Alterity and

T ranscendence
EMMANUEL LEVINAS
Translated by Michael B. Smith

a
THE ATHLONE PRESS
LONDON
 First published in the United Kingdom 1999 by
THE ATHLONE PRESS
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1999 The Athlone Press
Oringally published as A ltfritf et Transcendence Fata Morgana 1995
The publishers wish to express their appreciation of assistance given
by the government of France through Le Minist&re de la Culture in
the preparation of his translation.
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 Contents

Translators Note vii

Preface by Pierre Hayat ix

I THE OTHER TRANSCENDENCE 1

1 Philosophy and Transcendence 3
2 Totality and Totalization 39
3 Infinity 53
II PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE AND
FIRST PHILOSOPHY 77
4 Beyond Dialogue 79
5 The Word I, the Word You, the Word
God 91
6 The Proximity of the Other 97
7 Utopia and Socialism 111
III PEACE AND RIGHT 119
8 The Prohibition against Representation
andThe Rights of Man 121
9 Peace and Proximity 131
10 The Rights of the Other Man 145
 Contents
IV CONVERSATIONS 151
11 The Philosopher and Death 153
12 Violence of the Face 169
Bibliographical Note 183
Notes 185
Index 193
 Translator's Note

The French moi is consistently translated as /, and

the French je as I, without the italics. The pronoun
he and related forms are sometimes used, as in the
French original, to refer to hypothetical persons of
either sex; the terms man and fellow man are also
used in this way. Levinass prochain, a nominalized
adjective meaning next, is translated sometimes as
fellow man* and sometimes as neighbour.
English words in square brackets, if in the main
text, are intended to clarify -ambiguities in my trans
lation; if in the footnotes, to differentiate my notes
from those of the author. Italicized French words in
brackets are Levinass own, which I supply either in
cases in which a technical distinction might otherwise
be lost, or when the morphology of the original word
carries semantic connotations. that cannot be
translated.
I would like to express my gratitude to Alisa Ray
of the Berry College Faculty Research and Sponsored
Programs Office for final manuscript preparation,
and to my wife Helen for her helpful stylistic
suggestions.
 Preface
Philosophy Between Totality
and Transcendence
by Pierre Hayat

Philosophy is Platonic'
(Emmanuel Levinas)
Alterity and Transcendence the title Emmanuel
Levinas has chosen for the present volume, which
groups twelve texts written between 1967 and 1989,
leads us directly to the idea that transcendence is
alive in the relation to the other man (see below,
p. 126).
How are we to perceive what is at stake in this
thesis of Levinass? First, by recalling that transcen
dence can be construed variously. Levinas insists that
etymologically transcendence indicates a movement
of crossing over (trans), but also of ascent (scando).1
In its etymological sense, transcendence leads us to
the notion of going beyond, of upward movement, or
of a gesture that moves beyond itself. Transcendence
would appear to be the marker of the paradox of a
relation with what is separate. It is a way for the
distant to give itself.
 This tension toward the beyond this look lifted
toward the heights would, on this view, originally
be mediated through the sacred. Human beings
bowed before what was beyond them. Their greatness
came from their being dissolved into a higher domain
of being, that of the absolute or eternal.
Such is clearly not the direction taken by Levinas.
For in that figure of transcendence we recognize the
magic mentality that prompts men to believe that
the world in which they live is governed by mysteri
ous powers. Levinas reminds us that Western philos
ophy has contributed to the liberation of men from
that false and cruel transcendence.2 Reason delivers
us from the illusion of a world-behind-the-world. It
frees mankind from the fear of an imaginary beyond.
The world that, having become for man an object of
knowledge, has lost its troubling strangeness, hence
forth appears without secrets and open to theoretical
investigation and within technologys grasp.
Does this mean that today transcendence has lost
all meaning? With the modern philosophies of the
subject, we are witnessing a transmutation of the idea
of transcendence, rather than its eviction. Transcen
dence cannot be reduced to the transcendent. It does
not define a dimension of the real that reaches beyond
the inner life. It accompanies the birth of human
subjectivity. It is not a question here of making
transcendence subjective, but of being amazed at
subjectivity (...) as the very modality of the
metaphysical.3
 Thus, man is no longer required to dissolve into a
higher reality. Transcendence becomes the intimate
structure of subjectivity. In other words, it is subjec
tivity that is found at the beginning of the movement
of transcendence. Levinas calls upon Jean Wahl, his
friend and interlocutor for several decades, to express
that idea. Man is always beyond himself. But that
beyond-oneself must eventually be conscious of the
fact that it is himself that is the source of transcen
dence.4 The transcendence of subjectivity attests to
this amazing possibility of going beyond any actual
situation and exceeding any definition.
But modern philosophy, looking at transcendence
from the point of view of subjectivity, renders the
notion of transcendence problematic. Indeed, is there
not something like an an antimony in the proposition:
The subject transcends itself? Either we have a true
transcendence, but in that case the subject is carried
along in its transcendent movement, and, in that
adventure, .the subject, ceasing to be itself, loses its
identity, or its substance; or the subject remains itself
in its movement of transcendence, but then there
may be doubt as to whether or not there is true
transcendence.5 Thus, the celebrated project of the
modern philosophers, in which the subject surpasses
itself by creating, returns the subject to itself, without
making a true transcendence, a going out from self,
possible.6
What is the source of this impossibility, for the
modern philosopher, of maintaining the subject intact
in the movement of transcendence, without the lat-
ters losing its meaning? It lies in his persistant
attachment to the age-old privilege of the One.
Whether transcendence expresses the subjects ability
to distance itself from any real actuality and afRrm
itself as pure freedom, or whether it refers to the
subjects power of realizing itself in history through
its works, its underlying principle is in the idea of the
identity of being.
Levinas is dedicated to rethinking transcendence
by other pathways than those taken by the modern
philosophies of the subject. To do thisj he does not
give a definition of transcendence a priori, but shows
how a new transcendence is the very meaning of
the human. Levinass philosophy is constructed on
the basis of a non-constructed intuition: that of the
upsurge of transcendence as a question to the Other
and about the other.7 Transcendence is born of the
intersubjective relation.
But in order to bring transcendence into view does
it suffice to assent to the foundational character of
intersubjectivity? When the intersubjective relation is
presented as a mirror-like relation in which each
subject stands face to face with the freedom of the
other, alterity is still being thought on the basis of the
identity of the /. Transcendence, or the going out
from oneself, cannot, under these circumstances, come
into view. A fortiori, the desire for recognition does
not bring a true transcendence into the subject, since
through the other it is itself that the subject is seeking.
In such a relational context, conflict ineluctably
becomes the essential mode of the relation to the
other, as each subject sees its power of transcendence
wrested from it by the other. And as Sartre writes:
The other as a look is nothing but this: my transcen
dence transcended.8
In order for a true transcendence to be possible,
the other must concern the /, while at the same time
remaining external to it. It is especially necessary that
the other, by his very exeriority, his alterity, should
cause the I to exit the self. Levinas wants to show
that the other, by his face, attests to himself, simply,
directly, without going through any mediation. That
exceptional capacity of the face to testify to itself
outside all objective context and independently of the
intersubjective field is, of itself, a message addressed
to the subject. By the non-ordinary manner in which
it manifests itself, the face opposes violence with
metaphysical resistance. In doing so, the face raises
the subject to responsibility.
We see how Levinas proposes to think the inter
subjective relation: not as a reciprocal but as a asym
metrical relation; not on the basis of a common space
but across the ecart separating the I from the other,
as a lowering, in discontinuity.
In such a relation, the I does not put itself in
question; it is put in question by the other. It is
precisely in taking the other as ones point of depar
ture that transcendence can emerge. True transcen
dence is not born of the interiority of a being, of
 which it would be the prolongation or idealization,
but of exteriority. Transcendence cannot, conse
quently, be felt otherwise than as a subjectivity in
crisis, that finds itself facing the other, whom it can
neither contain nor take up, and who nonetheless
puts it in question.
The face of the other is the locus of transcendence
in that it calls into question the / in its existence as a
being for itself. There is in this something like a
trauma of transcendence that prevents the / from'
remaining within itself, and carries it to the limits of
itself. But in that accusation of the I by the other,
human subjectivity as responsible for the other and
before the other is formed. Levinass philosophy reha
bilitates pluralism, setting out from the interhuman
face-to-face that cannot be resolved into a higher
unity. But pluralism first defines the structure of
subjectivity. The I paradoxically finds within itself
the other as such, that will never be interior to itself.
The first text of this volume sheds particular light
on the way Levinas understands transcendence. The
study Philosophy and Transcendence (1989), pub
lished in the Encyclopedic Philosophique Universelle, is
exemplary of the way a great philosopher can inscribe
his own approach in his relation to other philoso
phers. Levinas examines the way Plotinus, Descartes,
Husserl and Heidegger have encountered the ques
tion of transcendence, showing how the search for
the original locus of transcendence is doubtless one of
the main problems of philosophy (p. 4). But Levinas
 also shows that through the question of transcendence
it is philosophy itself that is called into question. For
in the amazement that prompts philosophical ques
tioning Levinas recognizes the disproportion between
cogitatio and cogitatum' that attests to transcendence
(p. 3).
The manner in which Levinas presents the Ploni-
nian approach is significant in this regard. The
transcendence of the One in Plotinus expresses the
philosophical awakening itself, understood as the
aspiration to a wisdom that is not knowledge, that is
not representation, that is love (p. 8). That elan
toward the One attests, in Levinass view, to a certain
way of philosophizing that makes of philosophy the
privileged mode of expression of a nostalgic desire for
fusion. Such a philosophy, which associates transcen
dence and the search for unity, fails to recognize the
idea of an effective transcendence in sociality {ibid.).
Here Levinas shows his opposition to the philoso
phies of the same - he, the philosopher who recog
nizes in the* relation to the human face the original
locus of transcendence. Through transcendence, Lev
inass pluralist philosophy desires to do justice to the
irreducible exteriority of the face and the ultimate
plurality of the interhuman relation.
#
Setting out from transcendence, we are thus led to
two cardinal categories of Levinass philosophy: total
ity and infinity. Two articles published in the Encyclo
paedia Universalis, Totality et totalisation and Infini,
have the virtue of both proposing a precise conceptual
analysis of these two categories and of oudining how
the main currents of Western philosophy have
approached them.
These two articles in the Encyclopaedia Universalis
seem to me to be of particular interest for an under
standing of Levinass philosophy. Levinass readers
know the use he makes of the idea of the infinite in
Descartes, and are not unaware of the presence of
Rosenzweig in inspiring his critical examination of
the idea of totality. But in the two studies reproduced
here, Levinas also shows how the pre-Sdcratics, Aris
totle, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant deal with the ideas
of totality and the infinite.
Levinass intent is obviously not to present a com
pilation of reference works. Like Philosophy and
Transcendence, the articles Totality and Totaliza
tion and The Infinite, testify to the deep immersion
of Levinass thought in the history of philosophy, and
to his taking up of a position that is affirmed within
that history. Here we are led into Levinass labora
tory, in which the author of Totality and Infinity
confronts the procedures of the great metaphysical
systems with his own, on the basis of a theoretical
and historical elaboration of the notions of totality
and infinity. As such, these two texts may be read as
a response, perhaps, to the reproach that Levinas
makes an overly personal, and slightly equivocal use
of the categories of totality and infinity.
It has been suggested, in particular, that Levinass
definition of the totality as a unity possessing an
intrinsic reality and proceeding from an exclusive
principle is reductionist. May not Levinas have
imprudendy enlisted in the polemic conducted by
Franz Rosenzweig against philosophers from Ionia
to Jena, taking up the view that totality would not
leave room for the particularity of beings? Thus, for
example, can one not conceive of a living organism as
a totality without thereby reducing it to an abstract
generality? For the idea of a biological totality allows
one precisely to show what makes up the concrete
reality of a singular being. Not only does the idea of
totality not necessarily lead us to think that reality is
homogeneous (the parts of a whole can themselves be
diverse), it reveals the diversity of reality differently,
according to whether the totality is static or dynamic,
and whether its parts define the elements of a struc
ture or the phases of an evolution.
The article Totality and Totalization/ a unique
text in the Levinas corpus, is the occasion for remind
ing us that the idea of totality is, in the history of
philosophy, the object of a variety of approaches. The
totality designates the perceptual synthesis, but also
the unity of the concept and the unconditionality of
the regulative idea. Levinas also emphasizes that the
totality is at the heart of philosophical reflection on
the truth defined as a totality, on history understood
as totalization, and yet again on the hermeneutic
method that intertwines the whole and the part. It
therefore seems that this study should not be over
looked by anyone wishing to grasp the value of
Levinass critique of the totality.
That critique is primarily directed at the postulate
underlying thoughts of totality: the totality leaves
nothing outside (p. 41). Such a postulate applies in the
first instance to thought, to the extent that totality
gathers the diversity of reality into a sole concept. But
it also applies to society, since the social totality makes
possible the grouping of individuals in the same place,
beneath the same set of laws and amidst the same
institutions.
It is in taking the idea of the infinite as his starting
point that Levinas justifies the overflowing of the
totality, since there is no common measure between
the idea of the infinite and the infinite of which it is
the idea. The thought of the infinite does not take
possession of the infinite of which it is the idea.
Setting out from the infinite, which is close to the
idea of transcendence, ethical responsibility is vali
dated (p. 54). That responsibility of the I is brought
about by the other man, who is refractory to concep
tualization, and whose social status does not do justice
to his uniqueness. Thus we see that the refusal of
totality does not derive, in Levinas, from a decree of
the /, but rather from the relation to the face, which,
blocks totalization.
Does this mean that Levinas asks us to chose the
infinite over the totality? That would be a misunder
standing. Ethical transcendence wrests the individual
free from the social totality, but is reflected within
 the totality itself when it is a question of assuring the
coexistence of responsibility fopthe other and the
equality of all before the law.
Just as ethical responsibility is not unaware of the
social totality, so thought could not constitute itself
without the work of the concept. Between the totality
and the infinite, Levinass philosophy lets a tension,
rather than a disjunction, appear. It affirms the pri
macy of ethics, which exceeds but does not exclude
the concept.
Between the concept and the infinite, between
totality and transcendence, Levinass philosophy
traces a singular path, one that runs into that of the
masters of Western philosophy. Levinas reminds us
that in Plato truth is the result of the synthesis of the
concept, but that the good is to be sought beyond
being, in an impossible totalization (p. 50). Can we
not discern here a double homage to Platonic philos
ophy to a conceptual, clear and universalizable
philosophy> but also to a philosophy open to transcen
dence, beyond totality?
#
Just as transcendence is not a philosophical theme
among others because it calls philosophy itself into
.question, so ethics is not, in Levinas, a branch of
philosophy, because it is given as first philosophy.
The relation to the other who addresses the I is, for
Levinas, the ultimate situation, or the last presuppo
sition. Question of the question, source of all ques
tions: the relation to the other forbids philosophical
discourse from closing in upon itself. It is from this
angle that Levinas wonders about the dialogical
essence of philosophy.
Four texts included here Beyond Dialogue
(1967), The Word I, the Word You, the Word God
(1978), Ethics and First Philosophy. Proximity to the
Other (1986), and the preface to Martin Bubers
Utopie et socialisme (1977)9 show how the occasion
of dialogue allows Levinas to validate the primacy of
ethics.
Already in Plato it is shown that philosophy is not
to be reduced to the logos because it implies the
relation with an interlocutor. The quest for truth
cannot be detached from the living presence of the
interlocutors. But the Platonic dialogue has as its goal
the union of the participants in the dialogue around
the true idea.10
The merit of Martin Bubers philosophy of dia
logue is precisely that it brings out the intrinsic value
of the dialogical I-Thou relation. Bubers thought
prompted me to engage in a phenomenology of
sociality (p. 103). Buber teaches us that relation
between the I who addresses a thou and the thou
who calls upon an / is the initial structure of meaning,
beyond what can be stated. In the text of 1978,
published on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of
Bubers birth, Levinas writes: To say you is the
primary fact of Saying ... Saying is that rectitude
from me to you, that directness of the face-to-face,
directness of the encounter par excellence (p. 93).
This text, which presents a wonderful homage to the
philosophy of Martin Buber, allows us to nuance the
interpretations that merely oppose Levinas to Buber,
forgetting the deep ties that bind the two thinkers.
But Levinas also initiates a difficult dialogue with
Buber. When Levinas declares, When I speak of first
philosophy, I am referring to a philosophy of dialogue
that cannot not be an ethics, we recognize a proxim
ity to Buber: the beginning of philosophy is not the
cogito, but the relation to the other (p. 98). But we
also understand that Levinas diverges from Buber by
recognizing in the dialogue the non-reversible cir
cumstance of ethics. '
Thus, the originary dialogue is situated beyond
the dialogue in that it testifies to the search for a
proximity beyond the ideas exchanged, a proximity
that lasts even afer dialogue has become impossible
(p. 87). That the fundamental conjuncture of the
human is not the agreement of men around shared
ideas Buber had perceived. But for Levinas the rela
tion that constandy reinstates the humanity of man is
not the formal structure of the reciprocal relation in
which the I is a you for the other and the you is
discovered to be another I. Beyond the reversibility of
that structure, Levinas wants to find the asymmetrical
ethical relation, which consists for the / in going
toward the Other where he is truly other (p. 88)."
Levinas continues to pursue this dialogue with
Buber in the preface to Utopie et socialisme. After
having presented Bubers thesis, which sets the politi
cal and the social in opposition to one another,
Levinas inquires into the possiblity of socialisms
appearing as a new ethics (p. 116). That utopian
dimension of human sociality is, in Buber, thematized
in the model of the I and Thou, on the basis of
which a social relation without powers could be
conceived (p. 117). But with Levinas the utopia of the
human, which means that the meaning of the human
is never closed up in a place, is to be sought in the
asymmetrical relation between the other man and me.

The ethical transcendence that springs up in the
interpersonal relation indicates that the egalitarian
and reciprocal relation is not the ultimate structure of
the human. So it is that the infinity of the face of the
other man is the living refutation of the pretension of
the social totality, the economic and administrative
structure, to be sufficient unto itself. Three texts
The Prohibition Against Representation and the
Rights of Man (1984), Peace and Proximity (1984),
and The Rights of the Other Man (1989) attest to
that preoccupation of Levinass, by initiating a discus
sion on rights and peace.
Levinas reminds the reader that the rights of man
are a priori in that they are affirmed independently of
all agreed upon law (p. 145). But he also stresses that
they become effective when they are incorporated
into the judicial determinism by taking root in a
State (ibid.). Thus the notion of right includes both
the reality of positive laws and the idea in the name
of which men have the task of formulating the
requirements of freedom (p. 147). But a right is
always the expression of the agreement of wills sur
rounding the law. It is the free limitation (of free
dom) in consenting to the rationality of the universal
(ibid.).
Levinass effort consists in producing a critique of
the thought of the rights of man. That critique is not
an external questioning of the philosophy of the rights
of man, but rather a quest for its conditions of
possibility. In that journey toward the ultimate source
of the right, Levinas finds the individual responsi
bility of man before the other man: 'The rights o f man,
absolutely and originally, take on meaning only in the
other, as the right of the other man. A right with
respect to which I am never rele^ed(p. 127)12
This statement of Levinass could be misunder
stood if we failed to emphasize its problematic nature.
For the right of the other man is not an abstraction:
it does not Jake on meaning in thin air, in forgetful
ness of human society. It has already been emphasized
that the transcendence of the infinite is reflected in
the social totality. One may also recall that statement
in Totality and Infinity, doubtless one of the strongest
and most difficult of that work: The third party
looks at me from the eyes of the other person, which
means that all the others are present in the face-to-
face.13
So it is that the non-egalitarian and interpersonal
structure of the ethical relation, the very one that
transcends the political order, is corrected by the
requirement of equality that comes from the taking
into account of the third.party. The same ambiguity
is found regarding the right: The affirmation of the
right of the other man subverts the general idea of
the rights of man but carries within it the solicitude
for the rights of all mankind.
Two conversations open out this work of Levinas,
for whom philosophy is never wisdom, because the
interlocutor it has just embraced has already
escaped.14The first conversation, with Christian Cha-
banis, concerns death (1982). In the second, Levinas
responds to the questions of Angelo Bianchi (1985).

The section titles are by Pierre Hayat, who thanks

Monsieur Michael Levinasfor his discreet and invaluable
assistance.
TH E O TH ER TRAN SCEN D ENCE
 Philosophy and Transcendence

I
TH E IDEA OF IN FIN ITY
Ten years ago, I wrote: The transcendence of things
in relation to the lived intimacy of thought in
relation to thought as Erlebnis, in relation to the lived
(which is not fully expressed by the idea of a still
confused and non-objectifying consciousness) - the
transcendence of the object, of an environment, like
the ideality of a thematized notion, is opened, but is
also traversed, by intentionality. It signifies distance
as much as it does accessibility. It is a way for the
distant to be given. Perception already grasps; the
concept 'the Begriff retains that sense of seizure.
Whatever effort may be required for the appropria
tion and udlization of things and notions, their tran
scendence promises possession and enjoyment that
consecrates the lived adequation of thought to its
object in thought, the identification of the Same,
satisfaction. Astonishment a disproportion between
cogitatio and cogitatum - in which knowledge is in
pursuit of itself, is dulled in knowledge. This way for
the real to exist in intentional transcendence on the
same scale as the lived, and for thought to think on
its scale and thus to enjoy, is what is meant by
immanence.1 An awakening of thought to knowl
edge, to presence, to being; to re-presentation, to
knowledge, to the secret will that wills and intends
in the intention, reversing the latter in an act of
constitution. Is that the original awakening of
thought? Had it not already been opened to a deeper
vigilance, to which is revealed, beyond all unveiling,
that which cannot be contained in any representation?
A transcendence of the Cartesian idea of the Infinite,
in a thinking that finds itself thinking more than it
can embrace, the blinding bedazzlemeRt of the gaze
by an excess of light and a bursting of knowledge in
adoration to which Descartes alludes at the end of
the Third Meditation. Beyond the objective, which is
always already correlative to a prior aim and inten
tion to discover - behold an other that reveals itself,
but that does so precisely in surprising the intentions
of subjective thought and eluding the form of the
look, totalitarian as presence eluding the transcen
dental synthesis. An exceptional idea of the Infinite
that has escaped being, and of a presence stronger
and more venerable than the totality. An idea that
cannot, by virtue of"the ontological argument, be
peremptorily relegated to presence, to being that is
locked within the totalizing look, nor to some other
world, nor some empty heaven.
The search for the original locus of that idea of the
Infinite and its transcendence is doubtless one of the
main problems of philosophy. A locus to be sought in
the.dimensions of the humanity of man. Drunk with
being in himself and for himself in the presence - or
the modernity - that he unveils by his cognitive
thought and more indubitably planted in his cogito
than his feet on the ground, man is capable of
sobering up and of dis-interestedness and extreme
vigilance vis-d-vis his absolutely other fellow man. A
vigilance that is not that of the look. The vigilance of
a responsibility that from me to the other, irreduci
ble concerns me qua chosen and irreplaceable, and
thus unique and unique only thus, in that identity of
I, above all form, outside every order, whom the
work of the transcendental constitution already pre
supposes. Is not the face of ones fellow man the
original locus in which transcendence calls an author
ity with a silent voice in which God comes to the
mind? Original locus of the Infinite. Dimension of
alterity and transcendence, which we shall speak
more of at the end of this reflection, after having
insisted upon the ecstatic and metaphysical transcen
dence taught by the Greeks, its transformation into a
philosophy of immanence in which the transcendental
structures absorb the exigencies of the absolute, but
in which the I even of the I think that supports
them has not yet clarified its identity of the unique
one.
 II
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF TH E ONE
For Plotinus (Enneades V, 1, 6), thought as the act of
knowing or intellection, in the duality of seeing and
seen, emanated from the transcendence of the One,
from its unity or repose, untroubled by any relation
of multiplicity, not even that of self-consciousness,
which would already be knowledge and duality. The
emanation itself is called movement of the Immobile,
a contradiction in the order of knowledge! Already
in Platos Parmenides, the One refused to give itself up
to any of the possibilities, any of the hypotheses of a
thought that remained knowledge, i.e. thematization
and presence of being; it refused to give itself up
without even constructing itself dialectically with
respect to that question, without formulating itself as
thinkable on the basis of the negations of its refusal,
be it only to take on the substantive form in which it
is evoked in the Platonic dialogue.
The intellection that has emanated from the One,
the intellection of the One is, by its very thematiza
tion, already multiple. But not only because of the
distance that separates the intellection from the intel
ligible. As distant from the One, its only dealings
would be with a multiplicity of Platonic ideas instead
of having in act to do with the One, with which, in
the form of an oudine, it had to do in potentia. A
strange circumstance in the intellection of the One.
 It docs indeed think this principle, but in trying to
grasp it in its simplicity, it diverges from it and
. takes into itself other things, which multiply___It
possessed a vague outline of the object of its vision,
without which it would not have received it into
itself, but that object, from being one, has become
many; it is thus that it knows it in order to see it
and has become vision in act.2
It has already missed, or fails to grasp, the unity of
the One as it attains, in act, ideas. But the intellection
that is intellection of the multiple ideas is not separ
ated from the One absolutely by that multiplicity,
which remains nostalgia for the One, homesickness.
That which might be called the movement of knowl
edge - seeing - (or, in todays terminology, the noetic-
noematic intentionality of knowledge) filled but
dispersed, is, precisely by virtue of its dispersion, a
state of privation, compared to the unity of the One.
And yet, as if the One were sensed in that very
privation, as if knowledge, still aspiration by the fact
of the dispersion of its seeing, went beyond what it
sees and thematizes and were precisely thereby a
transcendence; by the very deficiency of its plural
rationality; as if its dispersed accession to multiple
being [essence] were a piety Plotinus speaks of
prayer3 with respect to the inaccessible One. Ambi
guity, or risk incurred by being at a distance from
the One in the knowledge of the intelligence, in the
 intelligible, the multiplicity of which may keep one
far from the fatherland, but thus, as privation,
hollowed out, attach one to it. Just as at the next,
lower level of emanation, the soul, separated from the
intelligence and dispersing itself among the things of
this world, is capable of gathering itself and prepares
to hear the voices from on high. This gathering of
itself, this turning back to oneself this knowledge
that in the consciousness of self is already an aspiring
to higher than self, to the intelligible of intelligence
and from there to the One.
This nostalgia, or this piety or gathering of oneself,
going beyond and above the intelligible that is present
to the intelligence - is philosophy, aspiration to a
wisdom, that is not knowledge, that is not represen
tation, that is love. Love of a wisdom other than the
intelligible giving itself to knowledge. Philosophy that
would thus be transcendence itself. Philosophy as
union with the One or fusion with it, inscribing itself
in an ecstatic itinerary the steps of which we cannot
retrace here. It begins in any case in the intelligence,
though the latter is transcended in its privation of the
One. Transcendence toward the One with which
union is possible. It seems to me important to recog
nize the attention given in the School of Plotinus to
the instants of accomplishment effectively attained by
the master: the union with the One is not a utopian
ideal. It is not love as aspiration that is triumphant
transcendence, but love as union. The idea of an
effective transcendence in sociality itself, in proximity
rather than in ecstasy, will remain foreign to Greek
thought. Let us note the classicism of that thought
that, through neo-Platonism, was transmitted to
Western philosophy, making it impossible for philos
ophy not to recognize, down to the time of Hegel,
the dissatisfaction in aspiration. Already the notion of
the unhappy consciousness! All complacency in dis
satisfaction (and even in love as aspiration) under the
pretext that they contain, hollowed out, what they
lack all renunciation of wisdom in favor of the
simple love of wisdom, or philosophy, would one day
come to be looked upon as romanticism, a pejorative
appellation. Philosophy, always dissatisfied with being
just philosophy! The return to the One of that which
was dispersed from it without diminishing it the
coinciding with the source of the beyond being
was to be the big question, in the separation of the
intelligence from the One, for the philosophy that
emerged from it. The aspiration to return is the very
breath of the Spirit; but the consummate unity with
the One, a pure identity in which all multiplicity and
all number are abolished in the rare instants attested
to by Plotinus, when distance, or even the distinction
of knowledge be it only the distinction between
knowing and the known in the consciousness of self
disappears without leaving any traces. The One to
which intelligence piously aspires, beyond the ideas it
attains and grasps in their multiplicity (in which,
however, it is completed, realized, in act, satis-fied)
the One beyond the noema that is equaled by the
noesis of intelligence - would be, according to the
neo-Platonic schema, better than that aspiration and
that approach from which the One is still absent.
There is love in the look of knowing, but, because of
that absence which is again signified by the dispersal
of the known, that love is worthwhile only because of
the transcendent immobility it seeks and in which the
seeking is absorbed, because of the One in which the
lover coincides with the loved without distinction, in
which the movement of ecstasy is abolished and
forgotten. The consummate unity of the One, a
satiety of Kronos4 for all eternity is worth more than
love, still subject to time, and that, in Platos Sym
posium, according to the teaching of Diotimus,
remains a demigod.
Ill
TH E TRANSCENDENCE OF
KNOW LEDGE AND TH E PHILOSOPHY
OF IMMANENCE
Neo-Platonism, exalting that consummate unity
beyond being and knowing, better than being and
knowing, offered the monotheism that conquered
Europe in the first centuries of our era an itinerary
and stations capable of corresponding to mystical
tastes and the needs of salvation. Piety could be
understood as modeling itself on the activity of the
intelligence, on its vision in act of a multiplicity of
ideas, a vision that did not actualize its outline in
potential its project of the One/ but was attached,
relatively to it, by its very privation. Prayer
expressed the metaphor of that relation, of that pres
ence by absence, in the ascendancy of the thought of
knowledge and Intelligence. Knowledge as presence,
as being and beings a multiplicity of ideas, to be
sure, but also their gathering together, their synthesis,
their understanding, their compresence in the unity
of their apperception, in which temporal dispersion
passes for a privation of intelligibility that is recuper
ated in re-presentation or ideality vision dominating
the process of becoming. The evolution of Western
thought, freeing itself from the transcendence of the
One, but finding it again in the unity of the system
and the immanence of transcendental unity. The
return in immanence in the world that is perceived,
embraced, mine of the very large and quasi-formal
structures of the neo-Platonic schemata, the contours
of which can still be clearly discerned in the set of
modern Hegelian or Husserlian themes. These struc
tures mark'the return of transcendent thought to
itself, the identity of the identical and the non
identical in self-consciousness, which recognizes itself
as infinite thought without other in Hegel. And, on
another plane, they command Husserls phenomeno
logical reduction/ in which the identity of pure
consciousness carries within itself, in the guise of the
I think/ understood as intentionality ego cogito
cogitatum all transcendence/ all alterity. All exter
nality reduces to or returns to the immanence of a
subjectivity that itself and in itself exteriorizes itself.
The first person of the present in the cogito, in which
Hegel and Husserl find themselves standing on the
ground of modern philosophy, guarantees knowledge
its congenital synthesizing and its self-sufficiency,
foreshadowing the systematic unity of consciousness,
and the integration of all that is other into the system
and the present, or the synchrony (or the a-temporal)
of the system. This is a set of philosophical themes in
which time is subordinated to eternity, to a present
that does not pass nor is there any getting beyond
it in the universal and eidetic laws governing the
empirical dispersion in the a-temporal ideality that
stands, immobile, above the immediate temporality of
human patience, in the substitution of dialectical rigor
for the incompressible, indispensable duree that must
not be ignored. Or else time is subordinated to
eternity in accordance with another intention and
project, when the phenomenological description ven
tures behind or beneath abstraction, ideality or the
formal structure of speculative time. Does not Hus
serls analysis of time come down to expressing time
in terms of presence and simultaneity of retained or
anticipated presents? Temporal sciences! As if time
were reducible to its way of making itself known, or
its manner of conforming to the requirements of its
manifestation. An analysis in which the meaning of
the meaningful would be equivalent to its aptness to
the present and representation, to the simultaneity of
a manifold entering into and unfolding within a
theme; or, more radically yet, its aptness to presence,
i.e., to being (taken in its verbal sense). As if, in the
notion of presence or in the notion of being
expressed by presence a privileged mode of time
were fused with the birth of knowledge itself, in
representation, thematization and intentionality. As if
knowledge, concreteness of presence, were the psych
ism of all thought. Manifestation, in this way of
thinking, would coincide with the signifying of mean
ing and appeal to understanding. Representation (Ver-
gegenwartigung) memory and imagination - would
wrest from the past and the future (simple modes of
misunderstanding, of inaccessibility to the hand, and
thus of the incomprehensible) a presence, already or
still ungraspable, of the past or the yet to come.
Representation would be the first grasp of it, to which
the intellect refers back, for the comprehension it
founds. It would bring these presents, at first
ungraspable, of the past and future, to the simultane
ity of the theme. As if time, in its diachrony came
down to a failed eternity, to the moving image of an
immobile eternity, or of the consummate One. Henri
Bergson, who, for the first time in the history of
ideas, attempts to conceive time outside that failure
of eternity, has characterized the destiny of that
notion in philosophy as that of a becoming that passes
for a privation of eternity.
The rationality of knowledge would correspond to
the absolute of the One. Knowledge rejoining, here
below in the immanence of the obvious manifesta-
tion the known of being, or rejoining, in reflection,
the transcendental concreteness of oneself, is fulfilled
or accomplished: wird erfiillt. The equality of the One
to itself - a supposedly prototypical equality - has
thus become, in knowledge, adequation, and, from
there, satis-faction and as such, as the very signifying
of the meaningful, the secret of a civilization. Knowl
edge as research is still privation, but it is no longer a
powerless and pious nostalgia for the transcendence
of the unattainable or only in exceptional circum
stances attained One. The presence of being in
truth is grasp and appropriation, and knowledge is a
teleological activity. What remains in thought 'in
potentia is also a power. A teleology animates con
sciousness, according to Husserls Crisis.5 Conscious
ness moves toward an end, a terminus, a given, a
world. Knowledge is intentionality: act and will. An
auf etwas hinauswollen [desire to get somewhere], an
I want and an I can that the term intention itself
suggests. An I want and an I represent to myself
that Husserl at least takes as being included in
intentionality. A thought that un-thinks itself in order
to represent or master presence. Being in its presence
offers itself to a taking in hand; it is donation. The
most abstract lessons of science begin in a world that
we inhabit, amidst things that are within hands
reach. These are things given in a world that is given
that Husserl calls life-world. The intentionality of
consciousness is concretely grasp, perception and con
cept, praxis incarnate in all knowledge, the precocious
promise of its technical prolongations and of con
sumption. The being that is correlative to conscious
ness, already signifying on the basis of an ontology
that could be called idealist, is datum and donation
and to be taken. The meaning of satis-faction does not
just come down to the abstract adequation of a
perceived matching a perception. The concreteness of
satisfaction is enjoyment. A lived that is not simply
a content of consciousness, but that is signifying: in it
the identity of the I am, of the Togito content with
itself and persevering in its being, is identified. Iden
tification of the free ipseity of Western man within
the limits of his powers.
A freedom that only obstacles can limit: natural
and social forces, and death. The obstacles of nature
and society, over which knowledge can progressively
triumph. The obstacle of death the unassumable, the
incomprehensible, which accredits the idea of a finite
freedom.
But freedom is always measured by its powers.
The marvel 'Of Western man in his modernity, which
is probably essential to him: the ideal of the satisfied
man to whom all the possible is permitted.
The questions that we have to ask can now be
formulated. Does thought only think as besiegement
of all alterity, disappearing in the unity of the result
or in the identity of the identical and the non
identical, engulfing the absolute affected or
extinguished in it, in the ambiguity of philosophical
idealism or realism? Does thought thinking the abso-
lute signify nothing but need, lack and nostalgia or
satisfaction, accomplishment and enjoyment? Does
the diachrony of time signify only deficiency of pres
ence and nostalgia? Cannot thought approach the
absolute otherwise than by knowledge and in knowl
edge and excel by that approach, better than the
return to the One and coincidence with unity? It is
to the dominant conception of traditional philosophy,
according to which thought is fundamentally knowl
edge, i.e., intentionality - will and representation -
that some limits are to be delineated. My analysis will
take as its point of departure some reflections on the
intentional act.

IV
TH E RELATIONSHIP TO TH E
OTHER MAN
I begin with intentionality as set forth in Husserls
phenomenology. In it, the equivalence between
thought and knowledge in its relation to being is
formulated in the most direct way. While isolating
the idea of an original, non-theoretical intentionality
from the affective and active life of the soul, Husserl
appears to have kept as its basis the representation -
the objectifying act adopting on this point Bren-
tanos thesis, despite all the precautions he took with
his new formulation of that thesis. Now, knowledge
is, in itself, a relation to something other than con
sciousness and, as it were, the aim or the willing of
that other, which is its object. Husserl, in examining
the intentionality of consciousness, wishes to deter
mine 'worauf sie eigentlich hinauswiW [what it is,
essentially, that it wants to get at]. That will, already
suggested by the word intention, suggests and justifies
the use of the term acts to designate the units of
consciousness. In the intuition of truth, knowledge is
described as a fulfilling, as the satisfying of an aspira
tion toward the object. A grasping of being equivalent
to the constitution of that being: the transcendental
reduction, in suspending all independence in being
other than that of consciousness itself, allows us to
recover that being suspended as noema or noesis and
leads us or is supposed to- lead us to the full
consciousness of self affirming itself as absolute being,
confirming itself as an I who identifies himself
through all the differences, Master of himself, just as
he is master of the universe,6 and capable of shedding
light in all the shadowy corners in which that mastery
of the I would be contested. If the constituting / runs
up against a sphere in which he finds himself bodily
intertwined with what he constituted, he is there in
the world as if in his skin, in accordance with the
intimacy of the incarnation that no longer has the
exteriority of the objective world.
But a reduced consciousness which, in reflection
on itself rejoins and masters, like objects in the world,
its own acts of perception and knowledge, and thus
confirms self-consciousness and absolute being - also
remains, as if supplementarily, non-intentional con-
 sciousness of itself, without any voluntary aim; non-
intentional consciousness acting as knowledge,
unbeknownst to itself, of the active I that represents
the world and objects to itself. It accompanies all the
intentional processes of the consciousness of the I that,
in that consciousness acts and wants and has inten
tions. A consciousness of consciousness, indirect and
implicit, without any initiative proceeding from an /,
without aim. A consciousness that is passive, like the
time that passes and ages me without me. An imme
diate consciousness of self, non-intentional, to be
distinguished from reflection, from inner perception
to which the non-intentional would be apt to become
the inner object, or which reflection would be
tempted to replace in order to render explicit its
latent messages.
The intentional consciousness of reflection, taking
the transcendental /, its states and mental acts, as its
object, can also thematize and seize or explicate all its
of non-intentional lived experience, qualified as
implicit. It is invited to do so by philosophy in its
fundamental project, which consists in bringing to
light the inevitable transcendental naivet of a con
sciousness forgetful of its horizons, of its implicit
elements and the time it lasts.
Hence one is prompted too quickly no doubt
to consider in philosophy all that immediate con
sciousness solely as non-explicit knowledge, or as a
still confused representation to be brought to full
light. This would be the obscure context of the
thematized world that reflection, intentional con
sciousness, will convert to clear and distinct data, like
those that present the perceived world itself or abso
lute reduced consciousness.
Still, we have the right to ask whether the non-
intentional, which is lived in the margin of the
intentional, retains and delivers up its true meaning
when subjected to the scrutiny of reflective conscious
ness. The critique traditionally directed against intro
spection has always suspected a modification that
spontaneous consciousness would undergo beneath
the scrutinizing, thematizing, objectifying and indis
creet eye of reflection - a kind of violation and lack
of recognition of a certain secret. An ever refuted,
ever renewed critique.
I ask: What goes on in that non-reflective con
sciousness that is taken to be only pre-reflective, and
that, implicit, accompanies intentional consciousness,
which in reflection aims intentionally at the thinking
self, as if the thinking I appeared in the world and
belonged there? What can that supposed confusion,
that implication, mean positively, so to speak?
Does the knowledge of pre-reflective self-con
sciousness know how to talk, properly speaking? A
confused consciousness, an implicit consciousness pre
ceding all intention or duree having gotten over all
intention - it is not an act but pure passivity. Not
only by virtue of its being-without-having-chosen-to-be,
or by virtue of its fall into a tangle of possibilities
already realized before all voluntary taking up, as in
Heideggers Geworfenheit [thrownness]. A conscious
ness that rather than signifying a knowledge of self
is a self-effacement or discretion of presence. Pure
duree of time that the phenomenological analysis
describes, nonetheless, in reflection, as structured
intentionally according to an interplay of retentions
and protentions that, in the duree of time itself,
remain at least inexplicit; a durSe removed from all
will of the /, absolutely outside the activity of the /,
and that, as aging, is probably the actual carrying out
of the passive synthesis on the basis of the passivity of
the lapse whose irreversibility no act -of memory,
reconstituting the past, can reverse. The temporality
of time escaping a limine [from the threshold] by
virtue of its lapse, all activity of representation. Does
not the implication of the implicit signify otherwise,
here, than as does knowledge that has been taken
away, otherwise than a way of envisioning the pres
ence or non-presence of the future and the past?
Duree as pure duree, as non-intervention, as being-
without-insistence, as being-on tiptoe, as being with
out daring to be: instance of the instant without the
insistence of the /, and already a lapse, that leaves
while entering! A bad conscience, that implication of
the non-intentional: without intentions, without aims,
without the protective mask of the individual \person-
nage] contemplating himself in the mirror of the
world, reassured and striking a pose. Without name,
situation or titles. A presence that dreads presence,
that dreads the insistence of the identical /, stripped
of all attributes. In his non-intentionality, on the
hither side of all willing, before any fault, in its non-
intentional identification, the identity backs away
before its affirmation, is worried before what the
return to self of identification may have in the way of
insistence. Bad conscience or timidity; without culpa
bility, but accused; and responsible for its very pres
ence. The reserve of the non-invested, the
non-justified, the stranger on the earth according to
the expression of the psalmist, of the stateless person
or the homeless who dares not enter. The interiority
of the mental perhaps that is what it is originally:
that lack of boldness to affirm oneself in being and in
ones skin. Not being-in-the-world, but being-in-ques-
tion. In reference to which, in memory of which, the
/ that already posits itself and affirms itself - or firms
itself up in being, remains sufficiently ambiguous
or sufficiendy enigmatic to recognize itself as being,
according to Pascals formulation, hateful in the very
manifestation of its emphatic identity as an ipseity, in
the saying I. The superb priority of A is A, the
principle of intelligibility, that sovereignty, that free
dom in the human /, is also, if one may express it so,
the occurrence of humility. A putting into question
of the affirmation and firming up of being, that is
echoed in the celebrated and easily rhetorical -
quest for the meaning of life, as if the absolute / that
has already taken on meaning on the basis of the
psychic or social vital forces,, or of its transcendental
sovereignty, went back to its bad conscience.
 Pre-reflective, non-intentional consciousness cannot
become conscious of that passivity; as if, in it, already
there was the distinction between the reflection of a
subject positing itself in the indeclinable nominative,
assured of its perfect right to be and dominating the
timidity of the non-intentional, like a childhood of
the mind to be gotten over, like an access of weakness
in an impassible psyche. The non-intentional is pas
sivity from the start, the accusative is its first case, so
to speak. A bad conscience that is not the finiteness
of existing signified in anguish. My death, always
premature, may check the being that qua being
perseveres in its being, but in anguish, this scandal
does not shake the good conscience of being, nor the
morals based on the inalienable right of the conatus,
which is also the right and the good conscience of
freedom. On the other hand, in the passivity of the
non-intentional in the very mode- of its spontaneity
and before all formulation of metaphysical ideas on
this subject the very justice of being posited in
being is put in question; being, that is affirmed with
intentional thought, knowledge and the grasping of
the now. Here we have being as bad conscience, in
that putting in question; being-in-question, but also
put before the question. Having to answer. The birth
of language in responsibility. Having to speak, having
to say /, being in the first person. Being me, precisely;
but from then on, in the affirmation of its being me,
having to answer for its right to be. Pascals the I is
hateful must be thought through to this point.
 To have to answer for ones right to be, not in
relation to the abstraction of some anonymous law,
some legal entity, but in fear for the other. My being-
in-the-world or my place in the sun, my home -
have they not been the usurpation of places belonging
to others already oppressed by me or starved, expelled
to a Third World: rejecting, excluding, exiling,
despoiling, killing. My place in the sun, said Pascal,
the beginning and the archetype of the usurpation of
the entire world.7 Fear for all that my existence
despite its intentional and conscious innocence - can
accomplish in the way of violence and murder. Fear
coming from behind my self-consciousness and
whatever returns there may be of the pure persever
ance in being toward good conscience. Fear of occu
pying in the Da of my Dasein someone elses place;
the inability to have a place, a profound utopia.8 Fear
that comes to me from the face of the other.
I have already spoken much about the face of the
other as being the original locus of the meaningful.
May I be. permitted to return for a moment to the
description of the irruption of the face in the phenom
enal order of appearance?
The proximity of the other is the signifying of the
face. A signifying that is immediately from beyond
the plastic forms that keep covering it up like a mask
with their presence in perception. Incessantly it pene
trates these forms. Before any particular expression -
and beneath all particular expression that, already
pose and countenance given to itself, covers and
protects it there is the nakedness and baring of
expression as such, i.e., extreme exposure, no defense,
vulnerability itself. Extreme exposure, before all
human aim as in a point blank shot. Extradition
of the besieged and the hunted of the hunted before
any hunt and any battue. Face in its directness of
facing..., directness of exposure to invisible death, to
a mysterious forlornness. Mortality beyond the
visibility of the unveiled - and prior to all knowledge
of death. An expression that tempts and guides the
violence of the first crime: its homicidal directness is
already singularly well adjusted in its* aim at the
exposure or the expression of the face. The first
murderer may not know the result of the blow he is
about to deliver, but his aim of violence makes him
find the line through which death reaches the face of
the other with undeflectable directness; traced out as
the trajectory of the blow delivered and the arrow
that kills.
But that face facing me, in its expression in its
mortality - summons me, demands me, requires me:
as if the invisible death faced by the face of the other
- pure alterity, separate, somehow, from any whole
were my business. As if, unknown by the other
whom already, in the nakedness of his face, it con
cerns, it regarded me before its confrontation with
me, before being the death that stares me, myself, in
the face. The death of the other man puts me on the
spot, calls me into question, as if I, by my possible
indifference, became the accomplice of that death,
invisible to the other who is exposed to it; and as if,
even before being condemned to it myself, I had to
answer for that death of the other, and not leave the
other alone to his deathly solitude. It is precisely in
that recalling of me to my responsibility by the face
that summons me, that demands me, that requires
me it is in that calling into question that the other
is my neighbour.
That way of requiring me, of putting me in
question and appealing to me, to my responsibility
for the death of the other, is a meaning so irreducible
that it is on that basis that the meaning of death must
be understood, beyond the abstract dialectic of being
and its negation, to which, on the basis of violence
that has been reduced to negation and annihilation,
one reduces9 death. Death signifies in the concretiza-
tion10 of what is for me the impossible abandonment
of the other to his solitude, in the prohibition
addressed to me regarding that abandonment. Its
meaning begins in the interhuman. Death signifies
primordially in the proximity of the other man itself
or in sociality; just as it is on the basis of the face of
the other that the commandment by which God
comes to my mind is signified11 to me.
Fear for the other, fear for the death of the other
man, is my fear, but in no way similar to being
frightened.12 Thus it departs from the admirable
phenomenological analysis that Sein und Zeit [Being
and Time] proposes of affectivity, or Befindlich^eit: a
reflexive structure expressed in a pronominal verb, in
which emotion is always the emotion of something
that moves us, but also emotion for oneself; in which
emotion consists in being moved [sSmouvoirJ - in
being frightened of something, elated about some
thing, saddened because of something, but it also
consists in being elating for oneself [se rSjouir pour
sot\, in being saddened for oneself, etc. I am troubled
and worried about my death. A double intentionality
of of And for, and thus a return to oneself, a return to
the anguish for oneself, to anguish for ones finitude:
in the fear of the dog, an anguish for my death. The
fear for the other man does not return to being
anguish for my death. It overflows the ontology of
Heideggers Dasein and his good conscience of being
with respect to that being itself. There is an ethical
awakening and vigilance in this affective disturbance.
Heideggers being-toward-death marks, indeed, for a
being, the end of his being-with-respect-to-that-being-
itself, and the scandal of that end, but in that end no
scruple about being awakens.

V
ETHICAL TRANSCENDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY
In the naturalness of being-with-respect-to-that-
being-itself, in relation to which all things and even
the other man - seem to take on meaning, essential
nature is called into question. A turning on the basis
of the face of the other, in which, at the very heart of
the phenomenon, in its very light, a surplus of signifi
cance is signified that could be designated as glory. It
demands me, requires me, summons me. Should we
not call this demand or this interpellation or this
summons to responsibility the word of God? Does
not God come to the mind precisely in that summons,
rather than in the thematization of the thinkable,
rather even than in some invitation to dialogue? Does
not that summons to responsibility destroy the forms
of generality in which my store of knowledge, my
knowledge of the other man, represents the latter to
me as similar to me, designating me instead in the
face of the other as responsible with no possible
denial, and thus, as the unique and chosen one?
The orientation of consciousness toward being in
its ontological perseverance or its being-toward-death,
in which consciousness is certain it is going to the
ultimate - all that is interrupted before the face of
the other man. It is perhaps that beyond being and
death that the word glory, to which I had recourse in
speaking of the face, signifies.
The human behind perseverance in being! Behind
the affirmation of being persisting analytically - or
animally - in its being, and in which the ideal vigor
of the identity that identifies itself and affirms itself
and fortifies itself in the life of individual human
beings and in their struggle for vital existence, con
scious or unconscious and rational the wonder of
the I vindicated in the face of the other, is also like
the suspension (like the epoche) of the eternal and
irreversible return of the identical to itself, and of the
inviolability of its logical and ontological privilege.
Suspension of its ideal priority, which negates all
alterity by murder or by engulfing and totalizing
thought. Suspension of war and politics that contrive
to pass for the relations of the Same to the Other. In
the / s deposition of its /-sovereignty, in the modality
of the hateful /, the ethical but also probably the
spirituality of the soul itself, and certainly the ques
tion of the meaning of being, i.e. its call for justifica
tion, is signified. It signifies through the ambiguity
of the identical that says I to itself at the height of its
unconditional and even logically indiscernible iden
tity, autonomy above all criteria; but that can, pre
cisely at that height of unconditional identity, confess
to its being the hateful I.
The I is the very crisis of the being of a being
[Ietre de Yetant] in the human. A crisis of being, not
because the meaning of this verb (in its semantic
secret) remains to be understood and is an appeal to
ontology, but because, being myself,-1 already ask
myself whether my being is justified, whether the Da
of my Dasein is not already the usurpation of some
ones place.
Bad conscience that comes to me from the face of
the other, who, in his mortality, tears me from the
solid ground on which I, a simple individual, place
myself and persevere naively, naturally, in my
position. Bad conscience that puts me in question. A
question that does not await a theoretical response in
the form of information. A question that appeals to
responsibility, which is not a practical last resort,
offering consolation for the failure of knowledge,
incapable of equaling being.
A responsibility that is not the privation of the
knowledge that comprehends and grasps, but the
excellence of ethical proximity in its sociality, in its
love without concupiscence.
The human is the return to the interiority of non-
intentional consciousness, to bad conscience, to the
possibility of its fearing injustice more than death, of
preferring injustice suffered to injustice committed,
and what justifies being to what ensures it.
VI
TH E TIM E OF TRANSCENDENCE
I have attempted to carry out a phenomenology of
sociality, starting out from the face of the other man,
reading, before all mimicry, in its facial directness, a
defenseless exposure to the mysterious forlornness of
death, and hearing, before all verbal expression, from
the bottom of that weakness, a voice that commands,
an order issued [signifie] to me not to remain indiffer
ent to that death, not to let the other die alone, i.e., to
answer for the life of the other man, at the risk of
becoming the accomplice of that death. The others
facing, in its directness, would appear to signify both
the defenselessness and the opposition of alterity, an
authority that is missing in the simply logical alterity,
which identifies individuals and concepts and distin
guishes them from one another, or, opposes notions
to one another by contradiction or contrariety. The
alterity of the other is the extreme point of Thou
shalt not commit homicide, and, in me, fear for all
the violence and usurpation my existence, despite its
intentional innocence, risks committing. The risk of
occupying, from the moment of the Da of Dasein, the
place of another, and thus, concretely, of exiling him,
of condemning him to a miserable condition in some
Third or Fourth World, of killing him. Thus there
emerges, from that fear for the other man, an unlim
ited responsibility, one that we are never discharged
of, one that does not end in the last extremity of the
neighbour, even if the responsibility then only
amounts to responding, in the powerless confronta
tion with the death of the other, Here I am. A
responsibility that harbors the secret of sociality, the
total gratuitousness of which, though it be ultimately
in vain, is called the love of ones neighbour, love
without concupiscence, but as irrefrangible as death.
Sociality, not to be confused with some weakness
or privation in the unity of the One. From the depths
of natural perseverance in the being of a being who
is assured of his right to be, from the heart of the
original identity of the / and against that persever
ance, and against that identity there arises, awak
ened before the face of the other, a responsibility for
the other to whom I was committed before any
committing, before being present to myself or coming
back to self.
What does this before mean? Is it the before of an
a priori? But would it not in that case come down to
the priority of an idea that in^the deep past of
innateness was already a present correlative to the /
thinly and that retained, conserved, or resuscitated
in the duration of time, in temporality taken as the
flow of instants would be, by memory, re-pre
sented? By that route, the privilege of the present
would be maintained; the present, the sovereign
expression of which is Platos theory of reminiscence.
Thus a reference of thought to perception would be
assured. And thus the privilege or transcendence of
eternity would be assured, as that of a present-that-
does-not-pass, in the ideality of the idea; an eternity
whose durie or diachrony of time would be only
dissimulation or deformation or privation in mans
finite consciousness. Also the privilege of the '/ thinks
stronger tb&n time, and gathering the scattered tem
poral shadows into the unity of transcendental apper
ception, the firmest and most formal of forms,
stronger than any heterogeneity of contents - to
identify the diversity of experience, in embracing and
seizing it again, qua identified, in the knowledge of
being, into which it enters. Fragments of the ancient,
unique One, regained. The / or the I thinly that
identifies would be the reason and logos of rationality.
Ontology would henceforth be interpreted not just as
 a knowledge that duplicates being, but as the ultimate
return of the identity of being to itself, as a return to
the One.
It is, on the contrary, a past irreducible to the
present that seems to signify in the ethical anteriority
of responsibility-for-the-other, without reference to
my identity assured of its right. Here I am, in that
responsibility cast back toward something that was
never my fault, never my doing, toward something
that was never in my power, nor my freedom
toward something that does not come back to me
from memory. Ethical significance of a past that
concerns me, that regards me, that is my business
outside all reminiscence, all retention, all representa
tion, all reference to a remembered present. Signifi
cance in the ethics of a pure past, irreducible to my
present, and thus, of an originary past. Originary
significance of an immemorial past, based on
responsibility for the other man. My non-intentional
participation in the history of humanity, in the past
of others, who are my business.
The responsibility for the other is not reducible to
a thought going back to an idea given in the past to
the I think and rediscovered by it. The natural
conatus essendi of a sovereign / is put in question
before the face of the other, in the ethical vigilance in
which the sovereignty of the / recognizes itself as
hateful, and its place in the sun the prototype and
beginning of the usurpation of the whole earth. The
responsibility for the other signified as an order in
the face of the neighbour is not in me a simple
modality of the transcendental apperception.
Before the face of the other, I have said. Can one,
properly speaking, use the preposition before [devant\
here? Have we not, in speaking thus, confused the
meaning of the face with the plastic forms of. repre
sentation that already mask it, whereas the face, in its
formal nakedness, or stripped of forms, expresses
mortality and signifies a commandment? Have we not
already failed to recognize the incessant surplus of
meaning that undoes these plastic forms? A surplus
that cannot be represented cannot be presented
but that signifies in the imperative with authority or
glory. I must return, even if in a very general and
rapid way, to the how of that glorious signifying of the
commandment, to the imperativity, so to speak, of
that original imperative, that original transcendence.
The face of the other concerns me without the
responsibility-for-the-other that it orders allowing me
to go back to the thematic presence of a being that is
the cause or source of this commandment. Indeed, it
is not a question of receiving an order by first
perceiving it and then obeying it in a decision, an act
of the will. The subjection to obedience precedes, in
this proximity to the face, the hearing of the order.
Obedience preceding the hearing of the order - which
gauges or attests to an extreme urgency of the com
mandment, in which the exigencies of deduction that
could be raised by an I think taking cognizance of
an order are forever adjourned. An urgency by which
 the imperative is, dropping all other business, cate
gorical, and an irreversible subjection, i.e., that does
not lend itself to the reversal of passivity into activity,
to the reversal that characterizes intellectual receptiv
ity, which always transforms itself into spontaneities
of reception.
But subjection to an obedience preceding the hear
ing of the order is this just insanity and an absurd
anachronism? Is it not rather the description of the
paradoxical modality of inspiration, breaking pre
cisely with the intellectualism of knowledge and
tracing out, in obedience to the absolute order, the
diachrony of the future itself? Is it not the unparal
leled way in which, absolutely irreversible, the future
commands the present without that way of concern
ing, without that affection by the commandment
and that passivity or patience, being reduced to any
sort of simultaneity, to any sort of superposition, be
it partial or punctual, of the present and the future
without the futures being dominated in the to-
come [et-venir] or the seizing of an anticipation (or of
a protention) without the representation of fear or
hope offending the dia-chrony of time and the excess
iveness and the authority of the imperative? Inspira
tion breaks, precisely, with the intellectualism of
knowledge: as if the order were formulated in the
voice of the very one who obeys it. Such would be,
beyond all metaphor, the voice of the ethical con
science, which is not the simple innateness of an
instinct, or the intentionality in which the I thinks
would continue to have the last word, investing that
which imposes itself to it, transforming impatiently,
in the realization, its irreversible passivity into initia
tive, equaling what it welcomes, distorting all author
ity. The conversion of the for-itself into a
for-the-other of responsibility cannot once again be
played out in an autonomous for-itself, be it in the
guise of a simple discovery made by the inflexible
(but still reflecting on itself) I think of a secret
modality, hitherto unsuspected, of some profound
nature. The transcendence of inspiration.
The heteronomy of ethical obedience, which, in the
guise of inspiration, is not the unfolding of a vis a
tergo: it comes from in frorit [de face]: submission to
the order issued [.signifie] in the face of the other man
which is not approached as a theme. Obedience to the
absolute order to the order par excellence origi-
nary obedience to the order par excellence, to the
word of God, on the condition of not naming God
except on the basis of this obedience. An un-known
God who does not take on a body, and who exposes
himself to the denials of atheism!
But the meaning or content of that order is insep
arable from the obedience subjected to its inspired
order. What is ordered is responsibility for the other
man, goodness wresting the / from its irresistible
return to self, the wresting of the / from uncondi
tional perseverance of a being in its being. One must
underscore the unity between the ethics of this subjec
tion to a commandment ordering responsibility for
the other and the diachrony of the future in that
irreversible subjection that does not become inverted
into knowledge and that, as if inspired, signifies
beyond that which, in obedience, can be represented
and presented. A beyond that the very imperativity
of the commandment and its goodness would signify
to obedience. The concretization of the paradox of
the idea of the infinite in Descartes third Metaphysical
Meditation, the revelation of transcendence behind all
unveiling of truths.
Ethical inspiration and future significance of
prophecy. I would like to suggest the;diachrony of
the future, setting out from the prophetic inspiration
that the impatience of anticipation in the Husserlian
idea of aim, of intentionality and pro-tention does not
equal. The idea of the Infinite taught by Descartes in
his paradox, an unparalleled thought, thinking more
than it can contain, the concrete wisdom of which I
have tried to articulate in obedience to the command
ment that, in the face of the other, dedicates me to
the other man that is a future aim beyond what is
to come [Id-venir], the true phenomenology. A
thought thinking more than it thinks or a thought
that, in thinking, does better than think, since it finds
itself to be already responsibility for the other, whose
mortality and consequently whose life regards
me. A thought constrained to the categorical impera
tive, inspired by an unknown God, constrained to
bear non-transferable responsibilities, but, thus, con
secrating my personal uniqueness, my primogeniture
and election. Dis-interestedness of a responsibility for
the other and for his past a past that for me is
immemorial on the basis of the future of prophesy
without which the un-known God would remain
inaudible in his glory, breaking his negative theology
without words that is the temporality in which the
intrigue of being and ontology is resolved in ethics.
 Totality and Totalization

We recognize a whole when a multiplicity of objects

- or, in a homogeneous continuum, a multiplicity of
points or elements - form a unity, or come, without
remainder, under a sole act of thought. Totality, that
which makes a whole a whole, is also used as a
synonym for the whole.
The ideas of whole and totality are implied in all
thought and all experience. Like the categories, they
form the latter, and as such, defy definition. All we
can do is situate them in relation to other fundamen
tal ideas, particularly to that of the part. In Kants
table of categories, totality is found among those of
quantity, and as the synthesis of unity and plurality;
in Aristotle, totality does not even appear where the
enumeration of categories goes up to ten, but it is
treated among the fundamental terms of thought in
Book Alpha of the Metaphysics.
Totalization may be understood to mean either
the grouping of objects or of points in a whole, or the
intellectual operation by which that multiplicity of
objects or points is encompassed. The two meanings
correspond to the extent that totalization and totality
remain within the limits of sensible intuition, in
 which the totalizing thought is able to peruse all the
elements of that intuition. We must begin by exam
ining totality more closely at this level and see, in
particular, how in examining how the thought that
comes into play goes beyond intuition, while remain
ing on its scale or within its measure.
But thought conceives of totalities beyond totalities
accessible to intuition, up to the whole that encompas
ses all things. The intellectual act rises from percep
tion, in which everything is shown within the limits
of the visible, i.e. already as a part, to thought
properly so called. This latter is not only an enlarged
vision, and one that is enriched with memories, but
also one that is panoramic and limited and condi
tioned by an encompassing whole. It intends hence
forth the. whole, understood to the very end and
leaving nothing outside. But does the intellectual act
not rise up in the void in this way? Do not such
totalizations and totalities limit themselves to the pure
form of the thinkable - to an absolutely indeterminate
something, more devoid of content than the most
general genera? Do they not belong to pure logic,
moving between an analysis that distinguishes, in any
whole, parts that it conditions, parts further divisible,
either infinitely so, or down to the level of elements
arbitrarily posited as absolutely simple, and a synthesis
taking each whole as a part of a vaster whole that
conditions it, thus going either to infinity, or, arbitrar
ily, to an absolute whole? Is totality, thought of in
terms implied by such a formalization, still within the
province of the true and the untrue? This is a
Kantian problem: Does not the idea of absolute
totality reduce to a pure concatenation of notions
without any hold on reality? That would mean the
divorce between the logical possibilities of thought for
which rationality remains the basis, on one hand, and
its [thoughts] pretensions to knowledge of being, on
the other.
The idea of totality can, however, be thought of
outside the schema of intuition. Thinking totality
would not consist in completing representation by
making the rounds of the elements to be totalized.
Far from reducing to a void, the totality of being
would be the essence of Being itself, any given image
offering only an abstract and partial aspect of the real.
Truth is only truth when it is the whole of being. In
this discordance between the whole and the given we
can see, according to Hegel, reality in its rationality
as a march toward the concrete universal, i.e. toward
an entirely determined universal. The whole would
presuppose a certain affinity of the parts among
themselves, an organization. It would be a cosmos, a
system, history. It would leave nothing else outside
itself. It would be freedom.
This questioning of the formalism of totality is also
reflected in the role played by the idea of totality in
the exegesis of texts, in which the part to be under
stood owes its meaning to the whole from which it
was taken, even though the whole cannot be under
stood without showing itself in its parts. Analysis and
synthesis, far from being independent operations,
presuppose one another reciprocally at every moment.
The role played by totality in hermeneutics would
then indicate that reason and totality are indeed
inseparable, but that totality requires more than a
spirit of continuity from reason.
The identification of the whole with the rational
and being is not, however, the sole thought of the
West. Issued from the Hellenic-Judeo-Christian tra
dition, it has had the anxiety of transcendence. To it,
freedom in the guise of totality has also revealed a
negative face of freedom. One must, consequendy,
ask whether it is human finitude alone that puts in
question the totality whose antinomies Kant per
ceived, and whether the crisis of that idea does not
come from the resistance that being puts up against
it, or better yet, from the difference between being in
its totality and the message of rationality.
I
TH E W HOLE IN IN T U IT IO N
It is most remarkable that, in perception, the per
ceived groups itself immediately into multiple, separ
ate things, sufficient unto themselves, so to speak
into totalities, independent from one another, the
irreducibility of which the Gestalt psychologists, in
particular, have underscored. Each one of these intu
itive wholes belongs to a vaster whole that concep
tual thought isolates. But in the network of relations
 that science substitutes for perception, the concrete
totalities of things are not just another step in a
logical process. From Aristotle to Husserl, their
meaning has been sought. The whole is that which
contains the things contained in such a manner that
they form a unit, says Aristotle, and the unit is a
characteristic property of natural things, so that the
whole par excellence is conferred on natural things.
They are whole by nature (physei), more eminently
whole than are artificial objects. Man is more whole
than any statue, a statue more whole than a number.
A distinction is drawn between the sum (pan), in
which the position of the parts is indifferent (water,
all liquids, numbers) and the whole (holon), in which
the position of the parts is not indifferent (the face,
the hand) the whole being applied to water or
number by extension, by metaphor. The formal
notion of totality is thus linked to a content. Can it
legitimately be detached? The question will be asked
from Kant to Hegel.
In Husserl, the whole is linked to the idea of
concretization or independent content. The depend
ent contents, being abstract (color and extension,
sound and intensity, for example), are summoned to,
and cannot exist outside of, the independence of the
concrete. Concretization characterizes the whole. The
whole is not contingent, as in Aristotle, upon the
finality of the natural being. It does, however, require
a content. But it is not reducible, in Husserl, to the
fixity of the image that represents it. The kernel of
the thing, circumscribed in its contours, given to
perception in flesh and bones, indicates the possi
bility of new determinations of that thing itself: a
horizon. The concrete whole is the datum along
with its horizon. The totality thus remains open. It is
the integration of a?J>ects that confirm one another.
When they infirm one another, the totality does not
explode; each breaking open immediately reconstitu
tes, in another direction, the process of the totalization
of aspects.
Despite its incompleteness, this intuitive whole is
distinguished from the totality that encompasses
things until the absolute totality of the world and that
declares itself in the external horizon, distinct from
the interior horizon. The world is a totality on
another model than the whole of the single object.

II
TOTALITY W ITH O U T REALITY
The movement toward the ultimate totality, an abso
lute world or being, admits of differences, even in its
formalism. The totality of individuals belonging to
the same genus differs from the totality of men
belonging to a nation, which in turn is different from
the totality of episodes making up a story, from that
of the points making up a space, or that of the
members that make up an organism, or of words
making up a language. Kant builds the idea of totality
by setting out from the relation of conditioning,
which is inscribed in the categories of the relation set
forth in the Transcendental Logic, and in which are
contained all intuitive data qua data, insofar as they
present themselves in experience to scientific under
standing. Science seeks the condition of the datum,
but only finds conditioned conditions. These suffice
for the understanding of facts and the establishment
of laws. They do not satisfy reason, which requires
the regressive synthesis of the whole series of con
ditions back to the unconditional. Reason is that very
requirement. It prescribes to understanding that it
embrace all the actions of the understanding in an
absolute Whole, in thinking the ideas of the world
and of God. Diverse aims of totality despite the
formalism of totalization, the ideas of the world and
of God go beyond the sensible datum. Kant shows
that, to the degree that they go beyond it, they remain
ideas that express no being. From the moment they
are given an ontological significance, they turn reason
against itself (antinomies) or make it speak nonsense.
In the ideas of totality, reason thus loses its cognitive
value. Its pretension to know would be illusory. In
agreement with the rationalist tradition of the West,
the idea of totality here again coincides with the ideal
of integral intelligibility. It remains a necessary illusion
and exerts a regulative function in scientific knowl
edge. But a gap separates henceforth reason and truth.
Kant puts the ontological meaning of reason in ques
tion. As a datum, being is a part, it is never all,
whereas thought can only direct itself toward being
in directing itself toward the datum. A reality corre
sponding to the totality is not unthinkable. It is not
known.
Discovering a rationality at the level of the sensible
and the finite, in contrast with the inordinate ration
ality of the Platonic Idea, rediscovering the Aristote
lian intelligibility inherent in things (which is
expressed in the Kantian doctrine of schematism, in
which the concepts of the understanding are exposed
in time), Kants criticist philosophy seriously shakes
the foundations of the idea of totality. Henceforth the
partial can have a meaning without the reality of the
Whole and appearance can cease being dependent
upon logical rationality. Since the absolute does not
lend itself to totalization, one may wonder whether
intelligibility is reducible to comprehension, to being
encompassed without remainder. But we must also
wonder whether the notion of being must not be
rethought according to the idea of totality.
Ill
TRUTH IS TOTALITY
Being can only be true if it is totality. The true must
include even errors, which, if excluded, would be
elsewhere, and would reduce the totality to a part,
i.e., to an abstraction. Contrary to the Kantian con
ception of knowledge, true knowledge is a breaking
away from the immediacy of the datum, from the
intuitive. The latter, always circumscribed in its
views (though they may be assembled as they are
imagined to be by a positivistic philosophy that con
siders itself to be the result of the sciences), is exclu
sive, partial, and depends upon points of view. The
true or the absolute, in which one can see, as Plato
would say, the sun in its abode (and not just in its
reflections), can only be thought, without resulting
from a synthesis that runs through the elements of a
given series. The thought that thinks being in its
totality is not a look placed in front of being. Repre
sentation, in which being is given to a thought still
separated from it, is only being still in the state of
indetermination or still insufficiently thinking
thought.
The true function of totalizing thought does not
consist in looking at being, but in determining it by
organizing it. Whence the idea of the temporal or
historical dimension of totality; history being not just
any element to totalize, but totalization itself. The
errors are truth to the degree that, in a given histori
cal period, thy express the still partial reality, but in
the process of going toward its completion. Their
partial character itself calls for their rejection, their
negation, which, in the concrete, is produced by the
action of reasonable men, that is, guided by the
universal, transforming nature into culture or isolat
ing reason from the immediate of the datum. There
is, here, progression toward the whole, the movement
of history itself, or the dialectic movement of thought.
Both superannuated truth and its negation are
determinant for the new truth that does not fall
ready-made from heaven, but results from that his
torical determination. Error is kept in its being gone
beyond. It is not outside of truth, which is total when
no negation is any longer possible, or when no new
determination is necessary. Totalization is the history
of humanity qua realization of rational universality in
mores and institutions, in which thought (the subject)
is no longer out of step with that which is thought
(substance), in which nothing remains other for rea
son, i.e., in which being is freedom.
The dialectical thought of totality allows one to
grasp at once the whole and its parts, seen in the light
of the whole; the whole being, as in Aristotle, the
finality of the parts itself. Total presence of being to
itself, or self-consciousness, the whole as the end of
history is not empty; it is the reality in its concretiza-
tion and most complete determination. A lucid and
free humanity, of which the nineteenth century
believed itself to be the glorious dawn.

IV
TH E HERM ENEUTIC TOTALITY
The constitution of a totality by the addition of parts
is only conceivable in a mechanistic version of the
world, in which one admits, as did Descartes, the
possibility in being and thought of simple natures,
intelligible by themselves (a totality that Aristotle
describes as not dependent upon the disposition of the
parts). The understanding of a text, a cultural work,
is accomplished otherwise. It is true that it goes from
the parts to the whole, but the parts derive their
meaning from the totality. There would appear to be
a circle in totalizing and analyzing thought that one
would be tempted to call vicious, as the analysis and
the synthesis mutually presuppose one another.
But the mutual presupposition of the analysis and
the synthesis can lead to the recognition of what
Heidegger called the hermeneutic circle, which one
would be wrong in calling vicious, since the circular
movement of the totalization is precisely irreducible
to a linear movement, operating in a homogeneous
environment. In this circular movement, the whole
and the parts determine one another. There are, in
the understanding of the totality, progressive jumps,
the first consisting in knowing how to enter into the
hermeneutic circle, in getting beyond the immediacy
in which the parts are given, as yet not understood as
being parts. A notion of totality and of intellect that
would lead to the understanding of all experience,
and perhaps all reasoning on things, according to the
model of the interpretation of texts. A notion of
totalization that is ever to be resumed anew, an open
notion of totality! A breaking away from the habits
of Cartesian understanding, moving from the simple
to the complex, without consideration of the light
that the totality sheds on the comprehension of the
simple. A conception in which the totality is the end
of the parts, as Aristotle would have it, but also a
conception in which, in an incessant to-and-fro move
ment, totality validates the part, which would justify
a religious or personalist conception of man at the
heart of creation, of which he would be both part and
end.

V
BEYOND TOTALITY
Kants critique of the idea of totality destabilized, but
did not put in question, the potential of rationality
for which a totalized universe seems to have the
mission, and that was already able to prompt the pre-
Socratics to formulate their wisdom by declaring that
all is this or that all is that: water, fire or earth.
In the course of the history of Western philosophy,
the impossibility of totalization itself has manifested
itself on a number of occasions: in the dualism of
opposed forces and values in Anaximander; in the
Good and the notion of a beyond Being in Plato and
Plotinus; as for being itself, in its equivocation that
only admits of the unity of analogy and in the
transcendence of the prime mover; in the idea that
sustains the philosophy of a transcendent God that
does not form a totality with the creature; in Fichtes
Sollen, which is not a simple powerlessness to think
being, but n surpassing of being, irretrievable by the
surpassed being, and which, in the final analysis, saves
the latter from illusion; in the Bergsonian durte,
which is the opening that puts back in question, on
the basis of the Future, all completed totality before
being the affirmation of I know not what mobile
essence of being; in the critique of Western totality
by Franz Rosenzweig, for whom God, the world and
man no longer form the unity of a total sum. Do
man and man form a totality any more than do
these?
This impossibility of totalization is not purely
negative. It traces out a new relation, a diachronic
time that no historiography transforms into a total
ized, thematized simultaneity, and the concrete
accomplishment of which would be the relation of
man to man, human proximity, peace among men,
such that no synthesis taking form above their heads
or behind their backs could dominate; a relation that,
in the forms in which it seems to occur, in the form
of a State, still draws its meaning from human
proximity. Humanity would not be, on this view, one
domain among those of the real, but the modality in
which rationality and its peace are articulated wholly
otherwise than in the totality.
 Infinity

Philosophy has borrowed the notion of the infinite

correlative to that of the finite - from reflection on
the exercise of knowledge, on one hand; from relig
ious experience or tradition, on the other. These two
sources determine the variety of meanings that are
attached to this notion, the problems it raises and the
evolution it undergoes in the course of the history of
philosophy. The term itself is a substantivized adjec
tive. It designates the property of certain contents
offered to thought to stretch out beyond all limits. It
is used in the first instance in cases in which limit has
its apparently original meaning. It is appropriate to
magnitudes of extension: to space, stretching out of
sight, beyond the place we inhabit or look at; to time
[le temps], from which the time of day [l*heure\ is
always torn loose; to the number series, none of which
is the greatest quanta making up a series. But the
term infinite is also appropriate to magnitudes of
continuity to extensive or intensive quanta continua,
in which no part of the whole is the smallest possible.
The content diminishes ad infinitum. But quanta, the
cradle of the infinite, are not its only domain. The
infinite can designate a superlative qualitative excel
lence, above human measure or limits, the divinity of
attributes enveloping the infinite with duration in the
immortality of the gods, despite a certain finitude
attested to by their multiplicity, which becomes con
flicts and combat. But the infinite can also be situated
above multiple infinities: the infinite One of the neo-
Platonists, above all multiplicity (which discovers the
perspective of infinity in which the Platonic idea of
the Good-beyond-Being was placed), the One God of
the Hebrew Bible brought into European history by
Christianity. The Bible, though it does not use the
term infinite (which in the Medieval Kabbala became
the absolute name of God: En-Sof = in-finite), states
a power beyond all power, that no creature, nor any
other divinity, limits, and whose ways no one can
know. The perfection of an inaccessible ideal, that no
thought, no act could ever attain (though one might
well wonder how that which is beyond act and
thought succeeds in making itself known as such to
the act of thought). Descartes said: [But] I conceive
God as actually infinite in so high a degree that
nothing can be added to the sovereign perfection
which he possesses.1 Here the notion of the infinite is
close to the idea of transcendence. But it also resides
in the idea of power itself, in the will that power
presupposes, in the spontaneity that is precisely a way
of being, without being determined by the outside,
i.e., without having any limits. The Cartesian God
will be infinite in this way: a will that is not even
commanded by Good or Evil, Truth or Falsehood,
because it institutes them. Mans free will can, in this
sense, in Descartes, also be said to be infinite. The
equivalence between free will and the infinite without
transcendence inspired the thought of the infinite in
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It is again the will - the
will of the will or the will to power, that, in
Nietzsche, describes the surpassing of man, the over
man. For a philosophy that judges transcendence to
be out of reach for the thinking but finite being, the
infinite is considered a methodological idea, a regula
tory principle of the science of the finite, and assuring
its progress. An idea and nothing but an idea, without
counterpart in being.
But transcendence is not the only way to free
oneself from limits. A being that had no other would
be, by that very fact, infinite. The God of Spinoza,
absolutely infinite being, self-caused, signifies that
extrinsic non-limitation, since all that is is in God,
and nothing without God can either be or be con
ceived of; this absolute is accessible to intellectual
intuition, which, distinct from the imagination, is
characterized precisely by the fact of uniting itself
instead of remaining other to the infinite that it
contemplates. It is also the status Hegel recognizes in
Spirit: the history of humanity, in which the thought
of men overcomes specific bodies of knowledge and
unilateral, exclusive institutions contradicted or
limited by others and thinks in keeping with the
universal, in such a way as to nffgate contradictory
propositions in preserving them dialectically in some
way in a coherent discourse. This latter institutes
itself as a totality, in which all Other is included in
the Same. The infinite would thus be absolute
thought determining itself of itself, in a State and
institutions by which, efficacious, it becomes Reality
and through which the individual human being is
free or infinite; as he will be free, in Marx, in a
classless society resolving all contradictions and in
which, consequently, an infinite is actualized. But to
see the infinite in the suppression of the Other or in
reconciliation with him assumes that the Other is, for
the Same, nothing but limit and menace. Who would
dispute that it is so, for the most part, in a human
society subjected, like all finite reality, to the formal
principle according to which the other limits or
cramps the same: the wars and violence of the world,
of all ages, is sufficient proof of that. But the other
man the absolutely other - the Other [Autrui]
does not exhaust his presence by that repressive
function. His presence can be meeting and friendship,
and in this the human is in contrast with all other
reality. The face-to-face is a relation in which the /
frees itself from being limited to itself (which it thus
discovers), from its reclusion within itself, from an
existence in which the adventures are but an odyssey,
i.e., a return to the island. The exodus from that
limitation of the I to" itself, which is revealed in a
whole series of reflections of contemporary philosophy
on the meeting with the Other - from Feuerbach and
Kierkegaard to Buber and Gabriel Marcel - is also
worthy of the adjective infinite.

I
TH E PROBLEMS OF TH E IN FIN ITE
Knowledge [la connaissance], the manifestation of
what is, of beings, to a conscious being, means as
much representation of the data (individual or univer
sal, intuition and understanding) as it does a going
beyond the data in the adventure and method of
research. In giving itself, a being offers certain traits
and excludes others. If it is thus, it is not otherwise.
Its being [essence] is defined. This limitation may be
construed as excluding no more than simple possi
bilities, swarming, without being, in the night. This
is the chaotic infinite, perturbing to knowledge \le
savoir]. From this angle, being would be finite in the
sense that a work of art is finished, in the sense that
a real entity can be realized to full perfection. It is
what artisans call finish. Finish closely linked to
knowability. The finitude or completion of being
would be precisely that by which it comes to maturity,
takes shape, takes form, is incarnated and receives,
so to speak, a complexion, becomes visible, appears:
that by which it presents itself or is conceived, that by
which, inspectable and delineated, it impresses the
design of being upon the malleable indetermination
of receptivity. But knowledge, in taking up a datum,
is also a refusal of the datum. The datum does nOt
exclude just possibilities. It is drawn abstracted -
from the totality of the real that stretches endlessly
beyond it. It is as if knowledge moved beyond the
datum, without having to gauge the height or degree
of that beyond.
Knowledge is not the information of consciousness
by an exhibited form; the finitude of the datum is
privation; and the gap between the datum and the
infinite constitutes the opening that allows the light
to pass through, as if even in its seeing even in its
speculation knowledge overcame a discrepancy.
The concept has nothing static about it; it aspires to
riches beyond the frontiers, setting out from the
indigence in which they [the frontiers] close up the
datum. The problem of the rationality or irrationality
of the infinite, the problem of its priority (do we
know the infinite by starting out with the finite, or
the finite against the background of the infinite)
derive from the ambiguous nature of knowledge,
[which is] representation and movement. And to the
extent that being meant, for the philosophical tra
dition of the West, fullness of presence and conse
quently accession to representation, the problem of
the being of the infinite depends upon the reconcilia
tion, possible or impossible, between the dynamism of
the infinite and the fullness of actuality. Does the
actual infinite have a meaning? Is it equivalent to
being itself? Or is it only a regulative idea? Is it just
a simple word? All these problems are intertwined in
the course of the history of the notion of the infinite.
The Infinite has contrived, in that history, to mean at
once the irrational hiddenness of matter and the
divinity (dissimulation or appearance) of God; the
historical evolution of men being, then, nothing but
the unfolding of the divinity of God, or the event
which requires no less than the history of humanity
of thought thinking itself, i.e., the event of rationality
itself.

II
TH E HISTORICAL GIVENS
The bad infinite
Classical thought, faithful to the ideal of completeness
and measure that inspired its art and religion, was
suspicious of the infinite. The hallmark of clouded
thought corresponding to an unrealized reality, and
lacking form to present itself to a knowledge capable
of containing^ or representing it, the infinite - the
apeiron was indeterminateness, disorder, badness.
But the finite forms, dear and intelligible, constituted
the cosmos. The infinite, a source of illusion, got
mixed up in it and had to be driven out, like the
poets from Platos city. Aristotle distinguished
between potential and act, and hence the infinite in
potentia of growth and division in the order of
matter - and the infinite in actu, which would be a
flagrant contradiction. That contradiction was only to
be overcome in the history of philosophy by a break
with the quantitative notion of the infinite that Des
cartes took the precaution of calling the indefinite,
and the traces of which Hegel would find even in the
infinite of the should-be Sollen which he will
contribute to disqualifying as the bad infinite. At the
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth, the mathematician M. B. [sic\ Cantor,
finding operations on the infinite as well defined as
those hitherto applied to actual, finite ones, will speak
of actual infinity in mathematics; but that notion
retains a rigorously operational meaning, derived
from a modification of axiomatics. For Aristode, to
be means to be in actu, to be accomplished and
completed. The definition or determination of the
real excludes only the possible; it does not transform
it [the real] into an abstraction detached from the
totality of reality. And yet, as far as being apt to
receive determination, the infinity of matter is not a
nothing in classical thought. Among the pre-Socratics,
the notion of infinity did not have an exclusively
negative and pejorative meaning, even at the level of
the spatial and temporal quantum. For Anaximander
(sixth century BCE), a principle called Apeiron, unborn
and incorruptible, is the source of all things, envelop
ing and directing them all, irreducible to any material
element. It is of inexhaustible fecundity, and produces
an infinite number of worlds. The cosmologists of the
sixth and fifth centuries BCE took up the notion
again: infinite time was linked with a perpetual
cyclicality. From Heraclitus and Empedocles to the
last Stoics, the idea of a cosmic periodicity was
affirmed, worlds succeeding worlds in an uninter
rupted time. There was not, between these worlds,
any continuity or progress. But among the atomists,
the idea of periodic returns replaced that of an infinite
flow of time always bringing new things.
Plato will commit a parricide,2 in affirming, in
opposition to his father, Parmenides, that non-being,
in a certain sense, is. All things include the unlimited,
matter, place, a greater or lesser degree of extension,
division and quality (more or less hot, more or less
cold), infinity and indeterminateness, which are not
pure nothings. But above all, without speaking of the
infinite apropos of the idea of the Good, and without
forbidding the look - after the journey and the
exercise that its exorbitant brilliance requires - to fix
that idea, Plato situates it beyond Being, thus opening,
in a different sense than the quantitative one, the
dimension of the infinite in which the infinite One of
the neo-Platonists will be placed. As for Aristotle, in
admitting the eternity of the world and its movement,
he allows something like an actual infinity in the
cause of this eternal movement. The act, purified of
all potential, or form, purified of all matter, the Prime
Mover or the God of Aristotle, sufficient unto itself
as thought of its thought, is infinite in this new sense.
Although Artistotle does not use the term, Saint
Thomas will identify the infinite of the God of the
Bible with the separation of pure form, and Hegel
will recognize the actual infinite of the Absolute
in the thought of the thought. That is how simplistic
it is to contrast the finitude of classical thought with
the infinity of modern thought. But the truth of
this commonplace resides in this: Space being for
Aristotle the limit of bodies, the Aristotelian cosmos
is finite, limited by the heavens and the fixed stars.
This is a view of the heavens that had a determinate
influence on cosmology until the dawn of the modern
period.
The divine infinite
During the Hellenistic period, through Gnostic specu
lation and Christian patristics, a contact is established
between Eastern spirituality and philosophy: the
notion of infinity is identified with the perfection and
Omnipotence of the Biblical God. The One of Plotinus
(205-270) is - by excess, not by defect - beyond any
sensible or intelligible world. It is infinite, without
form, beyond knowledge and activity, lacking all
lack. In it is concentrated that which, in the definite
forms that emanate from it, disperses discursively into
the infinity of matter. Finite, definite beings not only
close themselves off from the infinity of matter, but
remain torn away from the Infinite of the One. Its
fullness is not confusion, but a more complete deter
mination in which the lack that is constituted by the
separation brought about by definition is lacking. The
new idea of the infinite signifies precisely its compat
ibility with determination, as later, in the Kabbala,
the En-Sof, the infinite God, buried in the depths of
 his negativity, i.e., refractory to attributes, manifests
himself in the attributes called stfirot, without degrad
ing himself in that emanation, since that delimitation
is also understood as an event at the heart of his
hiddenness.
In Descartes and the Cartesians, the idea of perfec
tion, which envelops those of completion and actual
ity, is inseparable from the idea of the infinite. The
substance that we understand as being by itself sov
ereignly perfect and in which we conceive of absol
utely nothing that contains any defect, i.e., any
limitation to perfection, is called God.
It is not without some difficulty that divine perfec
tion and infinity are united. Origen (185254) con
tinues to put those who deny the limits in God by a
simple love of fine discourse on guard. To know is
to define. An infinite God would not be known. The
divine power must be tempered by his wisdom and
his justice. But already for Saint Augustine it would
be bringing God down to the human level to forbid
his encompassing the infinite. For Jean Damesdbne
(who died in 749), the Divine is infinite and incon
ceivable, and the only thing that can be conceived of
God is his infinity and his inconceivability. For
Thomas Aquinas (122574), the infinite is attributed
to God to the extent that matter and power do not
limit his form. The notion of the infinite loses its
quantitative meaning. The infinite in God is thought
of as actual infinity. The absence of limits takes on
the meaning of independence, of sovereign will. But
there is only an analogy between the infinite being in
God and the finite being in the creature. A created
infinite is absurd to Saint Thomas. There is no
infinite multiplicity in the content of a spatial seg
ment; its points are only infinite in potentia. As in
Aristotle, the world is finite in space. Even time can
be interpreted, according to Platos Timaeus, as being
born with the formation of the world. Roger Bacon
(121494) continues to question the temporal infinity
of the world, which would transform it into absolute
power, into God. But henceforth finitude is a sign of
imperfection, measuring the distance between the
creature and God, who is perfect and infinite. And
Duns Scotus (12651308), a partisan of the univocity
of being, suggests that the creature resembles the
Creator more than the philosophers of the analogy of
being thought: the creature resembles him in man, by
the will that commands the understanding. Nothing
other than the will is the total cause of the wills
willing. But we must wait until the Renaissance for
the finite world of the Graeco-Roman astronomical
system, like the Plotinian cosmos, to become open to
the infinite.
It is the human soul (conceived, according to the
biblical tradition, as being in the image of God) that,
in the creature, is the first to receive the attribute of
infinity. The way grace penetrates the soul could still,
perhaps, be conceived according to the way the active
intellect entered through the door in the Aristotelian
soul. But Duns Scotus already identifies that entry
with a capacity for the infinite in the nature of the
soul. For Meister Eckhart (12601331), finite crea
tures outside God are gifted with true reality in the
same sense as divine reality. The thought of the
Renaissance will recognize an infinite desire in the
soul, which is not a simple lack. For Descartes, the
idea of God is innate to the soul, and I am more
certain of God than of myself: the finite is known
against the background of the infinite. The intellec
tual priority of the infinite is henceforth added to its
ontological priority. The meaning of the infinite in
the creature also loses its quantitative meaning. It
concerns the free will that nothing, not even the
understanding, can command. The infinite as spon
taneity, i.e. as freedom, will dominate the Western
conception of the infinite. In Leibniz, that infinity-
spontaneity of representation and will reflecting the
infinite of God according to a functional law, particu
lar to each monad, reconciles in Gods creature the
finite and the infinite. Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64)
establishes a connection between Gods infinity and
the worlds finitude: God is at once implicitly one and
infinite and explicitly multiple and finite. The world
according to space and time is the unfolding of the
fullness that is complicit and actual in God, and that
is, moreover, unknowable in itself (like the En-Sof of
the Kabbalists), because any predicate would limit its
infinitude. For us, infinity is the only positive predi
cate of God. But the finitude and multiplicity of the
creature cannot be just finitude and nothing more,
*ILI 5 N ' V . P * R Y . SYSTIbr-
and lack perfection. They unfold Gods infinitude.
Not only does the human spirit, the sublime image
of God, take part in the fecundity of the creative
being by its infinite aspiration to knowledge, but the
universe itself explicates, in time and space, the infi
nite complexity of God. The world is a concrete
infinite, although Nicholas of Cusa does not call it
infinitum, like God, but indeterminatum, not eternal
but of infinite duration.
Infinity is the adequate measure of all that is: it is
the finite straight line that is in potentiality and the
infinite straight line in act, actualizing that which was
only potential in the finite straight line. Henceforth,
it is by the infinite that the finite is known a thesis
that is affirmed in Campanella (15681639), Des
cartes, Malebranche, Pascal, Spinoza and Leibniz.
The indetermination of the world is the imitation of
Gods absolute infinity. The unlimited character of
space acquires the dignity of a perfection, in counter-
distinction from the Aristotelian order of values.
Thus, outside rigorously scientific motives, it was a
religious thought that determined the infinitism of
modern science. Giodano Bruno (15481600) said to
the inquisitors of Venice: I teach the infinite universe,
the effect of the infinite power of God.
Kepler is still afraid of the idea of an infinite
world, without center, and that would thus exclude
order. But Descartes, Leibniz, Newton and the young
Kant affirm the infinity of spatio-temporal nature,
relating it to Gods infinity and the excellence of
(LiK-Net .
66 1 \ O /* ) /^ Kt Q
creation. Descartes distinguishes Gods infinity, on the
subject of which we understand that it cannot have
any limits, and the indefiniteness of space, in which
we see no reason for it to have any limits; but that
does not prevent him from seeing in the indefiniteness
of space the expression of the divine infinity. In
Leibniz, the monad is not only the human soul; it is
also the archetype of all being. The infinite of the
soul is already the infinite of the universe. The best
of all possible worlds reflects Gods infinity. I am so
much in favour of actual infinity, writes Leibniz,
that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is
popularly said, I hold that she shows it off every
where, the better to mark the perfection of her
Author. (Letter to Foucher, Gerhudt edition, VI).
Leibniz extends that thought of the infinite to the
small and the divisible. Thus, I believe that there is
no part of matter that is not, I do not say divisible,
but actually divided, and, consequently, the least
parcel must be considered as a world full of an
infinite number of different creatures. The most
finite creature is filled with the infinite in its own way.
Similarly, the actual infinity of the universe in its
extension and divisibility is reflected in the actual
infinity of the particular being through the infinite
fullness of little perceptions. The finitude of the
being distinct from Gods actual infinity consists in
the fact that these little perceptions are not knowledge
but remain obscure, and that each being reflects the
same infinity in its own way. God knows these infinite
reflections of the Infinite in the monads. The infinity
of the future is entirely present to the divine under
standing, Kant wrote during his pre-critical period.
Chapter 7 of Part 2 of his Theory of the Heavens3 is
tided Of the Creation in the Entire Extension of its
Infinity, in Space as well as in Time. Time is the
successive completion of creation. It requires no less
than eternity to animate the innumerable and endless
worlds, the entire extension of space. The Kant of
after the Critique of Pure Reason attributes a signifi
cance for free or moral action to that infinity. The
categorical imperative is only valid if* the subject is
autonomous, i.e., not constrained and free, i.e., not
limited by the other, or infinite. Kant adds to this, in
order for it to take on its full meaning, the postulates
of an unlimited length of time and an infinite being,
God, the guarantor of the concordance between virtue
and happiness. Kants practical philosophy opens the
way to the speculative philosophy of post-Kantian
idealism.
All is infinite
According to the young Spinoza, divine goodness
implies the total transferal of the divine to the crea
ture. Gods infinity and that of the world constitute
but one, in Spinozism, and are differentiated only as
natura naturans and natura naturata. By god, I under
stand an absolutely infinite being, i.e., a substance
consisting in an infinite number of attributes, each of
which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. God
 infinitely infinite the infinity of infinite attributes
prevents the attributes limiting Gods infinity. An
actual infinity by the force of its definition or by the
infinite enjoyment of being (per infinitam essendi
fruitionem), an infinity the parts of which are also
infinite, and that it would be absurd to suppose
divisible and measurable and composed of finite
parts, distinct from the infinity of duration, which
has no limits, not by the force of its essence, but by
that of its cause. Infinite spatiality expresses the
infinite essence of the divine substance in an immedi
ate way; the appearance of infinite time translates the
eternal consecution in the divine essence. An infinite
number of modes express the attributes. Nothing is
outside Gods Infinite, so that all singularity is but the
element of a chain of modifications and does not exist
qua arbitrary, finite and contingent. We see in Spi
noza the way the modes an appearance of finite
absolutely affirm the absolute Infinite. God is the cause
of the modes in the same way that he is the cause of
Himself. And, lastly, the revelation of the Infinite is
rationality itself. The infinite cause of himself is known
by himself, i.e., is intelligibility par excellence. It is
less clear why the Infinite in Spinoza is degraded in
appearance. An ambitious philosophy, pursuing to the
end the identification of the rational with the infinite
will progressively reduce the knowable - always, in
whatever form, given and exterior (and to which the
incompleteness of positive science, the bad infinite,
would still participate) to this very process of
surpassing: knowledge would thus be only knowledge
of knowledge, and consciousness only self-conscious
ness, thought only thought of thought, or Spirit.
Nothing would any longer be other: nothing would
limit the thought of thought. The thought of thought
is the infinite. But the surpassing of the given know-
able - which Hegel calls negativity - is a process of
determination. Its result is the concept. Hegel showed,
precisely, that negativity is a determination and that
determination is not completed with the limit of the
defined and with exclusion: that it is totalization
absorbing the other, or, concretely, the efficacious
action of Reason in history. The singularity of con
sciousness itself is but the labor of the infinite insert
ing itself into the datum. The totality is not a piling
up nor an addition of beings: it can only be conceived
of as absolute thought that, without any other thing
being an obstacle to it, affirms itself as absolute
freedom, i.e., act, efficacious thought qua thought,
actual infinity. The Classical ideal of knowledge as
determination or finitude of intelligible forms and
the rationality of surpassing thus meet. In Hegels
Logic, contrary to the conception of the Classical
thinkers, the finite is not determinable in itself, but
only in its passage to the other. The finite is some
thing that is posited with its immanent frontier as the
contradiction of itself by which it refers, and is forced,
outside itself. It is the very mode according to which
the infinite is revealed. But it is the fact of revealing
itself, knowledge, that is the event of the Absolute
itself.
The finite without infinity
Kants critique, in its rigorous distinction between
intuition, the pure form of which is time and in
which nature is given, and reason, which possesses the
idea of the infinite but cannot get a firm grip on
being, sets up the finite and the infinite in a new way.
As opposed to the Cartesian tradition, the finite, in
Kant, is no longer understood in light of the infinite.
Integrating the teachings of empiricism, Kant relates
the appearing of Nature to human sensibility, which
is the condition of a finite being, whose only way of
relating to the Real is by being affected, impressed,
receptive. Appearing nature thus bears the mark of
the subjects finitude. That mark consists not only in
the subjective character of sensation at once state of
soul and quality of object - but, more profoundly, in
the rigorously successive character of the regressive
synthesis carried out by science, which apprehends
and comprehends the real. The successive is marked
by the subject because the regressive scientific synthe
sis, which takes the datum back to its preconditions,
cannot transcend its incompleteness. It does not suf
fice for the subject to reason thus: If the conditioned
is given, the unconditioned condition or the totality
of conditions is given, precisely because the so-called
totality is here but temporal succession and not the
eternity of a logical consecution; because time is time
and not an actual infinity. The finite temporal
way of apprehending the real thus belongs to the
objectivity or reality of the real. The infinite, a
regulative idea, does not constitute the datum. The
infinity of the idea is only actualized at the price of
an illusion called transcendental appearance, Reason
illicitly leaping over time. The motives that guide
reason toward the infinite do not depend on the
function of the understanding, which assures, accord
ing to the schema of time, the synthesis necessary for
the unification of the sensible and the apprehension
of the datum. What does it matter if the principles of
understanding, like those of reason, derive, for Kant,
from formal logic! The indefiniteness of the temporal
series is not the obscure or the confused, of which the
infinity of the idea would be the clear and distinct.
The finite is not related to the infinite. Kants tran
scendental dialectic confirms the Kantian doctrine on
the schematism of the concepts constitutive of Nature,
expounding, against the incipient Hegelian era, the
irreducibility of the datum as such of the finite to
the movement of systematization and totalization and
dialectic transcendence. One must point out the
agreement of these positions with the meaning the
infinite takes on in science, which is at once open to
an infinite universe and - prudence more than wis
dom conscious of its essential incompleteness. In
Husserlian phenomenology, we find the Kantian way
of describing the finite independently of the infinite,
and the thesis that each form of objectivity has its
own finite modes of apprehension, which mark the
very objectivity of the objects. The idea in the Kan
tian sense of the term, i.e., the Kantian infinite as a
regulative idea, not realizable in being - a non-actual
infinite guides, in that phenomenology, which is
mainly idealist in this, the constitution of the object
on the basis of the finite datum: it illuminates the
infinite horizon on which the datum appears, and the
infinite horizon of horizons. Finally, in Heidegger,
the finitude of being is not the equivalent of a
negation of the infinite. On the contrary, it is on the
basis of positive structures of existence - being-in-the-
world, care and being-toward-death that finitude is
described. It is by setting out from finite temporality
and through the leveling and banalization of that
finite temporality that Heidegger deduces infinite
time. And on the last page of his Kant and the Problem
of Metaphysics, Heidegger teaches that nothing is as
radically repugnant to ontology as the idea of an
infinite being. While leaving open the question of
whether finitude does not presuppose some infini
tude, Heidegger is far from thinking that that pre
supposition brings us purely and simply back to the
Cartesian positions and themes, since he asks, always
writing the word presupposition in quotation marks:
What is the nature of this presupposition? What
does infinitude, posited in this way, mean? Bergson,
like Heidegger, and prior to him, teaches a time that
is irreducible to an infinite series of instants treated as
an eternity by the intelligence. The time composed of
homogeneous instants, a superficial, degraded time,
turns us toward duree, the instants of which in a sense
transcend themselves, laden with all their past and
already charged with a future; in the very limit of the
past, surging forth new; old with the age of being,
and as if at the first day of creation, creative, freeing
themselves of their limitations, infinite. The true
dimension of the past would be the inferiority that is
durSe. An infinity of the possible, more precious than
the actual infinity. But is not the bad infinity at the
bottom of all the triumphant infinities? That is per
haps the thought of Maurice Blanchot, who, in the
depths of being, hears the monotonous sound of a
ceaseless rainfall, devoid of meaning. We should also
note the new sense that Heidegger conferred on the
finite and the infinite. They are no longer the attri
butes of beings [Stants], to which they would be
related in Western metaphysics, which, according to
Heidegger, consists in understanding being \itre\ on
the basis of the beings that being manifests. It is the
being of beings that would be referred to by the terms
finite and infinite, thus responding to the ontological
problem, to the understanding of being that deter
mines, in Heideggers view, the history of philosophy
and of history tout court. Hence new light is shed on
many of the great texts on infinity, and even certain
ways of speaking, such as the gerund in Spinozas
infinita essendi fruitio.
 III
IN FIN ITY AND ETHICS
In the context of knowledge in which it appeared to
Western thought, the Infinite absorbs the finite, pre
sents itself as the Same overcoming the Other, a
thought of thought, becoming omnitudo realitatis. But
in that divinization of the Infinite, have we not lost
the specifically religious divinity of the God who
permitted the idea of infinity to dominate Western
rationalism? For a theology that made gnosis into the
very object of its gnosis, all relation to the Infinite
that was not knowledge would be taken for a repre
sentation without a concept, for the childhood of
absolute thought. One may, however, wonder
whether a different path is not possible. The presence,
taught by Descartes, of the Idea of the infinite in a
soul created too small to contain it, indicates that its
alterity neither limits nor absorbs, [but] that it elates
the soul that, .according to formal logic, it should
harm. That the alterity of the Infinite can consist in
not being reduced, but in becoming proximity and
responsibility, that proximity is not a failed coinci
dence but an incessant and infinite - and, so to
speak, glorious growth of alterity in its call to respon
sibilities, which, paradoxically, increase as they taken;
that the finite is, thus, as if for the greater glory of
the Infinite that is the formal design of the notion
of infinity that, when taken as knowledge, is lowered.
I have never treated the infinite except to submit to
it,' Descartes wrote to Mersenne on 28 January 1641,
showing in the very knowledge of the Infinite already
a beyond knowledge. The proximity of the other
showing me his or her face, in society with me, and
the implications of that encounter overturn the logical
and ontological play of the same and the other,
transforming it into ethics. An entire strain of con
temporary philosophy, setting out from the irreduci-
bility of the interpersonal to relations of objectivity,
thematization and knowledge, is situated in the relig
ious tradition of the idea of the infinite. One may
wonder whether it is not drawing close to that
tradition, even when it expresses itself in a deliber
ately and rigorously atheistic way.
PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE
AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY
 Beyond Dialogue

The ten points of Seelisberg approved in July, 1947

by an international conference against anti-Semitism
- the twentieth anniversary of which we are celebrat
ing today, is addressed to Christians. They formulate
resolutions on the way they should, in future, speak
of the Jews and teach about Judaism. This text does
not tell Jews what they should think about Christians.
Doubtless on this point our long cohabitation in
Europe, our co-citizenship in the modern nations, our
communion on the benches of lay schools, studying
Bossuet, Racine and Pascal, have not led to any form
of underestimation or disdain. Doubtless also, the fact
of Hitlerisms having been possible in a Europe that
had been evangelized for fifteen centuries has not
closed the eyes of Jews to the charity and abnegation
shown by Christians during a period in which, among
brown shirts, the black robe promised support, com
fort or at least understanding.
The Seelisberg text deals mainly with the cate
chism, attempting to rectify its perspective. It is
obvious that Judaism, unless it recants, can recognize
itself neither when it is condemned in theological
terms, nor when in theological terms it is rehabili-
tatcd. But the ten points of Seelisberg this new
Decalogue - attests to a concern to remind Christians
of the perpetuity and universality of the Old Testa
ment and the dignity of those who, according to a
Talmudic apology, ravished from the angels their
secret, in committing themselves to accomplish the
commandments before hearing the dogmas upon
which they are based. To adhere to an ethics without
worrying about its doctrinal presuppositions, to set
ones metaphysics according to categorical imperatives
- is surely to proceed in the way most in keeping
with the Biblical spirit. ;
The Seelisberg principles, too, have found an elite
capable of that angelic inversion in which the ethical
precedes doctrine, and does not worry about the dog
matic upsets it presages. In twenty years one does not
rectify the bad habits and mistakes of twenty centur
ies. But groups called Judeo-Christian Friendships
formed everywhere. The French one is also celebrat
ing its twentieth anniversary. It must be associated
with the homage that is due to the principles and
men of Seelisberg. The fact is, the Seelisberg confer
ence was already the work of Judeo-Christian associ
ations of various countries; thus it expressed the good
will of our Christian friends who did not even wait
for these ten points to become our friends. It is
therefore an unconditional friendship, impatient to act
and to preach by example, that we celebrate tonight.
The struggle against anti-Semitism - at Seelisberg,
in the Judeo-Christian Association - concerns primar-
ily the conscience of non-Jews. But we are too closely
allied to the spiritual life of our contemporaries not
to participate in their case of conscience. Besides, how
can we remain indifferent when a detente in human
relations is attested or announced? How can we not
take the hand extended with such confidence, sin
cerity and warmth? That is why, shortly after the
war, there was not only judeophilia, but Judeo-
Christian friendships. That is why there were Jews at
Seelisberg. Their position has not always been ...
comfortable. Believe us, it is not always agreeable -
or it is not unreservedly so to receive excuses, praise
and declarations attributing to you an advantageous
role in the metaphysical drama. Even in the Amitie
jud6o-chretienne [Judeo-Christian Amity], that
advantageous position has not always been comfort
able. From the outside, it appears suspect of ambigu
ity: for some, the Jews adopt an air of permanent
gravity, the better to accuse and vindicate; for others,
they appear to expose themselves to abandoning their
faith by dint of being pitied. Despite all these years of
progressive forgetting, no one among us can cure the
stigmata of so many burns, nor pardon nor absolve in
the place of those who have died. But to practice
Judeo-Christian friendship does not consist in enjoy
ing the role of victim, nor in allowing oneself to be
seduced by compassion.
Thinking now of the Jewish promoters of this new
movement of good will, Edmond Fleg and Jules
Isaac, and the great masters who have disappeared (to
 which we must also add the name of the great
militant, Maurice Vanikoff), I would like to dis
tinguish the different meanings that Judeo-Christian
friendship can take on for us, and to say, in con
clusion, the meaning it assumes for those who are
here twenty years afterward, when after all so many
things have changed. There no longer is any Jewish
Magisterium, as you know. Israel is a community of
persons studying the same books. Each person speaks
for himself or herself. But each in his sincerity bears
witness to an aspect the truth, and it is these various
aspects that I would like to mention briefly. Edmond
Fleg and Jules Isaac, assimilated Western Jews,
rejoined the community of Israel after the two crises
that struck European Jewry, the Dreyfus Affair and
Hitlerism. Edmond Fleg was overcome by the Drey
fus Affair. The triumph of truth did not make him
forget the bitterness of the struggle that had led to it.
He did not believe the rehabilitation of Dreyfus
suppressed the last contradiction of our society. But
the painful life of Edmond Fleg revealed an almost
inexhaustible power of hope. Judeo-Christian friend
ship certainly represented for him an attachment to
the common values that his work does not cease to
exalt. The point at which the paths separate is indi
cated very precisely in Jisus raconti par le Juif errant
[Jesus told by the Wandering Jew]1. That point is
situated much further than that of the parting of
ways. But for Fleg, after the separation itself, the
Jewish soul retains enough love to remain fraternal.
The attitude of a Fleg translates an experience of
kinship with Christianity. We recognize ourselves in
this relationship whenever we are in the presence of
a world that does not know, or does not want to
know, the Bible, like that Pharoah at the beginning
of Exodus a new sovereign who did not know
Joseph. Who will deny that the presence of that
world at the threshold of our own is not the charac
teristic trait of the period we are entering? I am not
thinking exclusively of our kinship in the face of
Nazism. But behold, upon the worlds stage,
innumerable masses advancing out of Asia. In the
eyes of these crowds who do not take sacred history
as their frame of reference, are we Jews and Chris
tians anything but sects quarreling over the meaning
of a few obscure texts? Through the two billion eyes
that watch us, History itself stares us down, shredding
our subjective certainties, uniting us in one common
destiny, inviting us to show ourselves able to measure
up to that htiman wave, inviting us to bring it
something other than distinctions and anathema.
With uncompromising intransigence before the
truth, and in opposition to the teaching of disdain, of
which he directly accused historical Christianity, but
also with uncompromising intransigence before the
truth, of which he proclaimed, as a humanist and
scholar, the virtue of reconciliation, Jules Isaac
struggled for and in Judeo-Christian friendship.
Without that element, Jews could Only receive friend
ship as commiseration or as a pardon, granted after a
long quarrel to a survivor who has done many
wrongs, but also suffered much hardship. It is true
that Judaism cannot lay claim to more innocence than
the rest of humanity. And because of the supplemen
tary obligations that it feels, and imprudendy calls
election, it is an unhappy consciousness, unhappier
than other unhappy consciousnesses. But Jules Isaac
has made possible an essential refusal. He rejected the
guilt imposed upon the Jews solely for a certain
theology. A guilt that ^separated them from all human
warmth. Many of us do not even consent to Jules
Isaacs language, in which too much theology is still
intertwined with history. But for all of us the essential
element of his thesis stands: rejection of the Mephis-
tophelian guilt of one who does good in willing evil,
or who assured the salvation of the world because he
alone had the soul of an executioner.
But the years that have gone by may not have
accomplished all that seemed possible to a Fleg or a
Jules Isaac immediately after the Liberation. The
acuity of the apocalyptic experience lived between
1933 and 1945 is dulled in memory. The extraordi
nary returns to order. There have been too many
novels, too much suffering transformed on paper, too
many sociological explanations and too many new
worries. I would now like to say what, from my
perspective, despite the changed situation, I have
found to be unique in the Judeo-Christian Amity of
Paris - during the little meetings held from time to
time under the presidency of Jacques Madaule. I
came late to this circle, and with a certain degree of
hesitation. Not for religious reasons. I feared that
adherence to an association created with a view to
bringing Jews and Christians closer together might
express ingratitude toward the lay spirit, which, by
other means, has united so many human groups
separated by a variety of beliefs and philosophies into
one republic.
The spirit I found there immediately appeared to
me not as a return to superannuated forms, anterior
to the constitution of an egalitarian and homogenous
society, but as presupposing that homogeneity and
going even further, and even more deeply, in the
spirit of equality and fraternity.
We are used to thinking of history as a harmonious
process in which all problems are resolved, all con
flicts settled, in which, in universality, all contra
dictions are reconciled. We approach already
accomplished history. Already Saint-Exup6rys boa
(whom one of my students once alluded to in this
connection) has swallowed the elephant without
chewing. And it is already digesting it.
What a watchful attention to history in the making
reveals besides the many problems awaiting their
resolution from reason, technology or dialogue is
the existence of insoluble problems; problems inher
ently insoluble, and delivered over to violence, not
just because of our passions, our impatience and our
laziness, but because of the dormant antimony within
them. Smothered by violence, they return, after the
blood and the tears, in the form of other insoluble
problems.
Perhaps the Judeo-Christian problem, when
thought through to the end, is one of those insoluble
problems, because Judaism and Christianity are part
of the same drama, and not different enough not to
challenge one another. And surely the Judeo-Chris-
tian problem is not the only insoluble one. And
perhaps a Jewish existence is caught up in many
insoluble problems; and perhaps in speaking of that
this evening I am not, as one might think, deflecting
the Jewish testimony that I must bear toward meta
physics. There are oppositions between men that, at
first blush, seem, like so many others, to do no more
than give rise to reflection and discussions, call for
committees, conferences and institutions, to dispel
violence. One soon perceives that all the difficulties
they contain can, in fact, be overcome. All but one.
And that last difficulty remains insoluble and annoy
ing because, without realizing it and out of patience,
the minds dealing with it turn toward violence and
guile, speak of conversion and expulsion, of using
force and driving into the sea - of too bad about this
or that or the other thing. After violent thoughts,
brought on by argumentative thoughts, pity is no
more.
JudeO-Christian Amity, such as I have seen it
practiced in this group (the only one I know), the
Judeo-Christian Amity of Paris and its president have
shown me, issuing from the specific cause that lights
its way, a new attitude, a paradigm of the one that
seems to me to be missing in the perfect deductions
of the sublime doctrinaires of progress: the search for
a proximity beyond the ideas exchanged, a proximity
that lasts even after dialogue has become impossible.
Beyond dialogue, a new maturity and earnestness, a
new gravity and a new patience, and, if I may express
it so, maturity and patience for insoluble problems.
Those who, under the presidency of Mr Madaule,
practice Judeo-Christian Amity in Paris, have
renounced proselytism and propaganda, not in order
to find some most-common-denominator platform,
but because they have understood that in certain
conflicts persuasion itself is violence and repression.
Neither violence, nor guile, nor simple diplomacy,
nor simple tact, nor pure tolerance, nor even simple
sympathy, nor even simple friendship - that attitude
before insoluble problems, whatj^n it be, and what
can it contribute?
What can it be? The presence of persons before a
problem. Attention and vigilance: not to sleep until
the end of time, perhaps. The presence of persons
who, for Once, do not fade away into words, get lost
in technical questions, freeze up into institutions or
structures. The presence of persons in the full force
of their irreplaceable identity, in the full force of their
inevitable responsibility. To recognize and name those
insoluble substances and keep them from exploding
in violence, guile or politics, to keep watch where
conflicts tend to break out, a new religiosity and
solidarity - is loving ones neighbour anything other
than this? Not the facile, spontaneous elan, but the
difficult working on oneself: to go toward the Other
where he is truly other, in the radical contradiction
of their alterity, that place from which, for an insuf
ficiently mature soul, hatred flows naturally or is
deduced with infallible logic. One must deliberately
abstain from the convenience of historical rights,
rights of enrootedness, undeniable principles and
the inalienable human condition. One must refuse
to be caught up in the tangle of abstractions, whose
principles are often evident, but whose dialectic, be it
ever so rigorous, is murderous and criminal. The
presence of persons, proximity between persons: what
will come of this new spirituality, that proximity
without definite projects, that sort of vigilante with
out dialogue that, devoid of all definition, all thought,
may resemble sleep? To tell the truth, I dont know.
But before smiling at maturity for insoluble problems,
a pathetic formula, actually, let us think, like one of
my young students, of Saint-Exup6rys little prince,
who asks the pilot stranded in the desert, who only
knows how to draw a boa constrictor digesting the
elephant, to draw a sheep. And I think what the litde
prince wants is that proverbial lamb who is as gentle
as a lamb. But nothing could be more difficult. None
of the sheep he draws pleases the litde prince. They
are either violent rams with big horns or too old. The
little prince disdains the gentleness that only comes
with extreme age. So the pilot draws a parallelogram,
 Beyond Dialogue
the box in which the sheep is sleeping, to the little
princes great satisfaction.
I do not know how to draw the solution to
insoluble problems. It is still sleeping in the bottom
of a box; but a box over which persons who have
drawn close to each other keep watch. I have no idea
other than the idea of the idea that one should have.
The abstract drawing of a parallelogram - cradle of
our hopes. I have the idea of a possibility in which
the impossible may be sleeping.
 The Word I, the Word You,
the Word God

Despite all that may have been said against science,

we must not forget that, amid the deterioration of so
many human orders, scientific research remains one
of the rare domains in which man controls himself,
bows to reason, is not wordy or violent, but pure.
These are moments of research, constantly inter
rupted by the banalities of everyday life, but moments
that, conjoined, have their own duration. Is not the
place of morality and loftiness henceforth the labora
tory? Is it not there that the soul is alone with being,
in an intimacy no desert hermitage could equal? The
object under investigation permits not the least dis
honesty, and is unforgiving.
But the idealist critic of the notion of substance
during the last century, the phobia of alienation and
reification, and, closer to us, Bergsonism, phenome
nology and the philosophy of existence have made us
suspicious of the quasi-natural tendency to take the
object as the model of reality, objectivity as the being
of what is, and science as true contact with the world.
Other models of the Real are then praised and
described: relation, durie, history, the person, the
 instrumentality of the means of production and of
physical objects, and human finitude. There is a
bringing out of the meaning that informs concrete life:
economic behavior, creative intuition, savoir-faire,
feelings, immediate sensible perception; also, the con
tradictions between thinkers and the struggles among
men, which announce the dialectic and its reconcilia
tions. These constitute so many different ways of
approaching the verb to be, which would be at the
birth of all meaning. The term modality no longer
designates just the possible, the real, and the necessary
of formal logic, but a variety of different ontological
structures.
The wisdom to which the new reflection aspires,
and the life it expresses, consist nonetheless in encom
passing the universe. While condemning the intellec-
tualist asceticism of the laboratory, we are still
persuaded that the signifying of meanings, or ration
ality, is still constructed the same way knowledge is:
an intention that encompasses includes an
externality.
The most spontaneous lived experience splits in two
in order to become antimate in rejoining itself. It
already reflects on itself in its naive spontaneity. We
hold to the image we have experienced, and make
ourselves memories. Enjoyment and suffering are
experience. To live in a meaningful way is to /(now
life in living it. All that philosophy of the concrete
continues, in a way, the classical tradition, in which
intelligibility was only a relationship with the world,
with being in its neutrality of the there is, the
articulated integration of the totality of the data
without remainder, pursued to the possibility of say
ing a sovereign I.
The relation that Martin Buber, born exactly one
hundred years ago, extracted from the word you, as
opposed to the objectivity of the that, and which was
to flower into dialogical philosophy, seems at first to
confirm this movement toward the concrete, so
named by Jean Wahl in an important work by that
title in 1932. In it, Wahl speaks especially of Gabriel
Marcel, who, in his Metaphysical Journal, published in
1927, without having read Buber, established the
originality and importance of the relation between
the I and the you.1
To say you is the primary fact of Saying [Dirtr].
All saying is direct discourse or a part of direct
discourse. Saying is that rectitude from me to you,
that directness of the face-to-face, directness of the
encounter par excellence, of which the geometers
straight line may be just an optic metaphor. Direct
ness of the face-to-face, a between us [entre-nous],
already conversation [entre-tien], already dia-logue
and hence distance and quite the opposite of the
contact in which coincidence and identification occur.
But this is precisely the distance of proximity, the
marvel of the social relation. In that relation, the
difference between the / and the other remains. But
it is maintained as the denial, in proximity which is
also difference, of its own negation, as non-in-differ-
cnce toward one another. Like the non-indifference
between close friends or relatives. Being concerned by
the alterity of the other: fraternity. The source of the
gratuitous hatred and disinterested devotion, but an
affectivity distinct from the love that, like hunger,
attaches itself to what can satisfy: an affectivity not to
be confused with the one involving the passions of
the soul, needs satisfied or unmet, nerve endings and
visceral changes.
An extra-ordinary relation. From Bubers and
Marcels first description of it, the word God is
pronounced, as if it shed light upon the space in
which the rectitude of the dialogue can take form.
You par excellence. Eternal you, offering itself to
invocation rather than observation or experience: an
invisible God. The pronoun you is not put in place of
some noun to designate a substance: a this or a that
that would in addition be qualified as you. Here the
nominative of the noun is left behind by the vocative,
which is not the denomination of beings. The thesis
with which Bubers I and Thou opens affirms that the
I-You relation is not reducible to the I-It. The you
does not presuppose the that. A logical paradox, a
counter-natural figure, that way in which the you
does not rest on a that in the neutrality of the there
is is the opening up of a dimension in which to mean
does not refer to being. God is conceived of outside
the world or beyond being, in dis-inter-estedness.
But such a topography, in Buber more clearly than
in Marcel, only appears before the other man
approached in the you. Here begins the itinerary of
the beyond, without our needing - before the human
face - in order to define the excessive term, transcen
dence, any words other than this pronoun, and with
out being able to find some language capable of
reabsorbing the illusion that would be its origin. For
that illusion would itself only be excessive, unless it
should be the hyperbole of transcendence itself.
In our spiritual heritage, love of ones neighbour
accompanies religious life. But it would at best be
only the second commandment, after the love of God.
And that ethics, according to the theologians, would
never equal the true essence of the relation to God,
always understood as being. At the religious level,
morality would be considered something we have
moved beyond. What seems to me to be suggested by
the philosophy of dialogue is that the encounter with
the other man takes place neither on a side-street nor
a detour, nor some parallel track of transcendence,
and that the.face of the other bears the trace of its
straightest, shortest and most direct movement.
'If there is a God, we must love Him only and not the
creatures of a day,' says Pascal.2 It is according to being
to its permanent or passing nature that love, on
this view, would be measured. The fact that fraternity
can mean the annulment, or the eclipse, of that
ontological importance of attachment, that a different
importance, a different above all else, a different
absolute can move us, that beyond the weight of the
neighbour in being or in nothingness, without ontol-
ogy, fraternity can take on an importance in excess, a
fraternity through which the God who opens up my
lips (,Psalms 51:17) immediately becomes meaningful
- that is the great novelty of a way of thinking in
which the word God ceases orienting life by express
ing the unconditional foundation of the world and
cosmology, and reveals, in the face of the other man,
the secret of his semantics.
 The Proximity of the Other

You wrote in Totality and Infinity: Tint philosophy is

an ethics. Do you mean that philosophy addresses itself
to what is most urgent to us as human beings?
When I speak of first philosophy, I am referring to
a philosophy of dialogue that cannot not be an ethics.
Even the philosophy that questions the meaning of
being does so on the basis of the encounter with the
other.
This would be a way of subordinating knowledge,
objectification, to the encounter with the other that is
presupposed in all language.
To address someone expresses the ethical distur
bance produced in me, in the tranquility of the
perseverance of my being, in my egotism as a necess
ary state, by the interruption of the conatus essendi
[effort to be] (an expression of the being of being in
Spinoza).
A going outside oneself that is addressed to the
other, the stranger. It is between strangers that the
encounter takes place; otherwise, it would be kinship.
All thought is subordinated to the ethical relation, to
the infinitely other in the other person, and to the
infinitely other for which I am nostalgic. Thinking
the other person is a part of the irreducible concern
for the other. Love is not consciousness. It is because
there is a vigilance before the awakening that the
cogito is possible, so that ethics is before ontology.
Behind the arrival of the human there is already the
vigilance for the other. The transcendental I in its
nakedness comes from the awakening by and for the
Other.
All encounter begins with a benediction, contained
in the word hello; that hello that all cogito, all
reflection on oneself already presupposes and that
would be a first transcendence. This greeting
addressed to the other man is an invocation. I there
fore insist on the primacy of the well-intentioned
relation toward the other. Even when there may be
ill will on the others part, the attention, the receiving
of the other, like his recognition, mark the priority of
good in relation to evil.
Your thought would be an attempt to exit what you
call the formless, the 'there is,' the phenomenon of
impersonal being without generosity. How does being
move from non-sense to !something that is?
This concept of the there is represents the
phenomenon of the absolutely impersonal. There is
posits the simple fact of being, without there being
any objects. The being in every silence, every non
thought, every way of withdrawing from existence.
 There is [*Yy a], in the same way as it is raining
[il pleut], its nice out [*7fait beau]. This it marks the
impersonal nature of the stage in which impersonal
consciousness saw that there is something, without
object, without substance - a nothing that is not a
nothing, for this nothing is full of murmuring, but of
a murmuring that has not been named. In that
horrifying experience of naughting, the thematics of
the there is grounds the construction of a subject
that, from the neuter, will affirm itself, posit itself.
From the there is, the enveloping presence of ano
nymity, which weighs heavily on the human being,
subjectivity emerges, despite that which annuls it.
This first exiting from self, an eruption from being,
begins with the recognition of things \choses\, but it is
also a stage of the enjoyment of life, of self-sufficiency.
This love of self is an egotism that founds being and
constitutes the first ontological experience. This
experience foreshadows the opening and true exiting
from self. The human will pass through another
decisive step, in which the subject, despite its satisfac
tion, fails to be sufficient unto itself. All exiting from
self represents the fissure that opens up in the same
toward the other. Desire metamorphosed into an
attitude of openness to exteriority. Openness that is
appeal and response to the other. The proximity of
the other, origin of all putting into question of self.
I f Martin Buber conceived of an I-You relation,
complete reciprocity, you would like that encounter to be
transcended in the relation of the subject to the Other,
who would be much more than a you, apparently.
The other would be alterity itself, and an unattainable
alterity.
Martin Buber was indeed the first to conceive of
the distinction between a thing that is, and a thing
that is that for me, an object that I can know. He
then contrasted to that a relation to the other, who
is not an object, who is not a thing, and who is the
one to whom I say you. He consequently contrasted
the I-You relation to the I-It one. He thought that
the I-You relation is irreducible to the I-It, and that
the social relation to the other presents a total auton
omy with respect to the observation of things and
with respect to knowledge. The social relation cannot
be knowledge because the correlate to that social
relation is a human being to whom I say you.
So I wondered whether the true relation to the
other rests on that reciprocity that Buber finds in the
I-You relation. Buber says that when I say you, I
know that I am saying you to someone who is an /,
and who says you to me. Consequently, in that I-You
relation, we are immediately in society, but in a
society in which we are equal in relation to one
another. I am to the other what the other is to me.
My interrogation consisted in questioning that ini
tial reciprocity. The other whom I address - is he not
initially the one with whom I stand in the relationship
one has with one who is weaker? For example, I am
generous toward the other without that generosity
being immediately claimed as reciprocal. Although
Buber is one of the first thinkers to put the accent on
an I-You relation in conjunction with an I-That, this
concept of reciprocity bothered me, because the
moment one is generous in hopes of reciprocity, that
relation no longer involves generosity but the com
mercial relation, the exchange of good behavior. In
the relation to the other, the other appears to me as
one to whom I owe something, toward whom I have
a responsibility. Hence the asymmetry of the I-You
relation and the radical inequality between the I and
the you, for all relation to the other is a relation to a
being toward whom I have obligations. I insist, there
fore, on the meaning of that gratuitousness of the for
the other, resting on the responsibility that is already
there in a dormant state. The for the other arises
within the /, like a command heard by him, as if
obedience were already being [letre\ listening for the
dictate. Alteritys plot is born before knowledge. But
that apparent simplicity of the relation between the I
and the You, in its very asymmetry, is yet again
disturbed by the arrival of the third person, who
stands next to the other, the you. The third party is
also a neighbour, a face, an unattainable alterity.
Here, with the third party, we have the proximity
of a human plurality. Between the second and the
third person, there can be relations in which one is
guilty toward the other. I pass from the relation in
which I am obligated to the other, responsible for the
other, to one in which I ask myself which is first. I
ask the question of justice: Which one, in that plural
ity, is the other par excellence? How can one judge?
How to compare others - unique and incomparable?
The person for whom one is responsible is unique,
and the one who is responsible cannot delegate his or
her responsibility. In this sense, the latter is also
unique. In the time of knowledge and objectivity,
beyond and on the hither side of the nakedness of the
face, Greek wisdom begins.
I now pass from the relation without reciprocity to
a relation in which there is reciprocity, equality,
between the members of a society. My search for
justice presupposes just such a new relation, in which
all the excess of generosity that I must have toward
the other is subordinated to a question of justice. In
justice there is comparison, and the other has no
privilege with respect to me. Between persons enter
ing into that relation, a relationship must be estab
lished that presupposes comparison between them,
i.e., presupposes a justice and a citizenship. A limi
tation of that initial responsibility, justice nonetheless
marks a subordination of me to the other. With the
arrival of the third party, the problem of fundamental
justice is posed, the problem of the right, which
initially is always that of the other. Jank6l6vitch
worded it well: We dont have any right; it is always
the other who has rights. It was indispensable to
know what number two is in relation to number
three, and number three in relation to number two.
Who comes first?
That is the main idea. I move from the order of
responsibility, in which even what isnt my business
is my business, from mercy, 'to justice, which limits
that initial priority of the other that we started out
from.
To get bac\ to my question on the relation to the
other, you write that the relations with alterity stand in
contrast to those in which the same dominates or absorbs
or envelops the other. What is alterity really about?
In that relation to the other, there is no fusion: the
relation to the other is envisioned as alterity. The
other is alterity. Bubers thought prompted me to
engage in a phenomenology of sociality, which is
more than the human. Sociality, for me, is the best of
the human. It. is the good, and not the second best to
an impossible fusion. In the alterity of the face, the
for-the-other commands the I. Ultimately it is a
question of founding the justice that offends the face
on the obligation with respect to the face; the extra
ordinary exteriority of the face.
Sociality is that alterity of the face, of the for-the-
other that calls out to me, a voice that rises within
me before all verbal expression, in the mortality of
the /, from the depths of my weakness. That voice is
an order. I have the order to answer for the life of
the other person. I do not have the right to leave him
alone to his death.
The access to the face is lived in the ethical mode. The
face, all by itself, has a meaning. What does it offer to
my gaze? What does it say?
The face is a seigniory and defenselessness itself.
What does the face say when I approach it? That
face, exposed to my look, is disarmed. Whatever
countenance it may put on, whether this face belongs
to an important person, titled, or ip appearance
simpler. This face is the same, exposed in its naked
ness. Beneath the countenance it gives itself, all its
weakness comes through, and at the same time its
mortality emerges; to the point where I can want to
liquidate it entirely. Why not? But that is where all
ambiguity of the face, and of the relation to the other,
lies. This face of the other, without recourse, without
security, exposed to my look and in its weakness and
its mortality is also the one that orders me: Thou
shah not kill. There is, in the face, the supreme
authority that commands, and I always say it is the
word of God. The face is the locus of the word of
God. There is the word of God in the other, a non-
thematized word.
The face is that possibility of murder, that power
lessness of being and that authority that commands
me: Thou shalt not kill.
So what distinguishes the face in its status from all
known objects comes from its contradictory nature. It
is all weakness and all authority.
That order that it exposes to the other also comes
from the requirement of responsibility on my part.
That infinite, in a sense, that gives itself to me, marks
a non-indifference for me in my relation to the other,
in which I am never done with him. When I say I
am doing my duty I lie, because I am never dis
charged with respect to the other. And in this never
released, there is the mise-en-scaie of the infinite, an
inexhaustible, concrete responsibility. The impossibil
ity of saying no.
But it is that anarchy that makes me say Here I
am, or Send me toward the other. A responsibility
never discharged, and always once again future,
which is not to come, but supervenes.1 A responsi
bility prior to deliberation, to which I was exposed,
dedicated, before being dedicated to myself.
You write: 4I am for myself solely to the degree that I
am responsible but you go stillfurther, since you express
the I as hostage for the widow, the indigent and the
orphan. This I, who is addressed is he not primarily
the hostage to any face that is presented to it?
That way of being for the other, i.e., of being
responsible for the other, is something dreadful,
because it means that if the other does something I
am the one who is responsible. The hostage is the one
who is found responsible for what he has not done.
The one responsible for the wrongdoing of the other.
I am responsible in principle, and I am so before the
justice that distributes, before the measures of justice.
It is concrete, you know! It is not made up! When
you have encountered a human being, you cannot
drop him. Most often we do so, saying I have done
all I could! We havent done anything! It is this
feeling, this consciousness, of having done nothing
that gives us the status of hostage with the responsi
bility of one who is not guilty, who is innocent. The
innocent, what a paradox! That is one who does no
harm. It is the one who pays for the other.
The other involves us in a situation in which we
are obligated without guilt, but our obligation is no
less for that. At the same time it is a burden. It is
heavy, and, if you like, that is what goodness is.
The trace of the infinite is inscribed in my obliga
tion toward the other, in this moment that corre
sponds to the call.
You just mentioned goodness. That is not philosophical
language, but stilli I know that you are overwhelmed by
Vasily Grossman in his book Life and Fate. Could you
talk to m about it?
That book describes the situation in Europe during
the time of Stalin and Hitler. Vasily Grossman rep
resents that society as being completely dehumanized.
There is the life in the camps, of course; it was the
same thing under Hitler and Stalin. Life seems regu-
lated on the basis of total contempt for the human
person, lack of respect for man; but as for Stalin, that
society is the outcome of the quest for a liberated
humanity. The circumstances of Marxisms having
turned into Stalinism is the greatest offence to the
cause of the human, because Marxism bore the hopes
of humanity: it may be one of the greatest psychologi
cal shocks for the twentieth-century European. Those
800 pages offer a complete spectacle of desolation and
dehumanization. The book reflects absolute despair,
and I see no horizon, no salvation for the human
race.
But in the decay of human relations, in that
sociological misery, goodness persists. In the relation
of one person to another person, goodness is possible.
There is a long monologue in which Ikonnikov, the
character who expresses the authors ideas, puts all
social preachments in doubt. That is, all rational
organization with an ideology and plans. The impos
sibility of goodness as a government, as a social
institution. Every attempt to organize the human
fails. The only thing that remains vigorous is the
goodness of everyday life. Ikonnikov calls it the litde
goodness.
Yes indeed, this passage is very important, and with
your permission I would like to quote it. Mostovkpi is in
prison, and he undertakes to read the writings of Ikonni
kov. He reads these words: ' Most of those being who
inhabit the earth do not take as a goal the definition of
the good. In what does the good consist? The good is not
in nature, and it is not in the preachings of the prophets,
either, or in the great social doctrines, or in the ethics of
the philosophers. But simple people bear in their hearts
the love of all living thing; they love life naturally; they
protect life. And a bit further he adds: 'Thus there exists
side by side with this so terrible greater good human
kindness in everyday life. It is the kindness of an old lady
who gives a piece of bread to a convict along the roadside.
It is the kindness of a soldier who holds his canteen out
to a wounded enemy. The kindness of youth taking pity
on old age, the kindness of a peasant who hides an old
Jew in his bam. And so on.2
The book is frightening, and on every page that is
the only positive thing. He even specifies that that
little goodness or kindness of one for another is a
goodness without witnesses. That goodness escapes
all ideology: he says that it could be described as
goodness without thought. Why without thought?
Because it is goodness outside all systems, all religions,
all social organizations. Gratuitous, that goodness is
eternal.
It is the feeble-minded who defend it and work at
its perpetuation from one being to another. It is so
fragile before the might of evil. Grossman writes that
it is as if all the simple-minded tried to douse the
worldwide conflagration with a syringe.
This book leaves us in an awkward position. For
despite all the horrors man has brought about, that
poor kindness holds on. It is a mad goodness, the
most human thing there is in man. It defines man,
despite its powerlessness, and Ikonnikov has another
beautiful image to qualify it: It is beautiful and
powerless, like the dew. What freshness in this
despair!
But it is true that the moment this goodness
organizes it goes out. Despite the rottenness, the
magnitude of evil wrought in the name of the good,
the human subsists in that form of one for the other,
in the relation of one to the other. The other as face,
extraordinary testimony to my freedom, who com
mands me alterity in the infinite, who elects me to its
service and who represents the ethical disturbance of
being and is going to lead it [being] along the
pathway of ethical dis-interestedness. The coming of
the human to ethics passes through this ethical suffer
ing, the disturbance brought by every face, even in an
ordered world.
This saindiness of the human cannot be expressed
on the basis of any category. Are we entering a
moment in history in which the good must be loved
without promises? Perhaps it is the end of all preach
ing. May we not be on the eve of a new form of faith,
a faith without triumph, as if the only irrefutable
value were saindiness, a time when the only right to
a reward would be not to expect one?
The first and last manifestation of God would be
to be without promises.
 Utopia and Socialism

The condemnation of Stalinism by the very society it

wrought marked the end of a certain idea of doctrinal
infallibility that had settled into peoples minds.
Socialist certainty, which until recently had remained
direct and dogmatic, and impressed even its adversar
ies by its power of expansion, is now in search of a
more critical and more difficult assurance. In its
faithfulness to Marxism, which, as one cannot forget,
was able to transform concepts into movements, the
search for new syntheses is beginning to make itself
felt. A deepening, which is not achieved in libraries.
Various rumblings have been heard over the last
decade from the most well established nations. The
appearance of groups and small bands who claim to
be as knowledgeable as the organized and experi
enced large revolutionary parties, and who, in the
name of new or renewed insights assume the right to
act by spreading violence in the guise of abortive
revolutions that is the new spectacle of the social
struggle. At times it seems to mask a sadness, a
sadness that hovers over a world that has lost the
security of the orthodoxies that had, up to that point,
been confirmed by a rectilinear history of validating a
way of thinking without afterthoughts. Disarray, but
also hope! The teachings, or at least the problems, of
the masters of socialism qualified as utopian - Saint-
Simon, Fourrier, Proudhon, perhaps Fourrier most of
all again attract attention.
Utopian socialism: it did not yet know that the
transformation of civilization, as Fourrier called it,
is not possible with ideas that come to you from who
knows where, that it cannot do without the science
that, in the structures buried within the real, present
social order, can read the intentions of the future
already sketched out; but a socialist mode of thought
that, by its very utopianism, is capable, in its nostalgia
for justice, of a certain audacity of Hope, and that
supplies realist action*with the norms necessary for
critique.
Martin Bubers book on utopian socialism, which
has just been translated by Paul Corset and Francois
Girard, completed in 1945, published in Hebrew in
1946 and in German in 1950, preceded de-Stalinisa-
tion. But it cannot leave todays reader indifferent.
Buber, in his description of utopian socialism,
attempts to bring out in Marxism and Leninism
themselves to which more than a quarter of the
work is devoted - the involuntary or unconscious
element of utopianism. The latter would be congeni
tal to socialist thought, which is inevitably of the
ethical order: prophetic and messianic. Utopianism,
according to Buber at least, is in a world in which
the eschatological sense has been lost since the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution the only
way to wish for a completely other society. It would
be fitting to point out the similarity between this
recourse to utopia and the one (differing in that it
comes from the very heart of Marxism, however)
perceived or postulated by Ernst Bloch: the referral
of all attempts to regenerate man to a radical renewal,
to what is not yet at all, to an unreality more unreal,
so to speak, than the social future discernable in the
factual present, to the principle of hope that, if we
are to believe Ernst Bloch, is civilization itself,
through the prophets, philosophers and artists.
If we consider Bubers work as an essay on the
history of ideas, his account of utopian socialism,
from Saint-Simon to Kropotkin and Landauer, might
require some supplement in the area of influences
undergone and exerted, and as to the completeness of
the systems themselves. But Buber warns us already
in the preface that he is leaving many developments
aside. He is following an idea: it is within the
opposition between the political and the social that he
situates the doctrines he studies. To him, the issue
seems to be to challenge the subordination of civil
society to the State, in which, for Hegel, humanity
would attain universality of thought and will, i.e.,
freedom. It is the idea of domination, coercion - or
as we would say today, repression that is the
starting point for Bubers thinking on political
relationships between men. The social, on the other
hand, would signify the common life of man, their
camaraderie, the presence of man to man, his proxim
ity. Socialism would consist in the regeneration of the
cells of the social tissue, broken down by politics.
Whence the importance given to the diverse forms
and modalities of that coexistence and of cooperation:
in work, production and exchange. Whence the care
that there be numerous social exchange groups, in
order for the presence of persons to other persons to
be a real presence. Whence the decentralization of
the whole, to avoid the organization and the admin
istrations intervening to statify that being-together of
men, organizing it according to abstract rules, and in
the name of anonymous powers. The idea of an
administration in which command is limited to the
technically necessary is distinguished from govern
mental administration, in which the power of men
over men goes beyond these necessities, in which man
dominates man, and consequently in which the com
munitarian ends of the group are forgotten.
Arent Marxism and Leninism mistrustful of the
State to the highest degree? The division of society
into classes and the domination of one class by the
other, against which the proletariats unite, are the
reason or secret of State. A classless society ends
political powers, substitutes an administration for the
government, and perfects society. Isnt that why the
soviets - councils springing up on the spot for pro
fessional cooperation and communal life appeared
to Lenin, precisely for that reason, suited to taking
over where the State leaves off? The political struc-
 tures that were introduced during the Revolution,
however, were only accepted as provisional, pending
the coming of the new society. Buber shows how the
realization of socialist society in Russia was from the
beginning and constantly - at odds with these
political structures that sprang up and defeated the
decentralization of the soviets. But one may wonder
whether the withering away of the State is not
permanently postponed in this way.
There is one lone, unique example of a socialist
society that was successfully realized: collective farms
- Kibbutzim - on the soil of the land of Israel. Buber
analyzes their structure and meaning in some particu
larly interesting pages. (Nevertheless, on this point,
we would like to have been able to measure the
distance we have traversed, both before and since,
and the shifting relationships over the last thirty
years.) But the Kibbutzim themselves are qualified by
Buber as non-failures rather than successes.
Thus there is, in Bubers view, a fearsome dialectic
between society and the State. Rather than being the
simple effect of the abuses of the powers, are not
crises part of the very essence of the collective body?
It is a question, and a pessimistic note in this whole
recollection of socialist utopianism, and of socialism
tout court.
Or perhaps this recollection, the ever-renewed
quest for a society in which the being-together of men
should be realized, a resistance to the forgetting of
this utopian should-be at the very heart of State
structures setting themselves up as ends in themselves,
and the resurgence of conscience against the States
deterioration of social relations - are themselves
objective events. Events that mark, in the society-
State dialectic, the moment of morality limiting poli
tics - an indispensable and unforgettable moment.
The radical way Buber approaches the theme of
political domination recalls, at times, the one so much
discussed today that it has become a commonplace:
the theme of the diffuse circulation of powers, which
marks the intersubjective experiences that appear the
most innocent and natural with the will to power. It
is a situation in which men, unbeknownst to them
selves, are all either dominators or dominated; a
situation that, in reaction, invites us to purify all
human relations of that political perversion and in
which socialism appears as a new ethics! In the
presence of certain acts of resistance and martyrdom,
daringly carried out in our world in the name of the
pure human, the utopian human, against the efficacy
of powers and powerful political entities, that ethics
affirms its objective status, shows itself to be Wirl{li-
ch^eit, efficient reality, and no longer lets itself be
repressed among the powerless beautiful souls or
unhappy consciousnesses.
In any case, that would be, beyond the contribution
of utopian socialism analyzed by Buber, the credo of
his own philosophical anthropology, in which the
relation of man to his neighbour is conceived of on
the famous model of I and Thou, distinct from the
objectification and the domination that always tri
umphs in the eyes of the objective gaze. The I-Thou
model allows us to conceptualize a firm distinction
between society and the State, and to conceive of a
society without powers. Due to a certain sense of
decorum, that anthropology remains implicit
throughout the pages of this work, the style itself of
which, perfecdy neutral and impassive the univer
sity style - is so little reminiscent of Bubers ardent
and inspired style. But the present essay may be
considered a sociological and immediately socialist
- prolongation of that anthropology.
PEACE AND RIGHT
The Prohibitioii against Representation
and The Rights of Man

In memory of Adelie Rassial

Is the prohibition against representation (which, by
the way, applies only to certain images in the Jewish
tradition1) to be understood in the limited sense of a
religious rule, and a purely repressive one at that?
The intent, in raising this question, is certainly not to
undervalue the pedagogical importance of such a
restriction, i.e., to overlook its contribution to the
spirituality of a mode of thought ascending from the
useful to the gracious, and from the sacred to the
holy, that I admire in Judaism. And even there, to
gauge that importance accurately and fairly within
Jewish piety and sensibility, one would have to go
back to its scriptural sources. Prohibition against
representation: we should not allow that expression
to circulate glibly and out of context, like an apho
rism, without having previously examined closely
what the written Law of the Bible says about it, and,
in its multidimensional and multilevel language, the
oral Law of the Talmud, in which, moreover, all
representation is authorized when it is a question of
scientific research.2 A study requiring considerable
erudition and a learned hermeneutics. Was it under
taken by those who have spoken before me? I hope
so. That is not my purpose.
As for me, I would like to inquire into whether,
beneath the mistrust of images of beings recom
mended by Jewish monotheism, there is not a denun
ciation, in the structures of signifying and the
meaningful, of a certain favoring of representation
over other possible modes of thought. In representa
tion cogitatio et cogitatum presence is created and
recreated, i.e., the presentation and the alterity of a
cogitatum, but, and precisely to the same degree, an
auto-donation or a giving-itself-over to thought.
Whence an offering-itself to a taking. And thus, in
the concreteness that is indispensable to a phenom
enological description, can one fail to notice an offer
ing-itself to hands already outstretched? And further,
can one fail to include, in the taking-in-hand, the a
priori of a latent incarnation of thought, and in that
taking, forget the taken: a solid, a being, a thing, or
something? Cohesion and complicity of a seeing and
a taking, but, in the re-presentation, the putting of
that which is thought [le pense] at the disposal of, and
on the same scale as, thinking [la pens6e\. a deep-seated
immanence or atheism in sight and knowledge, or
their temptation to idolatry! Here we have thought,
approaching even the uniqueness of the unique that
is expressed in the face, in the same way as visible
and plastic forms. Uniqueness of the one o f a kind
or uniqueness having broken with all kinds in the
sense of the loved one being unique for the one who
loves. A uniqueness that, to the one who loves,
immediately means fear for the death of the loved
one. Now, in the image, thought reaches the face of
the other reduced to its plastic forms, exalted, fasci
nating, and proceeding from an exacerbated imagin
ation though they may be. Though they may be a
work of art!
From a certain point of view, in the plasticity of
pure appearance, there emerges the caricature of eyes
that do not see, ears that do not hear, noses that do
not smell of Psalms 115. We catch a glimpse of an
inanimate idol in these verse's, but especially the inan
imate resembling the face, which allows itself to be
portrayed, to go into copies, exempla: shadows that
destroy the uniqueness of the unique and return it -
an individual - to the generality, the extension of a
genus. Opening of the very order in which resem
blance reigns or is disseminated.
Representation comes down to a thinking of this
or that, to an intentionality, a thematization of what
puts itself forward or gives itself in presence or
representation, of what lets itself be designated -
ultimately or immediately - by a demonstrative, and
in a word concretely, with the index finger. Thus a
thought thinking the thing prevails.3 The latter is not
a real part of that thought, but, in presence, it is given
to that thought. An unreally or ideally present thing,
present in the guise of intentional object, according
to the Husserlian terminology: present to thought,
without in any way being a real part of that thought.
But it is present with a presence that contracts and
fixes with certainty the logical articulations, the empty
forms of thought, which gathers itself in them, into
thematization and knowledge. These forms espouse
even the conceptual, though it is already so far from
the sensible, but is still taken as etwas iiberhaupt,
which in French is expressed so admirably as quelque
chose' [some thing], revealing, in the empty form so
named, as in the vestiges of a thing.
This empty form is applied to time itself, thought
of as presence, right down to the consciousness of its
flow/ of its dia-chrony, immediately interpreted on
the basis of a re-tained or pro-tained, remembered or
anticipated presence, as synchronization of duration
in representation, or as a historical account in the
simultaneity of writing symbols gathered into a text
that encompasses and unites temporal periods. A time
whose diachrony is thus lived as a privation of
immobile eternity, and expressed by the metaphor of
flux, as if time were a being [etant], comparable to a
flowing liquid. There is a privilege granted to the
something in thought which is also indicated by the
resources of language, in which all signification can
be expressed as a noun in a statement, in which all
signification can become a substantive, whatever the
native or primitive grammatical category may be:
adjective, verb, adverb, preposition, conjunction or
interjection, and all the syntactic particles, and all the
components of the sentence, and the sentence, the full
assertion.
Given this, may not the prohibition against repre
sentation be the denunciation of an intelligibility that
one would like to reduce to knowledge, and that
pretends to be original or ultimate, claiming, wrongly
perhaps, the dignity of being the birthplace of, and
bearer of, the indelible categories of the mind?
Doubtless no one would be ridiculous or foolish
enough to question the legitimacy and sovereignty of
knowledge and the substantive in an indispensable
domain and at an essential moment of the intelli
gence. In the prohibition against representation I am
only questioning the exclusive privilege that Western
culture has conferred on consciousness [conscience]
and the science [science] it carries within itself, and
that, as self-consciousness, promises ultimate wisdom
and absolute thought.
The reason this question arises is certainly not
because representation would be dedicated exclusively
to the pure materiality of the thing, as if it were
incapable of abstraction and could not intend the
non-material. It is rather because, in the presence that
it does not cease renewing, the adequation of thought
with its other is always accomplished; because as
intentionality it always intends something: a goal, an
end, a finite thing, term. Is all thought nothing but
aim and intentionality, finality, and a hold on the
finite? The challenging of intentionality does not tend
to return to a psyche closed in on itself, in some
sensible impression, in which sensualist empiricism or
psychological atomism was content. The prohibition
against representation would on the contrary suggest
in the meaningful a transcendence in comparison to
which that of intentionality was but an internment
within self-consciousness, though it is less narrow and
unbreathable than the immanence of the sensation in
Condillac.
This transcendence is alive in the relation to the
other man, i.e. in the proximity of ones fellow man,
whose uniqueness and consequently whose irreducible
alterity would be - still or already unrecognized in
the perception that stares at [de-visage] the other.
Beneath the plasticity of the face \figure] that appears,
the face [visage] is already missed. It is frozen in art
itself, despite the artists possible attempt to disfigure
the something that starts again, figurative, in pres
ence. Transcendence of the other man in his face, in
his facing-up-to [faireface] which in its extreme direct
ness (original concreteness of all directness) is an
exposure to inexorable death. Before all particular
expression and beneath every particular expression
(which already, pose and countenance that one gives
oneself which already, grimace, covers and protects),
there is a stripping bare and a nakedness of expression
as such, defenseless nakedness, extradition to death,
precariousness more precarious than any precarious
ness in that directness of exposure. Face as mortality,
mortality of the other beyond his appearing; naked
ness more naked, so to speak, than that which the
unveiling of truth exposes: beyond the visibility of the
phenomenon, a victims abandonment. But in that
very precariousness, the Thou shalt not kill that is
also the meaning of the face; in that directness of
exposure, the proclamation - before any verbal sign -
of a right that peremptorily calls upon my responsi
bility for the other man. It assigns me and demands
me, as if the invisible death which the face of the
other faces uniqueness separated from any whole -
were my business. Some of the very ego-ness of the I
in that non-transferable responsibility, like an election
instituting the I as a uniqueness. Responsibility deriv
ing from no guilt; a gratuitous responsibility respond
ing to a commandment not to leave the other alone
in his or her last extremity, as if the death of the
other, before being my death, concerned me; as if in
that death invisible to the other who is exposed to
it I became by my indifference the accomplice while
I could do something about it. Would not the tran
quility and g<5od conscience of perseverance in being
be the equivalent here of letting the other man die?
Thou shalt not kill that means then Thou shalt
cause thy neighbour to live. Event of sociality prior
to all association in the name of an abstract and
common humanity. The right of man, absolutely and
originally, takes on meaning only in the other, as the
right of the other man. A right with respect to which
I am never released! Hence infinite responsibility for
the other: the radical impossibility of immanence! An
affinity that comes to mind in the silent command
 of the face. The word of God? In any case, the one
rhat must precede Revelation in the positive religions
if the men who listen for it want to know who is
addressing them, and to recognize a voice they have
already heard. Of course it is obviously true that the
relation to the other can also be described as
approaching someone taken as a number in a totality
of a genus (taken as a something), and that one can
experience the other, seize his or her thoughts and
inner life and self, making them enter into a calculus
or a politics, on the basis of that person's expressive
gestures and words, by analogy with those the
observer knows of his own (the observer, the man
assured of his own right to be), and that this can
suffice for both his day-to-day behavior and his
attitude toward the future and history, to his way of
managing amidst represented things and persons. In
this scheme of things, the other man, the neighbour,
will already have compromised or enervated the
radical alterity of his uniqueness itself, facilitating the
administration and statistics necessary for the econ
omic, military and technical equilibrium of totally re
presented being. And indeed to the extent that that
equilibrium makes it possible to respond better, with
responsibly for the other, to the right of man (which
is originally the right of the other man), that universal
representation cannot be forbidden. But it is the
epiphany of the face that, before any particular
expression, uniqueness or alterity is expressed, which
is refractory to the image, to the consciousness o f...,
 and its transcendental synthesis. It is there that an
unheard of command, or the word of God is heard;
it interrupts the unity of the I think in each person
who, unique, is awakened to a non-transferable
responsibility for the first person who comes along. A
gratuitous responsibility: independent of what I may
or may not have committed. The non-transferable
responsibility of my logically indiscernible uniqueness.
Responsibility which is also the stern name of love
without lust.
It is the decisive ideas of Husserl on Gebrauchsob-
jecte objects of use, our. things, irreducible to their
purely theoretical appearance, and having constitu-
tively, qua objects of use, the same immediacy as the
presence of what Husserl calls Vorhandene Objecte als
solche4 ideas that, in the brilliant analysis in Sein
und Zeit lead to the notion of utensility (or of
Heideggers Zuhandenheit) understood as a way of
being freed from all foundation in any sort of
objectivity, or pre-existing Vorhandcnheit available to
a plain seeing (blofies Hinsehen); ideas that remain
foreign to the ethical problem proper, and in which
we heard, very early on, the echo of Bergsons prop
osition: To recognize an object is to know how to
use it, and also the reverberations of all that, in
Lucien L6vy-Bruhls work, was taught on represen
tation in primitive mentality5 ... it is certainly all
these views that encouraged me to reflect on thought
freed of all representation. (And this, prior to any
contact, in this regard, with the admirable teachings
of Buber and Gabriel Marcel, to whom are indebted
all who, even without realizing it, have trod the soil
cleared by them.) All these pages, which suggest a
meaningfulness prior to representation, in which tran
scendental philosophy situated the origin of thought,
have enabled us to hear, behind the already plastic
forms in which the face does no more than present
itself, re-present itself and appear as an image, and
where, in that image, the face reveals itself as some
thing - all those pages enabled us to hear (so to speak)
the ancient, biblical call and command that awakens
the subject to a responsibility for the other on the
basis of an uprightness [droiture] that is exposure to
death. Mortality, but also a right that challenges the
/, substantial and persevering remorselessly in its
being, that Pascal called hateful.
 Peace And Proximity

I
The problem of Europe and peace is precisely the one
posed by the contradiction of our European con
sciences. It is the problem of humanity in us, of the
centrality the Europe whose vital forces - those in
which the brutal perseverance of beings in their being
- are already seduced by peace, by peace preferred to
violence, and, more precisely still, by the peace of a
humanity that, European in us, has already decided
in favor of the Greek wisdom, which is to await
human peace on the basis of Truth. Peace on the
basis of truth, which (marvel of marvels) commands
men without forcing or combating them, which gov
erns or assembles them without making them subser
vient, which' can convince [convaincre] them with
words without conquering \yaincre\ them, and which
masters natures hostile elements by the calculations
and practical knowledge of technology. Peace on the
basis of the State, which is the gathering together of
men participating in the same ideal truths. A peace
that is enjoyed therein as tranquillity assured by
solidarity the exact measure of reciprocity in serv
ices rendered between counterparts: the unity of a
Whole in which each finds his or her rest, place
or basis. Peace as tranquillity or rest! The peace of
rest between beings having a firm footing or resting
on the underlying solidity of their substance, self-
sufficient in their identity or capable of satisfying
themselves seeking satisfaction.
But the conscience of Europe is a bad conscience,
because of the contradiction that tears her apart at
the very hour of her modernity, which is probably
that of ledgers set up in lucidity, that of full con
sciousness. That history of a peace, a freedom and
well-being promised on the basis of a -light that a
universal knowledge projected on the world and
human society - even unto the religious messages
that sought justification for themselves in the truths
of knowledge that history is not recognizable in its
millennia of fratricidal struggles, political or bloody,
of imperialism, scorn and exploitation of the human
being, down to our century of world wars, the
genocides of the Holocaust and terrorism; unemploy
ment and continual desperate poverty of the Third
World; ruthless doctrines and cruelty of fascism and
national socialism, right down to the supreme para
dox of the defense of man and his rights being
perverted into Stalinism.
Hence the challenge to centrality of Europe and its
culture. A worn-out Europe! The shattering of the
universality of theoretical reason, which arose betimes
in the Know thyself, and sought the entire universe
within self-consciousness. Hence the affirmation and
championing of specific cultures in all corners of the
globe. An affirmation that found support and thanks
and often its origin and always sympathetic
understanding - at the highest levels of the European
university itself. An interest on the part of our old
world, in the name of the ancient universalism of
Europe itself, for the countless particularisms that
pretend to be its equal. An interest that no longer
stems from some taste for barbaric exoticism, but
the exaltation of a logic other than that of Aristotle,
of a thought other than civilized. An exaltation that
may be explainable as remorse fed by the memory of
colonial wars and the long oppression of those once
called savages, a long indifference to the sadness of a
whole world. Hence the challenge to the centrality of
Europe by Europe itself. But perhaps in that very
challenge there is the testimony of a Europe that is
not just Hellenic! And hence also the question as to
what, precisely, the role of this latter is, in a Europe
that one would wish faithful to all its promises.
Europe against Europe, in yet another aspect and
in relation to the most dramatic eventualities. The
great empires that, to such a great extent, decide the
fate of our planet, are the product of a European
politics, economy, science and technology, and their
power of expansion. Universalism or imperialism!
European empires overflowing geographical Europe
and vying in power to the point of preparing if
necessary to blow up the very earth that bears
humanity. The explosion of the earth itself by an
energy that the search for truth having become
modern science - released from being. Here we have
truth threatening being itself. Here truth threatens,
so to speak, being qua being and disqualifies Europe,
which discovered and left uncovered these forces.
But doubtless that very way of disqualifying and
accusing already proceeds from a vocation of the
spirit whose powers of love are neither translated nor
exhausted by the love of wisdom.

II
That bad conscience expresses more than just a con
tradiction between a certain project of culture and its
results. It is not made up solely of the seductions of a
peace that ensures to each person the tranquillity of
his happiness and a freedom to own the world, and
also, no doubt, even the possibility of owning, which
nothing would disturb. It is not the failure of a
speculative or dialectical project in the Hegelian style,
a project that is indifferent to wars and assassinations
and suffering, as long as they are necessary in the
unfolding of rational thought, which is also a politics
- as long as they are necessary in the formation of
concepts, the logic and rational completion of which
are all that matter. It is not the intellectual disappoint
ment of a system belied by the incoherence of reality
that is the drama of Europe. Nor even just the danger
of dying, which is frightening to each one of us.
There is the anguish of committing crimes even
where concepts are in agreement. There is the
anguish of the responsibility incumbent upon each
one of us in the death or suffering of the other. The
fear of each for himself in the mortality of each does
not succeed in absorbing the gravity of the murder
committed and the scandal of indifference to the
others suffering. Behind the risk run by each for
himself in a world without security looms the con
sciousness of the immediate immorality of a culture
and a history. Have we not heard, in the vocation of
Europe, before the message of truth that it bears, the
Thou shalt not kill of the Decalogue and the Bible?
In Genesis 32, Jacob is troubled at the news that his
brother Esau enemy or friend is marching to
meet him at the head of four hundred men. Verse 8
informs us: Jacob was greatly afraid and anguished.1
What is the difference between fear and anguish?
Rashi, the famous Rabbinical commentator, specifies:
He was fearful for his death, but anguished at poss
ibly having to kill.
Reflecting on this ethical moment of our European
crisis - reflecting on our anguish (the anguish of
Jacob, felt at the prospect of violence to be committed,
even if it was necessary to the logical unfolding of
history, even if it was necessary to the unfolding
ordered by the march of truth advancing in absolute
thought and promising at the end of the road the
peace of the identity of the identical and the non-
identical) reflecting on this ethical moment of our
European crisis (attested in particular by the philo
sophical work of a Franz Rosenzwcig, reared in
Hegelian thought, but experiencing the First World
War, though only the First), we may wonder whether
peace must not respond to a call more urgent than
that of truth and initially distinct from the call of
truth. One may wonder whether one should not
construe the ideal of truth itself which no European
can gainsay - already as subordinate to an ideal of
peace that, older than that of knowledge, will but
open itself to the call of truth; one may wonder
whether knowledge itself and the politics governing
history do not find their proper place in already
responding to the requirement of peace and let them
selves be guided by that requirement. But peace in
this case will no longer be reducible to a simple
confirmation of human identity in its substantiality,
anchored in itself, in its identity of I. It will no longer
be a question of the bourgeois peace of the man who
is at home behind closed doors, rejecting that which,
being exterior, negates him. It will no longer be peace
in conformity with the ideal of the unity of the One
that all alterity disturbs. In a sensibility in which the
scandal of murder is not suppressed even when the
violence is rationally necessary, peace cannot mean
the serene tranquillity of the identical, nor can alterity
be justified solely as the logical distinction of parts
belonging to a fractured whole, united into a whole by
rigorously reciprocal relations.
Precisely what must be challenged is the conception
according to which, in the human multiplicity, the I
would be reduced to a fraction of a Whole, which is
reconstituted in its solidarity after the manner of an
organism, or a concept, the unity of which is the
coherence of members or the structure of an under
standing. The question must be asked (and this is the
other term of an alternative) apropos of the identity
of the I whether the alterity of the other does not
have, from the start, the character of an absolute, in
the etymological sense of the term; as if the other
were not other just in the logical sense, other by a
logically surmountable alterity in a common genus, or
transcendentally surmountable, lending itself to the
synthesis carried out by a Kantian I think. We must
ask ourselves whether peace, instead of consisting in
the absorption or the disappearance of alterity, would
not on the contrary be thefraternal way of a proximity
to the other, which would not be simply the failure
of coincidence with the other, but which would
signify precisely the excess of sociality over all solitude
- excess of sociality and love. I do not pronounce this
often misused word lightly.
Peace as relation with an alterity, irreducible to a
common genus in which, already contained in a
logical community, it would be only a relative alterity.
Peace thus independent of all appurtenance to a
system, irreducible to a totality and as if refractory to
synthesis. The project of a peace different from the
political peace discussed above. An ethical relation
that would thus not be a simple deficiency or priva
tion of the unity of the One reduced to the multi-
plicity of individuals in the extension of the genus!
Here, on the contrary, in ethical peace, a relation to
the inassimilable other, the irreducible other, the
unique other. Only the unique is irreducible and
absolutely other!
But the uniqueness of the unique is the uniqueness
of the beloved. The uniqueness of the unique signifies
in love. Hence peace as love. Not that the uniqueness
of alterity is conceived of as some subjective illusion
of a lover. Quite to the contrary, the subjective as such
is precisely the penetration - through the impassive
essence [essence] of being [etre] and the rigor of its
logical forms and genera, and through the violence of
its perseverance in being toward the unique, the
absolutely other, by love, proximity and peace. A
proximity different than some short distance meas
ured in geometrical space, separating some from
Others. A peace different than the simple unity of the
diverse in a synthesis integrating them. Peace as a
relation with the other in his logically indiscernible
alterity, in his alterity irreducible to the logical iden
tity of an ultimate difference added to a genus. Peace
as the incessant awakening to that alterity and to that
uniqueness. Proximity as the impossible assumption
of difference, impossible definition, impossible inte
gration. Proximity as impossible appearance. But
proximity! Husserls famous appresentation, not at
all as an impoverished representation, but as the
mysterious excess of the beloved. The excellence
proper of transcendence without reference to the
immanence of the true, which in the West passes for
the supreme grace of the spiritual. Indeed it is obvious
that it is in the knowledge of the other as a simple
individual the individual of a genus, a class, a race
that peace with the other changes into hatred; it is
the approach to the other as a kind of this or that.

II(
I have not conducted this formal analysis of peace -
as relation with the unique and the other - a relation
designated by the general term of love without
trying to deformalize, to recover these structures in
their concreteness, without a phenomenology. I have
thought that the uniqueness an<T the alterity of the
unique is concretely the face of the other man, the
original epiphany of which is not in its visibility as a
plastic form, but in appresentation. The thought
awakened to the face of the other man is not a
thought o f.. v a representation, but from the start a
thought for:.., a non-indifference for the other,
breaking the equilibrium of the even and impassive
soul of pure knowledge, an awakening to the other
man in his uniqueness indiscernible for knowledge,
an approach to the first one to come along in his
proximity as neighbour and unique one: Face, before
any particular expression and beneath all expression
that already countenance given to self hides the
nakedness of the face. Face that is not unveiling but
pure denudation of defenseless exposure. Exposure as
such, extreme exposure to the precariousness of the
stranger. Nakedness of pure exposure that is not
simply emphasis of the known, of the unveiled in
truth: exposure that is expression, a first language,
call and assignation.
Face that thus is not exclusively the face of man.
In Vasily Grossmans Life and Fate (Part Three,
Chapter 23), there is mention of a visit to the
Lubianka in Moscow by the families or wives or
relatives of political prisoners, to get news of them. A
line is formed in front of the windows, in which they
can only see each others backs. A woman waits for
her turn: Never had she thought the human back
could be so expressive and transmit states of mind so
penetratingly. The people who approached the win
dow had a special way of stretching the neck and
back; the raised shoulders had shoulder-blades tensed
as if by springs, and they seemed to shout, to cry, to
sob. Face as the extreme precariousness of the other.
Peace as awakening to the precariousness of the other.
For in that extreme uprightness of the face and in
its expression, assignation and demand that concern
the /, that concern me. In that extreme uprightness
[idroiture], his right [droit\ over me. The demand that
concerns me as I is the concrete circumstance in
which the right signifies. As if the invisible death that
the other faces were my business, as if that death
concerned me. In this calling back to responsibility of
the I by the face that assigns, demands and claims it,
the other is the neighbour.
 Taking as our starting point that uprightness of
the face of the other, I once wrote that the face of the
other in its precariousness and defenselessness is for
me both the temptation to kill and the call for peace,
the Thou shalt not kill. Face that already accuses
me, is suspicious of me, but already claims and
demands me. The right of man is there, in that
uprightness of exposure and command and assigna
tion, a right older than any conferring of honor and
any merit. The proximity of the neighbour the
peace of proximity is the responsibility of the / for
the other, the impossibility of leaving him alone
before the mystery of death. Which, concretely, is the
taking up of dying for the other. Peace with the other
goes even unto this. It is all the gravity of the love of
ones neighbour, of love without lust.
Peace of the love of ones neighbour in which it is
not a question, as in the peace of pure repose, of
confirming oneself in ones identity, but of putting
that identity itself in question, its unlimited freedom
and its power.
IV
But the order of truth and knowledge has a role to
play in that peace of proximity and in the ethical
order it signifies. To a very great extent, it is the
ethical order of human proximity that brings about
or summons that of objectivity, truth and knowledge.
This is very important to the very meaning of
Europe: its biblical heritage implies the necessity of
the Greek heritage. Europe is not a simple confluence
of two cultural currents. It is the concretization in
which the wisdoms of the theoretical and the biblical
do better than converge. The relation with the other
and the unique, which is peace, comes to require a
reason that thematizes and synchronizes and synthe
sizes, that thinks the world and reflects on being;
concepts necessary to the peace of men.
Responsibility for the other man is, in its immedi
acy, certainly prior to all questions. But how does it
oblige, if a third party disturbs that exteriority of two
people, in which my subjection qua subject is a
subjection to my neighbour? The third party is other
than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and
also a neighbour of the other, and not just his
counterpart [.semblable]. What am I to do? What have
they already done to one another? Which one comes
before the other in my responsibility? What are they,
then, the other and the third party, in relation to one
another? Birth of the question.
The first question in the inter-human is the ques
tion of justice. Henceforth it becomes necessary to
know, to make oneself a conscience. To my relation
with the unique and the incomparable, comparison is
superimposed, and, with a view to equity or equality,
a weighing, a calculation, the comparison of incom
parables, and therewith neutrality presence or rep
resentation of being, the thematization and visibility
of the face, discountenanced [dtvisagt] in a manner of
speaking as the simple individuation of the individ
ual; the weight of having and of exchanges; the
necessity of thinking together beneath one synthetic
theme the multiple and the unity of the world; and
thereby the promotion of the relation and ultimate
signifyingness of being to intentional and intelligible
thought; and finally thereby the extreme importance
in human multiplicity of the political structure of
society under the rule of law, and hence institutions
in which the for-the-other of subjectivity in which
the I enters with the dignity of the citizen into the
perfect reciprocity of political laws that are essentially
egalitarian or held to become so.
But the forms of the spirit thus promoted and the
notions such as being or rational truth that thus take
on the character of being originary of all meaning,
and the political unity with the institution and the
relations that are instituted on that basis are, at every
moment, on the verge of bearing within themselves
their center ot gravity and of weighing in their own
right on the fate of men, as a source of conflict and
violence. It seemed to me important, therefore, to
recall peace and justice as their origin, justification
and measure; to recall that that justice which can
legitimize them ethically i.e., retain the sense proper
of the human as dis-inter-estedness beneath the
weight of being is not a natural and anonymous
legality regulating human masses, from which a tech
nique of social equilibrium has been derived to har
monize antagonistic, blind forces through transitional
cruelty and violence, and that it is impossible to justify
in such a way a State abandoned to its own necessity.
Nothing can escape the control of the responsibility
of one for the other, which delimits the State and
ceaselessly calls for the watchfulness of persons, who
cannot content themselves with the simple subsuming
of cases beneath the general rule, as the computer is
capable of doing.
It is not unimportant to know and this is perhaps
the European experience of the twentieth century
whether the egalitarian and just State in which the
European realizes himself and that j's to be insti
tuted and preserved proceeds from a war of all
against all - or from the irreducible responsibility of
one for the other, and whether it can ignore the
uniqueness of the face and of love. It is not unimpor
tant to know this, so that war does not become the
institution of a war with a good conscience in the
name of historical necessities. Consciousness is born
as the presence of the third party in the proximity of
the one to the other, and thus it is to the extent that
it proceeds from it that it can become dis-inter-
estedness. The foundation of consciousness is justice,
and not vice-versa. Objectivity resting on justice. To
the extravagant generosity of the for-the-other is
superposed a reasonable, ancillary or angelic order;
that of justice through knowledge, and here philos
ophy is a measure brought to the infinite of the being-
for-the-other of peace and proximity, and as it were
a wisdom of love.
 The Rights of the Other Man

The formal characteristic of the Rights of Man, such

as they are conceived of since the Renaissance, consists
in their being attached to every human person inde-
pendendy from any prior granting by any authority
or tradition, and also independently from any act of
taking upon oneself or of meriting these rights. Also
called natural, these rights would also belong to men
equally, regardless of the physical or mental, personal
or social differences that distinguish men from one
another. Prior to all agreed upon law, they are a
priori. Human beings guilty toward others, upon
whose rights they infringe and who, by material or
psychological incapacity, are unable to exercise these
rights issued from their human nature fully in fact,
are indeed subjected to a limitation of these rights by
their empirical degradation. But that limitation is
legitimate, so to speak, or still in conformity with the
fullness of these rights, understood in the (implicit or
explicit) judgment in which that limitation is
pronounced.
The effectiveness of the Rights of Man, their incor
poration into the judicial determinism and their
weight in that order, the very fact of their discovery
and concrete formulation, brings with it necessary
social and psychological conditions that owe much to
the cultural, technical and economic state of a society
- to the influence of foreign civilizations, near or far,
and to the lucidity and intellectual refinement of the
citizenry. These conditions are not the basis of these
rights qua rights. They are neither the principle of,
nor the justification for, this privilege/ attaching a
priori to the human person. But the content [teneur]
of this right is not arbitrarily invented. Does it not
derive vi formae from the very a priori in which its
normative energy appears, in the guise of the right
to free will, and thus as independence from an abso
lute, as a dignity?
But the right of man, signifying the right to a free
will, is exercised in the concreteness of the empirical
order of man of man among men, in being-there
as the right to being-there or to live, and hence as the
right to satisfy the needs that sustain life and as the
right to work, allowing you to earn a living/ and as
the right to well-being and to the beautiful, that
makes life bearable. And why not even a right to
weekends and paid vacations and all the benefits of
Social Security? But then does not the requirement of
the right of man extend across the entire field of life-
in-the-world, even if it does admit of levels of
urgency?
The charter of the Rights of Man would thus
extend to the entire dispersion and hierarchy of
human relations direct relations, and those that are
established around things and the validity of that
charter would continually clash with what we may
call the mechanical necessities of the social reality
known to the positive sciences, which are mainly
attentive to causal laws; which indicates perhaps
especially the entire extent of a purely technical task
of reforms incumbent on the defenders of the Rights
of Man. This considerable task is not reducible to the
awakening of consciousness to the Rights of Man in
the underdeveloped or tyrannized countries. It con
sists in establishing and formulating the requirements
of freedom and its concrete conditions in the effective
reality of modern civilization, predetermined by
physical and social mechanisms, even though the
political wisdom that that task gives rise to may have
to introduce into the rules of traditional politics and
in the play of its forces and passions a new finality of
the Rights of Man, which, since the eighteenth-
century, has learned the way of revolutionary
struggle.
But the conception of the right of man as the right
to free will a content suggested by the form of this
right, by its a priori would it not be immediately
put back in question by the coexistence and the very
multiplicity of the holders of rights, who, all unique
and free, would violate each others rights or free
doms in limiting them? The war of each against all,
based on the Rights of Man I Unless we attribute to
the essence of free will a propensity for the rational,
and, thus, a respect for the universal, thanks to which
the imperative and the normative of the intelligible
would impose themselves on the free will of each,
consenting to limit itself in such a way as not to limit
others. A limitation of its own freedom. But also a
free limitation of its freedom! A free limitation, in
consenting to the rationality of the universal. The
consent to the reasonable would never be servitude
and the will would adhere to the rational, without
being subjugated to it, just like reason, which remains
upright thought even as it bows to the self-evidence
of the True. The respect for the other in the respect
ful will of the Intelligible, or, following Kants for
mulation, the possibility for the will to treat the other
in its decisions always as an end, or never simply as a
means. To Kant, the multiplicity of free wills is
reconciled in the Kingdom of Ends. The peace
between freedoms is thus possible, thanks to the
notion of good will which, would be practical reason,
a will that listens to and hears reason.
But is it certain that free will lends itself entirely
to the Kantian notion of practical reason? Does it
allow itself to be totally contained therein without
raising any difficulties? Does formalisms relation to
the universal appease the non-coercible part of spon
taneity, which would still distinguish between the
rationalism of the intellect and the rationalism that
informs a will qualified as reasonable?
And practical reason's intention, attributed to the
will, of ensuring the right of man or the freedom of
the neighbour - does it not cost free will its own
 The Rights of the Other Man
right to freedom? The duty in which it would be free
by virtue of the rationality of faithfulness to the
maxim of action does it not bear some submission,
attested, for example, by the law itself being lived and
adopted as dura lex? Unless a pre-eminent excellence
were granted to the other out of goodness: unless good
will were will, not just out of respect for the univer
sality of a maxim of action, but out of the feeling of
goodness. A simple feeling that we speak to children
about, but that can have less innocent names, such as
mercy or charity or love. An attachment to the other
in his alterity to the point of granting him a priority
over oneself. Which would doubtless mean, with
respect to the pathological sensibility, the pure pas
sivity and heteronomy Kant taught us to be wary of,
a primordial rupture. Rupture of the human with
respect to all the pre-human ontology of being per
severing in its being, of the being for whom it is in
its being only a question of that being itself. That the
Rights of Man are originally the rights of the other
man, and that they express, beyond the burgeoning
of identities in their own identity and their instinct
for free perseverance, tint for-the-other of the social, of
the for-the-stranger such appears to me to be the
meaning of their novelty.
C O N V E R S A T IO N S
 The Philosopher and Death

It is always the living, isnt it, who speak o f the dead and
death: we have just repeated that. The philosophers who
wonder about death do so necessarily about the death of
the other, since they have no more experience of their
own than do the rest o f us. Even Socrates, in whose veins
the hemlock poison flows as he carries on his last
conversation with his disciples, who speaks o f death while
he is in the process o f dying, has not yet lived through
death itself when he speaks of it. It is Plato who will
speak f ^ e dead Socrates.
I think you have touched on an essential point
here. Death is the most unknown of unknowns. It is
even otherwise unknown than all unknown. It seems
to me, whatever the eventual reactions of many
philosophers, and even in the [general] opinion, that
death is initially the nothingness of knowledge. I am
not saying that it is nothingness. It is also the fullness
of the question, but at first: One does not know.
These are the first words that come [viennent], and
they are appropriate [conviennent\.
It is definitive disappearance, for our world. And
with it, the speech of the one who is disappearing is
completed. One quotes the 'last words' of someone, but it
still involves words of a living person. The memoirs of
beyond the grave are also written before. The dead keep
silence.
It is disappearance for the others. But in itself it is
the dilemma between being and the not to be. The
description of the phenomenon of death is made
while one is alive. And if something happens after
ward, we must admit that it is not of the order of the
experience of the living. The possibility that some
thing happens afterward is located beyond our reach.
The idea that it involves a tertium quid, something
other than being and nothingness, is the very thing
that causes fright. We speak of it without ever being
sure that that is what we are talking about. It is
doubtless something that does not enter human
thought.
And yet, death is the only point of certainty on which
thought can cast anchor, the only indubitable event of
our destiny?
That it will come, yes. Death is the inexorable.
The only certainty, but inexorable?
All the rest is inexorable in terms of death. It is
the inexorable of itself, and in this sense also the
frightening. What comes, apd what we cannot take
upon ourselves! For thought, which always moves
among interdependent notions, death is the hole that
undoes the system, the disturbance of all order, the
dismanding of all totality. You go toward death,
you learn to die, you prepare for the last extremity;
but there is the last quarter of an hour (or the
last second), and at that point it is death that com
pletes the last leg of the journey by itself, and is a
surprise. In this sense, it is not a possibility like all
the other possibilities, in which there is always a
preliminary, always a project. To be unassumable
belongs to its very quality. It is an event without
project. The project one may have of death is
undone at the last moment. It is death alone that goes
the last leg. Not us. We do not, strictly speaking,
meet it.
Spinoza will say, as you know, that philosophers
should think of nothing less than of death. Heidegger,
by contrast, is the one who pursued philosophical
thoughts reference to death the farthest. The philos
ophers mortality marks his thought as it does his
existence. A finite existence. A finite human existence,
even if philosophical. Philosophical thought because
of that finitude. Heidegger calls the extreme possi
bility of death possibility of impossibility. Without
wishing to play on words, I have always thought that
possibility implied a human power, whereas dying is
unassumable: it is rather an impossibility of
possibility.
 That which is inevitable, and yet for us, in the strict
sense of the term, impossible?
The inexorable, in the sense in which I said just a
moment ago. From that point of view, it is resistant
to knowledge, in a exceptional way. It is not at all the
unknown because consciousness is limited in fact but
could someday miraculously expand. Death can never
be known. It is in this sense that I said a moment ago
that the unassumable belongs to its quality. Those
who return from the last extremity and tell about it
have not been there. Its not serious.
The world of the Cave remains closed upon itself and
its shadows, and we are none the wiser about it today,
according to you, than is Boo\ Ten of Platos Republic;
nor than our great-grandchildren will be, about this
essential point of human fate? Is death the Sphinx we
question but that does not answer?
Yes. And the word mystery is appropriate here. It
is the locus of that category: the mystery. An
unknown that raises a question. A question without
givens. It does not involve the tireless emphasis of the
self-evident banality that we dont know what lies
beyond death. We dont even know what meaning
the beyond might have in this circumstance. Even the
famous nothingness people agree about so readily is
problematic. Can one break with being? Can one exit
being? Dont negation and annihilation leave in place
the stage on which negations and annihilations are
played out? Isnt the outside inside, in a sense? Arent
we always enclosed within existence? No escape.
Maurice Blanchot, in his wonderful and strange
work, has conceived of death in terms of the impos
sibility of breaking away. This view on the mystery
of death is profound and obsessive. Ontology as
obsession. In the anguish of death, the impossibility
of nothingness. An impossibility of stopping the
music or of calling a halt to the ruckus of existence!
And yet, at the same time, the impossibility of going
on with them.
But along those same lines couldn't we also say, on
the positive side, that nothing entirely new comes along
in our existence except death? It is the intrusion of the
unknown, the never heretofore, in a world in which
everything will soon have happened. The mystery o f
death is also the possibility of something different. At least
some would say so.
Well talk about that other aspect of death. Some
thing new does in fact take place; but for us who
witness the death of the other person; well never
know what it means to the deceased himself. We dont
evfen know what legitimacy there may be in the
expression, to the deceased himself. But for the sur
vivor, there is in the death of the other his or her
disappearance, and the extreme loneliness of that dis
appearance. I think that the Human consists precisely
in opening oneself to the death of the other, in being
preoccupied with his or her death. What I am saying
here may seem like a pious thought, but I am per
suaded that around the death of my neighbour what
I have been calling the humanity of man is manifested.
To receive into one's thought and one's heart the
perspective of the death of the other is surely an act of
piety - but also of thought?
Yes.
Gabriel Marcel said that to love is to tell the other,
"You wont die, not y o u W h i c h is to recognize, thanks
to the loof( of love, that the others death is impossible,
and at the same time the impossible of death. In this
sense, can one say that death arrests the project of being?
It continues otherwise, but continues nonetheless, and not
just in our memory and thought. Can we not reintegrate
even the death of the other into a new project?
Gabriel Marcel believes in the metaphysical efficacy
Of love, and does not think the excluded middle is
thinkable.
Plato has Socrates say that he accepts running the
noble ris\ of immortality.' Isnt that a hind of continuity
o f the project, across the hiatus? Che changes plans, and
even lives, but one who was only mortal sees the possi
bility, the eventuality, open up, of becoming immortal by
passing through death. To run this risk but also to take
up this hope is this not precisely what is human,
terribly human?
Alexander Kojfcve liked to remind us, on the
subject of that moment when Socrates was about to
convince his interlocutors of the immortality of the
soul, and they were half hoping to see Socrates after
his death and half in despair before the imminent
separation, that Plato himself was not present at the
conversation and consequendy did not share the
emotion of those interlocutors. Did he not note, at
the beginning of the dialogue, that he had been absent
due to sickness? We will never know, therefore,
whether he was convinced on the point of immortal
ity by the proofs in the Pkaedo; or whether he had
run the noble risk of believing in it___If we are to
believe Kojive, at least, in whom there is no lack of
ingenious and penetrating ideas.
But is it not the case that a philosopher's reflection can
and must extend that far, i.e. to th*>point of risking the
unknown, of embracing that "noble risk f immortality'
that death makes us run? It that not to take into account
what, is most human in thought?
In my opinion that alternative of being and noth
ingness on which the proof of immortality is based
fails to pose the primary question. To be or not to be
is not the ultimate alternative, and in any case not the
ultimate or most urgent question. Well come back to
this point. It is true, of course, that to speak of
questions of life and death is to speak of urgent
questions. But is the couple life and death reducible
to being and not being? Is it not a metaphor for it?
We must get back to the concrete consideration of
death.
The couple is, concretely, indissociable. Life cannot be
thought of as if death did not exist, but conversely,
human life, precisely insofar as it is human, raises
questions about human death, which is nqt the death of
just anything. Of what is it the death, exdctly? Is it the
death of love, which is doubtless more than being? To
love or not to love is assuredly the more profound form
of the question: To be or not to be? We know that death
is an end, but we dont /(now of what, nor do we know
whether it is not also a beginning.
When death is there, we are no longer there. Is it
an end or a beginning? Lets concede that we know
nothing about it. Perhaps we dont yet realize to what
extent all that is unknown. The idea of the excluded
middle stakes out the unknown and mysterious
domain of the question of death. Just now I alluded
to the death-life metaphor. We use those two words
constantly as we live our daily lives, carried along by
our perseverance in being, forgetful of our properly
human vocation of disinterestedness, i.e. of disengage
ment with respect to our being and care for the being
of the other. Moreover, I always try to introduce the
idea that mystery is ineluctable in the description and
terminology of death. We must consider the other
face of that violence that unfolds in death, precisely
because it is not assumable; not by anyone. But before
the death of the other, my neighbour, death the
mysterious appears to me, in any case, as the bringing
about of an aloneness toward which I cannot be
indifferent. It awakens me to the other.
Heidegger deduces all conceivable meaning from
the-attitude of man toward his own death. He thinks
to the very end, in the senses of the term. He carries
out his thought to its ultimate consequences, and he
thinks that my death for me can be nothing but the
ultimate self. I wonder if that is, in fact, for thought,
the ultimate movement to the end. Is there not a
manner of thinking that goes beyond my own death
to the death of the other man, and does not the
human consist precisely in this thinking beyond ones
own death? I have no desire to exhibit some noble
soul in affirming this. What I mean is, the death of
the other can constitute a central experience for me,
whatever the resources of our perseverance in our
own being may be. For me, for example (and this
will hardly surprise you) the Holocaust is an event of
still inexhaustible meaning. But in any death to which
we are present, and I would even say in any approach
to a mortal man, the reverberations of that extraordi
nary unknown can be heard. We apprehend it irresis
tibly in the encounter with death in the other man.
The significance of that event is infinite, its emotion
ethical through and through.
The death of the other whom we love confers upon
death all its dramatic intensity, because the life of the
other has beamedforth all its intensity. It is not only the
death of the other; it seems the death of love, in which
the other toof( on for us the fullness of his being and life,
and an identity irreducible to any other. It is impossible
for it to pass unnoticed, that it be hidden; and when
death touches the loved other, it touches our common
love: it is our own death that is announced to us. When
we lose one of our own, as the saying goes, we enter into
intimate relations with death; its presence becomes more
familiar, and we discover how much it is interwoven into
our lives.
It is not the intensity that I have in mind, and my
analysis does not set out from a relation to the death
of those dear to us, and has even less affinity with a
return to oneself, which would take us back to the
priority of my own death. In speaking of the Holo
caust, I am thinking of the death of the other man. I
am thinking of the other man, for whom, I know not
why, one can feel oneself to be already a responsible
survivor. I have asked myself (perhaps you know this)
what the face of the other man means. I have allowed
myself to say that there is in him in the first instance
a directness and a rectitude: a being-face-to-face,
precisely as if he were exposed to some threat at point
blank range, as if he were about to be delivered to his
death. I have sometimes wondered whether the idea
of the straight line that shortest distance between
two points is not originally the line according to
which the face I encounter is exposed to death. That
is probably the way my death stares me in the face,
but I do not see my own death. The first obvious
thing in the others face is the directness of exposure
and that defenselessness. The human being in his face
is the most naked; nakedness itself. But at the same
time, his face faces. It is in his way of being all alone
in his facing that the violence of death is to be
assessed.
A third moment in the epiphany of the face: it
requires me. The face looks at me, calls out to me. It
claims me. What does it ask for? Not to leave it
alone. An answer: Here I am. My presence, of no
avail perhaps, but a gratuitous movement of presence
and responsibility for the other. To answer, Here I
am, is already* the encounter with the face.
In truth, its very singularity only appears at a moment
that extreme, that ultimate. We often say that she or he
loo^s like so-and-so. In that instant, it is clear that he
doesnt look anyone but himself that person one
loved, or didnt love and no one else can take his place.
If we want to define what that famous love of ones
neighbour a shop-worn saying is, I think we have
to return to that relation to the face qua mortality of
ones neighbour and the impossibility of leaving him
to his isolation. The positive definition of the love of
ones neighbour is to be distinguished from all that is
erotic and concupiscence. Love without concupis
cence; it is sociality itself. In that relation with the
face, in a direct relation with the death of the other,
you probably discover that the death of the other has
priority over yours, and over your life. I am not
merely speaking of the banal fact that one can die
for another. That banal fact that is not at all banal or
simple is the foray of the human, putting in question
the ontological necessities and the persistence of being
persevering in its being. Without knowing how to
swim, to jump into the water to save someone is to
go toward the other totally, without holding back
anything of oneself. To give oneself totally to the
other to respond to his unspoken request, to the
expression of his face, to his mortality, his Thou shalt
not kill. But above all, it is no longer just a question
of going toward the other when he is dying, but of
answering with ones presence the mortality of the
living. That is the whole of ethical conduct. In the
final analysis, the ultimate scruple is to not. push the
other back into some third or fourth world by
the place in the sun I myself occupy. Pascal said: My
place in the sun is the archetype and the beginning of
the usurpation of the whole world. As if, by the fact
of being there, I were depriving someone of his living
space, as if I were expelling or murdering someone.
It was also Pascal who said: The / is hateful. He
was not merely giving us a lesson in good manners
or style, but of ontology. As is the principle of identity
positing itself triumphantly as / carried with it an
indecency and violence, as if the / prohibited, by its
very positing, the full existence of the other; as if in
appropriating something it ran the risk of depriving
someone else of. something.
Simone Weil also said: 7 look at the world as if 1
were not in it. Could it be that that supreme form of
detachment and of contemplation, which is the opposite
of indifference, seeks perhaps in the world and in man
the original and infinite purity that they contain? It is an
attempt to deliver the world from the opaqueness of our
presence, from the obstacle constituted by our presence
between a pure look an^ *ts true object. Is it not in the
same way that Racines Phidre ends up, guilty and
ashamed o f being so? !'And death, robbing my eyes of
their light, restores to the day the purity they sullied.
I think those quotes concur on many points with
what I was trying to suggest. Behind the relation
with the death of the other, a very strange problem is
raised. Is our desire-to-be legitimate on the part of us
humans, even at the level of being? It is not a
question of asking ourselves in the name of I know
not what abstract law whether we shouldnt take our
own lives, but of finding reasons to live, to be worthy
of being. The bad conscience of being, coming to
light when confronted with the death of the other! Is
it not a hearkening to the commandment to love that
the face of mortals transmits to usP Of their right to
be there can be no doubt, but it is the I that is the
singular locus in which the problem arises. The effort
to exist, the aspiration to persevere in being, the
conatus essendi is, according to philosophers like Spi
noza, the beginning of all rights. That is precisely
what I try to put in question on the basis of the
encounter with mortality or the face of the other,
insisting, obviously, on the radical difference between
the others and me. The anguish for my own death
reveals my finitude and the scandal of an existence
dying always too soon. The good conscience of being
remains intact in that finitude. It is the death of the
other that challenges that good conscience.
All others do not, however, exist equally for us. They
exist more or less, and their death exists more or less,
according to whether their presence resonates closer or
more remotely in our lives. For all kinds o f reasons. But
when we have seen death touch the face of a being we
love, it can happen that it appears to us at once more
horrible and easier, desirable almost. It is life that
becomes foreign, and we almost seem to pass from the
horror of dying to that of living, of surviving the beloved.
Death takes on, after a fashion, the traits of that beloved
face, and through it becomes attractive, and instead of
frightening us, familiar. In short, to share such a fate
becomes enviable in the name of love. And in that name
only. All the great lovers of history wish to follow the
 other to the tomb, and sometimes do so. They make light
of life and death. Do we perhaps shed our I in a death
that truly touches us?
Death, in that case, has lost its sting.
It gives rise, as it were, to the others call, a call of
. love. In any case, it presents itself as a deliverance. It
saves us from living a half life.
But that is not an ethical attitude. On the contrary,
I was speaking of the ethical attitude that is at the
basis of sociality. Not of the attitude toward the death
of a being already chosen and dear, but of the death
of the first-one-to-come-along. To perceive that we
come after an other whoever he may be that is
ethics.
It is a kind of breaks an ontology in which our
own being conditions the approach of Being and of
beings. All that counts, after all, is the existence of the
other, and therefore the death of the other?
It is on the basis of the existence of the other that
my own existence is posited as human. I try to
imagine an anthropology a bit different from the
one taking its cue from the conatus essendi - setting
out from the relation to the death of the other. But I
believe I said that we are answerable not only for the
death of the other but for his life as well. And it is in
being answerable for his life that we are already with
him in his death. As for ontology, I have sometimes
wondered whether, in order to reveal the human that
strives to break frog, it should be grounded or
undermined.
 12

Violence of the Face

The global significance o f you wor\ is to find the

meaning of being beyond being - to relativize history
and the system by that which does not belong to the
system: the face of the other, which is in the trace of the
Infinite. Is that \ey to the reading of your worf^ correct?
I wouldnt say the meaning of being, but meaning: a
rationality, an intelligibility. The important idea,
when I speak of the face of the other, the trace of
Infinity, or the Word of God, is that of a signifying
of meaning that, originally, is not a theme, is not an
object of any field of knowledge, is not the being of a
being, is not representation. A God that concerns me
by a Word [Parole] expressed in the guise of the face
of the other man is a transcendence that never
becomes immanence. The face of the other is his way
of signifying. I also use another formula: God never
takes on a body. He never becomes, in the proper
sense of the word, a being. That is his invisibility.
That idea is essential in the reading of my book: De
Dieu qui vient A Iidee [Of God who comes to mind].
Why doesnt the face that I encounter in everyday life
belong to history, why is it not a phenomenon, a simple
experience? Why does it tear itselffree from context?
I have always described the face of the neighbour
as the bearer of an order, imposing upon me, with
respect to the other, a gratuitous and non-transferable
responsibility, as if the I were chosen and unique -
and in which the other were absolutely other, i.e., still
incomparable, and thus unique. But the men round
about me are multiple. Hence the question: Who is
my neighbour? The inevitable question of justice.
The necessity of comparing incomparables, of know
ing men; hence their appearance as plastic forms of
faces that are visible and, one might say, de-faced
[dt-visages]: like a grouping from which the unique
ness of the face is torn free, as from a context, the
source of my obligation toward other men; the source
to which the quest for justice goes back, in the final
analysis, and the forgetfulness of which risks trans
forming the sublime and difficult work of justice into
a purely political calculation - to the point of totali
tarian abuse.
Historicism, materialism, structuralism, ontology:
would the limit of all these philosophicalfigures be their
fundamental inability to go beyond being and history,
their restriction of meaning to being?
By and large that is so. But I am not tempted by a
philosophy of history and I am not certain of its
 Violence of the Pace
finality. I dont say that all is for the best, and the
idea of progress doesnt seem to me very reliable. But
I think that responsibility for the other man, or, if
you like, the epiphany of the human face, constitutes
a penetration of the crust, so to speak, of being
persevering in its being and preoccupied with itself.
Responsibility for the other, the dis-interested for-
the-other of saindiness. Im not saying men are saints,
or moving toward saintliness. Im only saying that
the vocation of saintliness is recognized by all human
beings as a value, and that this recognition defines the
human. The human has pierced through imperturb
able being; even if no social organization, nor any
institution can, in the name of purely ontological
necessities, ensure, or even produce saintliness. There
have been saints.
Then we must read the nihilist outcome of contempor
ary philosophy not as a destiny of philosophy as such, but
only as the result of that philosophy which, as ontology,
does not accept the risf{ of the beyond being of
transcendence?
Very well, but I would add that my propositions
do not pretend to the exclusivism of the philosophers
of history. If, in my view, the very origin of intelligi
bility and meaning go back to responsibility for the
other man, the fact of the matter is that ontology,
objective knowledge and political forms are com
manded by this meaning or are necessary to its
signifying. I said earlier that the origin of the mean
ingful in the face of the other, confronted with the
actual plurality of human beings calls for justice
and knowledge; the exercise of justice demands courts
of law and political institutions, and even, paradoxi
cally, a certain violence that is implied in all justice.
Violence is originally justified as the defense of the
other, of the neighbour (be he a relation of mine, or
my people!), but is violence for someone.
The notion o f meaning is fundamental in your work-
in the more recent writings, it reappears continually.
What is the philosophical status of that notion? Is it
really certain that philosophy must see\ meaning?
Except that the philosopher and the scholar who
reason and judge and the statesman will not be
excluded from the spiritual. But its meaning is orig
inally in the human, in the initial fact that man is
concerned with the other man. It is at the basis of the
banality according to which few things interest man
as much as does the other man.
I cannot further explain this moment in which, in
the weight of being, rationality begins. A first notion
of signifying, to which reason may be traced, and that
cannot be reduced to anything else. It is phenomeno-
logically irreducible: meaning means.
To seek the definition of meaning is as if one were
to try reduce the effect of a poem to its causes or
transcendental conditions. The definition of poetry is
perhaps that the poetic vision is more true and, in a
certain sense older than the vision of its conditions.
In reflecting on the transcendental conditions of the
poem, you have already lost the poem.
You reject the perspective of the indefinite dissemina
tion of meaning. Would it be accurate to say that your
conclusions are the opposite of those of the theoreticians
of writing [cr\Xurt], Derrida and Blanchot?
Yes and no, because I have great esteem for both
of them and I admire their speculative gifts. On many
points I concur with their analyses. But it isnt in
terms of writing [ecriture] that problems come to me,
and with respect to Writ [Ecriture] the Holy -
perhaps our positions diverge. I have often wondered,
with respect to Derrida, whether the dijftrance of the
present which leads him to the deconstruction of
notions does not attest to the prestige that eternity
retains in his eyes, the great present, being, which
corresponds to the priority of the theoretical and the
truth of the theoretical, in relation to which tempo
rality would be failure. I wonder if time - in its very
dia-chrony - isnt better than eternity and the order
of the Good itself.
Dia-chrony beyond the syn-chrony of all eternal
presentness - is it not the nodal point of the irrever
sible (or dis-inter-ested) relation of the / to the
neighbour that, precisely from me to the other, is
impossible synchrony and yet at the same time non
in-difference and, like a farewell [b-Dieu\, already
love?
Is it really possible to exclude all analogical mediation
in the use of human language about God?
I dont exclude that language in the least, but I
perhaps I insist on not forgetting its metaphorical
meaning. But what I am looking for is what Husserl
calls Originare Gegebenheit: the concrete circum
stances in which a meaning comes to mind in the
first place. It is not a gratuitous or vain quest for
some kind of chronological priority. I think the most
productive thing phenomenology has contributed is
the insistence on the fact that the look absorbed by
the datum has already forgotten to relate it to the
entirety of the mental procedure that conditions the
upsurge of the datum, and thus to its concrete mean
ing. The datum separated from the all that has
been forgotten is but an abstraction, whose mise-en-
scbne' is reconstructed by phenomenology. Husserl
always speaks of the blinders that deform naive
vision. It is not just a question of the narrowness of
its objective field, but of the obnubilation of its
psychic horizons; as if the naively given object already
veiled the eyes that seize it. To see philosophically,
i.e., without naive blindness, is to reconstitute for the
naive look (which is still that of positive science) the
concrete situation of appearing; it is to carry out its
phenomenology, to return to the neglected concrete
ness of its mise-en-scene that offers up the meaning of
the datum, and, behind its quiddity, its mode of being.
To seek the origin of the word God, the concrete
circumstances of its signifying, is absolutely necessary.
One begins by accepting his Word in the name of the
social authority of religion. How to be sure that the
Word thus accepted is indeed that spoken by God?
The original experience must be sought. Philosophy
or phenomenology is necessary to recognize His
voice. I have thought that it is in the face of the other
that he speaks to me for the first time. It is in the
encounter with the other man that he comes to my
mind or falls beneath the sense [tombe sous le sens\.
One has the impression that in ajense you wanted to
reverse the relation of exclusion between reason and
violence proposed by Eric Weil, in affirming, to the
contrary, the close solidarity of the two within totalitarian
discourse.
I have great admiration for the work, and much
piety for the memory, of Eric Weil. At no time have
I tried to exclude justice - that would be stupid -
from the human order. But I have made an attempt
to return to justice from what one might call charity,
and which appears to me as an unlimited obligation
toward the other, and in this sense accession to his
uniqueness as a person, and in this sense love: disinter
ested love, without concupiscence. I have already told
you how that initial obligation, before the multiplicity
 of human beings, becomes justice. But it is very
important, in my view, that justice should flow from,
issue from, the preeminence of the other. The insti
tutions that justice requires must be subject to the
oversight of the charity from which justice issued.
Justice, inseparable from institutions, and hence from
politics, risks preventing the face of the other man
from being recognized. The pure rationality of justice
in Eric Weil, as in Hegel, succeeds in making us
conceive of the particularity of the human being as
negligible and as if it were not that of a uniqueness,
but of an anonymous individuality. The;determinism
of the rational totality runs the risk of totalitarianism,
which doesnt, in fact, abandon ethical language and
has always spoken - and still speaks of the good and
the best, the famous language of proud things of
Psalms 12:4.' Fascism itself never glorified crime.
Therefore I say that E. Weil, a philosopher and an
infinitely respectable man, has had thoughts more
utopian than mine, precisely because it is very difficult
to ensure oneself against totalitarianism by a politics
of the pure concept that taxes the attachment to the
uniqueness of the other and the radical for-the-other of
the / with subjectivism. It seems to me that rational
justice is compromised when the relation with the
other is visibly profaned. And there, between purely
rational justice and injustice, there is an appeal to the
wisdom of the /, the possibilities of which perhaps
dont include any principle that can be formulated a
priori.
 You affirm that your way of naming God belongs
strictly to philosophical discourse, and not to religion. To
religion would belong the tas\ of consolation, not of
demonstration. What does that mean, exactly? Is religion
perhaps something superfluous?
The question is more complex. Both moments are
necessary; they are not on the same level. What I
want to show is the transcendence in natural thought
in the approach to the other. Natural theology is
necessary in order subsequently to recognize the voice
and accent of God in the Scriptures themselves. A
necessity that is perhaps the motivating force behind
religious philosophy itself. The seducer knows all the
ploys of language and all its ambiguities. He knows
all the terms of the dialectic. He exists precisely as a
moment of human freedom, and the most dangerous
of seducers is the one who carries you away with
pious words to violence and contempt for the other
man.
What is the correct position of the relationship between
Judaism and Hellenism that you propose?
Im in favor of the Greek heritage. It is not at the
beginning, but everything must be able to be trans
lated into Greek. The translation of the Scriptures
by the Septuagintal scholars symbolizes that necessity.
Its the theme of a text from the Talmud, that I had
occasion to do a commentary on last year. There is,
as you know, a legend about the translation of the
Bible into Greek. Ptolemy is said to have chosen
seventy Jewish scholars and locked them up in separ
ate rooms to translate the Jewish Bible into Greek.
Supposedly they all translated it the same way, and
even the corrections they felt obliged to make to
the text were the same. Father Barth6lemy, a profes
sor at the Catholic University of Fribourg, has said:
It is obviously the fanciful idea of a guide made up
for the tourists visiting the place. In the Talmud,
that story is gone over. It is clearly, for rabbinic
thought, an apologue, a midrash. The Talmud
wanted to approve both the translation of the Bible
into Greek and the principle of correction. There are
ideas that have their original meaning in biblical
thought and that must be related differendy in Greek.
But Greek is a language of impartial thought, of the
universality of pure knowledge. All meaning, all
intelligibility, all spirit is not knowledge, but all can
be translated into Greek. With periphrases it is poss
ible to give an account of a spirituality resistant to the
forms of knowledge.
What I call Greek is the way of our university
language, which we inherited from the Greeks. At
the university, even at Catholic and Hebrew univer
sities, we speak Greek even when and if we dont
know an alpha from an omega.
The transformation of ontological categories into ethi
cal ones proceeds to the point of putting the new
fundamental question: 'Do I have the right to be?'
Does that question belong to the consciousness of original
sin?
I think that philosophical discourse is independent
of that guilt, and that the question, Do I have the
right to be? expresses primarily the human in its care
for the other.-1 have written a lot on this theme; its
my main theme now. My place in being, the Da- of
my Dasein [the there of my being-there] - isnt it
already usurpation, already violence with respect to
the other? A preoccupation that has nothing ethereal,
nothing abstract about it. The press speaks to us of
the Third World, and we are quite comfortable here;
were sure of our daily meals. At whose cost, we may
wonder.
Pascal said: the I is hateful. In the sovereign
affirmation of the /, the perseverance of beings in
their being is repeated, but also consciousness of the
horror that egotism arouses in this myself. Pascal also
says that my place in the sun is the archetype and the
beginning of the usurpation of the whole earth.
One cant say that Pascal didnt know about orig
inal sin, but I wonder whether the human as such is
not sufficient for this supreme scruple whether
scruples are always already remorse.
Somebody wrote that the ethical responsibility you
speaks f ** abstract and devoid of concrete content. Does
that seem a valid critique to you?
 I have never claimed to describe human reality in
its immediate appearance, but what human deprava
tion itself cannot obliterate: the human vocation to
saintliness. I dont affirm human saintliness; 1 say that
man cannot question the supreme value of saintliness.
In 1968, the year of questioning in and around the
universities, all values were up for grabs, with the
exception of the value of the other man, to which one
was to dedicate oneself. The young people who for
hours abandoned themselves to all sorts of fun and
unruliness went at the end of the day to visit the
striking Renault workers as if to pray* Man is the
being who recognizes saintliness and the forgetting of
self. The for oneselF is always open to suspicion. We
live in a state in which the idea of justice is superim
posed on that initial charity, but it is in that initial
charity that the human resides; justice itself can be
traced back to it. Man is not only the being who
understands what being means, as Heidegger would
have it, but the being who has already heard and
understood the commandment of saintliness in the
face of the other man. Even when it is said that at the
origin there are altruistic instincts, there is the recog
nition that God has already spoken. He began to speak
very early. The anthropological meaning of instinct!
In the daily Jewish liturgy, the first morning prayer
says: Blessed art thou, O Lord, our God, King of the
Universe, who giveth the cock knowledge to dis
tinguish between day and night. In the crowing of the
cock, the first Revelation: the awakening to the light.
 Does peace have a future? What is Christianitys
contribution to its construction?
Oh, youre asking me for a prophesy! It is true
that all men are prophets. Doesnt Moses say (Num
bers 11:29): Would that all the Lords people were
prophets, and doesnt Amos go further - all
humanity: The Lord God hath spoken, Who can but
prophesy? {Amos 3:8). And yet it is difficult for me
to make predictions - unless the verses I just quoted
are themselves favorable prophesies.
I also think the trials humanity has passed through
in the course of the twentieth century are, in their
horror, not only a measure of human depravity, but a
renewed call back to our vocation. I have the
impression they have altered something in us. I think
specifically that the Passion of Israel at Auschwitz has
profoundly marked Christianity itself and that a
Judeo-Christian friendship is an element of peace, in
which the person of Jean-Paul II represents hope.
What is the value of liturgy and prayer?
One doesnt pray for oneself. Nevertheless, the
Jewish prayer, the daily prayer, replaces the sacrifices
of the Temple, according to Jewish theology. But
then, like the sacrifice of the Temple which was a
holocaust, it is in its entirety an offering. There is an
exception when one prays for Israel persecuted. In
that case one prays for the community, but it is a
prayer for the people called to reveal the glory of
God. In praying to God, it is still for God that one is
praying in this case as well.
When you are truly in distress, you can mention it
in prayer. But are you going to eliminate in this
manner a suffering that wipes away sins in expiating
them. If you want to escape your own suffering, how
will you expiate your wrong-doings? The question is
more complex. In our suffering God suffers with us.
Doesnt the Psalmist say (Psalms 91:15): I am with
him in distress? It is God who suffers most in human
suffering. The I who suffers prays for the suffering
of God, who suffers by the sin of man and the painful
expiation for sin. A kenosis of God! Prayer,
altogether, is not for oneself.
There arent many souls who pray with that prayer
of the just. Surely there are many levels. I have
presented you with the most rigorous of theological
conceptions. Perhaps it is important to know it. I
think the less elevated forms of prayer retain much
of its piety.
 Bibliographical "Note

Philosophy and Transcendence was first published as Philo

sophic ct transcendance* in the Encyclopidiephilosophique
universelUy (Presses Universitaires de France, 1989).
Totality and Totalization and Infinity was originally pub
lished as Totality et totalisation and Infini* in the
Encyclopaedia Universalis, Paris: Encyclopedia Univer
salis (Paris, 1968).
Beyond Dialogue was first published as Par del3i le dia
logue in the Journal des communautfs, (Paris: Consisto-
ire Israelite, 1967.
The Word I, the Word You, and the Word God was first
published as Le mot je, le mot toi, le mot Dieu in Le
Monde, 1978:
The Proximity of the Other was first published as La
proximiti de 1autre/ a conversation with Anne-Cathe-
rine Benchelah, in Phriatique, 1986.
Utopia and Socialism was originally published as the pref
ace to Martin Bubers Utopie et Socialisme9 Aubier-
. Montaigne, 1977.
The Prohibition against Representation and 'The Rights of
Man was first published as Interdit de la reprsentation
et Droits de l'homme*, Interdit de la representation -
Colloque de Monpellier, Seuil, 1981.
Peace and Proximity was originally published as Paix ct
proximite in Les Cahiers de la nuit surveillee> No. 3,
(Paris: Verdier, 1984).
The Rights of the Other Man was first published as 'Les
droits de lautre hommc in Les droits de Vhomme en
question, La documentation frantaise, 1989.
The Philosopher and Death was originally published as Le
philosophe et la mort, an interview with Christian
Chabanis, La mort, un terme ou un commencement
Fayard, 1982.
Violence of the Face wa originally published as Violence
du visage/ an interview with Angelo Bianchi, in Her-
meneutica, 1985.
 Notes

Foreword
1. LHerne, no. 60 (1991): 76-7
2. Idem., p. 80.
3. Idem., pp. 812.
4. Wahl, Traiti de Mitaphysique (Paris: Payot, 1953),
p. 721. Quoted in E. Levinas, Outside the Subject
(London: The Athlone Press, 1993), p. 82.
5. E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, n.d. [1969]), p. 274.
6. E. Levinas, Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,
Collected Philosophical Papers, edited and translated
by A. Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987),
p. 54.
7. LHerne, no. 60, (1991): 81.
8. J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1966).
9. [This work, which is a translation from Hebrew of
Martin Bubers Netivot be-utopyah, is available in
English as Paths in Utopia (New York: Macmillan,
1950) It appears as chapter 3 of the present volume. -
Trans.]
10. See also E. Levinas, De Dieu qui vient d Iidee (Paris:
J. Vrin, 1986), pp. 211-30.
11. Sec also Proper Names (London: The Athlone Press,
1996), pp. 17-39, and Outside the Subject (London: The
Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 448.
12. See also Outside the Subject, pp. 11625, and Entre nous
(London: The Athlone Press, 1998), pp. 1558.
13. Totality and Infinity, p. 213. [Translation slighdy
altered. - Trans.] See also Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981),
p. 158.
14. Totality and Infinity, p. 295. [Translation slightly
altered. Trans.]
Chapter 1: Philosophy and Transcendence
1. Levinas, De Dieu qui vient i Iidie (Paris: J. Vrin,
[1982J1986), p. 163. [Excerpted from a piece titled
Hermtneutique et au-deli, available in English as
Hermeneutics and the Beyond, Entre nous (London:
The Athlone Press, 1998), pp. 65-75. Translation
slightly altered. Trans.]
2. Enneades, Tractate 5, chap. 3, para.ll. [In order to
remain as close as possible to Levinass interpretation,
I translate his French version of the text, but for
purposes of comparison I append the translation of S.
MacKenna and B. S. Page, published in the Great
Books of the Western World Series, No. 17: Plotinus:
The Six Enneads (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc., 1952), p. 222. Trans.] It knows the Transcend
ent in very essence but, with all its effort to grasp that
prior as a pure unity, it goes forth amassing successive
impressions, so that, to it, the object becomes multi-
 pic----If it had not possessed a previous impression
of the Transcendent, it could never have grasped it,
but this impression, originally of unity, has become an
impression of multiplicity, and the Intellect-Principle,
in taking cognizance of that multiplicity, knows the
Transcendent and so is realized as an eye possessed of
its vision/
3. Enneades, Tractate 5, chap. 1, para. 6.
4. Enneadcs, Tractate 5, chap. 1, para. 4.
5. [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1970). - Trans.]
6. [Loosely quoted from Corneilles Cinna, Act 5, Scene
3, in which Auguste declares: l]c suis maitre de moi
comme de PUnivers/ - Trans.]
7. [Pascal's Pensies, in Pascal (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc., Great Books of the Western World
Series, no. 33, 1952), p. 226. - Trans.]
8. [Clearly the sense of utopia intended here is the
etymological one: no place.' - Trans.]
9. [The article Philosophic et transcendence from the
Encyclopidie philosophique universelle, Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1989, which appears to be the
earliest version of this text (as well as all subsequent
versions) has: Cette fagon de me r6clamer, de me
mettre en cause et dcn appeler &moi, 4 ma respon-
sabilitl pour la mort dautrui, est ufte signification
& tel point irrductible, que eest 4 partir delle que
le sens de la mort doit tre entendu, par del& la
dialectique abstraite de Itre et de sa negation &
 laquelle, & partir dc la violence ramenie & la
negation et k lanlantissement, on dit la mort. I
have assumed that the word dit should be riduit,
based on grammatical considerations as well as my
interpretation of the overall meaning of the passage.
- Trans.]
10. [Levinas uses the term concretization (<concritude), in
opposition to abstraction, in a way that suggests the
same phenomenological approach he designates else
where as deformalization (<deformalisation). It appears
to have the same sense as 4concr6tisation in Totalite et
infini (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 21;
Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, n.d. [1969]), p. 50, where its meaning is closely
connected with deformalization*. - Trans.]
11. [Levinas uses the word 4signifier, which can mean
both to signify or to order (to issue a command).
There seems to be a blending of both meanings in the
present context, which would not be out of keeping
with Levinass tendency toward ethical heteronomy. -
Trans.]
12. [Levinas uses the French term Veffrayer/ a reflexive
verb, and emphasizes the reflexivity by italicizing the
elided reflexive pronoun se. The ensuing analysis
turns upon Heideggers notion that the reflexives
denote a return to an auto-affectivity of Befindli-
chkeit/ rejected by Levinas because it suggests a
return to the self, or perhaps a failure to leave it. -
T rans.]
Chapter 3: Infinity
1. Descartes, Meditations, III [Descartes, Discourse on
Method and The Meditations (London and New York:
Penguin Classics, 1968), p. 126.
2. [See Platos The Sophist, 24Id. Levinas alludes to the
same parricide in Proper Names (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996), p. 61, and Humanism de Iautre
homme (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, Livre de Poche,
[1972] 1987), p. 10. - Trans.]
3. [AUgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels
(Konigsberg and Leipzig, 1755). English translation
by W. Hastie in Kant's Cosmogony (Glasgow, 1900),
reprinted as Kants Cosmogony: As in His Essay on
Retardation of the Rotation of the Earth (Greenwood:
Greenwood Press, 1969). Trans.]
Chapter 4: Beyond Dialogue
1. Edmond Fleg, Jesus: told by the Wandering Jew (New
York: E .P. Dutton, 1935).
Chapter 5: The Word I, the Word You, the Word God
1. [For further comments on the affinities between
Buber and Marcel, see Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel
and Philosophy, Outside the Subject (London: The
Athlone Press, 1994), pp. 2039. - Trans.]
2. Pascal, Pensees (Pens6e No. 479), tr. W. F. Trotter in
Great Books of the Western World, ed. Mortimer J.
Adler, vol. 30 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), p. 257.
Chapter 6: The Proximity of the Other
1. [The French is qui nest pas & venir, mais qui
advient.* I have interpreted the difference between
venir and advenir as one in which the latter term
conveys an adventitiousness or unforeseen element,
rather than just the futurity of the venir/ - Trans.]
2. [The material paraphrazed and quoted here is taken
from Vasily Grossmans Life and Fate (New York:
Harper Row, 1985), pp. 404-11. Translation slightly
altered. - Trans.]
Chapter 8: The Prohibition against Representation and
The Right of Man*
1. It suffices on this subject to consult the treatises Rosh-
Hashannah (p. 24a) and Avodah Zarah (p. 42b-43a)
of the Babylonian Talmud.
2. See the treatises Rosh-Hashannah (p. 24b) and Avo
dah Zarah (p. 43a).
3. See my study, Reality and its shadow, reprinted in
Les imprevus de Vhisioire, Fata Morgana, 1994.
4. See esp. section 27 of ldeen /, p. 50.
5. See my study, L^vy-Bruhl et la philosophie contem-
poraine, in Revue philosophique de la France et de
VStranger, no. 4, 1957, esp. pp. 558-61: La ruine de la
representation. [This piece can be found in English
in Levinass Entre Nous: Essays on Thinking-of-the-
Other (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), chap. 3. -
Trans.]
Chapter 9: Peace and Proximity
1. Verse 7 in Christian bibles.
Chapter 12: Violence and the Face
1. [Verse 3 in Christian bibles. Levinas uses the term
grandes phrases, the term used in the Bible de
Jerusalem T rans.]
 Index

absolute, the, 5, 13, 47, 62, 71 Bruno, 66

alterity, 11, 15,28, 29, 75,94 Buber, 57, 93, 94
altruistic, 180
Amos 3:8, 181 Campanella, 66
Anaximander, 50, 60 Cantor, M. B., 60
ancient, the, 31 cogito, 5, 15
anti-Semetism, 79, 80 conatus, 22
Apeiron, 60 conatus essendi, 32, 166, 167
apperception, transcendental, 31 concretization, 25, 43, 48
Aquinas, 63 Crisis (Husserl), 14
Aristotle, 39, 43, 48, 49, 59, 60, 61, Critique of Pure Reason, 68
62, 64
atheism, 35
auf etwas hinauswollen, 14 Damascene, 63
Augustine, 63 Dasein, 23, 26, 28, 30, 179
Auschwitz, 181 De Dieu qui vient a Iidee, 169
awakening, 4 death, 15, 29, 30, 166, 167; of the
other, 25; invisible, 24; my, 22,
Bacon, Roger, 64 26
bad conscience, 21, 22, 29 deconstruction, 173
Barthelemy, 178 deep past, 31
bedazzlement, 4 Derrida, 173
Befmdlichkeit, 25 Descartes, 4, 36, 48, 54, 55, 60, 63,
Begriff, 3 65-7, 75, 76
Bergson, 13, 73 diachrony, 13, 16, 31, 34, 36, 173
Bergsonism, 91 dialectic, 25, 47, 48, 88, 177
besieged, 24 dialectic, the, 92
besiegement, 15 dialectical, 48
beyond, the, 95; beyond being, 9, dialogical philosophy, 93
27, 50, 61 differance, 173
Bible, 54, 61, 83 dis-interested, 170
Blanchot, 74, 173 disinterestedness, 5, 37, 94
Brentano, 16 donation, 14, 15
Dreyfus Affair, 82 immanence, 4, 5, 11, 13, 169
durfe, 12, 19, 20, 31, 50, 74, 91 infinita essendi fruitio, 74
infinity, 4, 5, 53-75 passim; bad, 60,
Eckhart, Mcistcr, 65 69; created, 64; divine, 62
Empedocles, 60 injustice, 29
En-Sof, 54, 62, 65 innocence, 30, 84
Erlebnis, 3 Isaac, Jules, 81, 82, 84
essence, infinite, 68
eternity, 31, 173; immoble, 13 Jean-Paul II, 181
ethical responsibility, 179 Jtsus raconti par le Juif errant>82
ethics, 32, 35, 75, 76, 80, 95, 167 Judaism, 79, 84, 86, 177.
justice, 170, 176
face, 32, 33, 35, 76, 166, 175; of the
other, 23, 25, 27, 30 Kabbala, 62
face-to-face, 56, 93 Kabbalists, 65
Fascism, 176 Kant and the Problem of
Feuerbach, 56 Metaphysics, 73
Fichte, 50, 55 Kant, 39, 42, 44-6,66, 68, 71, 73
Fleg, 81, 82, 84 Kantian, 41
formalization, 40 kenosis, 182
Kepler, 66
Gestalt, 42 Kierkegaard, 57
Geworfenheit, 20 Kronos, 10
glory, 27, 33
God, 5, 25, 27, 35-7, 45, 51, 54, 55, Leibniz, 65, 66, 67
59, 63-7, 69, 75,91, 94, 96,169, life-world, 14
174,175,177,180, 182; of Logic (Hegels), 70
Aristotle, 61; infinite, 62, 63; love love without concupiscence, 29, 30
of, 95; transcendent, 50 love, 8,10, 94, 95,166, 174;
Good, the, 61, 173 disinterested, 175; of God, 95; .of
one's neighbour, 30; without
Hegel, 9,11, 12, 55, 60, 61,70, 176 concupiscence, 29, 30
Heidegger, 20, 26, 49, 73, 74, 180
Heraclitus, 60 Madaule, Jacques, 84, 87
Here I am, 30, 32 Malebranche, 66
hermeneutics, 42; hermeneutic Marcel, 57, 93, 94
circle, 49; totality, 48 Marx, 56
heterortomy, 35 Mersenne, 76
Hitlerism, 79, 82 Metaphysical Journal, 93
homicide, 30 Metaphysical Meditations
Husserl, 12, 14, 16, 17, 41, 43, 174 (Descartes), 36
idea, 73; Kantian, 73, of the Metaphysics (Aristotle), 39
infinite, 75; regulative, 58, 72 monads, 68
morality, 91 Seelisberg, 79, 80, 81
Moses, 181 sefirot, 63
murder, 23, 28 Sein und Zeit, 25
nakedness, 24, 33 Septuagintal, 177
natura naturans, 68 sociality, 8, 29, 30
Sollcn, 50, 60
Nazism, 83 soul, 8, 16, 28, 64, 67, 75, 82, 91,
Newton, 66 95
Nicholas of Cusa, 65, 66 Spinoza, 55, 66, 68, 69, 74, 166
Nietzsche, 55 Stoics, 60
non-indifference, 93, 94, 173, 174 subjectivism, 176
Numbers 11:29, 181 Symposium, 10
synchrony, 12, 173
Origen, 63 synthesis, passive, 20
Parmenides, 6, 61 Talmud, 177
parricide, 61 there is, the 93
Pascal, 21-3, 61, 66, 95, 179 Thomas, St., 61, 64
perception, 3, 14, 16, 17, 40, 42, 43 Timaeus, 64
Plato, 31, 47, 50,59,61,64 tiptoe, being-on-, 20
Plotinus, 7, 8, 9, 50, 62 totalitarianism, 176
poetry, 172 totality, 39
presence, 4, 6, 11, 13, 14, 20, 48, 75 totality, 4, 39, 402, 447, 49, 51,
proximity, 8, 23, 29, 33, 51, 75, 76, 56, 58, 60, 70, 71; hermeneutic,
88, 93 48 ~
Psalms 12:4, 176; 91:15, 182 transcendence, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 26,
psyche, 22 31,33,35,42, 50, 54, 55, 72,95,
Ptolemy, 178 169, 170, 177
representation, 4, 11, 13, 16, 20, 32, truth, 48, 54, 62
33, 47, 58, 65,169 unhappy consciousness, 9, 84
responsibility, 5, 22, 25, 27, 29, 30,
32,33, 35-7,75, 170 Vanikoff, 82
Revelation, 180 vigilence, 5, 26, 32
Rosenzweig, 51 violence, 23, 24, 25, 56, 169, 172,
Saint-Exuplry, 85, 88 177
Saying [Dire], 93
Schelling, 55 Wahl, 93
science, 91, 174 Weil, (Eric), 175, 176
Scotus, Duns, 64 wisdom, 8, 9, 36, 72, 92,176
Aesthetic Theory The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque
Adorno Deleuze
0 485 30069 9 HB 0 485 11421 6 HB
Composing for the Films 0 485 12087 9 PB
Adorno & Eislcr Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
0 485 11454 2 HB Schizophrenia
0 485 12017 7 PB Deleuze & Guattari
Freud and Nietzsche Preface by Michel Foucault
Assoun 0 485 30018 4 PB
0 485 11483 6 HB A Thousand Plateaus
Criticism and Truth Deleuze & Guattari
Barthes 0 485 11335 X HB
0 485 11321 X PB 0 485 12058 4 PB
Sollers Writer Cinema 1: The Movement-Image
Barthes Deleuze
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On Nietzsche Cinema 2: The Time-Image
Bataille Deleuze
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Nietzsche: The Body and Culture 0 485 12070 4 PB
Blondel Dialogues
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Death: An Essay on Finitude 0 485 11333 3 HB
Dastur Foucault
D 485 11487 9 HB Deleuze
Telling Time: Sketch of a 0 485 12154 9 PB
Phenomenological Chronology Logic of Sense
Dastur Deleuze
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Proust and Signs Nietzsche and Philosophy
Deleuze Deleuze
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Kants Critical Philosophy Dissemination
Deleuze Derrida
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Difference and Repetition Positions
Deleuze Derrida
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The Memory of Thought: On Towards the Definition of
Heidegger and Adorno Philosophy
Duttman Heidegger
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The Gift of Language: Memory and The Nature of Truth<D>
Promise in Adorno, Benjamin, Heidegger
Heidegger and Rosenzweig 0 485 11509 3 HB
Duttman
0 485 11488 7 HB On the Essence of Human Freedom
Nietzsches Philosophy Heidegger
Fink 0 485 11516 6 HB
0 485 11484 4 HB Phenomenology of Intuition and
Death and the Labyrinth: The Expression
World of Raymond Roussel Heidegger
Foucault 0 485 11515 8 HB
0 485 11336 8 HB Speech is Never Neuter
0 485 12059 3 PB Irigaray
Job: The Victim of his People 0 485 11452 9 HB
Girard 0 485 12089 5 PB
0 485 11304 X HB
Democracy Between Two
Things Hidden Since the Irigaray
Foundation of the World 0 485 11503 4 HB
Girard 0 485 12123 9 PB
0 485 11307 4 HB
The Scapegoat To Be Two
Girard Irigaray
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0 485 12120 4 PB
Violence and the Sacred
Girard The Forgetting of Air
0 485 11341 4 PB Irigaray
Deceit, Desire and the Novel 0 485 11491 7 HB
Girard 0 485 12119 0 PB
0 485 12067 4 PB Elemental Passions
To Double Business Bound: Essays Irigaray
on Literature, Mimesis and 0 485 11409 7 HB
Anthropology 0 485 12079 8 PB
Girard Thinking the Difference: For a
0 485 11343 0 HB Peaceful Revolution
Pleroma - Reading in Hegel Irigaray
Hamacher 0 485 11426 7 HB
0 485 11457 7 HB 0 485 12090 9 PB
An Ethics of Sexual Difference Beyond the Verse
Irigaray Levinas
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0 485 30070 2 PB Outside the Subject
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle Levinas
Klossowski 0 485 11412 7 HB
0 485 11440 2 HB 0 485 12097 6 PB
Explosion I Difficult Freedom: Essays on
Kofman Judaism
0 485 11458 5 HB Levinas
0 485 11379 1 HB
Explosion II Redemption and Utopia
Kofman Lowy
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Camera Obscura: Of Ideology Sex and Existence: Simone de
Kofman Beauvoirs The Sccond Sex
0 485 11490 9 HB Lundgren-Gothlin
Socrates: Fictions of a Philosopher Preface by Toril Moi
Kofman 0 485 11469 0 HB
0 485 11460 7 HB 0 485 12124 7 PB
Libidinal Economy
Nietzsche and Metaphor Lyotard
Kofman 0 485 11420 8 HB
0 485 11422 4 HB 0 485 12083 6 PB
0 485 12098 4 PB The Conflict of Interpretations:
The Philosophical Imaginary Essays in Hermeneutics I
Le Doeuff Ricoeur
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Alterity & Transcendence From Text to Action: Essays in
Levinas Hermeneutics II
0 485 11519 0 HB Ricouer
0 485 12152 2 PB 0 485 30064 8 PB
Entre Nous: Essay* on Thinking- Hegel: Contra Sociology
of-the-Other Rose
Levinas 0 485 12036 4 PB
0 485 11465 8 HB Clavis Universalis
Rossi
Proper Names 0 485 11468 2 HB
Levinas Friedrich Nietzsche: An
0 485 11466 6 HB Introduction
In the Time of the Nations Vatdmo
Levinas 0 485 11485 2 HB
0 485 11449 6 HB 0 485 12118 2 PB