British battleship HMS Irresistible abandoned and
sinking, having been shattered by explosion of floating
mine in Dardanelles during attack on Narrows Forts,
March 18, 1915 (Royal Navy/Library of Congress)
The Gallipoli Campaign
Learning from a Mismatch of Strategic Ends
and Means
By Raymond Adams
orld War I began on July 28, and relatively inexpensive in terms of tactics in response to new, highly de-
W 1914, 1 month after the assas-
sination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austro-
blood and treasure. Almost immediately,
however, the combatants faced each other
in a long line of static defensive trenches.
structive weapons, resulting in massive
casualties. Rising calls from British po-
litical leaders, the media, and the public
Hungarian throne.1 Most Europeans The Western Front quickly became a demanded action to break the stalemate.
expected the conflict to be shortover killing ground of unprecedented violence British strategists responded by opening
by Christmas was a common refrain in human history: combined British, a new front in the east with two strategic
French, and German casualties totaled objectives: drive Turkey out of the war
2,057,621 by January 1915.2 by attacking Constantinople, and open
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Adams, USMCR, is a The character of war had changed. a route to beleaguered ally Russia.3 The
student at the National War College. Armies had not changed their battlefield decision to open a second front in the
96 Recall/The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015
east in 1915 ultimately failed to achieve military officers to plan for the seizure Flawed Assumptions
Britains strategic objectives during the of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view Underpinning the
first full year of World War I. British to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea British Strategy
leaders pursued short-term, politically of Marmara and eventually knocking The British designed their Dardanelles
expedient military objectives in Turkey Turkey out of the war.9 Representatives plan on a series of faulty assumptions.
that were both ancillary to their military of the War Office and the Admiralty Political leaders and military planners
expertise and contrary to achieving the met and concluded that an attack on the alike assumed the Turks were deficient
overall ends of winning the war by defeat- Gallipoli Peninsula was not a militarily in martial skill, grit, and determina-
ing Germany. This article examines the feasible operation.10 Director of Military tion.19 Churchill displayed unbridled
disastrous results of the attempt to open a Operations Major General Charles confidence in the ability of naval bom-
second front and the disconnect between Callwell11 presciently observed that a bardment to destroy land targets.20
Allied strategic ends and means. campaign in Gallipoli was likely to prove British war planners assumed that the
an extremely difficult operation of war.12 battle fleet would easily breach the
Genesis of the He proffered that an operation in the enemys coastal defenses, float directly
Dardanelles Decision Dardanelles would require a force of not to Constantinople, and seize the straits
With combat in France and Belgium less than 60,000, with strong siege artil- without requiring a landing force.
characterized by hopeless direct assaults lery, echeloned into Turkey in two large Kitchener assumed that, once through
on entrenched enemy positions, British waves.13 Kitchener also disagreed with the straits, with naval guns pointing
strategists began planning for a new opening a second front, but for different at Constantinople, the fleet would
direction.4 First Lord of the Admi- reasons. He was reluctant to divert troops compel Turkeys capitulation, secure
ralty Winston Churchill contemplated from the continent, which he viewed as a supply route to hard-pressed Russia,
amphibious operations in the North Sea the primary focus of effort for the British. and inspire the Balkan states to join
to increase pressure on Germany. He A dichotomy of opinion thus emerged: the Allied war effort and eventually to
proposed a joint Anglo-French amphib- the politicians advocated for a second front attack Austro-Hungary, thereby pressur-
ious assault along the Belgian coast on the Gallipoli Peninsula, while senior ing Germany.21
designed to outflank German positions military officers argued against interven- Kitchener further assumed that
on the Western Front, liberate the port tion in Turkey.14 The debate continued once news of the arrival of the British
of Zeebrugge, and prevent Germany into winter. The dynamic changed on fleet reached Constantinople, the entire
from using Zeebrugge and Ostende as January 1, 1915, when Russia formally Turkish army in Thrace would retreat,
submarine bases.5 Ultimately, the British requested a naval or military demonstra- leaving Turkey to British control.22 Sir
failed to convince the French to par- tion against the Turks to ease the pressure Edward Grey, Secretary of State for
ticipate, effectively scuttling Churchills caused by the Turkish offensive driving Foreign Affairs, argued that once the fleet
North Sea plan. through the Caucasus Mountains.15 moved through the Dardanelles, a coup
British political and military leaders British decisionmakers debated the dtat would occur in Constantinople,
next focused attention on Turkey and the Russian request and the larger issue of the whereby Turkey would abandon the
possibility of military operations to seize future strategic direction of the war effort Central Powers and join the Entente.23
the Dardanelles,6 attack Constantinople, during a series of War Council meetings in All of the foregoing assumptions proved
and open a line of communication to early January.16 The council decided that false, and their cumulative effect fore-
Russia. Secretary of the War Cabinet the British would continue to fight side ordained the Dardanelles operation to
Maurice Hankey, Chancellor of the by side with France on the Western Front, disaster.
Exchequer David Lloyd George, and and the Admiralty would, commencing in
Churchill advocated military operations February 1915, prepare operations to in- Naval Operations in
against Turkey on the Gallipoli Peninsula.7 vade and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the Dardanelles
They agreed that the Ottoman Empire Constantinople as its objective.17 British naval forces shelled the forts
was weak and that Germany [could] per- Bureaucratic maneuvering and ne- at the entrance of the Dardanelles on
haps be struck most effectively, and with gotiation were thus necessary to reach November 1, 1914, well before the
the most lasting results on the peace of the a decision to launch the operation. The formal commencement of the Gallipoli
world through her allies, and particularly next major task for senior British leaders campaign. The purpose of the attack
through Turkey.8 Thus, within weeks was designing the strategy to implement was more to punish Turkey for siding
of the outbreak of war, British attention the War Councils decisions. The final with the Triple Alliance than an attempt
turned east. plan would call for a combined force of to secure the strait. The shelling had
At the end of August 1914, Churchill six British and four French battleships, ac- a more pernicious effect, alerting the
formally requested that Secretary of companied by a substantial naval escort, Turkish defenders that a future mili-
State for War Field Marshal Herbert to push through the Dardanelles and tary operation in the Dardanelles by
Kitchener organize a group of naval and fight to Constantinople.18 the British was likely. Mustafa Kamal
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams97
force of British, Australian, New Zea-
lander, and French troops. Hamilton
faced a challenge of epic proportions.
His task was to conduct the first
opposed amphibious landing in an era
of high-powered defensive weapons that
included innovations such as the machine
gun and highly accurate artillery firing a
new generation of high explosives.30
At dawn on April 25, 1915, British,
Dominion, and Allied forces waded
ashore onto six landing beaches at Cape
Helles.31 Amphibious operations contin-
ued for 8 months, but the Allies never
gained more than a foothold on the
peninsula. The campaign to outflank the
stalemate on the Western Front ironi-
cally began to resemble the fighting in
France and Belgium, although on a much
smaller scale, with Hamilton committing
his troops against an entrenched and
forewarned foe at Gallipoli.32 Although
Australian troops charging near Turkish trench, just before evacuation at Anzac, ca. 1915 (U.S.
Kitchener and Hamilton recognized that
National Archives and Records Administration)
a central assumption about the Turks
that they were a second-rate fighting
Attaturk, overall Turkish commander at Council to delay further naval action
force that did not stand a chance against
Gallipoli, and Otto Liman von Sanders, immediately.
British armswas clearly wrong, they did
a German general and military advisor The council charted a new course
not change course.33 In fairness to British
to Turkey, focused on fortifying the and called for landing troops in a beach-
military commanders, a major reason for
Dardanelles after the British attack of hopping campaign from the Aegean to
continuing the operation was political
November 1.24 The Anglo-French naval the Sea of Marmara, eventually attacking
expediency.34 David Fromkin observes,
force attacked the Dardanelles in force Constantinople.29 However, 38 days
Constantinople and the Dardanelles,
on March 18, 1915. The battle initially would pass before British commanders
because of their world importance for
favored the attackers. Naval bombard- were able to embark, transport, and land
shipping, and eastern Thrace, because it is
ment in the days preceding the assault military forces on the peninsula. In the
in Europe, were positions that occupied a
successfully destroyed several Turkish interim, the enemy seized the initiative.
special status in the minds of British lead-
defensive positions at the entrance to Turkey deployed six divisions, some
ers.35 As Churchill further argued, the
the straits.25 By midday, the British fleet 500 German advisors, and civilian labor
line of deep water separating Asia from
neutralized most of the Turkish mines units in a hurried effort to strengthen
Europe was a line of great significance,
at the mouth of the Dardanelles, leaving Gallipolis defenses in anticipation of the
and we must make that line secure by
nine more mine belts in the approach next round of fighting.
every means within our power.36
to Constantinople.26 The Clausewitzian
Despite the perceived importance
concept of chance in war then emerged. Amphibious Landings of the region to British war aims, the
The fleet approached an undetected line on Gallipoli Allies withdrew from the peninsula on
of 20 mines, which a Turkish steamer The British did not reassess their stra-
January 9, 1916, dashing hopes of de-
had laid just 10 days earlier.27 Three tegic objective of defeating Turkey
feating Turkey and reaching the Russians.
Allied warships struck mines and sank; and opening a line of communication
British, Australian, New Zealander, and
a fourth suffered severe damage and with Russia after the failure of the naval
French casualties totaled 130,000, yet the
was unsalvageable.28 The assumption attack. In fact, the historical record
operation achieved none of the goals set
that the Turks would surrender on sight shows just the opposite: British leaders
by British political leaders.
of the British naval force was incor- redoubled their efforts, eventually com-
rect, and the prospect of a collapse of mitting nearly 500,000 Allied forces
the Ottoman Empire by means of a to the Gallipoli operation. Kitchener
Mismatch of Ends and Means
The British experience in the Darda-
naval assault alone died on March 18. appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton as
nelles is a cautionary tale that highlights
The setback caused the British War the overall commander of a combined
the flaws inherent in a strategy charac-
98 Recall/The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015
terized by improperly aligned ends and
means.37 The initial plana navy-only
effort to forcibly enter the Dardanelles,
navigate the peninsula while destroying
land-based targets with surface fires,
and force the capitulation of Constan-
tinopleis perhaps the classic example
of imbalanced ends and means in World
War I. Naval gunfire in 1915 was
generally ineffective against land-based
artillery and even static targets without
ground-based spotters.38 Although the
fleet had limited success in the opening
days of the naval operation, decisively
defeating Turkish defensive positions in
the 35-mile-long strait with naval guns
alone was not feasible. Furthermore,
ships are by definition incapable of
taking land and occupying terrain. In
fact, neither Kitchener nor Hamilton
had any sustainable plan to seize and
hold terrain in March 1915. Ottoman soldiers and guns during Gallipoli campaign (Library of Congress)
Another example of mismatched ends
an amphibious task force. As a result, resistance which led to the disturbing lack
and means occurred in the minesweeping
Hamiltons staff, what could be fitted of confidence by commanders, who felt
phase of the first attack in Gallipoli. The
aboard the Queen Elizabeth, was squir- that the men should be evacuated.44
Allied fleet applied its least capable set
reled away throughout the ship.41 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, chief
of assets, that of fishing trawlers turned
of the Prussian General Staff from 1857
minesweepers manned by civilian crews,
The commander of one of the larg- to 1887, observed, Strategy can direct
against the most difficult part of the
est, most complex amphibious assaults its efforts only toward the highest goal
campaign, that of clearing mines under
in history was thus virtually powerless that the available means make practically
fire.39 Even the amphibious landings of
to exert his will over his own forces, possible.45 British means in the Gallipoli
April 25 lacked properly balanced ends
let alone those of the enemy. Without campaign did not support British strat-
and means. A total of five British, French,
the means to command and control a egy. The imbalance between ends and
and Commonwealth divisions landed at
complex military operation, the ends means in the naval and ground campaigns
five separate beaches against entrenched
were all but unattainable.42 A lack of two in the Dardanelles doomed the overall
defenders expecting an Allied attack.40
further meansamphibious doctrine and effort to failure.
Although the number of forces in action
previous army-navy joint trainingalso
in the Dardanelles consistently grew dur-
hindered Hamiltons ability to orches- Conclusion
ing the evolution of the operation, the
trate the landings.43 The Clausewitzian The changing character of war,
fact remains that the Allies never success-
concept of friction, compounded by the embodied in the deadly intersection of
fully held a beachhead for an extended
lack of command and control, amphibi- 19th-century tactics and 20th-century
period, largely due to the lack of means,
ous doctrine, and previous army-navy weapons, created a staggering number
that is, ground forces.
training, took effect on the battlefield al- of casualties in 1914. The carnage
Another imbalance in the ends-means
most immediately. The historical record is prompted British leaders to seek a new
paradigm was evident in British com-
replete with first-hand accounts of prob- front to break the European stalemate.
mand and control. Inadequate command
lems exacerbated by weak command and Strategists looked east to open a new
and control
control. An Australian soldier succinctly theater of war. The plan to conduct
described a frustrating scene undoubtedly operations against Turkey and open a
handicapped Hamilton throughout the
unfolding for thousands of men during route to Russia suffered from flawed
campaign, but was especially evident
the Gallipoli campaign: Battalions dis- assumptions, which led first to an
during the first, crucial days of the land-
solved into separated groups of men, ill-advised, naval-only attack in the
ing. Hamilton monitored the landing
some making marvelous progress but Dardanelles. Six weeks later, this time
from aboard the Queen Elizabeth. . . .
without possibility of any support. It without the element of surprise, the
[However], the Queen Elizabeth was
was this and the strengthening Turkish Allies attacked again. The second round
not configured as a headquarters for
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams99
Warships near Gallipoli Peninsula landing 155-mm gun at Sedd-ul Bahr (Library of Congress)
featured a larger naval fleet with an most challenging of military operations, conducted exercises, and structured forces
embarked landing force of five divisions. were widely considered impossible after to overcome the problems associated with
A series of amphibious landings over the failed Gallipoli landings. The seem- successfully assaulting fortified coastal
the next 8 months, however, failed to ingly overwhelming challenges presented defensive positions. A generation after
gain anything more than a foothold for by amphibious assaultsin command Gallipoli, the Allies successfully landed
the Allies. The British lacked the means and control, amphibious operations tens of thousands of troops on beaches
to achieve the desired ends in the Dar- doctrine (or lack thereof), interservice defended by entrenched and well-
danelles, particularly in the command coordination, and maintaining a beach- equipped German and Japanese forces.
and control, doctrinal, training, and head after landingconvinced military Allied amphibious operations in North
manpower realms. The Allies ultimately and political leaders of the futility of Africa, Europe, and the Pacific were
failed in their attempt to seize the Dar- operational maneuver from the sea. instrumental in the combined effort to
danelles, force Constantinoples surren- However, as Clausewitz observed, His- defeat Nazism and Japanese imperialism.
der, and open a link with their Russian torical examples clarify everything and Another lesson to emerge from
ally. In the final analysis, a flawed strat- also provide the best kind of proof in the Gallipoli, despite failure there, was the
egy, poorly executed, did not achieve empirical sciences. This is particularly importance of the indirect approach,
Allied ends.46 true in the art of war.47 which factored heavily into British
During the interwar years, military strategy during World War II. Churchill
Coda: Lessons Learned on planners and theorists validated the favored amphibious operations against
Amphibious Assault Clausewitzian concept of the value of Germany in the North Sea in 1914 in
The Dardanelles campaign was a disaster studying history. Planners and theorists an effort to bypass the main line of resis-
for Great Britain. Amphibious assaults analyzed the reasons for the failure in tance on the Western Front. Less than
against defended beachheads, among the the Dardanelles and developed doctrine, three decades later, Churchill opposed
100 Recall/The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015
the U.S.-favored Operation Roundup, extend for 4 miles, then widen again to 3 miles. theory of war. Under this theory, when people
They continue for another 20 miles before believe they have crossed a psychological
a cross-channel attack planned for entering the Sea of Marmara. This geographic Rubicon and perceive war to be imminent, they
mid-1942. The prime minister instead information is from Victor Rudenno, Gallipoli: switch from what psychologists call a delibera-
advocated for operations in North Africa, Attack from the Sea (New Haven: Yale Univer- tive to an implemental mind-set, triggering a
Italy, and the Balkanspresumably sity Press, 2008), 27. number of psychological biases, most notably
softer targets than Adolf Hitlers Atlantic
7
Fromkin, 125. overconfidence. This theory helps explain why,
8
Ibid. even when the commanders realized their cen-
Wallbefore a cross-channel assault 9
Graham T. Clews, Churchills Dilemma: tral assumptions about Gallipoli were wrong,
against Fortress Europe. The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 British political and military leaders made no
Finally, Churchill personifies the Dardanelles Campaign (Westport, CT: Praeger, change in the overall course of the Dardanelles
greatest legacy of the Gallipoli campaign. 2010), 44. strategy. Information concerning the Rubicon
A primary architect of the Dardanelles
10
Ibid. theory of war is from Dominic D.P. Johnson
11
Charles E. Callwell was an influential and Dominic Tierney, The Rubicon Theory
disaster, he managed to salvage his
military theorist. He published a seminal work of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the
reputation and career after Gallipoli, and on counterinsurgency titled Small Wars: Their Point of No Return, International Security
emerged as one of the most effective war Principles and Practice (London: His Majestys 36, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 740.
leaders in history during World War II. Stationery Office, 1899). 35
Fromkin, 548549.
The lessons of Gallipoli, learned at great
12
Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and 36
As quoted in ibid., 549.
the Dardanelles: A Dialogue in Ends and Means 37
Carl von Clausewitz devoted a significant
cost in blood and materiel, were thus not
(New York: Macmillan, 1963), 57. amount of discussion to the importance of
in vain. JFQ 13
Ibid. properly linking ends and means in strategy. See
14
Fromkin, 127, observes, The doctrine Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed.
of the generals was to attack the enemy at his Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Notes strongest point; that of the politicians was to at- Princeton University Press, 1984), 127147,
tack at his weakest. This politicians predilec- et seq.
1
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy tion for attacking at the enemys weakest point 38
Jonathan Schroden, Strait Comparison:
forged the Triple Alliance in May 1882. France, would surface again in World War II. Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles
Britain, and Russia formed the Triple Entente
15
Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: Oxford Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz
in 1907 in an attempt to balance the growing University Press, 2011), 14. Closure Event, Center for Naval Analyses,
German threat as Berlins economy and military
16
Ibid., 16. September 2011, available at <www.history.
grew in the early 20th century. Members of the
17
As quoted in ibid. navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-
Triple Alliance were bound to defend each other
18
Martin Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth room/title-list-alphabetically/s/strait-compar-
through force of arms; Triple Entente members Century, Volume One: 19001933 (New York: ison-lessons-learned-from-1915-dardanelles-
had a moral obligation to defend each other. Avon Books, 1997), 63. campaign.html>.
A critical event occurred on August 2, 1914,
19
Hart, 22. 39
Ibid.
when the Ottoman Empire signed a secret
20
Clews, 37. 40
Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Galli-
treaty joining the Triple Alliance. See Hew
21
Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Cen- poli, 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey, Osprey
Strachan, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of tury, 363. Military Campaign Series 8 (London: Osprey,
the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University
22
Ibid. 1991), 45.
Press, 2000), 1011; U.S. Department of State,
23
Ibid. 41
Gregory A. Thiele, Why Did Gallipoli
Catalogue of Treaties: 18141918 (Washington,
24
Rudenno, 1213. Fail? Why Did Albion Succeed? A Comparative
DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 11;
25
Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Analysis of Two World War I Amphibious As-
The Road to War: The Triple Entente, BBC Complete History (New York: Henry Holt and saults, Baltic Security and Defence Review 13,
Schools, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/schools/ Company, 1994), 136. no. 2 (2011), 139.
worldwarone/hq/causes2_01.shtml>.
26
Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Cen- 42
The ends were successful penetration of
2
Statistics of the Military Effort of the British tury, 365. the Dardanelles, landing and sustaining assault
Empire during the Great War (London: His
27
Gilbert, The First World War, 136. forces on well-defended beaches, and forcing
Majestys Printing Office, 1922), 237252.
28
Clews, 275. the surrender of the capital city of an empire.
3
Russia suffered stinging losses soon after
29
Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Cen- 43
Thiele, 150.
the outbreak of hostilities, particularly in the tury, 365. 44
Peter H. Liddle, Gallipoli 1915: Pens,
Battle of Tannenberg against Germany. The
30
Hart, 171. Pencils and Cameras at War (London: Brasseys
British feared a Russian collapse and thus
31
Fromkin, 157. The historical record is Defence Publishers, Ltd., 1985), 45.
sought to relieve pressure on the tsar by attack- replete with accounts of heroism and suffering 45
Grand [German] General Staff, trans.
ing through the Dardanelles to reach Russia. on both sides. However, a detailed account of A.G. Zimmerman, Moltkes Military Works:
4
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All the fighting at the tactical level is not within the Precepts of War (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War
Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the scope of this article. College, 1935), Part II, 1.
Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York:
32
Ibid., 561. 46
Churchill lost his post as the First Lord of
Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 124.
33
The concept of sunk cost applies in the the Admiralty and Hamilton lost his command
5
Ibid. Gallipoli campaign. The theory behind the in the aftermath of Gallipoli. The conclusions
6
The Dardanelles Strait is 35 miles in sunk cost concept is that in a failing endeavor, of the Gallipoli Commission, which inquired
length. The entrance is 2.5 miles wide. It such as Gallipoli, the decisionmaker justifies into the circumstances of the failed military op-
extends for 4 miles in a northeasterly direction, continued expenditure in an effort to recoup eration, are available at <www.nationalarchives.
widens to a maximum width of 4.5 miles, and past losses. gov.uk/ pathways/firstworldwar/transcripts/
then narrows to less than a mile. The narrows
34
British decisionmaking in the Gallipoli battles/dardanelles.htm>.
campaign is a classic example of the Rubicon 47
Clausewitz, 170.
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams101
