MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES [RY ~ TTALIAN MEDIEVAL ARMIES 1300-1500 DAVID NICOLLE G A EMBLETONFirst published in Great Britain in 1983 by Osprey, an imprint of Reed Consumer Books Ltd. Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London SW3 6RB and Auckland, Melbourne, Singapore and Toronto © Copyright 1983 Reed International Books Ltd. Reprinted 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1995 All rights reserved. Apart fom any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiies should be addressed to the Publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Nicolle, David Italian medieval armies, 1300-1500. —(Men-at-Arms series; 136) 1. Armies—Italy—History— 1268-1492 1. Title IL, Series 00945, U37 ISBN 0 85045 4778 Filmset in Great Britain Printed through Bookbuilders Lid, Hong Kong, Iryou would like to receive more infor Osprey Military books, The Osprey Messe regular newsletter which contains articles, new title information and special offers, To join free of charge please write to: Osprey Military Messenger, PO Box 5, Rushden, Northants NN1O 6YXtralian Meatheval Armies 1300-1500 Introduction Mercenaries were a common feature throughout most of Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries, and had been known far earlier. But nowhere did such a sophisticated system of hiring, payment and organisation of mercenaries develop as it did in Italy. This was, of course, a result of the peninsula’s special political, economic and social conditions, Here was a region divided into numerous independent or quasi-independent states, but which wasalso highly urbanised and economically developed. Feudalism had never really taken root, except in the south and in some peripheral areas of the far north. Urban militias in which the poor provided the infantry and the rich the cavalry had, throughout the early Middle Ages, generally been led by a town-based aristocracy. These forces had already re-established the towns’ dominance over the countryside, and had preserved Italy from domination by the Holy Roman Emperor and his German armies. The countryside did provide military levies, and was liberally dotted with castles; but in general these for cations were either dependent upon nearby towns, for whom the surrounding landscape formed a food- producing contado, or were owned by local lords who themselves spent most of their lives in town, The importance of the mercenary rose, either as urban militias declined in military effectiveness; or as political aggressiveness led to a need for standing armies; or as political tensions within the towns became painfully reflected in their militias. It was less true that rising incomes encouraged townsmen to hire others to fulfil their military obligations, or that towns ell under the domination of tyrants who did not trust their turbulent subjects. Many of these phenomena were seen elsewhere in Europe, and similarly led toa greater reliance on mercenaries. Yet Italy remained an extreme case, and the condottiere—whose name came from the condotfa or contract between him- self and his employer—was the result. Whether commander or humble trooper, the condottiere was a complete professional. His skill has never been doubted, but his loyalty and dedication to a particular cause often has. The Italian condottiere’s poor reputation was, ironically enough, a result of later criticism within Italy itself. Machiavelli was not the only 16th century propagandist who, harshly judging the political scenein his native land, wenton to provide an overstated armchair-strategist’s critique of the condottiere system obviously not looking for a hero's grave, he was at While a mercenary was savor Tugin 2!” Porabiago sfobiog Mion go . Austria) Alessoréria Maclodio) ? 3 Montag yerone Fore ® tay Torretnora, gstagnaro sorzanelip ea etna sO Tec Nona, 9 | (e ‘Sn Romano. Weed SL Telbrente e », . Rimini x sicko z a ‘ Untinb 2 " jetoX SEgidio. > : Seger ancora |, 9 2 | PaPAlSsTATE: | Rome to verte) eke) Described snes apie KINGDOM on a (oresvarset) . NAPLES i ; §(¢o Aragon) Palermo KINGDOM atato Orsiciuy a Regain ITALY circa 1450“The Martyrdom and Glorification of St. James’, detail of a late 13th century panel by Andrea di Jacopo d’Ognabene, on the antipendium of the Pistoia Cathedral Infanerymas betray soma af cht Byonation seen in Ital yment. One also wears a form of framed war-hat, descended from alate-Roman prototype, which had been in widespread use during the Carolingian era. inessman whose livelihood reputation and adequate the same time a bu depended on a fair results. Various modern historians have done much to set the record straight, among them Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters (London 1974); Geoflrey Trease, The Condottieri (London, 1970); and Joseph Deiss, Captains of Fortune The fact that this system persisted for so long must indicate some measure of success. Certainly it would appear that warfare in later medieval Italy—an area of astonishing social, economic, political and even religious tensions was generally less destructive than in many other parts of Europe. The failure of the system against London, 1966 4 foreign invasion early in the 16th century may also be less of a condemnation of the condottieri and more a result of changing patterns of warfare The second half of the 15th century had seen, in France, Spain and elsewhere, the appearance of much larger and to some extent truly national armies, as well as a greater emphasis on gun- powder. Social and economic conditions were also changing rapidly. In fragmented Italy the medieval mercenary leadership became irrelevant, or at least changed itself into something else— perhaps eventually into that later officer class which had its roots in much the same minor aristocratic strata. Meanwhile the humble soldier remained, gratefully accepting his pay from a new master. Medieval (Mercenaries Mercenaries had long pla Halian warfare, although during the 12th and 13th centuries local militia remained far important. The tradition of universal male military service, established by the Lombards in the 8th century, survived in many regions, particularly in the northern and central cities. This was extended tothe countrysideas townsestablished theircontrol over their surrounding contado. In practice, only the privileged and politically active classes actually bore arms. Militias were organised around city quarters and subor towns, was normally defensive and rarely lasted more thana week. This, and the local prideso character- of medieval Italy, meant that militia service was rarely resented Most militiamen were infantry, as few citizens could afford a horse, and the infantryman’s skills, were, in any case, less specialised than those of the horseman, Wealthier militia cavalry often tended to come from the rural petty-nobility. In open battle, as in the manning of their city walls, the infantry had a primarily defensive role, at least until the crossbow was widely adopted. Lacking ed an important role in more ate while servicemuch training, but with plenty of determination and numbers, they formed a screen from which their cavalry could make its charges. Meanwhile the carroccio, a cart bedecked with the city’s standards, provided a focal point and command- post for the entire army. Given Italy’s commercial and military role in the Crusades, it is not surprising that Muslim archery was soon reflected in Italian equipment and tactics. The growing importance of archery, particularly of the crossbow, and the consequently increasing weight of body armour for horsemen and of shields for infantry, was one fundamental reason why professionals took over so much of the fighting. Genoa and Pisa, which had close com- mercial contacts with the eastern Mediterranean, produced Italy’s first specialist crossbowmen, while it is worth noting that the composite bow of Byzantine form had, in fact, been abandoned in medieval Italy Many other infantry now put aside sword, buckler and short spear in favour of a long pike and the large mantlet, probably of Persian origin, held by a shield-bearer. Horsemen meanwhile never adopted increasing amounts of plate armour, plus horse-armour and spare mounts, all entailing greater expense and training. Herein lay the origins of the ‘lance’, the smallest cavalry unit which, by its very nature, tended to be professional and mercenary. While political circumstances led employers to favour foreigners, these could as well be Italians from another city as men from beyond the Alps. At first few in number, they were recruited individually. As the 13th century progressed mercenary units became permanent features in some cities, though their membership might well fluctuate. Mercenaries were soon being enlisted in small ready-formed groups under their own leadership. Many had come to Italy as part of Imperial or Angevin armies while others, hearing of the opportunities, arrived on their own. During An effigy of an Angevin nobleman of the Kingdom of Nay 1300-1325, in Salerno Cathedral. It is identical in all but detail to the supposed effigy of Charles I, king of Nay Sicily, in Lucera Cathedral. His harden arm defences (note patterning) and hi Tealian. are typicallyThe ruined fortress of Gerace stands on a crag overlooking the vital road slong the eastern coast of Calabria, It ret such af i original Byzantine appearance despite Norman tnd later rebuilding. Gerace alaa remained ont of the most Strategic sites in southern Italy throughout the Middle Age The castle was finally destroyed by an earthquake in1765. the second half of the century they often formed over half of the available forces in supposedly feudal southern Italy. Communal milit s remained predominant to the north, but even here things were changing by the end of the century. Factionalism, rather than the resulting rule of oligarchies and aristocratic signori, was a major reason for the decline of the militias. Mercenaries, exiles from other towns or unemployed foreign troops, were also available, skilled and relatively cheap. Relianceon foreigners, supposedly untainted by local politics, had also proved its worth in the persons of those podestas— chief magistrates enlisted from outside—who had already brought peace to a number of faction- torn Italian citie Given the riots, conspiracies and a that sed communal politics, it was hardly surprising that a ruling group felt dis- inclined to arm a city’s population. At the same time reliable permanent forces were often needed, not to defend the walls but to garrison the extended frontiers of the contado or to attack a neighbouring commercial competitor. ‘The podestas’ guard often became the nucleus of a mercenary company. The 14th century also saw city-fathers increasingly handing over the defence of their state to a mercenary and his ready-made army, naming him Captain-General and drawing up the condotta or contract from which he and his followers got their name. Meanwhile the citizens settled down to carning the money to pay this condottiere and reserving their own abundant « martial energies for ruthless political infighting ssinations characteThe Companies While the year 1300 can be a convenient date to mark the mercenaries’ emergence as the dominant element in Italian warfare, groups of troops with similar skills, such as French cavalry or Pisan crossbowmen, had long been recruited en bloc to form identifiable units, Not only was this easier for their paymaster, but the efficiency of such units was generally greater because its members knew their leader and had evolved both tactics and discipline. Documentary records evitably focus upon commanders, but the groups or Companies that these first condottieri led were still quite small William della Torre, for example, rose from the mercenary ranks to appear on the Sienese payroll in 1285 at the head of 114 cavalry. One company of the first decade of the 14th century was some 800 strong, including both horse and foot, but this was an exception. So were those huge roving bands of plunderers who soon caught the eyes of contemporary chroniclers. The seasonal and often short-term nature of Italian warfare made a mercenary’s. prospects very uncertain. All too often he was obliged to become an outlaw to feed himself, Many such men were foreigners and they soon found that their chances of success were greater if they operated in larger bands. Most of the largest companies of the early 14th century were, in fact, amalgamations of smaller units drawn together to survive a period of shortage. Perhaps for this reason they were very democratic. An overall leadership was elected, consultation among the troops preceded decisions, constables and counsellors shared the signing of contracts, and booty was divided according to rank and length of servi Among these first ‘free companies’ were the Company of Siena operating in Umbria (1322~ 23), the Company of the Cerruglio operating around Lucca (1329-30) and the Cavalieri della Colomba operating in Lombardy and Tuscany 1334). German knights predominated in these associations, largely because of economic reces ce. ion in Germany. Catalans also played a vital role, particularly among the leadership, which included William della Torre and Diego de Rat. The Catalan Grand Company which ravaged the Byzantine Empire around this time had its origins among Catalan troops brought to southern Italy by King Frederick of Aragon. Their leader was, however, an Italian of German extraction, Roger di Flor, who was called ‘The Father of All Condottieri’ by the Florentine historian Villani. Italians were, in fact, already well to the fore although some also had territorial ambitions rather than simply a desire for employment ‘The Rocca or Castle of Spoleto was built and completed by Matteo di Giovannello da Gubbio, called Gattaponi, berween 1355 and 1361. It formed a linch-pin in the restoration of Papal authority in Umbria, undertaken by Cardinal Albornoz and his condottieri army. The regularity and simy ofits plan, as well as its position on top of Monte 8. Elia, make it = classic example of 14th century Italian fortification. (After Steep siopeCastruccio Castracane, for example, served many pri which he nces before seizing power in his native Lucca, ruled from 1314 to 1328. By contrast Guidoriccio da Fogliano was simply a soldier who faithfully served the Sienese (1327-34), in whose city his memory is preserved by Martini’s splendid fresco, before being employed by Mastino della Scale of Verona. ‘The number of non-Italian mercenaries in early least then 14th century Italy was considerable—at 10,000 German men-at-arms between 1320 and 1360 alone, Swiss and Catalans were already known, along with Provencals, Flemings, Castil- ians, French and English, while Hungarians appeared after 1347. The largecompanies they now formed were significant military forces. A leading ‘The statue of Cangrande della Scala, ruler of Verona, who died in 1329, originally stood with other statues on top of the Scaliger Tombs off the Piazza dei Signori; it is now preserved in the Castelvecchio Museum. The way Cangrande is carry- ing his great-helm on his back is almost certainly an accurate later restoration, 8 German condottiere, Werner von Urslingen, was later credited with devising the ‘plague of companies’, but of course, he alone was not responsible. Nor was his the first of the much-feared ‘free companies’, This honour should go to the Company of St. George formed by Lodrisio Visconti out of demobilised veterans from Verona is native in the vain hope of seizing control of Milan in 1339-40. Werner von Urslingen, one of its surviving leaders, then created the more effective Great Company two years later. Urslingen and his successors alone gave continuity to the series of Great Companies seen throughout the 1340s and 508. In 1342 one was recorded as including 3,000 cavalrymen plus an equal number of retainers Some ten years later it consisted of 10,000 fighting men, including 7,000 cavalry and 2,000 cross- bowmen, plus 20,000 camp-followers. Despite the unreliability of most medieval figures, such a total is not inconceivable. Its organisation was equally impressive, with an established commissariat and self-contained judicial system which included a portable gallows. The Great Company, particularly under its later Provencal captain Montreal d’Albarno, was fully self-sufficie t. It won booty by moving from city to city in search of protectior demanding redundancy before quitting another city’s service. Some of these earnings were even invested in merchant ventures and money-lending. The ruthlessness of these early condottieri companies was never lived down by their more honourable but their attitudes were quite typical of the 14th century, a time of turmoil, social change and the Black Death, which wiped out one third of the Italian popu- lation, Yet, like its predecessors, even the Great Company had its failures. In 1342 a line of sharpened stakes backed by the determined militia infantry of Bologna denied Werner von Urslingen’s troops passage down the Val di Lamone for two months until an agreement was reached. In 1358, under Conrad von Landau, the Company was completely routed by Florentine militia crossbowmen and peasant levies, stiffened by as in in a narrow valley. Attempting revenge the following money, or by pay successors; mall contingent of mercenaries, aga