FROM THE

GULF TO THE

NILE
Water Security
in an Arid Region

Peter Engelke and Howard Passell

 FROM THE

GULF TO THE

NILE
Water Security
in an Arid Region

Peter Engelke and Howard Passell

This document was produced by the Middle East Peace and Security Initiative. Established in 2012 as
a core practice area of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, the Middle East Peace and
Security Initiative brings together thought leaders and experts from the policy, business, and civil society
communities to design innovative strategies to tackle present and future challenges in the region.

ISBN: 978-1-61977-435-3

Cover photo: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual
Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic
Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this
reports conclusions.

March 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Gulf-to-Nile Freshwater Overview 3

Water Hotspots 5

Case study: Egypt, the Nile, and the Grand Ethiopian

Renaissance Dam 11

Recommendations 15

Conclusion 17

About the Authors 18

 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

INTRODUCTION
Fresh water is fundamental to human health, social Hydro-diplomacy: Given the Gulf-to-Nile regions
development, peace, and economic growth everywhere history, few would be surprised to find that water
in the world. Yet in a great many places, and for a disputes have contributed to violent conflict between
great many people, clean freshwater is scarce. Current neighboring states. Yet, there is very little evidence to
trends on both the supply and demand sides strongly substantiate this claim. Interstate violence over water in
suggest that clean freshwater availability will become the region has been the exception rather than the rule,
more challenging in more places in the future. As a as has been true elsewhere in the world. There is only
result, water will become even more important than it one case in recent historythe 1967 Six Day War, when
currently is in contributing to the degradation of social, Israel fought Egypt, Jordan, and Syriawhere water
political, and economic systems in troubled countries disputes might have helped ignite an interstate war,
around the world.1 Nowhere are these dynamics more and even then water disputes were only one part of a
evident or more important than in the Middle East much larger geopolitical explanation for the outbreak
and North Africa (MENA), where population growth of hostilities.2 Regardless, active cooperation among
and water scarcity threaten acute impacts in the states is not a given and must be built over time. For
years to come. An unreliable water supply can act as every instance of successful hydro-diplomacy, there is
an important catalyst for instability, especially when at least one example of hydro-diplomatic neglect. The
present alongside other sources of discontent and result is less effective water management overall.
unrest (such as ethnic, religious, political, or economic
stressors). Water and fragility: A more troubling portrait arises
in the context of water as a driver of societal fragility.
The threat multiplier concept, well-established in
The Gulf-to-Nile region environmental security literature, links environmental

is . . . one where water- stressors to insecurity within societies. Chronic water

scarcity or increased water variability (more frequent
related challenges are flooding or drought, or seasonal changes in river flows)
can begin to fray societal cohesion, especially where
especially salient. capable governance is missing. In extreme cases, these
conditions can lead to forced migrations or other
The Gulf-to-Nile region, a portion of the Middle East sources of instability. They can contribute to intrastate
and North Africa, is not only an area of enormous conflict through riots, tribal or ethnic clashes, and
geopolitical consequence but one where water- violence. Left unchecked, such conflict can then lead
related challenges are especially salient. This region is to the breakdown of social and political systems. As
bounded by Turkey to the north, the Gulf in the east, this essay discusses, water stress might have been a
Ethiopia and Yemen to the south, and Egypt in the contributing factor to current conflicts in the region,
west (see figure 1). including conflicts in Yemen and Syria/Iraq.3

How this region and the world respond to chronic

(and worsening) water stress may be a harbinger, for
2 For a brief overview of water and conflict in the Middle East,
good or ill, of how similar water stresses in other key including the Six Day War, see Hannu Juusola, Water Conflicts
world regions will impact societies. Speaking broadly, in the Middle East, ISN ETH Zurich October 18, 2012, http://
the Gulf-to-Nile regions aridity, combined with its www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/
Detail/?id=153761&contextid774=153761&contextid775=153757.
rapid population and economic growth plus its welter For a longer treatment of water in this conflict, see Moshe
of interstate and intrastate conflicts, mean that the Shemesh, Prelude to the Six-Day War: The Arab-Israeli
region experiences just about every type of water Struggle over Water Resources, Israel Studies 9, 3 (Fall
2004), 1-45. Shemesh concludes that water, especially Arab
security challenge possible. But the region also offers concerns over Israeli water planning, played a significant role in
some promising opportunities. For instance: escalating tensions in the years prior to the conflict.
3 The threat multiplier concept was first articulated in a 2007
CNA Corporation report: The CNA Corporation, National
Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Washington,
DC: CNA Corporation, 2007). On the general question of
1 R. Damania, M. Bazilion, S. Dahan, S. Hallegatte, I. Klytchnikova, water and intrastate conflict, including Syria, see Marcus
S. Moore, L. Nitake, D Rodriguez, J. Russ, W. Young, High and DuBois King, Water Security, in Mely Caballero-Anthony
Dry; Climate Change, Water, and the Economy, World Bank (Ed.), An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A
Group, 2016. Transnational Approach (London: Sage, 2016), 163-164.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Figure 1. Water in the Middle East, from the Gulf While most independent observers concede that
to the Nile different groups in this multi-faceted conflict have
used water as a weapon, all agree that the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has been not only the
most aggressive but the most strategic as well in using
water as an instrument of warfare.
Turkey
Water as innovation and opportunity: But water as a
stressor and as a weapon is only part of the regions
Cyprus Syria story. A more positive storyline exists as well, and it is
Lebanon
Iraq Iran
one that should be told. Several states in the region,
Palestine
Jordan
including Israel and some Gulf Cooperation Council
Israel
(GCC) states, have become known for their attempts
Kuwait
to overcome aridity challenges through innovation,
Egypt
Bahrain
technical development, and good management.
Saudi Arabia
Qatar Several now enjoy reputations as innovators through
UAE
the development and deployment of desalination
Oman technologies and smart water systems. These
countries believe, rightly, that there is a large and
growing global marketplace for such technologies, and
Sudan
Eritrea
Yemen that innovation is a key to becoming both water secure
at home and prosperous abroad.
Djibouti

Somalia
This report is a collaborative effort between the
South
Ethiopia Atlantic Council and Sandia National Laboratories
Sudan to draw greater and more focused attention to this
region and this rising problem. It includes a synopsis
of recent empirical work on Egypt, the Nile, and the
Copyright Free Vector Maps.com
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, conducted jointly
by Sandia and the Atlantic Council. More exhaustive
Water as a weapon of war: While water insecurity has findings are contained in a Sandia Labs report on
not been a direct cause of interstate warfare, water Egypt and the Nile, released in the spring of 2016.4
can be used as a weapon once war starts. Water has
been used as a weapon of war in the past, including
in recent history (shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, 4 H. Passell, M. Aamir, M. Bernard, W. Beyeler, K. Fellner, N.
Saddam Hussein drained the Mesopotamian marshes Hayden, R. Jeffers, E. Keller, L. Malczynski, M. Mitchell, E.
in southern Iraq, in order to deny his domestic Silver, V. Tidwell, D. Villa, E. Vugrin, P. Engelke, M. Burrows,
B. Keith, Integrated Human Futures Modeling in Egypt,
enemies, the cover that the marshes provided). Water Sandia Report SAND 2016-0388, 2016, Sandia National
is currently weaponized in the Iraq/Syria conflict. Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, http://prod.sandia.gov/sand_
doc/2016/160388.pdf.

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

GULF-TO-NILE FRESHWATER
OVERVIEW
Aridity is the defining environmental characteristic the world.7 On the supply side, most countries are
of the Gulf-to-Nile region, although there are some arid or semi-arid, defined as receiving less than 250
important exceptions. Table 1 illustrates the ariditys mm (9.8 inches) of rain per year. On the demand side,
extent. Of seventeen countries listed in the table, only high population growth in many parts of the region
four have enough freshwater on a per capita basis has meant that the per-capita share of water has
to exceed a water stress standard of 1,000 cubic been declining for the past fifty years, in some cases
meters per person per year (this standard, commonly dramatically.8
accepted in the literature, attempts to define a
threshold below which societies are considered at risk In a part of the world characterized by so little rainfall,
from water scarcity).5 Not coincidentally, the countries it is not surprising that there is little surface water.
with the most freshwater (the first column in table 1) However, there are several important river systems,
are riparian states with major rivers running through the most critical of which are the Nile, Tigris, and
themEgypt, Turkey, Iraq, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Euphrates rivers. (The Jordan River is also an important
Sudan. and historic freshwater source, but its volume is tiny
in comparison to these other rivers.)9 These rivers
To put the numbers from table 1 into some perspective, underscore the boom-or-bust distribution of surface
in 2014 the United States had 3,069 billion cubic water across the Gulf-to-Nile region. Of the countries
meters (BCM) of total renewable freshwater available listed in table 1 that are above the 1,000 cubic meters
from all sources, which translated to 9,538 cubic threshold, all have the Nile, Tigris, and/or Euphrates
meters per person.6 Admittedly, the United States rivers running through them. (Egypts low per capita
is a vast country with its own arid regions, so these figure, relative to the other Nile riparian states listed
numbers are not reflective of every part of the country. in the table, is a result of higher population and lower
But, averaged nationwide, the United States has some rainfall.)
fourteen times more freshwater than Turkey, the most
water-rich country in table 1; each American citizen As in other countries around the world, Gulf-to-Nile
has access to roughly 3.5 times more water relative to states have augmented their surface water supplies
each Turkish citizen. Comparing the United States with by tapping into groundwater reserves. While these
Yemen, a country that is arid, poor, and conflict-ridden, reserves can be extensive in the region, groundwater
the proportions are astonishing: the United States has extraction rates often are well above recharge rates. On
1,461 times more total freshwater and 113 times more the Arabian Peninsula, extraction rates are exceedingly
water per capita compared with Yemen. high, often over half of all water withdrawals. Rising
demand is the culprit behind this increased reliance
A 2013 study by the United Nations Development on groundwater, even in those riparian states that are
Programme (UNDP) underscored the extent of the relatively rich in surface water endowments. While
aridity challenge facing countries in the Middle East some aquifers do recharge, especially those beneath
and North Africa. Although the countries in that study or near river basins and in rainy areas, aquifers in the
do not overlap exactly with the countries analyzed region generally recharge very slowly (or, in some
in this essay, it nonetheless provides a useful recent cases, not at all) and are thus tapped well beyond
overview of how scarce fresh water is in this part of replenishment rate.10

7 The UNDP study was of the Arab Region, hence did not
5 The Falkenmark indicator is the most common measure of
include Turkey and Israel, nor Nile River riparian countries
water stress, with 1,000 cubic meters per capita, per year
except for Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan. Conversely, the
defined as the cut-off for a water-stressed society. There
UNDP study included countries not addressed in this essay:
are other indicators. See Chris White, Understanding water
Libya, Algeria, Djibouti, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Comoros,
scarcity: Definitions and measurements, Globalwaterforum.org,
and Mauritania. United Nations Development Programme,
May 7, 2012, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/
Water Governance in the Arab Region (New York, United
understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-and-measurements/
Nations Development Programme, 2013).
and Amber Brown and Marty D. Matlock, A Review of Water
Scarcity Indices and Methodologies. White Paper 106 (Tempe, 8 UNDP, Water Governance in the Arab Region, 11-12.
AZ: The Sustainability Consortium, April 2011). 9 Average annual discharge in million cubic meters: Nile, 109,500;
6 FAO, Aquastat, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/ Euphrates, 32,000; Tigris, 52,000; Jordan, 1,340. Ibid., Table 1.1, 13.
query/index.html?lang=en. 10 UNDP, Water Governance in the Arab Region, , 16-19.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Table 1. Overlap between Select Transboundary River Systems and US Geostrategic Interests

Renewable water Water resources

Population growth rate
Country resources per capita
(percent/year)
(billion m3/yr)* (m3/inhabitant/year)**

Bahrain 0.12 86.3 0.9

Egypt 58.3 699.1 2.2

Ethiopia 122 1264 2.5

Iraq 89.86 2584 3.0

Israel 1.78 227.6 1.9

Jordan 0.94 124.9 2.3

Kuwait 0.02 5.7 4.3

Lebanon 4.5 906.8 1.2

Palestinian Territories 0.84 188.7 N/A

Qatar 0.06 25.6 3.3

Saudi Arabia 2.4 81.7 2.2

South Sudan 49.5 4217 3.9

Sudan 37.8 975.1 2.1

Syria 16.8 764.1 1.7

Turkey 211.6 2790 1.2

United Arab Emirates 0.15 15.6 0.5

Yemen 2.1 84.1 2.5

Sources: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Aquastat, World Bank.
* FAO Aquastats Total renewable water resources (TRWR), meaning total renewable surface and groundwater, from all available
internal and external sources. FAO estimates this figure for some countries.
** FAO Aquastats Total renewable water resources per capita, meaning TRWR divided by number of inhabitants of the country.
*** World Bank open data, Population growth (annual %). This database does not provide statistics for the Palestinian Territories.

Nor is this sobering portrait the end of the story. rise by 50 percent by 2050, the result of increased
Rising demand and increasingly constrained supply population and economic growth. At the same time,
are projected to continue well into the future. As the authors projected that supply will decrease by 12
population growth rates are high in the region (see percent under an average climate change scenario,
table 1), and as climate change will increasingly mainly a reduction in surface water levels.11
pressure surface water sources, countries that are
currently facing water stress levels will face even
more challenges in the decades to come. To illustrate, 11 P. Droogers, Immerzeel, W. W., Terink, W., Hoogeveen,
J., Bierkens, M. F. P., van Beek, L. P. H., Debele, B., Water
a 2012 study by a team of Dutch scientists estimated resources trends in Middle East and North Africa, Hydrology
that demand for freshwater in the MENA region will and Earth System Sciences 16 (2012), 8.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

WATER HOTSPOTS
This section briefly reviews some of the water hotspots Desalination trends in the GCC are expected to
within the Gulf-to-Nile region. go nowhere but up, the result of ongoing demand-
side growth for fresh water resources. One 2013
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES study estimated that GCC countries will increase
The six Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, their production of desalinated water by 180
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United percent between 2006 and 2025 (table 2). Because
Arab Emirates) are part of the Arabian Peninsula, one desalination is extremely energy intensive, that
of the driest places on Earth. Extremely low rainfall increase will require, in turn, a 150 percent growth
less than 100 mm (3.9 inches) annuallyplus high heat in energy consumption by GCC desalination plants,
and evaporation rates mean that GCC countries have absent technical breakthroughs.16
almost no surface sources of freshwater.
The consequences are significant. Desalination
Historically, these states depended on shallow already consumes an enormous amount of energy
groundwater aquifers that were sufficiently large (and in the GCC, thus it contributes to this regions high
at accessible depths) to meet basic needs, albeit for carbon footprint. The consultancy firm Strategy&
societies that were at much smaller levels of both estimates that desalination consumes 10-25 percent
population and wealth. Starting in the 1950s, however, of power generation in the six GCC countries.17 Saudi
this equation began to change dramatically with the Arabia alone consumes around 300,000 barrels of
increasing importance of the oil-driven economy. oil daily just to run its desalination plants.18 Moreover,
To keep up with booming economic and population desalination has considerable local environmental
growth, GCC states began turning to deep groundwater impacts. Because a sizeable fraction of the worlds
aquifers and desalination to provide freshwater supply. desalination capacity is located on the shores of the
Both of those techniques required modern machinery, Gulf, the ecology of the Gulf is being transformed.
which in turn required huge energy inputs.12 Currently, Chemical and brine releases (which increase pollution
several GCC states rely on groundwater sources for levels and salinity), and water intake processes are
the bulk of their fresh water needs, but this practice having serious effects on the Gulfs ecosystems and
is unsustainable because the regions deep aquifers, its marine life.19
while enormous, cannot recharge at rates anywhere
Some of these challenges can be ameliorated through
near fast enough to replace withdrawals.13 This is one
a focus on the water-energy nexus, specifically on
reason why GCC states have turned to desalination.
using renewable energy to power desalination plants.
In 2010, the combined desalination capacity of the six
As the Arabian Peninsula is blessed with sunshine,
GCC states was almost 40 percent of the entire worlds
solar energy is a feasible (i.e., cost-competitive)
production.14 Desalinated water is thus increasingly
option for powering desalination plants, and indeed
important; it now meets about a quarter of Omans
several GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the
fresh water needs, half of Saudi Arabias, and an
United Arab Emirates (UAE), have ambitious plans for
astonishing 87 percent of Qatars.15
large-scale renewable-powered desalination plants.20
But even a wholesale shift to renewable energy would
address only one of the water security challenges
12 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), facing the GCC. Doing so would leave other challenges
Desalination in the GCC: The History, the Present & the Future unmet, including the fact that the Gulfs ecology
(The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
[GCC], General Secretariat, 2014), 10-12.
would continue to erode even under an all-renewables
13 Omar Saif, Toufic Mezher, and Hassan A. Arafat estimate that scenario.
GCC states are all using hundreds to thousands times more
water than sustainable recharge would allow. See Omar
16 Derived from Fath, Sadik, and Mezher 2013, 163.
Saif, Toufic Mezher, and Hassan A. Arafat, Water security in
the GCC countries: challenges and opportunities, Journal of 17 Strategy&, Achieving a Sustainable Water Sector in the GCC:
Environmental Studies and Sciences 4 (2014), 329. Managing Supply and Demand, Building Institutions, Strategy&,
2014, 7.
14 Hassan Fath, Ashraf Sadik, and Toufic Mezher, Present and future
trend in the production and energy consumption of desalinated 18 Ferroukhi et al. 2016, 83.
water in GCC countries, International Journal of Thermal and 19 Saif et al., Water security in the GCC countries: challenges and
Environmental Engineering 5, 2 (2013), Figure 2, 156. opportunities, 331, 334-335.
15 Rabia Ferroukhi et al., Renewable Energy Market Analysis: The 20 Ferroukhi et al., 2016, 43-87. (Page 85 has reference to Saudi
GCC Region, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2016, 79. Arabia/UAE plans.)

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Table 2. Desalination Forecast in the GCC

2025 desalination 2025 GWh energy

2006 desalination 2006 energy
forecast requirement
Country production (Million requirement for
(Million cubic forecast for
cubic meters / day) desalination (GWh)
meters / day) desalination (GWh)
Saudi Arabia 9.1 23 48,391 119,111
United Arab Emirates 6.7 17.5 64,762 145,412
Kuwait 1.3 6 10,143 50,604
Qatar 1.2 3.2 14,516 32,625
Oman 0.8 3.1 5,471 12,150
Bahrain 0.8 2.8 8,772 22,225
Total GCC 19.9 55.6 152,055 382,127
Volume Increase
35.7 Mm3/day 230,072 GWh
2006-2025
Percent Increase
179 percent 151 percent
2006-2025
Source: Adapted from Fath, Sadik, and Mezher, 2013, 163.

Experts point to the need not only to increase future estimate concluded that customers in Saudi Arabia
supply, but also to decrease future water demand. pay around three cents per cubic meter for water that
Strategies for reducing demand include reducing high costs the government around $10.00 per cubic meter
subsidies for energy and water, which now result in to provide), the political backlash in Saudi Arabia has
consumers paying far below the true cost of water been severe, driven by outraged customers used to
production, emphasizing water conservation through paying very low fees for this critical resource.22
public awareness campaigns, and relying more on
water recycling.21 ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS
The most pleasantly surprising storyline in the
Over the past few years, Saudi Arabia, the most
Gulf-to-Nile region involves Israel and its neighbors.
populous GCC state, has taken steps in this direction.
Although this troubled part of the world has been
For decades, Saudi Arabias water policies focused
beset by occasional discord over water, the trend has
on expanding water supply through groundwater
been toward successful hydro-diplomacy, technical
extraction, desalination of seawater from the Gulf
progress, and innovation.
and Red Sea, and construction of water infrastructure
(irrigation systems, etc.). All of this was enabled Israels status as a regional water hub is a critical part
by the kingdoms incredible oil abundance and its of this success. Water security has been a feature
resulting cheap energy. However, this equation has of Israeli identity since the countrys founding in
recently shifted. Saudi officials, sensitive to both 1948.23 Through decades of dedicated effort, Israel
falling oil prices (which have dramatically reduced has transformed from a country facing chronic water
state revenues from oil exports) and increasing water stresses to one that is water secure, the result of a
constraints, have begun taking action to reduce water combination of factors. Since 1959, Israel has codified
demand and shift supply to recycled water. Of these,
by far the most controversial has been a reduction
22 Stella Thomas, Water security requires the removal of
in Saudi Arabias generous water subsidy, a decision subsidies, The Source, February 29, 2016, http://www.
motivated in part to stimulate efficiency gains and in thesourcemagazine.org/water-security-requires-the-
part to save billions in public revenue. Although based removal-of-subsidies/; Glen Carey and Zaid Sabah, Saudi
King fires water minister after complaints over tariffs,
on sound economic and environmental principles (one Bloomberg, April 24, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-04-24/saudi-king-fires-water-minister-after-
21 Strategy&, Achieving a Sustainable Water Sector in the GCC: complaints-over-tariffs.
Managing Supply and Demand, Building Institutions, 7-12; Saif 23 The observations in this paragraph are taken from Seth Siegel,
et al., Water security in the GCC countries: challenges and Let There Be Water: Israels Solution for a Water-Starved World
opportunities, 344. (New York: St. Martins Press, 2015), esp. chapters 1-2, 4-7.

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

into law the principle that all water in Israel is public

property to be managed by the state. This approach Israels actions, since
has worked because the state has, as a matter of
empirical fact, proven to be a competent manager of
its founding in 1948,
the nations water. Among other things, the Israeli state have turned the country
planned, built, and runs the National Water Carrier,
which transfers water from the (relatively) water-
into a regional water
rich northeast to the arid south, enabling economic powerhouse.
development and human settlement in the southern
parts of the country. Over the same period, Israeli
scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs also focused Israels actions, since its founding in 1948, have turned
on disruptive water technology development, ranging the country into a regional water powerhouse. The
from drip irrigation to wastewater reuse to plant same cannot be said for two of its neighbors, Jordan
breeding to desalination technologies. After successful and the Palestinian territories, both of which face
experimentation, Israelis have scaled these water- more challenging water conditions than Israel. While
saving or -generating technologies to the point where relations among these three parties have a long and
they could contribute meaningfully to the countrys often tortured history, water scarcity has not led to
water security. For example, Israel now desalinates overt conflict between them. On the contrary, while
some 500 million gallons (1.9 million cubic meters) of transboundary water has been a contested issue, more
water every day, adding that quantity to the nations often it has proven to be a source of cooperation.
freshwater mix. The result not only has been a dramatic
As one might expect, cooperation has been greater
increase in the amount of water available for Israeli use
between Jordan and Israel than between the
(and available for export to Israels neighbors), it also
Palestinian territories and Israel. Tacit hydro-diplomacy
has helped delink Israels water supply from natural
between Jordan and Israel began even before the
variation, in particular drought cycles.
two countries signed the 1994 Peace Treaty. After
Israel has become a global leader in the development the treaty, these states established a formal, standing
of water technologies. A long-standing emphasis on process (the Joint Water Committee) to institutionalize
technical accomplishment in the water space has their bilateral hydro-diplomacy. Under the treaty, both
cultivated a deep bench of water expertise within sides agreed to find ways to augment Jordans water
Israel. Some of these experts have taken advantage supplies, a situation that resulted in more technical
of Israels innovative culture to begin building a water- cooperation between them (and the actual transfer
tech, start-up subculture. Aided by government policy of water to Jordan from Israel). Israels evolution
designed to turn Israel into a knowledge economy into a desalination powerhouse, which has eased the
powerhouse, Israeli entrepreneurs have been working supply side, has helped defuse tensions over water
on everything from biotech-based wastewater between these countries, facilitating water-sharing
treatment technologies to water-smart household agreements.25
appliances to sensor-based water management
Yet despite progress, Jordans situation remains
systems. While such technologies will contribute to
tenuous. Jordan is poorer than Israel, its natural water
Israels water security, they are increasingly viewed as
supply is more constrained, and it now has to provide
important commercial exports.24
water for perhaps a million Syrian refugees who have
taken up residence in the country just over the past
few years.26 One hopeful solution is the so-called Red
24 Amanda Little, Israels Water Ninja, Bloomberg, January 8, Sea-Dead Sea project. Under the Red-Dead plan,
2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2015-01-08/
takadu-helps-israel-be-a-most-efficient-water-manager;
William Booth, Middle East: Israel knows water technology, 25 A review of this history is provided in Ram Aviram, David Katz,
and it wants to cash in, Washington Post, October 25, and Deborah Shmueli, Desalination as a game-changer in
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ transboundary hydro-politics, Water Policy 16 (2014), 609-624.
israel-knows-water-technology-and-it-wants-to-cash- See also Naama Teschner, Yaakov Garb, and Jouni Paavola,
in/2013/10/25/7bb1dd36-3cc5-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story. The role of technology in policy dynamics: the case of
html. International business rankings often place Israel at desalination in Israel, Environmental Policy and Governance 23
the top of the MENA region, in part due to the strength (2013), 91-103; Eran Feitelson and Gad Rosenthal, Desalination,
of its entrepreneurial start-up culture. See Peter Engelke, space and power: the ramifications of Israels changing water
Brainstorming the Gulf: Innovation and the Knowledge geography, Geoforum 43 (2012), 272-284.
Economy in the GCC, Atlantic Council, March 2015, Table 26 Michael Tiboris, Jordans water woes are a wellspring of
2, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/ Mideast strife, National Interest, December 11, 2015, http://
brainstorming-the-gulf-innovation-innovation-and-the- nationalinterest.org/feature/jordans-water-woes-are-
knowledge-economy-in-the-gcc. wellspring-mideast-strife-14579?page=2.

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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Figure 2. Map of Tigris and Euphrates rivers, including watersheds

Turkey

Iran

Syria

Euphrates

Tigris
Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia
Source: Wikimedia.

seawater will be drawn from Jordans Red Sea coast Jordan and Israel are the Red-Dead plans two major
and desalinated, with the fresh water shipped a short players, negotiations have included the Palestinian
distance for use in southern Israel, Jordan, and the Authority. The plan is thus an example of how hydro-
Palestinian Authority; and the brine shipped to the diplomacy and transboundary water engineering can
salty Dead Sea as a means of refilling that shrinking lead to cooperation and mutual interdependence.27
lake. Hydroelectricity generation will benefit these
countries, as the water flows from the higher coastal
location to the Dead Sea (which is below sea level).
Under this plan, Israel will send fresh water from 27 Siegel, 2015, 186-189. In the same chapter, Siegel discusses
more ambitious ideas involving how water might lead to much
its resources in the north to Jordan, near Jordans deeper regional cooperation among all three parties (Israel,
population centers, specifically Amman. Although Jordan, and the Palestinians); especially 190-195.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

TURKEY, IRAQ, SYRIA In addition, in the past few years, the conflicts in Iraq
As is true of the Nile and Jordan rivers, both the and Syria have placed both the Tigris and Euphrates
Tigris and Euphrates rivers have enormous historic under even greater stress. Recent scholarship has
importance. As in Egypt, the fertile land that these two documented the extent to which water has been
riverbeds created, along with the rivers water, gave weaponized in these conflicts. Combatants (especially
rise to ancient civilizations. Today, these rivers continue the Islamic State) have attempted to leverage their
to provide much of the water for the countries they control of water sources to fund their activities; flooded
traverse, especially Turkey, Iraq, and Syria (see figure 2). (or threatened to flood) downstream communities as a
form of control, eviction, or intimidation; and diverted
As in other parts of the Gulf-to-Nile region, when it river water to impede their enemies movements. As
comes to water, the stressors along the Euphrates an example, in August 2014 the Islamic State seized
and Tigris are more on the demand side than on the Mosul Dam, upstream of the city of Mosul, Iraq.
the supply side. The combined effects of population Perhaps motivated by fear that the Islamic State might
growth, intensive use of the river for agricultural, breach the dam and flood the entire city, US-supported
industrial, municipal and other purposes (leading to Iraqi and Kurdish troops swiftly retook the dam after
heavy pollution), and intensive dam-building have led heavy fighting.30
to a dramatic reduction in the flow of the Euphrates
(through water withdrawals and consumption) and a As the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are not over, their full
significant worsening of its water quality.28 effects on the rivers are not yet known. A long stretch
of the Euphrates remains smack in the middle of the
conflict between ISIS and other state and non-state
[T]he stressors along the combatants. The resulting breakdown of state control

Euphrates and Tigris are over stretches of the Euphrates River, especially
in Syria, and the breakdown of normal diplomatic
more on the demand side relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, makes the
governance challenge particularly acute.
than on the supply side.
YEMEN
The root problem facing both rivers lies in the fact that Yemen is one of the most water-insecure countries
the region has a limited history of interstate cooperation in the world. The average Yemeni has access to only
on transboundary river systems. Tri-partite talks over 86 cubic meters of water annually. On the supply
water management have occurred periodically in past side, Yemen receives only 167 mm (6.6 inches) of
decades, and Turkey has unilaterally agreed to send rainfall per year (by comparison, Israel, also an
500 cubic meters per second downstream to the arid country, receives about 2.5 times as much).31
Turkey-Syria border. However, there is no parallel to Historically, Yemenis have managed to thrive despite
the long-standing hydro-diplomacy that has existed these conditions through appropriate farming choices
for decades between Israel and Jordan over the and inventive methods of capturing rainwater.
Jordan River. There has been no consistent platform
for water-sharing talks among all three states and But over the past half century, increasing demand
little willingness to build the diplomatic infrastructure has upended Yemens delicate water balance. There
leading to long-term interstate governance. Each of are two main culprits. The first is population growth:
the three countries historically has used the rivers first Yemens population has grown from about five million
for their own purposes, with effects on other users a in 1960 to over 26 million today, and its current high
distant second on their list of priorities. For example, growth rate (about 2.5 percent per year) guarantees
over thirty dams have been built on the Euphrates strong population increases well into the future.32
during just the past half century. The inevitable results The second is khat, a thirsty plant whose leaves are
are widespread pollution and a significant reduction used as a narcotic and to which many Yemenis are
in the rivers flow (estimated at a 40-45 percent
reduction in flow since 1970).29 30 For a comprehensive read on the conflict and water, see Marcus
DuBois King, The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,
28 United Nations Environment Programme, Vulnerability Washington Quarterly 38, 4 (Winter 2016), especially 155-158.
Assessment of Freshwater Resources to Climate Change: 31 World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.
Implications for Shared Water Resources in the West Asia worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.PRCP.MM. Israel receives 435
Region (United Nations Environment Programme, 2012), 71. millimeters (17 inches) annually.
29 M. Nouar Shamout with Glada Lahn, The Euphrates in Crisis: 32 World Bank, World Development Indicators,
Channels of Cooperation for a Threatened River. Research http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.
Paper (London: Chatham House, April 2015), 2-4. aspx?source=2&country=YEM&series=&period=.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

addicted. Khat production in Yemen has expanded external observers point to the need for better water
over the past several decades to the point where the governance in Yemen, in particular to building state
crop now consumes a significant share of the countrys capacity to regulate water extraction (illegal drilling is
groundwater. As khat production in Yemen is highly a major problem), improving monitoring capabilities,
profitable and controlled by political and military investing in water conservation and efficiency, and
elites, there are few incentives to switch to less thirsty delivering water to disaffected populations in Sanaa
crops such as coffee.33 Since the 1970s, Yemenis have and elsewhere. And all agree that Yemens production
resorted to groundwater extraction as a way to find of khat must be reduced if the country is to have any
new sources of supply to meet rising demand, but that chance at sustainable water consumption.35
is an unsustainable practicegroundwater extraction
in Yemen is far greater than aquifer recharge, as is true But improving water governance in Yemen is far easier
in other parts of the Gulf-to-Nile region and especially said than done. Yemen is not just a poor country but
on the Arabian Peninsula.34 one being ripped apart by sectarian and ethnic conflict.
Water has become a destabilizer within Yemen, where
Solutions for Yemen are difficult, if not impossible. water scarcity leads to displacement of rural people
Desalination is not a realistic option, given its high and clashes over scarce water. Yemens government
cost relative to natural sources of fresh water. As has estimated that as many as four thousand people
Sanaa, the nations capital and largest city, sits inland die each year through violence related to water
and well above sea level (2,250 meters or 7,382 feet), scarcity. For many outside observers who worry that
the cost of desalinating seawater plus pumping the Sanaa will become the worlds first capital city to
desalinated water to the city almost certainly would be completely run out of water (sometime during the
prohibitively expensive. Instead of technical solutions, 2020s), the nightmare scenario is abandonment of the
city altogether.36
33 Adam Heffez, How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry: Farming Qat,
Wasting Water, Foreign Affairs Special Collection: The Green
Book, May 9, 2014, 101-102. 35 Heffez 2014; Craig Giesecke, Yemens Water Crisis: Review
34 James Fergusson, Yemen Is Tearing Itself Apart Over of background and potential solutions, (Washington: USAID
Water, Newsweek, January 20, 2015, http://www.newsweek. Knowledge Services Center, June 15, 2012), 5-6.
com/2015/01/30/al-qaida-plans-its-next-move-yemen-300782.html. 36 Heffez 2014; Fergusson 2015.

10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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CASE STUDY
EGYPT, THE NILE, AND THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN
RENAISSANCE DAM37
The Nile Basin is one of the worlds most important downstream to Egypt, and on the size of the dam and
transboundary river basins.37 For thousands of years, thus of its reservoir.
Nile waters have brought life and prosperity to peoples
living along its edges. Egyptian civilization has been In partnership with the Atlantic Council, researchers at
the most closely bound to the Nile (in 440 BCE, the Sandia National Laboratories set out to evaluate the
Greek historian Herodotus famously quipped that hydrological impacts of the dam and various other
Egypt was the gift of the river).38 Until very recently, dynamics that might occur if the dam is completed at
there has been little competition for the lower Niles the size referenced above. Sandia used five modeling
water. In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement, brokered platforms to simulate hydrology, agriculture, economy,
with Britain, allocated 4 billion cubic meters of water human ecology, and human behavior. The effort was
(BCM) per year of the Niles flow to Sudan, 48 BCM per not aimed at making predictions, but rather to better
year to Egypt, and none to any of todays other nine understand how potential hydrological impacts
riparian states. In 1959, the Nile Waters Treaty further might ripple through other sectors of society and the
codified a similar distribution. But in the decades since, economy.
other riparian nations have begun to demand what
The most important result was that the dams effect
they claim as their fair share of the water, which they
on Egypts long-term impact on lower Nile water level
hope to use for badly needed economic development
is likely to be small, when compared with the effect
and human welfare.
of projected population and economic growth on
The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance demand for water. According to the models, Egypts
Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, the main tributary to the growth dynamics are the main reasons why it is likely
Nile, represents one of the first challenges to Egyptian to face long-term water scarcity, regardless of whether
influence over the Nile waters. If finished, the dam will the GERD is built or not. Filling the GERD reservoir
be massive, storing 63 BCM of water in its reservoir at slow rates (e.g., over eight to thirteen years) will
(roughly equal to a full years flow from the Blue Nile) mitigate shorter-term risks for agricultural and energy
and producing 6,000 megawatts of hydroelectric production in Egypt, but over the longer run, the
power for Ethiopia and (possibly) neighboring states. GERDs effects will be minor compared with demand-
side pressures on the Nile.
The scale of the dam and disagreement over its
planning and execution has meant that, in recent Sandias modelers also explored the possible impacts
years, the GERD has become a source of contestation if the Egyptian populace came to see the GERD as
between Egypt and Ethiopia. Within Egypt, the project a contributing factor for water and food scarcities or
has raised fears that Nile River water supply will be economic difficulty. In this case, building the dam could
reduced, which in turn will negatively impact the trigger unwelcome developments, such as internal
countrys agricultural production, food availability, social unrest or grievances directed outward toward
economic productivity, public health, and overall Ethiopia. Although not tested in the model, increased
well-being. Much of this anxiety is focused on the diplomatic tension between these two countries could
multi-year period during which the GERD reservoir threaten a constructive relationship between Egypt
will be filled, which will reduce the flow of the Nile and Ethiopia that is vital to maintaining stability and
security within the region.

To conduct their analysis, Sandia scientists ran five

37 Much of this section is revised material taken from Passell et al.,
Integrated Human Futures Modeling in Egypt.
models, summarized as follows:
38 In The History of Herodotus, Book II, Herodotus wrote: For
any one who sees Egypt, without having heard a word about HYDROLOGY
it before, must perceive, if he has only common powers of
observation, that the Egypt to which the Greeks go in their Researchers evaluated the GERDs impact on water
ships is an acquired country, the gift of the river. See: http:// storage in Egypts Lake Nasser (the reservoir above
classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.2.ii.html.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Figure 3. The Nile River Basin and the Grand of food production in Egypt to 2050 has no significant
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam correlation with the GERD fill rate.39

WATER-AGRICULTURE-FOOD SYSTEM
Sandia scientists were also interested in understanding
resilience in Egypts water-agriculture-food system,
which faces a range of significant challenges. These
challenges include a growing population, high
dependence on food imports, widespread subsistence
farming, and potential constraints on long-term Nile
River water supply, including from the GERD. High
food imports make economic sense when global
supplies are plentiful and prices are low, but Egypts
dependence on imports makes it vulnerable to price
shocks. Subsistence farming makes up a significant
fraction of Egypts agricultural output, with about
a quarter of Egypts wheat not only grown but also
consumed in rural areas.

Modeling showed that increased ground water

extraction for farming could provide a short-term
option for dealing with supply shortages. But drilling
wells represents a non-sustainable policy, as Egypts
aquifers do not recharge. A second option, improving
Source: The Geopolitical Impact of the Nile, Stratfor Global
Intelligence, 2012. Photo is republished with permission of Stratfor.
agricultural water efficiency, is expensive in the short
https://www.stratfor.com/video/geopolitical-impact-nile. term but can pay big dividends over the long term
assuming water supply becomes scarcer. To have any
the Aswan High Dam) and changes to Egyptian significant impact, the bulk of Egypts farms would
agricultural production. have to adopt these water practices, representing an
enormous scaling problem. Finally, increasing food
Results showed that filling the GERD reservoir should imports will likely be more expensive than aquifer
have an important short-term impact on water supply drilling but cheaper than developing more efficient
(figure 4) and food production in Egypt, depending on agricultural practices. However, increasing food
the fill rate and precipitation patterns. Food production import dependency deepens exposure to global food
could be reduced by about 25 percent in a worst-case markets, representing a form of risk when global food
scenario between 2020 and 2023. prices spike.
But the model also showed that demandfrom
projected Egyptian population and economic growth ECONOMY
will have a much more significant long-term impact Sandias researchers explored how the Egyptian
on Nile water supply. Lake Nasser could be drained to economy might respond to reduced Nile flow by
its dead storage level (meaning a water level below modeling the effect of reduced flow on employment,
the dams outlets, thus accessible only by pumping) government spending, and commodity prices.
sometime between 2025 and 2030, even if the GERD
Results showed that reduced Nile River flow did not
is never finished. Building the GERD might accelerate
produce sharp declines in health or food availability, at
that process by up to five years.
least up to a certain point. Beyond that point, however,
Projected water shortage will have a significant impact the model predicted a sharp decline in conditions
on Egyptian food production over the long term, with a large negative impact on the population.
mostly from increasing demand and not from building Modelers estimated that the threshold value was in the
the GERD. The fill rate for the GERD does not have neighborhood of 30 percent Nile River flow reduction.
important impact over the long term, but slower fill
rates will help with short-term impacts. The overall loss 39 The modeling in this section is described comprehensively in
D.L. Villa, V.C. Tidwell, H.D. Passell, and B.L. Roberts, Applying
the World Water and Agriculture Model to Filling Scenarios
for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sandia Report
SAND2016-11187, 2016.

12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

Figure 4. Modeled Lake Nasser storage, 2000-2050, under various future consumption and climate scenarios

180
LTA No GERD

LTA 10%
160
Climate Bounds No GERD
Climate Bounds GERD 10%
140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

The solid red line represents the projected storage in Lake Nasser assuming long-term average (based on
1912-1997 records) temperature and precipitation data repeated annually from 2000 to 2050. The scenario
also includes a composite of projected UN population growth rates and historical World Bank data and
projections from 1960 to 2100. The precipitous decline from 2000 to 2026 occurs because of projected
increases in withdrawals from the lake to meet the resulting increases in consumption. Those increases
in consumption are due to projected increases in population in Egypt coupled with projected economic
growth, which drives higher water consumption. By 2026, the lake reaches its dead poolwhich is water
below the level of the dam intakes and accessible only with pumping.

The dashed red line shows how the filling of the GERDs reservoir would hasten the decline of the lake level.
In this scenario, 10 percent of the Blue Niles discharge is diverted annually into the reservoir. At this filling
rate, the lake reaches its dead pool about five years earlier.

The green lines show the projected decline in lake levels given the same population and economic
projections with modeled climate data replacing long-term average data. Climate data were obtained from
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5).
CMIP5 results come from a range of climate change scenarios and project an upper bound (the upper green
line) and a lower bound (the lower green line) to the effect on Lake Nasser. These projections capture the
inter-annual variability inherent in hydrological systems. In general, CMIP5 results project increased rainfall
in the Blue Nile Basin, and so occasional spikes in rainfall increase the storage, but continued pressure from
population growth and economic development consistently brings the lake level back to the dead pool.

The blue lines show the projected decline in lake levels from CMIP5 given all the same assumptions but with
the 10 percent annual diversion from the Blue Nile to the GERD reservoir. Again, what is noteworthy is that
the difference is very small between the green lines, without the GERD, and the blue lines, with the GERD.
Interestingly, the modeling that includes CMIP5 climate data only projects a one- to two-year difference in
the time it takes the lake to decline to its dead pool in comparison to the five-year difference using long-term
averages. This, along with the spikes in storage in the following years, suggest that Lake Nasser storage will

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 13
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

be very sensitive to climate variability, and that filling schedules for the GERD reservoir should vary with
the climate if Lake Nasser storage levelsand Egyptian water sustainabilityare going to be considered.

Projections for future population growth, economic development, and climate variability all contain
uncertainty. Figure 4 shows the results from one simulation created from one set of possible values for
future population growth, economic development, and climate. Even with this uncertainty, models like these
are valuable for better understanding the possible ranges of future dynamics.
This summary is paraphrased from: H. Passell, M. Aamir, M. Bernard, W. Beyeler, K. Fellner, N. Hayden, R. Jeffers, E. Keller, L.
Malczynski, M. Mitchell, E. Silver, V. Tidwell, D. Villa, E. Vugrin, P. Engelke, M. Burrows, B. Keith,. Integrated Human Futures
Modeling in Egypt, Sandia Report SAND 2016-0388, 2016, http://prod.sandia.gov/sand_doc/2016/160388.pdf.

In Egypt, that threshold value could be different, but a long period of gradual improvement in conditions,
the important point is that a threshold may exist, and contributed to the unrest that occurred in Egypt after
policy makers should not assume a linear relationship 2008.
between river flow and impact on Egyptian society.
SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT
This models chain of causality was: reduced river
Sandia researchers modeled how Egyptians might
water availability to Egyptian agriculture reduces
react to lower Nile River water, and whom they might
food production, which produces higher food prices
blame for itthe Ethiopian government, the Egyptian
and reduced household food consumption, which
government, or any other actor.
negatively impacts health. However, model results
suggest that an increase in subsidies could offset the The modeling showed that building the GERD likely
effects of reduced food production. will have a socio-political impact within Egypt,
specifically the potential for social unrest. It showed
HUMAN ECOLOGY that the highest potential for unrest is likely to occur
Sandias Human Resilience Index (HRI) tests the well after the GERD reservoir is filled, with Nile water
hypothesis that human ecological conditions can be levels remaining low. Under this modeling scenario,
directly linked to a countrys security, stability, and the population would realize that blaming conditions
resilience, as well as its ability to rebound from shocks. on the dam was misplaced, thus increasing their
Shocks, such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, refugee resentment toward the government. The government
migrations, economic failures, or ethnic clashes can might be able to deflect discontent outward toward
degrade societies. In a society with strong resilience, the GERD and, by extension, Ethiopia, but only for a
shocks can be absorbed and the society can return period of time.
relatively quickly to normal. In a society with poor
resilience, shocks may cause wide oscillations leading Perhaps the best way to prevent unrest is to reduce the
to extreme conditions including instability, violence, importance of the GERD on the popular imagination.
and conflict. According to the model, Egyptians would see and
feel the impacts of a shorter GERD filling period
Sandias HRI modeling shows that the human more intensely. A longer filling period, in contrast,
ecological condition in Egypt was among the lowest might enable governments in both countries to adjust
in the MENA region in the early 1960s but climbed expectations over a longer period. Robust diplomacy
steadily into the twenty-first century. Moreover, Egypt between Egypt and Ethiopia could be an effective
is one of the few countries in the region that shows means for accomplishing this outcome.
a relatively stable HRI projection into the future. This
projection is a result of dynamic relationships between In summary, Sandias modeling indicates that the
population growth, population density, caloric intake, GERDs contribution to the real material challenges
and freshwater availability that are projected into the facing Egypt is likely to be much smaller than stresses
future. arising from other factors. However, building the
GERD will stress the country and might contribute to
Egypts steady increase in HRI value suggests economic, social, and political turbulence within Egypt.
increasing resilience in Egypt until 2008, although The good news is that timely government actions in
the political and social turmoil in that country since Egypt and between Egypt and Ethiopia can offset that
then indicates less resilience. It is possible that sudden impact.
price shocks for food and energy, coming after such

14 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A recent and widely cited World Bank report asserts And, over time, they fill with sediment, becoming less
that there are three broad technical responses that can useful for water storage.
mitigate water shocks under a changing climate.40 All
three can play crucial roles in relieving water stress and Unfortunately, increasing supply by these means
preserving prosperity and peace anywhere, including is costly in terms of money, energy, and in some
within the Gulf-to-Nile region. They are (1) increasing cases pollution. It is not an accident that the regions
the supply of water, (2) improving water efficiency, wealthiest countries rely on desalination, which is
and (3) enhancing resilience. not a panacea even under the best circumstances.
Desalination is like an alchemy that turns energy into
INCREASE SUPPLY fresh water, and is a reasonable strategy for providing
drinking water when energy is cheap. But without
Numerous technologies exist for increasing water
dramatic technological improvements, desalinations
supply in the Gulf-to-Nile region.41 Desalination in Israel
high cost precludes its use in agriculture. Also, the
and in the GCC is already playing an important role
concentrated brine produced by desalination destroys
in meeting fresh water demand. But desalination is
coastal ecologies if not disposed of carefully and at
not the only option. Wastewater recycling increases
considerable expense.
water supply (for example, recycling water that is
used at sewage treatment plants). If combined with
anaerobic digesters, recycled water can generate The cheapest way to
energy (methane) for electricity generation for use
by the plant itself. The waste sludge in turn can be conserve water . . . is not to
used as a fertilizer. However, capital costs are high, a
constraint that is especially problematic in poor cities
use it in the first place.
and countries where waste water treatment may be
rudimentary.42
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY
Improving the efficiency of water use is often a cost-
Large dams and reservoirs harness river flows and effective way to relieve stress on water sources. The
dampen the impact of seasonal droughts and floods. cheapest way to conserve water, as the saying goes,
And, as with the GERD, big dams generate massive is not to use it in the first place.
electrical power. However, these dams have their
drawbacks: they require big financing, often displace Most efficiency efforts require fiscal incentives and
people (who then must migrate elsewhere), and disrupt effective government oversight and management.
riparian ecosystems through changing water flow, Public water ministries and agencies can provide
quality, and temperature. Large reservoirs, especially leadership if they create the incentives and provide the
at lower elevations and in hot, arid environments (as funding to line irrigation canals and ditches (to prevent
with Egypts Lake Nasser) lose water to evaporation. leakage of water into the soil), cover open ditches to
prevent evaporation, apply advanced technologies
40 R. Damania, M. Bazilion, S. Dahan, S. Hallegatte, I. Klytchnikova, to improve irrigation efficiency (for example, drip
S. Moore, L. Nitake, D Rodriguez, J. Russ, W. Young, High and irrigation techniques), shift some agriculture to
Dry; Climate Change, Water, and the Economy.
controlled environments (greenhouses), and change
41 Unless otherwise noted, water conservation technologies and
approaches throughout the concluding section are drawn crops toward less water-intensive types. In wealthier
from the World Bank paper cited above plus the following parts of the region, cities can implement household-
sources: K. Brooks, P. Folliott, and J. Magner, Hydrology and scale and commercial-scale efforts.
the Management of Watersheds (Ames, Iowa: Wiley-Blackwell,
2013); A. Vickers, Water Use and Conservation (Amherst,
MA: WaterPlow Press, 2); M. Falkenmark, and J. Rockstrom, Water pricing schemes are important. Progressive
Balancing Water for Humans and Nature; The New Approach in water pricing keeps water costs low for small users
Ecohydrology (London: Earthscan, 2004); S. Solomon, Water and the poor, but raises prices for large users. Water
(New York: Harper Collins, 2010); United Nations World Water
Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water markets, which are still poorly developed or absent
Development Report , 2015: Water for a Sustainable World. within the region, allow buyers and sellers to trade
Paris, France. water. Putting a price on water that reflects the true
42 G. Tchobanoglous, H. Stensel, R. Tsuchihashi, and F. Burton,
Wastewater Engineering; Treatment and Resource Recovery,
cost of production allows water utilities to recover
Fifth Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2013) ; David their investment. It also reduces demand through
Mara, Domestic Wastewater Treatment in Developing Countries efficiency gains.
(London: Earthscan, 2004).

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 15
FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

However, higher water pricing schemes are almost All river basins in the Gulf-to-Nile region face this
always controversial. The most basic reason is that dilemma, with weak governance regimes the norm
water is seen as a human right.43 For this reason, even rather than the exception.
where most people can afford to pay the true cost of
water provision, the removal of water subsidies can ENHANCE RESILIENCE
generate significant consumer backlash. While floods and droughts are natural phenomena that
introduce variability into hydrological systems, global
Saudi Arabia provides an example of how one country
climate change is exacerbating that natural variability.
in the region is attempting these two strategies of
Increasing the resilience of systems in the absence of
developing new sources and improving efficiencies. For
climate change has been an important objective and
decades, the kingdoms aggressive expansion of deep
will become increasingly important as climate change
groundwater extraction and construction of desalination
progresses.
plants served the countrys needs. But that era is coming
rapidly to a close, stimulated in large part by the Saudi Resilience is the ability of a system to suffer shocks
governments realization that it can no longer afford without significant loss of function, which can be
the high financial costs. Over the past couple years, it defined in terms of three capacities: absorptive,
has formulated ambitious plans to provide alternative adaptive, and restorative.46
sources of water (such as reuse of urban wastewater)
and to reduce demand through shifting away from water- Absorptive capacity refers to how easily a system
intensive crops and other policies. (Unbelievably, for can absorb impacts and deal with the consequences.
decades Saudi Arabia has subsidized wheat production; In terms of water security, to improve a systems
wheat is a thirsty crop unsuited for desert conditions.) absorptive capacity would mean increasing water
The governments recent decision to reduce its generous storage, strengthening water delivery and treatment
water subsidies, hence to increase the price of water for systems, introducing redundancy into the system
consumers, has proven to be highly controversial despite (e.g., building backup water delivery systems in case
its economic logic.44 of disaster), and segregating water systems so that if
one part of the system collapses, other parts of the
Improved efficiency is also a governance issue. system can continue to function.47 Increasing storage
As is true throughout this region, there are few refers to building dams and reservoirs, which can
transboundary river basins with strong management capture flood water and allow that water to be used
regimes in place. Fewer than half of the worlds during dry periods. Creating and protecting wetlands
transboundary basins have effective treaties governing is even better in that it both reduces and disperses
their use, and many that do exist are insufficient to floods while at the same time delivering other benefits
the management challenges at hand. River basin like water purification, fisheries protection, and wildlife
agreements often exclude important riparian states, conservation. However, all these strategies require
do not address the full range of water use and institutional support and investment, and many
management challenges in the basin, lack robust interventions can be expensive.
implementation mechanisms, do little or nothing to
address sub-national water stresses (an important Adaptive capacity refers to whether, and how fast, a
source of conflict over water), or do not possess the system can be reorganized after disruption occurs. In
capacity to deal with sudden and unforeseen changes the water space, examples include rerouting water (for
in water flow (as in the case of extended drought).45 example, inter-basin transfers), post-disaster water
conservation, and even rationing.48

43 On water as a human right, see Ken Conca, The United States Restorative capacity refers to the capacity of
and International Water Policy, The Journal of Environment a system to repair itself. In the water space, an
Development, June 2008, http://jed.sagepub.com/ example is construction of advance warning and
content/17/3/215, 225-226.
monitoring systems that allow water managers to
44 Thomas, 2015; Saeed Haider, Saudi Arabia aims at 100
percent wastewater reuse by 2025, Al Arabiya English, brace for disasters and other disruptions.49 But such
February 19, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/
technology/2015/02/19/Saudi-Arabia-aims-at-100-percent-
wastewater-reuse-by-2025.html; Sara Jerome, Saudi Arabia
sets sights on 100% wastewater reuse, Water Online, March 25,
46 B. Biringer, E. Vugrin, and D. Warren, Critical Infrastructure
2015, http://www.wateronline.com/doc/saudi-arabia-sets-sites-
System Security and Resiliency (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).
on-wastewater-reuse-0001.
47 Ibid.
45 For a general discussion of transboundary water regimes, see
Ken Conca, Decoupling Water and Violent Conflict, Issues in 48 Ibid.
Science and Technology, Fall 2012, 39-48. 49 Ibid.

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 FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

interventions also require large financing, sound There are very few countries in the Gulf-to-Nile
planning, and foresight. region in such a position. This is the good news,
meaning there is significant demand-side room for
Arguably, the greatest form of resilience is through improvement. While there are many ways to increase
reducing demand. A system requiring lower amounts water-use efficiency through technical interventions
of a resource can be more resilient to variations in (detailed above), the greatest long-term threat to
supply, at least up to a point. At extreme levels of resilience in the Gulf-to-Nile region is not the variability
resource efficiency, systems can become no more of the hydrological system, nor even the impacts of
efficient without painful interventions, a situation climate change, but is rather the impacts of increasing
known as hardening of demand.50 The waste in population and increasing resource consumption.
the system that can be painlessly cut out has been
eliminated, and further decreases threaten to break it.

50 C. Howe and C. Goemans, Manager to Manager The Simple

Analytics of Demand Hardening, Journal of the American
Water Works Association 99, 2007, (10): 24-25.

CONCLUSION
Much of the Gulf-to-Nile region is already water to be optimistic. Some countries in the regionIsrael
insecure. Unfortunately, in the decades to come many if is onemanage to conserve water while enjoying a
not most countries in the region will face even greater buoyant economy at the same time. Realizing water
challenges with respect to their water supplies. On efficiency gains across the region will depend on
the supply side, climate change will introduce greater whether other countries can afford the technical
turbulence into the regions hydrological cycles, with upgrades that water-efficient countries such as Israel
uncertain and possibly grave consequences. On the use, whether those countries can create the political
demand side, growtheconomic and demographic will to make the necessary policy decisions and invest
will continue to pressure already stressed water in the water management structures that are needed
supplies. High population growth is a core driver of to pull off what is essentially a governance problem.
increasing demand around the world and across the
Gulf-to-Nile region. Suggestions to slow population The most important and ultimately effective resiliency
growth over time are contentious for many reasons strategy is to find a way to decouple demand for
but should be included in any rational discussion water from economic and population growth. As
of resource policy.51 The same is true for economic water has no substitute, finding ways to reduce high
growth, which normally proceeds in tandem with consumption levels while maintaining human welfare
increased water use. Perhaps the biggest question and quality of life is a massive and difficult challenge,
facing the region is whether countries can realize but essential if countries around the region are to
economic gains, given increasing populations, realize good economic fortune and political stability.52
without higher water consumption? Although this is
52 See, e.g., Fischer-Kowalski, M., M. Swilling, E. von Weizsacker, Y.
an exceedingly difficult challenge, there are reasons Ren, Y. Moriguchi, W. Crane, F Kruasmann, N. Eisenmenger, S.
Giljum, R. Hennicke, R. Lankao, and A. Siriban Manalang. 2011.
Decoupling Natural Resource Use and Environmental Impacts
51 See, e.g., J. Guillebaud, Voluntary Family Planning to Minimise from Economic Growth. A Report of the Working Group on
and Mitigate Climate Change, BMJ, May 20, 2016, 353: i2102, Decoupling to the International Resource Panel. United Nations
http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2102, accessed Environment Program. ISBN: 978-92-807-3167-5. http://www.
6/1/2016. See also numerous publications from the United unep.org/resourcepanel/decoupling/files/pdf/Decoupling_
Nations Population Fund, http://www.unfpa.org/publications. Report_English.pdf. Accessed 6/1/2016.

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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Peter Engelke is a Senior Fellow within the Atlantic Councils Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security. His work involves assessing global trends, connecting them to current
challenges, and designing strategic responses for policymakers and thought leaders around
the world. His diverse portfolio includes topics ranging from grand strategy to regional
futures to natural resources and urbanization. Previously, Dr. Engelke was a visiting fellow at
the Stimson Center. Formerly, he was on the research faculty at the Georgia Tech Research
Institute, where he co-authored his first book, Health and Community Design. His second
book (The Great Acceleration, 2016), is a global environmental history since 1945. Dr. Engelke
is a former Bosch Fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart, Germany. He holds
a Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University and is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetowns
School of Continuing Studies. Dr. Engelke currently is residing in Geneva, Switzerland.

Howard Passell works in the Strategic Futures and Systems Analysis Group at Sandia
National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His work focuses on emerging national
security issues associated with water, energy, food, ecosystems, climate, and population,
with an emphasis on the relationships between resource scarcity and human security. Over
the years his work has included resource monitoring, modeling, management, capacity
building, and policy-related projects at various scales in the US, Central Asia, the Middle
East, and North Africa. He teaches as an adjunct professor in the Water Resources Program
at the University of New Mexico. His undergraduate studies were in classical literature and
the liberal arts at St. Johns College in Santa Fe, NM. He earned his masters and doctorate
degrees in conservation biology and hydrogeoecology at the University of New Mexico.

18 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 Atlantic Council Board of Directors

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