The Indefensibility

of Lockean
Liberalism:
by

J S. Runia

1
 Loyola Marymount University
31 May 2013
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude for all those who made this work possible
before diving into the work itself. Firstly, to Dr. Nemoianu whose patient guidance led this work
toward success. Secondly, to Dr. Wilson whose guidance in the realm of political theory was
invaluable for this project. Thirdly, to Dr. Stone who taught the logic which made possible the
thought-process which was necessary for this work. Fourthly, to my friends who put up with my
thesis talk and provided invaluable insights. Fifthly and most importantly, to my family who
has supported me during this very academically enriching period of my life. Lastly, to myself for
countless hours of hard work.

2
Table of Contents
I. Groundwork (5)
A. Introduction (5)
B. The Good (6)
1. The Good of Essential Man as Understood by Aristotle: Eudaimonia (7)
a. What Essential Man Is (7)
b.The Need for Neo-Eudaimonia (9)
2. Neo-Eudaimonia (9)
a. Existential Man (10)
i. Power (10)
ii. type (10)
b. The Look of Neo-Eudaimonia (11)
C. The State (13)
1. What the State Is (13)
a. Law (13)
b. Community (13)
2. The States Highest Good: Justice (14)
II.Thesis (15)
III. Ontology and Epistemology (15)
IV. Phenomenology/Psychology and Ethics - The State of War and State of Nature (17)
A. The State of Nature and its Natural Law: Reason (17)
1. The Unnaturalness of Natural Law (18)
2. The Inadequacy of Reason (18)
3. Purposiveness (19)
4. Man as Political (20)
5. Liberty (22)
a. An Important Distinction (22)
i. Negative Liberty (23)
ii. Positive Liberty (23)
iii. A Brief Contrast (24)
iv. Internal and External Opportunity (24)
v. Internal and External Exercise (25)
b. Lockes SON Liberty (25)
i. Legitimacy (25)
ii. Ethical Implications (26)
c. Lockes Positive Aside (26)
6. Equality (30)
a. Legitimacy Of Lockes Equality (30)
b. Ethical Implications (30)
7. The Divine Right Of Property Owners (31)
a. Legitimacy (32)
b. Ethical Implications (32)
B. The State of War (34)
1. Legitimacy (35)

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 2. Ethical Implications (36)
V. Political Theory (37)
A. Global Considerations (37)
1. How the State Comes to Be (38)
2. Justice (39)
B. Natural Rights from Natural Laws? (39)
1. Primary Natural Rights (40)
a. Life (40
b. Lberty (41)
c. Property (41)
2. Secondary Natural Rights (42)
a. Adjudication (42)
b. Retribution (42)
C. Lockes Political Dos and Donts (45)
1. Justice as Blind (45)
2. Good of the People (46)
3. Consensual Taxation (46)
4. Non-Transference of Authority (47)
VI. Concluding Remarks (47)

Bibliography (49)

4
I. Groundwork
[I]n the realm of nature, things are naturally arranged in the best way possible - and the same is true of
the products of art and of any kind of causation, especially the highest. To leave the greatest and noblest
things [political theory/statecraft] to chance would hardly be right.
- Aristotle
In the spirit of this quote, I will first unfold a preliminary foundation for statecraft that, I
believe, is logically impeccable; I will then apply this statecraft logic to John Lockes
Second Treatise of Government. The reason I am doing this is because (a) Locke is
injuriously wrong, (b) Lockes theory is the one which dominates the modern political landscape:
a dangerous combination indeed. This essay will be a deconstruction and hopefully successful
attempt at unveiling the incoherence and problematic nature of Lockes political account,
providing a prolegomenon to a better approach. To prepare the reader, this theory is one
characterized most accurately as: a naturalistically meritocratic venture down the
road of cooperative humanism.
A. Introduction
To begin, It would be a modest claim to say that any political account is
necessarily rooted in accounts of ethics and psychology at least if the content
is properly framed and understood. Let us consider this claim: if we are to discuss the art of
statecraft, the activity of theoretical politics focused on the concerns of what the state is
and how the state should be organized and constructed, then:
1. We must be able to address the concerns of what man1 is: Since it is from and for the
human that the state is founded, the state is a naturally human endeavor en toto.
There are some human factors that are universal, others that are particular. Therefore, the
universal and particular psychology of man matters in our talk of statecraft.
2. We must have an answer to all shoulds such as the one that appears within our
question: how should the state be... To have an answer to a should, one must have a
conception of what is good and bad: this is the domain of ethics. Politics, then, depends upon
ethics as well.
I believe there is a right answer to all of these concerns and questions, though those
right answers might not be, at this point in time, determinable, i.e. even though, what I say
here is more true than that which is presented by Locke, it is less true than that which will follow
as more and more of Beings complexity is discerned;2 as time progresses, scientific endeavors
of man uncover more and more concerning the nature of Being, which bring with them
additional possible knowledge applicable to all our concerns and questions: changing our what
is what relative to these concerns. It should be stated, however, that our limitations neither
should discourage our efforts (if anything, they should encourage more of them), nor do they
imply that we cannot now provide some better answers than are now the standard (and have
been since the seventeenth century).3 This is because I will attempt to be as critical4 as possible.

1 There are two ways of looking at man: existentially and essentially. The essential is that which
can be universalized of all who are human and so does not have a complicated look; the existential both takes
into account the human universal(s) and the multiplicity of difference among members of the species
that limits the essential grouping of humanity. Man, as he exists, cannot be captured by merely universal
quantification: existential propositions (differences) must be taken into account if we are to conceive accurately.
2 For more on this, see my work on Hegels Logic; in reading this, it would also be want for the reader to take
notice of the work by Caroline Liviakis On Identity Statements, in which she argues quite convincingly that it
is neither the case that a=a nor the case that a=b can be true.

5
I will wholeheartedly attempt to expound the truth for I will not have any ulterior motives; my
love of wisdom, and thus the approach of my wisdom too, demand truth, after all.
B. The Good
So that our statecraft can be maximally good, it must be rooted in as maximally
accurate a conception of what good is as possible. While impossible to be non-controversial due
to the very nature of the question itself, this question must be answered if we are to be able
to have this discussion: the whole of ethics and politics turn on this one definition. The good is
our locus within the realms of man, ethics, and politics: if we lose sight of it, we lose our ground
and become lost. Now, I think it safe to begin with the following definition of good provided by
Aristotle: that toward which all things aim.5 This must be the case, for if a thing was not at
least considered good, there would be no logically sound reason for anything to aim for that
thing. This gives rise to a distinction, we will see, between actual and apparent goods.
On Aristotles view, different kinds of things have different kinds of goods.
Different things have different functions and the goodness...of anyone who fulfills some
function or performs some action, are thought to reside in his proper function.6 An actual
good, therefore, is that which is conducive to the flourishing of the proper function of a thing;
an apparent good is something that is believed to be conducive to this flourishing, though in
actuality is not. Whereas advanced biological knowledge is actually good for the doctor, whose
function of medicine requires a knowledge of biology, it is not necessarily actually good (but
merely apparently good) for the lawyer (whose function of practitioner of law instead
entails an actual good of knowledge of law); however, it might accidentally be actually good
for the lawyer to know biology (if it is needed for a case). We must now pose and answer the
concern of what is good for: (1) essential man (but will find this insufficient and instead
study), (2) existential man, and (3) the state. This will be done by asking (a) what the
thing is and (b) what the corresponding good is.
1. The Good of Essential Man As Understood by Aristotle: Eudaimania7

3 A major assumption is here being held. In another work (that is largely unfinished) concerned with what the
questions of philosophy are, I propose the threefold thesis: 1. Philosophys questions are all connected in
the following way: First, ontology answers the question of what the nature of being is, which
enables us to answer the question of epistemology, namely: what can be possibly known of
being? This being done, we are able to ask the questions of human phenomenology and
psychology; the first is concerned with how humans naturally act, while the second is
concerned with how humans naturally think. Having answered these questions, the question
of ethics: how should humans act? presents itself. After answering this question, we are
able to answer the final and most important question, viz., the twofold question of politics:
Should we have a state? If so, what should that state look like? 2. The strength (or
correctness) of ones logic determines the possible strength (or correctness) of their answer
to any given question and 3. The strength of ones answer to the first question determines
the possible correctness (for other mistakes are naturally possible in the logics application
along the way of the second and so on ). I believe these claims are rather axiomatic, though I cannot here
defend them any further.
4 A critical philosophy is the analysis and definition of our fundamental concepts, and the clear statement and
resolute criticism of our fundamental beliefs(C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, 1923)
5 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Ostwald trans., 1094a1-3
6 Ibid. 1097b22-28
7 (Eu-) = good + (daimon) a god or ethereal entity + (ia) a thing participating in or characterized by = good
godlikeness.

6
 Aristotles ancient philosophy provides an antiquated conception of humans (due to his
lack of technology) that nevertheless exercises a proper logic, thereby yielding a good that
fits in principle, even by modern standards. I say in principle because the core notions are
spot on, though the scope of applicability, its generalizability, are lacking. Aristotles conception
of the mind, we will see, has sufficient fit with the actual mind and so we can say that his logic is
applicable. What we will find, however, is that a universalized approach is imprudent, making
necessary a bifurcated approach and a discussion of existential man.
a. What Essential Man Is
Aristotles ancient conception of man as man presents man as a hylomorphic
composite of soul and body. The soul is understood by Aristotle to be the forming principle of
man, whereas body is the material out of which man is composed. According to Aristotles dated
understanding, the soul consists of two elements, one irrational and one rational.8 Firstly, of
the irrational element,9 there are two parts: the one is vegetative [that part which is
responsible for nurture and growth...10 and is most active in sleep11] and has no share in
reason at all...[and the will, which]...partakes in reason insofar as it complies with reason and
accepts its leadership.12 The semi-rational of the two: the will, on Aristotles view, is subject to
the governance of the rational, which can, but need not necessarily, be functioning properly (due
to ones internal constitution or lack of education). Secondly, and more importantly, the rational
element of the soul [also] has two subdivisions [or parts]: the one possesses reason in the strict
sense, contained within itself, and the other possesses reason in the sense that it listens to reason
as one...to a father.13 With the former, we apprehend the realities whose fundamental principles
do not admit of being other than they are, and with the other we apprehend things which do
admit of being other.14 One is the scientific, and the other, the calculating.15 As a self-
respecting twenty-first century philosopher, I am obliged to say that Aristotle is, in terms of
material correctness, wrong; however, it should be noticed that, logically speaking, he is
entirely correct.
His rudimentary understanding of human psychology, limited by the technology of his
era, was not able to provide a right answer to the concerns of biological psychology; his
model, however, models the modern understanding of the brain and so his logic concerning man
should be considered valid and sound. The modern brain is, after all, understood as being
constituted of a hind-, mid-, and fore- brain just as Aristotles soul is understood as being
composed of vegetative, sensitive, and rational parts; furthermore, the functionality of the
ancient and modern trios are more or less identical. To solidify the connection, the brains of
lower mammals, to varying degrees, contain the lower two parts and plants sustain
themselves by different, though similar processes. Lastly, his distinction of two types of
rationality correspond to the dual hemispheric functionality of the brain. The first of these points
requires substantiation.

8Ibid. (1102a27-29)
9Ibid. (1102a33)
10Ibid. (1102a32-33)
11Ibid. (1102b5)
12Ibid. (1102b28-32)
13Ibid. (1103a2-4).
14Ibid. (1139a6-10)
15Ibid. (1139a12)

7
 There are three parts of the human brain: hind, mid, and fore. The hindbrain, also
known as the brain stem, is composed of the medulla, pons, and cerebellum. The
medulla is the base of the brain that is responsible for autonomic functions such as breathing,
digestion, heart and blood vessel function, swallowing and sneezing. The pons is located directly
above the medulla and is involved in the following functions: arousal, controlling autonomic
functions, relaying sense information from the cerebrum to the cerebellum (which is worn as a
backpack by the pons), and sleep. The cerebellum is responsible for fine motor skills that require
very precise use of the body, e.g. snapping ones fingers. The midbrain, or diencephalon, is
composed of the thalamus and basal ganglia. The thalamus is essentially the control center
of the brainstem and all brain beneath it: it is the great regulator of the lower brain. The basal
ganglia, wrapped, to some extent, around the thalamus is the reward center of the brain,
responsible for the valuations of good and bad based upon impression (or release, production,
and/or consumption of neurotransmitters). The forebrain is composed of the neocortical
regions of the brain. These regions are responsible for higher level processing of information
and, to the extent present, are particular to homo sapiens; however, neocortical structures (in
varying lesser degrees) also adhere in lower mammals. Another interesting fact of this
forebrain, one reinforcing the connection made between Aristotles theory, is that its
foremost part is responsible for all conscious thought, or the exercise of reason, which is
what differentiates man from beast and plant.
As there is sufficient fit between Aristotles conception of man as man and actual
man as man, we can conclude that his logic of the human is sound and that we are want in
adopting eudaimonia: understood as happiness or human flourishing as this essential
man good. However, I wish to depart from Aristotle in his reckoning of what this looks like.
For Aristotle, there is an imaginary ultimately virtuous man, a man who lives solely by the
golden mean and is necessarily a higher type of man.16 If (what we will see is) an overly
noble conception of universal human flourishing (due to its emphasis on the rational faculty and
its function: reason) is held in place, it will not be universally applicable and therefore not
good for all: what is needed is a noble approach that is generalizable, one which will make
possible, actualize, and perpetuate the improvement of all for the benefit of all at the expense of
none.
b. The Need For Neo-Eudaimonia
On Aristotles view, the highest human good is that good which is final in an unqualified
sense for the human, but what could this be? This description, Aristotle holds, seems to apply
to happiness above all else; for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the
sake of something else.17 There is no semantic disagreement here, rather a theoretical

16 Two things here: (1) Aristotle makes a distinction between men (by nature) and slaves (by nature), and (2)
Aristotle grants proper citizenship (in the Politics) only to property owning men (by nature).
1. Those people who use reason, that which separates man from beast, Aristotle says are men; those humans
who do not use reason, but rather function in an animal-like fashion are slaves. While one might get touchy on
this subject the fact that there are higher and lower types of men demands recognition as self-evident. These are
the only people, Aristotle says, deserve citizenship. On point (1) one might consult Nietzsches master-slave
continuum as presented in both Beyond, Good, and Evil and Genealogy of Morality.
2. We will notice a similar tendency in Lockes theory, though a major difference exists between the two
views. Whereas Aristotles theory explicitly and intentionally makes such a claim, the claim is arrived at
implicitly and accidentally: as a consequence of a systemic tendency in the case of Locke. This will be
discussed in Sec. V of this essay.
17Ibid. 1097b1

8
disagreement. Everyone, Aristotle rightly asserts, call[s] it happiness, and understands by
being happy the same as living well and doing well. But, when it comes to defining what
happiness is, they disagree.18 Aristotles view will be presented first and it will then be shown
that it lacks the comprehensiveness required of the task at hand, though this notion of happiness
as flourishing will be salvaged.
Now because the proper function19 of man as man, on Aristotles view, is a life in
accordance with the rational element, Aristotle conceives of eudaimonia in a very aristocratic
sense, saying that one who lives eudaimonia, lives according to the logical limit, or fully
flourished manifestation, of reason. This is what Aristotle has in mind when he discusses a life of
perfect virtue.20 Obviously, this standard is lofty: a crystal palace in the sky for man at
large (though one rooted in the world), attainable only by the highest and most disciplined, a
daunting task dependent upon the high functioning rational element. Only the highest men whose
rationality is above a certain degree can attain such a feat and the presence of such a feat as the
goal is only useful to that small subset of the total set of humanity; this will not do for the total
population, however, due to its lack of comprehensiveness and generalizability. Lastly, let it be
stated before we proceed that the aspect of happiness as flourishing entailed in
eudaimonia is what I wish to live on in neo-eudaimonia; for, nothing, I believe is more
important than humanity, understood generally, being happy by compatibly flourishing.
2. Neo-Eudaimonia
Etymologically, we have seen, eudaimonia breaks down to good godlikeness. I think
it safe to make two assumptions: first, a good god would always pursue that which is good for
them; second, a good god would respect the good action of every other good god. This
speculative nonsense concerning gods must not be taken to be referential to deities, but rather
to us humans who have gone so far as to create countless gods over the ages in countless cultures
(the representatives of which (both man and god) were annihilated by other men representing
other gods). A strictly essential approach such as that of eudaimonia as presented by Aristotle
leaves us wanting compatibility and further, more accurate differentiation. Therefore, we will (a)
take an existential approach to man on the grounds of (i) power and (ii) type, and (b)
identify a properly generalizable understanding of what the good(s) of man and men is and
are.
a. Existential Man
We know that man is body and brain, but this does not account for the differences in
human manifestation of brain and body. Man is differentiated both quantitatively and
qualitatively; the quantitative sense refers to power whereas the qualitative sense refers to the
way in which power is channelled and organized by the individual human, or type. Let us
examine both and pave the way for a more tenable look for human happiness.
i. Power

18Ibid.1095a15-20
19 The unique function of man rooted in the unique part of man.
20 Virtue...consists of two kinds, intellectual virtue or moral virtue. Intellectual virtue or excellence owes its origin
and development chiefly to teaching, and for that reason requires experience and time. Moral virtue, on the other
hand, is formed by habit, ethos(NE, 1102a15-16). Intellectual virtues are virtues of the rational part and are
responsible for regulating the moral virtues of the will; when working perfectly, i.e. when perfectly virtuous,
functionality is in accordance with the golden mean: acting in the right way, to the right extent, with
the right attitude for the circumstance in question. This sort of man is always on, so to speak. Never is
there a moment when he is off, or functioning imprudently for the circumstance in question.

9
 Different people are born with different levels of functionality, which are either cultivated
or degraded by environmental factors.21 Based on the degree to which power exists in the
individual, the individual will be capable of exertion (the more power, the more possible
exertion). Consider that some extend themselves as far as is humanly possible, be it physically or
mentally, whereas others have no will and/or power to exert themselves to such an extent. To be
less powerful is not a crime, but an important fact; for: we learn that some are less capable than
others and can accommodate the particular need of individuals (based on a particular function)
only if we are able to acknowledge such realistically. For instance, one born with a fragile body
should not exercise at normal levels because such is not in correspondence with what that
person is capable of nor what is consequently good for them. On the other side, a person
whose rational power is low will not be capable of learning at a normal pace. The same
applies on the higher end, but in the opposite way. A low-powered person cannot and should
not question contemporary thought structures in the domain of physics, just as Einstein cannot
and should not participate in the Special Olympics. I cannot be more scientific in my explanation
of power, though I find it self evident that different people have differently sized wells so to
speak. Anyway, let us move on to type.
ii. Type
Consider two people: A and B. Both have equal power and such is evident in the set S
[where S= {C, D, E...}] and its inability to determine who the more capable of the two is. On
the one hand... On the other... they say ad infinitum. Aside from the level of ones
power, in terms of differentiation, is the way in which that power manifests itself. For Napoleon,
it was conquest; for Mozart, it was music; for Nietzsche, it was philosophy. Either way, I could
not tell you which of the three was most powerful: they are all about equally extended, only in
different ways; this difference in type of power-extension is a consequent of different internal
organizational schemes (or types) of power. This qualitative difference that presents itself in man
on the particular level cannot be fully defined in this essay, for I do not know precisely every
type, nor do I have the intention to dwell. However, it is safe to claim that humans are
differentiable in terms of some typological scheme. Now what of neo-eudaimnoia?

b. The Look of Neo-Eudaimonia

Everyone aims at that which they consider good; however, different things are good
for different people in different amounts at different times.22 Some things are good for everyone.
Some things are good for some people (and bad for others). Some things are good for no one,
i.e. they are altogether bad. For example: taking care of ones body is good for all; drinking
alcohol is good for some (but not for others); and urinating in a public pool is bad for all. Further,
everyone requires a personal quantity: whatever amount is right for them if they are to
maximally flourish. For instance, if I am a strapping lumberjack working out in the woods, my
dietary needs will be greater than that of the slender, sedentary princess in her ivory tower;
similarly, if I am incredibly smart, more academic studies would be good for me than if I was
less intellectually gifted. When people desire that which is actually good (rather than
apparently good) for them and act toward this right desire (for them), and acquire

21 Beneficial factors are those that maximally improve with minimal degradation; malevolent factors are those that
have a contrary effect. This concern is a major topic of discussion in the field of psychology and is labeled the case
of nature v. nurture.
22 See Aristotles dicussion of the golden mean (NE, 1105b18-1109b25)

10
the habit of acting in such a way, they tend toward flourishing into the epitome of their
expression of humanity: becoming fully who they are this is the end goal for all.
In modern psychology, this would be referred to as self-actualization, defined as:
"the full realization of one's potential, and of one's 'true self;23 or, more precisely, "intrinsic
growth of what is already in the organism, or more accurately of what is the organism itself...
[and] is growth-motivated rather than deficiency-motivated,"24 according to Maslow. What must
be kept firmly in mind is that each organism has its own parts, functions, and therefore goods
that lead to self-actualization: there is not, as Aristotle would claim, some ideal of man by
which man should be judged. To put it more clearly, this self-actualization scheme is a function
of ones natural constitution (though the environment into which the person is thrown will
determine the possible looks this may take). If one is here skeptical, consider that to be a
self, one must be distinct from all others; consider also that the self could most accurately be
defined as the sum of all functions of the entity in question (that is, if we deny the immaterial). If
one is different25 from others and one is merely their set of functions, then one is different from
another solely in terms of functions. If one is different in terms of functions, one has different
goods. Different goods lead to different self-actualization schemes.26 Everyone can
be maximally good - for them, however, since people are so divergent in their inherent
capacities, so too must be that which is good for them.
This, however contrary to the notion or interpretation one may have concerning such a
presentations inability to respect the universal human if there is such a deep consideration
of inherent human differences, can still respect the human. This is merely because one is a
human, sharing, to whatever degree, in the objective (with their subjective) human
experience; they constitute a portion of what is contained in what it objectively means to be a
human being.27 Merely by being human, I believe, humans have certain rights, not inherently, or
a priori, but of necessity ad hoc. This is for the very simple reason that: if one human does
not have rights at any time and is violable, it is logically possible that any human will have no
rights at every particular time and be violable, creating a lack of security in the expectations of
all citizens, which severely implicates the very stability of the state itself as it possibly leads to
seemingly whimsical arrangements. Probably out of a primitive survival impulse came the
fundamental and universal human command: no murder, a tenet of every major religion,
morality and non theocratic legal system. This has been the case historically speaking as far back
as our records date.28 However, it cannot be said, without otherworldly appeal, that humans have

23 Gleitman, Henry; Fridlund, Alan J. and Reisberg Daniel. Psychology. 6th ed. New York: Norton & Company,
2004.
24 See Maslows Motivation and Personality (3rd edition, 1987)
25 When I use the word different, I would like for it to be held firmly in mind that simply because two things are
different, no necessary inequality is implied, though it can be so (just not necessarily). This is because there may be
two things, in the quantitative respect equal, yet inherently different in the qualitative sense. An example of such a
marked qualittative difference retaining quantitative equality on a very simple level might be two electronic devices,
both running on an equal level of battery power, though performing radically difficult functions.
26 By self-actualization scheme, I mean this: what it looks like, empirically, for that person to self actualize; one
might express this by answering the concern of how much of the world (in the form of education, resources, etc.) it
would take for this person to self-actualize and what this actualization might look like for the individual in question.
27 See Nagels View from Nowhere in which he convincingly argues that the objective view of the world
(from no particular place within it) is the union of the collection of all subjective perspectives, especially chapters I-
VI.

11
inherent, a priori rights as a function of the universe. Some may be dissatisfied with my brevity
on this controversial topic, but I do not wish to dwell.
Let us consider both a one man and two man world to illustrate, contextualize, ground,
and to some extent justify what was above said.29 In a world containing one person, the objective
and subjective highest human goods would be conflated for the objective is merely the satisfiable
articulation of what is right based on impartial observation (from the view from nowhere) of
the set of all subjectives and, in this scenario, we are dealing with a set of one. We must also
bear in mind the distinction made between actual and apparent goods and the fact that ones
thinking something good for them is not necessarily implicative of that thing being actually
good for that person, where good is identified as that which is conducive to ones flourishing.
Now, say this one person has a power x and a type A (or is an xA type of person). In such a
world, whatever arrangement makes xA the best possible xA is best. This, objectively speaking,
seems the highest human good for our human in a vacuum: being oneself fully. That
which is to be considered bad for our lone human is that which is opposed to that
humans self-actualization: anything which hinders one from becoming and
being oneself. Lastly, there are no constraints aside from that which is objectively bad for our
lone human on that lone human in such a world. This is conducive to the flourishing of an xA
type, but if a yB type enters the world structured for the xA type, the objective good expands
to contain xA+yB=...30 However, if the material conditions of the world remain exclusively
geared for the provision of xA flourishing, then the yBs ability to flourish will be hindered, not
due to inability, but circumstance: a lack of fit between the material man and material world. One
or more subjective goods may be the end goal, however the objective good will be a pipe dream
because there is insufficient fit between what is aimed toward and what should be aimed
toward as a function of what is. This is where the state comes in.
C. The State
Before we go on to ask the question of what the states highest good is, we must first
formulate an acceptable definition of what the state is; for without an understanding of the
subject itself, how could we possibly know its highest good? Accordingly, in this section we will
examine (a) what the state is and (b) what the highest good of the state is.
1. What The State Is
The state is a natural outgrowth of man: a collective improvement and protection device.
The state is an apparatus by which men attempt to promote a better state of affairs (ideally the
objective good) than would be possible without; the state, Aristotle says is a creation of nature
and prior to the individual...[because] when isolated, [the individual]...is not self sufficing.
Rather, the individual is like a part in relation to the whole.31 So far, we have set the stage but
now must talk of the two necessary elements of the state: (i) law and (ii) community. If
nothing else, the state necessarily provides these two elements to its inhabitants.
a. Law

28 There were, however, several warring states in which the command was less operative and a handful of
exceptions to the rule.
29 Let it be stated, however, that I do not believe a man on an island or two men on an island could be properly
happy or man as know him, for I believe the state (or community at least) is constitutive of what it means to be a
human as we know the human.
30 Where ... denotes the objective good, the most compatible combination of all subjective goods: in
this case an objective good that compatibly satisfies both xA and yB schemes.
31 1253a25-27

12
 To quote Ronald Dworkin, We live in and by the law. It makes us what we are: citizens
and employees...We are subjects of laws empire...32 This law in and by which we live is a
provision of the state. The state is responsible, usually with reference to an ethical or moral
doctrine, for saying what is acceptable and what is unacceptable for those living within its
bounds. Acceptable is that which is legally permissible; unacceptable is that which is illegal. This
then might be called the coercive element of the state. This coercive element of the state is the
foundational element of the state and provides the basis in and by which we experience (both
socially and ethically) the world; for its laws influence the very valuations the citizens might
possibly make. Lastly, the states legal system, in providing parameters for its citizens
concerning acceptability and unacceptability, makes possible the social aspect of civic society:
community.
b. Community
The state, perhaps most importantly for mans sake, has a constitutive element in that it
also provides community. The states laws influence the very valuations we might possibly make
and our fellow citizens within the state socialize us to these values and to sociability itself. On
the first point, it influences our basis for all valuations in providing us a value system: a dictum
of that which is considered good and that which is considered bad. On the second point, we are
born into a family, contained within the state, which has been conditioned by the state and passes
along such conditioning to the individual. Community might best be thought of as the sum of
individuals living in a given state which influences the inherent capacities of those individuals,
molding them in a shape which does not violate the legal framework of the state. Community is
constitutive of the social facts (such as individualindividual relations) at hand in any given
society in that the configuration of a society in such and such a way, played out, will imply a set
of possible outcomes that might not intersect with those possible sets of outcomes rooted in
different initial conditions, e.g. types of citizens. Man requires the community that is provided
by the state if that man is to be a man (as we know man) at all; while a singular man in the world
is ontologically prior to a state composed of several men, this type of man is either beast or
god not man as we now know him.
Lastly, the community as sum of individuals, I argue, is indicative of the shape of the
states highest good. Given a community of 1,000 people, the highest good of that community
would be the compatible flourishing of these 1,000 people which will necessarily vary from this
1,000 to another, because the social entities or collective consciousnesses will be different
between cases, given different conditions. The state is constitutive of the very humanness we
value; what though of its highest good?
2. The States Highest Good: Justice
Justice is the objective good and the primary function of the state. When
another human is introduced into the world containing a lone human, we will remember, the
highest subjective good of the former might conflict with the highest subjective good of
the latter. Such conflict is the very reason the state is crafted by us humans: as a remedy to the
conflict that arises without the states provision of a system of law due to subjective
disharmony and to promote the common good, what Nagel calls the objective good.
These two primary factors of statecraft might be conceived in tandem as justice. Ideally,
justice, the states primary goal will make compatible these usually conflicting individual
human ends, or subjective goods, by providing the objective good. The highest good of
the people, considered generally corresponds with the end of the state: Justice.

32 Laws Empire, pp. vii

13
 The states system of law is tasked primarily with the provision of justice.33 I think
it would be absurd to argue that a fundamentally unjust state is ethically tenable; however, like
Aristotle argued with human happiness (which largely, as we have seen, defines the shape of
justice because ones conception of justice turns on ones definition of happiness), I believe the
problem is less semantic and more theoretical in nature. The reason Locke and I agree about the
necessity of justice, but not about what justice instantiated would look like is very simple: our
definitions of justice vary in some way because our definitions of happiness
vary. Therefore, before diving into Locke, it would be wise for us to formulate a definition of
justice, relative to our highest individual human good (and bad): flourishing (or the
privation of such). For, so far, our incomplete formula is: if the highest human good is to self-
actualize and the states highest good is providing its citizens justice, which
is...then...
Justice, I believe, can be defined as: fairness, properly understood as: (1)
egalitarianism of consideration34 and (2) equal protection of all citizens from
that which is bad (for them). For, if it is granted that (a) the humans highest good is
to flourish, (b) that which is bad is that which is opposed to ones flourishing, (c) the state
was created naturally by humans for humans to promote justice (its highest good), (d) the
above definition of justice holds, then it must be the case that (e) the state which makes most
possible the compatible flourishing of all its citizens, considered equally, is to be deemed most
good, most providing justice. A necessary condition for this goodness to be authentic, though,
is that all premises used in our considerations be true, otherwise, what we have is irrational and
even if we have reached the right conclusion, our getting there is accidental: our task in
philosophy is to minimize (ideally erase) all such accidents by not taking shots in the dark:
aiming for close enough. I am not aware of any meaningful objections on these points,
but will later address the liberal (and libertarian) conception of justice. Having made known the
demands of my critical approach to the highest art of philosophy: statecraft, let us move to
John Locke, whose Second Treatise is the foundation of contemporary liberalism.
II. Thesis
The political account given by John Locke is an indefensible
philosophical position that is incapable of providing justice; a more involved,
inclusive, extensive, and realistic state than Locke is willing (or able) to grant
is necessary for such an achievement. To show this, I will examine John Lockes
movement from concerns of ontology to politics as presented in his Second Treatise on
Government given the above criteria. I will begin with a brief and inconclusive, though
necessary discussion of Lockes ontology and epistemology. Next, I will address Lockes
human phenomenology/psychology and ethics (as presented through the states of nature
and war). Finally, I will focus upon the political theory derived by Locke from his answers to
the prior questions.
III. Ontology and Epistemology

33 As put by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice, Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of
systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise
laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are
unjust(pp.3).
34 Egalitarianism of consideration means simply this: The state must consider all its citizens
equally; otherwise, could it not be said that it is playing favorites and fundamentally unfair in its
considerations?

14
 Locke is thoroughly a Christian and this fact is notably reflected in his formulation of a
response to the concerns of ontology and epistemology. He holds that the Judeo-Christian Gods
existence is true and that this God gave the world to men in common...for their benefit, and the
greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it...35 and that the earth, and all
that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being...all the fruits it
naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by
the spontaneous hand of nature...36 This is no doubt borrowed from Genesis myth of
creation, specifically Day 6, when:
God said, Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness, so that they may rule over the fish in the sea
and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals, and over all the creatures that move
along the ground. So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male
and female he created them. God blessed them and said to them, Be fruitful and increase in number; fill
the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature
that moves on the ground. Then God said, I give you every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole
earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. They will be yours for food. And to all the beasts of
the earth and all the birds in the sky and all the creatures that move along the groundeverything that has
the breath of life in itI give every green plant for food. And it was so.37
My question here, though it will not be pursued further, is: are we justified in holding
such a view of self-supremacy, even down to the anthropomorphic God? This
conception of Being is undoubtedly a mischaracterization - a Christian humanizing of
Existence itself and affects, as will be seen, each of the other aspects of Lockes account
given in the Second Treatise. While I will not further assail the question of Gods existence
in this piece, the notion dovetails quite neatly into the concern of the nature of Lockes
epistemological claims, which must now be examined.
Locke believed that in the pre-state, the state of nature (SON),38 people could
have: knowledge of God, knowledge of Heaven and Hell (and what leads to such things),
knowledge of Gods Natural Law: reason (and its two principles of liberty and equality), and
knowledge of the Natural Rights (which derive from Natural Laws three principles).39 Natural
Law will be discussed in the next section, but the question now arises: could we have a
knowledge of such things?
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an adequate response to the
legitimacy of the concern of the Judeo-Christian God, I would like to propose that, when
discussing man, ethics, and politics, we do ourselves a great disservice by arguing from God. The
reason for this is very simple: we know nothing of God. Sure, in Bk IV, Ch. 10 of his Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, Locke provides a proof of God and, in his
Reasonableness of Christianity, defends the Judeo-Christian conception of God, but God

35 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Bk II, Sec. 34

36Ibid. Sec. 26
37 Gen.1: 26-31 (NIV)
38 The State of Nature, Robert Nozick says, in Ch. 1 (entitled Why State of Nature Theory?) of his Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, is a very important tool in political philosophy because it allows the user to explain
fundamentally the political realm in terms of the non-political...[by] start[ing] with a nonpolitical situation, showing
how and why a political one would later arise out of it...(pp.6). This is, though not entirely, different, we will
notice, from the application attempted by Locke. Locke, we will notice, uses a law governing the SON to
differentiate it from an original position per se: the State of War, which is also used equivocally to refer to
any state not entered into via compact.
39 See Woottons treatment of Locke in his Modern Political Thought from Machiavelli to Nietzsche
(second edition), pp. 279

15
simply has not properly exposed himself to us and so to utter God is__ does both us and God a
disservice. It does a disservice to us in the sense that it cannot be realized in action or attained in
man.40 It does God a disservice by maintaining that we can accurately describe Him. Rather
than such a stance, we are more want to adopt a position of silence in the tradition of
Maimonides.
Though the constraints of this essay will not allow me to explore the above mentioned
arguments provided by Locke, I argue the following: if God exists, then we can properly
know nothing of him for he resides beyond the scope of our experience. Further, a claim that a
thing is premised in God, of whom no proper knowledge is possible and who created
everything, is trivially true for it brings us no closer to the precise proof of any given thing;
i.e. if God created everything then it is equally true of all things that they were caused by the
prima causa: the causa sui. If it is equally true of all things, then it brings us no closer to
understanding any particular thing and so must not be the best possible explanation for it
progresse[s] [us] to the same point we were before[:]41 asking about the eminent cause(s) of
the thing in question.
IV. Phenomenology/Psychology and Ethics - The State of War and State of
Nature
At the onset of the Second Treatise, Locke makes it known that he is using the SON
as a tool by which to examine the state men are naturally in without the state; however, he
distinguishes this SON from the State of War (SOW) via the deceptively complicated Natural
Law. In terms of my philosophical anthropology, the SOW might represent the
phenomenological/psychological and the SON, the ethical; however, this distinction is
one which lacks justification and merely (and purposively) makes convoluted the matter, blurring
the distinction of is and ought in the pre-state condition of man, which is taken to be singular.
We will begin with the SON and those sub-topics contained within, moving on to the SOW once
we have finished the previous discussion. While it would do justice to the proposed structure of
philosophy to begin with the SOW, Lockes discussion of such is largely dependent on the SON.
Our focuses will be whether Lockes beliefs are legitimate and whether they are conducive to
human flourishing and justice.
A. The State of Nature and its Natural Law: Reason
Locke defines humans in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Christian sense: as rational
animals.42 This can be seen in his formulation of our (or, I might say, Gods)
psychobiological natural law.43 According to Locke, the SON: has a law of nature to
govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions. This is because, Locke says: men being all the workmanship of

40Aristotle, NE 1096b33-34
41Ibid. 1097a25
42 The use of rational creature to denote that which is human can be seen throughout Book IV of his Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. The posit of this universal predicate is also made in the Second
Treatise (most notably Ch. VI Of Paternal Power).
43 This might be more appropriately denoted supernatural law. Another use toward which Locke employs
Natural Law will be discussed in the next section on the political aspect of his theory. This political aspect (or
equivocation) of his natural law will be denoted political natural law.

16
one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the
world by his order, and about his business;44 put another way:
they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be
supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were
made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to
preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless
it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life,
the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.45
1. The Unnaturalness of Natural Law
To frame my discussion of Lockes natural law as a concept, I would like to present and
explicate the following quote by Nietzsche: Let us beware of saying that there are laws in
nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody
who trespasses [naturally].46 What Nietzsche is saying is that the universe itself is
disinterested in the affairs of man, much in the fashion of Spinoza and his conception of God:47 it
simply is. All value comes from the human for the human; no valuations exist before man posits
those valuations on that which simply is there: Being itself. Humans have interpretations of
Being, and being convinced (or satisfied) by their personal (or facilitated) reckonings, the human
thereby attempts to posit valuations of our interpretation of Being onto Being itself for the
majority of people, and for Locke apparently, any answer is better than no answer at all: not
knowing. Of Being, Nietzsche remarks, None of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to
it.48 We are merely providing our conventional account of what Being is as understood by the
Judeo-Christian perspective, not piercing into the what is itself. Hegel says that philosophy is
merely a series of mistakes leading, eventually, to the right answer and I think this is true (though
not teleologically). I do not think that we have all the right answers (though we have some and
are constantly finding more). Locke assuredly did not have the right answer and was furthermore
more wrong than we crusaders for truth and of the universe.
Natural Law, as understood by Locke, is ontologically rooted in the Christian God;
however, it is discoverable through reason alone. This natural law provides Lockes, or might I
say Gods should: his (or His) ought. Rather than giving us the original position as state
of nature theories ought to, Lockes state of nature gives us a position that ontologically follows
such an origin, for law has differentiated the two. One might say that this explanation is
normative rather than descriptive. This aspect of Lockes theory does not provide the what is
what; rather, it provides the what should be (which must have a what is what
ontologically prior to itself for otherwise the should would lack reference). To call a natural
law a law is to mince words. What though of this explanation: this universal predicate of reason?
2. The Inadequacy of Reason
Here we see the interplay of the questions of philosophy: i.e. we see how the
ontological and epistemic mistakes incurred have manifest in Lockean psychology. Take God out

44 Locke, Second Treatise, S. 6

45 Two Treatises, Bk II, Sec. 6. Also note that Locke is not here making a convincing argument, nor is he giving
a descriptive account of the State of nature; rather, he is proving a moral prescription and conflating it into his
account.
46 Nietzsche, Gay Science, Kauffman, S. 109
47 See Spinozas Ethics
48 Gay Science, S. 109

17
of the equation and the natural law: reason, no longer is a provision of that God: a necessary
truth of humanity considered universally: available at any time for any one to consult if they so
choose; it becomes merely a predicate believed to be universal of man by Locke and a number of
other theorists in his tradition. Can this predicate be applied universally to man now that the
removed Gods Supreme Perfection has, as a consequence of its removal, removed its
necessity?49 I think not.
Lockes universal human predicate found in the natural law is more moral prescription
than objective description of man as man before the existence of the state became an actuality. A
counter-example is what must be provided if I am to undermine the supposed truth of Lockes
universal assertion; luckily for me he has done the work for me. In Ch.VI, Sec. 60, he says:
But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature, any one comes not to such a
degree of reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules
of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will (because
he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and
government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and
ideots are never set free from the government of their parents; children, who are not as yet come unto those
years whereat they may have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having;
thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves,
have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their
good for them, says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty, which God
and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring, till they can be able
to shift for themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.
These counterexamples being so graciously provided, we must seek out actual rather than
ideal human universal(s). Two immediately come to mind, both also provided by Aristotle in
his Nichomachean Ethics and Politics respectively. All humans are: (1) purposive;
(2) political (or social). Neither of these universal human predicates, I believe, will be found
problematic after they are further explained.
3. Purposiveness
All humans are purposive in the sense that every action and choice seem to aim at
some good, which, we remember, is defined as that toward which all things aim. No one does
anything without a purpose (I would say reason, but I would then be equivocating and,
perhaps, making the same mistake as Locke). We all act or choose toward some good;
however, we may not always do so toward that which is actually good for us (which we
would if reason were our universal rule). If rationality were our rule, irrational acts would not
occur at nearly the rate they do. Humans do things that are bad for them all the time: Im about to
smoke a cigarette, for instance (though some really think these apparently good things
are actually good: they know it). Though my reason is well aware that smoking is bad,
my sub-rational brain (particularly the basal ganglia and thalamic portion) is that part which
wants a cigarette). In some, due to biological or environmental factors, no or very little rational
process regulates these sub-rational urges and so the desire and the corresponding purposiveness
it inspires cannot be called rational. Here we have a case of apparent and actual goods.
Neither my thinking nor my knowing something is good for me makes that thing good
for me; its being good for me makes it good for me. A persons actual good, we
will remember, is that which makes that person flourish. All apparent goods acted toward
do not necessarily help a person flourish; they are either good, neutral, or bad in terms of
flourishing; i.e. they either have a beneficial, neutral, or detrimental impact on ones

49 One might refer to Descartes conception of a Supremely Perfect Being in his Principles of Philosophy or to
Plantingas ontological proof of God. In doing so, the focus should be on what is entailed by supreme perfection.

18
self-actualization scheme. Lockes system does not have room for such a distinction,
partially because the universal human application of the predicate reason rather than
purpose, makes it the case that purpose is reasonable, i.e. we are led to believe by Locke that
we always have the capacity for rational choice and that our not acting according to
reason is, therefore, a choice rather than a naturally inherent (to x degree) and trainable
thing.Seeing that the universal predicate of purposiveness is more preferable than that of
rationality in terms of accuracy, let us examine the ethical implications of such a distinction. If
one is not always acting rationally, and some never act rationally, then some are sometimes
exempted from responsibility for actions and some are always exempted; this, however, aside
from his positive aside, his contradictory remarks in Chap. VI, undermines the punishment
scheme associated with a model assuming reason; for, if reason is assumed universally,
retributive punishment may always fit as consequence for transgressions of Gods law of
nature, which, we will remember, could be consulted by everyone if only they chose to
do so. Without universal reason, the blame for my acting in such and such a way because I
thought it was good would lie with he who told me that such and such was good (or he who
was rational and failed to tell me that such was bad). I would not act in a way that was bad for
me if I (a) knew it was bad and (b) had no habit (or a removed habit) of acting in that way.
Rather than confer the responsibility to accomplish the ultimate goal onto one man (who
may or may not be acting rationally), we are more justified in helping out our fellowman having
adopted purposiveness. One man is less likely to know what is right than the state itself could
(if only because the state itself contains more of the objective perspective in that is has more
brain power in that it is in most cases composed of more than one person). If everyone helped
out more often than when convenient, fewer people would make mistakes, or act badly.
4. Man as Political
Humans are also, universally considered, social (or political) animals. In his
Politics, Aristotle says that he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man [or a beast] or above humanity [or a god].50 Locke would agree with me that
we are social, but we diverge when it comes to the grounds of that sociability. For Locke,
[e]very one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason,
when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of
mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.51
We see here that Lockes conception of compassion and human benevolence is unjustly
rooted in self-love and are want to consult Tuckness articulation of Strauss realization that
Locke only recognizes natural law obligations in those situations where our own preservation is
not in conflict, further emphasizing that our right to preserve ourselves trumps any duties we
may have.52 This sort of love is limited at the point at which its utility for the user falls below
cost (be it physical or financial for the two are materially equivalent on Lockes reckoning); by
using a system such as this, we essentially only encourage beneficence and humanist values
when it is convenient or would not physically or financially harm us. Put another way, on
Lockes view, because property and life are conflated, it is acceptable for my want to preserve
the capital part of my existence to trump the need of someone for their biological lifes

50 Aristotle, Politics 1253a2-3.

51 Second Treatise, Sec. 6
52 Tuckness, Alex, "Locke's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-political/>.

19
preservation.53 For instance, if I was in my $100,000 car and could save you from getting killed
by another car if I used my car as a projectile, thereby destroying my car, Locke would say that I
am not obliged to do so because it would cause me $100,000 of property harm. This
minimization of the role of others in the determination of goodness or badness of ones
experience for all is deeply problematic, for I believe that mutual care and respect amongst the
human race is more important than Locke gives it credit for it is certainly more important than
property.
Others provide the material basis for all of our interpersonal interactions; the better the
others, the better their influence on the self; the better their influence on the self, the better the
self can be. Our divergence can perhaps best be captured in an example. Let us assume that a
number from 1-10 represents how well someone is doing, 1 being the lowest, 10 the
highest. If Person A =9, Person B=3, Person C=2, I would argue that by raising both B and C
up to 4, expending 3 points, though maintaining a slight supremacy, person A would ultimately
benefit more in the second configuration, given enough time because the possible quality of
interactions with others improves. The logic here might be expressed as follows: it is better to
be Bill Gates with half the amount of money and no homeless people than
Bill Gates as is surrounded by homeless people. This is primarily because exposure
to homelessness, poverty, pain, etc. in fellow humans causes psychological empathy and pain on
a primitive rather than rational basis.54 The better all are doing, the better each can possibly do.
Furthermore, consider Harvey Harlows experiment on Rhesus monkeys, who share the mirror
system which make us such inherently social beings. Harlow and his assistants fed the monkey
and met their physical needs; however, deprived them of all social contact: most died. Without
social contact, the otherwise healthy monkey dies. The same would probably happen with a
human, though to attempt such an experiment would be ethically problematic to be sure. Let us
examine further the impact on ethics such a revision to the natural law might have.
We really become what we think about (though it must be stated that: our thinking a thing
makes it true only for us: no positing onto the world is warranted without demonstration in the
realm of experienceable phenomena). We automatically and naturally connect with fellow
humans, interpreting and experiencing their condition (in our minds) while they do the same (in
reality). What might the ethical implications of such a natural condition be? Consider an
example provided by Thomas Nagel in his The View from Nowhere: a man is starving
himself so that he can build a monument to his God; a person will be inherently inclined to help
this man eat, for witnessing his starvation, the mere witnessing of it, harms them. They are
impressed with starvation, imagine starvation, and feel a glimpse of it thanks to mirror neurons.
However, a closer relationship would be needed for an interest in helping the man finish his
statue, for no pain is caused to the passerby if the statue is or is not completed: no incentive is
present to help him in his goal naturally. I am willing to help out someone suffering in front
of me because it raises their state, thereby elevating my perception of the state and my feeling
from that perception. This is why Nagel presents the theorem: your need is more

53 This point will be elaborated upon later in this section and in the next section.
54 For more on this, one might look into the recent discovery of the mirror system of the human and primate brains.
The mirror system of the brain is one which functions both when one does and one sees another do. We literally
become what we see. When we see homelessness (which is painful), we experience a derivative of homelessness
(which pains us, though not as much) through a process of unconscious and sub-rational mimicry. It is primarily
thalamic, though it does extend into the forebrain. It is therefore, at least to some extent, sub-rational and more
natural (as similar behaviors occur in other mammals) and important than Locke gives it credit for.

20
objectively important than my want.55 I think Nagel is right on this point; however, I would
like to make a stronger claim.
Rather than merely universally accommodate particular needs universally, I argue that,
because we are so intimately and subliminally connected to one another, we should also exhibit,
practice, and experience care for our fellow humans, their well being, and their flourishing in
the same way we would care for a loved one. This might be referred to as community-wide
fraternity;56 the logic here is that if we put significant weight (comparable to that which we
give ourselves and loved ones) on the subjective goods of others, no: others themselves, then
we are less inclined to either impede their progress or harm them and everyone is more likely to
succeed. By living fraternally, embracing our sociability and need for socialization with a hearty
and indiscriminate benevolence, we would eliminate the motivation for crime (for one is less
likely to harm and more likely to help others if one shares meaningful bonds with those people)
and constantly improve everything for everyone. Lockes system does not allow for such a
concept of fraternity to actualize for the primacy of sociability is made secondary on Lockes
understanding. He reduces the hedonistic import of others and inflates selfish import. Let us
continue our critical endeavor through Lockes Second Treatise, moving on to the first
derivative of the psychobiological natural law: liberty.
5. Liberty
Before discussing Lockes conception of liberty, we must first consult Charles
Taylor for an important distinction of liberty which is an extension of Isaiah Berlins work on
liberty. Having reviewed Taylors thoughts on the matter, I will make a second distinction.
a. An Important Distinction
Before discussing Lockes understanding of liberty in the SON, liberty itself demands
examination. Isaiah Berlin, in his Two concepts of liberty57 distinguishes negative liberty
from positive liberty.58 A negative conception of liberty, according to Charles Taylor, is
one which want[s] to define freedom exclusively in terms of the independence of the individual
from interference by others, be these governments, corporations, or private persons;
alternatively, a positive conception of liberty is one which believe[s] that freedom resides at
least in part in collective control over the common life.59 These preliminary descriptions must
be fleshed out before we proceed; for they tell us very little. Once we have fleshed these out, a
second distinction will be necessary.
i. Negative Liberty
Negative liberty, taken to its logical limit, i.e. a caricatural version of negative liberty,
according to Taylor:
is the tough-minded version going back to Hobbes, or in another way to Bentham, which sees freedom
simply as the absence of external physical of legal obstacles. This view will have no truck with other less
immediately obvious obstacles to freedom, for instance, lack of awareness, or false consciousness, or
repression, or other inner factors of this kind. It holds firmly to the view that to speak of such inner factors

55 See Nagel, Thomas; The View From Nowhere, pp. 166-175.

56 See Dworkins Laws Empire, pp. 193-202
57 Four Essays on Liberty, (London, 1969), pp. 118-72
58 Charles Taylors analysis of these two concepts presented in Ch. 8 of volume two of his Philosophical
Papers, entitled: Whats Wrong with Negative Liberty? will be cited on the matter.
59 Taylor, Charles; Philosophy and the Human Sciences Philosophical Papers Volume 2;
Cambridge: 1985; Ch. 8, pp, 211-229 P. 2

21
 as relevant to the issue about freedom, to speak for instance of someones being less free because of false
consciousness, is to abuse words.60
This, according to Taylor, is
a representative portrait of the negative view because it rules out...one of the most powerful motives behind
the modern defence of freedom as individual independence, viz., the post-romantic idea that each persons
form of self realization is original to him/her, and can therefore only be worked out independently.61
It is also important to note that the proponents of negative liberty themselves often seem
anxious to espouse their extreme, Hobbesian view.62 For, negative theories want to define
freedom in terms of the individual independence from others63 and are concerned with the area
in which the subject should be left without interference.64 Lastly, according to Taylor,
negative theories can rely solely on an opportunity-concept, where being free is a matter of what we can
do, of what is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options...Freedom consists
just in there being no obstacle...that nothing stand in the way.65
But, we have to say that negative theories can rely...rather than that they necessarily do so
rely...to allow for...negative theories...which incorporate some notion of self-realization.66
ii. Positive Liberty
Here, an exercise concept,a view of freedom which involves...the
exercising of control over ones life67, i.e. one [that maintains one] is only free to the
extent that one has effectively determined the shape of ones life68 is more in order. The extreme
negative view, we realize, is indefensible if we adopt a good of self-actualization.
According to Taylor, negative theories tend to actualize this can, this failure to
recognize exercise-concepts of liberty, as a result of fear of the Totalitarian Menace. This
is understandable because the more state impetus, the less self impetus; however, by refusing to
acknowledge the exercise side of things, one both devalues liberalism and adopts a
philosophical position that is altogether indefensible. The reason for this is very simple: a pure
opportunity-concept does not acknowledge internal impediments that hinder ones ability
as involved in the thought-equation, despite their presence in the equation of actuality. If I
have the innate talent of writing: I was BORN to write, to express with words and I was
thrown into such a circumstance in society where, due to poverty, (bad education, parental lack,
etc. as a result of), no money for or knowledge of books, literature, grammar (aside, of course,
from the subpar public provisions in my under-privileged part of town), then I am not properly
free to write, to be who I am. At least some acknowledgement of both internal impediments
to and exercise concepts of liberty, characteristic of positive theories, therefore, must be
admitted.
The positive concept of liberty, in its caricaturally extreme form,holds that
coercion can be justified in the name of freedom if it is needed to bring into existence the
classless society in which alone men are properly free,69 i.e. man can...be forced to be free.70
Communism, which does so coerce, according to Taylor, is an extreme portrait of such a
60 Ibid. P5
61 Ibid. P6
62 Ibid. P7
63 Ibid. P8
64 Ibid. P9
65 Ibid. P10.
66 Ibid. P 10
67 Ibid. P. 8
68 Ibid. P. 8

22
concept of liberty that never the less expresses the inner logic of this kind of theory.71 This
logic might be expressed in the following way: Freedom..[is]..self-direction...the
actual exercise of directing control over ones [own] life.72 Whereas negative
theories give dominant weight to liberty as opportunity (but allow room for exercise
too), positive theories rely on exercise concepts exclusively: exercise is freedom on
this sort of view. The very fact that psychological factors being taken into account requires
an exercise-concept (the essence of positive conceptions), indicates, I believe, the contained
truth within.
iii. A Brief Contrast
Positive liberty, then, might be considered 'the actual liberty to' whereas negative liberty
might be considered 'the theoretical liberty associated with a system in which it is possible that
one can____. Maximized Opportunity is doubtlessly appealing, but if it is accompanied by a
minimized 'exercise of,' what good can it be said to have? What actual use? Is it not but a castle
in the sky for man at large: a thing beyond one that defines one's life negatively and gives one's
life negative value, i.e. value in terms of some other rather than value in terms of oneself? I
would like to make a second distinction amidst our two types one internal and the other external.
iv. Internal and External Opportunity
Internal opportunity describes a situation in which there exists the possibility of my being
able to do x given my mental or physical potentiality for S. For example, if I have the latent
capacity for mathematical reasoning, then I have the internal opportunity to solve complicated
problems. External opportunity describes a scenario in which, based on the possibility of my
possession of C, it is a logical possibility that I might do y. Say I could have five hundred
dollars; if this is the case, then I have the opportunity to buy any thing at that cost. Investigating
these two types of the opportunity concept further indicates the need for exercise: opportunity
alone is a necessary condition for both x and y, but it is not necessarily a sufficient condition.
One reason for this is the nature of the beast: humans do not function at so high a level that
opportunity alone is sufficient for providing them meaningful liberty. We realize again: exercise
is necessary.
v. Internal and External Exercise
Internal exercise is the possession and mastery of attribute A such that thing x, can be
done as a consequence of the possession and usability of A. If I actually have mathematical
reasoning, then I can actually solve complicated problems. External exercise would be a
situation in which I possessed C and was enabled to do y as a consequence of such. If I actually
have five hundred dollars, then I can actually spend five hundred dollars on a five hundred dollar
good. Again we see that the exercise concept reinforces and makes meaningful the opportunity. If
men are constituted in such a way that logical potential is an overstatement of actual potential,
then opportunity becomes vacuous. The exercise of the person must correspond with any
opportunity actualized by that person if that person is to called properly free to do the thing in
question.
b. Lockes SON Liberty

69 Ibid. P3
70 Ibid. P3
71 Ibid. P4
72 Ibid. P4

23
 Here, liberty, as presented by Locke in the SON, will be examined. This will
naturally set the stage for a discussion of the second derivative natural right Locke
derives from this derivative of the psychobiological natural law;73 however, the focuses
here will be (i) the legitimacy of liberty so understood, and (ii) the ethical
implications of such a conception of liberty. Liberty, in the SON, is defined by
Locke as perfect freedom to order [ones] actions, and dispose of [ones] possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,74 without asking leave, or
depending upon the will of any other man.75
i. The Legitimacy of Lockes Liberty in the SON
We notice immediately that this definition is what Isaiah Berlin would refer to as a
negative definition of liberty, one which defines it exclusively in terms of the
independence of the individual from interference by others, be these governments, corporations,
or private persons,76 according to Taylor. However, we will notice that it is not a completely
negative definition of liberty for a constraint is in place (even in the pre-state, pre-
law, SON): the law of nature: reasons bounds (which can no longer be said to exist
universally and in an obligatory sense as Locke would have us believe). If we reformulate
Lockes argument to accommodate the removal of this constraint we humans would have total
negative liberty, universally. Are we free to do as we please in the SON, with no
determining constraints? I think not.
There are several determining factors which make possible the avenues along which
ones life might traverse. This is what I will call set-determinism. What this means is: based
on the factors that be said to apply to any persons situation and situatedness in and within the
world, different sets of possibilities are determined for that person. Factors such as those of
genetics (which determine power and type) and locale into which one is thrown (which
determines ones environmental influences) will determine and constrain the possibilities of
ones life: the shapes it might possibly take. Since each person is thrown into a different
situation, people are differently free to order their actions, some in varying amounts, some in
different kinds. For instance, take two people in a pre-political world, one in an African or
South African Jungle surrounded by vicious animals more than capable of killing humans, one in
the very fertile and peaceful mediterranean climate and conditions of parts of Europe. The
European will be free to relax, whereas the South American or African will not (for the
determinant of threat of violent death via animal is stifling to relaxation). While, a great
deal more could be said of set-determinism and its validity, my exercise-side
counterexamples on this point have been presented and I will move to the remainder of this
definitions content, which breaches the ethical realm.
ii. The Ethical Implications
73 See Section V of this essay.
74 The bounds of reason need not necessarily hold in the SON, for we are not, as a rule, rational. In the SON, a
state before institutions demanding the cultivation and exercise of reason, we required the strength and ferocity to
hunt; so, Im sure our finite mental energies were more directed to the brain stem than they are now, which would
result in a decrease in the energy possibly distributable to the neocortex (safely assuming human finiteness). Further,
not everyone shares equally in reason: there are vast disparities between human reasonableness considered generally.
More on this last point will be said below, but suffice it to say: if reason is the law outside of which I cannot act, I
might consult my will instead; or, I might not have reason and it would not apply: see toward the end of Chap. VI:
Of Paternal Power.
75 Two Treatises on Government: Book II, Sec. 4
76 Taylor, Ch. 8 P5

24
 The second part of Lockes definition: ...without asking leave, or depending upon the
will of any other man obviously neglects the fact that humans are social in a stronger sense
than via self-love: i.e., we need human contact on a more fundamental than Lockes theory
admits. By being free from reliance on my fellow man, I am, firstly, led to believe that such
a thing is problematic, or against my nature: that, somehow, it is wrong for humans to
cooperate with and depend on one another. This holding of Lockes propels further his thesis that
the individual trumps the society; the problem with such a thesis, we will remember, has already
been addressed. This is also detrimental to the whole of humanity in that it fails to cultivate this
universal and meaningful human aspect of sociableness itself, viz. fraternity. There is, unlike
Locke would have one believe, a Social Entity that determines the individual and matters.
Further, returning to the first portion of our discussion, this mischaracterization of
humans lead humans away from being fully human. We define ourselves in terms of a negative
and relatively trivial type of liberty and so we define ourselves and our capacities negatively,
thereby failing to capture that which actually inheres in the individual. By doing this, by saying:
everyone can do anything, we lead ourselves away from that which we are differently capable
of such that no alienation of extension of possibility exists. If nature does not offer someone the
exercise, than offering that person opportunity in this fashion is nothing more than a tease. This
tease is a great error, because it fails to call it as it is, positively, and is a resort to negativity
false objectivity.
c. Lockes Positive Aside
In Chapter VI: Of Paternal Power, in addition to providing contradictions, Locke
also provides a more positive, exercise concept of liberty; though, the weight with which its
content applies to the remainder of the work and the contradictions due to the conflation of
Lockes worlds, make this aside merely an aside: a detour that might be most accurately called a
non-starter. The positive definition seems to occur within a negative framework,
crippling its systemic admissibility. The reason I provide this sub-section is solely for charity.
In Sec.54,Lockeadmits:ThoughIhavesaidabove,Chap.II.Thatallmenbynature
areequal,Icannotbesupposedtounderstandallsortsofequality.Lockesadmissionis
promptedbythefactthat:
ageorvirtuemaygivemenajustprecedency:excellencyofpartsandmeritmayplaceothersabovethe
commonlevel:birthmaysubjectsome,andallianceorbenefitsothers,topayan observanceto
thoseto whomnature,gratitude,orotherrespects,mayhavemadeitdue.
Despitetheseincongruencies,Lockemaintainsthat
allthisconsistswiththeequality,whichallmenarein,inrespectofjurisdictionordominionone over
another;whichwastheequalityItherespokeof,aspropertothebusinessinhand,beingthatequalright,
thateverymanhath,tohisnaturalfreedom,withoutbeingsubjectedtothewillorauthorityofanyother
man.
Lockespositiveconceptionoflibertyemergesinhisdiscussionofchildren.Children,
Lockeconfesses,arenotborninthisfullstateofequality,thoughtheyareborntoit.77Thisis
becausetheirparentshaveasortofruleandjurisdictionoverthem,whentheycomeintothe
world,andforsometimeafter;butitisbutatemporaryone.Moreprecisely,Lockeargues:
Thebondsofthissubjectionareliketheswaddlingclothestheyartwraptupin,andsupportedby, inthe
weaknessoftheirinfancy:ageandreasonastheygrowup,loosenthem,tillatlengththeydropquiteoff,
andleaveamanathisownfreedisposal.78

77 Sec. 55
78 Sec. 55

25
Lockeaddsthatchildren,unlikeAdam,arebornignorantandwithouttheuseofreason79and
so
allparents..[are],bythelawofnature,underanobligationtopreserve,nourish,andeducatethechildren
theyhadbegotten;notastheirownworkmanship,buttheworkmanshipoftheirownmaker,theAlmighty,
towhomtheyweretobeaccountableforthem.80
Thisisforthereasonthatthelaw,thatwastogovernAdam,wasthesamethatwastogovern
allhisposterity,thelawofreason;however,nobodycanbeunderalaw,whichisnot
promulgatedtohim;andthislawbeingpromulgatedormadeknownbyreasononly,hethatis
notcometotheuseofhisreason,cannotbesaidtobeunderthislaw.81Notbeingunderthis
law,onLockesview,theycannotsaidtobefreeforlaw,initstruenotion,isnotsomuchthe
limitationasthedirectionofafreeandintelligentagenttohisproperinterest,andprescribesno
fartherthanisforthegeneralgoodofthoseunderthatlaw.82
The end of law, on Lockes understanding, is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve
and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law,
there is no freedom. This for the reason that liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence
from others; which cannot be, where there is no law. This seems in tension with the natural law
parameters we have thus far seen, especially when Locke says:
freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when
every other man's humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his
person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is,
and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.83
The power, then, that parents have over their children, Locke contends, arises from that duty
which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during the imperfect state of
childhood.84 This, Locke says, gives the parents a duty to educate their young (or have
someone educate their young).
This conception is flawed for it is implicative of a situation in which something is
necessary and not possible, implying a contradiction. By solely tasking the parent with the
education that parents children we run into a two combinations of three problems on the
exercise side of things, which leads us into contradiction: (1) that which is best for the kid in
terms of education, might not be something of which the parent has knowledge, and (2) the
parent cannot afford to pay a tutor who does know or lacks the knowledge or means to
knowledge of who might be capable of such; these conditions, taken together (1 & (2 or 3), are
sufficient to imply a contradiction involving modality (necessary and not possibly). If the parent
cannot possibly ascertain the contents of their childs vessel, nor can they afford to hire
someone who does (or even have a knowledge of who such a person is), then the child will
probably not be properly educated and might not actualize, which is both bad and an
impossible duty.85
To solely and indiscriminately task parents with the provision of what is right for
their childs education, I think we are foolish; while yes, nature works in this fashion due to its

79 Sec. 56
80 Sec. 56
81 Sec. 57
82 Sec. 57
83 Sec. 57
84 Sec. 58
85 See Sec. 69. This issue will be revisited in IV.A.7.

26
proven success, when dealing with matters of rationality, would it not be wiser of us to impose a
more rational duty? Most of the time a parent will have a really good approach for their child,
but more often than need be, this system fails. Rather than leave such important a thing as
education to the whim of the parent who may or may not know what is best, I believe that
more intervention on part of the state is here warranted for the rationally run state has a higher
total rationality than any parents can and can therefore more precisely indicate what is best or
what set of options is best for any given persons education. Rather than rely on the chance that
mom and dad know best, which is mostly true, would we not be more true if the fate of
each was the concern of all and the subjective were informed by the objective?
Nozick would argue profusely against my conception of statecraft for his practical theory
is not a positive conception, but rather a negative libertarian position, one which advocates the
ultra-minimal state, saying no other can be justified. Whereas my demands of
neoeudaimonian statecraft as reasoned above, require an interventionist approach, Nozick
argues that leaving it all up to the invisible hand is more prudent. This is because liberty, in the
negative sense, is Nozicks primary political principle, lexicographically speaking. This is the
trademark of any libertarian, a word we have hitherto thrown around without definition.
For something or someone to be considered libertarian, what can be said of that thing
or person? Nozick argues that liberty (defined in a negative sense) is a lexicographically primary
right that cannot be trumped by any other claims. For Nozick, the freedom to do what one
pleases without any direct coercion otherwise is what makes life valuable.86 The libertarian line,
we see, is one which itself turns on ones reckoning of liberty. The liberty used by Nozick is not
a positive liberty, but rather, like Locke, one that is negative. This is evident as his concern in
writing this piece is a government which constantly interferes with peoples lives87 Freedom as
the choice to do x or y or z without intervention is mans primary right on Nozicks view. We
here see how the invisible hand of his system operates: it is the aggregate of all choices. The
entire Nozickean model is built upon this choice, hence: libertarianism. However, non-externally
determined (at least in part) choices are, as we will see, never made; one always owes at least
something to the environment into which they were thrown.
Now, if choice were necessarily rational due to a change in the human race such that
rationality became a human universal, then any given choice might be called a free act (given a
positive reckoning of what it means to be free). Under these conditions, Nozicks theory might
be called a great success. This, however, is not the case and the reason is quite simple. The
majority of people are not free if choice is what we value highest because only rational choices
can be called free if what we mean by free is internally determined and spontaneous
(or, put negatively, not externally-determined). Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure
Reason, admits that everything in the empirical universe is subject to the empirical laws of
determinism and so spawned the noumenal realm of reason. If reason, Kant argues, has this
special realm, it would not be subject to such laws. If it exists in the empirical realm, then it must
be subject to causal laws. Reason, we will remember is merely an outgrowth of the material brain
and so unless we appeal to something higher or lower than this universe, say God or immaterial
soul, etc., the former move is not warranted and the latter must be the case. Furthermore, reason
can only deal with that to which it has been exposed and their combinations. This being the case,
we cannot be said to possess spontaneity in the sense Kant or Nozick suggest.

86 Ch 1, 7 10. Also see The Examined Life.

87 163

27
 Let us take Einsteins theory of relativity as an illustrative example. Einstein was a
mathematician who had a great deal of math power and creative power. But, his relativity owes
itself to the body of knowledge which preceded Einstein just as much as Einstein. Einsteins
theorems, purely rational things, are referential to a set of other axioms and theorems and
resulted from a particular model. Had the propositions on which Einsteins theory not existed, his
theory could not have existed; the same applies to the case of a different model. Had there been
no Newtonian physics, the could not have been no theory of relativity. Had there been
geocentricity, there could have been no theory of relativity. Either way, we see that Einsteins
theory of relativity was determined, at least in part, by external determinations: it was
there...only, the connections had to be made. If even the most rational people are determined in
what they might possibly do based on that which has been done before and their material
conditions, then people never really have a choice in the sense that Nozick believes.88
This being the case, we must maximize the quality of determinations rather than pretend
they are not an issue and that the choice is always ours if we wish to practice rational statecraft.
The illusion of choice which dominates theories such as Lockes, Kants and Nozicks practical
philosophies. All this being said, let us move the focus of our discussion to equality.
6. Equality
Liberty cannot be discussed further, unless we enter the political realm; until that point,,
let us move on to the second derivative of natural law: equality. Our approach will be
the same as with liberty: (a) legitimacy and (b) ethical implications. Lockes notion of
equality can be understood as follows:
all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of
nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination
or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion
and sovereignty.89
a. Legitimacy Of Lockes Equality
Locke runs into a crippling problems here: the facts. The fact is, people are not born
equal: born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties. A
counterexample that comes to mind is this: The very fact that we are able to distinguish between
higher and lower men. The lower man, whose physical and rational powers are below average,
and a higher man, whose physical and rational abilities are above average; such a distinction
could not even be made given equality. The former cannot extend oneself very far physically or
mentally whereas the latters possible extension would surely be a marvel to behold.
Furthermore, on a more universal note, equality falls apart for the reason that person A is not
equal to person B, for they are different people.90 We should not conceive of ourselves as all
created equal before God if that equality is incoherent: people are different. The
legitimacy of Lockes equality is nonexistent and so we cannot sympathize with his position.
b. Ethical Implications

88 This renders Nozicks Wilt Chamberlain illustration of how liberty upsets patterns and why patterns are therefore
injurious to liberty (See pp. 160-174) irrelevant for that liberty cannot be said to be liberty if what one means by
liberty is spontaneity from external determinations. Such a thing is not possible we have shown, for any person
because of ones presence in a world which is not a vacuum. One does not exist in the world alone and, even on the
subliminal level, every person determines each other.
89 Bk. II, Ch. 2, Sec. 4
90 Again, the reader might refer to Liviakis work in logic concerning identity statements.

28
 The question now becomes, what ethically problematic implications might
arise by holding that all are created equal by God given that this is not the
case? The primary implication, as might be inferred, is a misrepresentation of what it
means to be human (though, this can manifest in two ways): (1) the better is made to
function by a standard that is below him for the preservation of equality, (2) the lesser is made
to function at a level above him for the preservation of equality. In case (1): if one is leaps and
bounds above others, and yet is considered equal, then he is not being held up to that standard
which will lead to his self-actualization; in case (2): if one is far below ones peers and
considered equal, then that one will be held to a standard which is beyond their limit,
inhibiting self actualization; either way, only the middle benefits from such an approach.
Equality, as understood by Locke, implies a dangerous mischaracterization of
humanity, which leads to inappropriate standards, a tendency toward neglect of those above
and below, which leads to an impediment to the good: the bad. The worst sort of
inequality, after all, is treating unequals as equals.
Rather than this, it would be more prudent for us to look instead to the individual in
determining what level that person (and people like that person) should function to maximally
flourish. This would doubtlessly be favorable to a scenario in which a blanket standard, a one
size fits all approach is administered. Given a knowledge of power, type, and the material
conditions of that person, a set of viable and compatible options for any given person can be
determined. For we know, what a person is capable of and what can possibly be done in that
persons situation. Not every one is the same and not every one should do the same thing. Amidst
the sea of difference, however, exists degrees of similarity with reference to the three proposed
categories. By ignoring the reality at hand and insisting on a negative valuation, one which kind
of works for everybody, we commit a great blunder: we reject ourselves as we are in lieu of
what we speculate we ought to be: conflating is and ought such is the consequence of
Lockes and all other normative explanations.
7. The Divine Right Of Property Owners
Though this will be touched upon again toward the end of this essay, it must be stated
here in the phenomenological/ethical realm that Lockes natural rights to property are remarkably
similar to the Filmers Divine Right of Kings; I have thusly deemed these rights the divine
right of property owners. Locke attempts to argue: how men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common...without any express
compact of all the commoners.91 We will also see, as was briefly discussed earlier, how property
and life are conflated on Lockes view. His argument runs in the following way: (1)
God...commandedman...tolabour,and...(2)thepenuryofhisconditionrequireditofhim.92
(3)Asmuchlandasamantills,plants,improves,cultivates,andcanusetheproductof,somuch
ishisproperty.93(4)Thisisjustifiablebecausethereislandenoughintheworldtosuffice
doubletheinhabitants94and(5)sincetherewasstillenough,andasgoodleft;andmorethan
theyetunprovidedcoulduse.95Lockethenboldlyclaimsthat(6)theconditionofhumanlife,

91 Sec. 25
92 Sec. 32
93 Sec. 32
94 Sec. 36
95 Sec. 35

29
whichrequireslabourandmaterialstoworkon,necessarilyintroducesprivatepossessions,96
whichduetotheperishabilityofthings,wouldnotbeaproblemhadnottheinventionof
money,andthetacitagreementofmentoputavalueonit,introduced(byconsent)larger
possessions,andarighttothem;which,howithasdone.97
a. Legitimacy
Three major problems plague this aspect of Lockes theory: (i) finite and scarce
resources, (ii) his conflation of life and property, (iii) his negative defining of that which is good
for the human. This arguments first major downfall is the problem of finite resources. Locke
assumes a superabundance of resources due to the pre-industrial time in which he was living.
However, such a reality is fictitious and no common land exists anymore. Whenever anyone
acquires land or resources today, it is from someone elses holdings (unless a rare new discovery
is made). Secondly, by making materially equivalent life and property, as is done by linking the
two of necessity; this makes it the case, as we have seen earlier, that my desire to not lose my
money can trump my obligation to save my fellow citizens life. Peoples wants become
entitlements as much as needs on this view. Lastly, to use property as a universal value
marker and end rather than those specific goods which correspond to the particular form of
man, we must say that it is ultimately left to the individual choosing to allocate ones resources
such that they can attain these goods which would be most conducive to their flourishing; this
intermediary step simply complicates and makes less attainable the already daunting task of
attaining neo-eudaimonia through action unless one is already properly rational and is born
into a substantive economic position (both of which, we have shown, are not universal
characteristics of humanity and the principle is therefore not generalizable). As these claims of
Lockes has no legitimacy for they are both maligned with our earlier findings and in themselves
incoherent, they should not be held. However, if we do hold such a view of such a significant
nature, it being incorrect, there are sure to be implications in the ethical realm.
b. Ethical Implications
There are two major ethical implications of holding such natural property rights
which present themselves in Lockes theory (though numerous others to be sure): inheritance and
capital. Though, it should be stated, I will only discuss the former here, for Locke himself
acknowledges and then ignores, writing off to and justifying by consent, the latter.98 Let us now
deal with the claim that parents have an obligation to provide for their children and leave
inheritance. The child of a supremely wealthy man, under such circumstances is given a life
that demands no labor on his part: one might be a doofus, though have economic security and the
exercise liberty this entails in a degree which is unnecessary for that persons actualization
(perhaps even contra-posed) and above that persons merit; alternatively, one thrown into
poverty, despite their innate potentialities is given very little exercise wiggle room (though

96 Sec. 35
97 Sec. 36. On this last point, Nozick interjects saying that consent is an illegitimate justification and instead points
to an invisible hand explanation (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 18), which is one that minimize[s] the use
of notions constituting the phenomena to be explained(ibid. pp.19) and thereby: (a) is fundamentally
disconnected from the subject at hand and (b) defines the thing negatively and leaves the shape of it all up to
chance. This is not so different from Lockes conception for chance rules when mans desire to extend human law
further than the natural law is admissible given consent and tacit consent, or consent by not dissenting in the same
way as that with an invisible hand. Either way, chance and a negative tendency dominate the Lockean
perspective and those which derive from it, e.g. Nozicks libertarian line and both are philosophically inadmissible.
98 See sec. 36. cited above. This claim does not require a thorough examination for my purposes, but one might
refer to either Das Kapital or the Communist Manifesto for more criticism of capital itself.

30
opportunity is abound). In short, it can only be universally attested that people have the
negative freedom for such, though the positive freedom responsible for the actualization of such
is not so universally provided.
Inheritance leads to such a scheme that a just t1 might lead to an unjust t2;
furthermore, the very notion also entails a contradictory and therefore impossible duty: a
situation in which a thing is both obligatory (necessary) and not possible simultaneously and for
the same person. Consider the following: if we have Person 1a, a smart laborer that made
millions, Person 1b, his doofus son, Person 2a, a poor slightly intelligent factory worker,
and Person 2b, his brilliant son (one whose intellectual power is abundant) whose innate
typological structure might be called tactile artist and Persons 1a and 2a die immediately
after their sons, who, let us grant, are their sole heirs, are born, then fundamentally contra-
posed to merit and thereby non-neoeudaimonian moves occur within and as a consequence
of Lockes model and at least one non-trivial instance of contradiction can be found.
For starters, if what we have hitherto said is accurate then family history in isolation of a
persons experience of that history has no weight in our consideration of what is good for that
person: only what is good for that person has any actual bearing in that things subjective
goodness or there lack of. Now, Persons 1a and 2a die, we will remember, giving all of their
poseessions to their children. The children, 1b and 2b, we will remember, are a doofus and
artistic genius respectively (as a function of their innate existential being). 1a left the doofus a
large lump sum, whereas the artistic genius was left very little: only enough to grind it out. A
doofus has very little going on in their rational mind and so does not need anything very specific
nor anything very complicated to be amused or for satisfaction: for their particular looks of
flourishing. The art-genius seed on the other hand, if he is to blossom into the flower he
could be, will need art in his life, so to speak. This requires exposure, history lessons of the
craft, technique lessons, materials, practice, etc. These things require time and money, a luxury
not afforded to 2b. As a result of such, we have found an instance in which a move from a just
past can lead to an unjust future with inheritance in place. Also, as has been said, a second
consequence of such a systemic approach occurs for 2a, whose obligation to flourish his
son is simply not possible. The poor, average father of the brilliant child, furthermore, has
an obligation under Lockes view, to provide for the proper education of his son, but this is
impossible given the fathers poverty and subjective perspective in the objective world, implying
a contradiction.
The impossible duty in this case arises for at least two reasons: financial and
cognitive. The opportunity for such is there, sure; but limited or no exercise capacity exists in
2a to fulfill his obligation to provide for 2b. This occurs in at least two ways: firstly, it could be
the case that the father lacks the financial resources to provide for the necessary tutelage for his
sons comprehensive educational needs; secondly, moreover, his intellectual power might
render him unable to identify even (a) his childs innate greatness and (b) what might be best for
a child with such potential. If there is no exercise capacity or ones exercise capacity is thusly
limited, one cannot do something. If no exercise to provide for ones childs educational needs
(due to a lack of cognitive discernment and/or money) exists in a system in which this provision
is a duty, then we have a situation in which A is both necessary and not possible. This
implies a contradiction because not possibly may be manipulated to read necessarily not.
A thing cannot be simultaneously necessarily the case and necessarily not the case. This belief
too must be disregarded.

31
 I do not mean to say that all smart people should have more money than all stupid people,
though this is how it might have come across hitherto; it is more a matter of to each
according to their merit and need rather than a (more often than not) irrational urge so
that they might actualize fully. A smart person of a creative type, will need education, materials
for their craft, inspirational experiences to maximize their efficaciousness in their craft, etc. (in
addition to any essentially human needs) so that they can actualize, whereas the average man or
doofus might only need a nice bed, food, water, a job, a muse, activity, vacation time, etc. People
are different and so deserve and require different things as a function of who they are.
Furthermore, people are relatively equal and so a floor and ceiling should be in place. If there is a
finite ammount of capital and a, given the march of time, infinitely many people, some
intervention is necessary. Though, we must remember, what one has is what one is on Lockes
understanding. This negative perspective on man is injuriously flawed for it fails to take into
account what man really is (as we have determined in our talks of equality). A mechanism by
which each is given a provision by which they might most likely flourish would be preferable.
B. The State of War
The State of War, it was above said, is merely a rhetorical device by which Locke
attempts to galvanize his system.Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state
of nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and
is not, a common judge.99 Locke tells us that the state of nature and the state of war...are
as...distant as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of
enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another.100 Whereas the state of
nature, entails men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth,
with authority to judge between them, the state of war is characterized by force, or a declared
design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to
appeal to for relief and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against
an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject.101
The SOW, according to Locke, is a state of enmity and destruction102 and it is by
declaring a sedate settled design upon another man's life, [that] puts him in a state of war with
him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's
power to be taken away by him...103 For, on Lockes view, it is perfectly just...[that]...I should
have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction:104 this is because the
fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible [and] when all cannot
be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred.105 Further, given that the innocent is
preferred, what of the perpetrator?
Locke says that one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an
enmity to his being...because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason...106
Put a little more clearly, they have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be
treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him
99 Sec. 19
100 Sec. 19
101 Sec. 19
102 Sec. 16
103 Sec. 16
104 Sec. 16
105 Sec.16
106 Sec 19

32
whenever he falls into their power. The reason Locke finds this so problematic is because he
holds that
To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an
enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who
makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me.107
Locke take this reasoning along a fallacious detour down a very slippery slope when he claims:
He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must
necessarily be supposed to have a foundation of all the rest; as he that in the state of society, would take
away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take
away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.108
Property is given an equal weight as the human life we re-realize when he concludes:
Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill,
when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my
preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no
reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the
aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case
where the mischief may be irreparable.109
1. Legitimacy
What I want to argue is that the state of war is conceptually prior to the state of nature
and that the reason Locke creates this state of war is merely as a definitional means of
separating this sort of illegitimate state (in terms of the Deontic ethical prescription we find
in his natural law) from both a legitimate state-by-compact and the natural state, i.e. one
in accord with Gods law of nature. The notion of a state-by-compact will soon be elucidated
(Sec.V.1), but for now, let us consider the distinction that Locke has made between the SOW and
SON and determine whether this distinction is legitimate or merely a questionably employed
rhetorical instrument.
State of nature theories, we will remember, are a philosophical method by which
the political theorist begins with an imagined non-political situation and shows how and why a
political situation might arise out of it. However, Lockes state of nature is not an original
position. Lockes original position is rather the state of war. The state of nature is merely
Lockes ethical prescription to the SOW, as commanded by God for the benefit of the
human species. As Arendt put it in a posthumous publication from the last years of her life
entitled Punishment and Responsibility: When Kant [just as Locke] spoke of the moral
law, he used the word in accordance with political usage in which the law of the land is
considered obligatory for all inhabitants in the sense that they have to obey it. This she says, has
a not so coincidental overlap with the fact that God can only address man in the form of
command, i.e. Thou Shalt! Laws of nature, just as civil laws are obligatory and so a distinction
can be made on Lockes view. However, as Arendt rightly states: I follow a law of nature when I
die, but it cannot be said, except metaphorically, that I obey it and so the parallel between the
two sorts of laws does not hold.110 No more on this can be said unless our discussion becomes
entirely political, so let us examine the implications of such a view and transition into the
political realm.
2. Implications

107 Sec. 17
108 Sec. 17
109 Sec. 19
110 This discussion will be continued in the next section.

33
 The primary implication of such a holding is, put colloquially, we do not call a
spade a spade. On Lockes view, any state of affairs that is not (a) in accord with Gods
command or (b) a state by compact is properly the state of war. The reason for this is that it
violates Lockes natural rights of life liberty and property, all three of which will be
discussed in the next section. However, back to our point, simply because the Roman state did
not arise via compact but rather conquest, does not negate the fact that Rome was a proper state,
with a proper system of law, and a proper culture. By saying that Rome (or, indeed, any non-
consensual state) is but a state of war is a philosophically purposive move warranted only
by the self-evident (if we but consult reason) Supremely Perfect Law ordained by Lockes
Supremely Perfect Being. This brings us to the crossroads of ethics and political: law itself.
Lockes natural law and his Deontic position argue: an unjust law is no law as at all.
This line of thought originates in Augustine and Cicero and merely convolutes an already
complicated matter by fusing the legal realm with the moral. If they were the same thing, we
would call them by the same name. This presupposes that an unjust law violates justice,
understood by Augustine, Aquinas, and Locke as promulgated by the divine positive law
found in the ten commandments. I have already yielded on the unprovable God issue and so will
not attempt to reduce this claim to absurdity; however, let us merely consider such a position:
strongly suspect.
I argue that an unjust law is an unjust law and to call it not a law is to mince words and
to not call spades precisely what they are: spades. Whereas an ethical criterion is necessary for
law to be law on Lockes view, this simply is not so. The ethicalness of a law does not
determine the lawness of that law, its being law determines its lawness. So far in my studies,
I think that H.L.A. Harts definition is strongest, though I have no desire to defend it from others
such as Dworkin presently. Hart claims, in The Concept of Law is that all that is needed for a
system of law to exist in a society is for there to be primary and secondary rules in place;
primary rules, according to Hart, resemble orders backed by threats...[but]...differs from such
orders in the important respect that [they] commonly appl[y] to those who enact [them] and not
merely to others. 111 By secondary rule, or rule of recognition, Hart means those rules
conferring legal powers to adjudicate or legislate (public powers) or to create or vary legal
relations (private powers) which cannot, without absurdity, be construed as orders backed by
threats.112 No ethical constraint is a player in this equation.
If we drop the deontic line due to the illegitimacy of the position that unjust law is not
law, then what are we to consider law? So long as there are clear orders for the citizens of a
state and a rule determining what constitutes a valid primary rule, we have a legal system and
law. Any claims of moral turpitude are ethical or moral rather than legal claims. When
determining the whether or not concerning a states stateness, or laws lawness, we must
only ask: is this thing x? rather than: does this satisfy what I want it to satisfy? If there are
both types of rules in a given geography, then there is state; if those rules are ethically
problematic, then this is an ethically problematic state, but a state nonetheless. Our moral end-
goal cannot turn a u into an x. We do not have a horrible state, an ethical state, and a
political state; we merely have the theoretical original position, which might look
different from instance to instance and the state proper, and its many manifestations which can
look different as well. We must call spades spades, for otherwise, our logic runs into

111 Hart, Concept of Law, Oxford, 1997, pp. 79

112 ibid. 79

34
contradictions: unjustifiably claiming that A=B, when the truth of the matter is that A=A and
B=B (maybe). Anyway, let us move on to the purely political aspect of Lockes theory.
V. Political Theory
In discussing Lockes Political conception, I would like to begin with a global discussion:
an extension of the groundwork set for this inquiry; then, extend the more local issues addressed
in this works body. Again, our critical scrutiny seeks answers to the concerns of: (a) the
legitimacy and (b) the implications of adopting such statecraft-logic rules.
A. Global Considerations
The approach in this section will be as follows: first, we will examine precisely what
the state is, according to Locke; secondly, we will ascertain Lockes purpose of the
state. This will be done with reference to the discussion hitherto and Lockes arguments will be
scrutinized accordingly. Due to the definitional structure of Lockes system,113 the only
legitimate state, on Lockes view, is one entered into via compact from the SON (not the
SOW), a life and human law obliged to and rooted in natural law. Such a distinction is
unwarranted we will remember. Anyway, let us examine how the state comes to be according to
Locke.
1. How the State Comes to be
Locke mistakenly defines the states genesis by tracing the population increasing
movement from family to families to state, i.e. from conjugal to civic society, which brings
with it more problems as well. The first society, Locke tells us, was between man [Adam] and
wife [Eve], which gave beginning to that between parents [Adam and Eve] and children [Cain
and Abel]; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added. However, says
Locke, these, taken together, came short of political society and was but a conjugal
society. Conjugal society, as understood by Locke, is made by a voluntary compact
between man and woman that entails right in one anothers bodies as is necessary to its chief
end, procreation. Locke adds that conjugal society also draws with it mutual support and
assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary...to unite their care and affection...
[and]...to their common offspring, who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them, till
they are able to provide for themselves.114
Locke posits this right because he holds that the end of conjunction between
male and female being not barely procreation, but continuation of the species and so
ought to last...so long as is necessary to nourish the young ones...till they are able to provide
for themselves.115 To be more precise, this rule of the infinitely wise Maker tasks the
parents with the provision of not only food and shelter, but also education and inheritance116
But, what of masters and servants? Master and servant relations are as old as
history,117 according to Locke. The two names, obviously, refer to those of far different
conditions. The master has a temporary power over... the servant, which is the product of
a free man...selling [a master]...the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to

113 If we consider the model of what is presented in the Second Treatise, Lockes state becomes merely a
logical derivative of prior definitions (and the interplay there of) provided in his argument, viz., natural
law+derivatives, state of nature, state of war, and his psychological conception.
114 Sec. 77-78.
115 Sec. 79. (emphasis added).
116 Sec. 81
117 Sec. 85 might it be said that this contradicts the law of equality also?

35
receive that is often life-engrossing, though no greater than what is contained in the
contract between them.118
Locke tidily connects all these in the delightful image of a master of a family with
all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves united under the
domestic rule of a family.119 Naturally, there are many families and the rule of one (due,
perhaps, to self interest) may conflict with another. As a reason indicated necessity (rather
than as necessarily natural as a human outgrowth), the state (civil society) arises via
compact of families and comes to be umpire by settled standing rules120 established by the set
of families. The justification for such a move from coexistent conjugal societies to civil
society on part of the set of families (i.e. the justification of the state itself), according
to Locke, lies in the inability of the sets members to effectively and objectively preserve their
private property from the claim of other members. Unfortunately for Locke, his general
political genesis conception runs into several problems of such a magnitude that his argument
cannot possibly survive.
He illegitimately defines law and the state in a negative sense, thereby looking beyond
what is for what he wants it what is to be. While there are numerous problems contained within
the above passages of the Second Treatise , only the global problem of consent as
means by which civic society, i.e. the state, is (legitimately) entered into will be
discussed here. On Lockes view, a state, properly speaking, can only be entered into via
consent from the SON. The reason for this, we will remember from our discussion of the SOW,
is that any state entered into by any other means is not civic society (how we describe the
society of a state), but merely another manifestation of the SOW. Such a distinction continues the
ought in Lockes definitions and descriptions: under Locke, explanation seems interestingly
normative. Simply because Rome was not founded on a consensual basis from the state of
nature does not make Rome any less a state in the explanatory sense, though it does, on
Lockes normative logic, make Rome but a SOW. Such a distinction is troubling for then we are
referring to the historical state of Rome as the state of war of Rome, though the
commonplace definition of state is undermined. On a critical approach, a states lack of
legitimacy does not make a state not a state; rather it, at best, makes the state lack moral
turpitude. A claim as strong as Lockes cannot be supported.
Furthermore, while his logic is too strong in terms of definition, it is not strong enough in
terms of the essential state. Can we justify the Lockean thesis of it would be more
convenient to enter into the state than the individuated familial situation, so
let us enter into the state? Is the state not more natural than this? Is it not the case
that some sort of state with some sort of system of law will necessarily arise
(the necessity being derived from the human social universal) in any human group? Is not the
family but a more local example of the global concepts: state, system of law? In light of
this alone, we are not justified in viewing the state in such a fashion, i.e.
arising on a consensual basis and rational basis: rather, we find, the state arises on a natural
basis, more primal level: because we are human (a species not universally rational). By looking
at the state proper as an outgrowth of a consensual process, we commit two statecraft logic
118 Might it be said that a servant has no say in the matter? Perhaps, as is ususally nearly universally the case,
this person in servitude was forced by personal or environmental factors: lacks of exercise for instance, and was
driven and determined into servitude.
119 Sec. 86
120 Sec. 87 AAFQ

36
sins: 1. we equivocally use the word state, conflating definitions, etc.; 2. we fail to incorporate
the fact that the state, whatever form it might take, is a necessary natural outgrowth
of humanity on a more fundamental basis than consensual. Further, because
Locke uses a negative reckoning of law, he fails to capture precisely what law is. This trend is an
extended thread throughout this work and will smoothly serve as our transition to justice, on
Lockes view.
2. Justice
The state, according to Locke, is merely a convenient apparatus by which men achieve
Lockes understanding of the highest good of the state: Justice (as a protection of my
property from your claims). According to Locke, the great end of men's entering into
society..[is]..the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and
means of that [are] the laws established in that society.121As put by Edward Younkins,
According to Locke, justice is inconceivable without personal propertywhere there is no property, there
is no justice. The essence of Lockean justice is the security of each persons personal possessions as a right
based on the law of nature.122
This, however, contradicts what has previously been said and (hopefully) agreed upon, and so
cannot be maintained. Rather than hold such an ascetic definition of justice (one which
minimizes and rejects that which is properly human), we are more inclined to hold, in light of
what has been hitherto argued, a conception more in line with neo-eudaimonia, a positive rather
than negative reckoning.
What, however, would be the implications of holding such a concept of justice? If the
government is primarily concerned with property rights derived from natural law, what place
does providing compatibility of actualization schemes fall? If a different concept of
justice than that which can be philosophically defended is used, unless the former contains the
latter, justice will not be provided. This is largely the reason I have undertaken the task of so
meticulously challenging Locke: his system does not provide justice; it merely
protects the Divine Right of Property Owners. Having considered Lockes views, I
believe it is want to exclaim that this line of reasoning is seriously flawed in the sense that,
objectively speaking, ones moral beliefs concerning the legitimacy of the state do not
determine the fact that it is in fact a proper state with a binding system of law. In demystifying
the state, we find that the legitimacy of Lockes conception of what the state is and the
purpose thereof simply does not suffice.
B. Natural Rights from Natural Laws?
When discussing Lockes psychobiological laws of nature, I made reference to the
doubly equivocal sense in which Locke uses the term, what I call his political laws of
nature. Each of these laws grant those under their governance a corresponding right on
Lockes view. The issue here, is that right is not natural; rather, it is a consequence of
positive law. I, on the one hand believe that all law, properly speaking, is positive law
(though there are blank spots): bridges that must later be crossed; Locke, however, bases his
entire argument on a sort of divine command, natural (or supernatural) law theory derived
from an unproven and unprovable jural agency: God. God is sovereign over humanity and
any governor on Lockes view. To say this, God legislated natural laws with the binding force
and provision of right of positive law is to mince words and equivocate doubly. Such an
understanding of law, rights, and sovereignty, especially due to the content seen and yet to be

121 Sec. 134

122Younkins, Edward, Justice in a Free Society, URL=<http://www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins27.htm>

37
seen, is deeply problematic. This is no exaggeration either because of what God as sovereign
entails: Supreme Perfection; i.e. once sedimented in the minds of the people, Gods
necessarily right answers are difficult to replace: how, I see the citizen asking, could it
be the case that God had it wrong? You fool! This being said, I will present his
formulation of the three natural rights: life, liberty, property and will also examine their
derivatives: adjudicative right and retributive right.
1. Primary Natural Rights
Locke holds that, in the state of nature, we have three natural rights to life, liberty,
and property and two derivative rights to retribution and adjudication. We will
remember that Lockes natural law teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions. Additionally, in Sec. 87, Locke says that, in light of the Laws of Reason, Liberty,
and Equality, man has:
a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and
attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is
persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact,
in his opinion, requires it.
We have already called into question the foundations for such a power, which would be
an appropriate term if Lockes philosophical pillars remained intact, but to extract a right is
unwarranted unless these psychological laws are, in fact, actually some sort of Divine
positive law, which would be (as was said earlier) doubly equivocal. Though they are
invalidated, it is want to examine these natural rights. Before individuating the trio, we must
briefly look at the trio itself, for its members are lexicographically ordered, i.e. life is the
primary right, liberty the secondary, property the tertiary - property rights cannot violate life or
liberty rights, which cannot violate life rights. However, is it not the case that property (or
capital) is the cost to exercise liberty if all is put in its terms? And is it not the case that the
exercise of freedom is the very thing that makes life valuable? We will see ultimately, that these
values are driven to inversion. This is due to conflation of life and property on Lockes view. If a
loop of the form: 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3... is used and 1=3, then the series denoted as 1, 2, 3 is quite
misleading for the series is really: (1 or 3), 2, (1 or 3), 2... If the line between 1 and 3 does not
exist, then both 1 and 3 trump 2 and so we take notice of a serious systemic flaw of Lockes
system: property and life trump liberty. Anyway, let us move on to the rights themselves.
a. Life
Life is, on Lockes view, something which each human has a natural right to. While it
is nice to think in such a way, as was said earlier, this is not the case: the only reason life is
inviolable is because if one person is subject to being killed at some time without reason, then so
too is it possible for everyone at any time, creating a lack of security of expectations in the
most fundamental sense. What Locke tries to do here, is set up a Divine-command-harm-
principle of sorts, however, the threshold at which life sets the harm is far too weak. Only
physical harm, which detriments life, is here taken to account: psychological harm (due
probably to the crudeness and inaccuracy of Lockean psychology), is not accounted for. If
that which is good for any given person is self-actualization of their inner
potential and that which is just is that which accommodates such universally, then our
harm-threshold must be stronger than that which Locke is willing to grant. If human goods
are fundamentally psychological in nature, even in part, then psychological harm matters
more than Lockes threshold of harm in life can ably allow.
b. Liberty

38
 At any rate, Locke holds that the political natural law limits our liberty at the point
at which the right of life is transgressed, to whatever degree. As previously stated, this creates
a scenario in which I can do whatever I please so long as no physical harm is incurred, for
only physical harm is truly opposed to the biological reality of life. Because this harm
threshold is so high, the opportunity domain of our supernatural right of liberty extends
farther than it ought if we are to attain what we have called good and just. Furthermore, liberty
precedes property in the ordering, however, in actuality: liberty is contingent upon
property. In a capitalist system, one in which all value is in terms of capital and everything
thereby costs capital, if one does not have capital, one cannot do anything. Again, we see that
Lockes conception does not put enough weight on the exercise side of liberty, causing his
postulations to lack tenability.
c. Property
Use of property as a natural right is assuredly unjustified; however, it might also be
argued that the use of such necessarily violates Lockes second, more important,
lexicographically prior, natural right: liberty and undermines life. There is a finite amount
of property in the world at any given time. If person u acquires (as made possible by the
invention of money) half of all existent property, then the liberty of persons x, y, and z to own
property is fundamentally limited by person us extensive property holdings. Locke claims that
property cannot hold at the expense of liberty which cannot hold at the expense of life; however,
in actuality, his system leads to a reversal of this ordering. Liberty is contingent upon property;
life is only valuable if liberty is possessed. Obviously, such a view cannot be sustained: a
collapse of the three into one another occurs. However, by holding the apparent good of property
higher than the actual good of self actualization, we define our good both ascetically and
unsatisfiably: ascetically in the sense that we are defining our goods in terms of a
transcendental absolute; unsatisfiably in the sense that there is no end in property acquisition:
more, more, more is the motto.
This might seem innocent enough, but the implications are immense: firstly, we reject
that which is actually in terms of that which is absolutely; secondly, as put by Nietzsche: A
state that cannot attain its ultimate goal usually swells to an unnaturally large size. This, one
might think, is harmless enough, but consider also that the world-wide empire of the Romans is
nothing sublime compared to Athens. This is because the strength that should really go into the
flower here remains in the leaves and stem.123 The Roman goal was domination, a goal which
knows no ends, whereas the Athenian goal was self-cultivation, an attainable goal. Rather than
define ourselves in terms of property as Lockes theory would have us do, we should, i.e. it
would be good for us to, define ourselves in terms of ourselves so that we, the flowers, can
flourish. We must not allow for the Divine Right of Property Owners to
extinguish the Actual Right of Potentially Blossoming Flowers. Might we explore
further the dangers in the case of America? It would be nice, but the constraints of the task at
hand will not here allow it.
2. Derivative Natural Rights
From Lockes three primary natural rights, the two distinct rights[:]...one of
punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in
every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party...124 follow.

123 Portable Nietzsche 32 Note (1870-71) III, 384

124Second Treatise Sec. 11

39
These might be better understood as the rights of adjudication and retribution, which
now beg for a thorough examination.
a. Adjudication
Everyone, according to Locke, shares equally in the ability to judge transgression of the
laws of nature in the state of nature. I would not disagree with Locke that in the original
position people have an equal opportunity to judge cases. I find no reason why
they would not; however, not everybody in the state of nature has the ability to
exercise this opportunity. This has been made clear by my treatment of Sec. 60. Person A,
the unreasonable, cannot accurately judge a case. Only the most rational should be
deciding cases. If I want to learn, I go to a teacher (not a fool); otherwise, I am foolish and made
more foolish. Only those who are capable of objective adjudication according to previously
established criteria should be charged with the task of adjudication; for they are the ones who
are truly capable of such in an ordered, methodical manner. Alternatively, if everyone is equally
judge and not everyone exercises rationality, then we leave judgment up to chance: a
philosophically unjustifiable approach.
b. Retribution
Locke argues that
in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to
use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate,
what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: 125 for
these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call
punishment.
Locke argues this because
[i]n transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason
and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and
so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being
slighted and broken by him.
Such a trespass, says Locke, is
a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature,
every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed
that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others,
from doing the like mischief.
Put more clearly: EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER
OF THE LAW OF NATURE.126
What Locke is here arguing is not as strongly retributive as that envisaged and proposed
by such thinkers as Kant, but a weaker retributive instinct which seeks to offer counterweights to
the crimes via punishment. Because the natural law, from which the natural right of
retribution came, is an ordinance (or command) of God, who is Supremely Perfect, so too must
be that Gods law and the rights derived from such laws; the concern here is very simple: is
this retributive right legitimate? Is it possible that this balancing act of retribution can reach
equilibrium through counterweight? More precisely put: does retribution of this kind lead to the
common good and justice? Is retribution the right right or is it seriously flawed? I will argue
that even the retributive spirit attached to the concept of punishment is unwarranted, medieval,
and implies alienation and dejection of those punished (accompanied by the title and value
125 In the state of nature, one which has no law (NL does not hold): everyone in the state of nature has the negative
liberty to do whatever they want
126 Sec. 8; see sec 7 for Lockes inadequate justification.

40
judgment of evil criminal), despite its unattainable attempts to merely re-reach equilibrium. It
is undoubtedly the result of the inadequate
ontological/epistemological/phenomenological/psychological/ethical
misconceptions we have hitherto addressed. If we are free to consult reason at any
time, then it only makes sense to call us evil for breaking the Good law, for
we must be a savage who would willingly and knowingly break such a law. To
quote Nietzsche on the matter: the criminal deserves to be punished because he could have
acted otherwise.127 It is not due to right but rather to anger that I retributively punish you;
you have acted in a way that is in some way opposed to that which I deem right (i.e. wrong).
Your wrong behavior angers me and must be punished into compliance with that which
God deems right for all, viz., natural law. What, though, of the consequences of such
practices? What happens when I deem you evil for transgressing the Good?
To again cite Nietzsche, this time more locally on the notion of counterweights, Within a
community in which all regard themselves as equivalent there exist disgrace and punishment
as measures against transgressions, that is to say against disruptions of the principle of
equilibrium.128 To explain further, disgrace, as understood by Nietzsche, is a weight placed
in the scales against the encroaching individual who has procured advantages for himself through
his encroachment and through the disgrace he incurs[, the encroacher], experiences
disadvantages which abolish these earlier advantages and out weigh them. Punishment, i.e.
enforced imprisonment for acts of violence, restitution and punitive fines for theft, too, on
Nietzsches view imposes a far greater counter-weight. More precisely, the transgressor is
reminded that through his act he has excluded himself from the community
and its moral advantages: the community treats him as one who is not equivalent, as one of
the weak standing outside it.129 By punishing through retribution, even merely in a rational
attempt to return things to as they were, we fail. By claiming one guilty, rather than deficient
in proper ethical or behavioral knowledge, we institute a fitting (equally weighted (to the crime)
punishment), an additional weight of societal dejection is added, tipping the scales in the other
direction. Could it not be said that such a punishment logic is archaic and reminiscent of the
brutal state of nature (Lockes state of war)? Furthermore, because such a scheme
contradicts that which we have determined to be good (compatible human flourishing), it, too,
must fall.
Rather than retributive punishment, we are more justified in adopting an educational
model of punishment (especially since we have determined that reason is not a human
universal). If it is possible that one who breaks the law is unaware that there is such a law, it
does not make very much sense to punish him. Neither does it make sense if he was led into the
circumstance by another under false pretenses, etc. If this persons inadequate rationale led them
into an evil, it might make more sense to show them where, how, why, etc. they went wrong
rather than banish them from the realm of those who can possibly be considered good
citizens.

127 Genealogy of Morals II, 4. It is also want to express the Nietzschean view that such a retributive instinct
predates this humane understanding of it, i.e. its origin is more primeval. Rather, its origin lies in anger: it was
out of anger over some wrong which had been suffered, directed at the perpetrator(II,4) and was merely modified
by the idea that every injury has its equivalent which can be paid in compensation(II,4).
128 Nietzsche, cf. Kauffman, Viking Portable Nietzsche, pp.
129 ibid.

41
 Take an example in the United States to contextualize how this might play out: a man
commits the non-violent felony of grand theft auto. He is captured by the police and
convicted: labeled a felon and forced to stay in prison with other felons for a predetermined
period of time such in a degree which matches his transgression. When he is released back into
society and is penniless (for he is stealing cars), jobless (and is furthermore disadvantaged in the
acquisition of employment for he must mark felon on his application) and is considered by
society to be a wicked man who has transgressed the Good Law. This human being who
committed a crime due to the circumstances in which he was raised is forever alienated,
dejected, and put further into a position in which they must break the law.
We should instead be focused upon how we can prevent such transgressions, perhaps by
forced education or a more therapeutic and perceptive rather than judgmental approach. A
prison is forced nothingness, exposure to others who have committed crimes, and hostile
guards (for they are guarding the scum of society). This is a horrible place to forcefully put a
person who resorts to crime. Rather than this, why not place them into harsh educational
facilities with able psychologists and psychiatrists capable of addressing their needs and a habit-
forming curriculum that leads them to or back to a neoeudaimonian way of life. Would this
not be more conducive to universal human flourishing?
D. Lockes Political Dos and Donts
Legislative power, i.e. the states ability to craft and enact laws, is limited by the
following constraints according to Locke: (a) is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary
over the lives(Sec. 135), (b) cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary
decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated
standing laws, and known authorized judges: and fortunes of the people(Sec. 136), (c) cannot
take from any man any part of his property without his own consent(Sec. 138), (d) cannot
transfer the power of making laws to any other hands(Sec. 141). In light of these four limits,
which will not here be elaborated upon, Locke decides that
These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have
set to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government. First, They are to govern
by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor,
for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough. Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed
for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people. Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of
the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly
concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have
not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly,
The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any
where, but where the people have.130
To complete my destruction of Lockes place in the realm of philosophical grandeur, I will
eliminate these last four stilts on the grounds of their lack of validity and inability to provide
justice.
1. Justice as Blind
Locke holds that law should be applied equally regardless of the case or person involved,
the law should be a universal thing. While this has become the rule in modern discussion of
politics (Lockes model of democracy is the right answer after all), I am not so sure that it is
the best logic for our endeavors in the realm of statecraft. If the favourite at court
breaks a tax-law (which is also broken by the man at plough), his knowledge of the law is
greater and so it might be argued that there was a greater intentionality or wariness of the

130 Sec. 142

42
violation. In light of such, adjudication should no doubt be stricter in their ruling of his case than
that of the man at plough. Further, if it is true that different things are good for different people
at different times, how can one thing be good for all and another bad? This view is
undoubtedly derived from the earlier points of Lockes concerning equality which we have
shown to be wrong and so is unsoundl both in itself and in its derivation.
Our judgment of what is what and what should be done must take into account
the situational factors at hand rather than use an algorithm and a rule book (though these must
also be employed). If person A underpays his taxes due to harsh economic conditions so he can
pay for his familys welfare, is it right to penalize him as harshly as we would penalize person B,
the CEO of a major corporation for the same offense? In the first case, it was for survival; in the
second, it was out of selfishness. Should we even punish the former? Would it not be more
uplifting for all if we helped him out of his dire position so that he would be able to contribute
to society, which makes life as we know it possible, possibly enjoyable, and worth living? People
say: who needs a state? its only after our money after all. I earned this
money. To this dangerous group I say: why not move to a part of the world in which no state
or an unstable state exists and let me know how that experience goes. Security of expectations
cannot be provided by anarchy: anything becomes actually (as opposed to merely logically)
possible. At any time, anything might happen to anyone in the absence of the state for billions of
purposive animals will be guided solely by their respective purpose with no ground whatever.

2. Good of the People

My only problem with Locke here is that his state good, as we have shown, is the
protection of its citizens property; however, that which is actually good for people is not
property, property is just a means toward the attainment of that which produces human
flourishing. Locke sets his good too high in one sense and too low in another. His criterion is too
high in the sense that property is a rational abstraction: a concept (especially when in the form of
capital or a gold standard) that exists in the air, so to speak; it is too low in the sense that it itself
does not produce happiness necessarily it is only a means to the next means of that which we
purchase hoping that thing produces the end of neo-eudaimonia. The organizational scheme
employed by Locke is convoluted and impractical: it is furthermore unjust according to our
criteria.
By securing the property of the people rather than promoting universal and compatible
flourishing, Lockes state takes us to an unjust arrangement, probably because of the conflation
of how we act and how we ought to act according to the natural law root of his system. The
problem of a primary concern with the protection of property is that property then trumps the
well being of the people themselves. This is not surprising, though; after all: Lockes three
natural rights of man invert themselves. Property trumps liberty; liberty trumps life. Rather than
concern ourselves primarily with our bank accounts, the amount of capital we possess, it would
be more beneficial and just for us to concern ourselves with caring for both ourselves and our
fellow man. We are stuck with each other, must interact with one another and depend on one
another: no man is an island. Our statecraft valuations must reflect this and on Lockes model,
such a thing is unlikely to occur (that is, unless everyone were rational). Lockes individualist
conception and the individualist tradition one finds in those he has influenced cannot possibly
provide us the fraternity necessary for a mutually beneficial existence in the state. If one
person wins, that person necessarily won but need not necessarily help his fellow men (who
might be losing). If everyone wins, then everyone necessarily won.

43
3. Consensual Taxation
No property would be possible without the state and so the state could be said to have
more of a claim to property than the individual, it being the precondition of property ownership
itself.131 Here we again see the political reinforcement of the Divine Right of Property
Owners in that their claim to property trumps the states task of providing justice because there
can be no justice without property, etc. I believe that taxation is important, for without taxation
the state has no funding. Why should we leave it to the great proportion of individuals, the
greater part of which lack complex reasoning power, to decide the amount of taxation. Now, here
I realize that Lockes theory arose in response to a time in which monarchs might raise their
taxes at a whim: because they wanted more money and I am in no way encouraging such a
thing. What I think is justified given what has been above stated is that the specialists who can
diagnose the needs of the state and find equilibrium between the states needs and the peoples
needs. There must be checks and balances in place; however, I do not think we should rely on
the masses, I believe we should rely on the few capable and willing of guiding us on the linear
path through time toward global flourishing: justice for all. This requires a methodical
approach and not leaving things to chance. Leaving it to the masses is leaving it to chance in that
the masses can be persuaded by the elite. This is all too common in the American manifestation
of Lockes system, is it not? The advertisements, speeches, and rhetoric of our politicians do it all
the time. Such a whimsical approach to statecraft does not provide the common good, it provides
the tyranny of the easily influenced majority.
4. Non-Transference of Authority
This non-transference but by the peoples whim is troubling for the people can be
manipulated, whether by media, rhetoric, etc. If people are manipulated into transferring
authority (without the psychological room we would need to characterize such a thing in Lockes
theory), then it remains a just world. The problem with this is that if such a move, i.e. a
supposedly just, though unjust, arrangement occurs due to the lack of exercise ability in the
bulk of the citizen population, is made, then those who do have an exercise ability take
advantage of those without an exercise ability by creating alluring opportunities which purport to
provide more freedom though the achievability of such by such a means is lacking. This
coaxes the collective psyche of man at large, influencing the decision making process and
creating an illusion of choice. It is not the case that the people choose; it is the case that they, at
least to a degree, are chosen for by the powerful who desire positions of power and the powerful
by virtue of their positions.
The ber rational have the liberty to manipulate psychologically in this system (for
psychological harm is not captured by Lockes harm principle). Those with a powerful
rational faculty of mind have the exercise liberty to craft schemes for capital that strengthen
themselves by the universal standard of capital at the expense of others (in correspondence with
supply and demand). Furthermore, those in positions of power, assuming they are in those
positions by choice and purposive effort in virtue of such, wish to retain that power (regardless of

131 One might consider Hobbes famous claim that in Ch. XIII of Leviathan: Whatsoever therefore is consequent to
a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without
other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of
moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

44
the particular form that power takes; those with overwhelming internal power wish to manifest
this power (for the function power manifests as power (though the manifestation, as was
before said has many looks). These two categories of higher man both, therefore, have
incentive in this system to manipulate the whim of the people such that they gain and retain
power (especially since such psychological coercion falls below Lockes threshold of harm).
VI. Concluding Remarks
We have seen that Locke has wrongly answered every question of philosophy; he has
failed by any respectable standard. His failure is significant in that the American system herself
is founded upon this wretched Lockean soil. Seeing that Locke has been argued into the ground
from that which is most good for humans: neoeudaimonia, can it be said that Lockes
democracy, the current favorite in America, is correct? I think not. A more involved state, one
which considers the needs of its citizens equally and provides the space for all of them to
compatibly actualize, rather than merely use a universal approach, is required. If we are to
attain neo-eudaimonia, a Lockean liberal model will not suffice. Rather than this abhorrent
system in which the rational can take advantage of the irrational, a system in which the wise
guide the rest so that all can compatibly attain happiness is more in order, philosophically
speaking. Though, due to the selfish, self-saving, self-perpetuating capitalists who would much
rather chalk it up to the invisible hand and natural law, I am skeptical whether any change
is actually possible. Though, we philosophical antagonists of the Lockean American system can
rest easy, if only for a time; for we have pierced through the heart of one of both Lockean
liberalism and modern day capitalisms most important philosophical underpinnings.

Fin.

45
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47