Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state 1821-1878 “This book has a double emphasis: It examines the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent Romanian national state, and it discusses the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both a protector and a menace. In the early nineteenth century the centers of Romanian political life were the Danubian Principalities of ‘Moldavia and Wallachia, which were both under Ottoman rule but which had separate, autonomous administrations. Although welcoming Russian aid against the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian leadership at the same time feared that the Russian government would use its military power to establish a firm control over the Principalities or would annex Romanian lands, as indeed occurred in 1812, Here this difficult relationship is examined in detail as it developed during the century in connection with the major events leading to the international acceptance of Romanian independence in 1878. The con- flicts that arose in this period, in particular the issues of political domination and the possession of Bessarabia, have remained disturbing elements in the relations of the two statesRussia and the formation of the Romanian national state 1821-1878 BARBARA JELAVICH Ld CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE MELBOURNE SYDNEY‘The Pit Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK +40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Austealia Ruizde Ataredn 13,2804 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001 South Africa hupuiwww.cambridgeore (© Cambridge University Press 1984 ‘This bookiisin copyright Subject to statutory exception and tothe provisions of relevant colletve licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1984 First paperback edition 2004 A catalogue record for this book i availale from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Jelvich, Barbara, 1923, Russia and the formation ofthe Romanian national state, 1921-1878, Bibliography: p. 1. Romania ~Polities and government ~ 1821-1866 2. Romania ~Poites and government ~ 1866-1914, 3. Romania ~ Foreign relations ~Soviet Union. 4, Soviet Union — Foreign relations -Romenia. I. Title DR242.J44 1984 949,801 82-23578 ISBN 0521 25318 7 hardback ISBN 0821 52251 X paperbackContents List of maps and illustrations Preface Introduction: The establishment of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities I 0 m1 ‘The Russian protectorate ‘Toward a Russian protectorate: the Greek revolution, Tudor ‘Viadimirescu, and the Russo-Turkish War ‘The protectorate established ‘The resistance to the protectorate: the national opposition and the revolutions of 1848 ‘The protectorate renewed, 1849-1854 ‘The Romanian emigration ‘The Crimean War ‘The European guardianship ‘The Romanian question at the Paris conference : the double ‘The implementation of the congress decisio lection of Alexander Cuza ‘The Cuza era, 1859-1866 ‘The recognition of the double election The administrative and legislative union of the Principalities Revolutionary Europe The Dedicated Monasteries page vii 16 a 3 39 50. 58 35 6 66 p 101 102 109 122 130Contents ‘The coup d'état of 1864 The overthrow of Cuza IV Prince Charles, 1866-1871 ‘The provisional government “The accession of a foreign prince ‘The first years of Charles's reign, 1866-1869 The erisis of 1870-1871 V Prince Charles, 1871-1878: the Eastern crisis The Catargiu government: the first period ‘The St, Petersburg agency ‘The commercial conventions ‘The first phase of the Eastern crisis: Romanian neutrality ‘Toward a Russian agreement War and independence “The Congress of Berlin ‘The implementation of the Treaty of Berlin Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index ue 146 153 153 164 "9 198 215 215 21g ea 227 ag 259 217 286 292 gor 385 346Maps and illustrations Mars ‘The Ottoman Balkans, 1815, page 18 ‘The Danubian Principalities, 1859 99 Between pages 148 & 149 ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAP Alexander Guza Prince Charles Nicholas T Alexander II ‘A contemporary American map of the military operations in the summer of 1877. viiPreface ‘The purpose of this narrative is twofold: on the one hand, to examine the role played by tsarist Russia in the formation of an independent Romanian state, and on the other, to study the reaction of a Balkan nationality to the influence of a neighboring great power that was both a protector and a menace. The period of emphasis is the years from 1821, when a revolt with both Romanian and Greck leadership oc- curred in the Danubian Principalities, to 1878, when Romanian inde- pendence was accepted by the powers in the Treaty of Berlin. All of the events pertaining to Russian-Romanian relations do not receive equal attention; the weight is placed on those episodes that were crucial to the formation of the modern Romanian state and its leadership: the establishment of the Russian protectorate, the revolution of 1848, the reorganization of the Principalities after 1856, the double election of Alexander Cuza and his subsequent unification of the administrations and legislatures of the Principalities, the advent of Charles of Hohen- zollern-Sigmaringen in 1866, and, finally, the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878. ‘The relationship of Russia and the Romanian Principalities involved far more than the issues common in diplomatic history. The conserva- tive nature of Russian autocracy and the basically liberal stance of the Romanian national leadership after 1848 made political ideology a major cause of friction. The Russian government was always deeply concerned about the political institutions established in the Principali- ties. In addition, two related questions, the revolutionary movements and the status of Orthodox institutions, played a major role in the mu- tual relationship. The Russian government throughout the nineteenth century was repeatedly troubled by the fact that the Principalities were a center of revolutionary agitation, both national and liberal,Preface which involved dangers for Russian interests. At the same time Russian officials watched diligently over the interests of the Orthodox church not only in the Romanian lands, but throughout the Balkans. The pro- tection of Orthodoxy was regarded as a religious duty as well as a good policy for the securing of Russian influence in the peninsula. Less attention is devoted to economic and social issues, except as they relate to diplomatic, political, and ideological questions. In the period under study Russia and the Principalities had parallel, but not com- petitive, economies. Both were agricultural, and large estates worked by peasant labor prevailed. Their social structures were also similar. In both, the landed aristocracy held absolute social, economic, and po- litical preponderance. The Romanian peasants were enserfed until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Russian until the 1860s. That decade witnessed land reforms in both areas. The large estates were divided, with a part of the land given to the peasants in return for re- demption payments. Because both regions were exporters of grain, there was some limited competition for markets between Russian and Romanian producers, but this condition never caused major conflicts like those that arose, for instance, between Romania and the Habsburg Monarchy over similar issues. Both governments were in theory under autocratic rule, either by tsar orbysultan, In fact, in each the predominating influence was exerted by landowners or those connected with landed interests. As the nine- teenth century progressed, other educated groups in both societies ~ the government officials, army officers, merchants, lawyers, writers, and teachers - played an ever-increasing role in politics. Because neither re- gion had an industrial economy, workers and capitalists, with their unique interests and problems, had little influence. In the Principalities, where commerce tended to be in the hands of those of a non-Romanian background, including Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Germans, busi nessmen were not major participants in political life, although there were important exceptions. In both Russia and the Principalities the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of the population, was effectively excluded from political affairs. They had almost as little actual repre- sentation under the Romanian constitutional system as under the Rus- sian autocratic institutions. In terms of power, whether political or military, Russia and the Prin- cipalities were entirely unequal. By the beginning of the eighteenth century Russia wasa great European power with a vast national territory and a strong army; the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and ‘Wallachia were weak states under Ottoman control. However, although they were a part of this Muslim empire, they did enjoy, at least in theory, xPreface certain rights that separated them from the rest of the sultan’s domains. In contrast to other Balkan lands, they were never Turkish pashaliks. ‘Thus Ottoman administrators did not directly govern Romanian lands. Instead the Principalities were entrusted to native princes, often called hospodars in the diplomatic correspondence of the day. Their power in turn rested on the support of a native aristocracy, the boyars, who con- trolled local administration. Despite the fact that they enjoyed internal autonomy, the Principalities were under Ottoman jurisdiction as far as foreign policy and military matters were concerned. In their relation. ship with the Porte (a term regularly used in diplomatic correspondence, along with Sublime Porte, to refer to the Ottoman government), the position of the provinces varied over time. A low point was reached in the eighteenth century. In addition to submitting to the suzerain powers of the sultan, the Principalities were required to pay a large tribute as well ascertain taxesand gifts, and the Ottoman authorities had the right of preemption over Romanian agricultural products. Constantinople in the eighteenth century was provisioned from these rich lands. ‘This narrative deals mainly with events in Moldavia and Wallachia. Although a predominantly Romanian population lived in Transylvania and Bukovina, under Habsburg rule, and in Bessarabia, under Russian control after 1812, the affairs of these regions only marginally affected Russian relations with the Romanian political center, that is, with the Danubian Principalities. Therefore developments in these areas are discussed only as they became important in international relations or played a major role in the Romanian national movement. At this time both Russia and the Principalities, as Orthodox states, used the Julian rather than the Gregorian calendar. Therefore double dates are usually given. It is, unfortunately, at times difficult to deter- mine which system was used in a particular document. A Russian or Romanian writing from Paris, for instance, might employ either style. When doubt exists, the date on the document cited is used. Otherwise, all single dates are in the new style. Some difficulties are also to be encountered in the spelling of proper names, Many Russian and Romanian diplomats, for instance, used French versions of their names. In this text the form that is in common use today has generally been adopted. Some first names have been anglicized; others remain in their national spelling. Geographic place names are usually in the form commonly used in diplomatic histories and in the documentation. It is thus, for instance, Jassy, not Iasi, and Plevna, not Pleven. A completely standard and uniform system is an impossibility. ‘This narrative is based primarily on Russian and Romanian diplo-Preface matic documentation, material that is listed in the Bibliography. Be- cause of the great amount of writing on diplomatic history and in particular on the “Eastern Question,” that is, on the international con- troversies caused by the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the notes are of necessity limited to a citation of documents and the major works in Rus- sian and Romanian used in the preparation of this book. Only some of the many valuable works in other languages have been included. Similar limitations have been placed on the Bibliography. The author wishes to thank Professors Keith Hitchins, University of Illinois; Frederick Kellogg, University of Arizona; and Paul E, Michel- son, Huntington College, for their comments on the manuscript. Her husband, Charles Jelavich, as usual, had a major part in the preparation of the book. She would also like to acknowledge her deep gratitude for the assistance given her in her research in the archives and libraries in Romania. As before, she would like to thank Serge Giers for allowing her to use the papers of his grandfather. The preparation of this study ‘was aided immensely by a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies, which allowed the author the time necessary for research and writing, and by research grants from the Office of Research and Advanced Studies, Indiana University, which covered, in particular, copying and microfilm expenses. ‘The author is also indebted to Debbie Chase, who typed the final ‘manuscript; to Lin Maria Riotto, who prepared the index; and especially to Janis Bolster, whose expert editorial comments added much to the final text.Prince CharlesNicholas I Alexander 11‘A contemporary American map of the military operations in the summer of 1817. F.V. Greene, Report on the Russian Army and its Campaigus in Turkey #8 1877-1878: Atlas (New York: Appleton, 1879)-Introduction: the establishment of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities Dd Although Russian influence over poli not become firmly established until the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774, Russian actions were already playing an important role in their internal development at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The main direction of the policy of Peter the Great was toward the Baltic rather than the Black Sea, but he had early in his career also shown an interest in expansion southward toward the Black Sea and, in particu- Jar, in the acquisition of Azov. The entire question of Russian rela- tions with the Ottoman Empire became especially acute when in 1709, after his defeat at Poltava, Charles XII of Sweden fied to Constanti- nople and there, with French assistance, attempted to stir the Porte into action. His efforts met with success, and in 1711 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia. Within the Principalities the Russian victory over the Swedish king made a deep impression. The temptation was strong to enter into rela: tions with the Russian court in an attempt to break the Ottoman control over the Principalities. Accordingly, both Constantine Brincoveanu, the prince of Wallachia, and Dimitrie Cantemir, the ruler of Moldavia, opened negotiations with Peter. In April 1711 Cantemir and Peter con- cluded the Treaty of Luck. This pact of mutual assistance placed Moldavia under Russian political control; the terms stated that Cante- mir, the boyars, and all of the Romanian population would henceforth be considered the Russian ruler’s faithful subjects. Other sections of the treaty guaranteed Cantemir’s personal and political future, Engaged in a struggle with the boyars, the prince used his Russian connection to strengthen his own position. The terms of the treaty thus declared that “all the state power will rest in the hands of the prince,” that the no-Introduction nd the subject population should submit to his orders, and that the cities should be regarded as “his own property.” Should the new allies lose the war, Cantemir was to emigrate to Russia, where he and his family would be supported in a proper manner by the Russian treasury! After a similar understanding had been reached with Brincoveanu, Peter launched in June 1711 an ambitious Balkan campaign. In a pat- tern that was to be standard feature of Russian policy during the next two centuries, he called upon the Ottoman Balkan Christians to rise in his support. The Russian armies crossed the Pruth River and ad- vanced as far as Jassy. Although Cantemir fulfilled his alliance obliga- tions, Brincoveanu remained passive. In July, when the Russian troops ‘were surrounded, Peter was forced to make a treaty with the Ottoman Empire that contained highly unfavorable terms. Cantemir, who was placed in a dangerous situation, left with the Russian army, He sub- sequently lived in St. Petersburg, where he pursued a highly productive ferary career. In accordance with the promises in the previous treaty, he received from the Russian government fifty villages and fifty thousand serfs, together with two houses in the Russian capital. His family and his descendants were subsequently to hold prominent positions in Rus- sian service, Brincoveann remained on the Wallachian throne until 1714, when he and his four sons were executed for suspected treasonous relations with the Habsburg Monarchy ‘The Russian defeat had enormous political consequences for the Principalities and resulted in a severe restriction of their autono- mous position. Since the Ottoman government no longer trusted the native boyars, it henceforth appointed the princes only from among the ranks of the Phanariot Greeks. This group derived its name from the Phanar, or Lighthouse, district of Constantinople, which was not only the residence of the Orthodox patriarch, but also the home of many Greek or Hellenized families who had come to be closely associated with the Ottoman administration. Although those of Greek background predominated, some were of Italian, Romanian, or other ancestry. Often extremely wealthy, they had won their power and riches through thei service to the Porte and through exploiting the economic opportunities to be gained by this association. Since at this time the highest positions in the Ottoman administration went to those with the money to pur- chase them, the Phanariot Greeks were in an advantageous situation. For over a century they were thus able to control some of the major posts in the Principalities. They were also deeply involved in other as- pects of Ottoman foreign affairs and internal administration.Introduction ‘The Phanariot period is usually pictured as the worst in modern Romanian history. Although the Porte did not divide the Romanian lands into pashaliks or send in regular troops to occupy the land, it did place the provinces under extreme fiscal pressure. Undergoing a century of internal economic decline, domestic political chaos, and repeated defeat on the battlefield, the Ottoman government regarded the relatively rich Principalities as excellent sources of tax revenues and food supplies for the army and the population of Constantinople. The Phanariot princes became the agents of the Porte for the collection of these prizes. Some were indeed responsible for important reforms, but the majority represented the interests of the central government more than those of the people whom they ruled. This situation also resulted from the conditions under which they governed. Themselves the victims of the Ottoman system, the Phanariot princes held office but a short time, They thus did not have the opportunity to become closely ac- ‘quainted with or to identify their interests with those of the Principali- ties, although they often became large property owners in the region. Naturally, the native boyars, belonging to the formerly dominating class, deeply resented the power and influence of the new princes, de- spite the fact that they usually cooperated closely with them. The temp- tation for certain groups of boyars to look for assistance to foreign courts, in particular Vienna and St. Petersburg, was accordingly strong. After the defeat of Peter, the Habsburg Monarchy stood in the fore- front of the European powers from whom dissident boyars might expect aid against the Porte, Some of these men were willing to accept Habsburg suzerainty over the Principalities as long as the boyar domi nation of local government was retained. In 1718, when Austria gained Oltenia and the Banat in the Treaty of Passarowitz, they were able to experience the consequences of Habsburg rule directly. At first the region wasallowed a measure of autonomy, with boyar control retained. ‘The administration was in the hands of a council under the ban, or gov- ernor, George Cantacuzino. However, at this time the Austrian court had other objectives in mind for Oltenia, With the intention of convert- ing the new possession into a major grain-producing area to supply the imperial army, the Habsburg officials were more interested in establish- ing a centralized, efficient administration than in protecting the interests, of the Romanian aristocrats. The introduction of imperial institutions both reduced the political power of the boyars and increased the obli- gations of the peasants who worked the land. Habsburg rule thus lost much of its attraction as an alternative to Ottoman suzerainty. More- over, throughout the century the Habsburg government was especiallyIntroduction interested in expansion directly southward into the lands of the western. half of the Balkan peninsula. It therefore had less need to win the sup- port of, or to make promises to, the Romanian leadership. In contrast to the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian government recognized the prime strategic importance of the Romanian lands in its continuing struggle with the Porte. Throughout the period of this narrative the Russian leaders, tsars and officials alike, were fully aware of the role that the Principalities would play in their conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, both as staging areas for campaigns against Constan- tinople and as a source of agricultural supplies for the army. In 1736 the continuing Russian pressure against the Khanate of the Crimea, an Ottoman tributary state, and the lands north of the Black Sea led to the outbreak of further hostilities. Austria joined the conflict in 1737 Al- though the initial Russian campaign was conducted in the steppe zone and the Crimea, in 1739 an army under the command of General Miin- nich entered Jassy. The Moldavian boyars once again welcomed foreign intervention, but their hopes were disappointed. First, Austria was forced to make a peace in September 1739 in which it surrendered most of the gains of the Treaty of Passarowitz, including Oltenia. The Rus- sian government, after signing a similar agreement, withdrew from the Romanian lands and kept finally only the city of Azov. For the next thirty years, from 1739 to 1768, the Principalities enjoyed a period of peace. At this time, during the reigns of Constantine Mavrocordat in both Wallachia and Moldavia, reforms were introduced in both prin- cipalities. Since the measures affected the privileged position of the boyars, in particular their relations with the peasants, this group be came even more hostile to the Phanariot princes and more willing to look abroad for assistance against the Ottoman-sponsored regime. With the accession of Catherine the Great in 1752, Russian policy became more adventurous and aggressive, especially in regard to Poland and the Ottoman lands north of the Black Sea. In 1768 the Porte de- clared war as a result of Russian encroachments in Poland, and once more Russian armies entered the Principalities. At the same time a fleet wwas sent from the Baltic to the eastern Mediterranean to challenge the Ottoman navy. Since the Russian forces were almost uniformly victori- ous, the hopes of the native boyars were again high. The political status they preferred was the establishment of two independent principalities, but under the protection of one or more of the great powers ~ Russia, Austria, or even Prussia. The question of annexation by Russia, with the maintenance of internal autonomy, although discussed, was an unrealistic alternative. All of the European states at this time were extremely apprehensive about the Russian intentions. In fact, the 4Introduction ‘Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774, which brought peace, was con- cluded under great-power pressure to prevent Russia from making even wider gains at Ottoman expense. The first partition of Poland, in 1772, was arranged in part as a diversion to hinder Catherine from making further demands on the Porte. Even with these limitations, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was a major triumph for Russia, and it is a landmark in the Russian ad- vance to the south and west. Its terms gave Russia lands between the Bug and the Dnieper rivers, formerly in the possession of the Khanate of the Crimea. The latter state was declared independent, a condition that left it open to eventual Russian annexation. Russia also gained important commercial privileges. Its ships were allowed the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, which had previously been closed to non-Ottoman shipping, and through the Straits into the Mediterranean. ‘The Russian government could now appoint consuls in Ottoman cities, and it was to enjoy commercial rights there similar to those which had been previously granted to France and Britain. In the highly con- troversial Article 7 Russia received what was later interpreted by its diplomats as the right to speak in behalf of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire. The presence of Russian shipping in the Black Sea and the official representation in Jassy and Bucharest were, of course, to be of great significance for the future, but even more impor- tant was Article 16, which related directly to the Principalities and gave Russia the right to oversee Romanian internal life. Of the ten points, the most significant was the last, which stated: “The Porte like- Wise permits that, according as circumstances of the two principalities ‘may require, the ministers of the Imperial Gourt of Russia ... may speak in their favor, and promises to listen to them with the attention that is due to friendly and respected Powers.”* In other sections of this article the Ottoman government granted amnesty to those who fought with Russia, gave assurances of tax relief, allowed those who wished to emigrate to Russia to do so, and agreed in no way to obstruct the free exercise of religion or the building and repairing of churches. The princes were also permitted to send official representatives to Constan- tinople to defend their interests. Although this treaty brought undoubted benefits to the Principali ties, Moldavia in the same period was forced to accept the Habsburg Monarchy’s annexation of Bukovina, which was claimed as a reward for theoretical services rendered in the conclusion of the peace. Unable to hinder the cession, because of its military vulnerability, the Porte accepted the action in 1775. ‘The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, in officially recognizing Russian 5Introduction rights of intervention, gave the great northern power a major voice in all subsequent political changes in the PrincipalitiesS In the ensuing years the Russian statesmen made full use of their privileges, both to extend Romanian autonomous rights and also to tie the provinces closer to their interests. With Russian encouragement the Porte next proceeded to make a series of declarations and agreements that defined the obligations of the Principalities to the Porte and gave certain politi- cal guarantees. The most important of these were the Hatti Sherif of 1774, the Sened of 1783, and the Hatti Sherif of 1784. In these the pay- ments due the Porte from the provinces received closer definition, and the already existing exclusion of Muslims as residents or property owners in the Principalities was reconfirmed. Russian influence was also strengthened. The Porte agreed that the princes were not to be removed arbitrarily and that depositions would be carried out only in agreement with Russia, When the Porte in 1786 dismissed Alexander Mavrocordat in Moldavia without consulting St. Petersburg, the Rus- sian representative in Constantinople immediately protested the action as a violation of treaties, In addition to the strengthening of its position in the Principalities, the Russian government was concerned with exploiting other gains made in the treaty. In 1779 the Treaty of Ainali Kavak, which was fol- lowed by another agreement in 1783, gave Russia additional commer- ial rights. Much attention was directed toward developing the newly annexed territory, including the Crimea, which became a part of the Russian Empire in 1783. Colonists were brought in not only from Russia, but from other lands, in particular from the German states. Efforts were also made to build up Russian naval power; Kherson be- came the major base, and construction of a Black Sea fleet was begun. ‘The Russian colonization of the former Ottoman lands and the estab- lishment of a naval presence in the Black Sea profoundly altered the power balance in the area. Despite the enormous gains of the previous years, Catherine was not content. As long as Maria Theresa remained empress of Austria, Catherine could not tempt her into an alliance aimed at further ad- vances at the expense of the Porte. After Maria Theresa's death, when Joseph II proved casier to influence, the Russian empress proceeded to propose nothing less than the full partition of the Ottoman posses sions in Europe, as well as the distribution of some of the Asiatic lands of the sultan, In an exchange of letters in 1782 Joseph and Catherine agreed upon a division: Austria was to obtain Oltenia, a part of Serbia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina; Istria and Dalmatia, then in Venetian pos- session, were also assigned to Vienna, with their former owner re- 6Introduction ceiving compensation with Crete, Cyprus, and the Peloponnesus. France, which had yet to be approached with the scheme, was allowed Syria and Egypt. The Russian share was to be the largest of all. Two areas, the lands between the Bug and Dniester rivers and territory in the Caucasus, were to be annexed directly. Two puppet kingdoms were then to be established. The first, a revived Greek-Byzantine state, was to include Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Greek territories. Catherine's grandson, Constantine, was the intended ruler, but with the provision that the state should never be united with Russia. The second kingdom, composed of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, was to be named Dacia and placed under an Orthodox prince. It was rumored that Cath- erine's favorite, Gregory Potemkin, who had done a great deal to build up southern Russia, was a possible candidate. Obviously such wide aims could be achieved only after a crushing military victory. In September 1787 Russia again went to war with the Porte; Austria joined in February 1788. Both governments sent armies into the Principalities. Russian war aims in this campaign were set in November 1787. Despite Catherine’s ambitious schemes, the principal objective was the acquisition of the land between the Bug and the Dniester. The establishment of an independent buffer state, comprising Wallachia and Moldavia, was also foreseen. ‘The war, how- ever, did not proceed as expected. The allies found their efforts dis- tracted by the subsequent events in Western Europe connected with the French Revolution; Austria was compelled to make peace in Au- gust 1791 because of the dangers in that region. Moreover, in the Previous year Joseph 11 had died; his successor, Leopold 1, was more cautious. Events were also not proceeding well for the Russian government. Although the gifted general Alexander Vasil'evich Suvorov was able to win impressive victories in the Principalities, the international sit- vation became increasingly unfavorable for Russia. In 1788 Sweden declared war, an action that prevented the sending of a Russian fleet to the Mediterranean. In addition, the attitude of the other great pow- ers to the Russian efforts was becoming increasingly hostile. Therefore, in the Treaty of Jassy, concluded in 1792, the Russian government contented itself with the acquisition of the territory between the Bug and the Dniester. This agreement, like those preceding, had a great significance for the Principalities. Russia was now a neighbor of Mol- davia. Moreover, Article 4 stated that the Porte would abide by the provisions of the previous agreement, and the arrangements concern- ing taxes, emigration, and amnesty were reaffirmed.® ‘The Porte was, of course, well aware of the dangers of the increasing 7Introduction Russian rights in regard to the Principalities. The Ottoman officials had also witnessed the dubious loyalties of the Romanian boyars, In 1792 and 1793 attempts were made to win the support of this group by a series of declarations and promises concerning the provinces and their unique privileges. Unfortunately for the Porte, the internal weak- ness of the state and the continuing pressure of the great powers lim- ited its ability to assure a stable and acceptable administration. In fact, during the rule of Constantine Hangerli, prince of Wallachia from 1797 t0 1799, Phanariot rule probably reached its lowest point. Not only was the Porte unable to retain the loyalty of its Romanian sub- jects, but Russian interference continued unabated. Although a period of relative tranquility followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Jassy, Catherine did not abandon her previous objec- tives in regard to the Principalities. The primary Russian attention, however, was focused on the Polish question and the conclusion of the final partitions of 1793 and 1795. From 1792 to 1796 the Russian agents in the Principalities concentrated their efforts on winning adherents among the boyar families and maintaining and consolidating their predominant influence.’ At this time the center of Russian activities wwas Jassy, where the consulate-general was located. ‘The Russian officials were particularly concerned with assuring that the princes were in their camp. In this endeavor they soon faced com- petition, not only from the Porte, but from France. Although Sultan Selim II wished to maintain the peace, he also continued the tradi- tional Ottoman policy of close ties with France. Deeply concerned about his military weakness, he embarked upon a period of military reform for which he depended on French advisers and support. From their advantageous position in Constantinople, the French diplomats wished to extend their influence into the Principalities. In 1796 a temporary agent was dispatched to Bucharest; in 1797 regular representatives were appointed for the Principalities. They joined the Russian agents, who had held office since 1782, and the Austrians, who arrived in 1783; British representation was not established until 1803. From the Rus- sian viewpoint, the French presence introduced a disturbing element. Like their Russian colleagues, the French consuls attempted to play be- tween the factions in Romanian politics and to set up their own party of clients and supporters. ‘The French actions caused annoyance and anxiety in St. Petersburg for other reasons too. The Russian government was well aware that the French agents in the Principalities could keep a close eye on Rus- sian military preparations across the border. French advisers to the sultan were involved in the strengthening of the Ottoman fortifications 8Introduction in the area, in particular the strongholds of Bender, Ismail, and Akker- man, The Polish situation was also @ consideration. With the defeat of the national forces, bands of Polish rebels crossed into Moldavia. Not only were these groups ferociously anti-Russian, but they also formed a center for the dissemination of French revolutionary ideas and propaganda. The Russian officials feared their possible influence within Russia and the role that they could play in support of France in this strategically sensitive area. Because of these additional considerations the Russian government continued to keep a close watch on Romanian affairs; it remained par- ticularly concerned about the attitude of the princes and the possible attraction of France for them. These apprehensions led the Russian dip- Iomats to insist on the replacement in 1795, of the prince of Moldavia, Michael Sutu, with Alexander Callimachi, who henceforth acted in the Russian interest. Similarly, in 1796 in Wallachia, Alexander Mo- rruzi was replaced by the apparently more ardent Russian partisan Al- exander Ipsilanti Despite the declared aim of good relations with the Porte, Catherine began diplomatic preparations for a more active policy. In an agree- ment negotiated in 1794, Austria and Russia decided that the Prin- ipalities should be united to form an independent state under Russian control. In 1795 Britain adhered to this pact; a favorable attitude could also be expected from Prussia. Further Russian campaigns against the Porte, however, were hindered by the death of Catherine in 1795. Her son and successor, Paul, reacted against what he considered the overly aggressive and expansionistic activities of his mother. He preferred an accommodation with the Porte to further territorial gains at Otto- man expense. Adopting a policy of maintaining the empire, rather than partitioning it among the powers, he sought to establish Russia in- stead of France as the government with the principal influence in the sultan’s councils. Russian political predominance in Constantinople and the support of the territorial integrity of the empire were to be- come henceforth a standard alternative policy for the Russian diplomats should a program of partition seem unfeasible or dangerous. In the 1790s European diplomacy was dominated by the ambitious schemes of Napoleon, The Russian position in Constantinople was immensely strengthened when in 1798 Napoleon launched an attack on Egypt; on the way he picked up the Ottoman possessions of the Tonian Islands and Malta. France, not Russia, had become the princi- pal danger to the Porte. In September 1798, for the frst time, a Russian ficet sailed through the Bosphorus and anchored outside Constanti- nople’ An alliance agreement negotiated in 1799 contained a secret 9Introduction clause permitting the Russian fleet to pass freely in and out of the Straits; Britain subsequently adhered to this treaty. A joint Russian~ Ottoman operation was next launched against the French-held Ionian Islands, which quickly fell before this assault. Since Russia was an ally of the Ottoman Empire and a supporter of its territorial integrity, Russian officials in the Principalities of necessity adopted a passive policy. Even during the unfortunate period of Hangerli’s rule, when conditions were extremely bad, no move was made in the Romanian interest. In March 1801 Paul was murdered; he was succeeded by his son, Alexander I. At the end of his reign Paul was in the process of break- ing with his allies and entering into negotiations with France. His successor, while not pursuing this policy, did favor a position of neu- trality. In October Russia made peace with France, and in the follow- ing year Britain and the Ottoman Empire reached similar agreements with Paris. The Porte was to be spared further fighting until 1806. During this period a bitter battle for supreme influence was fought out in Constantinople among the representatives of Russia, France, and Britain. Undergoing a process of internal dissolution that was ac- companied by the rise of strong local military leaders, the Porte tended to follow the dictates of the power that appeared to have the greatest military resources at the moment. Meanwhile, the attention of Europe had shifted from the Near East and Mediterranean to Central Europe, where the great battles for Continental predominance were being fought, For Russia too the main concerns centered on Europe proper. How- ever, its government continued to pursue certain definite aims in the Principalities. Following a policy of expansion in Georgia and the settlement of the southern steppelands, the Russian government wished to assure that a stable situation existed in the region and that friendly regimes held power in the Principalities. French activity, in particular, continued to cause concern. The blocking of foreign intrigues and the winning of as many partisans as possible from among the Romanian boyars remained standard Russian objectives. The annexation of the Principalities, or their reduction to the position of Russian vassals, also continued to be considered. From 1796 to 1801, as we have seen, Russian activities remained cir- cumscribed, After this date new considerations led to a change of policy. By this time the Porte had lost control over large sections of its lands in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and North Africa to local notables, the ayans, who organized their own military forces, set up personal regimes in their districts, and successfully defied the central authority.Introduction Unable to assemble the military force needed to subdue these rebels, the Otloman government attempted to pit one against another. Pas vanoglu Osman Pasha, with his center in the city of Vidin, was among the most successful of the ayans. He was able to organize a dangerous band of bandits, political dissenters, and rebellious janissaries. Usually at odds with the central government, he fed and paid his followers by organizing raids on the surrounding Bulgarian, Serbian, and Wal- Jachian lands, His actions were particularly devastating for Wallachia, which had no local force of sufficient strength to counter these attacks. Boyars, peasants, merchants, and clerics alike were forced to flee to ‘Transylvania, Some boyars favored calling in Russian troops, since the Ottoman army could not handle the situation. Although the ques- tion was a matter of negotiation between Russia and the Porte, the latter naturally hesitated to accept Russian military aid that might lead to a further weakening of Ottoman control in the Principalities Nevertheless, the Russian government was able to use the oppor- tunity to increase its treaty rights. Under Russian pressure the Otto- man Empire in 1802 issued a hatti sherif that confirmed the former privileges and immunities of the Principalities and offered further advantages both to the inhabitants and to the Russian government. ‘The term of office of the prince was set at seven years; he could not be deposed unless he was proved guilty of a crime and then only with Rus- sian concurrence. Article 4 gave explicit recognition to the Russian influence in the domestic affairs of both Principalities: “The hospodars will take into consideration the representations that the Russian envoy will make to them. Other parts of this document, together with additional acts issued in 1802 and 1803, enlarged and defined the provisions of the previous hhatti sherifs and the Sened of 1783, The rights at this point enjoyed by Russia caused concern among contemporary statesmen, The Habsburg minister, Prince Clemens von Metternich, considered that the Porte had for all practical purposes surrendered its suzerainty over the Prin- cipalities. The French ambassador at Constantinople, General Brune, observed that “the protection over the Wallachians and Moldavians al- lowed by the treaties to Russia has become a sovereignty, almost with- out disguise.” ‘The lull in military activity among the great powers in the Mediter- ranean and the Balkans came to an end in 1805 when France and Rus- sia resumed the war. A Russian naval squadron was once again active in the Adriatic. As before, the allegiance of the Porte was important to both belligerents. Because of its own military impotence, the Otto- man government tended to side with the power that it saw as the ultiIntroduction mate victor. In August 1806, probably as a result of French suggestions, the Porte removed the Russian candidates Ipsilanti and Moruzi and replaced them with Alecu Sufu and Scarlat Callimachi. Since the action was carried through without consultation with Russia, it was in violation of the previous treaties. Although the Porte very soon re- gretted its decision and restored the former princes, Russian troops were sent into the Principalities in November. In December 1806 the Porte declared war despite the extremely unfavorable military situation that it faced. ‘The Ottoman difficulties were compounded when in 1807 France and Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit, thus depriving the Porte of the hope of French assistance. Moreover, the agreement dealt rectly with the Ottoman Empire's problems and contained provisions potentially disastrous for that government. Alexander I and Napoleon agreed that France should attempt to mediate between the Porte and Russia. Should this effort fail, the two signatory powers would discuss a division of the Ottoman Empire. During a meeting at Exfurt in 1808, when no agreement or armistice had been achieved, Napoleon and Alexander decided that Russia should annex the Principalities, but they did not consider further partition plans. Meanwhile, the Otto- ‘man position continued to deteriorate, In 1804 a revolt had broken out in Serbia, which the Ottoman army was unable to crush. In 1807 a rebel- lion in Constantinople resulted in the deposition of Selim III and his replacement, first by Mustafa IV, and then by Mahmud II. The pro- vincial ayans still defied the central power. After 1807 negotiations continued between the Russian and Ottoman representatives over pos- sible peace conditions. They failed to reach a successful conclusion largely because of the Ottoman refusal to abandon the Principalities. From 1806, when their armies entered the Principalities, until 1812, when a peace agreement was finally signed, Russian officials adminis- tered both Moldavia and Wallachia. During this occupation they worked principally through the divans and their boyar partisans. ‘Their main concern was assuring supplies to the army, which not only was in occupation of the Principalities, but was waging a war against the Porte. At first the Russian government relied primarily on Con- stantine Ipsilanti, who had been ruler of Moldavia from 1799 to 1801 and of Wallachia from 1802 to 1806, and who in 1807 was ap- pointed prince of Wallachia, His loyalty to Russia seemed assured. He had previously called for Russian intervention against Pasvanoglu; in 1806 he had encouraged the Russian government to invade. At that time he had offered assurances that the provinces could provide both financial and military assistance and that there would be no difficulty in 12Introduction finding provisions for the Russian troops. These promises could not be fulfilled. Once in the Principalities the Russian authorities found it extremely difficult to obtain adequate supplies in this impoverished region. They also had to deal with opposition from those boyars who disliked Ipsilanti and the Russian occupation. The situation was made ‘worse by the intrigues of the Russian military commanders, who in- volved themselves in the social and political life of the region. In Au- {gust 1807 Ipsilanti was removed from office and sent to Russia, but he wwas given an estate near Moscow as a reward for his services. ‘The administration of the Principalities was next placed in the hands ofa Russian official, Sergei S. Kushnikov, assisted by a group of Russian clerks and officials. Their major immediate problem was securing sup- plies for the army. If suificient food and matériel could not be provided through official channels, the army simply seized what it wanted. This situation was bound to create a great deal of animosity among the peas- antry, who were directly affected by these actions. The burden of sup- porting a Russian army and administration at this time, as in the past and the future, was extremely heavy. Moreover, both provinces had been impoverished by the previous extortionate methods of gov ernment and taxation, and Wallachia had suffered from the repeated raids of Pasvanoglu. On top of these problems, the cost of the Russian ‘occupation was to prove devastating. One study of this question con- tains this description: A Russian source slates that in 1808 the income of Wallachia was 2.737.809 tei, of which 1,969,908 lei were spent for the maintenance of the army. In 1809 ‘Wallachia contributed a similar percentage of her income to the Russi ‘Moldavia, the 1809 income was 2,561,866 lei, of which 1,569,720 lei on the army. Moldavia contributed an even greater percentage of its income to the Russians in 1811. Romanian sources indicate that during the war more than half of the Principalities’incame went to supply the Russian army the end of 1809 almost all of the working cattle and wagons in the Principalities ‘were being used to move supplies for the army.!! In addition to the friction caused by problems of military supply, the administration of the region proved frustrating for conscientious Rus- sian officials, who attempted to introduce orderly methods into the Principalities. Where previously government business had tended to be conducted orally and informally, the Russian representatives pre- ferred written records and formal procedures. Individual officials also continued to involve themselves in local politics and often on opposite sides. In March 1810 Kushnikov was replaced by V. I. Krasno- Milashevich. Meanwhile, negotiations continued between the Ottoman Empire and 3Introduction Russia, The principal stumbling block to peace was the status of the Principalities, At first the Russian government sought control of both rovinces; in 1811 the demand was reduced to Moldavia. Russian rela- tions with France were by this time in a process of swift decline. With the increasing probability that war with France would again break out, the Russian representatives were more willing to make concessions to the Porte, The chief issue in the negotiations remained the line of the new boundary: the Porte wished to draw it at the Pruth; Russia insisted on the Sereth, Finally, in May 1812, the two powers signed the Treaty of Bucharest.!2 Among the articles affecting the interests of the Prin- cipalities, the most important was the cession to Russia of the territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, which came to be known as Bessarabia. Since the border ran along the Kilia Channel of the Danube Delta, Russia became a riparian power of that river. The treaty also reconfirmed the previous privileges granted to the Principalities, in- cluding those which gave the Russian government predominant i fluence. After the negotiation of the treaty the Russian troops were withdrawn from the Principalities and sent home to meet the French invasion. The Ottoman government was not happy with the agree- ment: the chief negotiators were beheaded. Neither the Porte nor the Principalities were directly involved in the great campaigns that resulted in the final defeat of Napoleon. Nor ‘were Ottoman or Balkan problems the subject of negotiation at the Congress of Vienna. For the Principalities the Treaty of Bucharest was to inaugurate a period of relative peace. Nevertheless, most of the major political problems remained to be settled. The rule of the Phanariot princes still caused deep resentment; it could also be expected that the Porte would, where possible, attempt to undermine Russian influence in the region. The major issue of which power should predominate had not yet been conclusively settled. ‘The eighteenth century was thus, as we have seen, a period of almost continual conflict for the Principalities. In an age of rapid expansion the Russian government correctly assessed the enormous strategic sig- nificance of the provinces. In turn, at least some sections of the Ro- manian aristocratic leadership recognized that the Russian court was the best source of support against the Ottoman suzerain. Both bene fited from the relationship thus established. Russian armies did use the Principalities as a staging area and a source of supplies in their cam- paigns against the Porte. In return, and largely because of Russian pressure, the Principalities received from the Porte a further confirma- tion and a more exact definition of their privileges. However, at the same time the Ottoman government was forced to grant to the Russian 4Introduction government special rights of intervention in the internal affairs of the Principalities. Thus, as Ottoman influence weakened, that of Russia increased proportionately. In addition to the military aspects of the problem, the Russian gov- ernment had other objectives in the Principalities, ones that varied with the circumstances of the moment. At times the Russian officials and their boyar partisans thought of a full annexation of one or both of the provinces; the erection of puppet states, such as Catherine's kingdom of Dacia, was also considered. Toward the end of the century another alternative, Russian domination of the Ottoman government, became a possibility. In this case the Russian diplomats preferred the mainte- nance of Ottoman integrity and thus full Turkish control over the Prin- cipalities. At no time was the establishment of a truly independent Romanian political unit a matter of serious consideration. By 1812 a sort of compromise had been reached. Russia annexed directly only Bessarabia. Although puppet kingdoms were not formed, Russia gained a position of political domination through the treaty provisions that allowed its officials to intervene in the internal affairs of the Princi- palities and to act as a kind of intermediary in relations between the Porte and its Romanian subjects. As far as the Romanian leadership was concerned, there was as yet, of course, no true national government. The Phanariot princes, except under unusual circumstances, acted as agents of the Porte. The boyars, ‘whose ranks were weakened by internal divisions, were as much inter- ested in maintaining their privileged social and economic position as they were in resisting foreign control. In their opposition to Phanariot rule and Ottoman fiscal exactions, many were indeed willing to tum to Russia, as well as to the Habsburg Empire and France. Because of its geographic position, Russia offered the best hope of effective assis tance against Constantinople. Nevertheless, Russian power and prestige themselves constituted a danger. The next half century was to demon- strate the difficulties in the relationship and to show whether the Prin. ipalities could accept Russian backing against the Ottoman suzerain and retain at least a degree of political autonomy. 15CHAPTER I The Russian protectorate With the establishment of peace in 1815 the Russian government had occasion to be well satisfied with European conditions. After the men- ace of French aggression and French-supported revolutionary upheaval ‘was suppressed, Russia emerged as the predominant Continental mili tary power. Joined in close alignment with the Habsburg Monarchy and Prussia, a combination usually referred to as the Holy Alliance, the Russian government was a part of the most important European alliance system. With the acquisition of the major share of Poland, it also had no more territorial claims in the West. Weary of war and revo- lutionary upheaval, and with few pressing foreign policy objectives, Russia became the principal supporter of the status quo in European olitics. Seager eeEdgSeuTeestsinEEa Teer CeesEaaetTaeaeteiae similar satisfaction. If the Porte kept its treaty obligations, the Russian government was in a position to dominate the internal politics of the Principalities and to play a major role in the relations of the Ottoman government with its Orthodox subjects. During the eighteenth century, as we have seen, Russia waged repeated campaigns with the aim of at- taining certain territorial objectives. This direction of policy was, at least temporarily, to be reversed. The Russian government now wished to maintain the status quo in the Near East as well as in Europe. With the achievement of the Pruth boundary, the Russian leaders recognized that they had little more to gain by an aggressive policy in either area. ‘The desire to maintain the conditions of 1815 went beyond the ter- ritorial settlement reached at the Congress of Vienna. In addition, Tsar Alexander I was to become deeply concerned about the maintenance of the conservative regimes in power after the defeat of Napoleon. For 16The Russian protectorate Russia, as for other European states, the long period of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon had involved not only the threat of French Continental domination, but also that of the overthrow of established governments and their replacement by revolutionary re- gimes. However, it is important to emphasize that Alexander, despite his support of the suppression of revolts after 1815, was not against political reform if it were carried through by regular means. Following the principles of enlightened despotism, he favored the introduction of orderly administrative procedures and just legal systems in states suffering from the evils of corruption and misgovernment, but these measures were to be introduced from above by the legitimate authori- ties. He also was not against constitutional government: he was, after all, a constitutional monarch at least in theory in the Congress King- dom, established after 1815 in the Russian-dominated Polish lands. ‘What he was to combat with intensity was the overthrow of legitimate governments by force and violence. With these convictions he was able to work well with Metternich, who shared a similar outlook. When revolutionary movements broke out first in the German and Italian states and then in Spain, Portugal, and South America, the conserva- tive monarchies ~ Russia, the Habsburg Empire, and Prussia ~ together adopted a policy calling for armed intervention by outside states in support of legitimate governments. Although these policies were followed with relative consistency in Western and Central Europe, some adjustments had to be made in the Russian attitude toward events in the Ottoman lands. Russia usually backed Serbian demands for increased autonomy despite the revolts of 1804 and 1815. Moreover, as we have seen, Russia had acquired certain treaty rights in regard to the Balkan Christians, in particular in the treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji and Bucharest, which had to be upheld. In addition, Orthodoxy was a basic element in the Russian conservative ideology, and the interests of the church had to be defended. Thus the revolt of an Orthodox Balkan people, even though it might be against the “legitimate monarch,” the sultan, might present the Russian leaders with difficult choices. ‘The Russian support of Orthodoxy also involved another aspect, which was to be important for Romanian affairs. The Russian govern- ‘ment and Russian church dignitaries naturally wished to remain in close touch with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the chief repre- sentative of the Balkan Christians. In the eighteenth century this office, like the Danubian Principalities, came to be dominated by Phanariot Greeks, who used their position to extend their control over all of the ecclesiastical establishments in those parts of the Balkans under direct ”Russia and the Romanian national state res.) — 777 wauacena ‘The Ottoman Balkans, 1815The Russian protectorate Ottoman rule. The Greek influence over Orthodox affairs in the Prin- cipalities was also strong. Most important was the control of the so- called Dedicated Monasteries, whose lands embraced about an eleventh of the territory of the provinces. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate ‘was a part of the Ottoman administrative system, and that it was ex- tremely corrupt, the Russian government gave it immense support throughout the century. The aim was to preserve as far as possible the unity of the Balkan Christians under this organization. Although the Russian officials would have liked to obtain a position of dominance in the councils of the church, this aim was never achieved. In fact, the Patriarchate was usually able to exploit Russian power for its own goals; it was never a tool in Russian hands. In the Principalities the situation after 1812 continued to be bleak. Both provinces had been devastated by the war and foreign occupation. Moreover, under the new princes, Joan Caragea in Wallachia and Scar- lat Callimachi in Moldavia, the population was to undergo a period of extreme fiscal oppression. Both rulers had been forced to pay a high price in bribes for their positions, and they wished to recoup their ex- penditures, The resultant increase in taxes and other payments was naturally passed on down to the peasantry. Caragea’s misrule was so flagrant that he was finally forced to flee to Pisa in 1818. His replace- ment, Alecu Sutu, arrived with a suite of eighty relatives and eight hundred other retainers, including an Albanian guard. ‘The Phanariot system was thus still firmly in place. However, by the 1820 a situation had developed that was fast becoming unendurable for both the native boyar and the dependent peasant. As in the previous century change would have to come through boyar leadership; the small middle class of merchants and artisans contributed only a few political leaders. The great majority of the peasants, although no longer enserfed, had no political power and were forced to make high payments both to the state and to the landholders. Their grievances were primarily social and economic and were directed against the bo- yars. They were more concerned with gaining changes in the agrarian relationships and in securing a free title to their land than with prob- Jems of Ottoman swerainty, Phanariot domination, or Russian tervention. With this social and economic situation, it is understandable why political power lay, and was to remain, in the hands of a relatively small minority. The boyars themselves were divided by their personal interests, and, of course, by the size of their estates and their compara: tive wealth. ‘Those who held their rank because they belonged to an- cient families felt superior to those who were enobled because of state 19Russia and the Romanian national state service or for similar reasons. Many members of this class were well educated. They kept in touch with events in Europe, and they were well aware of contemporary ideological trends, During the Phanariot period they had, as could be expected, divided into factions, and they fought for influence and power. Primarily interested in maintaining their own privileges in landholding and local administrative control, they seldom concerned themselves with peasant problems. ‘The corruption and injustice of Phanariot rule had, as we have seen, caused extreme dissatisfaction. The Greek princes were correctly regarded primarily as Ottoman agents, and they were blamed for the draining of Romanian resources for Ottoman benefit. Although they developed no set program or ideology, as did the reformers of 1848, many boyars did seek radical changes in the government of the Prin- cipalities. First and foremost, they demanded an end to the Phanariot regime. They wished to control their own administration, and they wanted native princes. They were divided on the powers to be assigned to their ruler; some wished him to be subordinate to a boyars’ council Most obvious was the need for the establishment of a just administra- tive system and the assurance of law and order throughout the provinces ‘The chaotic financial situation also had to be confronted. Unlike later leaders, the boyars of this generation were not nationalists in the modern sense. Nevertheless, they desired to have each principality run its own affairs, and they assumed a basic unity and similarity between Wallachia and Moldavia. They did not regard each other as foreigners, but as members of the same family, sharing a common language and past history. ‘The boyar attitude toward Russia had remained ambivalent. Russian support was indeed sought against Ottoman rule during the eighteenth century. When, however, it appeared that Russia might seek to annex the provinces, the attitude changed. Under Ottoman rule the Princi- palities did indeed enjoy a special position; they were not Turkish pashaliks. An increase of Russian influence, even if not a direct annex: ation, might result in an even further reduction of the boyar’s role in his government. Moreover, after 1815 there was no sign that the Russian leaders were greatly dissatisfied with Phanariot rule. They recognized the necessity of political and economic reform in both provinces, but in this period Greek influence was strong in St. Petersburg. Many Greek nationals had entered Russian service. The Russian carrying trade in the Black Sea was in Greek hands. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji had given Greek ships the right to fly the Russian flag. Therefore, should issues involving the Greek influence in the Principalities come into question, the Russian attitude could not be predicted beforehand. 20The Russian protectorate ‘Towarp A RUSSIAN PROTECTORATE: THE GREEK REVOLUTION, TUDOR VLADIMIRESGU, AND THe Russo-Turkish WAR By the beginning of the 1820s, despite the urgent need for reform, it was lear that some radical event would have to occur to alter the basic conditions in the Principalities. There appeared little chance that the necessary changes would be made by the regimes in power. An entirely new situation was created, however, not because of Romanian initia- tives, but because of the activities of Greek leaders intent on securing independence from Ottoman rule. Their precipitation of a revolution both in the Principalities and in Greece was to open once again the dangerous issue of the Eastern Question and to force another Russian intervention in the affairs of the peninsula. ‘The Greek revolution of 1821 had its origins in multiple and com. plex developments, but for the Principalities the major role was played. by the Phanariots and by a secret organization, the Filiki Etairia (Friendly Society). Organized in 1814 by three Greek merchants, it had as its objective the freeing of Greek lands from Ottoman control. The organization made a slow start, but in 1818 it moved its headquarters to Constantinople and by 1820 it had enrolled hundreds of members, both in the Greek-inhabited territories and in the Principalities. Al- though the movement hiad Greek liberation as its primary aim, attempts were made to involve other Balkan peoples, including the Serbs, Bul- garians, and Romanians, in a united uprising, Even more important than the gaining of Balkan Christian adherents, however, was the task of attracting Russian support. From the beginning the leaders of the society understood that it was essential that they win not just passive Russian acquiescence, but active armed intervention. That assistance would come from St, Petersburg seemed to some an obvious assumption, Certainly, in the past Russia had aided resistance to Ottoman rule; before each invasion of Ottoman territory the Russians, like the Aus- trians, had called upon the Balkan people to revolt. In order to attract members to the organization, the Etairia usually let it be understood that Russia stood behind the movement. The apparent link with the ‘Orthodox great power was one of the major strengths of the entire un- dertaking. ‘The Etairia had another apparent advantage. Russia had at this time two foreign ministers. The first, Karl Vasilevich Nesselrode, was a Rhineland German, but the second, Ioannis Capodistrias, was a Greek from Corfu with a strong interest in Greek causes. He had entered Russian service in 1809 and had risen rapidly thereafter. Although aRussia and the Romanian national state strong nationalist, he in fact was convinced that Greek interests would be better served by a concentration on education and moral awakening than by an emphasis on revolutionary activity. To the Etairia he seemed, nevertheless, an ideal leader. He was approached by members of the organization in both 1817 and 1820. When he refused to head the move- ment, the position was taken by Alexander Ipsilanti, who was similarly of Greek ancestry and in the Russian service. The son of the pro-Russian former hospodar Constantine Ipsilanti, Alexander had been educated in Russia; he was a general in the Russian army and an aide-decamp of the tsar. Although the question of Russian official involvement in the conspiracy has been much debated, it appears that the tsar was aware of the existence of the society, but not of its specific plans. Capo- distrias probably knew more; he certainly gave strong warnings to hi Greek acquaintances not to provoke disturbances in the hope that Rus- sia would intervene. The general European situation was not at all propitious for the renewal of a Russian advance in the Balkans; the tsar was strongly against revolutionary activity. The Etairia, however, appears not to have taken the realities of the diplomatic situation into serious consideration. Despite the fact that the society could gain no open official encourage- ment, it continued to use the Russian name freely. Plans for an uprising proceeded, and in 1820 it was decided that there should be simultaneous revolts in the Peloponnesus and the Principalities.’ Despite the wide- spread Romanian resentment of Greek influence, the provinces offered certain advantages as centers for rebellion. The Etairia had been able to gain many recruits from among the boyars of Greek background, al though not from among the native Romanians. The prince of Moldavia, Michael Sutu, was a member. Alecu Sutu, the ruler of Wallachia, had not joined, but by 1821 he appeared close to death. The Russian consuls in Jassy and Bucharest, Andrei Pisani and Alexander Pini, maintained a neutral attitude. Moreover, the provinces had an excellent strategic location. Despite the lack of official Russian support, Bessarabia was a center for the organization of the movement. Men and supplies were assembled there and elsewhere in the Black Sea territories. Moreover, the idea persisted that once the revolt commenced, the Russian govern- ment would be forced to send an army into the Principalities both to prevent the Ottoman government from crushing an Orthodox move- ment and in reaction to the expected atrocities. The Etairia could count too on the military support of princes’ guards and volunteer forces. Assistance was also expected from another quarter. The Etairia had come to an understanding with a Romanian leader, Tudor Viadimires: 22The Russian protectorate cu, who headed a native Romanian movement, although one whose aims differed radically from those of the Greek conspiracy.’ Born in a family of free peasants, Viadimirescu had risen to the rank and position ofa boyar. Formerly a commander of the pandours, a Romanian militia organized during the previous wars, he had fought with the Russian troops and had received a decoration, Vladimirescu was, in fact, the first to move. He came to an agreement with the agents of the Etairia and with members of the provisional government in Bucharest who were in charge during the illness and death of Sutu. In January 1821 he departed from Bucharest for Oltenia, where he organized an uprising among the peasants. He was able to join together a formidable force of pandours, peasants, and other volunteers, which was called the Peo- ple’s Assembly. Ina declaration issued at Pades on January 23/ February 4, he addressed the peasants in fiery words that had little to do with the Greek movement or even with the Romanian grievances against the Porte: ‘Brothers living in Wallachia, whatever your nationality, no law prevents aman to meet evil with evil... How long shall we suffer the dragons that swallow us alive, those above us, both clergy and politicians, to suek our blood? How long shall we be enslaved? . .. Neither God nor the sultan approves of such treatment of their faithful. ‘Therefore, brothers, come all of you and deal out evil to bring evil to an end ‘This clear call to revolution received an immediate response. Peas- ants attacked the property of the landowners and burned and looted their houses. Despite stern warnings from Vladimirescu, his followers engaged in violent and lawless actions. It should be emphasized that this revolt was directed against the prevailing social and economic condi- tions, not against Ottoman rule, Vladimirescu sent frequent messages t0 the Porte giving assurances that the uprising was against the abuses of the Phanariot regime and that the peasants sought only the restoration of “old rights” that they had lost. He called upon the Ottoman officials to investigate the situation. Victorious in the countryside, he and his followers next marched to Bucharest. Meanwhile, Ipsilanti was putting his plans into action. On February 22/March 6, wearing a Russian army uniform, he crossed from Bes sarabia into Moldavia, accompanied by a few followers. There the Etairia members joined him, and they were able to take over the gov- ernment in Jassy with little difficulty. Ipsilanti continually assured his supporters that the Russian army was right behind him. Once estab- lished in power, he and the Moldavian boyars sent a petition to the tsar. ‘They could not have chosen a worse moment, Alexander I was at that time attending the Congress of Laibach, which had been called to deal 23Russia and the Romanian national state with the revolutionary movement in the Italian peninsula. In a period of strong conservatism, deeply disturbed by the European events, Alex- ander was unlikely to approve a similar event in an adjacent region. However, because communications were poor, the Russian reaction was slow in coming. Thus in the first weeks Ipsilanti’s claim to Russian backing was not disputed. The Russian consuls took no action. Al- though instructions were sent to Pini in Bucharest in early March denouncing Viadimirescu’s actions and stripping him of his Russian decoration, he did not learn of this until the end of the month. Per- suaded by the Etairia’s promises of Russian backing, he too had assured his followers of the tsar’s support. Alexander's repudiation of Ipsilanti was also not known in Bucharest until the end of March, The tsar’s reaction to the events in the Principalities left no doubt about the Rus- sian position. A circular dispatch, sent by Nesselrode in March, clearly reflected the imperial disfavor. The conspiracy of Tudor Vladimirescu, ‘who was described as “an obscure adventurer at the head of some irregu- lar troops,” was to be treated with speed and firmness: Always frank and loyal in his policy, the emperor, from the time that he learned Of the insurrection of Viadimirescu, made haste to notify the Porte that th individual, who had formerly been decorated with the cross of St. Vladimir, had been removed from the list of the knights of that order, and that His ‘Majesty would observe with pleasure if the Turkish government without the least delay would cake the most appropriate measures to reestablish calm in. the Prineipalities. ‘The dispatch added that Alexander strongly disapproved of Ipsilanti’s actions, “that his conduct is entirely contrary to the wishes and inten- tions of His Imperial Majesty and that, removed from the registers of the army, with the prohibition of ever returning to Russia, he could count neither on any aid nor even on any sign of interest . .. as long as he misleads his compatriots and brings them to inevitable misfor- tunes.”* With this unequivocal Russian stand, neither Viadimirescu nor Ipsilanti could hope for success. Moreover, it soon became clear that the two men had opposing objectives. On March 1/13 Ipsilanti, with a force of only a few thousand untrained and undisciplined volunteers, left Moldavia for Wallachia; at the end of that month Vladimirescu, with about eight thousand men, arrived at the outskirts of Bucharest. OF the two forces, the Romanian was obviously the stronger. Both armies were facing grave dangers. Russian aid had been refused; a Russian army under generals Wittgenstein and Kiselev stood watch on the border, but remained neutral. With Russian approval, Ottoman troops had entered the Principalities in May. In this situation the com- 24The Russian protectorate manders decided to retreat to Oltenia and the mountains. The difference between the movements was becoming increasingly evident. Vladi- mirescu never abandoned his attempts to reach an understanding with the Porte; his aim was an improvement of peasant conditions in the Principalities, not Greek liberation. Although he had the larger army, he had alienated many of his followers, in particular when he executed some of his commanders for looting. Taking advantage of defections in Viadimirescu’s ranks, the Etairia attempted to assume command of his forces. He was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered on May 21/June 2. Although the Greek commanders were successful in taking over the army, it in fact began to dissolve. Defections had already begun when the peasant volunteers realized that a true social revolution was not likely to be accomplished. With the death of their commander, many simply went home. The illorganized and undisciplined army of the Etairia was finally crushed at the battle of Dragisani on June 7/19. At the end of the month the last Greek forces were annihilated at Sculeni on the Pruth. Meanwhile, the character of the Greek revolution had changed. At the beginning of April a revolt had broken out in the Peloponnesus, which was to have far wider repercussions than the disaster in the Pri cipalities. Faced with such widespread rebellion, the Ottoman govern- ment was forced to take immediate action. Larger military forces were sent into the Principalities. Other, more drastic, measures were then im- plemented against the Christian population in both the Greek and Romanian lands, and these altered the attitude of the Russian govern- ment. After the victory of the Etairia in Moldavia in March, its ad- herents had massacred part of the Turkish population in Jassy and Galatz, Similar atrocities accompanied the outbreak of the revolt in the Peloponnesus. The reaction of the Porte was equally violent. Not only were reprisals taken against Christian civilians, but on Easter eve the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his bishops were killed. When news of these events reached St. Petersburg, Alexander I felt obligated to take some steps in support of his fellow Orthodox Chris- tians. Although the Russian government at this point spoke out in defense of both the Grecks and the Romanians, it did not alter its attitude toward the revolutionary movements as such. As before, it considered any actions taken by the Ottoman authorities against the participants in the revolt justified. What were denounced were the widely reported atrocities committed against Christian populations who were not ac- tively engaged in rebellious activity. A circular dispatch of July 1821 made this distinction clear. It condemned the measures taken “not 25Russia and the Romanian national state against the insurgents but against the entire Greek nation” and con- tinued: ‘The emperor is fully justified in demanding chat the Turkish government protect the exercise of the Christian religion, the persons of its ministers, the inviolability of its temples, and that it not at all carry devastation and death into the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and that for the inhabitants of these countries, as well as for those of the isles of the Archipelago and the rest of Greece, it observe a just and constant distinction between innocence and crime? In addition, the Russian government was determined to maintain its rights under the treaties. In August the Russian representative in Constantinople, Gregory Aleksandrovich Stroganov, was recalled from his post. The questions in dispute concerned not only those involved in the Greek uprising, but also the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Principalities and the nomination of the princes. By this date all of the great powers had become involved in the new and dangerous situation in the Balkans. ‘The Ottoman army remained in occupation of Wallachia and Mol- davia for sixteen months. Throughout this period the Principalities ‘were once more under the heavy burden of supplying the needs of an army of occupation, Domestic affairs were also in a state of turmoil. Dur- ing the peasant revolt and after the entrance of the Ottoman troops, a ‘mass migration of thousands of boyars and merchants into Transyl- vania had occurred. Many of those who had been involved with the Etairia feared retribution, Brayov and Sibiu were the center for the refugees, some of whom remained out of the country as late as 1826. In May 1822 an agreement was reached among the powers, and the Ot- toman troops began to leave the Principalities, with the last departing in September. ‘The failure of the Greek revolt had beneficial consequences for the native boyars, who were finally able to gain their chief objective. Since the Porte could no longer trust its Greek officials, the period of Phana- riot rule came to an end. In April 1822 a six-man delegation from Mol- davia under the leadership of Ion Sturdza and a similar one of seven members from Wallachia under Gregory Ghica went to Constantinople with a common program. Both groups sought the appointment of na- tive princes, the formation of a Romanian armed force to replace the previous princes’ guard, the restriction of officeholding to Romanians, the right to petition the Porte for the redress of grievances, and other similar measures. Most of these desires were granted in a firman. With the appointment of Sturdza and Ghica to head their respective princi- palities, the Phanariot era came to a formal end. 26The Russian protectorate Although the actions of the Porte met most of the Romanian re- quests and gave evidence of an Ottoman desire for reconciliation, the Russian government refused to accept these measures. The Porte had made its decisions without consulting Russia; the princes had been named without the consent of the tsar. The terms of treaties had thus been broken, a condition that the tsar and his government would not accept. The Russian officials, nevertheless, did not at this time go further than issuing protests. ‘With a new regime in power, life in the Principalities could return to normal. Some measures were taken against the peasants who had revolted under Viadimirescu’s leadership. However, although villages were disarmed and attempts were made to collect the taxes and labor obligations that were due from the period of the rebellion, the entire matter was handled with relative moderation. During this time the Principalities’ financial condition had deteriorated further. The Otto- man occupation had cost fifteen million piasters, and the provinces owed the Porte large sums in tribute and other payments. In political affairs the major change to be noted was that the official positions were now entirely in the hands of native boyars. Meanwhile, the European diplomats continued to be concerned about the ramifications of the Greek revolt. A stalemate between the Ottoman army and the revolutionary forces was broken in 1825 when the sultan called in Mehmed Ali, the pasha of Egypt. His son Ibrahim, a brilliant general, led the Egyptian forces. His victories changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Recognizing the dangers in the situation, the three powers principally affected, Britain, France, and Russia, came to an understanding. After 1825 Russian policy was decided by a new tsar, Nicholas 1, who was to pursue a more active policy in Eastern affairs. In 1826 Russia and Britain agreed to cooperate and act as mediators to attempt to establish an autonomous Greek state; France joined them in 1827. The Greek question was thus made the common concern of these powers. Each received the assurance that its alliance partners would not use the new Eastern crisis to gain dispro- portionate advantages. Although its actions were thus limited in Greek questions, the Rus- sian government was free to pursue unhampered the negotiations with the Porte that involved other matters. In 1826 Mahmud II was in a dangerous domestic situation. Not only had he been unable to crush the Greek revolt, but he was about to take major steps to reform the Ottoman military forces. Thus, when the Russian government delivered a virtual ultimatum in March, the Porte was forced to agree to negotia- tions on the issues in dispute between the two countries. The Conven- 27Russia and the Romanian national state tion of Akkerman, signed on September 25 /October 7, dealt with the Asiatic frontiers, the status of Serbia, and similar problems, as well as, with the affairs of the Principalities. The most important provisions concerning the Romanian lands were incorporated into a Separate Act, which reaffirmed the previous arrangements and strengthened the Rus- sian right of intervention and supervision. The princes were to be elected from among the native boyars by the divans, the traditional councils, associated with the hospodars and composed of the most in- fiuential men; the choice was to be confirmed by both courts. They were to serve for seven years, and they could be reelected. They could only be deposed for crimes and with the approval of the two powers. ‘The Hatti Sherif of 1802 was reconfirmed. The divans were to handle ‘matters of taxation; freedom of commerce was guaranteed except in rela- tion to the supplies due to the Porte. Most significant for the future was the stipulation that administrative reform should be undertaken: ‘The disorders of the last years in Moldavia and Wallachia having cau: ‘most severe injury to order in the different branches of the internal admi tion, the hospodars shall be bound with the least possible delay, together with the respective divans, to take the necessary measures to improve the conditions Of the Principalities confided to their care, and those measures shall form the subject of a general regulation for each province, which shall be put immedi ately into execution the ‘The Convention of Akkerman did not remain long in effect. Mahmud TI was soon to face a major foreign crisis. After the Ottoman govern- ment refused to accept allied mediation, a joint French~British-Russian squadron was organized for duty in the Mediterranean, the task of which was to prevent supplies from reaching the Egyptian army that ‘was operating in the Peloponnesus. In October 1827 this force anni- hilated a Turkish—Egyptian fleet anchored in the harbor of Navarino. The Duke of Wellington, at the head of the British government, was shocked by this unexpected occurrence and withdrew from the coopera- tive effort. The British influence would thus not be available as a re- straint on Russia in the next months. As might be expected, a violent reaction occurred in Constantinople; in December the sultan declared a “Holy War” on Russia and the Convention of Akkerman was de- nounced. The first belligerent act, however, did not take place until April 1828, when Russian armies once again entered the Principalities. ‘The Russian occupation, under General Wittgenstein, proceeded with great speed; there were, of course, no Ottoman troops in the country.” The Principalities faced another extended and difficult period of military occupation. As before, the Russian command took full con- trol of the country. The princes Ghica and Sturdza, who had cooperated 28The Russian protectorate with the Porte, were deposed. Count F. P, Paltlen was appointed to head the two divans and given full power over the civil government. He was, however, himself under the authority of the commander of the army of occupation. The familiar problems arose at once. The first interest of the Russian authorities was, of course, the conduct of the war. The Russian command had arrived on the scene with optimistic hopes about the supplies that could be acquired in the country. The Russian officials were soon involved in bitter conflicts with both the Romanian peasants and the boyars over questions of requisitioning and mode of payment. As usual, the population was expected to provide housing for the Russian troops and transport for war matériel. The Russian officials were also determined to collect the regular taxes. As long as Pahlen remained in charge of the civil administration, concern for the interests of the Principalities was shown, He wished equitable arrangements to be worked out. He was, however, replaced in January 1829 by the much tougher and more exacting General P. F. Zheltukhin, who placed first emphasis on fulfilling the needs of the military forces. During this period the Russian authorities were in full control of the country. The regular Romanian officals remained in office, but they could do little more than carry out the Russian direc- tives. As in previous wars, the Russian army made use of some Ro- manian fighters, with the pandours again playing a major role, ‘The harshness of the Russian attitude in the Principalities reflected in part the difficulties of the war. This campaign was not to result in an easy victory. The fighting was brought to an end in September 1829, but the moderation of the terms of the peace reflected Russia's fear that the other powers might intervene and a realization of the basic ‘weakness of its military position. Supplies were short and the army was far from its base. In considering what terms they wished to impose upon the Ottoman government, the Russian statesmen had to consider some real limita- tions on their position. They were already bound by the agreements of 1826 and 1827 with Britain and France, which set limits on large acqui- sitions of territory. Moreover, they had to weigh carefully the advisa- bility of severely weakening, or even destroying, the Ottoman Empire. Russian military power was not sufficient, at this time or later, to impose a unilateral settlement. If large territorial gains were made, the other powers would have to be compensated. Austria as well as France and Britain would expect equivalent acquisitions. With these considerations in mind the Russian government adopted a policy that was to be main- tained to the 18505. Instead of seeking the destruction or partition of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian statesmen decided that the state should 29Russia and the Romanian national state be maintained, but as a weak power under Russian influence. The terms of the Treaty of Adrianople of September 1829 reflected this atti- tude. Russia made only minor gains of territory, chiefly in Asia but also including the Danube Delta. An indemnity of 1.5 million ducats was levied, though the sum was later reduced. The Ottoman government agreed to recognize Greck autonomy and to allow more privileges to Serbia Russia's decision concerning its attitude toward the Ottoman Empire naturally affected the provisions of the peace in regard to the Princi: palities. Except for the acquisition of the Danube Delta, Russia took no more Romanian territory. Instead the peace terms reaffirmed and strengthened the rights that Russia had gained in the Hatti Sherif of 1802 and the Convention of Akerman. Article 5 dealt with this ques- tion: ‘The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having been in consequence of 2 Capitulation placed under the Suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity, it is understood that they shall preserve all the privileges and immunities which have been granted co them either by their Capitulations, or by the Treaties concluded between the two Empires, or by the Hattisherifs promulgated at different times, In consequence whereof, they shall enjoy free exercise of their Worship, perfect security, an independent national Government, and full liberty of Commerce. Other sections of the meaty lessened the economic controls of Otto- ‘man suzerainty and reduced the payments that could be collected. Most advantageous was the termination of the Ottoman right of preemption: ‘The Sublime Porte, animated by the sincere desire of insuring to the «wo Pr Cipalities all che welfare of which they are susceptible, and being informed of the abuses and annoyances to which they were subjected on account of the supplies required for the consumption of Constantinople, the provisioning of the Fortresses situated upon the Danube, and the requisitions of the Arsenal, fully and entirely relinquishes in their favour its right in this respect.!0 Although a set annual tribute was still to be collected, the Principalities were required to make only a few other payments, such as the gift of fered at the accession of each prince, who was now to be chosen for life. Other provisions reflected the Russian desire to accent sharply the division between the Principalities and the rest of the empire. The boundary was to be the thalweg of the Danube; the fortified towns of ‘Turnu Severin, Giurgiu, and Briila, which had been under Turkish con- trol, were to be returned to Wallachia, and their Muslim inhabitants were to sell their property within eighteen months, No Ottoman for- tifications were to be allowed in the Principalities: “no Mussulman can ever establish his residence, and . . . the only Mohametans who can be 30The Russian protectorate admitted therein are merchants provided with firmans, whose object in repairing thither is to purchase, on their own account in the Pr cipalities, the goods necessary for the consumption of Constantinople, or other articles.” The line of division at the Danube was further em- phasized by the fact that a quarantine was to be established along the river, The Principalities were allowed to organize a militia to handle the quarantine as well as to provide border guards and to preserve law and order. ‘The Treaty of Adrianople brought to a close a process that com- menced with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, By 1829 the Ottoman government for all practical purposes was excluded from effective in fluence in either Wallachia or Moldavia; it had little more than the right to confirm the nomination of the princes and to collect a fixed tribute, Russia, the recognized protecting power, exerted the real au- thority. Henceforth, the governments of the two Principalities were to consider the continued Ottoman suzerainty as only a minor burden. Instead they were to find themselves under constant pressure from the Russian government and its representatives in Bucharest and Jassy. Although in many instances the Russian actions were to the ultimate benefit of the inhabitants, the conditions of the protectorate and the regular interference were bitterly resented. ‘THE PROTECTORATE ESTABLISHED With the war successfully concluded the Russian government could proceed with the program of political reform in the Principalities al- ready enunciated in the Convention of Akkerman.”? According to th peace terms the Russian army was to remain in occupation of the ipalities until the Ottoman war indemnity was paid. With an armed force on the scene and with a recognized right of protection, the Russian authorities could introduce any regime they wished. They had certainly every interest in assuring prosperity and tranquility in this dependent area. The region was an important military outpost, which could serve asa base against Constantinople and as a source of supplies should war break out again. The strategic position in regard to the Habsburg Empire and the Danube River was also of significance. A friendly ad- ministration anda contented population could be of immense advantage in the future. Not only did the Russian government have every desire to create favorable conditions in the area, but it had the services of an excellent administrator, General Paul Dmitrievich Kiselev, who replaced Zheltu- khin in November 1829 and remained in office until April 1834. An ex- 31Russia and the Romanian national state tremely able man of enlightened political views, Kiselev was well suited to give expression to the Russian determination to endow the Princ- palities with an efficient and modern system. Immediately upon assum- ing his post, he went to work to solve the obvious problems. The occu- pation had caused devastation in the land even though fighting had not taken place in the provinces themselves. To ease the severe food short- ages, Kiselev imported supplies from Odessa. He also organized a quarantine to deal with pressing health problems, in particular the prevalence of cholera. Among his first acts was the formation of a militia composed of regular, salaried soldiers. His chief contribution, however, was his supervision of the drafting of new administrative statutes for both Principalities. Already, in June 1829, committees had been established in each principality to consider political reforms. They consisted of four members, two named by the divans and two by Zheltukhin, who met under the chairmanship of the Russian consul-general, Matei Leovich Minciaky (Minchaki). Most of their work was completed during the period when Kiselev was in charge. The general was both president of the divans and the chief of staff of the Russian army corps in occupation of the country; he thus held the highest civil and military positions. In contrast to his predecessor, who alienated the Romanian boyars by his brusque manners, Kiselev was a tactful and conciliatory diplomat. Al though he favored Russian annexation of the Principalities, his views ‘were not generally known. Despite his personal opinion, he worked within the framework of his instructions and attempted to establish as good an administrative system as possible, with the hope that it would serve to join the provinces closely to Russia. By April 1830 the two committees had completed their work. The texts of their proposed administrative regulations were somewhat al- tered by Kiseley before being forwarded to St. Petersburg, where a commission examined them and made some additional changes. They were then returned to the Principalities and there considered by two special assemblies, which were given only limited rights to amend them, The first assembly, presided over by Kiselev, was held in Wal- lachia in March 1851; it was composed of fifty-four members chosen chiefly from the wealthy boyars. After it had finished its work in April, Kiseley proceeded to Jassy, where he headed a similar assembly. The Russian authorities faced more opposition in Moldavia, where the pre- vious annexation of Bessarabia was in the boyars’ minds. The docu: ments, known collectively as the Organic Statutes, were promulgated in Wallachia in July 1831 and in Moldavia in January 1832. The texts were similar but not identical.1# 32The Russian protectorate ‘The new statutes thus were the product of a Russian initiative, drawn up under the close supervision of Russian officials, and put into practice during a Russian occupation. They were, nevertheless, a real step for- ward in Romanian political development. The governments of the Principalities were henceforth to be conducted on the basis of legal documents, which were introduced for the express purpose of assuring an orderly, modern administrative system. The documents cannot be described as true constitutions; they were instead detailed administra tive regulations for the government of each Principality. Their pro- visions met most of the demands that had been set forth by the boyars in their petitions to the Russian court and the Porte in the previous years. ‘They assured that this class would retain its predominant position in the state, 2 result fully consonant with the desires of the conservative Russian regime. Its aim was a stable, prosperous government, not a change in social relationships. The establishment of parallel sets of regulations in the two principalities was to aid in the accomplish- ment of their eventual unification, an event that was foreseen at this time. ‘The Organic Statutes provided for a centralized state system and the separation of the executive and legislative powers. The executive branch was to be headed by a prince, who was to be elected for life by a special assembly of high boyars. The legislature, consisting of thirty- five members in Moldavia and forty-two in Wallachia, was also com- posed of members of this class, The assemblies could pass laws, but the prince had a veto right. The prince could also prorogue the assemblies, although he could not dissolve them without the permission of the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The assemblies voted the budget, but they could not force the prince out of office. They could, however, appeal over the head of the ruler directly to the Ottoman and Russian courts, The possibility of Russian interference was thus assured all along the line. ‘The new charters offered great benefits to the boyars, who used this opportunity to make gains at che expense of the peasants. With the end of the Ottoman right of preemption on Romanian products, and with the growing demand from the West, the landowners saw the op- portunity to make greater profits from their estates. It was obviously to their interest to gain control of as much land as possible and to assure themselves of a steady supply of labor. In the Organic Statutes they were able to have themselves designated for the first time as the actual own- ers of the land; the peasants were allotted only the right to the use of two-thirds of each estate, During this period the labor oblig increased and peasants were required to give six months’ notice before 33Russia and the Romanian national state leaving the land, Kiseley, incidentally, did not approve of the agrarian In January 1834 Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Conven- tion of St. Petersburg. The Porte accepted the Organic Statutes, and the annual tribute was set at three million piasters. The two powers further decided that as an exception they, not the assemblies, would name the first princes, and that their terms would be limited to seven years. The Russian candidates, Alexander Ghica in Wallachia and Michael Sturdza in Moldavia, thus assumed office. After Kiselev and the Russian army of occupation departed, the consuls, P. 1. Riickmann (Rikman) in Bucharest and Timkovskii in Jassy, represented the Rus- sian interests During this period the Russian government was actively pursuing the policy of close cooperation with the Porte that was adopted after the Treaty of Adrianople. An opportunity to strengthen further the ties with Constantinople came in 1831. Mehmed Ali, who had given loyal support during the Greek revolution, rebelled against his suzerain power, and he was able to win decisive victories over the Turkish army. In a desperate situation, Mahmud 11 turned to the European powers, but only Russia would help him. In July 1833 Russia and the Porte concluded the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi, which ranks with Kuchuk Kainardji and Adrianople in significance. Ostensibly a treaty of mutual defense, the agreement in effect placed the Ottoman Empire in a rela- tionship of dependence on St. Petersburg, Russian soldiers and sailors were sent to the Straits area to aid the new ally. As long as this advan- tageous situation could be maintained in Constantinople, the Russian diplomats had no wish to weaken or endanger Ottoman interests. In order to improve its position in the Near East even further, the Russian government in September 1833 concluded the Treaty of Miin- chengritz with the Habsburg Empire. In this understanding the two sig- natories agreed that they would cooperate to support the Ottoman Empire and to oppose Mehmed Ali. Should their efforts fail, and should that state collapse, they would work together to establish an alternate arrangement, These two agreements had a great significance for the Principalities. Their immediate neighbors, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia, were now on excellent terms, and they all favored the maintenance of the status quo, a condition that included Russian predominance in the Principalities. Until some event should occur that would break this combination, there was little chance that Romanian political conditions could be changed. Neither Britain nor France had the ability to influence events in the Principalities, and their policies too favored Russian control in the area. 34The Russian protectorate ‘The Russian decision to come to an agreement with Austria on Near Eastern questions was in conformity with the general tightening of re- ations among the conservative powers that occurred as a result of events in Western and Central Europe. In the early 1830s another round of revolutions took place, including a major revolt against Russian rule in the Polish territories. This rebellion proved exceedingly difficult to crush, and its consequences were to have a long-term effect on Russian foreign policy. After the failure of the movement a massive emigration from Poland took place, and many of its members organized revolu- tionary centers in their new homelands. The most effective leader among this group was Prince Adam Czartoryski, who had been Russian for- eign minister in the reign of Alexander I. With an office in Paris that functioned like a government-in-exile, he conducted negotiations with heads of state and dispatched agents all over Europe. A radical wing of the Polish emigration was also active; it cooperated with the Young Europe movement and was attracted to carbonari tactics. The great national enemy of the Polish groups, right and left alike, was tsarist Russia. Wherever they went, they carried with them their intense dis- like of this conservative power, which held the majority of the Polish ands under its sway. Polish emigrants were henceforth to have much influence in the Principalities. Some settled in the region. A large number fled into the Ottoman Empire, where they entered state service. From this base they worked to reconcile the Romanians and the Ottoman officials and to join them in a common front against Russia. Within the Romanian ands the Polish leaders were naturally received with sympathy by those who opposed the Russian protectorate, The Polish representatives in tum recognized the value of establishing a base in the Principalities, in particular in Moldavia, because of its strategic location in relation to the Russian-dominated Polish territories. The Russian government, well aware of these activities and their potential danger, continually put pressure on Romanian officials to restrain Polish exile groups. ‘The predominant Russian position in the Principalities was main- tained until 1854, but not without great difficulty and a major crisis in 1848. One problem that the Russsian officials faced was their lack of a firm base of support among the population at large. Russian rule was soon identified with the Organic Statutes and the control of the govern- ment by the great boyar families. Yet even the men who benefited by these conditions did not become reliable Russian partisans. The princes regularly got in touch with the agents of other powers; the boyars them- selves were split into hostile factions. Individuals supported the Russian position only when it suited their personal interests. Moreover, although 35Russia and the Romanian national state the Organic Statutes represented progress, they did not introduce the representative government that some members of the educated classes ‘came increasingly to favor. When the Russian officials insisted on the maintenance of the statutes virtually intact, those who sought more liberal institutions naturally saw Russia as the chief hindrance to fur ther progress. Nevertheless, despite the many problems that arose, the Russian of cials assigned to the Principalities did attempt to carry through th task of protecting Russian interests and assuring good government in the region. As individuals they established close relations with the ‘wealthy boyar families, many of whose members had been in the Russian service. Cosmopolitan, well educated, and experienced, the Russian rep- resentatives shared with the Romanian aristocracy a knowledge of the French language and a similar political outlook ‘A good description of life in the Principalities and the relations of Russian officials with the Romanian boyars from the Russian point of view is given in the memoirs of Nicholas Karlovich Giers, who became Russian foreign minister in 1882, but whose first post in the diplomatic service was in the consulate in Jassy. Giers showed his complete aware- ness of the Russian position in the country nd the system his government wished to maintain, He described the Organic Statutes as “a gift from Russia” and commented: “Our consuls were instructed to make sure that the regulations were strictly adhered to. This political aspect of their du- ties was of great importance and gave them an exceptional position in the Principalities.” He recognized the powerlessness of the suzerain and noted that “the vassal dependence [of the Principalities) upon the Porte was so weak that it was reduced merely to the paying of tribu ‘The Turks did not dare to interfere in questions of internal adminis- tration in Moldavia and Wallachia.” "* ‘With the departure of the Russian armies, the newly appointed princes took over the administration of the country. Ghica and Sturdza faced many similar problems. The chief immediate difficulty was the bad economic situation in the provinces and the heavy payments that were due. During the Russian occupation the tribute had not been paid; the back installments were still owing. Additional obligations were the traditional gifts that had to be made at the time of the investi- ture of the princes and the expenses left over from Kiselev's administra- tion, which, of course, the Principalities were supposed to pay. In ad- dition, serious political controversies soon arose. In both provinces a similar division of interest was to emerge. Under the rule of the Organic Statutes three centers of influence were established ~ the princes, the assemblies, and the Russian consulates. Any combination was possible 36The Russian protectorate among them. Usually the assemblies and the princes came into conflict, and both appealed for support to the Russian representatives, who then had the task of acting as final arbiters. This position gave the consulates fa great deal of influence, but it also drew them into even relatively minor conflicts. From the Russian point of view, Wallachia proved the more trouble- some province. The prince, Alexander Ghica, was a brother of a former ruler, Gregory Ghica. He had worked with Kiselev, and the Russian government considered him a reliable supporter. Once in office he pro- ceeded to make many enemies by his methods of administration, which included appointing his two brothers as ministers. The consul-general in Bucharest, Riickmann, worked with him, but a major issue that arose, involving Russian influence, caused friction between the con- sulate and the Wallachian government. Ritckmann was given the diff cult task of securing the acceptance of a so-called Additional Article to the Organic Statutes, one that the Russian government claimed had been “eft out” of the original version, This highly controversial provision made the approval of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire necessary for any change in the statutes. This further limitation on the political rights of the Principalities was strongly resented, but, as Giers com- mented, "It was considered necessary to keep Moldo-Wallachian politi- cal independence within definite bounds.”'* Although Ghica acceded to the Russian demands, the Wallachian assembly, by then opposed to the prince, refused to accept the article. This obdurate attitude resulted in the dissolution of the assembly and the election of another, which proved similarly stubborn, The Russian government finally met the problem by persuading the Porte to issue a firman in May 1838 that forced the acceptance of the provision. ‘The mood of the assembly remained hostile to the prince, Elections held in 1841 strengthened the ranks of his opponents. Meanwhile, in the previous year a new Russian consul-general had been appointed. Like his predecessor, I. A. Dashkov was soon drawn deeply into the con- flict between the prince and the legislature.!” The assembly drew up a petition against the ruler, as it had the right to do, and the document wwas presented to both the Russian and Ottoman governments, which then sent commissioners to investigate the situation. What then hap- pened is described in the Giers memoirs as follows: One can imagine the intrigues that brought about the appearance of these political inspectors. The Turkish commissioner, as is customary, took full ad- Vantage of the situation, and made a fortune by taking bribes from the hospo- dar as well as from each of the candidates for the office of prince by promising each individual the support of the Porte. While our representative, listening 37Russia and the Romanian national state to anybody and everybody, tried to form a fair opinion on the state of affairs, he was deceived, being unfamiliar with both the region and the people. In this situation the opposition triumphed, and Ghica was deposed in October with the approval of both the Ottoman and the Russian gov- ernments. Giers disapproved, believing that “the kind and noble” Dash- kov had been too much influenced by his friend George Bibescu. Although the Ghica administration had been bad, Giers commented that nothing better could be “expected of his opponents, trained in the school of political intrigue, as were all the boyars of that time ~ intrigue of which you can receive a true conception only in the East.”"* In December 1842 a specially elected assembly chose a candidate favored by Dashkov ~ Bibescu. One of the richest boyars in the country, he was well educated and he had studied law in Paris. Although he had been part of the opposition to Ghica in the assembly, that body turned against him as strongly as it had against his predecessor. Some legitimate grievances existed, but the basic problem remained that neither in Wallachia nor in Moldavia would the great boyars accept the authority of one of their number. Each individually sought the office for himself and fought against whoever held it. Soon a new issue involving Russian influence became the center of the conflict between the prince and the assembly. The quarrel this time concerned the question of concessions given to a Russian engineer, ‘Trandafilov, to explore the country and exploit the mineral resources he discovered. The opposition became so intense that Bibescu finally obtained the approval of Russia and the Porte to dissolve the assembly. He then governed the country by decree for two years. The next as- sembly, elected in 1846, was packed with his supporters. Despite the continual controversies, some advances were made in this period. A Jaw on naturalization passed in 1847 made it easy for a Moldavian to be- come a Wallachian citizen. A customs union, a matter of great impor- tance for the future, was agreed upon in Wallachia in 1846 and in Moldavia in 1847. It came into effect in 1848. Conditions were relatively more tranquil in Moldavia, where a clever prince ruled. Michael Sturdza, thirty-nine years old at the time of his appointment, was a practical, enterprising, and strong ruler, but also qrafty and corrupt. Although he sought relations with the other powers, he took great care not to antagonize the Russian government. He se- cured the acceptance of the Additional Article without difficulty. He was also responsible for many important internal advances; during his reign roads, bridges, and hospitals were built and the postal service was improved. Like his colleague in Wallachia, Sturdza faced the con- stant opposition of boyars who were jealous of his position or who dis- 38The Russian protectorate liked his policies. His rule was also identified with the Organic Statutes and the Russian domination. Those who opposed the system and the protecting powers naturally sought his removal. ‘THE RESISTANCE TO THE PROTECTORATE THE NATIONAL OPPOSITION AND THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 By the 1840s the Russian government had gained a large number of enemies in the Principalities. ‘The obvious position of dominance, to- gether with the often crude and demeaning manner in which it was en- forced, rankled. The identification of the Organic Statutes with Russian rule damaged the regimes based on these documents, The unwillingness of the Russian officials to accept basic modifications in the system and their insistence on approving any changes whatsoever caused further feelings of grievance. Moreover, Russian rule, as has been emphasized, maintained the domination of a class and a political and social system. Opposition to boyar preeminence or to the untepresentative character of the state institutions could only reflect on the protector. Meanwhile, although the Russian government continued to attempt to preserve the status quo, life in the Principalities was changing. In his memoirs Giers made particular reference to the contrast between the older generation, who usually wore the national costume, and the youth, who followed the latest Paris fashions ~ differences that also reflected evolving attitudes. The change, Giers believed, had begun during the administration of Kiselev.!? Certainly, during the years of the protec torate, Romanians were, as in the past, in touch with and aware of the political, social, and cultural events in Central and Western Europe. The attitude of the privileged youth, the sons of the boyars, was to be- come particularly important for the transmission of radical ideas into the Principalities. Since no institutions of higher education were avail- able in the Principalities, students had to go abroad for university-level training. The great majority went to Paris, although some attended universities in Vienna or the German states. Few were attracted to St. Petersburg. Paris, of course, was the center for the propagation of the liberal-national revolutionary doctrines of the age, ideals that were to prove immensely attractive to young Romanians and applicable to the conditions in their country.” ‘The Russian government was well aware of the situation, During the reign of Nicholas I, France, despite the relatively conservative regimes of, first, the Bourbon restoration, and second, Louis Philippe, was re- garded with extreme suspicion as the harborer of dangerous revolution. 39Russia and the Romanian national state ary movements. In foreign relations too France was regarded as the chief Russian adversary, The influence that students educated in Paris could have on the Russian protectorate was recognized. In November 1846 Nesselrode instructed Dashkov to try to persuade Romanian stu- dents to attend universities in countries “where public instruction is under the control of governments that profess monarchical and con- servative principles.” If the authorities in the Principalities could not stop students from going to Paris, they should at least “discourage that tendency by encouraging in contrast studies made in Russia, Aust and Prussia.” Subventions could enable needy students to go to these countries, and when they finished their education, “they could be given preference in advantageous employment in the teaching career as in the other branches of public service.”* Despite the Russian awareness of the problem, Romanian students and intellectuals made Paris their spiritual center. Most of the major political leaders for the future congregated there, including Nicholas and Radu Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, Ion and Dumitru Bratianu, Nicholas Balcescu, and Alexander foan Cuza. Michael Kogilniceanu, in contrast, studied in Berlin, Their constant discussions and debates concerning the conditions in their country did not result in the formulation of a single program, but they did share certain conceptions common to the liberal-national revolutionary programs of the time. In general, they agreed that a constitutional regime should be introduced into the Pri ipalities, one including representative institutions that would widen the base of the government to bring in the educated, property-owning section of society. They approved of the principle of equality before the law and in the assessment of taxes. They also sought provisions to guarantee civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, the press, and as- sembly. Their major problem was to be the resolution of the land and peasant question. Since the majority, as sons of landholders, benefited from the existing social conditions, many proved reluctant to espouse doctrines that might cause them personal losses. Thus few of the pro- posals were democratic. The open and free participation in national politics of the great peasant majority was not a goal of the major revo- Tutionary programs. All, of course, wished to change the government of the Principalities to eliminate the Russian influence and to alter, or dispense with, the Organic Statutes. Perhaps more important than the generally liberal cast of the Ro- manian revolutionary ideology was its national direction. Certainly, as far as the Russian position in the Principalities was concerned, it was this aspect which was to have the deepest and most negative results. ‘The Romanian intellectuals were fully aware of and deeply humiliated 40The Russian protectorate by the implications of the Russian protectorate. In Paris they came un- der the influence of the ideas of romantic nationalism, including revolu- tionary concepts of national liberation. Like others in the romantic age, they became greatly interested in the origins of their people and in classical civilization. With their emphasis on the Roman and Dacian heritage of the Romanian people, they naturally tended to have an attitude toward Russia divergent from that of many in the older gen- eration, some of whom saw Russia as an Orthodox brother and 2 useful balance to Ottoman control. In contrast, the Latin background of the Romanian nationality appeared to link the Romanian people, not with the Slavs, but with the French and the Italians. Moreover, like other revolutionaries of the period, the Romanians looked at tsarist Russia as the embodiment of political and social backwardness; France, in con- trast, symbolized progress, reason, and beauty. Educated in Western countries and deeply convinced of the validity of the revolutionary ideals, the emerging Romanian leaders were to reject the Orthodox, Ottoman legacy with its Russian ties and to stress theit Roman and Dacian origins and the Latin basis of their language. The national pro- gram was exceedingly broad. The emphasis was on the ending of both Russian and Ottoman political control in Moldavia and Wallachia and the unification of these Principalities. Some, however, looked forward to the full union of what they regarded as the rightful Romanian lands, including not only these two provinces, but also Bukovina, Transyl- vania, and Bessarabia; Habsburg possessions, as well as Russian and Ottoman interests, were thus involved. ‘The most effective leadership of the movement against Russian pro- tection and the regime of the Organic Statutes was in the hands of the revolutionary youth both within and without the Principalities. The boyars’ opposition to the princes has been described. Their internal jealousies, however, prevented the organization of a strong opposition. ‘The new leaders had the advantage of a single ideology, and they used European examples of revolutionary strategy. Most important was the formation of various societies, either secret or public. Within the Prin- cipalities literary societies could meet openly. Others were secret and remained in close touch with similar organizations abroad. All re- cruited members from those who opposed the protectorate, the regimes in power, and, in particular, the close association with autocratic, backward, Orthodox Russia. The strong anti-Russian attitude, the “tendency toward ingratitude,” as the Russian consul in Jassy at this time, Karl Evstafevich Kotesbu, expressed it, was well known to the Russian government. In a memorandum to Nesselrode, Kotsebu com- mented on the “spirit hostile to Russia that wins over the masses, exalts 4Russia and the Romanian national state their imagination, and turns them away from the horizon of thei ral destiny in order to lose them in the shadow of an ideal hope.’ ‘The Russian agents were particularly apprehensive about the obvious links between the Romanian revolutionaries and the Polish movement. In 1846 a revolt broke out in Cracow, which was under Habsburg con- trol. The failure of this action did nothing to quell the intensity of Polish feeling or to limit the intrigues of the emigrants. The Russian officials remained concerned in particular with the activities of those connected with Czartoryski, The obvious sympathy with which the French government regarded Polish actions and the assistance that French diplomats offered were similarly observed with distaste In February 1848 the fall of the government of Louis Philippe marked the commencement of a revolutionary wave that swept through Europe Italy, the German states, and the Habsburg Monarchy were the scenes of revolts that succeeded in overturning the governments in power. The Principalities too were caught up in these events. The first crisis occurred. in Moldavia, where on March 27/April 8 a large crowd, consisting chiefly of townspeople, liberal boyars, and those who opposed the Sturdza regime, assembled in the St. Petersburg Hotel. Speeches attack- ing the prince were made, and a committee was appointed to draw up a petition. This document, which refiected the standard liberal program, ‘was submitted to Sturdza, who not only rejected it but proceeded to arrest about three hundred of the participants in the demonstration, Many were subsequently sent to prison or into exile. This firm reaction ended revolutionary activity in that principality.** ‘The course of events in Wallachia was to be quite different. Here the revolution had the services of talented leaders, some of whom were to exert the predominant influence on Romanian political life for the next four decades. Two of these, on Ghica and C. A. Rosetti, were in Bucharest already, but they waited for the return of some of their friends who were abroad, notably Nicholas Baleescu and Jon Britianu. ‘They were joined by the Golescu brothers. In one of the first moves Ghica was sent to Constantinople to reassure the Ottoman government on the aims of the revolt. As in the time of Tudor Viadimirescu, the leaders tried to secure at least the neutrality of the suzerain power through assurances that the position of the Porte in the Principalities would not be affected. In Constantinople the efforts of Ghica were sup- ported by the Polish emigrés and the French and British embassies. ‘The Wallachian revolution was formally announced at Islax on June 9/21, at which time a proclamation was read that included a ‘ewenty-two-point program of reform. The clear objective of the rebel- aThe Russian protectorate Jion was the end of Russian protection and the overthrow of the regime based on the Organic Statutes. The revolutionary forces won an almost immediate victory. In Bucharest Bibescu agreed to sign the Islaz Proc- lamation, but he soon lost his nerve, abdicated, and left for Transyl- vania, A government was then set up with Metropolitan Neofit at its head. Despite this bloodless victory, the revolution had certain obvious weaknesses. It did not have, for instance, an armed force at its command. Viadimirescu, it will be remembered, had organized the People’s As- sembly. In June Colonel George Magheru was entrusted with the for- mation of a national guard; he subsequently left for Oltenia to set up a camp. The many domestic difficulties faced by the revolutionary leaders and the friction among them certainly weakened the movement, but for the ultimate success or failure of the effort the reaction of the Rus. sian and Ottoman governments would be the determining factor. Obviously, the revolutionary regime could not assemble the forces needed to resist an Ottoman or Russian occupation. Although there was some hope for an understanding with Constantinople, the Ro- manian leaders could not expect anything but enmity from Russia. The entire revolutionary effort was directed against Russian control and the government that Russia sponsored. Moreover, the Wallachian move- ‘ment was but a small part of the Europe-wide changes that threatened to disturb the balance of power and to endanger Russian security. ‘The events of 1848 caused extreme anxiety to Nicholas 1. Although known for his highly conservative views, he had been willing to accept some liberal reforms under certain circumstances. He was a constitu- tional ruler in Poland until 1830; in 1844 he had accepted the constitt- tional government established in Greece even though it had be brought about by revolutionary action. Some regarded the Organic Statutes as constitutions of a sort. In general, the tsar, like his predeces- sor, was willing to accept political reform as long as it was introduced through legal procedures and preferably under the sponsorship of a legitimate ruler. He was, however, strongly opposed to revolutionary activity such as that which won such astounding victories in 1848. Although he held these principles, Nicholas did not particularly regret the fall of the July Monarchy; he had never liked Louis Philippe’s regime. The subsequent victory of the revolutionary forces in Vienna and Berlin in March, however, was an entirely different matter. Russia had lost the support of its closest allies, and the entire Central European area had been opened to revolutionary infiuences. The Russian govern- ment was, nevertheless, paralyzed. In fear of a similar uprising in its 43Russia and the Romanian national state Polish territories and unprepared for military intervention on a wide scale, the tsar could only wait, observe the course of events, and strength- en his armed forces. ‘The policy of abstention adopted toward the revolt in Western and Central Europe was not to be applied to the Principalities. From the beginning the Russian government made it clear that the situation there was quite different. The Romanian revolutionary movement had as a main objective the removal of Russian control. It also represented the first truly national manifestation in the region. Previous revolts had been rooted either in peasant social and economic grievances or in the conspiracies of the boyars against the regimes in power. In contrast, the Wallachian rebellion not only was specifically anti-Russian in direc- tion, but was part of a great European movement whose success would alter the balance of power on the Continent and perhaps lead to similar internal disorders in Russia itself. Even before the outbreak of revolutionary activity in the Prineipali- ties, the Russian government had made its attitude known. In an in- struction of March 16/28 to Kotsebu, Nesselrode wrote that although Russia would not intervene in European countries unless requested, this policy did not apply to the Ottoman lands under Russian protec tion. There political changes would not be tolerated, and force would be the response to attempts to change political conditions, These de- cisions were communicated to the hospodars, and the determination to intervene if necessary was made clear. Sturdza’s prompt suppression of the agitation in Jassy made such action unnecessary. Nevertheless, the tsar did take certain steps. In April he sent General Alexander Osipovich Duhamel, an aide-de-camp, to the Principalities to report on the situation. At the same time he concentrated his Fifteenth Division in Bessarabia. Duhamel visited both capitals, where he discussed the situa- tion with the leading political figures and emphasized the Russian de- termination not to allow political changes. In addition to taking these measures, the Russian government re- mained in contact with the Porte, which in May dispatched its own special commissioner, Talaat Effendi. The Ottoman envoy, like his Russian counterpart, warned that the political organization established by the Organic Statutes must remain unaltered. Thus both the Russian and the Ottoman governments had made their attitudes known before the outbreak of the Wallachian revolution. ‘The provisional government in Bucharest therefore had good reason to fear immediate Russian military action. On June 12/24, even be- fore Bibescu abdicated, Kotsebu strongly protested the breaking of the 44The Russian protectorate Organic Statutes, and he announced his departure. He told the French representative that he did not know what the tsar would decide, but he believed that sufficient motives for intervention existed. Duhamel, who was still in Bucharest, withdrew to Bessarabia The decision to initiate a military occupation was in fact made not by Nicholas I, but by Duhamel, who had been given the power to call in a special military unit organized for that purpose. Considerable con- fusion, including counterorders by the tsar, accompanied the action, but Russian troops did enter Moldavia on June 25/July 7. They first marched to Jassy, where their objective was to assure that a revolt similar to that in Wallachia did not take place in Moldavia. The oc- cupation of Moldavia, where the revolutionary danger was now mini- mal, should have been the first step to a similar action in Wallachia. Expecting such an occurrence, the members of the provisional govern- ‘ment, in a moment of panic, fled to the mountains on June 28/July 10. ‘A new regime was established, but it was immediately overthrown by a popular reaction. The revolutionary leaders then returned to Bucha- rest, where they were given a three-month respite from further outside dangers. Although Russian troops were stationed in Moldavia, Nicholas 1 regretted Duhamel’s decision. He believed that the cooperation of the Ottoman government should have been first obtained. Not only did he wish to end the occupation of Moldavia as soon as possible, but he did not at first foresee intervention in Wallachia. The decision to act in concert with the Porte was communicated to the Russian represen- tatives in Constantinople, who initiated discussions with Ottoman offi- cials concerning the question of possible joint action. The Russian attitude at this time was stated in a circular dispatch of July 19/31, which declared that the previous occupation of Moldavia was designed to prevent the spread of revolutionary activities from Wallachia. The Russian government had no intention of interfering in the affairs of other states, but it was determined to maintain its treaty rights in the Principalities, whose obligations to both Russia and the Porte were stressed. The document declared that the objective of the Wallachian revolutionaries was to set up, under the name of a Daco-Roman kingdom, a new separate and independent state, for the formation of which they will come to an agreement with their brothers from Moldavia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, ‘The realiz tion of such a plan, if i is allowed to happen, would lead to serious conse- quences. Should, in’ the name of an alleged nationality, whose origin is lost in the night of the ages, the Moldo-Wallachians come sometime to separate 45Russia and the Romanian national state from Turkey, in pursuance of the same principle, under the influence of the same desire, one would soon sce Bulgaria, Rumelia, all of the races with di- verse languages that make up the Ottoman Empire, aspire also to emancipate themselves, in order each to form a separate state, ‘The dispatch concluded with the assurance that the Russian interven- tion in Moldavia was not a precedent for similar action in Europe, since the Russian rights in the East “are based on treaties that do not exist in the West." Faced with the apparent danger of an immediate Russian interven- tion, the revolutionary government in Wallachia suffered from the extreme disadvantage that it could expect assistance from no outside European power. Although the new regime did send emissaries abroad, it was soon obvious that their efforts would be in vain. France, the coun- try to which the Romanian leadership felt its closest attachment, was faced with grave internal problems of its own. The French government expressed its sympathy and advised the Wallachians not to provoke a Russian intervention by extreme actions. Even less success was gained in Britain, where che government, for considerations of general policy, could not become involved in the events of the region. Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, of course, were in the midst of a domestic revo- Intionary crisis. In these dangerous circumstances the Wallachian revolutionary lead- ets had no alternative but to turn to the Porte. Regarding Ottoman suzerainty as a lesser evil and recognizing the common interest in the removal of Russian predominance, they made a great effort to gain the acceptance of the Porte for their actions. In Constantinople Ion Ghica, the representative of the revolutionary government, continued to assure the Ottoman officials of Romanian loyalty and to promise that no mea- sures would be taken that would lessen the sultan’s authority. Should an intervention be necessary, the Romanian leaders preferred that it be carried out by the Ottoman army alone, rather than by a joint action with Russia. ‘The Ottoman government found itself in a most uncomfortable posi- tion. The Turkish statesmen were, of course, delighted with the success of amovement directed against Russian predominance in the Principal ties, although they, of course, were against revolutionary activities in principle. The opportunity might be exploited to remove Russian con- trol from the provinces. The military weakness of the Porte, however, prevented it from acting to achieve such an objective. In fact, it soon came under strong pressure to take actions that would in fact result in the reestablishment of Russian influence, The ambassador, Vladimir Pavlovich Titov, and the other Russian representatives urged the Porte 46The Russian protectorate to join with St, Petersburg in crushing this revolutionary disturbance. Because of the problems that it faced in Gentral Europe at the time, the Russian government at first wished the Ottoman army to deal with the crisis in Bucharest. Under conflicting pressures, the Porte finally sent a new commissioner, Suleiman Pasha, to investigate the situation. Should he need it, he had at his service an army of twenty thousand under the command of Omer Pasha. Suleiman arrived in Giurgiu on July 19/31. Entering into nego- tiations with the Wallachian leaders, he was able to obtain changes in the government, but it was still dominated by those who had been prominent in the revolution. When the conciliatory nature of Sul man’s actions became obvious, the Russian government objected strong- ly. The Ottoman envoy had negotiated with the revolutionary leaders and had agreed to some of their requests. The Russian officials, in contrast, wanted a complete change of government, a full disavowal of the revolutionary acts, and a punishment of the conspirators. The old order of the Organic Statutes was to be restored intact. Although the Ottoman government attempted to justify Suleiman's actions, it agreed that more drastic changes would have to be made. One of the leading statesmen of the empire, Fuad Pasha, was thus sent to Wallachia. He proceeded to Galatz, where, during his days in the quarantine, he con- sulted with Duhamel and with some Romanian leaders. Meanwhile, an atmosphere of increasing tension was apparent in Bucharest; rumors of an impending occupation spread. With the pop- ulation in a state of agitation and excitement, incidents could be ex- pected to occur. A mob in Bucharest burned a copy of the Organic Statutes, and a small monument erected in honor of Kiselev was de- stroyed. Many peasants arrived from the countryside, With so much combustible material at hand, some demonstrations were inevitable. On September 13/25 Fuad entered the country together with the Otto- man troops. Acts of violence, the most notable being a clash with a group of firemen resulting in about two hundred casualties on each side, accompanied the occupation, ‘Once in Bucharest Fuad called together the leading boyars. He read to them a firman dissolving the previous government and naming Con- stantine Cantacuzino, a Russian candidate, as the single regent. The former conditions had thus been brought back with little bloodshed. Faced with overwhelming military might, the Wallachian revolution- aries could not resist, although there was some disagreement on the question. The volunteer camp in the mountains, under the direction of Magheru, was disbanded. Without a military force of their own the revolutionary leaders could only surrender. 7Russia and the Romanian national state Despite the Ottoman action, carried through under pressure from Russia, that government was not satisfied. There were fears that the Ottoman commissioner would not show sufficient enthusiasm in uncov- ering any remaining revolutionary actions. Moreover, a proper attitude of contrition was not apparent in Bucharest. Other justifications for action also existed. Some conservative boyars, fearing a resurgence of the revolutionary movement, were requesting assistance. The concur- rent victory of the Hungarian revolution and events in the Habsburg Empire made the control of Wallachia of increased strategic signifi- cance, The political situation in the province had to be kept under firm control. In addition, Nicholas I was now prepared to move against the revolutionary danger both in Central Europe and in the Principalities. With 250,000 soldiers ready to march, he had the means to intervene de- cisively in both areas. ‘The Russian intervention did not please the Porte, which saw no need for the action. When Fuad arrived in Bucharest on September 13/25, Duhamel informed him of the imminent arrival of a Russian army under the command of General Alexander Nikolaevich Liiders:5 Fuad, although without official instructions on the matter, opposed the Russian intervention, arguing that order was fully restored and further military action was not necessary. The danger of incidents should Rus- sian and Turkish troops occupy the city together was also stressed. Nevertheless, on September 16/28 the Russian army entered Bucharest. ‘The Russian official pronouncements emphasized cooperation with the Porte, although no prior agreement had in fact been made. Once the Russian army crossed the Wallachian frontier, it became obvious once again that Russia, not the Ottoman Empire, was the state that in fact controlled Wallachia. General Liders, working with Duhamel and Kotsebu, dominated the Gantacuzino administration; Fuad played a distinctly secondary role. ‘The Russian occupation was carried out without the least sign of resistance. Peaceful conditions had been reestablished before the ar- rival of the Russian army. Moreover, the administration in office had Russian approval. With the major steps taken toward assuring stable government, the Russian officials could turn to the task of arresting and punishing those who had taken part in the revolt. The Russian officials, in contrast to the Ottoman, placed emphasis on the apprehension of former revolutionaries. They also wished to make sure that the admin- istration was purged of those who had taken office during the period of the revolt, Although the Russian measures were often harsh, there was certainly no reign of terror. In fact, in comparison to what happened to revolutionary leaders in other areas, for instance in Transylvania in 8The Russian protectorate 1849, the treatment was mild. Some of those apprehended served prison sentences; others lost their government offices or had property con- fiscated. Of course, after the failure of the revolution those most deeply implicated in it fled abroad. There they continued their political activi- ties and, as shall be seen, caused great concern to the Russian officials. However, only a decade later the majority of those involved in the movement were back in the Principalities and engaged in their former occupations. Meanwhile, the revolutionary ideals and goals remained alive among the exiles. Despite the relative moderation of the occupation, the new inter- vention caused extreme bitterness, Although the Russian declarations emphasized that the intention was to rescue the majority of the nation from the misdeeds of a minority, the fact remained that the revolution. ary leadership had commanded the support of most of the population. ‘The Russian actions were thus viewed as yet another attempt to sup press the true wishes of the people. This difficult situation was com- pounded by the presence of the army of occupation and the numerous problems that we have seen in previous similar episodes. Once again complaints were made that the Russian soldiers were taking supplies and not paying for them. Difficulties were met in connection with the requisitioning of housing and transport. The occupation was also a major financial burden for the state. The entire cost of the undertaking was charged to the Principalities, with the sum divided between them. To meet the immediate problem of payment, the tsar “magnanimously”” granted 2 loan of 300,000 rubles.** The Ottoman government, in con- trast, did not charge the cost of the occupation to the provinces, and its officials paid for supplies. ‘The major Russian objectives were achieved during the first months, and thereafter the affairs of the Principalities assumed a secondary po- sition in Russian policy. In June 1849, answering an appeal from the young emperor Franz Joseph, Nicholas I sent his armies into Transyl- vania. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and the failure of similar movements throughout Central Europe, the tsar could regard the European scene with satisfaction. Despite their limited extent and ultimate failure, the events of 1848 were to leave a lasting imprint on Romanian political development. Aswe shall see, the revolutionary movement was to provide the national leadership for the next four decades. The future relationship with Rus- sia was similarly shaped by this episode. It was clear that the program of the Organic Statutes represented the furthest limit that the Russian government would allow for political reform. Although Russian back- ing had previously aided the Principalities in resisting the claims of the 49Russia and the Romanian national state Porte, the Russian protectorship by the middle of the century had be- come as burdensome as the former Ottoman control. Autocratic Russia, holding Polish lands, could not be expected to be sympathetic to the liberal, national ideals of the most advanced and effective element in Romanian political life. ‘THE PROTECTORATE RENEWED, 1849-1854 After the suppression of the revolutionary government in Wallachia and the occupation of both provinces, the Russian authorities were next faced with the problem of setting up governments that would serve their interests. In April 1849 General Grabbe was sent to Constantinople to negotiate a new agreement, and in May the protecting power and the suzerain signed yet another treaty regulating the status of the Princi- palities. The Convention of Balta Liman marked the high point of the Russian domination. The princes were henceforth to be named by Russia and the Porte, rather than elected by native assemblies. Their terms of office were reduced from life to seven years. The boyar assem- blies were replaced by smaller councils, known again as divans, whose members were to be chosen by the princes, In addition, commissions were to be set up whose function would be to revise the Organic Statutes. ‘Their work was to be examined by the Ottoman government, which would then consult with Russia27 If the changes were approved, the Porte would issue the necessary proclamations. Barbu $titbei, the broth- er of Bibescu, was named the ruler of Wallachia; Gregory A. Ghica was appointed for Moldavia. ‘The new arrangements did nothing at all to improve political con- ditions or to calm the general dissatisfaction. The revolution had indeed been suppressed, but liberals and conservatives alike wanted an end to the Russian intervention, Moreover, it was difficult to establish stable administrations. No sooner had the new princes been named than they became the targets of attack by the boyar factions who had lost out by the nominations. The previous bitter struggles over political offices continued, and the disaffected parties once again addressed appeals to the Russian consulates. Although all groups complained about Rus- sian interference in principle, few, as in the past, were adverse to call- ing for Russian aid to defend their individual interests. The official Russian attitude to expressions of dissatisfaction was given in a Nessel- rode instruction of 1851 to the consulates in the Principalities ‘We have certainly not had the hope of setting up in the Principalities gov- cernments secure from every reproach, from every complaint. What we had in view wo years ago was to reestablish in these provinces the tranquility that 50.The Russian protectorate ‘was profoundly troubled by some audacious agitators and to place at the head of their new administration men who were the most generally considered as competent and honest. Until this time the princes Stirbei and Ghica have justified the choice of the ewo courts that gave them their votes and it will not be on the basis of vague grievances or to satisfy personal rivalries that we will change our opinion in their regard, or that we will consent co modify the clauses of the Convention of Balta Liman. Despite the support given the princes, the Russian officials continued to report on the prevalent corruption and misgovernment. There were attempts to improve the situation, Nominations were made for com- missions that were to revise the Organic Statutes, and they began their work. It is interesting to note that the man in charge of military ad- ministration, General Duhamel, was, like his predecessor, Kiselev, con- cerned about the condition of the peasants. In 1849, in regard to the nominations for the commissions, he wrote: Since it is a question of improving the situation of the farmer, and since this result can be obtained only by concessions on the part of the landlords, I be lieve that it is necessary, as far as possible, to place on the committees of re vision individuals who have compassion for the miseries of the people and who by their social position have it in their power to take the initiative toward some indispensable sacrifices? Duhamel also recognized the political helplessness of the peasant. Writing in 1851, he described how the agents of the landholders came to understandings with the lower officials, who were able to place stuch pressure on the peasants that many, in despair, emigrated to other Ottoman lands or to Transylvania." Despite such Russian official con- cern, the regulations adopted in 1851 concerning agrarian relations in both Principalities in fact worsened the peasants’ relative position, Even though the necessity for reform was recognized, and indeed some changes were introduced, the Russian officials were limited in their choice of actions. The fear of revolutionary ferment far outweighed any convictions that the political system had to be changed. The con- sulates had in the past regularly reported on the feelings that remained. from the revolutionary period." Both princes were warned by the Rus- sian authorities to remain on guard against subversive activities and to keep a close watch over correspondence carried on between individuals in the provinces and those in the emigration. The Russian consuls were fully aware of the activities of the exiles and their influence in the country. On September 21/October 3, 1851 the Russian consul in Buch- arest, Khaltchinskii, reported to Nesselrode on the continuing problems in regard to the emigrants: “Besides the incendiary writing that is sent back into the country, the numerous Wallachian travelers who this yearRussia and the Romanian national state visited Paris and London brought back on their return the inspirations of their exiled compatriots and they kept alive an agitation of spirits that deserves an added vigilance on the part of the two hospodars.”3* ‘Before the termination of the occupation in 1851, the Russian officials took the occasion to warn about what could happen should disturbances again break out. In a declaration designed to appear in the official journals of the Principalities, the Russian authorities made it clear that they were prepared for another intervention.** In his instructions to his consuls Nesselrode also emphasized that Russia intended to main- tain its influence and its rights under the treaties. Should “the revolu- tionary spirit again raise its head” and should the princes be unable to handle the situation, the army corps stationed in Bessarabia would march in “to reestablish order and to deliver the guilty to a severe justice." ‘With this Russian determination it did indeed appear as if the goals of the revolutionary movement had little hope of success, at least in the immediate future. Indeed, in the years following the crushing of the revolt, the international situation too appeared extremely dark for the Romanian revolutionaries, as well as for their Polish, Hungarian, Ger- man, and Italian counterparts. The conservative forces had triumphed throughout Central Europe. The Convention of Balta Liman had tightened the Russian hold on the Principalities, and few expected that the tsarist government would soon consent to modifications in its strong position. In this bleak scene only one encouraging sign remained. As we have seen, the revolutionaries had been greatly influenced by their French connections. The single major success of 1848 had been achieved in Paris with the victory of Louis Napoleon. The experiences of the revolutionary year had shown the Romanians as well as the Italians that they could not hope to achieve their national goals without great-power assistance. In the next years Louis Napoleon was to prove a valuable ally and a supporter of the national movements. ‘Tue ROMANIAN EMIGRATION ‘The political activities of the Romanian emigration were to have a major importance not only in winning support for the national cause, butalso for future Russian relations with the Principalities.® Although most of those who had participated in the revolutionary events in Moldavia were soon able to resume their former lives, none of the major Wallachian leaders could return. Moreover, the Wallachian govern- ment, as we have seen, took measures to attempt to prevent any cor respondence or contact between them and their friends and relations 52The Russian protectorate in the Principality. During this period of exile they continued their political activities from various centers, including England, the Otto- man Empire, Greece, and Switzerland, although Paris remained the center. At first, the factionalism and ideological division that had been apparent during the revolutionary period continued. Separated by personal feelings and lacking a common social and political goal, they could not rally around a single leader or program. In fact, the one major objective that won universal approval was the destruction of the Russian protectorate. In other matters there was considerable differ- ence of opinion. Some, for instance, sought complete independence, whereas others favored a continuation of the association with the Otto: man Empire. Similar disagreements existed over the form of government to be established in the future and the great powers that should be sought as friends and allies. Vienna and Berlin had their partisans, as, well as Paris. France, nevertheless, continued to offer the chief attraction. Many of the emigrés simply returned to their former associations and activities. ‘Two organizations, the Romanian Democratic Committee and the Asso- ciation of Romanian Students, were formed under the leadership of men who not only had been prominent in the revolution, but were to play major roles in the future, such as C. A, Rosetti, Dumitru and Ton C. Bratiann, Alexander Golescu, George Cretulescu, and others. The majority supported a radical program, including the unification of all of the Romanian lands, full independence from both Russian and Otto- man control, a republican government, and social equality. The out- standing theoretician, N. Balcescu, died in 1852. ‘At first, the emigrés’ closest connections were with French intellec- tuals, such as Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet, and A. de Lamartine, and with socialist circles. They also, naturally, were close to other exile groups, notably the Poles. Some became associated with radical move- ments, in particular with Mazzini and his European Democratic Com- mittee. These activities did not endear them to French official circles, especially as the government of Louis Napoleon moved to the right. ‘Their radical programs made them even more suspect after Napoleon’s coup d'état of December 1851. In June 1853 Jon Britianu was arrested in connection with a plot to assassinate Napoleon. Although he was cleared of the major charge, he was condemned to three years’ detention for his other activities. ‘The change of atmosphere in Paris forced the exiles to face realities ‘The retention of their more radical social and political ideals could obviously lead to a complete disaster. Moreover, these were the issues that had been the chief cause of dissension within the emigré ranks pre- 53Russia and the Romanian national state viously. Faced with this situation, the Romanian leadership wisely ac cepted the necessity of circumscribing the national program. The em- phasis was shifted to the securing of limited goals: the removal of the Russian protectorate, the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the appointment ofa foreign prince. The more radical aspects of the rev- olutionary program were abandoned; national unification was limited to the two Principalities, with the question of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia left for the future, Some former radicals, such as the Bratianu brothers, were to move quite noticeably to the right. ‘The basis was thus set for winning the support of the French ruler, who took the title of Emperor Napoleon HII in 1832. Already a firm adherent of the national idea, he added the Romanian cause to his previous Polish and Italian enthusiasms. This French connection was certainly a logical association for the Romanian nationalists. With their emphasis on their Daco-Roman origins and their Latinity, an alliance with the strongest Latin great power was advisable. Moreover, the at- tention given to the common cultural association won the Romanians supporters among French intellectuals of a romanticnationalist bent. ‘The Latin linguistic bond had a particularly great attraction here. For instance, Quinet wrote: “The first qualification (titre) of the Ro- manians, the most striking, is incontestably their language. It is their true mark of nobility amid the barbarians.” In the same vein he con: tinued: “The Romanians say to the West: ‘Restore to us our rightful place (droit de cite) in the family of Latin peoples. We are your though surrounded by barbarians. Rescue us from this captivity ‘The cultural superiority repeatedly emphasized in the declarations of both the Romanian and the French romantic nationalists, of course, di- rectly reflected on the Russian position in the Principalities. The deep conviction of Latin superiority over the surrounding Slavic people, in particular the Russians, was to be an abiding attribute of Romanian na- tionalism. Previously, Russian and conservative Romanian leaders had emphasized the cultural advantages of their Orthodox civilization over that of the “barbarian” Muslim conquerors. Now Frenchoriented Romanian liberals were to use the same vocabulary to attack the Rus sian protectorate. Although the major emphasis of the Romanian effort was directed toward gaining French support, attempts were also made to win British approval. Here the major work was carried out by D. Bratiann, who lived in London from 1851 to 1857. In 1851 the Philo-Romanian So- ciety was formed among sympathizers with the Romanian cause. In Britain the arguments used were those which would have most appeal to local interests, including the iniquity of the Russian protectorate and 54The Russian protectorate the opportunities for commercial gain that would be opened once the Russian control over the lower Danube was lifted. Despite the fact that the Romanian arguments fitted well into the growing anti-Russian sentiment, they did not convince the influential British statesmen, such as Lord Palmerston. Although the ending of the protectorate did be- come part of the British peace objectives during the Crimean War, the restoral of Ottoman authority, rather than the establishment of a strong Romanian national unit, was the goal of the British leadership. Nevertheless, the Romanian emigrés in both Britain and France by 1854 had accomplished much toward educating influential public opin: ion about conditions in the Principalities. Placing great emphasis on publicity and propaganda, they wrote books, pamphlets, and articles for journals and newspapers. They also organized countless public meetings and made efforts to convert prominent public figures to their cause. Although they disagreed among themselves on the details of the political program they wished introduced into the Principalities, the majority continued to share the general beliefs held by European liberals in the middle of the nineteenth century. They supported constitutional gov- ernment, with the principal power held by the legislative bodies. As we have seen, their first goal was the establishment of an independent na- tional state. Although they had no formal organization, they did in a sense form a political party, and in subsequent sections the designation “Liberal Party” will be used to refer to this group. In the same manner, their opposition will be called the Conservatives or the Conservative Party, although again the term covers many varying political opinions. Here the name will be used to refer to those who opposed radical politi- cal change, who wished to preserve historic institutions, and who de- sired to limit popular participation in the government. Conservatives also usually preferred to allow the executive branch to exert the major power in the government. With the failure of the revolution the Conservative influences were predominant in the Principalities. Despite their undoubted success in winning foreign partisans, the Liberals could not really hope to attain their goals unless some event should occur that would end the over- whelming Russian military and political influence in the Principalities. Jt was thus most fortunate for the Romanian national leadership that such an unexpected occurrence was soon to take place. Tue Crmean WAR At mid-century the Russian government appeared to have won tri- umphs everywhere. Its Holy Alliance partners, Prussia and the Habs- 55Russia and the Romanian national state burg Monarchy, once again enjoyed stable, conservative governments. Although Louis Napoleon, whose regime represented revolutionary principles, held office, France appeared diplomatically isolated. In addi- tion, Nicholas I believed that he had an understanding with Britain and that he would work with this power in Eastern affairs. Although the Russian government still favored the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East, the dangers that could arise from future upheavals in this sensitive area were recognized. In conversations in January 1853, the tsar presented to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Hamil- ton Seymour, a plan for a possible future partition of Ottoman territory. At this time Nicholas I declared his continued interest in holding 2 protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia, The Principalities were thus seen as a permanent part of the Russian sphere of control. ‘This extremely favorable Russian position was about to collapse. Although the origins and events of the Crimean War are not a part of thisnarrative, itis interesting to note that the conflict came about largely over the interpretation of the treaties that gave Russia a special position in relation to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, the same agreements that had so influenced the fate of the Principalities in the past? Moreover, the first belligerent action leading to the outbreak of hostilities involved the Principalities. In July 1853, scarcely two years after their previous departure, Russian troops again crossed the Pruth. In October the Ottoman Empire declared war; France and Britain did not join in until March 1854. ‘The Principalities were thus once again under military occupation. During the first weeks the princes $tirbei and Ghica were caught be- tween two opposing pressures. On the one hand, the Russian officials demanded that they break relations with the Porte and refuse to pay the tribute; on the other, the Ottoman government, backed by Britain, pressed them to obey the directives of the suzerain power, end all communications with the Russian authorities, and leave their posts. In October they did indeed abandon their offices and depart for Vienna. ‘The Russian officials then took over the government. General Andreus F. Budberg, in command of the Russian forces, like Kiselev before him, assumed the title of president plenipotentiary. The divans, established asa result of the Convention of Balta Liman, remained, but their mem- bers were appointed from among the Russian partisans. ‘The Russian occupation was of short duration ~ from July 1853 to August 1854. The familiar problems recurred; the securing of housing, transportation, and supplies caused tension between the military au- thorities and the population. The Russian administration carefully enforced the censorship regulations, and public meetings were pro- 56The Russian protectorate hibited: the memories of 1848 were still fresh. As before, the Russian officials sought to attract local support for their war against the Otto- man Empire. Although their cause awakened much enthusiasm in other parts of the Ottoman territories, particularly among the Slavic and Greek inhabitants, they won few adherents in the Principalities. In fact, largely because of the events of 1848, many had sympathies favoring the Porte, feelings that were strengthened once France and Britain entered the war. ‘The political situation in the provinces was soon, however, to change radically. In June 1854 the Habsburg Monarchy concluded an agree- ‘ment with the Porte and then turned to St. Petersburg with the demand that the Russian armies evacuate the provinces. Because of its weak military position, the Russian government was forced to comply. Aus trian and Ottoman forces then took their place.*® Omer Pasha was once again in Bucharest. Assurances were given that the joint occupation was only temporary and that the previous conditions would be restored after the war; Ghica and $tirbei returned to resume their offices. Despite the declarations and the Russian withdrawal, the Romanian nationalists were not happy about the new situation, They remained deeply suspicious of Austrian and Ottoman intentions. They certainly had no desire to exchange Habsburg for Russian domination. More- over, bitter feelings were aroused when the Habsburg authorities had to deal with the problems that had caused so much ill will during pre- vious Russian occupations. Conflicts arose over the requisitioning of supplies and housing and matters of local internal administration. Like their Russian counterparts, the Habsburg authorities were able to gain the support of some conservative Romanians, but they could not win the allegiance of any sizable groups among the population, ‘The Habsburg occupation had one great advantage: it prevented the Principalities from becoming a battlefield. The Romanian lands thus did not suffer from the devastation of a war fought among the great powers. Although the Principalities were neutralized, their ultimate fate was a matter of constant concern to the diplomats. Throughout the war Vienna remained the center of continual negotiations. In August 1854 the European allies and the Habsburg government agreed upon a set of conditions, known as the Vienna Four Points, which were designed to serve as the basis for peace. After the allied victories in the Crimea and the fall of Sebastopol, the cession of Bessarabian land ad- jacent to the Danube and the neutralization and demilitarization of the Black Sea were added as concrete demands. Obviously, these points had great significance for the future of the Principalities. In January 1856 the Russian government, after suffering a defeat in the Crimea and 57Russia and the Romanian national state receiving a Habsburg ultimatum, accepted a strengthened version of these terms. ‘The Congress of Paris, called to formulate the final peace terms, opened on February 13/25, 1856. Each nation was represented by two plenipotentiaries: Count K. F. BuolSchauenstein and Count J. A. von Hiner for Austria; Count Alexander Walewski and Baron Frangois A. Bourqueney for France; the Earl of Clarendon and Earl Henry R. C. Cowley for Britain; Prince Aleksei Fedorovich Orlov and Baron Filip Ivanovich Brunnow for Russia; Count Camillo de Cavour and the Mar- quis de Villamarina for Sardinia; Ali Pasha and Mehmed Djemil Bey for the Ottoman Empire. The Prussian delegates, Otto von Manteuffel and Maximilian von Hatefeldt, were admitted only later in the sessions. Although Napoleon III was not personally in attendance - no rulers were ~ he was able to exert a great deal of influence and to decide the policy of the French representatives on a day-by-day basis. His sympa- thetic attitude was an immense aid to the Romanian position. The final terms of the treaty were based on the points previously discussed. For Russia the most damaging clauses were those concerned with the Black Sea and the Danube. The Black Sea was declared neutralized and de militarized; neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire was to maintain a fleet on its waters or naval arsenals on its shores. The Straits remained, as before, closed to warships of all powers. In addition, Russia was compelled to surrender to Moldavia three districts of southern Bes- sarabia, a cession which meant that this state was no longer a Danubian riparian power. The river as a whole was placed under international control, and the delta was returned to the Ottoman Empire. Among the other provisions of particular significance for the Principalities was the ending of the Russian protectorate. The Romanians, as well as the Serbs, were placed under a joint European guarantee. The specific pro- visions made for the future organization of the Principalities, which caused much controversy, will be discussed in detail subsequently. These terms, deeply humiliating for Russia, were to have an enor- mously liberating effect in the Danubian lands. Most important was the termination of the Russian protectorate. The period of the Organic Statutes and Russian domination had been of great significance for Romanian national development. On the positive side, certain Rus- sian actions had undoubtedly been to the Romanian benefit. The estab- lishment of the protectorate as well as earlier Russian interventions had indeed greatly weakened the bonds between the Principalities and the Porte. Previously, during the period of Phanariot rule, the suzerain state had often transgressed the autonomous rights of the provinces. The Russian treaties with the Ottoman Empire placed definite limits on 38The Russian protectorate Ottoman interference: the relationship between the vassal and the suzerain power was defined; the tribute and other payments were set; an end was made to the Ottoman right of preemption in the purchase of Romanian agricultural products; and, in addition, an Ottoman occupa- tion of Romanian territory, unless under unusual circumstances, was ‘made almost impossible and Muslims were prevented from buying prop- erty orestablishing permanent residences. The Organic Regulations had. also provided the provinces with a better political system than they had enjoyed previously. The administration introduced at this time was progressive for the time and the place. ‘The negative aspects, were, however, to take precedence as time passed. The protectorate did represent great-power domination. As such, it became a symbol of national oppression. Russia thus became the state that drew the chief focus of nationalist hatred. In comparison, Ottoman influence appeared relatively benign; the Turkish ability to compel obedience was extremely limited. Moreover, although the Or- ganic Statutes had once represented progress, this element was largely negated by the subsequent Russian refusal to consider changes in the political system. As a result, those who sought a further evolution in political development were forced into the opposition. The intellectuals and educated youth, deeply influenced by contemporary European thought, were to be particularly effective in combating Russian influ- ence. Attracted by Western liberal-national doctrine, they came to share the common feeling of the European revolutionary that autocratic Russia was the great enemy of humanity and progress. This conviction, of course, was intensified by the Russian role in the suppression of the revolutions of 1848. In addition to the specific terms of the treaty, other aspects of the Crimean War crisis were to have an equally beneficial effect on Ro- manian affairs. Before 1853 the Russian position in Europe had been immensely strengthened by the fact that it was a member of the strong. est Continental coalition, the Holy Alliance, which included Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. The diplomatic maneuvering during the war, particularly the support given by the monarchy to Russia’s ad- versaries, resulted in the breaking of the alignment. In 185 Nicholas I died. Hisson, Alexander IJ, thus came to the throne at a time of military defeat and diplomatic isolation. After the war he appointed as foreign minister Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, who had previously been ambassador in Vienna. He shared with the tsar a feeling of disgust and anger at what they felt had been a Habsburg betrayal and a failure to return the support that had been given against the Hungarian revolu- tion in 1849. For the next several years they were to show themselves de- 59Russia and the Romanian national state lighted to cooperate in diplomatic combinations that would weaken and humiliate their former ally. They thus welcomed the opportunity that arose at this time to work with France, the power that the previous tsar had regarded as the chief menace to the Russian position in Europe. ‘The rapprochement between Russia and France, now the patron of the Romanian cause, was to set the stage for a major advance in the na- tional program.CHAPTER 11 The European guardianship ‘The Treaty of Paris opened a new era in European diplomacy, one that was to be characterized by victories for the German and Italian, as well as for the Romanian, national movements. Since there was as yet no representative Romanian administration, the fate of the country lay primarily in the hands of the great powers. The decisions were to be made no longer by one power, in collaboration with the Porte, but by a concert of the seven signatories of the treaty. The rivalry among these governments was to be a great advantage for the Romanian lead- cexship over the next years.! ‘The Crimean disaster compelled a change of policy in the Russian relationship with the Principalities, as well as in other areas of inter- national relations. The humiliation of the defeat and the dangers that had arisen during the war forced the Russian government to consider radically different courses of action. Alexander II regarded the treaty asa national humiliation and a stain on his personal honor. The break- ing of the terms of the agreement that were damaging to Russia thus had first priority for the future. Four aspects of the settlement, in par ticular, had profoundly altered the Russian diplomatic position in the Near East: the neutralization of the Black Sea, the cession of the three districts of southern Bessarabia, the loss of a special position in relation to Constantinople, and the assumption by the powers of additional guarantees for the Porte, Of these provisions the Russian government was most immediately concerned with the limitations on its activity in the Black Sea, The neutralization hampered its ability to exert pressure on Constantinople and was bound to affect any future moves in the Balkans or the Cau- casus. Even worse, the Russian southern shores were now vulnerable to 6Russia and the Romanian national state attack from British, French, and Ottoman navies, which could operate from the straits or the eastern Mediterranean, Should the Crimean coalition hold in peacetime, Russia would face a permanent threat. This section of the treaty deeply influenced the attitude held toward other powers, and its removal became the major aim of Russian policy in the next years. ‘The second provision that the Russian leaders were most anxious to change concerned the Bessarabian territory. At issue was not only the strategic value of the lands, but the question of Russian prestige Like other monarchs, the tsar regarded any loss of territory, of his “patrimony,” as a personal affront to his honor. His determination to regain this land was bound to affect his relations with the successive governments of the Principalities. As far as the loss of exclusive control over the provinces was concerned, this matter appears to have caused less regret. Despite the treaty, the common frontier and the continued interest in all of the Orthodox people made it inevitable that the Rus- sian government would remain deeply involved in Romanian affairs. Treaty stipulations could not change this situation. In the immediate postwar period the major Russian concern was to assure that the pro- tectorate was not replaced by an exclusively Habsburg influence or an increase of Ottoman control. ‘The unfortunate outcome of the war forced the Russian government to revise its relationship with the Ottoman Empire, As we have seen, in the previous thirty years Russian diplomacy in the area had moved in two directions. After the signing of the treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar Iskelesi it had followed a policy of working with, but also dom- inating, the Porte. As long as the Russian representatives held the pre- dominant influence in the councils of the sultan, they had a natural interest in protecting the territorial integrity of the empire. This ob- jective was seen in particular in the 1830s, when assistance was offered against the threat from Egypt. The conclusion of the Convention of Balta Liman marked a high point in this policy of collaboration. After the Crimean defeat it was naturally to be expected that Britain and France, not Russia, would have the primary influence in Constanti- nople. Since this fact was recognized, Gorchakov in his instructions to the Russian representative, Apollinarii Petrovich Butenev, empha- sized that he should seek not a special position, but “parity” with the other powers. Efforts should be made to assure that no single state ob- tained a controlling position. Parallel with the previous policy of cooperation with the Porte had been that of the protection of Orthodox Christianity. The Russian rights in this regard had been most clearly defined in relation to the 62The European guardianship Serbs and Romanians, but Russian statesmen certainly felt that they had a unique relationship with and obligations toward all the members of their faith. The attempt by Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov to obtain a clear statement of Russian rights in this regard had been a major cause for the outbreak of the Crimean War. The fear of the pow- rs, Britain in particular, that Russia would continue to use its links h the Orthodox to exert control in the empire was reflected in the peace settlement. Guarantees for the independence and territorial in. tegrity of the Ottoman Empire were given in Article 7 of the treaty and in a special agreement signed by Britain, Austria, and France in April. Im addition, Article g of the treaty prohibited the powers from inter- fering “either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire.”? Despite the endeavors of the victors, the Russian government had no intention of abandoning what were regarded as its “permanent inter- ests” in the East. Among these, and in the most prominent place, con- tinued to be the Orthodox church and the fate of the Christian na- tionalities. Russian concern over these people could, of course, not be expressed without some form of “interference” in the internal affairs of the empire. The Russian awareness of the link between religion and politics and the determination to pursue past policies was well expressed in an instruction sent to Butenev in July 1856. The future relations with the Orthodox church were discussed here. Because of the impor- tance of this subject for the Principalities, the text will be quoted at Iength. Attempts had been made by Russia’s adversaries, the memo- randum stated, to persuade the clergy and the Orthodox populations of the East that the only aim of our (the Russian] intercessions in favor of the church ‘was political domination; that we were intending to bring the church and the populations under our influence with a view to conquest. ‘We do not need to say that this is not so. It is true that our political interests are, as they have always been and as they will not cease to be in the Orient, by the nature of the conditions chemselves, tightly inked to those of Ortho- doxy. Our adversaries know this perfectly. When they combat the church of the East, as well as when they pretend to protect it in order ¢o better procure means of fighting it, itis not only from zeal for Catholic and Protestant propaganda, but also and above all with arriéve-pensée against our influence. Since the wars of Empress Catherine, the Orient has gone through a period of transition, Our great interest for ourselves is that it be able to emerge one day without losing the principal element of preservation and homogeneity that dwells there, living and powerful, for centuries, despite the vicissitudes to which it isa prey, despite the diversity of the races subjugated by the Ottoman conquest. It is an interest of the first order for us to have in our immediate 63Russia and the Romanian national state neighborhood populations that are attached to us by the ties of the faith that brought Greece back to life and chat will bring about progressively under our eyes the resurrection of the Slav and Romanian nationalities ‘We do not hesitate to repeat that our interest in favor of our cozeligionists of the East should not at all be concealed. It is based on two perfectly avowable principles: that of an intimate religious union and that of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire according to the sense of the Treaty of Paris? Nevertheless, despite the determination to continue certain past pol ies that was expressed, the defeat did compel some radical, if tempo- rary, alterations in policy ~ domestic as well as foreign. The Crimean disaster had shown not only Russia’s military weakness, but the eco- nomic and social backwardness of the society. Since the necessity of reform was clearly recognized, the Russian leaders were well aware that the major national attention would have to be concentrated on internal problems, Russia could no longer play the role of the gendarme of Europe and the main prop of the conservative order. Gorchakov thus adopted what he characterized as the policy of recueillement: Russia would turn into itself and place its major emphasis on internal reform. For the moment an aggressive active role in foreign policy would have to be abandoned. Neither in European affairs nor in issues connected with the Eastern Question could the Russian state maintain a predomi: nant position until its military establishment was strengthened. The great reforms of the 1860s included a thorough reorganization of the army Despite this negative approach, the Russian government in the next ‘years was to have certain specific foreign policy aims. The first, as we have seen, was the breaking of the Treaty of Paris, or parts of it, should the opportunity arise. Like all defeated powers, Russia was to await the first moment possible to overturn an unacceptable settlement, More over, the Russian leaders after the experience of the war remained acutely conscious of the danger of isolation, particularly during a peri od of internal reform. The war had shown the vulnerability of the state when it was forced to face Europe alone. A major Russian goal in international affairs thus became to split the Crimean alliance and to win one of the partners as its own ally. Unfortunately, among these powers the possibilities of securing a friend and supporter were tremely limited. Prussia, of course, had not participated in the wa neutral attitude had been regarded as favorable, However, the Russian government did not believe that Prussia was strong enough to provide major assistance in a time of crisis. A Russian-Prussian alliance was not considered an adequate counterweight to the combination of states that had won the Crimean War. Moreover, two of these powers had to be immediately eliminated as 64The European guardianship possible close associates — Britain and Austria. Britain remained the chief adversary, with interests in conflict with Russia's all over the map, but in particular in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Both the former foreign minister, Nesselrode, and Gorchakov consid- ered this state the major challenge to St. Petersburg. Relations with the Habsburg Monarchy were similarly sensitive. After the war the Rus- sian leaders felt a great animosity toward this power. In the next years a strong note of reprisal and revenge can be seen in their attitude toward ‘Vienna. The Russian statesman and the tsar felt personally betrayed by the Habsburg actions, and they certainly wished to see their former conservative ally paid back for its desertion. ‘The elimination of these states left only France as a possible partner. ‘The choice of this power as an ally would, of course, signify a complete reversal of former attitudes and the abandonment of ideology as a prime consideration of foreign policy. Despite his increasingly conserva- tive internal direction, Napoleon III did stand for significant changes in the map of Europe and he did support the use of revolutionary means for the accomplishment of national goals. However, the Russian leaders had, in fact, no real choice. If they wished to break the Crimean front, the weak point lay in Paris, Even during the war some connections had been maintained with France. It was also obvious that the two sea powers, Britain and France, were keen rivals in many areas. With a French alignment, the Russian attitude toward revolutionary change in the Balkans was thus modified. Until 1877, when Russia finally went to war with the Ottoman Empire on the issue, the Russian government was often tempted to support Balkan national movements not only because of the traditional sympathy for the Orthodox sub- jects of the sultan, but also because of the possibility that independent and autonomous Balkan states might provide useful allies. During the next twenty years some Russian diplomats were to consider that an alliance of Russia with the Orthodox people, particularly the Slavs, would be more satisfactory than any European partnership, and that they would provide a sufficient counterweight to threats from other powers. This willingness to support national revolt did not in any ‘manner mean that the tsarist government had lost its apprehension over revolutionary activities whose aim was the abolition of monarchical regimes and the establishment of democratic parliamentary systems. As shall be shown, great care was taken in the assessment of each movement. Russian policy after the Crimean War was thus essentially defensive. Prime emphasis was placed on internal reform. The association with France was to avoid diplomatic isolation, and for the future the first objective was to be the breaking of the peace provisions. In Eastern 65,Russia and the Romanian national state affairs there was continued interest in the Orthodox population and in achieving a parity of influence in Constantinople. In this total picture the affairs of the Principalities had but a minor place. Here too the Rus- sian government aimed at assuring itself an equal influence with the other powers; exclusive Habsburg control was particularly feared. At some time Russia also intended to take back the Bessarabian districts As far as Romanian internal development was concerned, the value of the regime of the Organic Statutes was defended, but the need for fur- ther reforms was recognized. As to their exact extent, this decision was to be made on the basis of the demands of Russia's general European policy, in particular the alliance with France. ‘Tux ROMANIAN QUESTION AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE Even before the end of the Crimean War it had become apparent that important changes would be made in the internal administration of the Principalities. The abolition of the Russian protectorate was one of the Vienna Four Points; the issue had played an important role in the preliminary conference held in Vienna in 1855. As in the case of Greece in the 18205, the great powers assumed that they would make the final decisions on the form of government to be given the Prine palities; the question was simply what that should be. Obviously, the regime of the Organic Statutes, closely identified with Russian domina- tion, had to be brought to an end. Even the Russian government recog- nized that major changes would have to be made here. Before any reforms could be introduced, the basic issue had to be met: should Moldavia and Wallachia remain separate states, or should they be united, perhaps under a foreign prince, in accordance with the clear wishes of the active political elements in each principality? ‘On this issue the powers fell into two distinct and opposing camps. ‘The Ottoman Empire naturally feared any settlement that would ‘weaken its hold on these lands, feeble as it was. Not only did the Porte wish to keep the area as a buffer against Russia, but the question in. volved Ottoman prestige. At this time the Ottoman state was in a period of internal reform whose aim was the modernization and strengthening of the state. Following French examples, the direction was toward centralization and the tightening of the hold of the gov- ernment on the provinces. Certainly, a true federal solution was never seriously considered. The union of the Principalities was thus opposed because of its probable effect on the Romanian relationship with the 66The European guardianship Porte and the inevitable influence that it would exert on the other Christian people of the empire, Further autonomous rights for the Romanians would lead to immediate, similar demands by others. ‘The Ottoman stand was strongly supported by the Habsburg Empire. As previously, this government's position was determined by its concern for the more than two million Habsburg Romanians who would un- doubtedly be attracted to Bucharest should it become the capital of a vital, successful Romanian national state. Moreover, another considera- tion had arisen. With the end of the Russian protectorate the mon- archy had an opportunity to assert its political and economic prepon- derance. During the occupation measures had been taken to strengthen the ties of the provinces with their western neighbor. Roads had been built, the most important of which ran from Brasov to Bucharest to Briila. The navigation of the Danube had been improved, and the Aus- trian intention to dominate that waterway was made clear during the peace negotiations. Telegraphic communications were opened between Jassy and Bucharest. Plans were also developed for building a railroad network that would connect the provinces with the lands of the mon- archy. Unlike Russia, the Habsburg Empire could offer economic ad- vantages to the Principalities both as a supplier of manufactured goods and as a market for Romanian agricultural products and raw materials Already, full use had been made of the privileges gained through the capitulations and consular jurisdiction, It was clear that a weak govern: ment and two separate Principalities would be more accessible to con- rol from Vienna in both a political and an economic sense. Along with the Habsburg Empire, Britain stood as a strong defender of Ottoman integrity, including the continued control of the Princi- palities, Britain had fought the Crimean War to maintain, not to weaken further, the Ottoman Empire. Although Austria was perhaps the chief benefactor of the removal of the Russian protectorate, Britain had a similar interest in securing the permanent blocking of Russian south- ward expansion at the Pruth. The return of the Danube Delta to Otto- man rale was certainly an aid to British commerce. The government also had a major interest in the establishment of stable regimes in the Principalities. At this time and later, British statesmen were to give much verbal support to the idea of constitutional government, particu- larly in regard to the affairs of Western and Central Europe, but they never allowed these principles to hamper their policy in the Ottoman lands or, of course, in the Asian and African territories under their control. The prime British concern at this time was to be whether the provinces united would form a better barrier against Russia, as France 67Russia and the Romanian national state argued, or whether the move would simply further weaken the Ottoman Empire and diminish its ability to function as a buffer. If union would indeed promote British interests, then the government would welcome the opportunity to respect the “‘wishes of the people.” Certainly, Britain would not be reluctant to aid movements that were to the detriment of Russia. firm British decision was not made until July 1856. ‘The French position, in contrast, was clear. Napoleon TI henceforth was to be the strongest advocate for the Romanian nationalists, al- though individual French interests were never sacrificed. His support of the idea of union and a foreign prince was made clear during the peace negotiations. Although he always subordinated Romanian interests to those of the Italians, he did, when there was no other conflict, usually promote the Romanian national idea. Indeed, France had nothing to lose and much to gain from the establishment of a strong Romanian state. It was obvious that the Romanian liberal leadership found its true inspiration in Paris. A liberal-national victory in Bucharest would assure France a firm outpost for the defense of its interests in Eastern Europe. ‘The political balance was to be decisive for the attitude Russia took toward the Romanian question, Although the Russian government never did adopt a firm, open, unwavering position, the advantages to begained by acting in collusion wich France were too obvious. The issue was one, and about the only one, over which France and Britain could be divided. Russia's general need for an ally thus outweighed the ob- vious disadvantages of the establishment of a national political unit on the lower Danube. It was obviously preferable, as it had always been, to have two weak principalities that could be more easily controlled. Similarly, the dangers to the Russian autocracy presented by a neigh- boring state with a liberal government remained as before. The pre- eminent position that France would enjoy in a united Romania was also fully realized. Nevertheless, Russia's desire to break the Crimean al- Jiance and to gain a partner for its own policy overrode these negative considerations, Moreover, support for the nationalist position in Ro- manian affairs had the major advantage of also serving to thwart Habs. burg policy. Should their own loss of predominant influence be in- evitable, the Russian leaders were determined that they should not be supplanted by the Habsburg adversaries. Because of these considera- tions Russian policy during the next years was essentially to support the French proposals, even when they underwent basic alterations. ‘The question of the future political organization of the Principali ties was discussed at the sixth meeting of the Paris conference on Feb- ruary 25 / March 8. AC this time Walewski stated the French support for 68The European guardianship union, Cowley concurred with his arguments. Ali that the Principalities had been separated since ancient times and that they had developed along different lines. The population, he claimed, favored the division. Supporting the Ottoman stand, Buol also main: tained that the provinces did not want union and that they had not been consulted. The French position was backed by Orlov, who de- clared that Russia favored unification as an aid to the prosperity of the Principalities. Cavour also consistently seconded the French declara- tions. Because of this division among the powers, and because they did not wish to delay the conclusion of the peace, the delegates on February 27/March 10 agreed to a Walewski proposal that the treaty contain only a general statement concerning the political and administrative regime to be established, leaving the details for a subsequent confer. ence. A commission of Buol, Ali, and Bourqueney was named to draw up this document. On two later days, February 29/March 12 and March 2/14, the conference considered the text of the articles pro- posed. The aim was to find a basis that all of the representatives could accept and to postpone the actual decision on the future of the prov- inces. The provisions were thus of necessity vague. It was agreed that the wishes of the Romanian population “relative to the final organiza. tion of the Principalities” would be determined through the instrumen. tality of assemblies to be chosen in each Principality, which were to represent “the interests of all classes of society.* At the same time an International Commission, composed of representatives of the guaran teeing powers and the Porte, was to be established in Bucharest. Its task ‘was to inquire into conditions in the Principalities and, taking into ac count the decisions of the assemblies, to make recommendations to the powers concerning the future organization of the country. These pro- posals would then be considered by a conference to be held in Paris, where the final arrangements would be made. In this settlement the in- terests of the powers and the Porte would be taken into consideration, as well as the desires of the Principalities. The decisions of the con- ference were to be expressed in a convention; the Porte would then issue a hatti sherif to put these into effect. This procedure, which in no way settled the major Romanian issues, signified the powers’ recognition of the difficulty of securing an agreement on the problem among the members of the Crimean coalition. ‘The question of the Principalities was dealt with in Articles 20 through 27 of the Treaty of Paris, In addition to the provisions already discussed, the agreement stated that no power had the right of exclusive intervention in the Principalities, which were to be the collective con- in rebuttal, replied 69Russia and the Romanian national state cern of the signatory powers. The provinces were to “continue to en- joy, under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte and under the European guarantee, the privileges and immunities which they possess,” and to have an independent and national administration “as well as full free- dom of religion, of legislation, of commerce and of navigation.”* They were also allowed to have an armed force for defense. Extremely important for the future were the severe limitations placed on the Ottoman right of military intervention. Article 27 stated: “If the Internal Tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced ‘or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding with the other contracting powers in regard to the measures to be taken for maintaining or reestablishing legal order. No armed intervention can take place without previous agreement between those Powers.”* In practice, this condition made any Ottoman intervention most im- probable, since it was very doubtful that such a “previous agreement” could ever be obtained. Not only were the powers divided, but none of the guarantors, because of their own public opinion, could easily con- sent to an Ottoman suppresion of a Romanian revolt. A joint action, such as had occurred in 1848 by Russian and Ottoman troops, and in 1854 by Habsburg and Ottoman forces, was after 1856 more difficult to contemplate. Thus, although the Principalities remained under Otto- man sovereignty, the Porte had no adequate means of enforcing its de- cisions. The European powers together, not just Russia alone, stood between the Porte and its Romanian subjects. ‘This settlement and the new diplomatic alignments were to be of enormous benefit to the Romanian national leadership. Certainly, the substitution of a great-power protectorate for the former exclusive Russian control was a great advantage. It was obvious that the guaran- tors would seldom agree on a single course of action; the disputes among them were to give the Romanian statesmen considerable latitude in which to move. At the same time great-power jealousy could be used to prevent any single country from again exerting real domination. Aus- tria, although still in occupation, was soon to be forced to withdraw its troops; the Porte had been effectively blocked from gaining the military means to exert control over the Principalities or to enforce its rights as the suzerain power. Moldavia, of course, had also gained by the annex- ation of Bessarabian territory, although its acquisitions were but a small section of the area to which the Romanian nationalists lay claim. As far as the decisions of the powers on the international organization of the country were concerned, their success or failure would be deter- mined over the next years.The European guardianship ‘THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONGRESS DECISIONS: THE DOUBLE ELECTION OF ALEXANDER CuzA Although the procedures to be followed had been established at the congress, their implementation was to lead to continual controversy and confusion. The steps to be taken had been set down clearly. A firman was to be issued by the Porte, with the cooperation of the powers, establishing the procedures for the elections to the assemblies, called divans ad hoc, and determining who should vote. These bodies, once elected, were to express their desires, which in turn would be considered by the International Commission and transmitted to the powers, who would then meet in Paris to make the final decisions. Although the gen- eral lines of action were obvious, many details, in particular in connec- tion with the franchise, remained unsettled. Moreover, the entire process created a situation in which the animosities among individuals and political groups would be given ample opportunity co express them- selves. Added to these difficulties were the problems connected with the sharp conflicts among the representatives of the guarantor powers and their struggles to secure the victory of their candidates. ‘During the period of the protectorate the Russian predominance had not been seriously challenged. However, after the Crimean War other states saw the possibility of winning, if not control of Romanian pol cal life, at least the first position among the great powers. Austria, stand- ing for conservative interests and Moldavian separatism, and France, with its support of the liberal-national position, were the chief adver. saries, but the representatives of all of the powers in both Jassy and Bucharest entered into competition to influence events. In the same manner individual Romanian politicians sought assistance from the foreign consulates. Although there was much talk about the danger of outside intervention, both the Romanians and the guarantor states freely violated the principle in practice. Serious objections were made usually only when one’s opponent thereby gained an advantage. Few took seriously the practicality of applying a rule of nonintervention universally. The most extreme example of consular interference was shown in the activities of the Austrian agent Gédel de Lannoy and the French representative Victor Place in Jassy. Burdened with the previous military defeat and the legacy of 1848, Russia could not at first compete ‘on an equal basis with the Crimean victors, but it did have a number of important and influential supporters, particularly in Moldavia, Any conflicts that arose over the elections in the Principalities, ac- pRussia and the Romanian national state cording to the regulations, were to be referred to the representatives of the powers in Constantinople and to the Porte. Here the situation was complicated by the fact that a struggle for influence over the Ottoman government was again taking place. Russia, of course, was temporarily out of the race, Instead, Britain and France, the Crimean allies, fought for first position. The situation was made worse by the deep personal animosity between the ambassadors, Stratford de Redcliffe and Edouard Antoine Thouvenel. The British representative's long tenure at the Ot- toman capitol had evidently given him the feeling that he was something like a Turkish minister. The two sides had their adherents within the government. Reshid Pasha was regarded as a British partisan; Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha were considered friends of France. The Habsburg rep- resentative, Anton von Prokesch-Osten, who had long years of experi- ence in Ottoman affairs and who was the agent of a power that supported Ottoman integrity, also had much influence. The two other powers in- volved in Romanian affairs, Sardinia and Prussia, played relatively minor roles in the contest. On the eve of the launching of their own national unification movements, both states tended to support the na- tional idea and to be anti-Habsburg. Their firm support of the French position on Romanian issues meant that France had automatically two supporters on every question. Before the elections could be held, the Porte had to appoint the men who would run the country until the final organization was decided. Barbu $tirbei and Gregory A. Ghica were in office, but their terms of seven years were coming to an end. According to the Organic Statutes the Porte should have appointed a caimacamie (regency) of three mem- bers. Instead, one man was named for each province. The office of caimacam was of central importance in view of the coming elections. ‘This official could exert a controlling influence over the voting through the Ministry of Interior and the judicial system, over which he would have control. He could change officials, and he could interfere in court, decisions. In July 1836 the Porte chose Alexander Ghica, then sixty years old, for Wallachia. This nomination was at first generally ap- proved, but his actions soon alienated many. In Moldavia, T. Bal, the first appointment, died in March 1857, and was followed by a very con- troversial figure, Nicholas Vogoride. Vogoride was of Greek origin; he had gained Moldavian citizenship only in 1846. He was married to a Moldavian heiress of the Conachi family. Although his original nomina- tion had been supported by Place, the consul soon turned against him. Since his main links were to be with the Austrian consulate, both Vogo- ride and his minister of interior, Costin Catargiu, soon came under strong attack from nationalists, as well as from the French and Russian pThe European guardianship consuls, for their pro-Habsburg sympathies and their obvious cor- ruption. SSpUDRES=00E0=90157200=ER0N0=0 32000 =CCEC0E050020" observers, union was the general desire of the politically involved sec- tion of the Romanian population. The issue of the foreign prince was clouded by skepticism whether the powers would allow such an appoint ment, but this idea too had general approval. The choice of a native rruler, whether over a united state or in each principality, continued, as in the past, to cause much controversy. As before, in each province every ‘major politician appeared to have the ambition to be prince. In Wal- lachia the chief candidates were the caimacam, Alexander Ghica, and the brothers $tirbei and Bibescu. At first the latter two cooperated against their common rival. In Moldavia the major contest was between Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory, who were separated by an intense and irreconcilable hatred. All of these candidates, as well as those be- longing either to the unionist or to the separatist camp, at this point pre- pared for the elections. They organized committees and distributed political literature. They also gave out bribes and attempted to assure that officials sympathetic to their views would be in the right positions during the elections. Fraud and the corruption of public officials was, of course, as much a part of Romanian political life at this time as previously. ‘The problem of corruption was greatest in Moldavia, Under the ad- ministration of Gregory Ghica, the unionists had been in a better position there than in Wallachia. In May 1856 a liberal press law had been passed that allowed the continuing publication of Steaua Dundrii (Star of the Danube) under the editorship of Michael Kogalniceanu, ‘This paper was to be the central organ of the unionist movement. On. May 25/ June 6, nineteen Moldavian leaders met in Jassy to form the the society “‘the Union.” The central committee of this organization in- cluded the conservative landowners G. Sturdza, §. Cantacuzino, and Peter Mavrogheni; their liberal counterparts D. Rallet and K. Rolla; and, from the professional class, Kogalniceanu, A. Panu, and V. Malines- cu, However, after the advent of the Bals administration, the separatists gained the upper hand. The Moldavian government directed its efforts toward suppressing the unionist movement and securing the election of separatist candidates. The caimacam used his influence to dismiss off- cials who were for union and to replace them with his own men. The po- lice and the courts were similarly employed to hamper unionist activity. When Vogoride came to office, he continued this policy and retained the Bals administration. At this time Austrian inftuence was predomi- nant. The caimacams were in close touch with the Austrian consul and 3Russia and the Romanian national state thus earned the extreme displeasure of Place and his Russian colleague, Sergei Ivanovich Popov. The Moldavian regime was obviously follow- ing policies approved and supported by the Habsburg Empire and the Porte. ‘With these conditions Moldavia was the best hope of the supporters of separatism, both within the Principalities and among the great pow- xs, Since this issue was to remain important until the 1870s, the position of those who opposed union should be reviewed. It is difficult to obtain sufficient exact information on the members and programs of this group because the overwhelming emphasis in Romanian historical writing has been on the unionists and their activities. Although undoubtedly the majority of the politically active citizens in the Principalites wanted union, a significant minority saw it as damaging to their interests and to their principality. In 1836 the exact political conditions that would exist in a unified country were not clear. The Liberal Party, the main carrier of the idea, contained among its members many who supported radical political change, a republican form of government, and, even more important, a solution of the land question to the advantage of the peasant. Many great landowners in both provinces saw their position challenged in two directions. They had previously always held the con- trolling position in the political life of the state; they had elected the princes, and this right had a practical and often commercial value. In addition, their political influence had assured their domination of the land and the peasantry. Many now feared, and with justification, that a Liberal regime would introduce a new agrarian system that would re- sult in the passing to peasant control of all or part of the lands of the great estates. For the Moldavians there were additional considerations. Moldavia was the smaller of the two provinces in territory and population, and Jassy was off the main trade routes. It was obvious that in a unified state Bucharest, not Jassy, would be the capital. Since Romanian administra- tive practice followed the French system of strong centralization, the national government and the important public offices would be in that city. Unification would mean that Moldavians would lose direct control over their government and some important public offices. Thus, in ad- dition to the conservative landowners, some officials and members of the merchant and professional middle classes joined the separatists. In Moldavia there were accordingly separatist organizations with their own literature and propaganda, They were, however, never strong enough to win the elections through strietly legal means, nor could they compete with the Liberals in electoral tactics. The Vogoride regime was 4The European guardianship forced to resort to fraud because the clear advantage was held by the unionists Unlike Moldavia, Wallachia had no important separatist organiza- tions. This province, nevertheless, had severe political problems. Here the principal struggle centered on the issue of who would be prince. Even those who favored a foreign candidate were involved because ‘most recognized that the great powers would probably block such a solution. Moreover, the ranks of the unionists were split by strong dis- agreements over policy as well as over individuals. The situation became more acute with the return of the 1848 exiles, many of whom belonged to the radical wing of the Liberal Party. Ion Baliceanu, a moderate, came back in February 1855. In the spring of 1857 N. and Stefan Golescu, C. A. Rosetti, and D. Britianu followed; by July most of the exiles had returned. Thereafter they took the lead of their party, to the detriment of the moderates; they knew well how to conduct cam- paigns and win popular support. They were regarded by some of the representatives of the guarantor powers as dangerous radicals. Despite the fears of the conservative governments, the Liberal pro- gram during the elections was in fact moderate. Although there was some talk of revolutionary action, particularly in the face of fraudulent and illegal procedures by the caimacams, the concentration was on gain- ing power through legal means and within the rules established by the ‘Treaty of Paris. The unionists knew that they could win if these were enforced. Experienced politicians, they launched an active and aggres- sive political campaign. Committees were organized to support the position. A regular correspondence had by this time been established between Liberal groups in both provinces. A great emphasis was placed on freedom of the press so that the national program could be circulated. The Conservatives had no really competitive ideologi cal program and thus could not benefit to a similar extent from the introduction and guarantee of civil liberties. ‘The political positions described hitherto were those held by the landowners, the small middle class, and the clergy. The reaction of the majority of the population, the peasantry, is not so clear. This subject is difficult to treat because of the absence of critical analyses of peasant awareness of national issues. All Liberal leaders claimed to speak for “the people”; Conservatives too believed that their program was for the best interests of the entire population. Certainly, Liberal politicians were able to recruit large crowds for partisan demonstrations, but the means by which this was done at times leave doubts about the true convictions of those who participated in such actions, The true interest 6Russia and the Romanian national state of the peasant lay, of course, less in political questions concerning the organization of the state than in land reform. Because of this, the Lib- eral Party, with its left wing that supported radical change, probably best represented peasant concerns. There were, nevertheless, no major Liberal spokesmen who had a peasant background, nor, of course, was land reform a major item on the Liberal program at this time. The Liberal Party was in no sense a peasant organization. Its attitude was at the best paternal, at the worst condescending. One cynical observer commented concerning its leadership: “It is only lawyers and professors who preach that political combination”; they were men who wished to bring about 2 miniature French Revolution that would give them po- litical power and public office.” Certainly, this aspect of the party was to be shown in coming years when it enjoyed political predominance. True peasant parties were not to come into existence until the next century. At this time the majority of the people played only a passive role in events that were, however, to create a situation to their ad- vantage. ‘Meanwhile, the representatives of the great powers prepared to play their assigned role in the proceedings that were intended to discover “the wishes of the population.” Russia was reduced to the level of the other powers; it was one of seven guarantor states. Although general policy had been set at the peace conference, many details still had to be decided. Specific questions regarding the franchise and the duties of both the divans and the International Commission had yet to be settled. Alter the appointment of the caimacams, the next matter of importance was the formulation of the firman that would set the rules for the elec tion. The representatives of the powers took an active part in this task, with each pressing for decisions that would favor his government. A major problem was the franchise. The treaty specified that all levels of society should be represented, but it was assumed that the major in- Auence should be retained by the propertied classes. France, supporting the popular program of union, wished as wide a franchise as possible. In contrast, the Habsburg Monarchy demanded a strict limitation on the number of voters in order to give the advantage to the great land- ‘owners, who were more likely to be separatists. In the final version the voting was by electoral college, with different procedures for the pro- prietors, who kept their disproportionate representation, the middle class, and the peasants. The voting for each group was held on separate days; the representatives were to sit in the divans grouped by their col leges, and they were to present individual reports to the International Commission. As regards the subjects that could be considered by the divans, an 76The European guardianship effort was made by the Habsburg government, backed by the Porte, to force the exclusion of the question of union from the debates, since, it ‘was argued, the issue involved the rights of the sovereign power. The French, supported by the Russians, insisted that the assemblies should be completely free to express their wishes. Of course, the great powers were under no obligation to accept the proposals presented by the divans, which could only make recommendations: they were not con- stituent assemblies, and they could not legislate. ‘The duties of the International Commission, set forth in Article 23 of the treaty, included the investigation of conditions in the Principali- ties and the formulation of suggestions for their future organization. ‘The commission was also to supervise the elections and assure that they were conducted fairly. The members assembled in Constantinople in the fall of 1856;° they included Sir Henry Bulwer for Britain, Rafaello Benzi for Sardinia, Safvet Pasha for the Ottoman Empire, Baron E. Richthofen for Prussia, and Charles A. Talleyrand-Périgord for France. ‘The Habsburg delegate, Baron Koller, was soon replaced by Liehmann von Palmrode. The Russian commissioner, Constantine Mikhailovich Basily (Bazili), was well prepared for his task by his considerable ex. perience in Eastern affairs? Bom in Constantinople, he came from a Greek-Albanian family. His father had participated in the Greek revolution and had been forced to flee to Russia, where he entered state service. Basily’s major post previously had been that of consul-general at Beirut. His position on the commission made him the senior Russian official in the Principalities. There he was assisted by Popov, the consul in Jassy, and by E. R. Shchulepnikoy, the vice-consul in Bucharest. Despite the fact that the commission was formed so promptly, its members did not arrive in Bucharest until March 1857. The delay was occasioned by conflicts over the new Russian boundary and the conse- quent postponement of the evacuation of the Habsburg army. Arrange ments also had to be made concerning the transfer of the three districts of southern Bessarabia and the Danube Delta. The major disagreements that arose over the drawing of the frontier involved the town of Bol- grad and the possession of Serpent's Island, which had an important strategic position at the mouth of the Danube. Finally, the points in dis- pute were awarded to the Ottoman Empire in return for some minor border rectifications in favor of Russia, The Habsburg army was with: drawn by March 1857. The Russian government had been particularly adamant that its commissioner should not proceed to Bucharest until this evacuation had been accomplished. ‘The instructions issued to the Russian agents reflected the considera- tions previously described. They were to cooperate with France and to ”Russia and the Romanian national state insist on an equality of treatment with the other powers on all matters. On the Romanian question the provisions of the treaty were to be strictly followed. The Russian representatives were to maintain an att tude of complete abstention in local affairs; they were to support no party or candidate. They were to observe conditions, but take no initia tives, and report to their government on Romanian polities and public opinion. On the vital questions of union and a foreign prince, they were to express no views whatsoever ~ in favor either of the status quo or of a radical change. The attitude to be maintained was clearly in dicated in an instruction from Basily to Popov, reflecting the orders from St. Petersburg, sent in the summer of 1837 when the preparations for elections were in progress: ‘The essential matter for us, even more, the only objective that we have in view, is the free and frank expression of the wishes of the country. The question of union, as every other political question, is for the moment outside the sphere of our preoccupations. But if anyone uses any means whatsoever (0 influence the expression of the wishes of the country in one sense or another, for or against the idea of union, we should watch out for it with the same solicitude, the same impartiality. One should not suppose us favorable to union because ‘we protest against the abuses brought into play in order to stifle that wish.1° ‘The Russian government was also most eager to see the election proceed in a correct and orderly fashion. The principal concern was lest the radical elements cause disorders that would provide a pretext for the powers, notably the Habsburg Empire and the Porte, to inter- vene. The Russian agents were told to emphasize to the Romanians that nothing would be more detrimental than to provide the occasion for a collective intervention, or even to impose on the powers the obligation to intervene. ‘The Russian government was fully informed of the general desire for union and a foreign prince. Although Basily was personally con- servative and distrustful of the “men of 1848," he made no attempt to oppose their cause, and his reports reflected faithfully the national de- sires, For instance, he wrote in April 1857 that Safvet had argued that only about a thousand were unionist. Basily, in expressing his cisagree- ment, commented that certainly there were few leaders: the number does not go beyond several hundred in this country, but that of the convinced and the converted rises perhaps to a hundred thousand. I do not say that the ‘masses are aroused; the intellectual state of the masses in the Principalities is known, But men capable of thinking and acting, the mass of the boyars and the bourgeoise, are avowed partisans of union.! ‘The idea of union, Basily believed, was closely connected with that of a foreign prince. Few thought that the system would work under a native 78The European guardianship ruler, since he could not provide the necessary stability or prestige. Basily, of course, followed his instructions to cooperate with Talley- rand, whose government similarly supported free elections and the right of the divans to express their opinions. However, by this time the French agents were urging their partisans to work only for union, since a foreign prince would arouse too much opposition among the powers. The Sardinian and Prussian commissioners backed their French and Russian colleagues. As previously, the Austrian and Ottoman rep- resentatives took a strongly antiunionist stand. Their position was strengthened exceedingly when the British adopted a similar attitude. Although, as we have seen, the British representatives at the Congress of Paris had sided with France on the question of union, they now aban- doned this stand. For Britain the major consideration would always be whether union would or would not be beneficial to British policy in the Near East. The firm support of Ottoman integrity was, as before, occasioned by the belief that the empire must be maintained as a bar- rier against further Russian advances in the Balkans. The French gov- ernment had previously argued that the United Principalities would play a similar but even more effective role. However, after further con- sideration, the British leaders came to a negative decision. In July 1856 Lord Palmerston commented: “The united principalities would be a field for Russian intrigue and not a barrier against Russia.”!? After this month the British representatives were instructed to oppose union by all legal means. British policy therefore continued in the Cri ‘mean tradition. The union was seen as a weakening of the Ottoman Empire's control and thus of its ability to withstand Russian pressure. ‘The separation of the provinces appeared necessary to secure the British objectives. ‘As we have seen, the best hope for the powers who opposed union lay in Moldavia, If a negative return could be gained there, a unionist majority in Wallachia would have no significance. Repeated protests were delivered to the commissioners on the electoral proceedings. In May all of them except Basily, who saw little to gain from the trip, visited Jassy. Despite the continuing controversy, preparations for the elections continued. In June the initial electoral lists for Mol- davia were ready. Their composition assured a separatist victory. Al- though many unionist sympathizers were inscribed, a majority for their ‘opponents was guaranteed. The names had been carefully selected. As one Romanian historian wrote: Of 2,000 great proprietors in Moldavia, they [the lists] contained the names of only 350; of the 20,000 or more small proprietors, they had inscribed only 2,264. Among the electors of the cities one had found to register in the whole 9Russia and the Romanian national state state of Moldavia only 11 persons who exercised the liberal professions. In all the lists were comprised of (but) 4,658 electors of the upper classes instead of 40.000 which they should have contained.!> According to the firman, thirty days were to elapse before the elections could be held. Unionist protests flooded the friendly consulates in Jassy. In Constantinople, on French initiative, the four ambassadors on June 13/25 delivered a note of protest to the Porte, warning that it would not be in keeping “with the dignity of the commission . . . to put itself in touch with a Divan, which will not be composed in a man- ner to be able to pass for the true expression of the wishes and needs of the country, and which will respond so badly to the intentions of the Congress of Paris in that regard.” In the commission Basily on June 20/July 2 proposed that Vogoride be censured, but the move was op- posed by Bulwer, Liehmann, and Safvet.'® Caught between the opposing pressures of the powers, and itself against union, the Porte hesitated. Finally, after a delay of eight days in the scheduled date, the elections commenced on July 7/19 and continued for three days. The Moldavian unionists, in protest against the situation, simply stayed away from the polls. As a consequence, of the 193 priests on the lists, only 17 voted; of the 465 electors chosen from the great landowners, only 207 appeared.!* Thus the fraudulent elec- toral procedures had not fulfilled the intentions of the separatist caima- cam. Although the separatists did win the elections in a technical sense, the divan chosen in this manner could not be regarded as a true expres- sion of the wishes of the population. ‘An immediate international crisis followed. In Bucharest the four commissioners announced their refusal to accept an assembly elected under these circumstances. The meetings of the commission were sus- pended, and attention was focused on Constantinople. There Thou- venel, supported by his three colleagues, demanded the annulment of the elections. Although the Porte refused to act on its own authority, it did agree to delay the convening of the Moldavian divan until the powers had come to an agreement. The lines were drawn: Britain and Austria opposed an annulment; the other four powers demanded it. With this division of France from Britain and Austria, a major Russian aim ~ the breaking of the Crimean coalition - appeared to have been achieved. Gorchakov made a great effort to impress on France the extent of the Russian support. He directed Victor Petrovich Balabin, the Rus sian chargé in Paris, to ask Walewski what the French cabinet expects to do on this occasion. Our opinion is formed. But, desiring to conserve a perfect accord with the French government, we will de- lay the official and final announcement in order to come to an understanding 80The European guardianship with it, for certainly its dignity is more at stake than ours. M. de Thouvenel has been in the forefront of the entire discussion of this affair. The challenge hhas been openly made by Lord Redcliffe and M. Prokesch, and the diplomats as well as the public of Constantinople are watching to see who will prevail. On such things local respect and righeful influence in the Orient depend in a lange part.!7 Balabin was further instructed to assure Walewski of full Russian support, and similar directions were sent to Butenev in Constantinople. When the Porte did not annul the elections, the French, Russian, Prus- sian, and Sardinian governments broke relations. Despite this apparent shattering of the British-French entente of the previous years, the ex- perienced Russian ambassador in Paris, Kiselev, who had already played such a major role in Romanian affairs, had few illusions. On June 24/July 6 he wrote to Gorchakov that he did not think that Napoleon 111 would break his ties with Britain, His views were to prove prophetic.'S Indeed, Napoleon III, for both external and internal policy, could not afford to end the British alignment. Among the nationalities com: peting for his favor, the Italians rather than the Romanians held his major interest. He could not antagonize the greatest sea power and hope to achieve a political success in the Italian peninsula. French economic concemns also dictated cooperation with Britain, Moreover, this part of the emperor's policy was not supported by other French diplomats. For instance, despite his dislike of Redcliffe, Thouvenel favored working with Britain. There was, in addition, a question whether union was the best policy for France and whether a foreign prince would not simply introduce more problems into the Romanian situation. As a result of these hesitations, the basis for a compromise was set. ‘A meeting held at Osborne in August was attended by Napoleon II1, Queen Victoria, and their principal ministers and ambassadors, An understanding was reached in which Britain agreed to the French desire for the annulment of the Moldavian elections; in return, France backed down on the question of union. A British memorandum on the bargain stated: “It is agreed to be desirable that the two Provinces should have similar organic institutions, and that while retaining their separate Governments, they should have a common system in regard to all mat- ters civil and military to which such a community of system can ad- vantageously be established.” This highly ambiguous wording was open to many interpretations, but it was clear that Napoleon had abandoned his support of union as well as the idea of the nomination of a foreign prince. Moreover, both France and Britain had violated 81Russia and the Romanian national state the spirit of the Treaty of Paris in that they had prejudged the question of the future of the Principalities. Although previously neither power had wished to limit the right of divans to discuss unification, they now acted in a manner to assure that such an objective could not be put into practice. The two powers in secret session decided the main issue on which the election campaigns in the Principalities were based. How- ever, because of the secrecy of the proceedings, only the British con- cession on the annulment of the elections became immediately known. It thus appeared on the surface as if Napoleon III had won a diplomatic victory; his retreat on the major question remained concealed. Not only did the French government reverse its position, but it did not inform Russia about the shift. The Russian attitude, it will be recalled, favored not union, but the assurance of the right of the Prin- cipalities to express their wishes through free elections. The final de- cision would be made by the representatives of the powers in confer- ence after the proper procedures, as dictated by the treaty. had been followed. The Osborne agreement, of course, meant that such a course of action would not be adopted. Given the diplomatic balance of the time, the major issue had already been settled. The holding of the elec- tions was thus in fact a futile exercise. ‘Despite the French concessions, Walewski, in discussing the Osborne meeting with Balabin, stated that Napoleon II had rejected British attempts to negotiate separately. Rumors, however, soon reached St. Petersburg from both British and Austrian sources that Napoleon had renounced union. The concern that this ambiguous situation aroused in St. Petersburg is reflected in the letters of Gorchakov to Balabin at this time. In recounting a conversation with the French diplomat Charles Baudin, Gorchakov wrote that he told him: ‘The newspapers... . are full of allusions to the concessions that the Emperor Napoleon made at Osborne, and they assume that the result was reached only as a result of a compromise, Redcliffe has gone further. He expressly hinted to the Porte that Emperor Napoleon had explicitly renounced union at Os- borne. Austria supports the same version in less ostensible ways. Emperor Na- poleon ... had certainly the right to renounce union. We would not have been justified in showing surprise about this subject, even less in raising any objec- tion whatsoever. But then he should have told us and above all he should not have instructed his minister to ell us the contrary. But, we have full confidence in the loyalty of Emperor Napoleon, we do not call into question the perfect accuracy of the communications that he has made to us. In this letter Gorchakov also admitted that he believed that something more had been conceded at Osborne than had been announced. If this were true, it would be a warning for the future. It would be par- ticularly bad, Gorchakov believed, if, at a time when a meeting was BeThe European guardianship scheduled between Napoleon II and Alexander Il, the French emperor “concealed from us the knowledge of his acts bearing upon a question on which we have given him the most loyal cooperation, and if, what would be even worse and which I refuse to believe, the French govern- ment has knowingly misled us on the significance of the engagements made at Osborne.”® When the two rulers, accompanied by their foreign ministers, met at Stuttgart on September 13 /25, the question of the Principalities was discussed, but the French statesmen maintained their silence on the Osborne bargain. Gorchakov at this time repeated the Russian position that no decision on union would be taken until the divans had made their opinions known. On the question of a foreign prince, the Russian minister declared that the tsar would not accept a ruler who was not Orthodox and that he would also not allow a Russian prince to take the position. Walewski gained the impression from these discussions that Russia opposed union. The Russian desire to work with France and the willingness to back any French proposal was, however, again repeated. With France and Britain in basic agreement, the crisis over the Prin- ipalities came to an end. The Habsburg government, if not the Rus sian, was informed of the settlement. Redcliffe and Prokesch together advised the Porte to annul the Moldavian elections. Once this was accomplished the four powers resumed their diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. The International Commission again carried on its functions in Bucharest. Elections then proceeded in both provinces. ‘Those held on September 8/20 in Moldavia, on the basis of revised lists and with the cooperation of Vogoride, returned a clear mandate for union. Of the eighty-seven deputies elected, sixty-six were unionist, six were separatist, and fifteen were peasants who would probably sup- port union.#! The unionists also won in Wallachia, but the predomi nant aspect of that election was the split of the delegates into $tirbei and Bibescu factions. Among the Liberals the victory went to the radi- calsand the recently returned emigrés, rather than to the moderates Once called into session, the assemblies proceeded as could be ex- pected. The Moldavian divan opened on September 22 / October 4. On October 7/19 it voted a program of five points, including union, a foreign prince, autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty, a representative government, and neutrality. The Wallachian deputies, meeting first ‘on September 30/October 12, adopted an almost identical program ‘on October 8/20. Autonomy, union, a foreign prince, and representa- tive institutions were thus the clear wish of the Romanian people as expressed by the divans. The powers had the answer to the question they had originally asked. After adopting its program the Wallachian 83Russia and the Romanian national state assembly suspended its sessions until the great powers should come to a decision on the demands. The Moldavian divan, in contrast, con: tinued its discussions. The representatives did not limit their debates to questions concerning future political institutions, but also dealt with controversial social questions. At the beginning of 1858 the Otto- man government declared both assemblies dissolved, since they had accomplished their basic functions. The International Commission then proceeded to draw up its report, which was completed on March 26/April 7. The wishes of the Romanian population had been deter- mined; the powers now had to meet to reach a final decision. During this period the instructions to the Russian agents remained the same. They were to limit their statements to generalities, advise moderation, and secure the execution of the regulations for the elections as set down in the firman. Disorders that could lead to a military oc- cupation had to be avoided. The second round of elections caused no complaints as far as procedure was concerned. Vogoride, it was recog- nized, acted in a correct manner. Despite the satisfaction with the con- ditions of the election, Basily was most concerned about the radical composition of the assemblies, whose membership he regarded as hav. ing an anarchical spirit He did not like the prominent position won by the former leaders of the revolution of 1848, who, it will be re- membered, had retuned to Wallachia in 1857. They were obviously popular with the electorate and they were able, he believed, to intimi- date the moderates. At the time of their arrival he had expressed his suspicions that the Porte, on British urging, had authorized their return, with the hope that they would cause so much disorder that a military intervention would be justified. He was also extremely disturbed by the debates in the Moldavian assembly and by the discussions of social questions, in particular the relations of the peasants and the land- owners. Despite his concerns over these matters Basily in his reports to his government expressed clearly the obvious desire of the Romanians for union and a foreign prince. Sympathetic to the nationalist position, Basily argued that union was not possible without a foreign prince, who could provide the stability and strength needed by the country. The dangers of an elective native prince had been demonstrated in the past. ‘The Russian agent advised his government not to oppose an idea which is that “of the masses as well as the intelligent classes." With the completion of the work of the divans and the International Commission, the final decision rested in the hands of the powers. The Russian position on union and a foreign prince had to be clearly stated. For the formulation of Russian policy in regard to the Principalities 84The European guardianship the important views were, of course, those of Alexander II, Gorchakov, and Kiselev. The opinions of Kiselev, who was regarded as the main Russian expert on the Principalities, had great influence, An exchange of letters between Gorchakov and Kiselev, with the tsar’s comments, shows the ideas of these statesmen.* This correspondence clearly re- veals the concern felt over the political instability in the region and the dangers to be faced should a representative government be established ina state directly adjacent to Russia. The Principalities could become a center of unrest and contribute to Polish rebellion. Certainly, in theory, the separation of the provinces had many advantages for Russian policy. Nevertheless, it was the opposing considerations that took precedence. Obviously, a success of the separatists would serve only to strengthen the influence of Austria, the Porte, and Britain at the expense of Russia and France. Moreover, the Russian government did not want to take a position contrary to that of France. It must be remembered that the Osborne decisions were not known in St. Petersburg. Finally, the Russian diplomats, in particular Kiselev, did not want to oppose the wishes of the Romanian population without a good cause. With this general agreement on union, there remained the problem of how this solution could be implemented. Both Alexander IL and Kiselev opposed the nomination of a foreign prince. Any candidate would necessarily come from a Western, non-Orthodox family, since Russia could provide no suitable choices. He would probably be either French or proFrench; in any case he would not be oriented toward St. Petersburg. Under the circumstances the best alternative appeared the nomination of a native prince to rule over the united provinces. Kiselev wished him to be given a life or even a hereditary appointment. It should be emphasized that the Russian diplomats considered that any settlement reached at this time would be only temporary. The purpose ‘was to postpone a final regulation of the affairs of the provinces until Russia had regained its military strength and could exert a stronger influence. The Russian officials believed that the rivalry within the Principalities would keep any government weak, a situation that was considered an advantage to Russian policy. Union under a native prince was thus favored as a temporary expedient. It would allow Russia to stand by its declarations at the Paris conference of 18565; it would win favor among the Romanians; and it would maintain good relations with France. The Russian government also believed that the majority of the powers would oppose a foreign prince ‘The conference opened in May 1858 with the ambassadors of the powers in Paris serving as the representatives for their countries: Hib- ner for Austria, Hatzfeldt for Prussia, Villamarina for Sardinia, Cowley 85,Russia and the Romanian national state for Britain, and Kiselev for Russia. Fuad Pasha came from Constanti- nople for his government. Walewski served as president of the confer- ence, and again he was closely instructed by Napoleon III. The dele- gates immediately decided on secrecy for their proceedings. During the subsequent discussions Kiselev did not play a leading role on most questions. Before the opening he had been informed of the Osborne decisions by Walewski. He was surprised, and he did not think the French alternate plan, which was soon to be introduced, would con- tribute to the tranquility of the area. During the discussions the main issue was, of course, the political organization of the Principalities. However, the chief dispute was to arise from the relatively minor issue of the flag. Of the powers France was obviously in the most difficult position. Previously the chief advocate of union and a foreign prince, the French govern- ment had to back down on both issues. In the attempt to achieve a solution as close to union as possible, Walewski sponsored a plan that would have brought about a form of legislative unification. He suggested that two hospodars and two assemblies be chosen, but that a central commission with real powers be established, composed of nine members from each assembly. This body would be empowered to make laws of interest for both principalities. It would also approve the laws passed by the separate assemblies and have a role in the preparation of the budgets for both provinces. The reaction to this proposal was as might be expected. Hiibner and Fuad opposed anything approaching union; Kiselev stood by France. Cowley, while accepting some measures to assimilate administrative institutions, believed that the French plan went too far. The opposition finally triumphed. As will be shown, central commission did form part of the final agreement, but its powers were limited. ‘Whereas agreement was reached on this point, the conference almost broke up on the question of the common flag. Although Austria and the Ottoman Empire accepted the name “the United Principalities” when on the British suggestion the words “of Moldavia and Wallachia” were added, the flag was to be another matter. It was a question on which the Habsburg Monarchy would not yield; such a symbol of Romanian unity would have an effect on its Romanian population. During these discussions both the Austrian and the French delegates threatened to leave. Many alternatives were suggested; for instance, a crescent could be added to the flag indicating Ottoman suzerainty. Both Walewski and Kiselev objected to this; Kiselev indicated the problem of attach- ing a Moslem emblem to the flag of a Christian country. Napoleon III, who had yielded so much on the matter of the organization of the 86The European guardianship provinces, proved very stubborn on this issue. Hiibner too declared that Austria would leave rather than back down, When consulted by the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Gorchakov agreed to support France, but believed that it might be well to yield on form. A sugges- tion by Prussia that the two militias when united could use the same standards, but separate flags, was also turned down. After long argu- ments the matter was finally settled when Austria agreed that the two separate flags would fly on two poles, but that a common blue pennant could be attached to each. Although Kiselev did not play the leading role in these debates, he did take the initiative on the question of the autonomous rights of the Principalities. It should first be mentioned that both France and Russia were concerned about public opinion in the Principalities. During the first meeting of the conference Walewski made a plea for union and a foreign prince, although his government had already in fact abandoned the idea and his new plan called for neither. Similarly, Kiselev spoke in favor of the national solution despite the fact that his declarations were outside his official instructions and he knew very well that the powers would not accept this solution, In the conference Kiselev introduced a memorandum whose objective was to define the relationship among the Porte, the Principalities, and the guarantor powers. His arguments had influence on the final agreement in that in Article 2 the rights of the Principalities received a more precise defi tion. Moreover, again according to a Kiselev proposal, the payment for- merly made to the Porte at the investiture of a prince was abolished and the tribute increased. The sum was fixed at 1 million piasters for Moldavia and 2 million piasters for Wallachia. In the conference Kis eley also argued that the Principalities should be allowed certain ad- ditional rights. For instance, he proposed that the stipulations of commercial treaties contracted between the powers and the Porte should not apply to the Principalities without their consent. He also brought up the question of consular jurisdiction and the Dedicated Monasteries. ‘The final convention, signed on August 7/19, was a document of fifty articles, of which only the most significant for the future are sum- marized here.” The document established a government for the Pri ipalities with parallel but separate institutions: two governors, two as- semblies, and two separate administrations. A Central Commission, with limited functions, was to be composed of sixteen delegates, eight from each principality, chosen by the prince from the assemblies or from the ranks of the high officials. The commission could prepare Jaws of a common interest to both provinces - for example, concerning matters such as the tariff union, the post, and the telegraph. These 8Russia and the Romanian national state would then be submitted through the prince to the assemblies. The commission was also to work on the codification of the laws and a re- vision of the Organic Statutes. The regulations, except where they had been replaced by the August convention, were thus recognized as being still in force. The princes were to be elected for life by assemblies chosen on a very restricted franchise; they were to be invested by the sultan, ‘The Principalities remained, of course, under Ottoman suzerainty. ‘This relationship had been reduced to little more than a nominal control of the foreign relations of the provinces and the payment of tribute. As before, the Ottoman government had no means of enfore- ing its decisions. Despite efforts to change the limitation, the Ottoman armies, according to Article 8, could still enter the Principalities only with the consent of the guarantor states.® It was recognized that this could be obtained only under highly unusual circumstances, The Rus- sian government continued to react strongly on this question: matters of Russian security would be involved if the Ottoman armies were able to occupy the neighboring provinces easily. For the future another section of the treaty was to have great sig- nificance. Article 46 covered both civil rights and the peasant question. All Moldavians and Wallachians were declared equal before the law. in taxation, and in the right to hold public office in both province other individual liberties were guaranteed. In addition, Romanian nationals “of all the Christian rites” were to “enjoy political rights equally.” Similar conditions were to be extended to the other religions by legislation in the future. These stipulations, while maintaining re- strictions in particular on the Jews, did formally abolish previous special privileges held by certain sectors of Romanian society. The final section of this article dealt with the most controversial internal ques- tion — peasant emancipation — and stated: “The revision of the law which regulates the relations of the landlords with the farmers will be undertaken without undue delay with a view to improving the condi- tion of the peasants.” ## ‘The Russian government had every reason to be satisfied with the agreement as a whole. As we have seen, union had been accepted because it was believed to be the solution favored by France and by most Romanians. Separation, however, still had its advantages. The conference had also given the Russian delegate an opportunity to talk about autonomy and even to speak in favor of union and 2 foreign prince. Support had been ostentatiously given to France. Russia thus received the settlement that conformed to its best interests, but its lead- 88The European guardianship ers could also claim credit for backing the position preferred by the French government and the Principalities. ‘The terms now had to be applied, and here difficulties could obvious- ly arise. Most important, the convention called for another round of elections. Even though the franchise was still extremely limited, the most active political group remained the Liberals, and among them, the leaders were the men of 1848. The emigrés had returned; the pre- vious elections had shown their strength. The danger persisted that their victory, even in separate principalities, would result in the establish- ment of political units that could have a dangerous effect on conditions within Russia. The Polish connection remained a source of extreme anxiety. To avoid unfavorable complications, the Russian policy be- came the strict enforcement of the treaty stipulations, which seemed the best means of maintaining the status quo in the area and preventing a complete radical victory. The Russian government was fully aware that the Romanian nationalists had no sympathy for Russia or for the past regime of the protectorate. The only Russian partisans were some large Iandowners, from whose ranks the separatists usually came and who had enjoyed a favorable position under the protectorate. The higher clergy also had connections with Russian Orthodoxy. Both of these elements in Romanian society were, however, declining in poli al influence. Even in the church, the majority of the clergy were na- tionalist in sympathy. ‘The closest ties between Russia and the Principalities lay, now as in the past, in the relationship of members of the Russian and the Ro- manian aristocracy. As we have seen, Romanians had won high posi tions in the Russian service. Further, some families were closely con- nected by marriage. The period provides excellent examples. After the tsar, Gorchakov was, of course, most influential in the formulation of Russian policy in regard to the Principalities, and he certainly had in timate ties with the area. Not only was his sister married to George Cantacuzino, a Moldavian large landowner, but his second son married a daughter of Michael Sturdza. In addition, in September 1858 Nicho- las Giers, who had been in the Principalities in the 1840s and 1850s, returned as consul-general.” In 1848 he had married George Can- tacuzino’s daughter, Olga, and thus Gorchakov was the uncle of Giers’s wife. There were other similar marriage alliances. In every case the re- lationship was with those sections of Romanian society which were con- servative, if not always separatist. The Russian diplomats, with some ex- ceptions, were bound to sce Romanian questions through the eyes of those with whom they had the closest personal ties. 89Russia and the Romanian national state After the convention was concluded Gorchakov sent to his agents a general instruction on the attitude to be adopted toward the Principali- ties. As was usual in his directives, the tone was lofty and the measures advised were expressed in vague and cloudy terminology. The main emphasis in his dispatch was that, though Russia did not seek domina- tion or an exclusive interest in the provinces, great care was to be taken to assure that no other state acquired this position. The Russian gov- ernment wished the Principalities to keep the autonomous rights they had gained and to remain a neutral country under great-power guar- antee. For this a strict execution of the treaty stipulations was neces- sary. Although the treaties had been framed in an anti-Russian sense, they would guard against changes in an unfavorable direction, There- fore the Russian agents should attempt to influence Romanian public opinion and the political leaders to abide by the international agree- ments, They should concentrate on consolidating the advantages they had won, Particular warning should be given against disorders at the time of the elections; these could bring foreign intervention. Dis- turbances would show the powers that conditions in the Principalities were unstable and that “their independent and national administra- tion is not compatible with the existence of the Ottoman Empire.” ‘The emphasis was thus to be on the maintenance of the political status quo. Although the Russian role was not to be completely passive, Rus- sian agents were instructed not to enter into intrigues. Russia had “neither candidates to bring forward, nor individuals to protect.” The Russian government would support those who respected “the legally established conditions with the aim of order, improvements and prog: ress” in maintaining them. ‘As far as the other powers were concerned, the Russian diplomats, as before, were to watch with care both Austrian and Ottoman activi- ties. The Habsburg Monarchy, it was stated, continued to base its dom- ination on its economic influence and on the abuse of consular jurisdic- tion. In relation to the Porte, the Russian consuls were to guard against any Ottoman intervention that passed beyond the limits of the treaties, stich as an arbitrary interpretation of the election rules or interference in the elections. Strong emphasis was placed on relations with France: As for France, the entente established between that power and Russia and con- secrated last year at Seuttgart by a loyal exchange of ideas and friendly assur- ances between the two August Sovereign has principally taken shape in the re- gion of the East. Ic has for a starting point the circular [dispatch] addressed by the two governments to their agents in Turkey and which requires them to avoid any struggle for influence between themselves, above all in religious questions, and to proceed as much as possible in paths of complete accord. It hhas developed in the diverse incidents which have arisen since then and today 90The European guardianship itis the gage for the maintenance of peace, the security of the Christian popula- tions, and the political influence of the ewo governments in the Fast. ® ‘The Russian representatives were further directed to cooperate closely with their French colleagues. ‘These instructions, vague as they were, called for the maintenance of the status quo established by the treaties, cooperation with France, and enmity to Austria, This policy was, of course, a reflection of the course of action adopted in all European affairs at the time. The Rus sian government did not want more crises to develop until its military reorganization was complete; revenge against Vienna remained a con- stant element in its plans. The dispatch, nevertheless, was open to various interpretations concerning its implementation. In fact, the two main Russian representatives in the Principalities, Giers in Bucharest and Popov in Jassy, worked in directions that were different if not in actual conflict Giers gave his support to the moderate conservative position and emphasized a strict adherence to the convention. He worked closely with his French counterpart, Louis Béclard. In Jassy Popov took a far more active position. Attracted to the unionist cause, he became violently anti-Austrian and expressed an extreme dislike of Michael Sturdza. He cooperated with his frankly and openly unionist French colleague, Victor Place. Both diplomats were to be cautioned by their governments on their attitude When the convention became known in the Principalities, few were content. As Popov wrote: “The effect that it has produced here is not very satisfactory; no one I know is satisfied with it; neither the friends of the old system nor the so-called progressives, these because they had counted on a more liberal constitution, the others because privileges have been abolished.” Although union remained the predominant desire of the politically aware, the franchise established by the convention gave the advantage to the Conservatives, if they remained together. The problem here was that they could not. Since the Conservative program was essentially the maintenance of the status quo, both politically and socially, there ex- {sted no real basis for organization for the achievement of a positive goal. The right in Romanian politics thus splintered into factions supporting a multitude of candidates for the hospodarship, all in bitter enmity to each other. The Liberals, as we have seen, did have a definite goal in union and a foreign prince. They were also closely connected through political clubs, an active correspondence among the leaders in both provinces, and a partisan press. They knew what they wanted, and they had a framework of political organization far more developed and sophisticated than their opponents. Their strength was in their 9Russia and the Romanian national state program; their weakness was the fact that they did not have a single candidate in either principality around whom they could all gather as the symbol of their cause. Like the Conservative, the Liberal camp was divided into competitive factions backing individuals who wer the top positions. There was also some disagreement on ta the electoral laws seemed to preclude a victory through legal means, some thought of revolutionary action. Others favored a declaration of union and a foreign prince either within or without the new assemblies. Finally, however, there was general agreement that it would be best to work within the convention stipulations and to try to elect a unionist assembly, even though it was recognized that it would be very difficult under the circumstances. Again, as in the previous elections, the question who would run the interim government was of vital concern for both sides.*S As before, the men in control could dominate the prefects and the courts and have the final say on the composition of the electoral lists. In Paris the powers had decided that the government would be in the hands of new caimacamies made up of the three principal ministers of the last reigning hospodars. The positions were taken in Wallachia by 1. Manu, E. Bileanu, and I. A. Filipescu; in Moldavia by A. Panu, Vasile Sturdza, and $. Catargiu, This decision was bound to cause difficulties, since it brought about a complete change of direction in both administrations. ‘The new regimes were the avowed opponents of their predecessors, and mass dismissals of officials commenced at once. Moreover, it soon be- came apparent that in both provinces the caimacamies were severely divided within themselves. Two questions had to be solved at once. First, would the caimacams resume their former ministerial posts? ‘This question had major significance because of the very important role of the Ministry of Interior in any election. It was agreed that the former positions would be retained. Second, would the caimacamie make de- cisions by majority rule, or did all three members have to agree unani- mously? This decision was to split in particular the Moldavian govern- ment and to endanger the election. In fact, the major controversies centered in this province. As in the previous campaign a multitude of candidates emerged to dispute the Moldavian hospodarship. The change of administration wwas a particular blow to Vogoride, who nevertheless remained a candi- date, along with Costin Catargiu, T. Bals, V. Ghica, and others. The chief rivals, however, were Michael Sturdza and his son Gregory. As before, Michael Sturdza was the choice of most conservatives. Very rrich, he was willing to use his money to win the office. Hee had returned to Moldavia after many years abroad, spent mostly in France, He at. 92The European guardianship tracted those who were against peasant reform and the separatists. At this time he was also the preferred candidate of Austria and the Otto- man Empire. In contrast, his son was less conservative; he favored grad- ual reform, and he was not against union. Gregory Sturdza won the sup- port of some unionists who did not like the social and political programs associated with the more radical Liberals. The Russian agents opposed his candidacy. Dissensions marred the actions of the Moldavian caimacamie from its inception. Of the members, Panu and Sturdza were inclined toward union; §. Catargiu was a conservative who acted in the interest of ¢ separatists. Since it was decided that the caimacams would resume their former offices, Catargiu controlled the vital Ministry of Interior. The question of appointments came up at once. The two unionists wanted an immediate widespread dismissal of the officials who had served under the previous administration, whereas Catargiu was willing to keep the ‘Vogoride appointments. However, it had also been decided that within the caimacamie decisions would be taken by majority rule. A situation wwas thus created that could easily lead to a crisis in the government. The break in the caimacamie came over two issues in particular. By a two-to-one vote the control over the press was ended. Liberal pa- pers were again able to publish, a distinct advantage for the unionists. ‘The major controversy, however, came over the question of appoint- ments. The two majority members, proceeding with a cleanout of the administration, soon quarreled sharply with Catargiu over the choice of new prefects, who would be responsible for drawing up the election lists and who were, of course, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Overruled in the voting, Catargiu left the meetings. His col- leagues then went ahead and made the appointments themselves. Par- ticularly controversial was their choice of A. Teriachi as director of the Ministry of Interior, an act that was a direct challenge to their col- league. In reply, Catargiu appealed to the Porte to intervene. The Otto- man government acted through Afif Bey, who had been sent to Jassy to communicate the firman on the election, Catargiu cooperated closely not only with Afif, but also with the Austrian consul, Gédel. The cai- macams for their part would not negotiate with Afif, who they claimed ‘was an official Ottoman agent and whose real mission had ended with the delivery of the firman. The telegraph office refused to accept his cipher telegrams. Having absolutely no means of enforcing its decisions, the Porte turned to the other powers. On November 15/27 the ambassadors in Constantinople met at the British embassy. They were in agreement that the two caimacams should be warned about their actions and their 93Russia and the Romanian national state attitude toward the Porte. Decisions could be made by the majority, but special account should be taken in making appointments of the opinion of the caimacam whose department was affected. The represen: tatives also thought that the caimacams were exceeding their assigned duties in some of the measures they had taken, for instance, in regard to the press. This diplomatic intervention accomplished nothing. The Ottoman government considered suspending the elections, but it re ceived no support from the powers. The recalling of the conference of Paris was also discussed, but here again no agreement could be reached. Austria felt reluctant to attend an international meeting in which it would be in the minority. ‘As the election approached, the situation in Jassy continued to de- teriorate. The two caimacams had been willing to change some of the officials whom they had appointed, but Catargiu wanted all of his choices to be accepted. Finally, the majority dismissed Catargiu. Even though the election had thus been to a degree compromised in Mol- davia, the situation was very favorable for the unionists. The caimacams had interpreted the restrictive electoral rules in a manner that made the maximum number eligible to vote. The larger the electorate, of course, the more opportunity the unionists had to win, ‘The quarrel among the caimacams had deeply involved the foreign consulates. As has been mentioned, Gadel had again collaborated with the separatists and had favored Catargiu. Victor Place energetically backed the majority decisions. Although Popov had been instructed to refrain from partisan activity, he enthusiastically supported his French colleague's position. His particular villain became Michael Sturdza. ‘Aware that his instructions forbade him to take a partisan position, he nevertheless argued that it was necessary to defend legality and the rights of the country just as energetically as our friends the French. I agree that we should avoid complications; but if the ‘Turko-Austrians all want them ~ and that is evident ~ what can we do? We must accept the situation on a day to day basis, While waiting let us try to dis ‘rupt their intrigues by the firmness of our attitude and the invariability of our principals3® Popov was chiefly concerned about Austrian activities. He queried Giers whether it was proper that they should yield to Austria and abandon the Russian role “of defenders of right, of autonomy and of nationality.”* Popov's partisan stand aroused not only Austrian and Turkish dis- pleasure, but also that of his superiors. Shortly before the election Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovskii, who was the Russian chargé in Constantinople, wrote Giers: 4The European guardianship The Turks complain of the too dogmatic attitude of Popov; itis said that he is completely under the influence of (sous la pantoufle de) Place. On the other side, L received an indirect complaint from Michael Sturdza, who is equally dis appointed that Popov refutes him openly. Sturdza, according to the news that fone has here, appears to have little chance to succeed; that is true; bue still that is no reason to burn our ships completely in case he becomes hospodar. In his report Popov lays stress above all on the immorality of Sturdza; but what has that to do with us? ‘These are certainly not models of virtue that one has before ‘one’s eyes and that one looks for in the East; however that does not stop one from carrying on business with the people in office and not rejecting those who Ihave a chance of coming to power. As to the relations of Popov with Place, it seems to me that they can and should remain intimate, without our consul seeing only through the perhaps too unionist glasses of his French colleague* Aldiough the conflict within the caimacamie was not as serious in Bucharest as in Jassy, Giers had to deal with many similar problems in the Wallachian capital. The conservatives there also did not have a candidate; their votes were divided among Stirbei, Bibescu, and A. Ghica. As in Moldavia, the new caimacamie as its first act turned to getting rid of officials appointed by its predecessor. Before leaving office Ghica had made additional appointments from among his loyal sup- porters and had raised many officers in rank. Once out of office, feeling that his chances of victory were extremely diminished, he turned to the left to try to make an alliance against the «wo strong Conservative candidates. The caimacamie itself split in a manner similar to that in Jassy, but the issues were quite different. Manu and Baleanu were ‘extreme conservatives; Filipescu, who was minister of justice, was a moderate. The quarrel among the three centered on the question of the qualifications for the franchise, with the majority attempting to limit it as much as possible. A test came over an ordinance that would have disqualified many members of the middle class, including the lead- ing Liberal journalist C. A. Rosetti. When the matter was referred to the courts, the judges, partisans of Ghica, declared the disqualification void. Their decision was then approved by Filipescu. Despite the caimacam’s influence, the final voting list was very small. The unionists were therefore in a much weaker position than in Moldavi In this quarrel, as well as in that in Moldavia, Giers took a moderate position, He did not approve of the actions of the Moldavian caima- camie; he disliked the mass dismissals and the attitude taken toward Afif Bey. Nor did he accept the interpretation given the electoral law, because it would have a “great effect on the composition of the future Moldavian assembly in having enter into it elements which would not possess the necessary guarantees of order and stability.”® He was thus in opposition to Panu and Sturdza because he considered them too liberal In Wallachia he opposed Manu and Bileanu for the opposite reason: 95Russia and the Romanian national state . Giers's attitude was shared by Béclard; both e opinions. Béclard, in contrast to Place, di trusted the Liberals, whom he saw as the equivalent of the Jacobins during the French Revolution.# Giers’s position was thus the support of legality and the observation of treaties. He wished a tranquil situation to be established and, if possible, a reconciliation between the parties so that the elections would not be endangered and the choice of the members of the assembly not compromised through illegal procedures. ‘The elections would then have to be annulled, a possibility that, he wrote, “makes me shudder.” Lobanov followed a similar policy in Constantinople. He did not want the Porte to interfere in or postpone the elections. The Russian diplo- mats also feared that disorders might break out at the time of the voting or that the assemblies would again proclaim union and a foreign prince. The first elections were held in Moldavia, where the unionists won thirty-three out of fifty-five seats. The remaining twenty-two places were divided between the adherents of Michael and Gregory Sturdza. The Liberals were thus in control, but they could not agree on one candidate. The names most often mentioned were Vasile Sturdza, Costache Negri, Lascir Rosetti, Vasile Alecsandri, Lascir Catargiu, and Peter Mavrogheni. Recognizing that a single name would have to deselected, the unionists assembled in the Museum of Natural History to choose their candidate. After much debate, they finally settled on Alexander Ioan Cuza, whose name had not been previously considered. Cuza, who was not at ‘the meeting, was himself surprised at the choice. ‘When the assembly met on January 5/17, the unionists were able to win a unanimous vote. ‘The elections for the Wallachian assembly took place between Jan- uary 20/February 1 and January 22 /February 3. Of the seventy-two deputies elected, forty-six were conservatives. The liberals C. A. Rosetti, ‘Vasile Boerescu, and N. Golescu were, however, returned for Bucharest. With around thirty votes, Bibescu appeared to have the best chance of winning, but again family rivalry proved fatal. The brothers Bibescu and $tirbei could not cooperate, and their partisans were willing to vote with the Liberals rather than switch allegiance. The actions of the caimacams in restricting the voting had already had a deep effect on the Liberal leaders. Feeling that they could not win through the bal- lot, they considered using revolutionary means. Although this action was rejected, they did employ their superior organizing abilities to assure mob support to gain their desires. Liberal agitators went among the Bucharest city population and to outlying villages to stir up the in- habitants against the Conservative deputies and the caimacams. They 96