Articles from History and Heritage Travel
in Africa
The South African Border War
2012- 02- 04 10:02:55 Peter Baxter
At t he end of 1987 and t he beginning of 1988 arguably t he largest t ank bat t le
in Af rica since WWII, and t he only one of it s kind ever t o t ake place in sub-
Saharan Af rica, was f ought . T he Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was a key
episode in what has since come t o be known as t he South Af rican Border
War. While t he Port uguese f ought t wo int ense guerrilla wars in t he region,
t hose being Angola and Mozambique, and whit e Rhodesia similarly bat t led
int ernal nat ionalist movement s t hroughout t he 1970s, none of t hese
compared in any way in t erms of size and regional impact t o t he semi-
convent ional, and at t imes f ully convent ional, war t hat Sout h Af rica f ought
against a combinat ion of local liberat ion movement s, t he int ernal f act ions of
Angola and Cuban, and t o a lesser ext ent Soviet armed f orces.
Somehow in t he myt hology of Af rican count er insurgency t he South African
Border War has t ended t o slip of f t he radar. Int ernat ional scholars of milit ary
hist ory are in t he main f ar more conversant wit h event s t hat occurred in
Rhodesia t han t hose t hat t ook place along t he arid and f eat ureless f ront ier
bet ween Angola and Namibia, t hen known as Sout h West Af rica. Here, f rom
1966 t o 1989, a generat ion of Sout h Af rican yout h held t he line in a conf lict
t hat f ew f ully underst ood, and which was f ought in t he midst of quant um
regional changes, evolving over t he course of it s t went y or more years f rom a
classic count er-insurgency campaign t o a f ully convent ional war.
>>Map
A brief background to the South African Border War
For t hose not f amiliar wit h t he wider event s of Af rican liberat ion, it might be
said in a nut shell t hat t he major European powers awoke in t he af t ermat h of
WWII wit h a recognit ion t hat t hey were ent ering int o a new world order t hat
would be governed less by t he dict um of men such as Cecil John
Rhodes{{1}}[[1]]Rhodes most widely quot ed remark in ref erence t o
imperialism was Philant hropy plus f ive percent , implying a an imperial mission
f or t he bet t erment of mankind alongside an obligat ion t o prof it [[1]] and more
in line wit h t he principals of t he Atlantic Charter, t he second and t hird principals
of which required t hat territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of
the peoples concerned and t hat all peoples had a right to self-determination. T he
t wo principal signat ories of t his document were Roosevelt and Churchill.
In act ual f act t he principal of self det erminat ion had become inescapable in
modern Af rica, bearing in mind t hat a generat ion of educat ed blacks had
ent ered t he mainst ream of polit ics, a great many of whom had been also
exposed t hrough milit ary service t o t he principals of f reedom implicit in t he
wider war ef f ort . T he dominoes began t o f all t owards t he end of t he 1950s,
wit h t he f irst major bloodlet t ing t aking place in Algeria and Kenya, and t hen a
decade lat er in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. Resist ance t o majorit y
rule t ended t o be regist ered most f orcef ully in t hose colonies occupied by
European set t lers. Rhodesia and Kenya were probably t he best examples of
t his. Sout h Af rica escaped much of t he pressure t o liberalize her polit ics by
dint of t he f act t hat she had been declared a Crown Dominion 1910, and t hen
grant ed de facto independence by t he Statute of Westminster of December
1931 t hat of f ered such t o all of t he set t led dominions.{{2}}[[2]]f our basics
levels of membership of t he Brit ish Empire exist ed. T hese were Protectorates,
Colonies, Self Governing Colonies and Dominions.[[2]]
T he Brit ish, meanwhile, handed over sovereignt y wit h very lit t le apparent
regret , t he French, on t he ot her hand, t ended t o renegot iat e revised t erms,
while t he Port uguese alone held on wit h f anat ical det erminat ion t o t heir
overseas provinces. Rhodesia was somewhat unique inasmuch as t he whit e
communit y declared a highly quixot ic unilat eral independence, and paid f or it
wit h f if t een years of brilliant but st rangulat ing civil war. Port ugal ult imat ely
relinquished Mozambique an Angola only in t he af t ermat h a peacef ul milit ary
coup in April 1974 t hat overt hrew a f ascist dict at orship in Lisbon, and
Rhodesia, of course, became Zimbabwe t hanks t o a negot iat ed set t lement
t hat ended a divisive civil war.
T his lef t Sout h Af rica alone st aring down t he massed ranks of Af rican
liberat ion, holding under her wing Sout h West Af rica (lat er Namibia), t he last
subst ant ive t errit ory, aside f rom Sout h Af rica herself , st ill under minorit y whit e
cont rol. Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola all had t heir liberat ion movement s,
each of which conf ormed t o t he somewhat ad-hoc organizat ion of a
revolut ionary movement , t ending also t o be Marxist aligned, and each
f ollowing f airly closely t he Maoist dict um of revolut ionary guerrilla war.
In t he case of Sout h Af rica t his was SWAPO, or t he South West Africa Peoples
Organization, a movement cut complet ely f rom t he clot h of Leninist /St alinist
revolut ion t hat had inbuilt int o it everyt hing t hat st ruck most cleanly at t he
heart of whit e Sout h Af rican f ear. Init ially SWAPO f ound ref uge in Zambia f rom
where incursions were launched int o t he Caprivi St rip region of Sout h West
Af rica t hat challenged Sout h Af rican law enf orcement hardly at all. Angola at
t hat t ime st ill lay under Port uguese cont rol. However, af t er t he 1974 coup in
Lisbon t he polit ical landscape changed radically. T he civilian government in
Port ugal f ell, t he symbolic value of empire def lat ed, af t er which an almost
unseemly rush t o divest t he nat ion of it s colonies gripped t he new milit ary
administ rat ion.
Sout h Af rica init ially responded t o t he Swart Gevaar, or black danger, buy
at t empt ing t hrough a policy of detente t o accommodat e black Af rica, of f ering
in exchange f or accept ance t he ballast of t he Sout h Af rican economy in a
cont inent -wide common market . At more or less t he same t ime t he Unit ed
St at es, somewhat dist ract ed by event s in Viet nam, began t o t ake not ice of a
sudden power vacuum in Af rica where t he Soviet Union and Cuba had adroit ly
begun t o sow inf luence. Sout h Af rica also t ook, some would say belat ed,
not ice of t he arrival of communism right in it s midst , not icing also t hat t he
liberat ion of Sout h West Af rica had become of t he new f ocus of t he Front Line
States, a loose af f iliat ion of newly liberat ed government s act ively conf ront ing
and seeking t o f lush out t he last corners of whit e dominat ion. T he lat est of
t hese had been Angola and Mozambique, bot h now under radical black
leadership, bot h aligned st rongly t o t he lef t and bot h manif est ly unst able.
Needless t o say SWAPO moved it s of f ensive operat ions swif t ly f rom Zambia
int o Angola where it was availed of almost 1200km of t hinly garrisoned border
wit h Sout h West Af rica. What is more t he implied might of Moscow and
Havana backed up t he ruling MPLA, which in t urn of f ered implicit support f or
SWAPO, alt ering t he complexion of Sout h Af ricas Border War almost
overnight .
Counter-insurgency in South West Africa
T he landscape of t he Namibia/Angola f ront ier varies f rom woodland savanna
bushveld t o desert hill count ry t o t rue desert , all of which on one way of
anot her, barring t he scarcit y of wat er, makes it reasonably accessible by f oot ,
helicopt er and vehicle. T he count ryside is in f act arguably bet t er suit ed t o
mechanized and air warf are t han low key guerrilla insurgency, and cert ainly in
t he early st ages of t he war SWAPO regist ered very lit t le ot her t han one
t act ical def eat af t er anot her, usually at t he hands of local and met ropolit an
police unit s aided by local t racking personnel. Operat ions t ended t o f avor t he
t racker/combat conf igurat ion t hat , incident ally, t he Rhodesians had already
mast ered t hrough t he development of such unit s as t he Selous Scouts and
t he local C Squadron SAS, among ot hers, which suit ed t he kind of low-t ech
war t hat was being f ought in t hat count ry, and t hat also underway in Sout h
West Af rica at more or less t he same t ime.
It must be remembered t hat SWAPOs primary t act ic had been no avoid set
piece engagement s wit h an enemy it could not hope t o beat in an open f ight ,
but rat her t o pursue a revolut ionary agenda among t he local populat ion,
seeding what dest ruct ion it could t hrough ambushes, land mine act ivit y and
occasional inf rast ruct ural sabot age. For t he remainder it sought always t o
st ay one st ep ahead of t he Sout h Af ricans, and f or t he most part it
succeeded. From t his emerged Koevoet, more accurat ely known as t he South
West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit, a mult iracial f orce modeled very
closely on t he Rhodesian Selous Scout s, alt hough of course remaining a police
and not an army unit .
On April 1 1974 t he Sout h Af rican Def ense Force assumed responsibly f or
border operat ions, which was not a moment t oo soon, f or in just over a
f ort night t he Port uguese Government would f all, pit ching Angola in a st eep
t raject ory t owards Marxist revolut ion and war. As observed by SWAPO leader
Sam Nujoma: Our geographical isolation was over. It was as if a locked door had
suddenly swung open. I realized instantly that the struggle was in a new phase
For us [it] meant that we could at last make direct attacks across our northern
frontier and send in our forces and weapons on a large scale.
Operation Savannah
T he f irst signif icant incursion t ook place t owards t he end of 1974 and early
1975. Port uguese decolonizat ion, once t he decision had been made, was
perf unct ory at t he very least . T his did not ramif icat e part icularly seriously on
t he power handover in Mozambique. Here t here was only one unit y movement
poised t o t ake power, and what ever it might have est ablished as t he new
polit ical blueprint of Mozambique, t he t ransit ion at least was relat ively
st raight f orward. In Angola, on t he ot her hand, t hree armed revolut ionary
organizat ions exist ed, conf igured t o a large ext ent along et hnic/regional lines,
and support ed respect ively by t he Unit ed St at es, Cuba and t he Soviet Union.
T hese were t he Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA, t he
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA, and t he National Movement for
the Total Independence of Angola , or UNITA. T he Port uguese lef t t he st age
upon t he underst anding t hat an elect ion would be held t o decide t he mat t er.
T his was t he Treaty of Alvor which ended t he long Angolan independence
st ruggle alt hough, of course, no sooner had t he agreement been signed,
t han t he long Angolan civil war began.
T he concern t hat t hese vent s generat ed in t he superpower capit als can easily
be imagined. T he Unit ed St at es, however, was somewhat slower of f t he mark
t han t he Soviet Union and Cuba in sowing inf luence in an ef f ect ive power
vacuum, t his t hanks largely t o event s st ill underway in Viet nam, and t he
ext reme reluct ance in Washingt on t o cont emplat e overt armed int ervent ion
anywhere else in t he world f or t he t ime being, and cert ainly not in Af rica.
T he Unit ed St at es, however, if not an ally, had at least a local part ner in t he
region wit h similar st rat egic int erest s as it s own t o call upon. T his was Sout h
Af rica. Wit h covert CIA assist ance, and much rhet orical American support ,
sout h Af rica moved int o Angola wit h t he int ent ion of inf luencing mat t ers on
t he ground, poising it self t o support t he pro-west UNITA and FNLA f act ions
against t he dist inct ly pro-east MPLA. Four Sout h Af rican bat t le groups began
what milit ary hist orians f rom all sides agree was a spect acular advance nort h
t owards t he capit al Luanda. T his operat ion was ult imat ely st alled by t he
combinat ion of signif icant Cuban reinf orcement of t he st at us quo and a
general re-adjust ment of t he polit ical landscape which saw t he US
wit hdrawing support and t he Organizat ion of Af rican Unit y opt ing t o t hrow it s
weight behind t he MPLA. T he sit uat ion f or Sout h Af rica, lef t carrying t he baby
as it were, was bot h embarrassing and milit ary precarious. An inevit able
wit hdrawal was ordered by Pret oria and complet ed t owards t he end of 1975.
All t hat could be said of t he mat t er was t he Sout h Af rica emerged wit h a new
key ally UNITA t o help cover t errit ory in a by now massively amplif ied
f ront ier insurgency. Overall power in Angola was assumed by t he MPLA wit h
overwhelming support f rom t he USSR, Cuba and t he Organization of African
Unity OAU.
SWAPO comes of age
Alt hough it was hardly t he t rut h of t he mat t er, Sout h Af rica was perceived,
and t he associat ed enemy propaganda drove t his f act home, t o have been
def eat ed in Angola. T his prompt ed a liberat ion hungry populat ion of Sout h
West Af rica and Sout h Af rica t o cont ribut e a great many more sons t o what
was seen as t he f inal push t owards Namibian independence. At t he same t ime
as it s ranks were t hus swelling, SWAPO was able at last t o break out of t he
easily def ensible Caprivi region and spread t he insurgency across t he lengt h
of t he Angolan/SWA border area in part icular int o t he polit ically alert and
populous Ovamboland.
T his conf ormed very much t o t he t hree phase Maoist st rat egy of guerrilla
warf are. To at t enuat e convent ional enemy f orces t o such an ext ent t hat t hey
are unable t o ef f ect ively operat e. No less import ant was t he polit icizat ion of
t he masses which in t he Af rican cont ext implied heavy doses of Marxist
aligned ideology alongside t he salut ary t ort ure and killing of select ed
individuals quit e of t en administ rat ive chief s who were st igmat ized by an
associat ion wit h t he st at e as an indicat ion of t he price t o be paid f or not
support ing t he movement .
The South African Response
Sout h Af rica was not immediat ely equipped t o t ake on a f ully f ledged
insurgency such as t his, an in t he beginning responded by f looding t he region
wit h bat t alions composed largely of young whit e conscript s who at t empt ed
by t he use of t he Kit cheneresque st rat egy of massive overland sweeps t o
drive f orward or net SWAPO concent rat ions. As many analyst s observed at
t he t ime, urban Sout h Af rican yout h were not dissimilar t o urban yout h
anywhere, and t ended t o be out of t heir dept h in t he deep bush of nort hern
SWA, while t act ically t heir command element lacked a cert ain amount of
creat ivit y, caused perhaps by inexperience. It might be wort h point ing out t hat
Sout h Af rica had scaled back it s milit ary preparedness in t he Af t ermat h of
WWII, and now, conf ront ed by an increasingly unf riendly int ernat ional
communit y, and t he onset of t he ant i-Apart heid St ruggle, it was much less
able t o replenish it s capacit y using t radit ional sources such as t he Brit ish.
Perhaps t he most import ant issue, however, was t hat t he SADF in all is
permut at ions had absolut ely no meaningf ul cont act wit h, no sympat hy f or and
no inf luence over t he local populat ion. T he bat t le f or heart s and minds, so
crucial in any armys count er-insurgency arsenal, was t heref ore lost bef ore it
was even f ought .
In due course, however, SADF began t o f ind it s f eet . A more t radit ional
count er-insurgency met hodology slowly evolved wit h perhaps t he earliest and
clearest sign of adapt ion being t he increased use of nat ive t roops as t he
bulwark of local knowledge and as t rackers in an increasingly art f ul approach
t o war. Koevoet came int o being, ref lect ing t he racially mixed make of up
Rhodesias Selous Scout s, f ollowed by 32 Bat t alion, or t he Buffalo Soldiers,
which consist ed in t he main of ex-FNLA f ight ers, 31 Bat t alion, made up of
Bushmen, 101 Bat t alion of Ovambos, 201 Bat t alion of East Caprivi and t he
et hnically mixed 911 Bat t alion. Wit h t he except ion of Koevoet, which was under
police administ rat ion, and 32 Bat t alion which remained part of t he SADF, all of
t hese became part of t he South West Africa Territorial Force SWAT F, a local
conf igurat ion t hat ult imat ely account ed f or about sevent y percent of t he
manpower engaged in t he Sout h Af rican Border War.
Towards t he end of t he 1970s t he Rhodesian Fireforce st rat egy airborne
envelopment in response t o ground coverage and pseudo operat ions
gained wide accept ance and became a key count er-insurgency st rat egy in
Sout h West Af rica. T his required int ensive ground pat rolling which in t he Sout h
Af rican case involved f oot pat rols, but also a great many APC and inf ant ry
support vehicles such as t he ubiquit ous Ratels and Caspirs. Air power in a more
convent ional sense was also rout inely applied, eit her in air raids against
st rat egic t arget s or in support of SADF ground operat ions. Nat urally
helicopt ers played a key role t hroughout , wit h t he SAAF deploying large
numbers of French Alouette IIIs, Pumas and Super Frelons.
In addit ion t o t his, heavy ext ernal operat ions against SWAPO or combined
SWAPO/FAPLA bases and set t lement s, of t en direct ly support ed by Cuban
Mig pilot s and ground t roops, were undert aken t hat again pushed t he war
t owards f ully convent ional scope, bringing, as t he 1980s progressed, SWAPO
ef f ect ively t o it s knees. T his, however, did not mean t he was was won. Far
f rom it . Not wit hst anding t he wider geo-polit ical global landscape, against
which Sout h Af rica had no def ense, as SWAPO f ell away as t he main enemy
Sout h Af rica f ound it self more deeply involved in t he Angolan civil war t hrough
t he ongoing support of it s proxy Movement UNIT A.
In t his regard t he SADF lost no single major t act ical engagement , but in doing
so, and in dest roying t he colossal amount s of enemy ordnance t hat it did, it
simply prompt ed ever more sophist icat ed and quant it at ive Soviet resupply
which exponent ially placed ult imat e vict ory f urt her and f urt her out of reach.
A negotiated solution
T he collapse of t he Soviet Union and t he removal of t he communist block as a
source of st rat egic and mat erial support f or t he enemies of Sout h Af rica
int roduced t he inevit abilit y of a negot iat ed set t lement . Mat t ers on t he ground
had reached an ef f ect ive st alemat e, and polit ically Sout h Af rica was at least
able t o say t hat it had cont ained mat t ers unt il such t ime as t he danger of a
communist t akeover of Namibia had been removed. T his was cert ainly t he
case. Pret oria reached t he conclusion f airly early on t hat t he war, such as it
was, was ult imat ely un-winnable, but at t he same t ime whit e Sout h Af rica
could hardly t olerat e a Russian/Cuban walk int o Namibia, and cert ainly it could
not accept a Marxist , one part y st at e sit uat ed on it s west ern f lank wit h t he
avowed posit ion of wiping whit e Sout h Af rica of f t he map.
In 1988 a UN Commissioner f or Namibia was appoint ed. Upon Sout h Af ricas
relinquishing cont rol of Namibia, Commissioner Bernt Carlssons role would be
t o administ er t he count ry on behalf of t he Unit ed Nat ions, t o f ormulat e a new
f ramework const it ut ion and t o organize f ree and f air elect ions based upon a
non-racial universal f ranchise.
Also in t hat year a US mediat ion t eam headed by t he highly compet ent US
Assist ant Secret ary of St at e f or Af rican Af f airs, Chest er A. Crocker, who
assembled negot iat ors f rom Angola, Cuba, and Sout h Af rica alongside
observers f rom t he Soviet Union f or a round t able session held in London.
Int ense diplomat ic maneuvering charact erized t he next seven mont hs, as t he
part ies f ormulat ed a series of agreement s t o bring peace t o t he region and
make possible t he implement at ion of Unit ed Nat ions Securit y Council
Resolut ion 435 (UNSCR 435).
At t he Ronald Reagan/Mikhail Gorbachev summit of leaders of t he Unit ed
St at es and t he Soviet Union in Moscow (29 May-1 June 1988), it was decided
t hat Cuban t roops would be wit hdrawn f rom Angola and Soviet milit ary aid
would cease at t endant on a Sout h Af rica wit hdrawal f rom Namibia. T he New
York Accords agreement s t o give ef f ect t o t hese decisions were drawn up
f or signat ure at UN headquart ers in New York in December 1988. Cuba, Sout h
Af rica, and Angola agreed t o a t ot al Cuban t roop wit hdrawal f rom Angola.
T his agreement known as t he Brazzaville Protocol also est ablished a Joint
Monit oring Commission (JMC), wit h t he Unit ed St at es and t he Soviet Union as
observers, t o oversee implement at ion of t he accords. A bilat eral agreement
bet ween Cuba and Angola was signed at UN headquart ers in New York Cit y on
22 December 1988. On t he same day, a t ripart it e agreement bet ween Angola,
Cuba and Sout h Af rica was signed whereby Sout h Af rica agreed t o hand
cont rol of Namibia t o t he Unit ed Nat ions.
