Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO
CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE,
BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY,
RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY,
JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION
MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO
SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her
father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE,
INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to

comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,

one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has
the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and

recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices
of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall
be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
 "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist
from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget

and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section
57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise
a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b),
5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon
join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 164527

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, CJ,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
NATIONAL HOUSING VELASCO,
AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, NACHURA, and
INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., REYES, JJ.
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT
TERMINAL, INC., and Promulgated:
MR. REGHIS ROMERO II,
Respondents. August 15, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65, petitioner,
in his capacity as taxpayer, seeks:

to declare NULL AND VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) dated
March 9, 1993 between the National Housing Authority and R-II
 Builders, Inc. and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project embodied therein; the subsequent amendments to the said JVA;
and all other agreements signed and executed in relation
thereto including, but not limited to the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool
Agreement dated 26 September 1994 and the separate agreements for
Phase I and Phase II of the Projectas well as all other transactions which
emanated therefrom, for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID;

to enjoin respondentsparticularly respondent NHAfrom further

implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other agreements
related thereto, and from further deriving and/or enjoying any rights,
privileges and interest therefrom x x x; and

to compel respondents to disclose all documents and information relating

to the projectincluding, but not limited to, any subsequent agreements
with respect to the different phases of the project, the revisions over the
original plan, the additional works incurred thereon, the current financial
condition of respondent R-II Builders, Inc., and the transactions made
respecting the project.[1]

The Facts

On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order

No. (MO) 161[2] approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive
and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan (the Plan). The
Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with various government agencies, was
tasked as the lead agency to implement the Plan as formulated by the Presidential
Task Force on Waste Management created by Memorandum Circular No. 39. A
day after, on March 2, 1988, MO 161-A[3] was issued, containing the guidelines
which prescribed the functions and responsibilities of fifteen (15) various
government departments and offices tasked to implement the Plan,
namely: Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH), Department of
Health (DOH), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Department of Transportation and Communication, Department of Budget and
Management, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Philippine
Constabulary Integrated National Police, Philippine Information Agency and the
Local Government Unit (referring to the City of Manila), Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Presidential Commission for Urban Poor, National
Housing Authority (NHA), Department of Labor and Employment, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education), and Presidential
Management Staff.

Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and

develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA
resettlement/low-cost housing projects.[4] On the other hand, the DENR was tasked
to review and evaluate proposed projects under the Plan with regard to their
environmental impact, conduct regular monitoring of activities of the Plan to
ensure compliance with environmental standards and assist DOH in the conduct of
the study on hospital waste management.[5]

At the time MO 161-A was issued by President Aquino, Smokey Mountain was a
wasteland in Balut, Tondo, Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman
conditions, collecting items that may have some monetary value from the
garbage. The Smokey Mountain dumpsite is bounded on the north by the Estero
Marala, on the south by the property of the National Government, on the east by
the property of B and I Realty Co., and on the west by Radial Road 10 (R-10).

Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies of the Smokey

Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in the formulation of the
Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or
the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the
Project). The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a
habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10,
adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project.[6] Once
finalized, the Plan was submitted to President Aquino for her approval.

On July 9, 1990, the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (Republic Act No.

[RA] 6957) was enacted.[7] Its declared policy under Section 1 is [t]o recognize the
indispensable role of the private sector as the main engine for national growth and
development and provide the most appropriate favorable incentives to mobilize
private resources for the purpose. Sec. 3 authorized and empowered [a]ll
government infrastructure agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations and local government units x x x to enter into contract with any duly
pre-qualified private contractor for the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure facilities through the build-
operate-transfer or build and transfer scheme.

RA 6957 defined build-and-transfer scheme as [a] contractual arrangement

whereby the contractor undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given
infrastructure facility, and its turnover after the completion to the government
agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total
investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return thereon. The last
paragraph of Sec. 6 of the BOT Law provides that the repayment scheme in the
case of land reclamation or the building of industrial estates may consist of [t]he
grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or industrial estate built,
subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of lands.

On February 10, 1992, Joint Resolution No. 03[8] was passed by both houses
of Congress. Sec. 1 of this resolution provided, among other things, that:
 Section 1. There is hereby approved the following national infrastructure
projects for implementation under the provisions of Republic Act No.
6957 and its implementing rules and regulations:

xxxx

(d) Port infrastructure like piers, wharves, quays, storage handling, ferry
service and related facilities;

xxxx

(k) Land reclamation, dredging and other related development facilities;

(l) Industrial estates, regional industrial centers and export processing

zones including steel mills, iron-making and petrochemical complexes
and related infrastructure and utilities;

xxxx

(p) Environmental and solid waste management-related facilities such as

collection equipment, composting plants, incinerators, landfill and tidal
barriers, among others; and

(q) Development of new townsites and communities and related

facilities.

This resolution complied with and conformed to Sec. 4 of the BOT Law requiring
the approval of all national infrastructure projects by the Congress.

On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415[9] approving and

directing the implementation of the SMDRP. Secs. 3 and 4 of the Memorandum
Order stated:

Section 3. The National Housing Authority is hereby directed to

implement the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of
 the Area Across R-10 through a private sector joint venture scheme
at the least cost to the government.

Section 4. The land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is

hereby conveyed to the National Housing Authority as well as the area to
be reclaimed across R-10. (Emphasis supplied.)

In addition, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was directed to assist in the
evaluation of proposals regarding the technical feasibility of reclamation, while the
DENR was directed to (1) facilitate titling of Smokey Mountain and of the area to
be reclaimed and (2) assist in the technical evaluation of proposals regarding
environmental impact statements.[10]

In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee

(EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan, chaired by the National
Capital Region-Cabinet Officer for Regional Development (NCR-CORD) with the
heads of the NHA, City of Manila, DPWH, PEA, Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), DENR, and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as
members.[11]The NEDA subsequently became a member of the
EXECOM. Notably, in a September 2, 1994 Letter,[12] PEA General Manager
Amado Lagdameo approved the plans for the reclamation project prepared by the
NHA.

In conformity with Sec. 5 of MO 415, an inter-agency technical committee

(TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the
EXECOM [t]o assist the NHA in the evaluation of the project proposals, assist in
the resolution of all issues and problems in the project to ensure that all aspects of
the development from squatter relocation, waste management, reclamation,
environmental protection, land and house construction meet governing regulation
of the region and to facilitate the completion of the project.[13]
Subsequently, the TECHCOM put out the Public Notice and Notice to Pre-Qualify
and Bid for the right to become NHAs joint venture partner in the implementation
of the SMDRP. The notices were published in newspapers of general circulation on
January 23 and 26 and February 1, 14, 16, and 23, 1992, respectively. Out of the
thirteen (13) contractors who responded, only five (5) contractors fully complied
with the required pre-qualification documents. Based on the evaluation of the pre-
qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc.
and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) as the top two contractors.[14]

Thereafter, the TECHCOM evaluated the bids (which include the Pre-feasibility
Study and Financing Plan) of the top two (2) contractors in this manner:

(1) The DBP, as financial advisor to the Project, evaluated their Financial
Proposals;

(2) The DPWH, PPA, PEA and NHA evaluated the Technical Proposals for the
Housing Construction and Reclamation;

(3) The DENR evaluated Technical Proposals on Waste Management and Disposal
by conducting the Environmental Impact Analysis; and

(4) The NHA and the City of Manila evaluated the socio-economic benefits
presented by the proposals.

On June 30, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos assumed the Office of the President (OP) of
the Philippines.
On August 31, 1992, the TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the
EXECOM to approve the R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) proposal which garnered the
highest score of 88.475%.

Subsequently, the EXECOM made a Project briefing to President Ramos. As

a result, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39[15] on September 9, 1992,
which reads:

WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a viable

conceptual plan to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a
habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across
Road Radial 10 (R-10) adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling
component of the project;

xxxx
These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the
administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority to
develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as
its development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide
employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas
for port-related activities.

In order to facilitate the early development of the area for disposition,

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, through the
Lands and Management Bureau, is hereby directed to approve the
boundary and subdivision survey and to issue a special patent and title in
the name of the National Housing Authority, subject to final survey and
private rights, if any there be. (Emphasis supplied.)

On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint

Venture Agreement with RBI [s]ubject to final review and approval of the Joint
Venture Agreement by the Office of the President.[16]
On March 19, 1993, the NHA and RBI entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement[17] (JVA) for the development of the SmokeyMountain dumpsite and
the reclamation of the area across R-10 based on Presidential Decree No. (PD)
757[18] which mandated NHA [t]o undertake the physical and socio-economic
upgrading and development of lands of the public domain identified for housing,
MO 161-A which required NHA to conduct the feasibility studies and develop a
low-cost housing project at the Smokey Mountain, and MO 415 as amended by
MO 415-A which approved the Conceptual Plan for Smokey Mountain and
creation of the EXECOM and TECHCOM. Under the JVA, the Project involves
the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost
medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial site with the reclamation
of the area directly across [R-10] to act as the enabling component of the
Project.[19] The JVA covered a lot in Tondo, Manila with an area of two hundred
twelve thousand two hundred thirty-four (212,234) square meters and another lot
to be reclaimed also in Tondo with an area of four hundred thousand (400,000)
square meters.

The Scope of Work of RBI under Article II of the JVA is as follows:

a) To fully finance all aspects of development of Smokey Mountain and

reclamation of no more than 40 hectares of Manila Bay area across
Radial Road 10.

b) To immediately commence on the preparation of feasibility report and

detailed engineering with emphasis to the expedient acquisition of the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR.

c) The construction activities will only commence after the acquisition of

the ECC, and

d) Final details of the contract, including construction, duration and

delivery timetables, shall be based on the approved feasibility report and
detailed engineering.
Other obligations of RBI are as follows:

2.02 The [RBI] shall develop the PROJECT based on the Final Report
and Detailed Engineering as approved by the Office of the President. All
costs and expenses for hiring technical personnel, date gathering,
permits, licenses, appraisals, clearances, testing and similar undertaking
shall be for the account of the [RBI].

2.03 The [RBI] shall undertake the construction of 3,500 temporary

housing units complete with basic amenities such as plumbing, electrical
and sewerage facilities within the temporary housing project as staging
area to temporarily house the squatter families from
the Smokey Mountain while development is being undertaken. These
temporary housing units shall be turned over to the [NHA] for
disposition.

2.04 The [RBI] shall construct 3,500 medium rise low cost permanent
housing units on the leveled Smokey Mountain complete with basic
utilities and amenities, in accordance with the plans and specifications
set forth in the Final Report approved by the [NHA]. Completed units
ready for mortgage take out shall be turned over by the [RBI] to NHA on
agreed schedule.

2.05 The [RBI] shall reclaim forty (40) hectares of Manila Bay area
directly across [R-10] as contained in Proclamation No. 39 as the
enabling component of the project and payment to the [RBI] as its asset
share.

2.06 The [RBI] shall likewise furnish all labor materials and equipment
necessary to complete all herein development works to be undertaken on
a phase to phase basis in accordance with the work program stipulated
therein.

The profit sharing shall be based on the approved pre-feasibility report submitted
to the EXECOM, viz:
For the developer (RBI):
1. To own the forty (40) hectares of reclaimed land.

2. To own the commercial area at the Smokey Mountain area composed

of 1.3 hectares, and

3. To own all the constructed units of medium rise low cost permanent
housing units beyond the 3,500 units share of the [NHA].

For the NHA:

1. To own the temporary housing consisting of 3,500 units.

2. To own the cleared and fenced incinerator site consisting of 5 hectares

situated at the Smokey Mountain area.

3. To own the 3,500 units of permanent housing to be constructed by

[RBI] at the Smokey Mountain area to be awarded to qualified on site
residents.

4. To own the Industrial Area site consisting of 3.2 hectares, and

5. To own the open spaces, roads and facilities within

the Smokey Mountain area.

In the event of extraordinary increase in labor, materials, fuel and non-

recoverability of total project expenses,[20] the OP, upon recommendation of the
NHA, may approve a corresponding adjustment in the enabling component.

The functions and responsibilities of RBI and NHA are as follows:

For RBI:

4.01 Immediately commence on the preparation of the FINAL REPORT

with emphasis to the expedient acquisition, with the assistance of the
 [NHA] of Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
[DENR]. Construction shall only commence after the acquisition of the
ECC. The Environment Compliance Certificate (ECC) shall form part of
the FINAL REPORT.

The FINAL REPORT shall provide the necessary subdivision and

housing plans, detailed engineering and architectural drawings, technical
specifications and other related and required documents relative to
the Smokey Mountain area.

With respect to the 40-hectare reclamation area, the [RBI] shall have the
discretion to develop the same in a manner that it deems necessary to
recover the [RBIs] investment, subject to environmental and zoning
rules.

4.02 Finance the total project cost for land development, housing
construction and reclamation of the PROJECT.

4.03 Warrant that all developments shall be in compliance with the

requirements of the FINAL REPORT.

4.04 Provide all administrative resources for the submission of project

accomplishment reports to the [NHA] for proper evaluation and
supervision on the actual implementation.

4.05 Negotiate and secure, with the assistance of the [NHA] the grant of
rights of way to the PROJECT, from the owners of the adjacent lots for
access road, water, electrical power connections and drainage facilities.

4.06 Provide temporary field office and transportation vehicles (2 units),

one (1) complete set of computer and one (1) unit electric typewriter for
the [NHAs] field personnel to be charged to the PROJECT.

For the NHA:

4.07 The [NHA] shall be responsible for the removal and relocation of
all squatters within Smokey Mountain to the Temporary Housing
Complex or to other areas prepared as relocation areas with the
assistance of the [RBI]. The [RBI] shall be responsible in releasing the
funds allocated and committed for relocation as detailed in the FINAL
REPORT.

4.08 Assist the [RBI] and shall endorse granting of exemption fees in the
acquisition of all necessary permits, licenses, appraisals, clearances and
accreditations for the PROJECT subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations.

4.09 The [NHA] shall inspect, evaluate and monitor all works at
the Smokey Mountain and Reclamation Area while the land
development and construction of housing units are in progress to
determine whether the development and construction works are
undertaken in accordance with the FINAL REPORT. If in its judgment,
the PROJECT is not pursued in accordance with the FINAL REPORT,
the [NHA] shall require the [RBI] to undertake necessary remedial
works. All expenses, charges and penalties incurred for such remedial, if
any, shall be for the account of the [RBI].

4.10 The [NHA] shall assist the [RBI] in the complete electrification of
the PROJECT. x x x

4.11 Handle the processing and documentation of all sales transactions

related to its assets shares from the venture such as the 3,500 units of
permanent housing and the allotted industrial area of 3.2 hectares.

4.12 All advances outside of project costs made by the [RBI] to the
[NHA] shall be deducted from the proceeds due to the [NHA].

4.13 The [NHA] shall be responsible for the acquisition of the Mother
Title for the Smokey Mountain and Reclamation Area within 90 days
upon submission of Survey returns to the Land Management Sector. The
land titles to the 40-hectare reclaimed land, the 1.3 hectare commercial
area at the Smokey Mountain area and the constructed units of medium-
rise permanent housing units beyond the 3,500 units share of the [NHA]
shall be issued in the name of the [RBI] upon completion of the
project. However, the [RBI] shall have the authority to pre-sell its share
as indicated in this agreement.
The final details of the JVA, which will include the construction duration, costs,
extent of reclamation, and delivery timetables, shall be based on the FINAL
REPORT which will be contained in a Supplemental Agreement to be executed
later by the parties.

The JVA may be modified or revised by written agreement between the NHA and
RBI specifying the clauses to be revised or modified and the corresponding
amendments.

If the Project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI

or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual
expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that
stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

As a preliminary step in the project implementation, consultations and dialogues

were conducted with the settlers of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite Area. At the
same time, DENR started processing the application for the Environmental
Clearance Certificate (ECC) of the SMDRP. As a result however of the
consultative dialogues, public hearings, the report on the on-site field conditions,
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published on April 29 and May 12,
1993 as required by the Environmental Management Bureau of DENR, the
evaluation of the DENR, and the recommendations from other government
agencies, it was discovered that design changes and additional work have to be
undertaken to successfully implement the Project.[21]

Thus, on February 21, 1994, the parties entered into another agreement
denominated as the Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement [22] (ARJVA)
which delineated the different phases of the Project. Phase I of the Project involves
the construction of temporary housing units for the current residents of
the Smokey Mountain dumpsite, the clearing and leveling-off of the dumpsite, and
the construction of medium-rise low-cost housing units at the cleared and leveled
dumpsite.[23] Phase II of the Project involves the construction of an incineration
area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.[24] The enabling
component or consideration for Phase I of the Project was increased from 40
hectares of reclaimed lands across R-10 to 79 hectares.[25] The revision also
provided for the enabling component for Phase II of 119 hectares of reclaimed
lands contiguous to the 79 hectares of reclaimed lands for Phase I.[26] Furthermore,
the amended contract delineated the scope of works and the terms and conditions
of Phases I and II, thus:

The PROJECT shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.

Phase I shall involve the following:

a. the construction of 2,992 units of temporary housing for

the affected residents while clearing and development of
Smokey Mountain [are] being undertaken

b. the clearing of Smokey Mountain and the

subsequent construction of 3,520 units of medium rise housing and
the development of the industrial/commercial site within
the Smokey Mountain area

c. the reclamation and development of a 79 hectare area

directly across Radial Road 10 to serve as the enabling component
of Phase I

Phase II shall involve the following:

a. the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that

will conform to the emission standards of the DENR
 b. the reclamation and development of 119-hectare area contiguous to
that to be reclaimed under Phase I to serve as the enabling component of
Phase II.

Under the ARJVA, RBI shall construct 2,992 temporary housing units, a reduction
from 3,500 units under the JVA.[27] However, it was required to construct 3,520
medium-rise low-cost permanent housing units instead of 3,500 units under the
JVA. There was a substantial change in the design of the permanent housing units
such that a loft shall be incorporated in each unit so as to increase the living space
from 20 to 32 square meters. The additions and changes in the Original Project
Component are as follows:

ORIGINAL CHANGES/REVISIONS

1. TEMPORARY HOUSING

Wood/Plywood, ga. 31 G.I. Concrete/Steel Frame Structure

Sheet usable life of 3 years, gauge 26 G.I. roofing sheets future
12 SM floor area. use as permanent structures for factory and
warehouses mixed 17 sm & 12 sm floor area.

2. MEDIUM RISE MASS

HOUSING

Box type precast Shelter Conventional and precast component

20 square meter concrete structures, 32 square
floor area with 2.4 meter meter floor area with loft floor height;
bare type, 160 units/ (sleeping quarter) 3.6 m. floor
building. height, painted and improved
architectural faade, 80 units/
building.
3. MITIGATING MEASURES

3.1 For reclamation work Use of clean dredgefill material below

the MLLW and SM material
mixed with dredgefill above
MLLW.
 a. 100% use of Smokey
Mountain material as
dredgefill Use of Steel Sheet Piles needed
for longer depth of embedment.
b. Concrete Sheet Piles
short depth of
embedment

c. Silt removal approximately Need to remove more than 3.0

1.0 meter only meters of silt after sub-soil investigation.[28]
These material and substantial modifications served as justifications for the
increase in the share of RBI from 40 hectares to 79 hectares of reclaimed land.

Under the JVA, the specific costs of the Project were not stipulated but under the
ARJVA, the stipulated cost for Phase I was pegged at six billion six
hundred ninety-three million three hundred eighty-seven thousand
three hundred sixty-four pesos (PhP 6,693,387,364).

In his February 10, 1994 Memorandum, the Chairperson of the SMDRP

EXECOM submitted the ARJVA for approval by the OP. After review of said
agreement, the OP directed that certain terms and conditions of the ARJVA be
further clarified or amended preparatory to its approval. Pursuant to the Presidents
directive, the parties reached an agreement on the clarifications and amendments
required to be made on the ARJVA.

On August 11, 1994, the NHA and RBI executed an Amendment To the Amended
and Restated Joint Venture Agreement (AARJVA)[29] clarifying certain terms and
condition of the ARJVA, which was submitted to President Ramos for approval, to
wit:

Phase II shall involve the following:

 a. the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that will
conform to the emission standards of the DENR

b. the reclamation and development of 119-hectare area contiguous to

that to be reclaimed under Phase I to serve as the enabling component
of Phase II, the exact size and configuration of which shall be
approved by the SMDRP Committee[30]

Other substantial amendments are the following:

4. Paragraph 2.05 of Article II of the ARJVA is hereby amended to read

as follows:

2.05. The DEVELOPER shall reclaim seventy nine (79) hectares

of the Manila Bay area directly across Radial Road 10 (R-10) to
serve as payment to the DEVELOPER as its asset share for Phase
I and to develop such land into commercial area with port
facilities; provided, that the port plan shall be integrated with the
Philippine Port Authoritys North Harbor plan for the Manila Bay
area and provided further, that the final reclamation and port plan
for said reclaimed area shall be submitted for approval by the
Public Estates Authority and the Philippine Ports Authority,
respectively: provided finally, that subject to par. 2.02 above,
actual reclamation work may commence upon approval of the
final reclamation plan by the Public Estates Authority.

xxxx

9. A new paragraph to be numbered 5.05 shall be added to Article V of

the ARJVA, and shall read as follows:

5.05. In the event this Agreement is revoked, cancelled or

terminated by the AUTHORITY through no fault of the
DEVELOPER, the AUTHORITY shall compensate the
DEVELOPER for the value of the completed portions of, and
actual expenditures on the PROJECT plus a reasonable rate of
return thereon, not exceeding that stated in the Cost Estimates of
Items of Work previously approved by the SMDRP Executive
Committee and the AUTHORITY and stated in this Agreement,
as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination, on a
schedule to be agreed upon by the parties, provided that said
 completed portions of Phase I are in accordance with the approved
FINAL REPORT.

Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 dated August 31,
1994[31] increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares
to 79 hectares,[32] to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
law, and as recommended by the SMDRP Executive Committee, do
hereby authorize the increase of the area of foreshore or submerged
lands of Manila Bay to be reclaimed, as previously authorized under
Proclamation No. 39 (s. 1992) and Memorandum Order No. 415 (s.
1992), from Four Hundred Thousand (400,000) square meters, more or
less, to Seven Hundred Ninety Thousand (790,000) square meters, more
or less.

On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued

Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square
meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite.

In its September 7, 1994 letter to the EXECOM, the OP through then

Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., approved the ARJVA as amended
by the AARJVA.

On September 8, 1994, the DENR issued Special Patent 3592 pursuant to

Proclamation No. 39, conveying in favor of NHA a 401,485-square meter area.

On September 26, 1994, the NHA, RBI, Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC), now known as the Home Guaranty Corporation, and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB)[33] executed the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool
Formation Trust Agreement (Asset Pool Agreement).[34] Thereafter, a Guaranty
Contract was entered into by NHA, RBI, and HIGC.

On June 23, 1994, the Legislature passed the Clean Air Act.[35] The Act
made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the
implementation of the planned incinerator project under Phase II. Thus, the off-site
disposal of the garbage at the Smokey Mountain became necessary.[36]

The land reclamation was completed in August 1996.[37]

Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the

DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional
390,000 square meter area.

During the actual construction and implementation of Phase I of the

SMDRP, the Inter-Agency Technical Committee found and recommended to the
EXECOM on December 17, 1997 that additional works were necessary for the
completion and viability of the Project. The EXECOM approved the
recommendation and so, NHA instructed RBI to implement the change orders or
necessary works.[38]

Such necessary works comprised more than 25% of the original contract
price and as a result, the Asset Pool incurred direct and indirect costs. Based on C1
12 A of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1594, a supplemental
agreement is required for all change orders and extra work orders, the total
aggregate cost of which being more than twenty-five (25%) of the escalated
original contract price.
 The EXECOM requested an opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to determine whether a bidding was required for the change orders and/or
necessary works. The DOJ, through DOJ Opinion Nos. 119 and 155 dated August
26, 1993 and November 12, 1993, opined that a rebidding, pursuant to the
aforequoted provisions of the implementing rules (referring to PD 1594) would not
be necessary where the change orders inseparable from the original scope of the
project, in which case, a negotiation with the incumbent contractor may be
allowed.

Thus, on February 19, 1998, the EXECOM issued a resolution directing

NHA to enter into a supplemental agreement covering said necessary works.

On March 20, 1998, the NHA and RBI entered into a Supplemental
Agreement covering the aforementioned necessary works and submitted it to the
President on March 24, 1998 for approval.

Outgoing President Ramos decided to endorse the consideration of the

Supplemental Agreement to incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. On June 30,
1998, Estrada became the 13th Philippine President.

However, the approval of the Supplemental Agreement was unacted upon

for five months. As a result, the utilities and the road networks were constructed to
cover only the 79-hectare original enabling component granted under the
ARJVA. The 220-hectare extension of the 79-hectare area was no longer
technically feasible. Moreover, the financial crises and unreliable real estate
situation made it difficult to sell the remaining reclaimed lots. The devaluation of
the peso and the increase in interest cost led to the substantial increase in the cost
of reclamation.
 On August 1, 1998, the NHA granted RBIs request to suspend work on the
SMDRP due to the delay in the approval of the Supplemental Agreement, the
consequent absence of an enabling component to cover the cost of the necessary
works for the project, and the resulting inability to replenish the Asset Pool funds
partially used for the completion of the necessary works.[39]

As of August 1, 1998 when the project was suspended, RBI had already
accomplished a portion of the necessary works and change orders which resulted in
[RBI] and the Asset Pool incurring advances for direct and indirect cost which
amount can no longer be covered by the 79-hectare enabling component under the
ARJVA.[40]

Repeated demands were made by RBI in its own capacity and on behalf of
the asset pool on NHA for payment for the advances for direct and indirect costs
subject to NHA validation.

In November 1998, President Estrada issued Memorandum Order No. 33

reconstituting the SMDRP EXECOM and further directed it to review the
Supplemental Agreement and submit its recommendation on the completion of the
SMDRP.

The reconstituted EXECOM conducted a review of the project and

recommended the amendment of the March 20, 1998 Supplemental Agreement to
make it more feasible and to identify and provide new sources of funds for the
project and provide for a new enabling component to cover the payment for the
necessary works that cannot be covered by the 79-hectare enabling component
under the ARJVA.[41]
 The EXECOM passed Resolution Nos. 99-16-01 and 99-16-02[42] which
approved the modification of the Supplemental Agreement, to wit:

a) Approval of 150 hectares additional reclamation in order to make the

reclamation feasible as part of the enabling component.

b) The conveyance of the 15-hectare NHA Vitas property (actually 17

hectares based on surveys) to the SMDRP Asset Pool.

c) The inclusion in the total development cost of other

additional, necessary and indispensable infrastructure works and
the revision of the original cost stated in the Supplemental Agreement
dated March 20, 1998 from PhP 2,953,984,941.40 to PhP
2,969,134,053.13.

d) Revision in the sharing agreement between the parties.

In the March 23, 2000 OP Memorandum, the EXECOM was authorized to

proceed and complete the SMDRP subject to certain guidelines and directives.

After the parties in the case at bar had complied with the March 23, 2000
Memorandum, the NHA November 9, 2000 Resolution No. 4323 approved the
conveyance of the 17-hectare Vitas property in favor of the existing or a newly
created Asset Pool of the project to be developed into a mixed commercial-
industrial area, subject to certain conditions.

On January 20, 2001, then President Estrada was considered resigned. On

the same day, President Gloria M. Arroyo took her oath as the 14th President of
the Philippines.
 As of February 28, 2001, the estimated total project cost of the SMDRP has
reached P8.65 billion comprising of P4.78 billion in direct cost and P3.87 billion in
indirect cost,[43] subject to validation by the NHA.

On August 28, 2001, NHA issued Resolution No. 4436 to pay for the
various necessary works/change orders to SMDRP, to effect the corresponding
enabling component consisting of the conveyance of the NHAs Vitas Property and
an additional 150-hectare reclamation area and to authorize the release by NHA of
PhP 480 million as advance to the project to make the Permanent Housing
habitable, subject to reimbursement from the proceeds of the expanded enabling
component.[44]

On November 19, 2001, the Amended Supplemental Agreement (ASA) was

signed by the parties, and on February 28, 2002, the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) submitted the agreement to the OP
for approval.
In the July 20, 2002 Cabinet Meeting, HUDCC was directed to submit the
works covered by the PhP 480 million [advance to the Project] and the ASA to
public bidding.[45] On August 28, 2002, the HUDCC informed RBI of the decision
of the Cabinet.

In its September 2, 2002 letter to the HUDCC Chairman, RBI lamented the
decision of the government to bid out the remaining works under the ASA thereby
unilaterally terminating the Project with RBI and all the agreements related
thereto. RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments
and costs incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return
thereon pursuant to Section 5.05 of the ARJVA and Section 6.2 of the ASA.[46]
 Consequently, the parties negotiated the terms of the termination of the JVA
and other subsequent agreements.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA) whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other
subsequent agreements, thus:

1. TERMINATION

1.1 In compliance with the Cabinet directive dated 30 July

2002 to submit the works covered by the P480 Million
and the ASA to public bidding, the following agreements
executed by and between the NHA and the
DEVELOPER are hereby terminated, to wit:

a. Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) dated 19 March 1993

b. Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement
(ARJVA) dated 21 February 1994
c. Amendment and Restated Joint Venture Agreement
dated 11 August 1994
d. Supplemental Agreement dated 24 March 1998
e. Amended Supplemental Agreement (ASA) dated 19
November 2001.
xxxx

5. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS

5.1 Subject to the validation of the DEVELOPERs claims, the

NHA hereby agrees to initially compensate the
Developer for the abovementioned costs as follows:

a. Direct payment to DEVELOPER of the amounts

herein listed in the following manner:
a.1 P250 Million in cash from the escrow account in
accordance with Section 2 herewith;

a.2 Conveyance of a 3 hectare portion of the Vitas

Industrial area immediately after joint
 determination of the appraised value of the
said property in accordance with the procedure
herein set forth in the last paragraph of Section
5.3. For purposes of all payments to be made
through conveyance of real properties, the
parties shall secure from the NHA Board of
Directors all documents necessary and
sufficient to effect the transfer of title over the
properties to be conveyed to RBI, which
documents shall be issued within a reasonable
period.

5.2 Any unpaid balance of the DEVELOPERS claims

determined after the validation process referred to in
Section 4 hereof, may be paid in cash, bonds or through
the conveyance of properties or any combination
thereof. The manner, terms and conditions of payment of
the balance shall be specified and agreed upon later
within a period of three months from the time a
substantial amount representing the unpaid balance has
been validated pursuant hereto including, but not limited
to the programming of quarterly cash payments to be
sourced by the NHA from its budget for debt servicing,
from its income or from any other sources.

5.3 In any case the unpaid balance is agreed to be paid, either

partially or totally through conveyance of properties, the
parties shall agree on which properties shall be subject to
conveyance. The NHA and DEVELOPER hereby agree
to determine the valuation of the properties to be
conveyed by getting the average of the appraisals to be
made by two (2) mutually acceptable independent
appraisers.

Meanwhile, respondent Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI) entered into
an agreement with the asset pool for the development and operations of a port in
the Smokey Mountain Area which is a major component of SMDRP to provide a
source of livelihood and employment for Smokey Mountain residents and spur
economic growth. A Subscription Agreement was executed between the Asset Pool
and HCPTI whereby the asset pool subscribed to 607 million common shares and
1,143 million preferred shares of HCPTI. The HCPTI preferred shares had a
premium and penalty interest of 7.5% per annum and a mandatory redemption
feature. The asset pool paid the subscription by conveying to HCPTI a 10-hectare
land which it acquired from the NHA being a portion of the reclaimed land of the
SMDRP. Corresponding certificates of titles were issued to HCPTI, namely: TCT
Nos. 251355, 251356, 251357, and 251358.

Due to HCPTIs failure to obtain a license to handle foreign containerized cargo

from PPA, it suffered a net income loss of PhP 132,621,548 in 2002 and a net loss
of PhP 15,540,063 in 2003. The Project Governing Board of the Asset Pool later
conveyed by way of dacion en pago a number of HCPTI shares to RBI in lieu of
cash payment for the latters work in SMDRP.

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, filed the instant
petition which impleaded as respondents the NHA, RBI, R-II Holdings, Inc. (RHI),
HCPTI, and Mr. Reghis Romero II, raising constitutional issues.

The NHA reported that thirty-four (34) temporary housing structures and twenty-
one (21) permanent housing structures had been turned over by respondent RBI. It
claimed that 2,510 beneficiary-families belonging to the poorest of the poor had
been transferred to their permanent homes and benefited from the Project.

The Issues
The grounds presented in the instant petition are:
I

NEITHER RESPONDENT NHA NOR RESPONDENT R-II

BUILDERS MAY VALIDLY RECLAIM FORESHORE AND
SUBMERGED LAND BECAUSE:

1. RESPONDENT NHA AND R-II BUILDERS WERE

NEVER GRANTED ANY POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
RECLAIM LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS THIS POWER
IS VESTED EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE PEA.

2. EVEN ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENTS NHA AND R-

II BUILDERS WERE GIVEN THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
RECLAIM FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED LAND, THEY WERE
NEVER GIVEN THE AUTHORITY BY THE DENR TO DO SO.

II

RESPONDENT R-II BUILDERS CANNOT ACQUIRE THE

RECLAIMED FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED LAND AREAS
BECAUSE:

1. THE RECLAIMED FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED PARCELS

OF LAND ARE INALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS WHICH ARE
BEYOND THE COMMERCE OF MAN.

2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED

FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED PARCELS OF LAND
WERE ALREADY DECLARED ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, RESPONDENT R-II BUILDERS STILL
COULD NOT ACQUIRE THE SAME BECAUSE THERE WAS
NEVER ANY DECLARATION THAT THE SAID LANDS
WERE NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE.

3. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED LANDS

ARE ALIENABLE AND NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE,
RESPONDENT R-II BUILDERS STILL CANNOT ACQUIRE THE
SAME BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER ANY LAW AUTHORIZING
THE SALE THEREOF.
 4. THERE WAS NEVER ANY PUBLIC BIDDING
AWARDING OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT LAND TO
RESPONDENT R-II BUILDERS.

5. ASSUMING THAT ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID

TRANSFER OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC HAD BEEN
PERFORMED, RESPONDENT R-II BUILDERS, BEING
PRIVATE CORPORATION IS NONETHELESS
EXPRESSLYPROHIBITED BY THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION TO ACQUIRE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.

III

RESPONDENT HARBOUR, BEING A PRIVATE CORPORATION

WHOSE MAJORITY STOCKS ARE OWNED AND CONTROLLED
BY RESPONDENT ROMEROS CORPORATIONS R-II BUILDERS
AND R-II HOLDINGS IS DISQUALIFIED FROM BEING A
TRANSFEREE OF PUBLIC LAND.

IV

RESPONDENTS MUST BE COMPELLED TO DISCLOSE ALL

INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
DEVELOPMENT AND RECLAMATION PROJECT.

The Courts Ruling

Before we delve into the substantive issues raised in this petition, we will first deal
with several procedural matters raised by respondents.

Whether petitioner has the requisite locus standi to file this case

Respondents argue that petitioner Chavez has no legal standing to file the petition.
 Only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint or
petition.[47] Respondents claim that petitioner is not a proper party-in-interest as he
was unable to show that he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct and personal injury as a result of the execution and
enforcement of the assailed contracts or agreements.[48] Moreover, they assert that
not all government contracts can justify a taxpayers suit especially when no public
funds were utilized in contravention of the Constitution or a law.
We explicated in Chavez v. PCGG[49] that in cases where issues of
transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury as the requisite injury is assumed. We find our ruling in Chavez v. PEA[50] as
conclusive authority on locus standi in the case at bar since the issues raised in this
petition are averred to be in breach of the fair diffusion of the countrys natural
resources and the constitutional right of a citizen to information which have been
declared to be matters of transcendental public importance. Moreover, the
pleadings especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds have
been indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey Mountain Project
Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies.
Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the instant petition before the
court.

Whether petitioners direct recourse to this Court was proper

Respondents are one in asserting that petitioner circumvents the principle of

hierarchy of courts in his petition. Judicial hierarchy was made clear in the case
of People v. Cuaresma, thus:

There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of

the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of
 the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Courts docket.[51] x x x

The OSG claims that the jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and
mandamus is concurrent with other lower courts like the Regional Trial Courts and
the Court of Appeals. Respondent NHA argues that the instant petition is misfiled
because it does not introduce special and important reasons or exceptional and
compelling circumstances to warrant direct recourse to this Court and that the
lower courts are more equipped for factual issues since this Court is not a trier of
facts. Respondents RBI and RHI question the filing of the petition as this Court
should not be unduly burdened with repetitions, invocation of jurisdiction over
constitutional questions it had previously resolved and settled.

In the light of existing jurisprudence, we find paucity of merit in respondents

postulation.

While direct recourse to this Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we
have however ruled in Santiago v. Vasquez that such resort to us may be allowed in
certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be filed with us if
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of [this Courts] primary jurisdiction.[52]

The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and legality of the SMDRP
involving several hectares of government land and hundreds of millions of funds of
several government agencies. Moreover, serious constitutional challenges are made
on the different aspects of the Project which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos
to the distribution of natural resources in the country and the right to information
of a citizenmatters which have been considered to be of extraordinary significance
and grave consequence to the public in general. These concerns in the instant
action compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure meant to provide an
orderly dispensation of justice and consider the instant petition as a justified
deviation from an established precept.

Core factual matters undisputed

Respondents next challenge the projected review by this Court of the alleged
factual issues intertwined in the issues propounded by petitioner. They listed a
copious number of questions seemingly factual in nature which would make this
Court a trier of facts.[53]

We find the position of respondents bereft of merit.

For one, we already gave due course to the instant petition in our January 18,
2005 Resolution.[54] In said issuance, the parties were required to make clear and
concise statements of established facts upon which our decision will be based.

Secondly, we agree with petitioner that there is no necessity for us to make any
factual findings since the facts needed to decide the instant petition are well
established from the admissions of the parties in their pleadings[55] and those
derived from the documents appended to said submissions. Indeed, the core facts
which are the subject matter of the numerous issues raised in this petition are
undisputed.

Now we will tackle the issues that prop up the instant petition.

Since petitioner has cited our decision in PEA as basis for his postulations in
a number of issues, we first resolve the queryis PEA applicable to the case at bar?

A juxtaposition of the facts in the two cases constrains the Court to rule in the
negative.

The Court finds that PEA is not a binding precedent to the instant petition because
the facts in said case are substantially different from the facts and circumstances in
the case at bar, thus:

(1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken through a JVA entered into
between PEA and AMARI. The reclamation project in the instant NHA case was
undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency in consultation with PEA
and with the approval of two Philippine Presidents;

(2) In PEA, AMARI and PEA executed a JVA to develop the Freedom Islands and
reclaim submerged areas without public bidding on April 25, 1995. In the instant
NHA case, the NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the winning
bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after
compliance with the requisite public bidding.
(3) In PEA, there was no law or presidential proclamation classifying the lands to
be reclaimed as alienable and disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI case,
MO 415 of former President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of then President
Ramos, coupled with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the
reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable;

(4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before the amended JVA was executed
by PEA and AMARI. In this NHA case, the JVA and subsequent amendments
were already substantially implemented. Subsequently, the Project was terminated
through a MOA signed on August 27, 2003. Almost one year later on August 5,
2004, the Chavez petition was filed;

(5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith as it signed the amended
JVA after the Chavez petition was filed with the Court and after Senate Committee
Report No. 560 was issued finding that the subject lands are inalienable lands of
public domain. In the instant petition, RBI and other respondents are considered to
have signed the agreements in good faith as the Project was terminated even before
the Chavez petition was filed;

(6) The PEA-AMARI JVA was executed as a result of direct negotiation between
the parties and not in accordance with the BOT Law. The NHA-RBI JVA and
subsequent amendments constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law; and

(7) In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were transferred to

PEA, a government entity tasked to dispose of public lands under Executive Order
No. (EO) 525.[56] In the NHA case, the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a
government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land and therefore said
alienable lands were converted to patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA.[57]
 Thus the PEA Decision[58] cannot be considered an authority or precedent to
the instant case. The principle of stare decisis[59] has no application to the different
factual setting of the instant case.

We will now dwell on the substantive issues raised by petitioner. After a

perusal of the grounds raised in this petition, we find that most of these issues are
moored on our PEA Decision which, as earlier discussed, has no application to the
instant petition. For this reason alone, the petition can already be
rejected. Nevertheless, on the premise of the applicability of said decision to the
case at bar, we will proceed to resolve said issues.

First Issue: Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted
the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as
this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner

Petitioner contends that neither respondent NHA nor respondent RBI may validly
reclaim foreshore and submerged land because they were not given any power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power was delegated by law
to PEA.

Asserting that existing laws did not empower the NHA and RBI to reclaim lands of
public domain, the Public Estates Authority (PEA), petitioner claims, is the
primary authority for the reclamation of all foreshore and submerged lands of
public domain, and relies on PEA where this Court held:

Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA shall
be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. The
same section also states that [A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved
 by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with
any person or entity; x x x. Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD
No. 3-A and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing
agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests. Since
large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for
public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed
lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for
public service.[60]

In the Smokey Mountain Project, petitioner clarifies that the reclamation was
not done by PEA or through a contract executed by PEA with another person or
entity but by the NHA through an agreement with respondent RBI. Therefore, he
concludes that the reclamation is null and void.

Petitioners contention has no merit.

EO 525 reads:

Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily

responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the
PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract
executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation
projects of any national government agency or entity authorized
under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA
upon approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted provision points to three (3) requisites for a legal and valid
reclamation project, viz:

(1) approval by the President;

(2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and
(3) undertaken by any of the following:

a. by PEA
b. by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA
c. by the National Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to
reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA

Without doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the agency primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects.
Primarily means mainly, principally, mostly, generally. Thus, not all reclamation
projects fall under PEAs authority of supervision, integration, and
coordination. The very charter of PEA, PD 1084,[61] does not mention that PEA has
the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. EO
525 even reveals the exceptionreclamation projects by a national government
agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land. One example is EO 405
which authorized the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop
submerged areas for port related purposes. Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has the
power to reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands vested in it.

Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to reclaim land and under EO 525
is primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating reclamation
projects, such authority is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may be
granted or delegated to another government agency or entity or may even be
undertaken by the National Government itself, PEA being only an agency and a
part of the National Government.

Let us apply the legal parameters of Sec. 1, EO 525 to the reclamation phase of
SMDRP. After a scrutiny of the facts culled from the records, we find that the
project met all the three (3) requirements, thus:

1. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines; as a matter of

fact, two Philippine Presidents approved the same, namely: Presidents Aquino and
Ramos. President Aquino sanctioned the reclamation of both the SMDRP housing
and commercial-industrial sites through MO 415 (s. 1992) which approved the
SMDRP under Sec. 1 and directed NHA x x x to implement the Smokey Mountain
Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area across R-10 through a private
sector joint venture scheme at the least cost to government under Section 3.

For his part, then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39 (s. 1992) which
expressly reserved the Smokey Mountain Area and the Reclamation Area for a
housing project and related commercial/industrial development.

Moreover, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 (s. 1994) which
authorized the increase of the Reclamation Area from 40 hectares of foreshore
and submerged land of the Manila Bay to 79 hectares. It speaks of the
reclamation of 400,000 square meters, more or less, of the foreshore and
submerged lands of Manila Bay adjoining R-10 as an enabling component of the
SMDRP.

As a result of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465, Special Patent No. 3591 covering
211,975 square meters of Smokey Mountain, Special Patent No. 3592 covering
401,485 square meters of reclaimed land, and Special Patent No. 3598 covering
another 390,000 square meters of reclaimed land were issued by the DENR.

Thus, the first requirement of presidential imprimatur on the SMDRP has been
satisfied.

2. The requisite favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase was impliedly

granted by PEA. President Aquino saw to it that there was coordination of the
project with PEA by designating its general manager as member of the EXECOM
tasked to supervise the project implementation. The assignment was made in Sec. 2
of MO 415 which provides:

Section 2. An Executive Committee is hereby created to oversee the

implementation of the Plan, chaired by the NCR-CORD, with the heads
of the following agencies as members: The National Housing Authority,
the City of Manila, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Public Estates Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the
Development Bank of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

The favorable recommendation by PEA of the JVA and subsequent amendments

were incorporated as part of the recommendations of the EXECOM created under
MO 415. While there was no specific recommendation on the SMDRP emanating
solely from PEA, we find that the approbation of the Project and the land
reclamation as an essential component by the EXECOM of which PEA is a
member, and its submission of the SMDRP and the agreements on the Project to
the President for approval amply met the second requirement of EO 525.
3. The third element was also presentthe reclamation was undertaken either by
PEA or any person or entity under contract with PEA or by the National
Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject
to consultation with PEA. It cannot be disputed that the reclamation phase was not
done by PEA or any person or entity under contract with PEA. However, the
reclamation was implemented by the NHA, a national government agency whose
authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived from its
charterPD 727 and other pertinent lawsRA 7279[62] and RA 6957 as amended by
RA 7718.

While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, we find

that the NHA had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While
PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention reclamation in any of the
listed powers of the agency, we rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim
land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically, and successfully
implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has
express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent
statutes. Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a
government agency or office by express provisions of law. On the other hand,
implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the
law[63] or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling
act.[64] In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that
when a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred by necessary implication.[65] It was also explicated that when the statute
does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government
agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the
authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions.[66]
The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279,
MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A,[67] viz:

1. NHAs power to reclaim derived from PD 757 provisions:

a. Sec. 3 of PD 757 implies that reclamation may be resorted to in order to attain

the goals of NHA:

Section 3. Progress and Objectives. The Authority shall have the

following purposes and objectives:

xxxx

b) To undertake housing, development, resettlement or other

activities as would enhance the provision of housing to every
Filipino;

c) To harness and promote private participation in housing ventures

in terms of capital expenditures, land, expertise, financing and
other facilities for the sustained growth of the housing
industry. (Emphasis supplied.)

Land reclamation is an integral part of the development of resources for some of

the housing requirements of the NHA. Private participation in housing projects
may also take the form of land reclamation.

b. Sec. 5 of PD 757 serves as proof that the NHA, as successor of the Tondo
Foreshore Development Authority (TFDA), has the power to reclaim, thus:
Section 5. Dissolution of Existing Housing Agencies. The People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), the Presidential Assistant
on Housing Resettlement Agency (PAHRA), the Tondo Foreshore
Development Authority (TFDA), the Central Institute for the Training
 and Relocation of Urban Squatters (CITRUS), the Presidential
Committee for Housing and Urban Resettlement (PRECHUR), Sapang
Palay Development Committee, Inter-Agency Task Force to Undertake
the Relocation of Families in Barrio Nabacaan, Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental and all other existing government housing and resettlement
agencies, task forces and ad-hoc committees, are hereby
dissolved. Their powers and functions, balance of appropriations,
records, assets, rights, and choses in action, are transferred to,
vested in, and assumed by the Authority. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
PD 570 dated October 30, 1974 created the TFDA, which defined its
objectives, powers, and functions. Sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Objectives and Purposes. The Authority shall have the

following purposes and objectives:

a) To undertake all manner of activity, business or development projects

for the establishment of harmonious, comprehensive, integrated and
healthy living community in the Tondo Foreshoreland and its
resettlement site;

b) To undertake and promote the physical and socio-economic

amelioration of the Tondo Foreshore residents in particular and the
nation in general (Emphasis supplied.)

The powers and functions are contained in Sec. 3, to wit:

a) To develop and implement comprehensive and integrated urban renewal

programs for the Tondo Foreshore and Dagat-dagatan lagoon and/or any other
additional/alternative resettlement site and to formulate and enforce general
and specific policies for its development which shall ensure reasonable degree of
compliance with environmental standards.

b) To prescribe guidelines and standards for the reservation,

conservation and utilization of public lands covering the Tondo
Foreshore land and its resettlement sites;

c) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain infrastructure

facilities, housing complex, sites and services;
 d) To determine, regulate and supervise the establishment and operation
of housing, sites, services and commercial and industrial complexes and
any other enterprises to be constructed or established within the Tondo
Foreshore and its resettlement sites;

e) To undertake and develop, by itself or through joint ventures with

other public or private entities, all or any of the different phases of
development of the Tondo Foreshore land and its resettlement sites;

f) To acquire and own property, property-rights and interests, and

encumber or otherwise dispose of the same as it may deem appropriate
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is readily apparent that the TFDA has the explicit
power to develop public lands covering the Tondo foreshore land and any other
additional and alternative resettlement sites under letter b, Sec. 3 of PD 570. Since
the additional and/or alternative sites adjacent to Tondo foreshore land cover
foreshore and submerged areas, the reclamation of said areas is necessary in order
to convert them into a comprehensive and integrated resettlement housing project
for the slum dwellers and squatters of Tondo. Since the powers of TFDA were
assumed by the NHA, then the NHA has the power to reclaim lands in the Tondo
foreshore area which covers the 79-hectare land subject of Proclamations Nos. 39
and 465 and Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598.

c. Sec. 6 of PD 757 delineates the functions and powers of the NHA which
embrace the authority to reclaim land, thus:

Sec. 6. Powers and functions of the Authority.The Authority shall have

the following powers and functions to be exercised by the Board in
accordance with its established national human settlements plan prepared
by the Human Settlements Commission:
 (a) Develop and implement the comprehensive and integrated housing
program provided for in Section hereof;

xxxx

(c) Prescribe guidelines and standards for the reservation, conservation

and utilization of public lands identified for housing and resettlement;

xxxx

(e) Develop and undertake housing development and/or resettlement

projects through joint ventures or other arrangements with public and
private entities;
xxxx

(k) Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms and
conditions as it may deem proper and reasonable;

(l) Acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise

dispose the same as it may deem appropriate;

xxxx

(s) Perform such other acts not inconsistent with this Decree, as may
be necessary to effect the policies and objectives herein
declared.(Emphasis supplied.)

The NHAs authority to reclaim land can be inferred from the aforequoted
provisions. It can make use of public lands under letter (c) of Sec. 6 which includes
reclaimed land as site for its comprehensive and integrated housing projects under
letter (a) which can be undertaken through joint ventures with private entities
under letter (e). Taken together with letter (s) which authorizes NHA to perform
such other activities necessary to effect the policies and objectives of PD 757, it is
safe to conclude that the NHAs power to reclaim lands is a power that is implied
from the exercise of its explicit powers under Sec. 6 in order to effectively
accomplish its policies and objectives under Sec. 3 of its charter. Thus, the
reclamation of land is an indispensable component for the development and
construction of the SMDRP housing facilities.

2. NHAs implied power to reclaim land is enhanced by RA 7279.

PD 757 identifies NHAs mandate to [d]evelop and undertake housing development

and/or resettlement projects through joint ventures or other arrangements with
public and private entities.

The power of the NHA to undertake reclamation of land can be inferred from Secs.
12 and 29 of RA 7279, which provide:

Section 12. Disposition of Lands for Socialized Housing.The National

Housing Authority, with respect to lands belonging to the National
Government, and the local government units with respect to other lands
within their respective localities, shall coordinate with each other to
formulate and make available various alternative schemes for the
disposition of lands to the beneficiaries of the Program. These
schemes shall not be limited to those involving transfer of ownership in
fee simple but shall include lease, with option to purchase, usufruct or
such other variations as the local government units or the National
Housing Authority may deem most expedient in carrying out the
purposes of this Act.

xxxx

Section 29. Resettlement.With two (2) years from the effectivity of this
Act, the local government units, in coordination with the National
Housing Authority, shall implement the relocation and resettlement of
persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local government unit, in
coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall provide
relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and
 access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the
basic needs of the affected families. (Emphasis supplied.)

Lands belonging to the National Government include foreshore and submerged

lands which can be reclaimed to undertake housing development and resettlement
projects.

3. MO 415 explains the undertaking of the NHA in SMDRP:

WHEREAS, Memorandum Order No. 161-A mandated the National

Housing Authority to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost
housing projects at the dumpsites of Metro Manila;

WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a viable

Conceptual Plan to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a
habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation area across R-
10 as enabling component of the Project;

WHEREAS, the said Plan requires the coordinated and synchronized

efforts of the City of Manila and other government agencies and
instrumentalities to ensure effective and efficient implementation;

WHEREAS, the government encourages private sector initiative in the

implementation of its projects. (Emphasis supplied.)

Proceeding from these whereas clauses, it is unequivocal that reclamation of

land in the Smokey Mountain area is an essential and vital power of the NHA to
effectively implement its avowed goal of developing low-cost housing units at
the Smokey Mountaindumpsites. The interpretation made by no less than the
President of the Philippines as Chief of the Executive Branch, of which the NHA is
a part, must necessarily command respect and much weight and credit.
4. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718the BOT Lawserves as an exception to PD
1084 and EO 525.
Based on the provisions of the BOT Law and Implementing Rules and
Regulations, it is unequivocal that all government infrastructure agencies like the
NHA can undertake infrastructure or development projects using the contractual
arrangements prescribed by the law, and land reclamation is one of the projects
that can be resorted to in the BOT project implementation under the February 10,
1992 Joint Resolution No. 3 of the 8th Congress.

From the foregoing considerations, we find that the NHA has ample implied
authority to undertake reclamation projects.

Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under NHAs charter, we rule that
the authority granted to NHA, a national government agency, by the President
under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory basis for the
reclamation of lands under the SMDRP.

PD 3-A is a law issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under his martial
law powers on September 23, 1972. It provided that [t]he provisions of any law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas, underwater, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under the proper contract. It repealed, in effect, RA 1899 which
previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to municipalities and chartered
cities and revested it to the National Government.[68]Under PD 3-A, national
government can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the President. It
cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the time of the
issuance of PD 3-A on September 23, 1972. Moreover, the Executive Branch is the
only implementing arm in the government with the equipment, manpower,
expertise, and capability by the very nature of its assigned powers and functions to
undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3-A, the Executive Branch through
the President can implement reclamation of lands through any of its departments,
agencies, or offices.

Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD 1084 creating the

PEA, which was granted, among others, the power to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas by dredging, filling or other means or to acquire
reclaimed lands. The PEAs power to reclaim is not however exclusive as can be
gleaned from its charter, as the President retained his power under PD 3-A to
designate another agency to reclaim lands.

On February 14, 1979, EO 525 was issued. It granted PEA primary responsibility
for integrating, directing, and coordinating reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government although other national government agencies can be
designated by the President to reclaim lands in coordination with the PEA. Despite
the issuance of EO 525, PD 3-A remained valid and subsisting.Thus, the National
Government through the President still retained the power and control over all
reclamation projects in the country.

The power of the National Government through the President over reclamation of
areas, that is, underwater whether foreshore or inland, was made clear in EO
543[69] which took effect on June 24, 2006. Under EO 543, PEA was renamed the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) and was granted the authority to approve
reclamation projects, a power previously reposed in the President under EO
525. EO 543 reads:
 Section 1. The power of the President to approve reclamation
projects is hereby delegated to the Philippine Reclamation
Authority[formerly PEA], through its governing board, subject to
compliance with existing laws and rules and subject to the condition that
reclamation contracts to be executed with any person or entity go
through public bidding.

Section 2. Nothing in the Order shall be construed as diminishing the

Presidents authority to modify, amend or nullify PRAs action.

Section 3. All executive issuances inconsistent with this Executive Order

are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 2 of EO 543 strengthened the power of control and supervision of the

President over reclamation of lands as s/he can modify, amend, or nullify the
action of PEA (now PRA).

From the foregoing issuances, we conclude that the Presidents delegation to

NHA, a national government agency, to reclaim lands under the SMDRP, is legal
and valid, firmly anchored on PD 3-A buttressed by EO 525 notwithstanding the
absence of any specific grant of power under its charter, PD 757.

Second Issue: Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the
power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands

Petitioner Chavez puts forth the view that even if the NHA and RBI were granted
the authority to reclaim, they were not authorized to do so by the DENR.
Again, reliance is made on our ruling in PEA where it was held that the
DENRs authority is necessary in order for the government to validly reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands. In PEA, we expounded in this manner:
 As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the
State, DENR exercises supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands. DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction on
the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. Thus,
DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged
areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA
needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation
projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.

DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all

lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed
lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 and 7 of
CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7
of CA No. 141.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of

areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the
physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through
private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval
of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or
lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.[70]

Despite our finding that PEA is not a precedent to the case at bar, we find
after all that under existing laws, the NHA is still required to procure DENRs
authorization before a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of
the Philippines can be undertaken. The requirement applies to PEA, NHA, or any
other government agency or office granted with such power under the law.
 Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, we nevertheless find
petitioners position bereft of merit.

The DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey
Mountain Project for the following reasons:

1. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The President is assigned
the task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. Control, in
administrative law, means the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[71]

As such, the President can exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant
the act or decision of a subordinate with the Presidents own. The DENR is a
department in the executive branch under the President, and it is only an alter ego
of the latter.Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by
a department like the DENR and then submitted to the President for
approval. However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President
decides on the implementation of a certain project or activity and requires said
department to implement it. Such is a presidential prerogative as long as it involves
the department or office authorized by law to supervise or execute the
Project. Thus, as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work,
making DENR a member of the committee tasked to implement the project, the
required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It
cannot be disputed that the ultimate power over alienable and disposable public
lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not the DENR
Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on the Smokey Mountain when
the President has already authorized and ordered the implementation of the Project
would be a derogation of the powers of the President as the head of the executive
branch.Otherwise, any department head can defy or oppose the implementation of
a project approved by the head of the executive branch, which is patently illegal
and unconstitutional.

In Chavez v. Romulo, we stated that when a statute imposes a specific duty

on the executive department, the President may act directly or order the said
department to undertake an activity, thus:

[A]t the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies [her] power as Chief
executive departments, bureaus and offices. [She] shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds
the steering wheel that controls the course of her government. She lays
down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever
policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In
short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act
directly or merely direct the performance of a duty x x x. Such act is
well within the prerogative of her office (emphasis supplied).[72]

Moreover, the power to order the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed
first in the Philippine President. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants
authority to the President to reserve lands of public domain for settlement for any
specific purpose, thus:

Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of
the Government.(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for
settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the
lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific
 public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation.(Emphasis supplied.)

President Aquino reserved the area of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite for
settlement and issued MO 415 authorizing the implementation of the Smokey
Mountain Development Project plus the reclamation of the area across R-10. Then
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 39 covering the 21-hectare dumpsite and
the 40-hectare commercial/industrial area, and Proclamation No. 465 and MO 415
increasing the area of foreshore and submerged lands of Manila Bay to be
reclaimed from 40 to 79 hectares. Having supervision and control over the DENR,
both Presidents directly assumed and exercised the power granted by the Revised
Administrative Code to the DENR Secretary to authorize the NHA to reclaim said
lands. What can be done indirectly by the DENR can be done directly by the
President. It would be absurd if the power of the President cannot be exercised
simply because the head of a department in the executive branch has not acted
favorably on a project already approved by the President. If such arrangement is
allowed then the department head will become more powerful than the President.

2. Under Sec. 2 of MO 415, the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM
chaired by the NCR-CORD to oversee the implementation of the Project. The
EXECOM was the one which recommended approval of the project plan and the
joint venture agreements. Clearly, the DENR retained its power of supervision and
control over the laws affected by the Project since it was tasked to facilitate the
titling of the Smokey Mountain and of the area to be reclaimed, which shows that
it had tacitly given its authority to the NHA to undertake the reclamation.

3. Former DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala issued Special Patents Nos. 3591 and
3592 while then Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued Special Patent No. 3598 that
embraced the areas covered by the reclamation. These patents conveyed the lands
to be reclaimed to the NHA and granted to said agency the administration and
disposition of said lands for subdivision and disposition to qualified beneficiaries
and for development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide
employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for port related
activities. Such grant of authority to administer and dispose of lands of public
domain under the SMDRP is of course subject to the powers of the EXECOM of
SMDRP, of which the DENR is a member.

4. The issuance of ECCs by the DENR for SMDRP is but an exercise of its power
of supervision and control over the lands of public domain covered by the Project.

Based on these reasons, it is clear that the DENR, through its acts and issuances,
has ratified and confirmed the reclamation of the subject lands for the purposes laid
down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.

Third Issue: Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed

foreshore and submerged lands considered as inalienable and
outside the commerce of man

Petitioner postulates that respondent RBI cannot acquire the reclaimed foreshore
and submerged areas as these are inalienable public lands beyond the commerce of
man based on Art. 1409 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,

good customs, public order or public policy;

xxxx
 (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived.

Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are
owned by the State and they cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain. One of the States natural resources are lands of public
domain which include reclaimed lands.
Petitioner contends that for these reclaimed lands to be alienable, there must
be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable and open to disposition or concession. Absent such law or
proclamation, the reclaimed lands cannot be the enabling component or
consideration to be paid to RBI as these are beyond the commerce of man.

We are not convinced of petitioners postulation.

The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of
public domain of the State for the following reasons, viz:

First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed
lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or
concession, to wit:

(1) MO 415 issued by President Aquino, of which Sec. 4 states that [t]he land
covered by the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite is hereby conveyed to the National
Housing Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10.
The directive to transfer the lands once reclaimed to the NHA implicitly carries
with it the declaration that said lands are alienable and disposable. Otherwise, the
NHA cannot effectively use them in its housing and resettlement project.
(2) Proclamation No. 39 issued by then President Ramos by which the reclaimed
lands were conveyed to NHA for subdivision and disposition to qualified
beneficiaries and for development into a mixed land use (commercial/industrial) to
provide employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for port-
related activities. Said directive carries with it the pronouncement that said lands
have been transformed to alienable and disposable lands. Otherwise, there is no
legal way to convey it to the beneficiaries.

(3) Proclamation No. 465 likewise issued by President Ramos enlarged the
reclaimed area to 79 hectares to be developed and disposed of in the
implementation of the SMDRP. The authority put into the hands of the NHA to
dispose of the reclaimed lands tacitly sustains the conversion to alienable and
disposable lands.
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR
anchored on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President Ramos, without
doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.

Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are
explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and
disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the
authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified
beneficiaries.

The query is, when did the declaration take effect? It did so only after the special
patents covering the reclaimed areas were issued. It is only on such date that the
reclaimed lands became alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. This
is in line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified and stressed:

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a

special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an
official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President
Aquinos issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that
the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.[73](Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly
taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the
requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable and open to disposition or concession (emphasis supplied).[74]
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or disposable,
we find that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample authority for the
classification of reclaimed land in the SMDRP for the repayment scheme of the
BOT project as alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Sec. 6 of RA
6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides:

For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any

infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and transfer
arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a
share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such
as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect
to the ownership of the land. (Emphasis supplied.)
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare that the
reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project proponent have become
alienable and disposable lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this
conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the enabling
component for the Project if such classification is not deemed made?

It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA,
does not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial
lands. We ruled in PEA that alienable lands of public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked
to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands (emphasis supplied).[75] To lands reclaimed by PEA or through
a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain
alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens
but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is
tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when
it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the
other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands
under its charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-
user agency authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The
moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to
the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial
properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the
reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then
it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or
alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed
purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.

From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has
been declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands
of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.

Petitioner, however, contends that the reclaimed lands were inexistent prior to the
three (3) Presidential Acts (MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465) and
hence, the declaration that such areas are alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, citing PEA, has no legal basis.

Petitioners contention is not well-taken.

Petitioners sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 without taking into
consideration the special patents issued by the DENR demonstrates the inherent
weakness of his proposition. As was ruled in PEA cited by petitioner himself, PD
No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom islands as alienable or disposable lands of public domain. In a similar
vein, the combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be
an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain.

The reclaimed lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598,
which evidence transfer of ownership of reclaimed lands to the NHA, are official
acts of the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his power of supervision and control
over alienable and disposable public lands and his exclusive jurisdiction over the
management and disposition of all lands of public domain under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592 speaks of the transfer of
Lots 1 and 2, and RI-003901-000012-D with an area of 401,485 square meters
based on the survey and technical description approved by the Bureau of
Lands.Lastly, Special Patent No. 3598 was issued in favor of the NHA transferring
to said agency a tract of land described in Plan RL-00-000013 with an area of
390,000 square meters based on the survey and technical descriptions approved by
the Bureau of Lands.

The conduct of the survey, the preparation of the survey plan, the computation of
the technical description, and the processing and preparation of the special patent
are matters within the technical area of expertise of administrative agencies like the
DENR and the Land Management Bureau and are generally accorded not only
respect but at times even finality.[76] Preparation of special patents calls for
technical examination and a specialized review of calculations and specific details
which the courts are ill-equipped to undertake; hence, the latter defer to the
administrative agency which is trained and knowledgeable on such matters.[77]

Subsequently, the special patents in the name of the NHA were submitted to the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila for registration, and corresponding
certificates of titles over the reclaimed lots were issued based on said special
patents. The issuance of certificates of titles in NHAs name automatically converts
the reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the NHA. Otherwise, the lots
would not be of use to the NHAs housing projects or as payment to the BOT
contractor as the enabling component of the BOT contract. The laws of the land
have to be applied and interpreted depending on the changing conditions and
times. Tempora mutantur et legis mutantur in illis (time changes and laws change
with it). One such law that should be treated differently is the BOT Law (RA 6957)
which brought about a novel way of implementing government contracts by
allowing reclaimed land as part or full payment to the contractor of a government
project to satisfy the huge financial requirements of the undertaking. The NHA
holds the lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely for the
purpose of the SMDRP undertaken by authority of the BOT Law and for
disposition in accordance with said special law. The lands become alienable and
disposable lands of public domain upon issuance of the special patents and become
patrimonial properties of the Government from the time the titles are issued to the
NHA.
As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic laid down the jurisprudence
that:

It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding

certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of
the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title
issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of issuance of such patent.[78]

The doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alijaga, Sr.,[79] Heirs of
Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic,[80] and the more recent case of Doris Chiongbian-Oliva
v. Republic of the Philippines.[81] Thus, the 79-hectare reclaimed land became
patrimonial property after the issuance of certificates of titles to the NHA based on
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598.

One last point. The ruling in PEA cannot even be applied retroactively to the lots
covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 (40 hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39-
hectare reclaimed land). The reclamation of the land under SMDRP was completed
in August 1996 while the PEA decision was rendered on July 9, 2002. In the
meantime, subdivided lots forming parts of the reclaimed land were already sold to
private corporations for value and separate titles issued to the buyers. The Project
was terminated through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 27,
2003. The PEA decision became final through the November 11,
2003 Resolution.It is a settled precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only
be applied prospectively as they may prejudice vested rights if applied
retroactively.

In Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, the Court trenchantly elucidated the prospective

application of its decisions based on considerations of equity and fair play, thus:
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119
of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited
above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are
bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article
4 of the Civil Code which provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective

effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in
People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] x x x when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.[82]

Fourth Issue: Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed

lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no
longer needed for public use
Petitioner Chavez avers that despite the declaration that the reclaimed areas are
alienable lands of the public domain, still, the reclamation is flawed for there was
never any declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use.

We are not moved by petitioners submission.

Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no
longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit
executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for
public use or public service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the
same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and
not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.

President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though

indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer
required for public use or service, thus:

These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under the
administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority to
develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its
development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide
employment opportunities to on-site families and additional areas for
port related activities. (Emphasis supplied.)

While numerical count of the persons to be benefited is not the determinant

whether the property is to be devoted to public use, the declaration in Proclamation
No. 39 undeniably identifies only particular individuals as beneficiaries to whom
the reclaimed lands can be sold, namelythe Smokey Mountain dwellers. The rest of
the Filipinos are not qualified; hence, said lands are no longer essential for the use
of the public in general.

In addition, President Ramos issued on August 31, 1994 Proclamation No.

465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine
(79) hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the
beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the publicdeclaring the power of NHA to dispose
of land to be reclaimed, thus: The authority to administer, develop, or dispose
lands identified and reserved by this Proclamation and Proclamation No. 39
(s.1992), in accordance with the SMDRP, as enhance, is vested with the NHA,
subject to the provisions of existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the
non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the Project cannot be
successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or
service. Certainly, the devotion of the reclaimed land to public use or service
conflicts with the intended use of the Smokey Mountain areas for housing and
employment of the Smokey Mountain scavengers and for financing the Project
because the latter cannot be accomplished without abandoning the public use of the
subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations on SMDRP together
with the issuance of the special patents had effectively removed the reclaimed
lands from public use.

More decisive and not in so many words is the ruling in PEA which we earlier
cited, that PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service.Consequently, we ruled in that case that the reclaimed lands are open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.[83]
In a similar vein, presidential Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 jointly with the
special patents have classified the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and
open to disposition or concession as they would be devoted to units
for Smokey Mountain beneficiaries. Hence, said lands are no longer intended for
public use or service and shall form part of the patrimonial properties of the State
under Art. 422 of the Civil Code.[84] As discussed a priori, the lands were classified
as patrimonial properties of the NHA ready for disposition when the titles were
registered in its name by the Register of Deeds.

Moreover, reclaimed lands that are made the enabling components of a BOT
infrastructure project are necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands
under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and illogical consequences would naturally
result.Undoubtedly, the BOT contract will not be accepted by the BOT contractor
since there will be no consideration for its contractual obligations. Since reclaimed
land will be conveyed to the contractor pursuant to the BOT Law, then there is an
implied declaration that such land is no longer intended for public use or public
service and, hence, considered patrimonial property of the State.

Fifth Issue: Whether there is a law authorizing sale of

reclaimed lands

Petitioner next claims that RBI cannot acquire the reclaimed lands because there
was no law authorizing their sale. He argues that unlike PEA, no legislative
authority was granted to the NHA to sell reclaimed land.

This position is misplaced.

Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act (CA) 141 to support his view
that the NHA is not empowered by any law to sell reclaimed land, thus:

Section 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or
sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. The area of the land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in
the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease if
requested and shall in no case exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to
grants, donations, transfers, made to a province, municipality or branch
or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said
entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted
donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered,
or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; Provided, further, That any person,
corporation, association or partnership disqualified from purchasing
public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act,
may lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residential purposes, but the lease granted shall only be valid while such
land is used for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)

Reliance on said provision is incorrect as the same applies only to a province,

municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government. The NHA is not a
government unit but a government corporation performing governmental and
proprietary functions.

In addition, PD 757 is clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer

properties acquired by it under the law to other parties, thus:

Section 6. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall

have the following powers and functions to be exercised by the Boards
 in accordance with the established national human settlements plan
prepared by the Human Settlements Commission:

xxxx

(k) Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms and
conditions as it may deem proper and reasonable;

(l) Acquire property rights and interests, and encumber or

otherwise dispose the same as it may deem appropriate (Emphasis
supplied.)

Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and
encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate. The transfer of
the reclaimed lands by the National Government to the NHA for housing,
commercial, and industrial purposes transformed them into patrimonial lands
which are of course owned by the State in its private or proprietary
capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or
qualified corporation.

Sixth Issue: Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI

was done by public bidding

Petitioner also contends that there was no public bidding but an awarding of
ownership of said reclaimed lands to RBI. Public bidding, he says, is required
under Secs. 63 and 67 of CA 141 which read:
Section 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this
chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall
ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for authority to dispose
of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of
 leases or sales of agricultural public land, that the Government will lease
or sell, as the case may be, the lots or blocks specified in the
advertisement, for the purpose stated in the notice and subject to the
conditions specified in this chapter.

xxxx

Section 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where an
applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit
issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by
sealed bidding as prescribed in section twenty-six of this Act, the
provisions of which shall be applied whenever applicable. If all or part
of the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands shall from
time to time announce in the Official Gazette or in any other newspapers
of general circulation, the lease of sale of those lots, if necessary.

He finds that the NHA and RBI violated Secs. 63 and 67 of CA 141, as the
reclaimed lands were conveyed to RBI by negotiated contract and not by public
bidding as required by law.

This stand is devoid of merit.

There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to
become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. Notices or
Invitations to Bid were published in the national dailies on January 23 and 26,
1992 and February 1, 14, 16, and 23, 1992. The bidding proper was done by the
Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) on May 18, 1992. On August 31, 1992, the
Inter-Agency Techcom made up of the NHA, PEA, DPWH, PPA, DBP, and
DENR opened the bids and evaluated them, resulting in the award of the contract
to respondent RBI on October 7, 1992.
On March 19, 1993, respondents NHA and RBI signed the JVA. On February 23,
1994, said JVA was amended and restated into the ARJVA. On August 11, 1994,
the ARJVA was again amended. On September 7, 1994, the OP approved the
ARJVA and the amendments to the ARJVA. From these factual settings, it cannot
be gainsaid that there was full compliance with the laws and regulations governing
public biddings involving a right, concession, or property of the government.

Petitioner concedes that he does not question the public bidding on the right to be a
joint venture partner of the NHA, but the absence of bidding in the sale of
alienable and disposable lands of public domain pursuant to CA 141 as amended.

Petitioners theory is incorrect.

Secs. 63 and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as they refer to government

sale by the Director of Lands of alienable and disposable lands of public
domain. This is not present in the case at bar. The lands reclaimed by and
conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of public domain. These lands became
proprietary lands or patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles
over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of CA 141. The
NHA can therefore legally transfer patrimonial land to RBI or to any other
interested qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the Director of Lands
because the NHA, unlike PEA, is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of
public domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial lands and can dispose of such
lands by sale without need of public bidding.
Petitioner likewise relies on Sec. 79 of PD 1445 which requires public
bidding when government property has become unserviceable for any cause or is
no longer needed. It appears from the Handbook on Property and Supply
Management System, Chapter 6, that reclaimed lands which have become
patrimonial properties of the State, whose titles are conveyed to government
agencies like the NHA, which it will use for its projects or programs, are not within
the ambit of Sec. 79. We quote the determining factors in the Disposal of
Unserviceable Property, thus:

Determining Factors in the Disposal of Unserviceable Property

Property, which can no longer be repaired or reconditioned;

Property whose maintenance costs of repair more than outweigh the

benefits and services that will be derived from its continued use;

Property that has become obsolete or outmoded because of changes in

technology;

Serviceable property that has been rendered unnecessary due to

change in the agencys function or mandate;

Unused supplies, materials and spare parts that were procured in

excess of requirements; and

Unused supplies and materials that [have] become dangerous to use

because of long storage or use of which is determined to be
hazardous.[85]

Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable properties. The

reclaimed lands in question are very much needed by the NHA for the Smokey
Mountain Project because without it, then the projects will not be successfully
implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are not unserviceable properties and are
very much needed by NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD 1445 does not apply.

More importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied to patrimonial properties

like reclaimed lands transferred to a government agency like the NHA which has
entered into a BOT contract with a private firm. The reason is obvious. If the
patrimonial property will be subject to public bidding as the only way of disposing
of said property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is almost
impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering the uncertainty of a
winning bid during public auction. Moreover, the repayment scheme of a BOT
contract may be in the form of non-monetary payment like the grant of a portion or
percentage of reclaimed land. Even if the BOT partner participates in the public
bidding, there is no assurance that he will win the bid and therefore the payment in
kind as agreed to by the parties cannot be performed or the winning bid prize might
be below the estimated valuation of the land. The only way to harmonize Sec. 79
of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA 6957 is to consider Sec. 79 of PD 1445 as
inapplicable to BOT contracts involving patrimonial lands. The law does not
intend anything impossible (lex non intendit aliquidimpossibile).

Seventh Issue: Whether RBI, being a private corporation,

is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain

Petitioner maintains that RBI, being a private corporation, is expressly

prohibited by the 1987 Constitution from acquiring lands of public domain.

Petitioners proposition has no legal mooring for the following reasons:

1. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid

a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional
requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. It cannot be denied that RBI is a private corporation,
where Filipino citizens own at least 60% of the stocks. Thus, the transfer to RBI is
valid and constitutional.
 2. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands
covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA,
said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified
as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the
NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of
public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with
its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the
State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the
Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by
Filipino citizens like RBI.

3. The NHA is an end-user entity such that when alienable lands of public domain
are transferred to said agency, they are automatically classified as patrimonial
properties. The NHA is similarly situated as BCDA which was granted the
authority to dispose of patrimonial lands of the government under RA 7227. The
nature of the property holdings conveyed to BCDA is elucidated and stressed in
the May 6, 2003 Resolution in Chavez v. PEA, thus:

BCDA is an entirely different government entity. BCDA is

authorized by law to sell specific government lands that have long
been declared by presidential proclamations as military reservations
for use by the different services of the armed forces under the
Department of National Defense. BCDAs mandate is specific and
limited in area, while PEAs mandate is general and national. BCDA
holds government lands that have been granted to end-user
government entitiesthe military services of the armed forces. In
contrast, under Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed
public lands, not as an end-user entity, but as the government
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
 coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
National Government.

x x x Well-settled is the doctrine that public land granted to an end-user

government agency for a specific public use may subsequently be
withdrawn by Congress from public use and declared patrimonial
property to be sold to private parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the
BCDA is a law that declares specific military reservations no longer
needed for defense or military purposes and reclassifies such lands
as patrimonial property for sale to private parties.

Government owned lands, as long as they are patrimonial property,

can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the
government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even
private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial
property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once
converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations.[86] (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing Resolution makes it clear that the SMDRP was a program adopted
by the Government under Republic Act No. 6957 (An Act Authorizing the
Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by
the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes), as amended by RA 7718, which is a
special law similar to RA 7227. Moreover, since the implementation was assigned
to the NHA, an end-user agency under PD 757 and RA 7279, the reclaimed lands
registered under the NHA are automatically classified as patrimonial lands ready
for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.

The foregoing reasons likewise apply to the contention of petitioner that HCPTI,
being a private corporation, is disqualified from being a transferee of public
land. What was transferred to HCPTI is a 10-hectare lot which is already classified
as patrimonial property in the hands of the NHA. HCPTI, being a qualified
corporation under the 1987 Constitution, the transfer of the subject lot to it is valid
and constitutional.

Eighth Issue: Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose

all information related to the SMDRP

Petitioner asserts his right to information on all documents such as contracts,

reports, memoranda, and the like relative to SMDRP.

Petitioner asserts that matters relative to the SMDRP have not been disclosed to the
public like the current stage of the Project, the present financial capacity of RBI,
the complete list of investors in the asset pool, the exact amount of investments in
the asset pool and other similar important information regarding the Project.

He prays that respondents be compelled to disclose all information regarding

the SMDRP and furnish him with originals or at least certified true copies of all
relevant documents relating to the said project including, but not limited to, the
original JVA, ARJVA, AARJVA, and the Asset Pool Agreement.

This relief must be granted.

The right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concern

is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, thus:

ARTICLE II

xxxx
 SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III

SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., this Court explicated this way:

[A]n essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people.It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information
relating thereto can such bear fruit.[87]

In PEA, this Court elucidated the rationale behind the right to information:

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency

in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise
of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if
expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials
at all times x x x accountable to the people, for unless citizens have the
 proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy.[88]

Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its agencies to fully disclose all of its
transactions involving public interest. Thus, the government agencies, without
need of demand from anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction and the contents of the
perfected contract.[89] Such information must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, meaning official recommendations or final positions reached on the
different matters subject of negotiation. The government agency, however, need
not disclose intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage. The limitation also covers privileged
communication like information on military and diplomatic secrets; information
affecting national security; information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused; information on
foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information.

It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of
the 1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for
the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on
government transactions.Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the
light of day if and when Congress decides to approve the proposed Freedom of
Access to Information Act. In the meantime, it would suffice that government
agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the information
on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and the agreements
themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on their respective
websites for easy access by interested parties. Without any law or regulation
governing the right to disclose information, the NHA or any of the respondents
cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose information relative to the
SMDRP to the public in general.

The other aspect of the peoples right to know apart from the duty to disclose
is the duty to allow access to information on matters of public concern under Sec.
7, Art. III of the Constitution. The gateway to information opens to the public the
following: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions; and (3) government research data used as a basis for
policy development.

Thus, the duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the duty to
permit access to information. There is no need to demand from the government
agency disclosure of information as this is mandatory under the Constitution;
failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested party
must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and
papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the
government office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to
gain access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers
only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a
broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions involving
public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public
documents of the government agency.

We find that although petitioner did not make any demand on the NHA to allow
access to information, we treat the petition as a written request or demand. We
order the NHA to allow petitioner access to its official records, documents, and
papers relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to the
said JVA and subsequent agreements relative to the SMDRP.

Ninth Issue: Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the

instant petition

Petitioner postulates that the operative fact doctrine is inapplicable to the present
case because it is an equitable doctrine which could not be used to countenance an
inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office.

On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the
various agreements implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no
longer be disturbed or simply ignored, citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines.[90]

The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious.

The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals,

wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:

As the new Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it
should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt
that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied
with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
 declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may
have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has
been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that
prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether
or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may
lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual

existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official. This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc.
v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.[91] (Emphasis
supplied.)

This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil
Service Commission, wherein we ruled that:

Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Governments order of

suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less retroactively apply
such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and
valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a
void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers
legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance
thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent
 private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a
formal leave application.[92] (Emphasis supplied.)

The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of

the Philippines, thus:

In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

In the May 6, 2003 Resolution in Chavez v. PEA,[93] we ruled that De

Agbayani[94] is not applicable to the case considering that the prevailing law did not
authorize private corporations from owning land. The prevailing law at the time
was the 1935 Constitution as no statute dealt with the same issue.

In the instant case, RA 6957 was the prevailing law at the time that the joint
venture agreement was signed. RA 6957, entitled An Act Authorizing The
Financing, Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of Infrastructure Projects
By The Private Sector And For Other Purposes, which was passed by Congress
on July 24, 1989, allows repayment to the private contractor of reclaimed
lands.[95] Such law was relied upon by respondents, along with the above-
mentioned executive issuances in pushing through with the Project. The existence
of such law and issuances is an operative fact to which legal consequences have
attached. This Court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in
consonance with such executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would work
patent injustice on respondents.

Further, in the May 6, 2003 Resolution in Chavez v. PEA, we ruled that in certain
cases, the transfer of land, although illegal or unconstitutional, will not be
invalidated on considerations of equity and social justice. However, in that case,
we did not apply the same considering that PEA, respondent in said case, was not
entitled to equity principles there being bad faith on its part, thus:

There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari from

invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim good faith because even
before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner
had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely
the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before
the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved
on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560. This Report
concluded, after a well-publicized investigation into PEAs sale of
the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are inalienable
lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA
knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of
the Amended JVA.[96]

Such indicia of bad faith are not present in the instant case. When the ruling
in PEA was rendered by this Court on July 9, 2002, the JVAs were all
executed. Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents
on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA
between the NHA and RBI. The respondents had no reason to think that their
agreements were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent
acts of the executive department lent validity to the implementation of the
Project. The SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor of the slum
dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and
the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or who bought
SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the
passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation.
Evidently, the operative fact principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands
of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.
The Courts Dispositions

Based on the issues raised in this petition, we find that the March 19, 1993 JVA
between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent
amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to
it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset
Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other
transactions which emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal,
and constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.

With regard to the prayer for prohibition, enjoining respondents particularly

respondent NHA from further implementing and/or enforcing the said Project and
other agreements related to it, and from further deriving and/or enjoying any rights,
privileges and interest from the Project, we find the same prayer meritless.

Sec. 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

 Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

It has not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in relation to the SMDRP and the agreements relative to it. Likewise, it
has not been shown what ministerial functions the NHA has with regard to the
SMDRP.
A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance. It is a duty which an officer performs in a
given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to the exercise of his/her own judgment upon the
propriety of the act done.[97]
Whatever is left to be done in relation to the August 27, 2003 MOA, terminating
the JVA and other related agreements, certainly does not involve ministerial
functions of the NHA but instead requires exercise of judgment. In fact, Item No. 4
of the MOA terminating the JVAs provides for validation of the developers (RBIs)
claims arising from the termination of the SMDRP through the various government
agencies.[98] Such validation requires the exercise of discretion.

In addition, prohibition does not lie against the NHA in view of petitioners failure
to avail and exhaust all administrative remedies.Clear is the rule that prohibition is
only available when there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
More importantly, prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait
accompli. The operative fact doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant of the
writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It should be remembered that petitioner was
the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and implemented. He had
the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the agreements on it, but he did
not. The moment to challenge the Project had passed.

On the prayer for a writ of mandamus, petitioner asks the Court to compel
respondents to disclose all documents and information relating to the project,
including, but not limited to, any subsequent agreements with respect to the
different phases of the Project, the revisions of the original plan, the additional
works incurred on the Project, the current financial condition of respondent RBI,
and the transactions made with respect to the project. We earlier ruled that
petitioner will be allowed access to official records relative to the SMDRP. That
would be adequate relief to satisfy petitioners right to the information gateway.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The prayer for a writ of prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The prayer for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED. Respondent NHA is ordered to

allow access to petitioner to all public documents and official records relative to
the SMDRPincluding, but not limited to, the March 19, 1993 JVA between the
NHA and RBI and subsequent agreements related to the JVA, the revisions over
the original plan, and the additional works incurred on and the transactions made
with respect to the Project.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 134209

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
- versus - GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

CELESTINA NAGUIAT,
Respondent. January 24, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated May 29, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of

land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in
the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December
1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant
[herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said
parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID
Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon,
Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and
that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein

petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments
of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for
or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim
of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general

default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of
the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration
case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . .

applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial
Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits.
Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government
had no evidence to adduce. [3]
 In a decision[4] dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her
the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her
name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby

adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales,
appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square
meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322
containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina
T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat
and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the
improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her
name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14,
[should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations
provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or
presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected
on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in
bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial
court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision
of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from

is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that
the CAs decision is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the
evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence
her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which
would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.)
141. In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its
finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property
subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by

positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of
private appropriation.[5]As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.[6] Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question
have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act[7] and the
Constitution[8] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily refer to a
large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees
and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui [9]
-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped
 it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,[10] which embodies

the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[11] All lands not
appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the
State.[12] Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Under Section 6
of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands
of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice
versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the
court.[14] Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[15]
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already
alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public
domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine.
Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier
cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public landfor period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a
registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests
open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more
than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the
appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)[16] and Herico vs. DAR,[17] among other
cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the
lands in question cease to be public land and become private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not,
however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in
said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be
registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the
difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the

proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land
applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.[18] Aside from tax
receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information
respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held,
however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[19]

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public

lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration
cases.[20] For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when
appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case
may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an
express and positive act from the government.[21]

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous
possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For,
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents
application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-
25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.