has been denied
all justice under law and under universal principles.
So, again, we implore the U.S. Congress to take to heart his case,
to take to heart the separation from freedom that Dr. Wang
Bingzhang knows, and to support him via a Congressional resolu-
tion to exert all due influence on China to free him at the earliest
possible date. Thank you.
Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wei, if you had a word or two on behalf of Huang Ciping and
the organization, please go ahead.
Mr. WU. Yes, sir. I would like to raise two issues. The first, is
the U.S.-based high-tech companies are transferring high-tech tech-
nology to China, and by doing so are helping the Chinese Govern-
ment to increase the degree of information censorship.
Second, I would like to remind Members of Congress that polit-
ical reform and democratization in China is related to U.S. national
security interests. Thank you.
Mr. FOARDE. That will conclude then, for today, our Open Forum.
We will try to do another one of these probably after the first of
the year.
We will have our next activity on Monday the 22nd. As I said,
I do not have a room yet. But as soon as I do, we will send out
an announcement.
Thank you all for coming this afternoon, and to our speakers for
sharing their views and information with us. Good afternoon, all.
(Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m. the open forum was concluded.)

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 APPENDIX

(21)

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PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAISER SEYET

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

ESCALATING REFOULEMENT OF UYGHUR REFUGEES

The Uyghur American Association is deeply concerned about the rising number
of peaceful Uyghur dissidents being returned to the Peoples Republic of China. Al-
though media attention has raised the deportation of Tibetan refugees from Nepal
and caused governments to act, no such attention has been paid to the escalating
phenomena of peaceful dissents being returned from Central Asian states and Paki-
stan under pressure from the Chinese government.
Before the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Chinese
diplomats would bring accusations of criminal wrongdoing against Uyghur refugees
and seek their deportation. Wanted posters in Chinese and the local language have
been posted on the streets in many cities. The pressure employed against the refu-
gees and their place of refuge can be summed up with this except from a 1996 internal
Chinese Communist Party Document:
Limit the activities of outside ethnic separatist activities from many sides.
Bear in mind the fact that Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the home-
bases for the activities of outside separatists forces. Through diplomacy, urge
these countries to limit and weaken the activities of separatist forces inside
their border. Take full advantage of our political superiority to further develop
the bilateral friendly cooperation with these countries. At the same time, always
maintain pressure on them. Considering the ethnic separatism activities outside
of the border, carry out all necessary dialog and struggle. Strengthen the inves-
tigation and study outside of the border. Collect the information on related de-
velopment directions of events, and be especially vigilant against and prevent,
by all means, the outside separatist forces from making the so-called Eastern
Turkistan problem international.
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document Central Committee (1996)
No.7 Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of
the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in Xinjiang
When the SCO was formed, official contacts started in the Central Asian war on
terrorism. At that point, the campaign against East Turkistan separatists had not
been internationalized, but quietly, dissidents continued to be arrested and returned
to face imprisonment, torture and even death, just for leaving the peoples Republic
of China.
After the events of September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the U.S. war on ter-
rorism, Chinese government officials began to equate the peaceful expression of
thought with terrorism. In many official Chinese government statements, terrorism
and separatism appear side-by-side as crimes to be fought.
The criminalization of peaceful ideas is not condoned by the U.S. Constitution nor
any international body or agreement, yet such a tactic is used to repress dissent in
countries that neighbor the PRC. The entire process should be viewed as an exten-
sion of the Chinese government Police State.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment provides that no State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The principle of non-
refoulement is a basic right of all people that flee tyranny and oppression and clearly,
according to the annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report, the Peo-
ples Republic of China abused the rights of citizens accorded under their constitu-
tion. Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment
of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommuni-
cado detention, and denial of due process. Such compelling evidence from the U.S.
State Department merits attention to safeguard the human rights of people escap-
ing oppression in the Peoples Republic of China.
The Uyghur American Association recommends that the U.S. government, in its
official dealings with Central Asian states, including Pakistan, Nepal, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan,

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Reinforce the ideal of the rule of law, namely, the principle of non-refoulement
with regard to people escaping persecution and oppression from the Peoples Re-
public of China;
Raise concerns about the treatment of refugees and their rights as guaranteed
under the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights;
Raise the issue of forced repatriations, the abuse of human and civil rights before
the proper U.N. bodies, and
Press for meaningful reform and change within the Peoples Republic of China
such that so many do not feel compelled to flee their homeland.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRI MARSH

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE RULE BY LAW IN CHINA TODAY

According to Jeremy Cohen in his The Plight of Criminal Defense Lawyers, pre-
sented to this commission on July 26, 2002, Chinas entire criminal process is in
need of radical reform. In his view, a radical, long-run political restructuring would
be necessary to bring the PRCs criminal process into compliance with [even] mini-
mal international standards. A cursory look at the problems Professor Cohen iden-
tifies reveals at least two types. On the one hand, the practice of criminal law in
China itself violates the body of Chinese law, which includes but is not limited to
the Constitution, the Penal Law, Prison Law, and Police Law. For example,
although both the Constitution and Police law prohibit interrogation to produce (en-
forced and hence false) confessions, police interrogation and torture is a fairly com-
mon practice in China, as illustrated in many of the Country Human Rights Reports
published by our Department of State. Specific instances described include torture
by electric shock and the shackling of hands and feet; confinement of practitioners
in mental hospitals; use of excessive force in detaining peaceful protesters; the death
of more than 200 practitioners while in police custody with many of their bodies
bearing signs of severe beatings and torture.; and the cremation of bodies before rel-
atives examine them. See, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights PracticesChina (2000) Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2000/eap/684.ht1
On the other hand, in addition to Chinese violations of their own legal codes, the
second type of problem identified by Professor Cohen has to do with the promulga-
tion of rules, in the form of administrative orders, articles of legislation, notices pro-
mulgated by all sorts of entities and bodies, including even the courts. These create
exceptions to the already drafted rules of law which put some disfavored group or
class at a disadvantage in securing the rights the State acknowledges they have.
In Jerome Cohens piece, of course the disadvantaged are all of those accused of
crimes, especially those accused of political crimes, and all of those trained to defend
those accused of crimesthe criminal defense bar. In spite of the so called right to
counsel afforded to all citizens, the Peoples Republic of China promulgated an ex-
ception for Falun Gong. As indicated in an announcement promulgated by the Judi-
cial Bureau of Beijing, (see appendix), this notice as a practical matter denies all
Falun Gong practitioners their constitutional right to legal counsel. Similarly, long
after Falun Gong practitioners had been unlawfully arrested in China, the anti
cult law was passed retroactively by the Peoples Congress to eradicate the practice
by the label of evil cult. To up the anti even further, a third rule was promulgated
in the form of a notice by the Supreme Court. It states that all persons who practice
Falun Gong practice an evil cult. By such a notice, the Supreme Court has under-
mined not only the independence of the judicial branch of government, it has also
undermined its modus operandi and raison detreto hear cases and render rulings.
Before trial, with or without a trial, if you practice Falun Gong in China, you are
guilty as charged. With or without an attorney, the deck is stacked.
The two above referenced types of problem identified by Professor Cohen are ref-
erenced in Ronald Dworkins A Matter of Principle (1985 Harvard University Press).
Chapter two, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, is especially relevant since it
distinguishes between two definitions of the rule of law.
There is the rule-book conception, which insists that the power of the state not
be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules explicitly set

1 Since 1999, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has Des-
ignated China as a country of particular concern. See, e.g., Report Of The United States Com-
mission On International Religious Freedom, 25 (May 2002).

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out in a public rule book available to all The government as well as ordinary citi-
zens must play by these public rules until they are changed, in accordance with fur-
ther rules about how they are to be changed, which are also set out in the rule
book. Id at 11. Those who subscribe to this view tend to care less about substantive
justiceare the rules fair, do they protect individual rights, is it feasible to believe
that such rules will in deed is enforced. As narrow a conception as this is, there
is not question that China has indeed violated the rule-book definition of the rule
of law, not only during the Cultural Revolution, the tragedy at Tiananmen, but also,
and most notably now during the latest persecution of Falun Gong. Those just stat-
ed above as well as those stated below are examples of this formulation.
There is a second formulation, which permits us to further evaluate state law to
see if it is consistent with even minimal international standards of law and, thereby
permits us to distinguish between a rule of law, and the rules promulgated by, for
example, the Nazis in WWII. This latter formulation additionally illustrates how in
fact what is packaged in China as a rule of law, is in fact and indeed a rule by
law.
In this second more expanded formulation of a rule of law, Dworkin observes that
Citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another and political
rights against the State as a whole. This formulation insists, That these moral and
political rights be recognized in positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the
demand of individual citizens through courts and other judicial institutions. Id, p.
12. This second conception requires moreincluding a judicial branch which oper-
ates independent of legislative and executive branches; an array of due process
rights such as oversight of the judicial process itself, right to a fair trial, right to
cross examine ones accusers etc. And of course a right for all to secure the rights
the State acknowledges they have. In this formulation, the promulgation of new
rules to deprive Falun Gong practitioners of their constitutional and legal rights
itself signals that we are dealing with something other than the rule of law in
China today.
As a China expert noted recently, what appears as a rule of law in China is in
fact a rule by law. Unlike the former, the latter is characterized by the states use
of the law itself to disfavor groups, to single out groups for unfair punishment, or,
as in China and Nazi Germany, to oppress, torture, exterminate or eradicate groups
or classes of persons in ways that shock the conscience and cause one to wonder
anewhow can we be so noble and so base, and all be of the same human stock?
Actually its important to note that a rule by law is nothing new in China. It was
used to create and implement the Cultural Revolution. It was used to stifle the stu-
dent democracy movement stated at Tiananmen. It is used to squash labor move-
ments, any and all criticism of the government. Most notably and most recently it
is used to deprive all persons who subscribe to the principles of Falun Gong of the
right to think for themselves, the right to a moral conscience, the right to religious
freedom, to freedom of speech, to assemble freely and peacefully, to appeal illegal
laws of their legislature and farcical rulings of their courts. It is used and continues
to be used to torture persons who refuse to relinquish any of the aforementioned
rights not for 1 day, or two days, but endlessly for years on torture devices which
can only bring tears to the eyes of those who truly contemplate what they are.
But in its latest guise, it is especially troubling and pernicious. In the very begin-
ning of the persecution of Falun Gong, it appears visibly and clearly when (1) By
order of former President Jiang, the police arrest Falun Gong practitioners without
legal ground, (2) The former president himself defines the crimes retroactively, by
trying to persuade the French newspaper Figaro, that Falun Gong, a peaceful medi-
tative form of cultivation, is instead an evil cult, (3) By executive order, the legisla-
tive branch passes the infamous anti cult law to legitimate the illegal arrests by
outlawing whatever range of meanings are referenced by the over broad and uncon-
stitutionally vague phrase evil cult, and (4) When the Supreme Court instead of
ruling on cases, expounds on the nature of Falun Gong by issuing a notice declaring,
at the behest of former President Jiang, that indeed Falun Gong is an evil cult, and
therefore even before or without a trial, all who espouse its principles are guilty of
criminal acts. Not very different from the Nazis forcing Jews to wear the yellow tri-
angle to identify themselves as enemies of the state, and hence not deserving of the
rights afforded its genuine members.
Its beginning is replicated in its implementation. In early June 1999, former
President Jiang gave a speech to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chi-
nese Communist Party wherein he creates the Office 6/10, a Gestapo organization
mandated to usurp proper functions of all three branches of government, of impor-
tant sectors of civil society, as well as private sector businesses and associations.
Officials of this office are stationed in the appeals office where they are known to
beat up FLG practitioners who attempt to file an appeal in accord with rights af-

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forded to all citizens by the constitution. Officials of this office are stationed in
schools, police stations, hospitals, mental hospitals, detention centers, labor camps,
re-education centers. They issue the orders to doctors to force feed Falun Gong prac-
titioners who refuse to admit that their spiritual beliefs are corrupt. They order the
prisons guards to place Falun Gong practitioners in cells with the most violent
criminals where they are beaten if not to death then to near death regularly. They
are stationed above the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instruct Ambassador staff,
and those working abroad how most effectively to expand the persecution to those
who practice Falun Gong here in the United States. Most pertinent herein, they too
promulgate rules and the rules they promulgate are not only inconsistent with
standards of common sense, decency, and morality, but they are also rules estab-
lished and promulgated to systematically, efficiently and effectively persecute Falun
Gong practitioners and eradicate the practice utterly from the mainland of China,
once and for all.
Finally, there are the sham show trials. According to an eyewitness of one such
trial, after the governments only witness admitted hed never met or heard of the
defendant before the onset of his trial, the Judge without any evidence whatsoever
still found him guilty as charged.
According to Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of Human Rights Watchs
Asia Division, cloaking this campaign in rhetoric about the rule of law doesnt give
any greater legitimacy to Chinas crackdown on Falun gong . . . The official ban
. . . should be lifted; the governments pronouncement that it is a true cult and that
it must be suppressed must be rescinded. All Falun Gong members in detention, for-
mally charged, or sentenced to labor camps for peaceful activities should be released
immediately. Id.
I would supplement those remarks by suggesting that we do all we can to promote
the rule of law in China. That this Commission continues to do it can. Because a
rule by law is dangerous not only for the harm it wreaks internally, but because
as long as the rule by law is the norm, such atrocities as the Cultural Revolution,
the tragedy at Tiananmen, and most unfortunately and notably the genocide it now
perpetrates against Falun Gong will continue under the cloak of a rule of law.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY COOPER

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE KIDNAPPING, DETENTION, SUMMARY TRIAL, AND SENTENCING OF

DR. WANG BINGZHANG
Distinguished representatives of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China: My name is Timothy Cooper, and I am the executive director of Worldrights,
a non-governmental organization dedicated to human rights advocacy worldwide. I
have the honor today to speak to you about the shocking case of Dr. Wang
Bingzhang, who was recently kidnapped, detained, summarily tried and sentenced
to life in prison in China for crimes he did not commit. Unable to attend these hear-
ings today, Dr. Wangs family, including his parents, brother, sisters and children,
wish to convey their appreciation to this commission for its interest in Dr. Wangs
dire and deeply troubling circumstances. For at this very hour, he languishes in soli-
tary confinement in a Chinese prison cell, facing the prospect of living out the rest
of his life in a 44 foot cell.
In many ways, Dr. Wangs story mirrors that of the thousands of other well-
known and lesser well-known political prisoners, who have also confronted the bru-
tal ire of the Chinese government for standing up for universal principles and world
rights in the face of severe and sustained oppression, more frequently than not at
the expense of their own freedoms, their own rights, and yes, even their own lives.
But in other ways, Dr. Wangs case is uniquely situated. The governments cal-
culated treatment of Dr. Wang appears to mark a new nadir in the annals of political
oppression in China. Indeed, it is Dr. Wangs familys contention that the deliberate
and unconscionable actions taken against him by the Chinese government crossed
an important moral and political divide that should raise a series of red flags in
the West and around the world about the direction Chinas human rights policies
may be headed.
It is for this reason that the U.S. governmentthe worlds champion for the
human rightsshould not and must not turn a blind eye to the fate of Dr. Wang.
Having himself stood tirelessly, if not heroically, for the civil and political rights of
1.2 billion of his own people in China for over 20 years as an exiled Chinese citizen
and a permanent U.S. resident, we believe that it is morally incumbent upon the

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United Statesand in particular the United States Congressto stand with Dr.
Wang in his greatest hour of need.
In June 2002, Dr. Wang and his two companions, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi, flew
to Vietnam to meet with mainland Chinese labor leaders in order to explore possible
venues for cooperation between the overseas pro-democracy movement and the ris-
ing labor movement. The strategic concept was to marry the head of the democracy
movement with the body politic of the fledgling labor movement. Such a powerful
marriage of political convenience would undoubtedly strike unholy terror in the
hearts of Chinese authorities. It is therefore understandable that the Chinese gov-
ernment would stop at nothing to try to thwart the development of such a poten-
tially potent strategic alliance.
On June 27, 2002, Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi were abducted from their
hotel lobby by about ten men, posing as Vietnamese policemen, only a short time
after meeting with a labor leader in the border town of Mongcai. According to Yue
Wu and Zhang Qi, two of the men spoke with Chinese, not Vietnamese, accents.
Told that they were wanted for questioning at the police station, they were taken
to an awaiting van. Soon they realized they were not being driven into town, but
out-of-town.
They arrived at the Beilun River, where Dr. Wang was forcibly removed from the
van and beaten because he refused to board a boat that stood waiting for them.
Forcibly taken aboard, they were escorted across the river and into China. Once on
shore, the leader of the group revealed a picture he had with him of Dr. Wang. With
satisfaction, he compared the picture with Dr. Wangs face. He had found his man,
all right.
Later, a new band of men arrived and took charge. This time they were all Chi-
nese. Dr. Wang and the others were blindfolded and taken by car to a nearby hotel,
where the kidnappers demanded a ten million dollar ransom. Naturally, Dr.
Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi carried no such sum. They provided their captors with
family contact information, including all cell phone numbers. But no family mem-
bers were ever contacted. No ransom was ever demanded.
After being detained in the hotel with papered windows for about a week, Dr.
Wang and his companions were taken to a Buddhist temple near Fangchenggang,
in remote Guangxi province. There their kidnappers abandoned them, still bound
and without warning. Moments later, the Chinese police arrivedin the words of
the Chinese authoritiesto rescue them.
But Dr. Wang, Yue Wu, and Zhang Qi found only continued detention. The three
were kept in police custody until the following day when they were transferred to
separate detention centers. There they were held incommunicado for over 5 months.
All the while, the Chinese government denied any knowledge whatsoever of their
whereabouts.
In December, the government finally announced that it was, indeed, holding Dr.
Wang and his two companions. Dr. Wang was charged with espionage and ter-
rorism. The others were set free. Yue Wu returned to Paris in December and Zhang
Qi was placed under house arrest until her return to the United States in March.
Meanwhile, Dr. Wang was summarily tried in a 2-hour, closed trial. His lawyer
received the case only a week or so before the trial and stated that he had no experi-
ence in such cases. In February, Dr. Wang was sentenced to life in prison for his
alleged crimes of espionage and terrorism, though no evidence was ever offered
by the Chinese government to support its outrageous allegations. All the while, Dr.
Wang has maintained his innocence. His appeal was later rejected and Dr. Wang
was taken into solitary confinement, where he has remained ever since.
In July 2003, however, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights issued Opinion No 10/2003, regarding the case of Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and
Zhang Qi. In its written opinion, the UNs Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
concluded that, among other things, the detention of Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang
was arbitrary and a violation of international law. It noted that during Dr. Wangs
first 5 months in detention, he did not have knowledge of the charges, the right
to legal counsel, or the right to judicial review of the arrest and detention: and that,
after that date, he did not benefit from the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right to adequate time and facilities for defense, the right to a fair trial before
an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to a speedy trial and the right to
cross-examine witnesses. Nor did the U.N. find any basis for China charges of es-
pionage and terrorism.
It concluded its opinion by calling on China to take the necessary steps to rem-
edy the situation of Wang Bingzhang and bring it into conformity with the stand-
ards and principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In
other words, it called on China to free him.

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Representatives of the Commission, Dr. Wang was trained as a lung surgeon. He
earned his Ph.D at McGill University in coronary-arterial research. Yet, he chose
to devote the best years of his life to promoting human rights and democracy for
the people of China, famously stating that Medicine can only cure a few patients,
but cannot cure the disease of a nation. Nowin ill health himself, suffering from
depression, gastritis, varicose veins and Phlebitis, without the benefits of Western
medicine, he faces the prospect of an interminable prison sentence in a 44 ft. cell
for crimes that he did notcould notcommit.
But as much as he requires medical assistance, Dr. Wang also requires the gen-
erous assistance of the U.S. Congress. Dr. Wangs family respectfully requests that
this Congress pass a joint resolution on his behalf, calling on the Government of
the Peoples Republic of China to release him on medical grounds at the earliest pos-
sible date, and to abide by the legal opinion rendered by the United Nations in his
arbitrary detention case. We believe such a resolution would reaffirm Americas
commitment to human rights in China and honor a man who has dedicated his life
to the freedom and human rights of so many others.
Thank you.

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SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CIPING HUANG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WEI JINGSHENG

FOUNDATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHAIR, INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF CHINESE
STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS (IFCSS)
SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

NO PRESS FREEDOM IN CHINA AFTER SARS

My name is Ciping Huang. Today, I am making a statement on behalf of the Wei
Jingsheng Foundation and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and
Scholars, regarding the current news media and information channels being con-
trolled by the Chinese government.
Early last spring, the China press got unexpected world attention because of
SARS. The initial cover-up by the government resulted in terrible consequences in-
cluding panic and many deaths in China. However, only after the disease spread
overseas and caused an international outcry, was the Chinese press loosened and
allowed to give out the number of deaths and related health information, trust-
worthy or not. As a result, kindhearted people around the world have an increased
hope for Chinese press freedom. As an old saying said: a loss may turn out to be
a gain; the SARS storm might bring a positive reform to the Chinese press.
Of course, the world should welcome each step of progress toward democracy and
freedom, no matter how small the step might be, if only it is a sincere step. How-
ever, people must be wary of illusions or wishful thinking. Without a systematic
guarantee in China, any step forward could be easily taken away by the govern-
ment.
The freedom of the Chinese press has long been a goal that Chinese people have
pursued. During the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement, many young people
sacrificed their lives for this goal. For a short few days, the Chinese people thought
they gained that freedom, only be crushed by tanks and the government propaganda
machine later on. Now there are still many people both on the China mainland and
abroad struggling hard to get even one private newspaper or magazine published
in China. So far, has anything changed? The only one real voice to be heard in
China is the voice from government. Non-governmental approved voices are cut and
muted.
The sad reality is: China has not gained more press freedom since SARS.
Even during the seeming opened crack of reporting on SARS, very little attention
was given to the Chinese governments decree to severely punish the rumor spread-
ers. Several dozen people were arrested for spreading the news about SARS.
In June 2003, the Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department
criticized more than 10 major well known newspapers and magazines, such as
<Beijing Communication>, <Three-United Life Weekly>, <Finance> etc. The cited
issues included SARS and the reporting on corrupted officials. After this criticizing,
some sensitive articles had to be killed before publishing. Especially those arti-
cles reporting on Doctor Jiang (who first appealed to open truth on SARS) got tight
censorship by the government and many articles were cut. Due to the new regula-
tions, SARS reporting is not a free topic but has a very clear and disciplined line
that the most journalists have no guts to cross. The forbidden topics also include:
the North Korea nuclear crisis, the nuclear submarine 361 explosion case, and Zhou
ZhengYi, the top corruption case in Shanghai. (See attachment 1.) 1
In recent months, the government has had more meetings to call for The Reform
of China Press and Publication. The proposals included cutting the number of to-
tally controlled newspapers, clarifying the Partys disciplines and emphasizing the
purpose of propaganda etc. However, as Cai YongMei, The executive editor of Hong
Kongs <Open> magazine (Kai1Fang4) analyzed: I think the government doesnt
want to lose the control of media. Light issues and non-sensitive topics might get
loosened, but serious topics, or those they think are principal issues will be held as
tightly as before. (See attachment 2.)
Last month, the veil over this reform was finally lifted. The Chinese government
finally decreed their detailed regulations without a sign of real reform. These regu-
lations demonstrated further the hard-line face of the central government that tries
to make a successful and strict control over the news media. In particular, the regu-

1 Attachments 1 through 5 appear on the Commissions Web site (www.cecc.gov) in Chinese.

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lations ask for strict censorship, and include dismissing and appointing the leaders.
(See attachment 3.)
Also in the summer, the Chinese news media and universities and academic/re-
search institutes received notices from the government clearly stating prohibitions
to discuss certain issues, in particular modifying the constitution, political reforms,
and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement.
We want to emphasize that China has a long way to go toward real press free-
dom. The root of the problem lies in the system, which has been there for over half
a century under the Chinese Communists rule. The following facts are some of our
highest concerns. The problems still exist after SARS.
1. There is no real private press in China and no independent journalism under
the Chinese Communists one-party leadership.
So far, except for some pointless papers and local small magazines (e.g. equivalent
to how to do make-up), China doesnt have a single newspaper or magazine owned
by a non-government agent or company. The registration of a press is a very com-
plicated and strict step. The government at any time can easily crush a newspaper
or magazine agent/company if it violates the government regulations, or even just
displeases some officials.
2. Internet Censorship is a serious abuse of the basic human right of right to
knowledge.
If you are in China and open Google or Yahoo!, you wont be able to find many
web sites that you can see in other countries. Since August 31 this year, Chinese
government shutdown the search machine Google in China again. Just before
every political event, Internet become one more place for the Chinese Communists
to tight their strict strike control. According to latest report by Central Agency,
the government has 300,000 people policing the Internet, including 30,000 profes-
sional work for the National Security Department, to monitor and filter news and
e-mails, to shutdown web sites and to give warnings to people who make undesir-
able web pages or posts on the Internet. Unless technically specially handled, E-
mails from dissidents such as me are often rerouted through the police bureau be-
fore reaching the intended recipients, and are often rejected and even be confiscated
without acknowledgement. In some cases, the recipients are harassed, or interro-
gated by the secret police. It surely is amazing that while this government has
failed to control forbidden pornographic materials on the Internet, it is able to put
a pretty good handle on the dissident voices and even just plain news.
The censoring not only applies to the news and articles posted in foreign web
sites, but also to local people who join chat rooms. Liu Di, a 19 year old college
girl, has been detained for months because of some words and essays she posted in
a chat room.
Yet, this type of the censorship is just part of the integral policing system in
China. As the other side of traffic, I was told by a friend whose sister worked to
examine the mails from overseas that one-third of all mails went through inspec-
tion, beyond even targeted mails. In addition, phone tapping is common and public
knowledge in China, and is not just applied to the dissidents and activists.
3. Brave journalists and liberal editors often get in trouble, and some are put in
prison just because they report the truth or speak from conscience.
While over all, Chinese people are the victims of the Chinese Communists propa-
ganda machine; Chinese news media workers are the direct victims. In the last 5
decades, many of them lost their freedom or even lives for it. One of my friends,
Wu XueCan, who was an editor for Peoples Daily, was put in prison and tortured
after the 1989 Tiananmen movement for his effort to bring truth to the people.
Many liberal editors and reporters got laid off or even put in prison for reporting
on corrupted officials, on the common peoples suffering, or just expressing (or even
just allowing) a different view from the government. They make a long list. Here,
I want to mention a few:
(a) Gao Qinrong, a journalist who reported about corruption on the irrigation
system flaw in ShanXi Province, received 13 years in prison. (Attachment 4 is
an article written by Yu Jie, an established scholar in China, about Gao.)
(b) Qi YanChen, editor, was prosecuted for spreading anti-government mes-
sages via the Internet by submitting articles to places such as the pro-democ-
racy electronic newsletter VIP reference. He was sentenced 4 years.
(c) Teng ChunYan, an American citizen and a Falun Gong practitioner, re-
ceived 3 years in prison for serving as a source on Falun Gong for news organi-
zations.
(d) An Jun was the founder of the China Corruption Monitor. His writings
were used as evidence of anti-state activities and he was sentenced 4 years. (In-

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terestingly enough, Ans verdict was not announced until April 19, 2000, the
day after the U.N. high commission on human rights failed to pass a US spon-
sored resolution to condemn Chinese human rights abuses.)
(e) Jiang QiSheng, journalist and political dissident, just finished 4 years jail
time in May for his pro-democracy articles including an essay to honor June 4
victims.
(f) Huang Qi, Internet publisher and web host, is still in prison for publishing
stories about human rights abuses, governmental corruptions, and June 4
Tiananmen.
(g) Yang ZiLi, etc. (4 youths), was sentenced lately (after SARS) for academic
discussion.
4. To survive one must to speak the Partys tongue.
It is very common for editors to have to cut some sensitive sentences when they
review articles in newspapers or magazines. The most sensitive parts are not por-
nography issues, but those related to the political issues. There is no evidence for
a change in this situation.
From very reliable channels, I know that the editors working in newspapers and
magazines can only have part of their own minds, if they care about their life or
their familys future. They consistently have meetings to listen to the governments
opinion, that usually announce some important regulations of how to report cer-
tain sensitive events. Keep the same tone with Party is the first rule for all jour-
nalists in China. Some of my editor friends say that they dont have their own
tongue but the Partys tongue.
5. China has been rated the second worst country for freedom of press and
speech. The bias, misleading, even false news serve for Chinese governments agen-
da.
On sensitive issues, only the government will have the right to decide if the news
can be opened to the public, and when and how. For example, the unemployed work-
ers unrest in Northeast China will be suppressed in any newspaper with the rea-
son of not disturbing the stability of the country. Early this year, in my home
town, Hefei City, when thousands students took to the streets to protest the wrong-
ful deaths of their fellow students, no reports appeared for days in the official news
media even though the city residents knew something happened because of the par-
alyzed traffic and angry crowd.
Government events cannot be revealed on time without the Partys control. Most
of them become top secrets. The Chinese people have little chance to know what
their peoples government does or will do. Even foreign correspondents based in
China cannot get timely newsthey face routine surveillance and need special per-
mission for leaving their city of residence.
For important world events, even though some city people can watch the news
from foreign satellite broadcasts (not very easily), most will be influenced by the
media controlled to report only the news the government wants people to believe.
For example, the reporting of the Iraq war was totally biasedSaddam became a
hero in the reports. Of course, this case is only one of many illustrating how the
controlled news media has been misleading many Chinese people in an effort to re-
alize the governments own agenda. Dislike and even hate of America is on the
agenda. One of the most noticeable expressions is that the news media becomes the
governments tool to fan up nationalism. Many more examples can be found that
cover almost all important world events, such as the North Korea Nuclear crisis,
Taiwan across the Strait, and the American pilots being shot down in HaiNan,
China.
6. The Chinese people dont trust the news if it is presented by the Chinese gov-
ernment.
Chinese people do not have faith in the Chinese government. They always know
that their government cheats. They do not trust the government and what it says.
Yet, for fear of their lives, their freedom, and their families, most people could not
and do not dare to voice their hope for a free press.
During the beginning period of SARS, Chinese people, especially those living in
the big cities such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai, relied on the news sent by
their overseas relatives. Some of my friends who worked in the USA told me that
they were very busy looking for SARS news and were sending it immediately back
to China so that their family members would have a timely updated true picture
of the cases.
Those people who dont have overseas relatives usually rely on BBC, Voice of
America, Radio Free Asia, or other overseas media since they have less confidence

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on their own governments report. Everybody knows the phrase In China, we only
have one voice.
After SARS, Chinese people still do not have confidence in the government media,
especially on political issues or other important issues.
Attachment 5 is an article on the subject that was by an overseas Chinese that
returned to China.
7. Foreign Investment and Internet will not bring free press to China.
Many foreigners, especially foreign investors, argue that their investment will
bring freedom including press freedom to China. The Chinese government has also
quietly encouraged such kind of notion, including making academics and Western
politicians believe in it. On the other hand, Chinese government rightly pointed out
that the News Media is a special enterprise that does not follow the rule of who
invests in it, owns it. The government specifically stated that the news media is
a State enterprise which applies to all the newspapers.
Similar ideas apply to the Internet. The Internet and advanced computer tech-
nology have become the tools for government monitoring and suppression of dis-
sidence. It is a shame that a US company like Yahoo! has voluntarily cooperated
with the Chinese governments requirements and made the guarantee to filter con-
tents disliked by the government. It is more a shame for Western companies to work
closely with the Chinese government to create the product Golden Shield which
blocks information transfer and tracks addresses and messages to help make state
policing the best in the world. (For detail about Golden Shield, please visit an arti-
cle on DaJiYun at: http://www.dajiyuan.com/gb/2/5/6/n188071.htm.) What is the
difference between doing these things and the exporting of high military technology
to China a few years ago?
Here we urge the freedom and democracy loving American people and the US
Congress to examine these issues and to prevent these moneymaking deals on the
price of Chinese peoples human rights and freedom.
To summarize our statement, there is no press freedom in China, even after
SARS. The support and effort from the outside world will always be necessary and
important. But first, we must know the real picture and what is really happening
in China. Any credence or wishful belief of press freedom coming soon in China is
not only concluding a wrong judgment, but also might hurt the people who have
been and will be sacrificing their lives for Chinas press freedom. The Wei Jingsheng
Foundation and IFCSS wish you can carefully evaluate the situation based on valid
facts and continuously push the Chinese government for the better.
Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KERY WILKIE NUNEZ1

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG IN CHINA

Thank you for the opportunity to submit a written comment on the persecution
of Falun Gong in China. In particular, I would like to discuss the detention and tor-
ture of American citizen Charles Lee.
Dr. Charles Lee traveled to China in January of 2003. The moment he stepped
off the plane, he was detained and beaten by Chinese authorities. He was later
rushed through a show trial and sentenced to 3 years in prison for a crime he did
not commit. On a previous business trip to China, Charles considered tapping into
a local cable to expose the human rights violations against Falun Gong practi-
tioners. He never considered sabotaging any TV or radio equipment (which is what
he was accused of). Nor did he ever do a broadcast.
From a 95-page letter that Dr. Lee managed to get to the U.S. Consulate only
by means of an 8-day hunger strike, as well as from information provided by the
U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, we understand that Dr. Lee has endured severe abuse
while in prison.
He was forced to wear smelly winter clothes on unbearably hot days; he was de-
prived of sleep for 3 days; he was handcuffed in a very painful position for over 72
hours. Police intentionally tightened the handcuffs into his flesh to make it more
painful, leaving scars on his wrists. He was also handcuffed for 130 hours while try-
ing to write his appeal to the Court. At least twice, he was force-fed (a type of tor-

1 Kery Wilkie Nunez is a Falun Gong practitioner and a legislative director for a national
Latino organization in Washington, DC.

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 32
ture that has resulted in the death of many Falun Gong practitioners). The Chinese
authority intentionally left the tube in his body for 4 hours to torture him. And
worst of all, the Chinese authority put tremendous pressure on Charles elderly par-
ents (his mom had leukemia) in an attempt to break Charles will. Charles didnt
want his parents to witness his suffering, as he was very concerned about their
health.
To understand why any Falun Gong practitioner would risk his or her life to
broadcast human rights violations in China, one must first understand how China
controls the media and fabricates lies to deceive the viewer into accepting the re-
gimes viewpoint. China uses its state-controlled mediaprint, radio, propaganda
shows, Internet blockade, etc.to spread lies about a very peaceful spiritual practice
that has brought millions good health and inner peace. According to an article of
July 23rd in The Washington Post, entitled Chinas Spiritual Outlaws, China
makes accusations and uses the word cult in describing Falun Gong in order to
sow confusion, suspicion, and indifference among outsiders. The article explains that
Falun Gong does not meet the definition of cult. It does not coerce obedience, brain-
wash its members, gouge them for money or compel worship of its founder, Li
Hongzhi. It doesnt wear down their egos, then build them up in the new image of
the spiritually transformed. Yet, Chinas state-controlled media spreads rumors to
the contrary, meanwhile the books are banned from the public.
Meanwhile, the government pressures everyone in society (professors, companies,
schools, neighbors, family members, etc.) to report on Falun Gong practitioners.
Some Chinese people are deceived by the media and are misled to believe that they
should report on their neighbors if they practice Falun Gong. What they dont know
is that they are reporting on innocent people who may be sent to a torture camp.
Torture of Falun Gong practitioners is well documented in the free world. Yet, there
is no way to educate the Chinese public about this, as a person may lose his life
for distributing a flier.
Recently, we learned that Chinese authorities forced an abortion on a Falun Gong
practitioner in her seventh month of pregnancy simply because she refused to give
up her beliefs. She was restrained while an abortion-inducing drug was given to her.
While abortion is relatively common in China, most Chinese citizens probably dont
know about this baby, which struggled in its mothers womb for 40 hours before it
died. Afterwards, the mother struggled to deliver the dead baby.
Perhaps a small dosage of truth would affect the views of a seemingly indifferent
populace. In fact, Falun Gongs broadcasts in China has allowed many Chinese citi-
zens the opportunity to see both sides of the story and follow their own conscience.
However, no one should have to risk his or her life to tell a story. It is my hope
that, with the guidance of the CECC, the United States will play a key role in im-
proving information exchange in China. I also hope that the rescue of Dr. Charles
Lee and other Falun Gong practitioners from China will become a priority for the
U.S. How the U.S. treats human rights issues will send a very important message
to Chinas new leadership.

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