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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta

Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-
filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16
years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of
PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as
those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the
offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from
the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the
case. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code
and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the
time of the commission of the offense did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of
age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was
charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for
overtaking a truck. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance
and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent
from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by
the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is
said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act
No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation
Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over
an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it must
not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal
ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN
MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49
3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It

sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin
fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank
refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that
Petitioners separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with
the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute
reads: The margin established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea
formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users. ISSUE: W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by
law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by
the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its
approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to
the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was
a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that
the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of
a bills due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and
valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall
keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of
attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the
journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that
substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the
bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law. LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished
product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is
distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a
finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials.
Hence, the importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a
4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA

1180 An Act to Regulate the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty,
property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional
requirement that a bills title must reflect the subject matter of the same because
regulate does not really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates
International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180
is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the
constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed
in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must
be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and
consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one
department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is
primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency
of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint for the collection of sales taxes from
Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is
unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales
because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is
not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide
Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces
two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to
the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA
1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only
one subject reflected by its title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition
prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the
title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or
narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to
its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity.
In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement
that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title. This is to
prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise
legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that
particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d
5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the
violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a
certificate to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head and body
of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do
with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be understood
to refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly,
that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N
chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as
the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended) is sufficient
and it need not include the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic is
included in the practice of medicine. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary
usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must
be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to
impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be
resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. A bill shall embrace only
one subject, expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legislation by
apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
the law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d

FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act
No. 121. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise
contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power
and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%
annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be
given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An Act to
Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider
because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill,
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title. HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an
amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation
to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is
satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary
for its accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be a complete index of the contents
of the act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d
6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote
No.47

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act
No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19
of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority
of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be
represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE: W/N
Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied
with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be
regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles
of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper
legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong because Article VIII, Section 49 of
this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be
split into two separate districts. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to
the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. Contrary to
Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal construction of the
"one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d
7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal
Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51

FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13,
section 2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry known
as fishing, with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before engaging in
fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of
this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this
municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three
months. The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of
the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of
1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5
of the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill because the Administrative Code is neither a
private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, An
Act amending the Administrative Code. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3
of the Jones Law, which provided that no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of
the bill, because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative
Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization
Act. LATIN MAXIM: 37

FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstitutional
on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is
Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill. This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which
adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.
ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and
void. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur makes the title
misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as
to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
LATIN MAXIM: d
8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes
Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote
No.50

FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to

pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel
mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the
City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated
damages to Respondents indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of
P275.47 with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed
to pay the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having
chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the
recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. ISSUE: W/N
Act No. 4122, entitled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between
Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five
thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,
is valid. HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of
Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection
with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments.
The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the
precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper
approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor
of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the
Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37

FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic

Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associations and
punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member of the CPP or any other organization
subversive in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the
statute due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute
void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overbroad. The cases were dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N
the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and
need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in
clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute
will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent.
The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d,
51d
9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.
Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55

FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act

purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly
fails to include the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES. The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing Resolution to Both
Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the
Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for
Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of
Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the
Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.
ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. HELD:
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the
title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2
and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise
categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for
therein is to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, which
phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The power to propose amendments
to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison
detre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required that the title of
the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of
detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people.
All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its
title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation
of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to
quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was an Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms,
and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of
this Act, did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26
violated the constitutional provision that no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill. ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N
it was inconsistent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the enactment
of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to
private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law
that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took
effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title
of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the
Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LATIN
MAXIM: 30a, 36a, 46a, 50
10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83

FACTS: The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant
attacked the constitutionality of the Peoples Court Act on the ground that it
contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter
expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of
Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3)
a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and
(4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N
the Peoples Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The Peoples Court was
intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the
indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were
allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the Peoples Court Act.
The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of
its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to
the subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant
to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act)
issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits
trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with
FAO No. 371. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its
legality on the ground that FAO No. 371 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former
having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter
stating that prohibition was for any single period of time not exceeding five
years duration. ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was invalid. HELD: Section 2
of FAO No. 371 was valid. Although FAO No. 371 was defective because it failed to
specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a
basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because the
rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 371 would be
inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period
of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. LATIN MAXIM: 37,
38a
11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.
Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)

FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and
below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum
Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed
fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the
deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed
a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order
to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. ISSUES: 1. W/N authority given by
LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the
ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. 2.
W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating
the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. HELD: 1. LTFRB did not have
authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP was not able to prove and
provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON
CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR
OTHER PURPOSES Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1,
1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary
Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the
period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the
rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to
June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of
bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary
Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to
implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c
12 China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)

FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching,
in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were
additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans
matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner
to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The
properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court
ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was
granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner
sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were
appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of
Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner can
extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should
govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the
properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot
prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to
an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the
administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: The decedent is a driver for Peoples Land Transportation Company, of which
Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmens Compensation Commission
awarded the decedents widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not
exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of
the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorneys fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based
on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmens Compensation Commission and prays
further that the P500 in attys fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.6
Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of the Workmens Compensation
Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its
jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in awarding the P500 in attorneys fees. HELD: Petition was dismissed. 1. The
Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the
Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction
over the main case. 2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the
Court. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a
13 Grego v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)

FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of
the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein
Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner
brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on
October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the
Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or not the
Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its
wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended
to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such
intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language
of the enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not
qualify the date of a candidates removal and that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The term to be
looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring
only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this does not fall
under the scope of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c
rd

FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the

municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees, meat inspection fees,
corral fees, and internal organ fees, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655.
Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Respondent, in
the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided
by Commonwealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance
of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge
slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it
overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would be
acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in
the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the
exception of slaughterhouse fees. One of the rules of statutory construction is
that certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid
without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so
interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.
LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37
14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)

FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an

expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in
the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, but
Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower.
ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just
compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and
legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in
expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis
for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted. LATIN MAXIM: 37

FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the
premises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The
case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to
1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has
not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res
judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also
affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of lease is
made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment is
barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the
continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the
compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language
employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second issue,
the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a
different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of
action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judicata does
not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,
15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)

FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate
JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of
Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated
Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a
PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise,
license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President Aquino
issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels
the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In
1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened
and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to
operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the
franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392
which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409 provides
that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power to franchise the
operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue
license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not
repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises
issued by the local governments without exceptions. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50

FACTS: Petitioner, an Iglesia ni Cristo, was a member of the Respondent Union

which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed
shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: Membership in the Union shall be required
as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement RA 3350 amended RA 875: but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization. Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE: 1. W/N
RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is
constitutional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when
ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorneys fee. HELD: The right to join
associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization.
Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7 of Art IV
of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded when the
defendants act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his
interest and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
40b
16 Taada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote
No.159

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE:
W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the
necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot
in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such
notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignorantia Legis non excusat. The court, therefore, declares that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force
and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the
Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a

FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that
if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a
certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs
duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13,
1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had
already elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering.
HELD: No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The
above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the
day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified
by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which month now means the
civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of
time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be
done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to
be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. There
is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a
17 Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)

FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of

certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff.
The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions
of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the
immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to
deposit in court, on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month, the sums of
money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments
however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month.
As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court
ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made
on or before the Tenth day of each month.

FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting
aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof
their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendants bond be
forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the
amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the
Defendant. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to
time, and finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On
July 10, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on
application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and
ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on
the date directed by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides: unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is
required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be
excluded. This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be
done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such computation for the
date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also directed that the sale
should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the property must stand.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c

HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term month must
now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the
Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter
fixes the length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c
18 PNB v. CA
Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19

FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in
favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The
notices of sale of Appellants foreclosed properties were published on March 28,
April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record. The date March
28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of
auction sale shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks.
ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication
of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that
that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is week. In
Concepcion v. Andueta, the term week was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply
with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b

FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem

parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously
given to them by the vendor of the latters intention to sell the property and
where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian
Court dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12
of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming
that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code
that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else.
Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right
of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have
expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the
Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. HELD:
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing
agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants. The purpose of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the
State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a Maxims invoked
by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43
19 U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote
No.22

FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig
(in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that
they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the
Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of
the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statutes true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the
assessed value thereof.

FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required

referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their
affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was
no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and
that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a
statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of
the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.
Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive
departments original and exclusive authority to act. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a,
24a

HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the
immediate context of provisions of the statute defining property qualifications
of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification
is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both
qualifications are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the
two in the mind of the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies
people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13,
1898, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the
payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an
election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If the property
qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the
statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN
MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
20 Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote
No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27

FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act
No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few
years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec.
203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place
of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N under the
provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No.
3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval
of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. HELD: Justices
appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment
(Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a

FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela

against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land
in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered
by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants
from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in
upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in
invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said
provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from
demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN MAXIM: 12a,
25a
21 Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote
No.33

FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Powers
Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of
1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid
because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to
function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations
were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a

FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be

considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the
Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question
the legality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that
the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is
a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task must
be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not
for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence of
judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62,
Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated
that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction
of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for
Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the
court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the
children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not
include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which
later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the
Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137
and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-
28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the
payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTAs decision on the date of
payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides
the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on
or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected
as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed
for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest
doesnt exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with
deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the
notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in
the notice isnt paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of
tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to
September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay
the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest
shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a,
24a, 26
23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote
No.56

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote
No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license

tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300,
have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21.
Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as
provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff
a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof.
On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff
that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiffs
delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-
Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the
cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961,
proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of
sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the
distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
specific language of the Act speaks of UREA FORMALDEHYDE, a finished product
which is distinct and different from UREA and FORMALDEHYDE. Petitioner argues
his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the
Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by
the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to
overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the
effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not
come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states UREA
FORMALDEHYDE as a finished product and not UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate
units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view
of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives.
If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by
legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his
duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or
charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and
the expenses of the distraint. The clear and explicit language of the law leaves
no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff
must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote
No.58

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They
mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30,
1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23,
1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was
P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his
outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law).
Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground
that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897
was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff
scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for
foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was
subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20,
1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring
that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June
20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the
obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be
subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioners loan
was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23,
1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said
that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023
compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions
the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has
already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to
credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit
unions credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state
the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to
Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, it is well established that only specific
legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must
be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.
Justice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote
No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and

maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On
two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its
facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should
be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the
port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard
Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company
should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to
another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other
franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner.
HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must
be granted to a competing party. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions
was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely
on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from
taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of
its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz,
Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel
for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is
obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners
move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is
illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for
the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under
section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court.
Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney
shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and
exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipalitys
interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation.
These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the
expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a
26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)

FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent

Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under
the Workmens Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporations reckless and
wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing
of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act or suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light of the
fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmens Compensation Act,
if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount received
from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. An
injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In allowing
Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not legislate in
this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being
charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because
technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the
Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as
the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple
frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore,
charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of
simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be
prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity would
be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48
27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote
No.74

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of
AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that
the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the
EPZA and is not in the Respondents jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states:
The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing
zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the
Authority ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from
investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of
sole in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is
the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may
investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
and investigated by a police committee composed of 3 councilors created by
Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an
adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was
appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the
Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police
officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof.
Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police
Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a
committee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred
in by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal
Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the
action of the police committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and
the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil
service authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a
28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang
Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote
No.87

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89

FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in

Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governors letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously
surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as
SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is
authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret
Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those
authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no
authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides the peace officers are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The
appointment sufficiently put him in the category of peace officer equivalent even
to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision
appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a

FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his

defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the
same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent
falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the
law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent
therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a
prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore
the conviction of the accused must stand. The Courts ruling overturned that of
People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c
29 Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)

FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check

drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-
stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against
Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a rubber or
bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v.
People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity
principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que
should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly
situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a,
46a

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City
of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail
dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the
City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the
alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour
to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of
resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be
manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to
bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the
absence of any express provision of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale
at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
24a, 37, 43
30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8

FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner,
the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province.
Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority
inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes
required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the
right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such
coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have
thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority
inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d

FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30

years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act
No. 2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain,
and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the
corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.
ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature
in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public
domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: That no bill may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill. LATIN MAXIM: d
31 Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote
No.20

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76,
Footnote No.16

FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the
title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered
Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents purchase
contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including
interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec.
Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive
effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the
amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No.
Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D.
957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed
prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant
with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No.
9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential
element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the
accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9
shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and
that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and
interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent
and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
b2
32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves
Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote
No.22

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu
Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23

FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar
acts applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled
that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of
the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of
Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme
Court, thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to
agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower
court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower courts usage of the
maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated
that the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which
is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b

FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should
be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by
collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located
in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to Respondent, the
legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the
National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of the power
granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning
of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. ISSUE:
W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages from
docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD: The term public refers to
the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to impose wharfage rests
on a different basis and that is ownership. The Court also referred to the previous
subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies
a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of
the National Government. The Court states that only those which are constructed by
the City shall be considered as its property. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b
33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.
Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote
No.28

FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as

provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided
in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than
two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive
period and not the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run
from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the
Final Adjustment Return (final payment). HELD: The date of filing of the final
payment should be considered. The Supreme Court said that, Sec. 292 of the NIRC
should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order
to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which
may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken
into view. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d

FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four days
after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings, challenging Petitioners eligibility on the ground that Respondent was
not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age
requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the
existence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised
Administrative Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications
at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office,
provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election
of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction
is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do
contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against
the intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly
and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should
possess the age qualification at the time of the election, the law should
suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No argument is
needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in
the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume
office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is
declared unlawful and illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b
34 US. v. Hart
Case No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In re: Estate of Johnson
Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote
No.38

FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No.
519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means
of support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by
the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through
the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other
Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the
portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the
phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of
the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How
should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be
based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation
gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative
will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is
not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding
superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary.
Inasmuch as defendant had, visible means of support and that the absence of such
was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling
houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33

FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil
Procedure states Will made here by an alienwill made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country,
may be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the
same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. The will of
Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that
Sec. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention
is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will
made here by an alien and to further fact that the word state in the body of the
section is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S
and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words
state and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is
excluded from the phrase another state or country. It is a rule of hermeneutics
that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the
language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the
written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing more than a
convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of
limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a
US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated. LATIN
MAXIM: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48
35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut
Case No. 231 G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993) Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote
No.43

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Mendoza
Case No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)

FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160. HELD:
No. Respondent relied on the word another appearing in the English translation of
the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only when the
new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for
which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is not
different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative
Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which
they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were tried and
convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD: No. What was
presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no
probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. The
English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this
section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposits a ballot in the
ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants
fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed. LATIN MAXIM:
50, d
36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba
Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
U.S. v. Quintanar
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)

FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or
the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party.
Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied
and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. HELD:
No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or
not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the Revised
Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first
complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish
equivalent of the word filed is not bound in the Spanish text which is
controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 36a

FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking
opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the Opium Law. On appeal,
Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the
Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect despues del
primero de Marzo. (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be
punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect despues del primero de Marzo. HELD:
The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text
says: on and after March 1, 1908. Where the Act was originally promulgated in
English, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
37 Employees Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
McMicking v. Lichauco
Case No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49

FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so
that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records.
They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds
because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only
real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a
term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an
express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease
under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The
property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the
Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must
be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law
was relied upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by
the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against

Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its duration:
an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata where judgment execution
is. And likewise, in the duration of Matas judgment, there was yet another pending
appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17,666.60. ISSUE:
With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. HELD:
Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The preference on
Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, which secures
preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that
no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of
Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of time for
perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the judgment,
strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology where it
would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor
(Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to.
One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments,
orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified
under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English
precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The
lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but
simply suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not
destroyed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49
38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to
the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the
said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently
enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the
sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial
court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been
exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid
notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales
satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure.
While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale;
the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their
obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The
intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified
of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-
day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the
sales although no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8, 9a, 10,
11d, 11e, 12a, 17

FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961,
which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the
decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the
past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous daughter
of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered
dependents under the Workmens Compensation Act. HELD: Yes. According to the
Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent
upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or
incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent
on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not his wife at the time of the
accident but at the time of his death, are still considered dependents under the
Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37
39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.
Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote
No.61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Case No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64

FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued
a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his
heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the
homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953,
heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to
recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE: W/N the
sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land
was valid. HELD: No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the
Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands
Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the
homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his
own, and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of
Nicolas was null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48

FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against

Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to
the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the
cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two cases
on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal
capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Yes. The
law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Company, must,
in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove legal
capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was
based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to
transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the
Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at
bar, the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed
long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the
Philippines. Therefore, said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as
the purpose was contrary to public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37
40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad
Case No. 154 G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote
No.71

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Go Chioco v. Martinez
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93,
Footnote No.93

FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business,
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain
rates of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from
Defendant, the Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been
paid under protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the
Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the
said business amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act
No. 2711, the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring
business. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec.
1462 of Act No. 2711. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in
the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only
as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished.
Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the
tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. LATIN
MAXIM: 2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28

FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory

note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three
months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and
sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months,
Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new
promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note,
Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they
executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle
was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due
only a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid
P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore,
Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18%
was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he
must give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000. ISSUE:
W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned
together with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking
into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is
clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the principal loan was forfeited together with
the interest. However, unlike the previous law, the current law RA 2655 provides
for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. The current law also
does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a rule of
construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consult the history of
the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 36a,
37
41 US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote
No.102

FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand,
Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that
implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear
of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the
Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless,
the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There
is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement
with the State. However, looking at the legislative history of the statute, it can
be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal
prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly
carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial
of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar
to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made
prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2

FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect
with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183
claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of
their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing
claim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent.
Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of
claims overlapping Petitioners claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were
valid, and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N
Petitioners mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A.
No. 137) provides: For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent
object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of
known rivers or creeks, a known public or private structure; a corner of approved
public, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or
location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands,
Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or
other government agencies. An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point.
Petitioners contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable
since it goes against the legislators intent to eliminate claim jumping and
overlapping claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b
42 Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote
No.103

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a
guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner
alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New
Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code
shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the
clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting
provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a
special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law
which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other
provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a
dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in
question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The
offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the
filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action.
With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it
will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case.
Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show
that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be
the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2
43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.
Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote
No.110

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
China Banking Corporation v. Ortega
Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)

FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized
Dept. of the Interior and Local Government, laid down the compulsory retirement
age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law
cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same law (which
temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents wanted to
be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they contend that the
term INP includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and
the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National
Police (INP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as
applicable only to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP
in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police
force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been
otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of
the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Indeed, the law
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that INP as used in Sec.
89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the
members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is
concerned. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2

FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in
default. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest
with current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the
Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He
refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which
prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person
except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes
criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks
the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly
refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment
debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to
place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The
discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress
indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2
44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR
Case No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.111

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
Case No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different

shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on
the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request having
been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court
modified Respondents decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what
the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a
refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax
court and insists the courts interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a
statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the
amendments for the Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the
deliberations of a law, controlling in the interpretation of the law. HELD: No.
Courts are not bound by a legislators opinion expressed in congressional debates
regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a mere
personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The

Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the
case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes,
lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any
other party because of the clause except for the activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A) in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.
ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any
party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioners interpretation fails
to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it
should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority,
but also the phrase by itself. What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from
investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar
activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether in collaboration, association
or joint venture with others or by itself. LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b
45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union
Case No. 77 G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote
No.133

FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of

Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes rest given to employees after
mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of
the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am 6:00 pm (12 hours of
work, four hours overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes rest after
mealtime. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to
dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 2. W/N a different criterion should
be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely
different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land
laborer. HELD: The definition of hours of work equally applies to seamen and no
need for a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, provides that when the work is not continuous, the time during which
the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset
completely, shall not be counted in the eight working hours. A laborer need not
leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest
shall not be counted, it being enough that he cease to work, and may rest
completely. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 26

FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan

City. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing
fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under
protest. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged
berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34.
HELD: No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of
the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the national ports
only. Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until
it was amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since
the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that
the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom
memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a
46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote
No.141

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146

FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman
against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension
of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health.
The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under
Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987
Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend
to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of
officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his
office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power
to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or
preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to suspension in its
punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec.
24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural
and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases
filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 28

FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying
and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within three
months, the Petitioners amount deposited was completely wiped out without his
permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to
prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate courts ruling on their
violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are
interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this
decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock
trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself,
it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case
is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United
States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9
47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Tamayo v. Gsell
Case No. 282 G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote
No.149

FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila,
filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal
Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from
the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not
allowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piece
of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for
P75,000.00 on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for
P68,959.00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The
CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00,
representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate.
Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred
in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD: No. The appraisal
is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. LATIN
MAXIM: b2

FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was
attributed to the boys inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the
first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages under the Employers Liability Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature
intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the
Employers Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act
was taken, being of American origin. LATIN MAXIM: b2
48 Ossorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)

FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector
of Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the
complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected
by way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiffs wife
constitutes her separate estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase for
the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that the
Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one against
the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property,
returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levying
against and collecting from said Plaintiffs wife upon her own separate individual
declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the income from
her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner
against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of
P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constitute
two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court
likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for
collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground
that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single
cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court
of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellants complaint. HELD:
No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each
single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Case No. 8 G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pando v. Kette and Sellner
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)

FACTS: Petitioners warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with
Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract.
ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void
because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider
attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of
insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as
it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states,
The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be
contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the
policy as forming a part thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2

FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on

January 30, 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public
places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building
of Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication,
and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks,
more particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took
place on February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public
places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied
the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. HELD:
Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. 692
of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the
sale in question have been substantially complied with. LATIN MAXIM: b2
50 Reyes v. Wells
Case No. 135 G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano
Case No. 235 G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971) Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote
No.156

FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping

machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff
Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine.
Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need.
Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the
mortgage. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June
29, 1922, the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount
nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of his co-
Plaintiffs. Due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount
of P12,000, the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the
instalments due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been
paid, are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the
testimony of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes
in question. These are also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. The
prohibition contained in said law against a witness testifying upon any
transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person, is
substantially the same as that contained in Sec. 383(7) of our Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe that the construction
placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, b2

FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He
managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received one
money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the
Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post
Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the banks clearing
account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioners
account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was
denied. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument.
HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US.
These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of
USs own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying departure
from the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable
instruments. LATIN MAXIM: 2b, 9a, b2
51 Cruz v. Pahati
Case No. 28 G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Republic v. Workmens Compensation Commission
Case No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)

FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in
check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment
and as a result, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the
check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. Bulahan
claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of
any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that
enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgment
declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the
Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him
the sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. The claim for
damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo was however
ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of
P5,000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of
evidence. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. HELD: Plaintiff
has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car.
It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of
Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a

FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorneys fee of

P600.00 under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they
had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. ISSUE: W/N the
beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA
610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. HELD: The resolution
of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from
the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult to construe that the
legislature intended to double the compensations received, considering that at the
times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have
conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9 of RA
610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was also contended that the
phrase or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees,
generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government in Sec. 9 is highly
indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation
benefits under other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b
52 Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.
Case NO. 53 G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 41 G.R. No. 70037 (July 7, 1989)

FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs were
notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment and
presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28, the
Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 was
allowed and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was tried
expired on May 30. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the
parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period.
HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the
mechanical part of the appealthe preparation of the papers for transmission to the
Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the
notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the
clerks office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of
error found in most other laws of American origin, it cannot be extended. But that
period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of
papers, after the right to remove the case has been secured. Therefore, it cannot
be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal.
Moreover, considering when the law was adopted, it seems impossible that the
Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the
term, given the physical impossibility to comply with it in many cases. LATIN
MAXIM: 11a, 19b, 27, 48

FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying
the Petitioners claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and
P434,234.92 for 1960. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609, entitled An Act to Authorize the Central
Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks Selling Rates of Foreign
Exchange, is a police measure or a revenue measure. HELD: RA 2609 is a police
measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our countrys international
reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background
and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing
less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601.
This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. Garcia to
Congress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960. The CTA
stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful
matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become
important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative history
of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unambiguous,
since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving
doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had been
decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 7a
53 Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.
Case No. 26 G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pascual v. Director of Lands
Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964)

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate
and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and
that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under
the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the
special import tax provided in RA 1394. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by
Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import
tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law. HELD: Petitioner took
exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no
room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken
to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should
receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of
laws. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws
is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such
antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by
implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called
upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation,
validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b, 38a, b2

FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102
C.A. No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on
the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years
and the taxes thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his
successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements
thereon, in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the
disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the
actual occupant. Thus, in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be
permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation, until
the consent of the occupant or settler is first had, or until such claim shall be
legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If anyone should be given prior right
of entry at all, it should be the actual occupants who have presented several
petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. ISSUE: W/N the
ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioners claim to a right of entry was
correct. HELD: No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given
by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement
deserves great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court
reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President, without the record
disclosing in our opinion, that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. To
the contrary, they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked
by Petitioner, namely, to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of
public land which Petitioner is not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
54 Orencia v. Enrile
Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez
Case No. 107 G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)

FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of
Court Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performing
functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and
recognized as such until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of
Divisions, among others, was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant
chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so
recognized and extended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and
after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is
unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief, and being a new position created
under RA 4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that Respondent,
being a lawyer, is more qualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school
graduate with second grade civil service eligibility, and praying that the petition
be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of
court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. HELD:
For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a new legal
provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of counsel
for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle that a
public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous construction,
one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to the
highest respect from the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October
16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for land taxes
to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, the
municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. The
Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of
Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violating
Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the
right to suffrage and public office. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to refrain
Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. HELD: No. Sec. 2659
refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without
possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law.
Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a
public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes, this does
not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these circumstances, we should
follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. Rafferty: long continued
administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, should be
followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
32, 42b
55 Sagun v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
Case No. 266 G.R. No. 73603 (June 22, 1988) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.180

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova
Case No. 236 G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote
No.181

FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for
those who are unable to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 3208,
the lots located in Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be used for
this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes,
before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, Petitioners
decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a
petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at
P50/sq m., which was in violation of RA 3802. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can
be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. to its
registered tenants or their successors in interest, in reference to Sec. 1 of RA
3802. HELD: No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioners rights should be well-defined,
clear and certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a clear and certain
right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower
than what is being offered. The Petitioners first leased these units for business
purposes. Thus, the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that
the market value for the lots is at least P120. The action of Respondent
Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of
discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is no obligation of Respondent
Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that the determination of the
selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a

FACTS: In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an
application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of
rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside
the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was designated
as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC
gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon
as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its
operations. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision,
which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the
authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a
petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is
authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro
Manila? HELD: Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain,
and operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches
within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations.
This can be seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long
as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The opinion
of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of
other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36b
56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 24 No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.183

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs
Case No. 241 No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927) Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the
CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner paid
under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Under the
law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and
duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said
containers within a 1year period. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to
an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the
Customs and Tariff Act. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import
taxes and duties. HELD: No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff
Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be
extended. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund,
offer two options to an importer. The first gives him the privilege of importing,
free from import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports
them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non-
extendible. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid
subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the articles
mentioned are exported within three years from importation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4,
38b, 43

FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to
United States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover.
Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant
collected wharfage dues on petitioners wharf. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect
wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. HELD: Yes. The Government can be
allowed to collect because not to do so would overthrow and destroy the whole
system of the Government, in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and
collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves, and it would have
defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. Dissenting
Opinion: Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed
or levied upon. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d
57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board
Case No. 164 No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960) Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ramos v. CA
Case No. 253 G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote
No.193

FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved
for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their
right. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983,
that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly
licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes
draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run,
the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and
entities by six. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.
HELD: No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is
permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not
entitled to the use of such days. Petitioners claim that the intent of the
legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are
untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire
House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioners claim that to allow the PCSO
to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable
because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6g, 37, 38b

FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement
confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for
additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on Sundays
and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn Administration
(RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distinct and separate
corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the President, a
governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the
price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out this function, by
law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA depends for its
continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General
Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretation by the
Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA workers and
employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter of
right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. ISSUE: W/N
RCA should be held answerable when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created
for the said obligation. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily
binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. The reason
for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government
called upon to implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President
specifically appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the
abovementioned obligation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11a, 38b
58 Salaria v. Buenviaje
Case No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote
No.193

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
University of the Philippines v. CA
Case No. 305 G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote
No.195

FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the
said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the
premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the
City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI
through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court.
Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No.
970 was issued by the President stating that except for the causes for judicial
ejectment of lessees bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree
are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereon is
personal use of the property by the owners or their families. Construction by
Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts
must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to
implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely,
personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of
the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 30a, 38b

FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from
dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be
dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the
Civil Service Commissioner. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the
case by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by the Civil
Service Commission. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was
initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and
E.O. 94, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme
Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and
final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil service
employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital,
independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board
of Appeals. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b
59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations
Case No. 120 G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Everett v. Bautista
Case No. 43 G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939)

FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the
certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in
Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429
PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note:
NAFLU didnt obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) Petitioner contends that the
spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent
answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace
Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply
to the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of
Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no grave
abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied
Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to
public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a,
39a

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queens
Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. The partnership charged admission fees of
P0.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.40 but not more than P0.70
per seat. During the first Quarter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.41. At
that time, imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters,
cinematographs, etc. whose admission price exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No.
128). The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily
receipts are not made at the same rate. As such, the Collector of Internal Revenue
issued Regulations No. 94, which states that the daily receipts of prices charged
differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458
of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of
the tax imposed. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to
Sec. 1458. They were asked to pay P992.50, which they refused to pay. ISSUE: 1. W/N
the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 2. W/N Regulations No. 94 is
in accordance with law. HELD: Yes to both. The interpretation given to a law by an
officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be
respected. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of
the law, contemporaneous construction is given weight. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong
Case No. 62 G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988)

FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank
of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted
and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of
DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the
arbiters decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA
then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a
motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAAs motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging
Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE:
1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering
that it has become final and had been partially executed. 2. W/N Sec. 2 of
Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD: A judgment in a
labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment.
In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and
is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy
Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the
Labor Code. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. And also, if a
contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared null and
void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 17, 37, 40c

FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and

Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on
September 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that
will retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123
granted a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January
1, 1977, provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will
be given the difference. Management argues that since on April 2, there has been an
agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00.
Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting
the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption
since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed. ISSUE: W/N
the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123. HELD: No. There was no formal
agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase. Moreover, the opinion of the
Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI
Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission
Case No. 293 G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) Chapter III, Page 206,
Footnote No.206

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Yra v. Abao
Case No. 316 G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928) Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote
No.214

FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax
for their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premium
remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know
that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the
assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization is
embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are imposed
on them. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the
Social Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law
for late payment of remittances. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. Petition
is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the
Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties, it has no
legal authority to condone, waive, or relinquish the penalty for late premium
remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. The reason of the law is to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people to provide employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age, and death. Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant
since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of the law is clear and the
intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation.
LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26

FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a
registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is that
he/she who is running should be a duly qualified elector therein. ISSUE: W/N
Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. HELD: Yes. He is
qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the Philippine
Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil.
Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was
not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, qualified
elector meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter
and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Executive
Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient that he
possess the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifications
stated in Sec. 432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disregard the
forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, qualified
electors and qualified voter the law means what it says. It would be an
absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own
municipality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 3a, 6c, 11a
62 Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR
Case No. 134 G.R. No. L-6741 (January 31, 1956) Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footnote
No.222 & 227

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In re: McCulloch Dick
Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote
No.223

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU

buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue agent
for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been
issued by Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not
state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of the
Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the agent
assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a refund
and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their
favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the Court of Appeals decision is
erroneous. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment or tolls, or any penalty in relation thereto. The decision of the Court
of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. Sec. 121 falls within the scope of
administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. 79 of the
Revised Administrative Code. b. The regulation (Sec. 121) is valid also because of
the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. The regulations were
approved on September 16, 1924. When the National Internal Revenue Code was
approved on February 18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, bills of landing
and receipts were re-enacted. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4

FACTS: Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed
for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the
acting chief of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the
Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-
General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form
prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General
has the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code to
institute and maintain deportation proceedings. HELD: Yes, the Governor-General has
the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. When the provisions
of Act No. 2113 were enacted and continued in force by the enactment of the
Administrative Code and again continued in force by the enactment of the Jones
Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral
part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction
which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to
know the effect which such statutes originally had, and by reenactment to intend
that they should again have the same effect. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 4, 9a
63 Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-19392 (April 14, 1965) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.222
and 224

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Laxamana v. Baltazar
Case No. 144 G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote
No.225

FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into

reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the
Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance
premiums and, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff
filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from
withholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by
foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines.
Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. 53 and 54 were substantially re-enacted by RA
1065, 1291 and 2343, said rulings should be given the force of law under the
principle of legislative approval by re-enactment. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be
withheld. HELD: No. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a
statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government
agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the
provisions without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent
that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. This principle is not
applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate
was amended. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in
unpublished letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these
rulings. Finally, the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability.
This took place within the Philippines, thus subject to income tax. LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 4

FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However, the
Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appointed
herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume
office. HELD: Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the
Revised Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code,
applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special
provision overrides a general one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21
does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. It has also been consistently
held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the
legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation.
Hence, upon re-enacting Sec. 2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been
adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 4, 38b, 50
64 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
Case No. 32 G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 1936) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote
No.226

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur
Case No. 187 G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996) Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote
No.232

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. He
relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the
provisions of Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits
under the vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of
the peace to gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the
Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence,
was not subject to item-veto. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7
was valid. HELD: Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legislature
intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the
possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can
constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Furthermore, the legislature
accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. The executive department
sustained the validity of the veto as well. Contemporaneous construction is not
decisive for the courts, but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted
and accepted the construction of statutes, they must be given great respect. Also,
this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has
long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of
unconstitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 2b, 3a, 6c

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since
its tax exempt status was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioners failure
to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder.
Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. With
the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax
exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends
that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case
between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have
power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the
President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be
given exemptions. Note however, that the Albay case was already superceded by the
Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the
requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. In
the present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly
approved by the Minister of Finance. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent Province and
provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against, and thereafter
sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect
collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. 2. W/N Petitioner
has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including its exemption
from payment of RPT. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status, but its
privileges were only suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT
against the Petitioner. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was never delinquent in
paying RPT, the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioners assets is also
considered void. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a, 49
65 J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova
Case No. 64 G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
J.M. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration
Case No. 135 G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970) Chapter XI, Page 434, Footnote
No.7

FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land

located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein
Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land
registration proceeding. The Tuasons prayed that the petition be dismissed on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed
to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the
Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity
of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin
vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was
also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 5a,
5b

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They
seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the
estate. Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, The Congress may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals Petitioner contends that said law
is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to lands not
landed estates. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The question is
one of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly states that land not
landed estates can be expropriated. It has a broader scope, allowing the
legislature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not distinguish between
different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long as there is a
need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c,
24a, 26, 37, 40c
66 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 154 G.R. No. L-34150 (October 16, 1971)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aglipay v. Ruiz
Case No. 4 G.R. No. 45459 (March 13, 1937)

FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the
Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was to
be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the
November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitution: The
Congress in a joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification. ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in
Sec. 1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1. HELD: There was a violation.
Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people
for their ratification in an election, An election only means one. Also, no fixed
frame of reference is given to the voter. No one knows what changes in the
fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. The amendments being
proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Petitioner, who is the
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition of such
because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the sale of
such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom.
HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act. No. 4052
grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a, 37
67 U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
Case No 295 G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922) Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ordillo v. COMELEC
Case No. 192 G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990) Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No.24

FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price
at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by
law. E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products
under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not
defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor
General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to
the Governor General are, Defendant will not be charged. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2868 is
unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The act is
unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial.
As known, no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law
delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can
never be delegated under a republican form of government. This power is exclusive
to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is dealing with private property
and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and the city of Baguio.
Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolutions and
memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces
voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao
being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone, legally and
validly constitute a region. HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that there shall be created autonomous regions consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas From this, it can be
derived that the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also show that the Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 11g, 25a, 28
68 De los Santos vs. Mallare
Case No. 89 G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950) Chapter XI, Page 440 and 450,
Footnote No.33 and 54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
Case No. 64 G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991) Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454,
Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71

FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioners removal from the same
office which would be the effect of Respondents appointment. Petitioner contends
that under the Constitution, he can not be removed against his will and without
cause, citing Sec. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: No officer or
employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause
provided by law. Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer belongs to
the unclassified service. According to Lacson vs. Romero, all officers or
employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision; but
notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545
of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure
any of the officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two
provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. ISSUE: W/N the position of
City Engineer is an unclassified service. HELD: No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution, it is clear that Sec. 4 protects those appointed into the service
that do not fall as any of the following: policydetermining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature. The position of city engineer is
neither of the above-stated. This is confirmed by the enactment of C.A. No. 177. As
a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil
Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the rules of
construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the
sense they have in common use. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los
Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the
emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is
removed for cause, and that Respondents appointment is ineffective in so far as it
may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. LATIN MAXIM: 39

FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This
runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 7,
Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD: No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the provision. The practice of holding
multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment,
particularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the
broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The former is meant
to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective
public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest
intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284 is therefore
declared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, b2
69 People of the Philippines vs. Muoz
Case No. 217 G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989) Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote
No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46

FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The penalty for
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution providing that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling
that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. HELD: No. In the case at
bar, the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of
penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not follow the
Masangkay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua. LATIN MAXIMS: 1, 6c, 20a

FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and
compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the
judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes.
The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax.
According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution of judges
salaries because the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Endencia vs. David confirmed
Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of
the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art.
8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the members of the
judiciary taxable. LATIN MAXIM: 3, b1
70 Taada v. Cuenco, et al
Case No. 286 G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapter XI, Page No. 451,
Footnote No.55

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aratuc v. COMELEC
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnote
No.62

FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel,
Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as
member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel,
Lopez, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other
Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however,
that six members of the Electoral Tribunal shall be members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is mandatory. The word shall is imperative in nature
relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as
members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. HELD: No. The application
of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted except as to
matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other
department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon
the courts, even in a doubtful case. Hence, if the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any
paramount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
6b, 9b, 11a

FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to
address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang
Pambansa. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by
the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the
Petitioners. HELD: No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the
Supreme Courts power over COMELEC decisions in 1935, the Supreme Court may
review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondents
decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the
1973 Constitutions intent to strengthen Respondents independence. Consequently,
errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in
certiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9a, 25a
71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta
Case No. 59 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Magtoto v. Manguera
Case No. 159 G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote
No.79

FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within 2
months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987
Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. On
the one hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled
within 90 days of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibits the
President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections,
except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at
stake. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. HELD: No, the appointments were
void. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the
Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the special circumstance of
Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years. Temporary
appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The prohibition is for
public policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments which is more
compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 35, 36b,
38a, 50, b

FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New
Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: Any person
under investigationshall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible. Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two
informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial
confession dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it
was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his
having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE: 1. W/N
the Petitioners extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible as
evidence. 2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied
retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioners confession is admissible. The court ruled
that a confession obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been
informed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession
is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution. 2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has
prospective effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite
unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 46a
72 Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. 106 G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives
Case No. 66 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457,
Footnote No.82

FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of
a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as
the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime
and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn
statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. The
1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that
such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him
retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. ISSUE:
1. W/N the Petitioners extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the
presence of a counsel. 2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be
applied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without
the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by
such argumentation, be admissible. 2. No. The specific provision of the 1987
Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during
custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be
applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was
made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 46a

FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Samar,
as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987
Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935
Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been
born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. ISSUE:
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. W/N this provision should
be applied retroactively. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the
Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be
accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. They need not perform any act of election granted that his
father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was only 9
years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks
to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born
of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children
born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9a, 42a
73 Sarmiento v. Mison
Case No. 277 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 458, Footnote
No.84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Domingo v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 37 G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on express
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 provides for
officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. HELD: No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the
appointment, by the President of heads of executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution with the requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position heads of bureaus from CA confirmation with the
intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a
venue for horse-trading, and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute
power of appointment in the President. The word also in the second sentence of
Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second
sentence shall be appointed in a like manner as that of the first group. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b

FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the
personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the
Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts
showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting
transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that even if
she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation allowance
on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a commutable
transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided
with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the
vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly
provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are
assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 24a
74 Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar
Case No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission
Case No. 76 G.R. No. L-37661 (November 16, 1932)

FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it

appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air
conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform
her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for
other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back
wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Labor
Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of
Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold
Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD:
The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to
this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations
between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as
systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner
merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with
Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivars questionable
activities. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the
carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Respondent
required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days
an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his
trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with
compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law. ISSUE: W/N the
amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No. 3316 conferred
jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioners business, although it is not
a common carrier. HELD: The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase for public use in
the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to
extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public
use. Public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase for
hire or compensation does not show the intent either. This is a stock phrase found
in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. Also, notwithstanding
the changes in the wording of the definition of the term public service
introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations made in the basic provisions
of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 36b
75

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ROUND 2
76 Aparri v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 15 G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Quijada
Case No. G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)

FACTS: R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation

Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint
and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the
President. On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing
Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. On March 15, 1962, the Board approved
Resolution No. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of
office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962. ISSUE: W/N Resolution
No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. HELD: No, Petitioners term
of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to
appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. The word term
describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such
term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of
office is not fixed by law, but by the Board. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c

FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was

convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 248 of
the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par
2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. ISSUE: 1) W/N
the trial courts judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid
down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to modify the
judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866
integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single
integrated offense. HELD: 1) The trial courts judgment is affirmed. 2) 2nd par of
Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two
offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal possession with homicide or
murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the occasion of to evince
an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause
with the use of. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
77 Baranda v. Gustillo
Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote
No.5

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
Case No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court,
after discovering that private respondents TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered
a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a
motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group filed a
separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of
said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked
to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the
pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents
the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of
petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. 2. What
is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice
of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. Respondent Judge abused
his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand. He forgot the 1st
par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens Before
the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
Court after proper showing that it is necessary to protect the rights of those
who caused it to be registered. 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, It shall be
the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration . If the instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating
the ground therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly
accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were
charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife
and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA,
Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-
inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law.
Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No, he is
not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused from the very
beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an
unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and
imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution
was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he
does not fall under RA 7309. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 25a
78 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan
Case No. G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Tanada v. Yulo
Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11

FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for
NPCs Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after the
PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban
Consolidated Constructors, were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Since
all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the
committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board
approved, but for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled.
Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending
undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
gross inexcusable negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office.
ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under
preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. HELD: Yes, it is
mandatory. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon
government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex,
regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from
office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the
information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v.
Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 5a, 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the
consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his
service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on
October 35, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory
the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said
Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the
directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease
holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to
hold office. 2. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires
confirmation by the Philippine Commission. HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to
hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office
are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter.
Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in
good behavior or does not become incapacitated. No, his transfer is not a new
appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the
jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
79 Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera
Case No. 146

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Radio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com.
Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)

G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the
Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience, to be able to
operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant
already in the same area, opposed Respondents application, claiming that public
convenience did not need another ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the
Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter
the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate
the ice plant. After which, Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one except
the Commissioner may hear contested cases. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera
to hear the case is lawful. HELD: No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32
of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys
the right to receive evidence or take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides
that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates, the
reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. Thus,
though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle
contested cases, where the law is clear, the Commission nor the Court may not
disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus, you have to look
at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applying the law. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a, 36b

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a

radio communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC).
Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, the
Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems
in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a complaint
by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didnt have a
certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for any public
service to operate. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy
before it can validly operate. HELD: Yes, they need such certificates to validly
operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Service
Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public
convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and
EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must issue a
certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications
systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c,
30, 46a, 49
80 National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista
Case No. 198 G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their
union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they
blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises.
Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private
property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor
Arbiter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that
can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of
the NLRC? HELD: Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. In the Labor Code, Sec.
217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. However, P.D. 1367 amended
Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award
damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. 217 to return the
jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the same section, but
without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from
employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no
jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a

FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which states that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased. HELD: In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that Art. 992
of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Art. 992. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual,
full blood brother of their father. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 36b
81 People v. Amigo
Case No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote
No.16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Santayana
Case No. 115 No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial
court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him
despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in
effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the
1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had
been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime
of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other
periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. HELD: In People
vs. Muoz, the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will
readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7b

FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years, and
to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of
the CIS, which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him
from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes. At the time of
appellants apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case
of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section
879. LATIN MAXIM: 46a
82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson
Case No. 184 G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969) Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.
Case No. 90 G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997) Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26

FACTS: On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance
of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount was
fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial
case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The
complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten
years from December 21, 1955 expired was considered to be December 21, 1965. HELD:
NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960
and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten
(10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955,
expired on December 19, 1965. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a

petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition
based on the argument that the constitutional provision on peoples initiative can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate
statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: NO.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for
the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of things,
the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43
83 Villanueva v. COMELEC
Case No. 170 No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mario R. Melchor v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 177 G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991) Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.35

FACTS: On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion
Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner
won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed
Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioners candidacy
was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment
of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that
Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw
after January 4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of
formal or technical defects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not
sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the peoples will in
favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the
very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of
the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its
literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of
last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. LATIN
MAXIM: 1, 9a, 39c

FACTS: On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-

Industrial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction
for the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a
certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to
sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Education.
During construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost
increase, but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses.
Consequently, the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the
payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of
signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For this reason
the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. W/N the petitioner should be held
personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. HELD: No. The chief
accountants issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial
compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. The
contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the
Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for the Court to compel the
Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968, to shoulder
the construction cost of the building, which was being utilized by the school when
he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9a, 12a
84 Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay
Case No. 50 G.R. No. L 26754 (October 16, 1970) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote
No.38

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Jesus v. City of Manila
Case No. 86 G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote
No.41

FACTS: Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove
his house. Petitioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on
May 6, 1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitioner filed
a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Respondent to
pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for
suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. The Court granted the
motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent
Court. For this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated
Dec. 6, 1963 and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion holding that its
decision dated Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the
reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. ISSUE:
W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was
time-barred.

FACTS: In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila
which was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectly
declared the size of the land. So, from 1901 1907, the original owner was paying
lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 1910. Upon
finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid the
taxes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-
1910. Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount.
Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from
before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. Taxes
may not be due and payable until they are assessed. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should
still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. HELD: Petitioner should only
pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9a, 38b, 43,
50

HELD: No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and
executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondents motion for
execution was filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days elapsed. From this
period, the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a
period of 3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, only 3
years, 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Hence
Private Respondents motion for execution was not time-barred. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9c,
11a, 11d, 11e
85 Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong
Case No. 45 G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1988)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Morales v. Paredes
Case No. 83 G.R. No. L-34428 (December 29, 1930)

FACTS: In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the
private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance.
The increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same day.
Sec. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor
within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977, the
company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying
the increase. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the
company. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. ISSUE: 1. W/N the
first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 2. W/N the
petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance.
HELD: No, the application was not a strict rule. The purpose of the PD is to
protect wages and income. The law takes into consideration that there is a
possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and
such incapability may happen anytime within the year. No, only the Department of
Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position
to pay. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. In absence of
any grave abuse of discretion, their recommendations will be respected by the
courts. Moreover, the company was able prove their financial situation by giving
financial statements. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 9a, 42

FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other
people have already registered such land as their own. Respondent Judge granted the
registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. While the Motion was
still pending, Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying
that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be
granted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: W/N a
new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not
have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other adequate
remedies available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should be
finished first. LATIN MAXIM: 9c
86 Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 125 G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Guia v. COMELEC
Case No. 30 G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz
Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed
this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted
by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural
child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the
natural child for it will go against Art. 335. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for
the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. HELD: The
law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the
intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would
be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny
the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it
comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not
prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a
natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also
and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b

FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the
Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. ISSUE:
W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials
of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.
HELD: No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the
Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the
Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically
stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two
and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be
interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation
of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the
single district provinces. The court realized that the language of the law in this
case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the
purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in
the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative
districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992
elections. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2
87 Salenillas v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 68 G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sarcos v. Castillo
Case No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969) Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No.
48

FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine

National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the
property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property
under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the
property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis--vis the said
property. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already
prescribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the
right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescription period
had already prescribed. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal
heirs. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act.
Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. With
regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a
foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. For
foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration
of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. LATIN
MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of
Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in
office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private
individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on
the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the
Decentralization Act of l967. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order
such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. HELD: The new
law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial
Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the
power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of
suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive
suspension over a Municipal Mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49
88 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 7 G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997) Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No.
53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa
Case No. 69 G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61

FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line
leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line
leaders did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not
allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit
written explanations as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents
tendered their explanation letters. Despite their explanation, they were not
allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the
management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to
sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But other line leaders were allowed to
resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6, l993. ISSUE: 1. W/N the
failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work
constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting
the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under
the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed
employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new doctrine
allowed the awarding of full backwages and also prevented the company from
deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the
pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a
period of not exceeding three years. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49

FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their participation in the failed coup detat on December l to 9,
l989. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court
Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to
peremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that
the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential
Decree. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial
investigation. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right
of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal basis for
the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners.
HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was
declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was
effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation
of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may
be referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were
abolished, the right to peremptory challenge was revived. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a, 10
89 Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No.69

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 151 G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957) Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote
No.76

FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After
the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of
the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void. The trial court ruled that this case was not
covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased
and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. ISSUE: W/N the
prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. HELD: Yes. It is a
fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the
ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility
of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other,
there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix
and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 9c

FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs Collector
assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties were
paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector reassessed
the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed
additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax
Court. Provision says that the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of
Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has
jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons
affected thereby. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Collector of Customs. HELD: Yes, there is indeed a disparity
between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of
the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word
Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme Court cited that
under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the
Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling,
the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent
clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous
intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not
the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is
important. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 16a, 16c, 36a
90 Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)

FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds
of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig
Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed an
action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a
clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper
since there is no showing that, as provided by law, there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended
to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy
remedy in the ordinary courts of law. HELD: There appears to be a typographical
error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: When the
complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior
tribunal, it may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary courts of law. The phrase courts of law should read as course of
law. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said
section in the California Code reads course of law instead of courts of law.
Spanish translation of said Sec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature
intended. In Spanish, the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary courts of
law. On its face, this evident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would
render the law nonsensical. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the
statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intent and
to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a,
36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37

FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax
credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondents payment for 1960 was
found to be short. Thus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together
with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10,
1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the
computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due,
claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the
difference between the deficiency tax and Respondents overpayment. ISSUE: 1. W/N
Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. W/N
Respondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its hands
the sum of P221, 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. Having been
paid and received by mistake, the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had
the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that payment is
made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.
Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the government as of
July, 1960, whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the
government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest
could be charged. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in
such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be
countenanced. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give
words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover,
a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect
to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b
91 People v. Villanueva
Case No. 116 G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Duque
Case No. 106

G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)

Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97

FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries
with damage to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the courts
jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was forwarded
to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without jurisdiction
because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and
even applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the
Justice of Peace. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction.

FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor
authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides that the
offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to
compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. According to Accused, a literal
reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. ISSUE: What
is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription
began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the
complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or
authority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but Accused does not
benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way as to give
effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. Institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as
surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word until. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 11a,
11d, 12, 15, 38

HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was with
the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Court of
First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of
property, it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less
serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there is the
possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of
the case and establish only the damage to property. The Justice of Peace, if given
jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2,636 fine for
the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be less than the amount of
the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 5, 11
92 Bello v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 15 G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 306 G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996) Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.112

FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which
should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a
petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50,
Sec. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to
certify the case to the proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the
dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and
mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent
Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the
Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to
Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First
Instance as principal party respondent and thus it could not grant any relief at
all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities.
ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of
judicial decision. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute,
defeating its purpose and stressed that it is the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity.
The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3
as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court
cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was requested
by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the
law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters. At the
Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as Oscar Perez.
Petitioners real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the
Ombudsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142. ISSUE: W/N
the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by
C.A. No. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court
may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to
injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be
construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
11a, 12a, 41a
93 Paat v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95 G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pritchard v. Republic
Case No. 245 G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page
156

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in
illegal logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing
Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the
order of confiscation in favor of the Governmentas well as the machinery,
equipment which are illegally used ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in
light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705. HELD: No. The above-quoted provision should be read
together with Sec. 68a. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to
be achieved and the evil to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a

FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from
filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for
exemption, it is imperative that Petitioners children should be enrolled during
the entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all
of his children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions required
to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. Issue: W/N the
Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the
aforementioned provision. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be
interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any
time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. The drafters of
the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. LATIN
MAXIM: 11a, 19a
94 Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page
156

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page
159

FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral
damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in
order to draw from the Americans bank account to pay the fees. China Bank
responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that
foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any
other process of any court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh,
such is the law and stood firm on the policy. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central
Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made
applicable to a foreigner. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the
exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted
during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As,
some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has
now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it
is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent,
stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined,
stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39

FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit,
considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of
Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members
in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but
not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous
decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to
reject the returns from Precinct 7. 2. W/N the board members who were candidates
for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a
municipal board of canvassers. 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of
canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general
elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled
that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of
municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election, despite
the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a canvassing board may
not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility
of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The law states any
member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office
in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body. Since Respondent
Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no
reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are
otherwise regular. LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26
95 National Housing Corporation v. Juco
Case No. 86 G.R. No. L-64313 (January 17, 1985)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Mejia
Case No. 111 G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997)

FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner,
Private Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and
Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as
Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for
dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past decisions,
decided in favor of the Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are
covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil
service. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private
stockholders. The 1935 constitutions section 1 article 12 states that A civil
service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided
by law. While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution
states that The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the government, including every government owned or controlled
corporation. Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation
carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Furthermore,
P.D. 807 Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, the Labor Code
states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law.
LATIN MAXIM: 6, 7, 24, 26, 38b

FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: Sec. 14. Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the phrase is killed covers both homicide and murder. 2. If the
crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death? 3. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate
offense. HELD: The words is killed make no distinction between homicide and
murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of
carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no difference in so far as the penalty
is concerned. The killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a
separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. The phrase is killed
refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated murder. Frustrated homicide
(or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the
clause of Sec. 14 by means of violence or in intimidation of persons. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 38a, 43, 48
96 City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines
Case No. 23 G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146

FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the
annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA
5447), which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent
tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum
limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125,
effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half
percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the
Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is
void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city
of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: W/N the tax
ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in
Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manilas contention that the additional
one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education
Fund Law that the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per
centum. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and
one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the
maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half
percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law
fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality.
The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax
at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent
as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned
ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49

FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those
who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive
officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua,
believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an
application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however,
denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the
same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded
from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petition is granted.
The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine
of necessary implication in deciding this case. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a,
20b, 37
97 Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal
Case No. 280 G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Richard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano II
Case No. 116 G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.171

FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for
failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner
contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and not the RTC. ISSUE: 1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case. 2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD
1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondents
argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that
should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 20c, 50

FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City
Drugstore. A test buy operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were
sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctors prescription, gave rise to the
closure ordered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked
the Mayors Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard
was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On
May 7, 1980, FDA approved Respondents request to exchange the locations of the two
drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this,
Petitioner then revoked the Mayors Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore.
ISSUE: The conflict between the FDAs and the mayors power to grant and revoke
licenses for the operation of drugstores. RULING: The FDA had the authority to
order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the Mayor however did not. In the
case of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the authority rested on the Mayor (local
jurisdiction). LATIN MAXIM: 20c, 38b
98 Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo
Case No. 155 G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 31, 1966) Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.178

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Concepcion
Case No. 205 G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote
No.202

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the 60-61 salary
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general
fund. The position, then held by the Petitioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to
the court on mandamus, wherein the Respondents motion to dismiss was granted hence
the current action. ISSUE: 1. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the
motion to dismiss? 2. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no, it
is not void. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action, which
can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. The question
raised is purely one of law. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and
opposition thereto. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies.
Further, petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance
is needed in abolishing his position. Such action was, however, done away with by
the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264). LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 20a, 32, 37, 49

FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion,

S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendants wife was a director of this co-partnership.
Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that
The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.
This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on
January 30, 1921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of
Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the interpretation and
construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a
punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant
contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away
basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the
Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b
99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote
No.205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioners

retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On
December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from
1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation
for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and
sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986.
Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment
acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended
Petitioners clearance from accountability and after another special audit,
Respondent approved Petitioners application for retirement but added that of the
money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioners retirement benefits
may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to
the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be
subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146
(Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted shall not be
subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.
Withholding Petitioners benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the
rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because
the intention is to provide for the retirees well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d,
11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano
Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the
Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with
the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding
Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the
security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be
borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with
DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and
severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727
(Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a
salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint
and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the
Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges
on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727,
and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not
acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting
the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as
the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a
particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b
100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was
petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the
name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to
College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She
exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and
legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The
word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so
that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose
to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner
is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief

filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as
amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual
retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who
retire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent
through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and
received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of
the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize
retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual
pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of
retirement benefits and render the option under the law meaningless and nugatory.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a
101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in
which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was
assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under
Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: There shall be levied
collected and paid on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a
charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ISSUE: W/N the words
products of the Philippines excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are
from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without
undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced
in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear;
it must be obeyed. The Term product of the Philippines should be taken in its
usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa)
and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are products of
the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the
Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils
which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid
under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17
Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that no tax (imposed by this law) shall be
collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have
been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale
dealers. Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a
dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par
72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had
been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The
Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise dispose
of had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the
phrase disposed of meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor
was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that the
purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of
stipulations to the contrary. The phrase disposed of as used in Sec. 17 of Act
No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation.
LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43
102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut
Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale
storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of
Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo
vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San
Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of
these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the
Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of
Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of
Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64,
and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse
pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court
is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it
becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by
their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely
emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times
adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition,
the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum
Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in
writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far
as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a,
50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine,
condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the
steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts
not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by
customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators,
exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the
machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A
turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating
device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts
must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as
"other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43
103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Ramos
Case No. 163

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Malanyaon v. Lising et. al
Case No. 160 GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981) Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52

G. R. No. L-4268 (January 18, 1951)

Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51

FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against
Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and
reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages
aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of
preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the City of
Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the
premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc.
commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and Respondent
Corporation, in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from
proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000
damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge declared
that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so
dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and
Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out
of court. HELD: Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new
action, is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 30, 36a, 36b

FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his
incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his
death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension
pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, Should he be convicted by final
judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of
the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. HELD: No. It is obvious
that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means
that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court
found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the
case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phil. 722),
" Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on
the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 25a
104 Rura v. Lopena
Case No. 139

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947) Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60

G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985)

Chapter 5, Page 189, Footnote No.53

FACTS: Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa
committed on different dates. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. Only
a single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was
denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final
judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, which
disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from
applying for probation. The trial court denied his application on the belief that
since the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those
dates. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has
not yet been previously convicted. ISSUE: How should the word previously be
construed? HELD: The word previously refers to the date of the conviction and not
to the dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five counts of
estafa, they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when
Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction
on his record. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 48

FACTS: Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was
interrupted by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land
in this jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of
Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.
ISSUE: W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands as stated
in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: Under the Constitution, aliens may
not acquire private or public agricultural lands, which includes residential lands.
It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention
had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification
and its technical meaning then prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of
residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such
citizens. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for under the Constitution, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given by the Secretary of
Justice (1939) also supports the claim that residential land is part of public
agricultural lands. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have
always maintained that residential lots are included in agricultural lands. If
the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit
of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b
105 Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc.
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Garcia v. COMELEC
Case No. 109 G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993) Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page No.
192

FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as

immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be
limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the
classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants.
Petitioners contend that having been classified as non-quota immigrants, they
should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word
immigrant is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent
residence. ISSUE: W/N the word immigrant only refers to a person who comes into a
country for a permanent residence. HELD: The only definition given by our law to
the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the
Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant." The law gives
no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term
"immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for
permanent residence as now contended by appellants. A review of the whole law would
disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give
broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the
admission of immigrants into the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 36b

FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the
Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent
Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and
referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an
ordinance. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the
Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local
initiative. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of
an initiative and referendum.

HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is
granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum
(Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a
system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the subjects of
initiative. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution
in its definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage
of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still proper subjects of
an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9c, 11a,
50
106
Motoomull v. dela Paz Case No. 180 G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) Chapter V,
Footnote No.73, Page No. 195

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Nazario
Case No. 218 G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988) Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No.
197

FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the
Sarkara Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the
issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The
resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on
a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner
sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the
enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court however
held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not
stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body
rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it
may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted by the
officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be
raised only by motion in the main case. ISSUE: 1. W/N the word court refers to a
trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a
stay in the execution of the decision. HELD: Yes, the word court refers to the
trial court. The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall
not stay the appealed decision, award, order. The exception is given where the
officer or body rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should
provide otherwise. The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by
the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be raised
only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particular word or phrase
is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity
or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words. Accordingly, an
interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in
accordance with the legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12a, 36a

FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to
pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a
municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum. He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance
is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to
him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance is null
and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance applies to
Accused. HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at
bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above
provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the
fishponds, he comes within the term manager. While it appears that the National
Government is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits
they generated. It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of
the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to
include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is
immune from taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 37
107 People v. Evangelista
Case No. 106 G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988)

FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Private
Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and Parole
Officer recommended denial of Private respondents application for probation on the
ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right
to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officers
recommendation and granted Private Respondents application on April 23, 1993.
ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting
private respondents application for probation. HELD: Yes. Private Respondent filed
his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect.
It is thus covered by the prohibition that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction and that the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of
the right to appeal. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction,
Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. LATIN
MAXIM: 6, 26, 49

FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of
P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Managers checks which turned out to
have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check.
Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said
amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the
checks involved were non-negotiable checks. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over
checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes. As provided in the articles of
incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to clearing checks and other clearing
items. Clearly, the term checks refer to checks in general use in commercial and
business activities, including nonnegotiable checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks
are within the ambit of PCHCs jurisdiction. There should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the
law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26
108 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al.
Case No. 261 G.R. No. L-12560 (September 30, 1958) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote
No.90

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Velasco v. Lopez
Case No. 308 G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which
the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had
control to Petitioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties
upon payment of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agreement, the
company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving
mineral land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of
land, including mineral lands. HELD: Yes. Any land spoken of in this provision
obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral.
It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26

FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leaving a

last will and testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several
grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated. ISSUE: W/N the will of
Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. HELD:
Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code
explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: The
testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. After the
testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year,
month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud, (art 695) Any will,
in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter
have not been observed, shall be void. (art 687) The law explicitly defines what
shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such
formalities arent met. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in
favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may
disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the
entire system established by the code. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a
109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez
Case No. 67 G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Oliva v. Lamadrid
Case No. 191 G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote
No.96

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and

household remedies. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors is
among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the Central
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: Foreign exchanged
used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the
importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to
any importer making application therefore. The petitioner therefore seeks a refund
of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers
and flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange
Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class,
namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The
stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under
the category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it
is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioners arguments
effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as
stated above. Though stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might
fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such:
fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 29, 36

FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security
for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the
property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the land
could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemption was made
within that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that
under C.A. No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2), but five
(5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and
torrens title. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.A.
No. 141 of Sec. 5 of RA 720. HELD: No. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a
homestead patent and a torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in RA 601
and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. In July 30,
1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 is applicable to
foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent; therefore, the
plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Where the general law is the
Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act, they should be unified,
and should abide by the conditions of the times. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50,
b, b2
110 Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter V, Page 200,
Footnote No.97

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court
Case No. 234 G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times
during employment, fell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health,
Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent
Corporation, the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social
Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full
wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law.
Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay, they
cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as these are exclusive to those
not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners
were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security
Act. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as
sick leave pay by a private benefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the
privileges under the Social Security Act, would be to enable the employer to defeat
the purpose of the law. The Social Security Act, having been enacted for the
welfare of the employees, cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such
purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 2b, 3a, 38b

FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached
some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes
bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached
properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution
was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached
personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be
ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond
issued was valid. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond
limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the
payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical
conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if
returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore,
is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of
any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory
judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 24a,
26, 36a
111 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 251 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter 5, Page 201 ,
Footnote No.100

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pilar v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 242 G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100

FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a
confrontation in the latters office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him.
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a
criminal case. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense.
HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM:
6a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 24a, B2

FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent
Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law
that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either
won or lost. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a non-candidate, having
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec.
14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their
certificate of candidacy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2
112 Sanciangco v. Roo
Case No. 273 G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985) Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.106

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 38 G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of
Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental
under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said
elections. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran
for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate
of candidacy. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that
even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.
Since he is unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ipso facto
ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May
1984 Batasan elections. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b

FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum
of money and attorneys fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services
to Petitioner between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of
P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the
latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of
the complaint; attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation.
ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. In Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the court upheld the
validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. The Courts holding
clearly debunks Petitioners insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the
memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrative or Executive Acts, Orders
and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 9a, 37 49
113 Castillo-Co v. Barbers
Case No. G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Martin
Case No. 214 G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971) Chapter 5, Page 204, Footnote No.110

FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging
irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial
Engineer. The items purchased were reconditioned instead of brand new and
included other irregularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus
Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive
suspension for 6 months. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power
to sign the order of preventive suspension. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman
possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. HELD: Yes. The
deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners.
There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the
Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions
classified as grade 27 or above. The word or is clearly disjunctive in this case
signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the
Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically
in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the
ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan
against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese
Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the
act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and
harboring. HELD: No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides
that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses its own
distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot
be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the
other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere
surplusage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 37, 15b
114 GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc.
Case No. 49 G.R. No. 126496 (April 30, 1997)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.
Case No. 158 G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130

FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of
telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate.
The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and
the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. ISSUE:
Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of
Commissioner Kintanar. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should
be reached by a majority vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows
that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners
suggesting its collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void
ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 15a, 24a

FACTS: PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order
to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations,
religious elements, womens and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily
denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances
disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by virtue of
the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the
operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their
citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. ISSUE: W/N the two ordinances as
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. HELD: The two
local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., this
Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the LGC, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress gambling and other
prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the
LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect
to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50
115 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Company
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971) Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 135

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Santiago
Case No. 224 G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962) Chapter V, Page 136, Footnote No. 211

FACTS: Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built LPG

tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it
to the companys plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the
importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary
industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the
term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is
any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. ISSUE:
W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an industry as
contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the
special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. HELD: Philippine
Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax exemptions are held
strictly against the taxpayer. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the
meaning of the term industries to activities that tend to produce or create or
manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and
general definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for
Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term
is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other
industries in general. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43

FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel."
The accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against
Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred
persons. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime
charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged
in the information is oral defamation, under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or
libel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353, of the same Code. HELD: The facts
alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. The word
"radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated,
all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a
means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that
prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission
and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between
transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by means of an amplifier
system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires"
intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has also been held in the
United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a
speaker over the radio constitute libel. LATIN MAXIM: 11h, 25a, 28, b2
116 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar
Case No. 45 G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966) Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No.
211

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC
Case No. 272 G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988) Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138

FACTS: Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during
a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid,
nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, Caltex
requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said
contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief. ISSUE: W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the
term gift enterprise which is banned by the Postal Law. HELD: No, said contest is
not a gift enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a game of chance where the
elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term gift
enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable any
lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind means such enterprise as
will require consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to
suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals.
There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is
preserved. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 28

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash

to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the
corporation. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled Modified Grande
Pasteurization Process and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied
utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the
NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega
falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. HELD: No, said
money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The jurisdiction of
the NLRC is outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 3 all
money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement While par. 3 refers to all money claims of workers, it is
not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed
into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the
context formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2 (terms and conditions of
employment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited activities). The
unifying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out
of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scope of par. 3 is
clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some
reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. LATIN MAXIM:
28, 36b, 36e
117 Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon
Case No. 114 G.R. No. 13983 (September 1, 1919) Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No.
141

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Industry Commission
Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-41315 (November 13, 1986)

FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage
because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from
Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: Perils
of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons,
barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and
misfortunes The trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is
not liable. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable
for the loss. HELD: No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner
for redress and not to the insurer. The words all other perils, losses, and
misfortunes are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with
the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in
the contract. A loss which, in the ordinary course of events, results from the
natural and inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the
ship, or from the negligent failure of the ships owner to provide the vessel with
proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a peril
of the sea. The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar
perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the cargo was improperly
stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure
to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was appropriately held that the
ship was not seaworthy. LATIN MAXIM: 29

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no

jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in
the name of Manuel Yap. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the
contractual disputes. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. A
detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express
provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.
Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of
jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. What the law intend here is to be all
embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not
mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. Thus, the jurisdictional
power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not
judicial. The phrase, to set the conditions means the right to prescribe rules
and conduct. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. Such
limitation is included in the provision in Sec. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25, 30, 31, 36
118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Case No. 43 G.R. No. 123248 (October 16, 1997) Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.158

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson
Case No. 257

FACTS: La Tondea registered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA

6231, the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly
known as Ginebra San Miguel. Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner
for using the 350 c.c., white flint bottles with the mark La Tondea, Inc. and
Ginebra San Miguel stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with
Petitioners liquor product bearing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and
distribution, without La Tondeas written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of
RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. ISSUE: W/N La Tondea was part of the protected
beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. HELD: The words other lawful beverages is
used in its general sense, referring to all beverages not prohibited by law.
Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although
regulated, is not prohibited by law; hence, it is within the purview and coverage
of RA 623, as amended. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very
purpose of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 26, 29

FACTS: Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth

beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private
Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting
evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his
supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly in
the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created
by the PCGG to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, both retired and in active service. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may
be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation
of RA 3019 and 1379. HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the
term subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close
association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to
the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2. LATIN MAXIM: 28,
30, 36b, 38
119 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote
No.133

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
United States vs. Sto. Nino
Case No. 302 Chapter V, Page 220, Footnote No.172

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is

prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec.
2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question
being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. ISSUE: W/N
the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as stated by
Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the
Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as
provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code. HELD: Yes. The imported foodstuffs are
considered prohibited importation under Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code. LATIN MAXIM: 29

FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted under
Act No. 1780, which stated that it shall be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly
weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the
possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to
carry the same under the provision of this Act. The trial court ruled that, using
the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE:
W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. HELD: No. The trial
court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in
determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule must
give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered
by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
29
120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission
Case No. 263 G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961) Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote
No.175 Rep. v. Estenzo Case No. G.R. No. L 35376 (September 11, 1980)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic

Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Archbishop of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise
known as the Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that the term
employer as defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem
generis--- be limited to those who carry on undertakings or activities which have
the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain, because
the phrase activity of any kind in the definition is preceded by the words any
trade, business, industry, undertaking. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can
be applied in this case. HELD: No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of
the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term
employer is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable
institutions or entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the
fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not
included. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 29

FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral

Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners
filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE: W/N
RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which
were declared public lands. HELD: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. The
Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of
the judiciary is to apply laws, not interpret it. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 30, 32
121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes
Case No. 130 G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 1915) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 180

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino
Case No. 97 G.R. No. L 38268 (May 31, 1979) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate
daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa.
Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea, and had begotten a natural child by a
priest, Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Aurea have since died. The lower court held
that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the
estate of Francisca. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. HELD:
Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgated on December. 18, 1899, repealed the law that
priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Since Vicente was born in
1905 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an acknowledged natural
child. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 35, 49

FACTS: Vicente A. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7
children. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all
liabilities or obligations of the decedent. Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a
Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. The trial
court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time
limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. A Petition for
Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court
claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of
the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the
petition has merit. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The
liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged
by the Partition Agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 29, 30a, 45a
122 Ching Leng v. Galang
Case No. G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Acosta v. Flor
Case No. 5 G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905) Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No.
187

FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He

and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the
adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The
petition was later granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based
on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization, the children are
now considered as Filipino citizens, (2) adoption gave the adopted children the
same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter, (3)
since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter, the children are
considered Filipino Citizens. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child
through adoption. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 254
of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is
not a part of the said enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Code does
not include acquisition of citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law that
provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring
citizenship and adoption is not part of it. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the
Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly
elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the
same. However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latters
allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor
can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a
result of said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of
Municipal President of Laoag, now held by Defendant. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff
maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of
said office? HELD: No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may be,
the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all
citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it
would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such
far-reaching importance. LATIN MAXIM: 30a
123 Lerum v. Cruz
Case No. 146 G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No.
192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao
Case No. 55 G.R. No. L-25811 (April 3, 1968) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193

FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and
Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative
value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance
of a divorce decree. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory
relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruzs
testimony? HELD: No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under
Sec 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a
person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. The sufficiency and
probative value of a testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory relief
in the instant case, is not included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed order
is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant to
RA 2370, declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city.
Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio
Poblacion, also called barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes
collected on real property located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of RA
3590. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount
pertaining to the said barrio, in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be
determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as
required by law. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao Citys Treasurer,
Council, Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which
dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the
passage of RA 4354, amending the charter of Davao City. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal
order was correct. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated
the barrios comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the Petitioner.
Thus, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio
Central as part of Davao City. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in
Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes
under RA 3590. LATIN MAXIM: 30
124 Vera v. Fernandez
Case No. 55 G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
Case No. 312 G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No.
197

FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of
Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Tongoy.
The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total
sum of P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, as provided in the Tax
Code. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for
unpaid taxes. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. A perusal of the
aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary
obligations of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely
different from the claims enumerated therein. Par. 315 of the Tax Code states that
payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time the
assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with
interests, penalties, etc. Thus, before the inheritance has been passed to the
heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even without its having
been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 30,
44

FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower courts judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 11 as illegal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, are
owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordinance,
the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964.
ISSUE: 1. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Is the City
of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. Is it
oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Does it violate
the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed; the ordinance is valid.
1. No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the
local government. 2. Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments broad taxing
authority. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement
or apartment tax, which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. 2 of the Local
Autonomy Act. 3. No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that
no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax, which
should not apply; the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. 4. No.
Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or
character within the taxing authority. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 20c, 30, 35, 42
125 Santo To v. Cruz-Pao
Case No. 275 G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No.
199

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Samson v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 270 G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No.
200

FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was
sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed a
petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge, Hon. Cruz-Pao,
despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, on the ground that
granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that Santo To was
not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General
recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders
disqualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the probation law (P.D. 968) Sec.
9. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. The law gives
more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a first-time offender and his
offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent judge cannot assume
that To had not shown repentance. Besides, where the Probation Law expressly
enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits, the clear intent is
to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 36b

FACTS: Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, terminated the services of

Respondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through Administrative Order No. 3,
because of lack and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner, to
said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the
position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his
position was not covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can
only be removed for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance
ruled in favor of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed said decision. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD:
Yes, Talens termination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly
declared by law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a
position determines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law
provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except
those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are
policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the
legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for
otherwise, it would have included them in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30
126 Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
Case No. 107 G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No.
202

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos
Case No. 54 G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No.
203

FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as
his beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After
a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter
denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the
Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the
appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using expressio
unius exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death
resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Did
the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. The fact remains that
the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Furthermore, the
personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances
where no liability attaches to the insurance company. Failure to include death
through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from
liabilities resulting from such. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30

FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a

fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.
Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of
Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made
without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno
violated P.D. 1564, which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions
for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional
Office of the Department of Social services and Development. ISSUE: W/N the phrase
charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. HELD:
No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats
the words charitable and religious separately and independently from each
other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes
need a permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to
include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term
charitable should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious
purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48
127 Escribano v. Avila
Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote
No. 205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Manabat v. De Aquino
Case No. 161 G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208

FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel

against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now
the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avilas authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city
fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary
investigation, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower
the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written
defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First
Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney
of that city. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary
investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney.
The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct
preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of
that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The
power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the
constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to
issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. What is important to remember is that
preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the
general rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11e, 12, 37

FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, wherein
the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified
of the decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by registered mail
on September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually received by
the court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared that the
appeal was late and dismissed it. ISSUE: 1. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on
September 22, when they were deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24, when they
were actually received by the court. 2. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15
days. HELD: Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 27 Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post
office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Uniformity of
rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Thus, Petitioners filed their appeal
just in time. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 9c, 11d, 12a
128 Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners
Case No. 115 No. 32441. March 29, 1930 Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Primero v. CA
Case No. 126 G.R. Nos. 48468-69. November 22, 1989

FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to
the administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to
patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed
by subsequent Opium Laws. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.
HELD: No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Laws
cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or
remove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined
term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to
patients. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his
residence while PD 9, the prohibition against fan knives, balisong or clubs was
in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answers in his
defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was carrying, was neither a blunt nor
bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the
law against bladed or blunt weapons. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt
weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. HELD: No, the bayonet is a bladed
weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make no sense if possession of a fan
knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would be punishable while possession of
a bayonet would not. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30a
129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc.
Case No. 142 Oct. 23, 1987

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Roldan v Villaroman
Case No. 262 G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No.
229

FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board
members or are merely ex-officio board members. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the
association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio
members. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. There is
nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past
presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they
are automatically made ex officio members of the board. LATN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas
became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner,
denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of
Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and
their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a
certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the
decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The CA
then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing
with the trial. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. The CA
resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the
decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, which held that the
phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to its proximate
antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. This ruling is in
conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be
understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the
interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of
qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law, but this rule is subject to the
exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the
antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to the
whole. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2
130 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons
Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
Case No. 170 G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231

FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with
(a) active collaboration with the Japanese, and (b) previous association with
the enemy. When she, along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case,
was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29, 1944, she was detained by
said Government under that charge. And under the same charge during all the time
referred to, she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. ISSUE: W/N
Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. HELD: Yes. The constitutional mandate
laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Since the
Peoples Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction
should be read as one law, and since the language used in this court in construing
the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same
as the language used by the Peoples Court Act on the same subject, the most
natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before
conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the Peoples Court has uncontrolled
discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not
strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act offensive not
only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is contrary to
the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 11g, 12a,
26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in
ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so
despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts
to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts.
Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except
those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within
3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires
Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the
lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and
incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the
cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has every right
to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the
reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not
apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved,
and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made
by the developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or
condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to
facilities, improvements, and infrastructures. The word and is not meant to
separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. LATIN
MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 33
131 People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani
Case No. 227 G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974) Chapter V,
Page 234, Footnote No. 232

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Andres Borromeo v. Fermin Mariano
Case No. 38 G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921) Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No.
240

FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on
February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July
13, 1963 through the counsels wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10,
1963, forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the reglementary fifteen-day period
for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that
the appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. ISSUE: W/N the
fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision.
HELD: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word promulgation
should be construed as referring to judgment, while notice should be construed
as referring to order. Tamanis appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as
Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the
notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand
to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a 11g, 34

FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth
Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge
of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.
The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on
the basis of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code, which states that nothing herein
shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being
appointed to be judge of another district. ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to
sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. HELD: Yes. The concluding part of
Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be
construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the usual introductory word,
provided. The word appointed in the proviso should be given its meaning in the
ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or designation of an
individual. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges
of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the
respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions
of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign, retire or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appoint lies on the
appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence,
appointees consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In
upholding the independence of the judiciary and the states separation of powers,
the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37
132 ALU-TUCP v. NLRC
Case No. 2 G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 250

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Arenas v. City of San Carlos, Pangasinan
Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 251

FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five
year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular
workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims
that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is
necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider
them as regular employees. Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the
Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees. HELD:
No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were considered
project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that
they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are
automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project
employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that project is done, their
services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2
of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do
not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to
which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6, 33

FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual
salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of which
was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city
government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but
the Respondent City refused. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase
in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations,
the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be
higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. In case there is repugnancy between the
proviso and the main provision, the latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is
given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a
more mandatory tone. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 33, 43,48, b2
133 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Case No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No.
266

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank
Case No. 126 30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915) Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 272

FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630
did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because
the second and the third readings were done on the same day. The President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with
the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three
separate days. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code, has been constitutionally passed. HELD: There is no merit in
the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement
for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but
not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except"
clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To
construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in
the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the
very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate
enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency. LATIN MAXIM: 33

FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the
firm, Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the
Defendant corporation. Isabels remedy for this was to furnish certain securities
and obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real
properties of her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her
sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to
cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can
legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903,
and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their
real property with her consent. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of
the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and
property of their minor children. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed
some parts of the old Spanish code. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, there
is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the
age of majority. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation
documents, Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid,
while Zoilos mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because
he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. LATIN MAXIM: 49
134 Ocampo v. Buenaventura
Case No. 88 G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People
Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982) Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8

FACTS: On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained
Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228 which
fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance.
On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the ordinance
was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome assemblage, and
therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto Ocampo filed a
complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority,
and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the
policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for
the same grounds. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative
cases involving police service and personnel. HELD: The Respondents argument is
devoid of merit. The power of local officials to investigate and decide
administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to
the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v. Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the
Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases
involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of
the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board
of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into
effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 6d

FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because
she only assisted her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation.
ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of
Sec. 189. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance
agent. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a
kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term agent used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of
the same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to the
agent in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189.
A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37
135 Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court
Case No. 108 G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986) Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No.
11

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Case No. 249 G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20

FACTS: Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal
of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu.
That same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When
complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly
listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. ISSUE: W/N an extension
telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. 1 of RA 4200. HELD:
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the
case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase device or
arrangement in Sec. 1 of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b2

FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and
Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of
Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles
City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment.
Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended that its lien
on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved
thereby. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings
against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said
attachment. HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut
off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in
actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict
between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction
as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with
each other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a, 37
136 Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino
Case No. 152 G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No.
16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No.
21

FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the
mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and
Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan and
mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. They contended
that the court erred in holding that the word void, as used in the Usury Law, was
intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the
word void, as used in the Usury Law, was intended to make the entire transaction
a nullity. HELD: No. From the very context of the law, the legislature, in using
the word void, did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity.
It was only with respect to the usurious interest. The intention of the legislature
must be ascertained, not from the consideration of a single word or a particular
phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof,
as compared with the whole. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose
of discovering the mind of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 25a, 37

FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash bond
of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. When JMM
Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA, the NLRC
dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by
Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the
required appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has
already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. The
POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows
that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond
in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
a decision of the POEA. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37
137 Araneta v. Concepcion
Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 24

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lichauco vs. Apostol
Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No.
23

FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground
of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibus
petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of
P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport; to enjoin
Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and to have
Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The judge
rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the
children to Defendant, a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the
children, P300 for a house, and P2,000 as attorneys fees. The judge refused to
reconsider the order. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before
deciding the omnibus petition. HELD: No. If the parties are allowed to present
evidences regarding the omnibus petition, it would violate the intent of the law
regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. A
recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another; the
legislatures intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection.
Note, however, that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal
separation case. As such, the determination of the custody and alimony must have
been given force and effect, provided it did not go to the extent of violating the
policy of the cooling off period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 27, 36a, 36c, 36d, 37

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and

other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the Director of
Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated in
Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall
have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. Legislations
involved in the case: Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code prohibition against
bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. 1770 of the Administrative
Code Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 1762 of the
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 Bringing of animals imported from
foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has been repealed by the
implication in Sec. 1770. HELD: No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature,
while Sec. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of
legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent
with Sec. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. 1762.
Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect, being a
special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. 1762, which extends
merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36a, 38b, 50
138 Cassion v. Banco Filipino
Case No. 51 G.R. No. L- 3540 (July 30, 1951) Chapter VI, Page 256, Footnote No. 31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Palmon
Case No. 220 G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35

FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs
defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to
Cabatigan. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to
repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA
3135, which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of
mortgage respectively, while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874, known as the Public Land
act, which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period
of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should
prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist, as when general and
special provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a
particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it
regardless of to the respective dates of passage. RA 2874 specially relates to
specific property, thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135.
LATIN MAXIM: 9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50

FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in
med and max period 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before
the arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the
ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has
jurisdiction. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f)
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all
criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months.
Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the
peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to
assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the CFI and
justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case.
LATIN MAXIM: 36c, 36d, 37
139 Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank
Case No. 57 G.R. No. 17222 (March 15, 1921) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Montenegro v. Castaeda and Balao
Case No. 179 G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952) Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No.
39

FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance

of Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of
said Defendant. In an earlier case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which
the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted
that since the insolvent had been declared as such, all civil proceedings against
him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60 of the
insolvency law. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To
ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every
section, provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every
other. Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of
the same law, and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated in
the other provision of the same law. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 36c, 36d, 36e, 37, b2

FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military

Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in
the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. Maximinos father
then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Three days
after, Pres. Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: 1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it
included sedition, which is not under the Constitution. 2. W/N the Bill of Rights
prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. HELD: There is no doubt
that it was erroneous to include sedition. Art. 7 only provides invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. Sedition
should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a
whole. Also, as posed by Prof. Aruego, the Bill of Rights impliedly denied
suspension in case of imminent danger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized the
President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the
Constitutional Convention, the debates voted down an amendment to add another
cause, which is imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2
140 Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga
Case No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No.
43

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Paras v. COMELEC
Case No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No.
50

FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and
petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum
products, contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the
power of a municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that
municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except
gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund. HELD: The ordinance
levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales
tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear
terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from the terms that the
amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of
sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from
imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, there subsists the
right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical interpretation of
the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in
excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power
of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a

FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that
under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a
regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the
first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election
is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient
to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.
(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.
Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will
unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering
inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38
141 Javellana v. Kintanar
Case No. 138 G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.55

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch II
Case No. 188 G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote
No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago,
Bago City, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls
leased to vendors. Said market has served the general population of the City of
Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of
Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that
Ordinance No. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or
operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, or
corporation other than the local government. Appellant claims that a public market
is one that is not owned privately; whereas the appellees say that is one that
serves the general public. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a
public market. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service
of the general public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of the charter provision
will readily show that by public market, it is meant one that is intended to serve
the general public. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his
market is engaged in servicing the public, not only in Bago City, but also those
coming from other municipalities. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 6d, 40c

FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La
Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 4858
(the City Charter). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act, Private
Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La
Carlota City. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the
one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711, which
became RA 4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom
the city mayor can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the period of
amendment in the Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final
draft of Sec. 21. ISSUE: 1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec.
21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. 2. W/N appointing authority
for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. HELD: 1. NO, it is
a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a
power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. If Congress
wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city
department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City Charter to that
effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. 2. NO.
Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to appoint the city
engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the
Philippines, who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, shall
nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2
142 Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 307 G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954) Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote
No.61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 165 G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976) Chapter VI,
Page 264, Footnote No. 63

FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros

Oriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in
the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the year
1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he
returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in
July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence,
the original date of hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July
12, 1951, had to be postponed. ISSUE: 1. W/N the application for naturalization may
be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines
immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 2. W/N domicile and
residence are synonymous. HELD: 1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant
for naturalization to reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship.
2. No. Although the words residence and domicile are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and
different from that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the
Philippines, not legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates
permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary
occupation. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7, 11a,
25a, 37

FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of
the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of
the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the
City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then
Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial
property of the City of Manila. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit.
The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360
of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such
grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a
gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair
advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at
the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila.
Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if
included, would defeat the policy of legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37,
43
143 Almeda v. Florentino
Case No. 10 G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No.
67

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Abellana v. Marave
Case No. 3 G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974) Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71

FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its
Sec. 14 that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to
serve during the term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709
amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City
Charter, as amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as
secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused
to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent
Florentino to the position, purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. ISSUE:
Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the
Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is nothing
in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal,
alter, or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by
implication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so
intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 37, 49, 50

FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which
found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI.
At this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another
branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate
and independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of
such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing
thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued
the order to deny Petitioners motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Petitioners literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 7
of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to a constitutional
question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art. 33 of the
Civil Code.2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, the grant
of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification
of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid
construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the law
is not favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal
norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant
being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 12a,
37
144 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
Case No. 317 G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote No.
78

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
City of Naga v. Agna
Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-36049 (May 31, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83

FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a
language other than English, Spanish, or a local dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese
merchant, was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. He and other Chinese
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.

FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage
tax. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year,
pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax
enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the
following year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that under the
Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication;
this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. ISSUE: Did RA 2264
repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No, it did not. There is
a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision only repeals a prior
provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can be harmonized, then the
Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case
because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 only applies for entirely
new tax provisions. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a, 38b

ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. The purpose of the

Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of
the public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City
of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in
Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. Instead of
interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese, it
may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be
written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, or have a duplicate
in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds
constitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 1a, 6d, 9c, 11e, 37
145 Tan v. COMELEC
Case No. 152 G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine Government v. Municipality of Binangonan
Case No. 118 G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No.
84

FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The
plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities
prospectively composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also
affected, were not included in the plebiscite. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional?
HELD: It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be
held in all units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new
areas. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and
not just the areas constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited
it to the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 12a

FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66

by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional
barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority
and that this legislation was not for the public good. ISSUE: Is EO 66
constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to
be constitutional and for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it.
LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37
146 People v. Del Rosario
Case No. 105 G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals
Case No. G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996)

FACTS: On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay
charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28,
1953. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91
of the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence,
an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the
prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was
committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed; 2. W/N the
term month in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of
the civil/calendar month. HELD: 1. In computation of the period of time within
which an act is to be done, the law has always directed that the first be excluded
and the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). Art. 18 of the CC directs that any
deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. As the RPC is
deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed,
resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. 2. By express provision of Article 13 on
the new Civil Code, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. In
accordance therewith, the term month used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be
understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month.
Hence, the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July
is the 60th day from May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b, 46a

FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate
brothers, Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His
estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq.
mts. out of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually,
an extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale was executed by and among
the surviving legal heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots.
Thereafter, Venancio sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said
partition), and a 149-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turned
out, however, that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No.
26. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such
OCT to Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment
should prevail, Art. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code? 2. W/N there
was a double sale. HELD: 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptive period
for such actions is 10 years, as held in previous cases. Hence, the action for
reconveyance had not yet prescribed. There is no ambiguity in the terms and
stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. Thus, the literal and plain meaning
thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. m
of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was,
therefore, done with evident bad faith. 2. There was no double sale. Both parties
did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c,
7a
147 Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina
Case No. 199 G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No.
104

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
C & C Commercial v. NAWASA
Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967) Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No.
107

FACTS: Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When
Labitoria died, a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and
testament. During the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estate
of the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed to
comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to
proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the special
administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. ISSUE:
1. W/N the will is valid 2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the
mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in
custodia legis. HELD: 1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated.
Accordingly, an erroneous date will not defeat a will. 2. Yes. The PNB had the
right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The mortgagee should foreclose the
mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135
fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in
custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil
Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been
acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 38a,
38b

FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks
projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one of
those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three
corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects
contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give preference to
local materials that are available, practicable and usable. The said law also
provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced
materials is in relation to the construction or repair work undertaken by the
Government. NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of
the term Government as used in the said law. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the
term government under RA 912. HELD: Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced
within the term government found in RA 312, and in the construction of their
works or purchase of materials thereof, local material should be given preference
whenever available, practicable and usable. Government-owned or controlled
corporations are not exempted from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this
case: C.A. No. 138 and RA 912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the
same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally
produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government (referring to
Filipino-First policy). LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b
148 Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan
Case No. 41 G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No.
119

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
Case No. 168 G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919) Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No.
124

FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an
electric light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together
with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the
Public Service Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered
11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business
operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing
ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby
depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. On the other hand,
Respondent maintained that it was vested with the power to provide for the levy
and collection of taxes for general and special purposes as stipulated in its
charter which was granted in 1950. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise
business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant
to the citys power of taxation. HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise business
of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of
taxation of the city under its charter. Neither could the latters power therein
granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the
franchise, considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do
so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the latter general and
the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the
general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a particular
case. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 50, d

FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal
revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of
an act of Congress in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally
collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On the
other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906
private charter. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private
charter. HELD: No. A special law (including private charters) having the character
of a private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the
special facts and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the
special law. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken
to have modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is
manifest. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50
149 De Jesus v. People of the Philippines
Case No. 87 G. R. No. L-61998 (February 22, 1983) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote
No. 117

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
US v. Almond
Case No. 157 G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906)

FACTS: The Petitioner, COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the

Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the
COMELEC, and, coincidentally, the Court of First Instance (now RTC). ISSUE: W/N the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public
officers. HELD: No. Sec. 2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC
the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all
election offenses punishable under the same Code. The legislative intent in
granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct
of elections. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. At the same
time, Sec 184 of the Election Code, which deals specifically with election
offenses, must be favored over provisions of P.D. 1606 which speaks generally of
other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office.
The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby
continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it
evinces. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9, 37, 38, 50

FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.W. Almond, master and in charge of the
steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an alien of East India who is afflicted with
trachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the
steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration
officers. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the
landing of Tawas Tahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without the
Defendants knowledge or consent. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it
appears that there was no consent, either tacit or express, to the landing of the
alien. HELD: Sec. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a
United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of
any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration
officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The word permit
implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of
the owner, officer, agent or person in charge of the vessel. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11e,
41a, 48
150 US v. Estapia
Case No. 298 G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote No.
23

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
U.S. v. Abad Santos
Case No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No.
28

FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, in
violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing
near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued that the term cockpit should
be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. ISSUE: W/N the
clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the
contemplation of the law. HELD: The term cockpit as used in the statute has a
limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had
been used by the Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed
strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to
the context. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 37, 48

FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether
any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the
expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his
position, including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law.
HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part
in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry
in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one person
criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent,
unless the law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a, 48
151

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ROUND 3
152 People v. Atop
Case No. 202 G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998) Chapter VII, Page 290,
Footnote No. 29

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Padilla
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941) Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote No.
30

FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. The trial court sentenced
him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the
third, holding that his common-law relationship with the victims grandmother
aggravated the penalty. Private complainant Regina Guafin, 12 years old, is the
granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos, the common-law wife of the Appellant. ISSUE: 1.
W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. 2. W/N the
trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. HELD: 1. The trial court erred. Nocturnity must have been deliberately
sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade
his capture or facilitate his escape. Neither can we appreciate relationship as
aggravating. The scope of the relationship under Art. 15 of the RPC encompasses
only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, and relative by affinity in the same degrees. Outside these enumerations
and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in
favor of the accused, no other relationship between the offender and the victim may
aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. 2. The Appellant was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended partys straightforward and
unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German citizen,
acting jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally evaded the provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires
Philippine or U.S. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege
established in said article. It is contended, however, that notwithstanding the
infringement of Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the Appellants cannot be punished therefore
since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. ISSUE: W/N a violation of
C.A. No. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108, entitled An Act to punish acts
of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights, franchises or
privileges. HELD: Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who
knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so
qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as
well as any alien profiting thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108. The
very title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and
purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of
certain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishment
provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision
requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. Under Act No. 108, any legal
provision, whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated
thereafter, would fall within its scope. One of such legal provision is Art. 4 of
Act No. 138. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c, 9a
153 People v. Salazar
Case No. 223 G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 292, Footnote
No. 36

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Garcia
Case No. 209 No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 41

FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds.
The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer, and as
such, accountable for the funds collected and received by him, did willfully,
feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his
own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77. Upon
arraignment, the Appellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and changed
to guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the Government without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Appellant
contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the
aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the
crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit
but lost the same while he was drunk. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower
court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. HELD: No. There is nothing
in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the
Appellant was drunk. When he entered the plea of guilty, he thereby admitted, not
only his guilt, but also all the material facts alleged in the information, namely,
that he willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate,
misapply, embezzle, and convert to his own personal use and benefit, from said
funds, the sum of P13,897.77, thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his
part. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the
willful acts charged were done with malice. LATIN MAXIM: 7b, 11e, 41a, 43

FACTS: The lower court, ignoring the Appellants minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the
RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to
the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication
has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the
offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. ISSUE: W/N
the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of the
RPC. HELD: Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it
now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting
Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing
at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution.
All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be
given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same
statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
unambiguous language. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b
154 People v. Terrada, et. al.
Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote
No. 42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No.
48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied
for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in
Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not
disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public
document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another
through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the
qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle
them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed
according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under
Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the
prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under
Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal
statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special
law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the
accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human
consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, An Act Regulating the
Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle. It appears that in the town of
Carmen in Bohol, there arent any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under
such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of
large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on
his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when
there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made
therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption
is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty
under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the
Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy.
More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants
of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by
disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a
perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for
the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the
States legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in
jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many
interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed.
LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37
155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No.
49

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No.
52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the
Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio
Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection
in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of
the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims
acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and
that the law was referring to identical banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N
to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent.
2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant.
HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isnt necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The
medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of
articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by
statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the
perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the
statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not
include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is
required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for
violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but
to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap,

sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the
sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin
Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the
Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not
the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any
rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the
provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided
that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of
Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file
answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in
this case. It is not sufficient that they had actual knowledge. Statutes in the
derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican
state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected
by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there
are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these
statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC
Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as
Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for
the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is
running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, No elective public officer
may change his political party affiliation during his term of officeor within six
months immediately preceding or following an election. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was
correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be
disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified.
He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978
and this cant be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no
one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed
affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition
cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which
public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom
of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would
diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not
do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the
notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control
facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public
bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative
slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either
authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it.
Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by
DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage
reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD:
No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract
to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the
contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a
negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102.
The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction
projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money and to
avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.
Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified
bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 12a
157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.
Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No.
62

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No.
64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land
without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore,
alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation
proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action
for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek
redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a
general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the
proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right
and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of
the landowner, and must be at least substantially or fully and fairly complied
with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of
law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any
appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result
of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory
on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having
unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its
operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus,
Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full
value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain
lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or
expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N
in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and
hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the
legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to
ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain,
it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those
questions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in
question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the
general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery
in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law
to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the
opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of
opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose
of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43
158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote
No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the
requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition
for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying
the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires
that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior
to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said
requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two
cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary
education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has
continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided
that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a
public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case,
Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen
because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period
of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his
children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner
has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary
and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that
Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes.
The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got
married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in
embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdess alleged
sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a
Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law
should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose
may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to
qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43
159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote
No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The
court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after
the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the
requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision
contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear
that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order
to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated
that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated
that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such
belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must
believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court
erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and
none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that
he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has
also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his
relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his family
with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that
"naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded
payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner,
who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt
it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and
a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect
taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and
enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the
Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was
withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a taxable person.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of
the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative
intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a
taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of
Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are
what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law
frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are
thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore
is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43
160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings,
Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and
Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic
archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as
provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant
contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the
cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption
privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining
chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from
tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the
conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but
their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all
churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious
property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though
strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the
legislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and
although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the
archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the
cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with

auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the
Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies
of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter
regarding the institutions tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private
Respondent was an independent contractor within the purview of Sec. 205 of the
Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3%
contractors tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or
branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject
to 3% contractors tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining
private Respondents university status and not in the course of an independent
business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that
the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business
apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying
the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of
the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43
161 Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs
Case No. 167 G.R. No. 30264 (March 12, 1929) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 256 G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No.
84

FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of
its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited
therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par. 141 of
Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for
are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law,
vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject
to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields
as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, however, the
CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts of
vehicles for use on railways. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as
manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. HELD:
Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of
vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the
language used. In case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the
government and in favor of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative,
and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. LATIN MAXIM:
38a, 43, 50

FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283,
621.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made
and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under P.D.
23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. They paid
such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. The Government
contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213
because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for
those who had pending assessments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then contended
that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null because P.D. 213 did not contain any
exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
spouses were properly given tax amnesty. HELD: Yes, because Revenue Regulation No.
8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 provided an exception to the
coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for being contrary to
the Presidential Decree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a
Presidential Decree. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 26
162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary
Case No. 82 G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No.
85

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and
selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was
classified as a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue
Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. Under
Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is
exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the
land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural food
products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC 47-91 then
reclassified copra as a non-food product. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food
product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. HELD:
No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenues interpretation is entitled to great respect
because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and
implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of the
coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption. LATIN
MAXIM: 2a, 42a, b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts
used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature.
Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. ISSUE: W/N
insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes.
HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked
into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J.
Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling
as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that
Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns
on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed
stictissimi juris. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43, b
163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc.
Case No. 68 G.R. No. L-8755 (March 23, 1956) Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No. 97

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Castaeda Jr.
Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-46881 (September 15, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote
No. 102

FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are
corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending
that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and
lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code.
ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or
trainers, the PCSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are
subject to the 20% amusement tax. HELD: The law refers to gross receipts and not
gross income. This clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts refer
to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and
admission fees are or are not charged. This necessarily excludes income of the
Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse
races. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with
horse racing. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor, lessee, or
operator, of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax, the three tax payers
being connected by the disjunctive conjunction or, thereby positively implying
that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator,
as the case may be, singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 27

FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National
Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax
without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued that
they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available
under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the
benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of
liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his
previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such
previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosure was not voluntary, the
claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of
P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents were
charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370 took effect. It is
necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec.
1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal
or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an
informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 43
164 Zamora v. City of Manila
Case No. 175 G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 259 G.R. No. L- 25602 31 (February 18, 1970) Chapter VII, Page 306,
Footnote No. 103

FACTS: Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who
have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of
Tax revision. Petitioner prays that the word land in the title and body of the
statute be interpreted to mean land including buildings and improvements thereon.
ISSUE: W/N the word land should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the
buildings and improvements thereon. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to
have been consciously made in Act No. 123, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and
551. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxation
is not applicable in this case. This rule is not without its exceptions and
limitations, and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under
consideration should be construed with some liberality. It is a remedial statute,
providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an
unfair and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of the Commission
have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special
signification, nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations
therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2

FACTS: In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901.

In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used
in the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into
flour and sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but the cost of
wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. Respondent
Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23,170.17
because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one
enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner
is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. HELD: No. Sec. 186-A of Internal
Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or
production of any article, in the determination of the value of such finished
article, the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted. While It is true
that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law, and are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equally a recognized principle that
where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no
occasion for the courts seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as
it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43
165 Ajero v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 5

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote
No. 117

G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994)

Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the
late Annie Sand. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind,
and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private Respondent opposed
the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same
was procured through improper pressure. It was also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero
claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. The trial court
granted and/or admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. On appeal, said
Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. 813 and 814 of
the New Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with
the law. HELD: No. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in
the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the
testator. Art. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the
dispositions in the will, but not its probate. A holographic will can still be
admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. 814. In case of
alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes, but not its entirety. The CA, however,
correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the
house and lot, which she shares with her fathers other heirs. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c,
7a, 9a

FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu,
the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the
testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but
the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. The lower court
denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law,
citing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is
correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. HELD: Yes. Sec. 618
of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. This
requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of
the will. Thus, it has been held that Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely
void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and
courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. Accordingly, we cannot
escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore,
cannot be admitted to probate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a
166 A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. Borja
Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-17750 (August 31, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No.
123

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lazo v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 70 G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123

FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to

recover compensation for overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this,
Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the scope of the term action falls under RA 1994. 2. W/N the Court
of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. HELD: 1. The Petitioner contends that the
phrase action already commenced employed in the statute should be construed as
meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. With this limited and
narrow interpretation, we cannot agree. The statute under consideration is
undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the
laborer concerned. 2. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent
employee that he was separated automatically from the said employment with
Defendants, and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, Defendants refused and
still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff, and his prayer for specific reliefs and other
reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from
overtime wages. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines

assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June
18, 1986, the Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to
relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the
next day. On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained
injuries. For injuries sustained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626
but was denied by the GSIS. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P.D. 626
was valid. HELD: No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his
station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the
reliever did not come on time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner
deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. While presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act may
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality
of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
167 Villavert v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 313 G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote
No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 2 G.R. No. 71813 (July 20, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine
Constabulary. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under
P.D. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the
ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that
Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal
ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to
the ECC which affirmed the denial. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. HELD: From the foregoing facts
of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which
was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder
verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. There
is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly
before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda DanaoRamona, in Negros Occidental

for a period of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she opted to do,
for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employed the private
Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed the two
Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. HELD: Yes.
The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor Code. Notwithstanding the
contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the
constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts, because
when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation
of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the
lease. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been
adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It was stated in the said case that
the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general. The court further stated that the purpose
of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated
because of the closure of establishment. Without such law, employees like the
Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is well
settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code, the workers welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. LATIN
MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d
168 Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 36 No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Manahan v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 79 G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No.
124

FACTS: Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with

Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The security
guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against
the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency
to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging
company. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the
appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal
was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. ISSUE: W/N the
formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal.
HELD: No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the
Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.
The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and
even though the payment was late, it was still paid. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 40b

FACTS: Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a
teacher in the Las Pias Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband
was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior
to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his
employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to the
Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. ISSUE: W/N the widow
of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. The findings of the
commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his
employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated
for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medical
records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. Epigastric pain is a
symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. Pursuant to
the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act
shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the
claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case should be
resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed
to give relief to the worker and his dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d, 40b
169 Liwanag v. Workmens Compensation Commission
Case No. 75 G.R. No. L-12164 (May 2, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sibulo v. Altar
Case No. 279 G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No.
125

FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag
Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard, who was killed in the
line of duty by criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation
with the Workmens Compensation Commission, which was granted in an award that
ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3,494.40 to the
claimant in lump sum. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to
compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that because the Workmens
Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations
of business partners, the compensation should be divisible. ISSUE: W/N the
Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. HELD: No.
Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the
obligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show how
their liability is solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of
the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of business
partners should be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly, and
one of them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partially satisfied,
which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to
employees. The WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally for the
employee and dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40

FACTS: Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract
of tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm
implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation.
The net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disapproved by the
Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division
contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Court of
Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public policy
as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instead of
receiving 60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitioner
claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against
public policy in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhaustive
list. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of
the Tenancy Law. HELD: No. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public
policy, the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which,
though not specified, are similar to those expressly mentioned. The purpose of the
law might easily be defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation
intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable
participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. Being a remedial
statute, it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its
general intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40
170 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Vicente v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 168 G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No.
127

G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986)

Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126

FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation.
He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared
1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Afterwards, the
Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working
as tenant; the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Later the
Petitioners ordered Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations,
which ordered his reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed
the Court of Agrarian Reforms decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the
Supreme Court. Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing
the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of
the suit was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity. ISSUE:
W/N share tenancy ended. HELD: No. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent
repeal of the law. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a
reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely
repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they were, the rule that
the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has
the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are
impaired. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12, 32, 38

FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his

employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at
the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income
benefits under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a
physicians certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total
disability. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner
could avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only
permanent partial disability. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. ISSUE: Whether
Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability.
HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not
an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of
the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he
incurred. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for
the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. It is for
this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11b, 12a
171 Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel Company
Case No. 283 G.R. No. L-8975 (June 29, 1957) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No.
128

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Corporal v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 83 G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131

FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and paid
the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by RA 611, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30, 1954,
brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. an
additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section
of the Administrative Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved on June 15, 1954,
that is to say, 15 days before they were separated from the company. ISSUE: W/N
Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the
New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive
effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a

FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course of
her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered complete
abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a
hilot. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal
bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband, herein
Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said agency
denied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because
the cause of his wifes death was non-work-related. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could
avail the compensation benefit. HELD: No. The determination of whether the prolapse
of Normas uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since
this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body.
While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally
construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such liberal
construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are
clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 43
172 People v. Moran
Case No. 216 G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No.
167 People v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989) Chapter VII,
Page 320, Footnote No. 168

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision was
published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has
already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by the
Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the
Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to
Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to
several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can
only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art.
7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also, the
prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. A
statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul
prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no
exception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy
or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law shortening the
time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous
one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. LATIN MAXIM: 26,
37, 46a, 48

FACTS: On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of
their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified
signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the
deed was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of
prescription has long passed. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in
dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. HELD: The SC
ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts as
a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that the purchaser has
examined the instruments of the record. The court will not hesitate to apply rules
of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones, should the circumstances
warrant. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance, always susceptible
possible challenges. This should also apply to criminal cases. Furthermore, as
stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that of the
prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is
the one to be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 48
173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista
Case No. 37 G.R. No. L-37867 (February 22, 1982) Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote
No. 170

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms
Case No. 145 No. L-36153 (November 28, 1975) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No.
173

FACTS: Respondent Gasilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to
receive his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities, he was
awarded with the full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month and
an additional P10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was approved.
However, due to the lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase
and only after January 15, 1971. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his
pension, starting from December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 plus P10
per minor, from June 22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference of P100
plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969 up to
January 15, 1971, the difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife, and P20
per minor from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971. ISSUE: W/N the lower court
erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilaos pension. HELD: Respondent
Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period
for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed
as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting such pensions the
earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. But, as the
government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the lower courts
is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each
minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The difference from
June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the
government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b

FACTS: Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a letter

to the Respondent Secretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner
expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by
RA 6389, on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which
he might be entitled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS approved his
retirement gratuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim
for gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is
entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616, and
RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. HELD: No. There is nothing in RA 3844, as amended
by RA 6389, that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be
laid-off can receive two pension benefits, one under its provisions and another
pursuant to C.A. No. 186. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of
the law embodied in C.A. No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double
retirement benefits to an employee. Being the law governing the retirement of
government employees, all other laws extending retirement benefits to government
employees should, in case of ambiguity, be construed in relation to C.A. No. 186
and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory construction that
when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is aware of
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and that in the absence of
an express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted
pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes, which should all be
construed together. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b
174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices
Case No. 60 A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (October 4, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote
No. 174

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the IAC
Case No. 128 A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No.
177

FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the
Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges
and Justices). P.D. 1438 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30,
which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth
year of retirement. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 provided
that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent
to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Since 1978
however, GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary, plus 2)
highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) longevity pay
(which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42, BP
129). The basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in Vol. 74 of the
Official Gazette, No. 30. ISSUE: Which version of P.D. 1438 must be followed. HELD:
The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as amended by P.D. 1438,
in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more in keeping
with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that,
being remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to
the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its
humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with
relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor but, more so,
for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b
FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA
910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon
termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy
resignation by President Aquino, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25,
1986, requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy
resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. Justice Britanico
served the government for 36.23 years, of which 10 years, 2 months, and 27 days
were served in the Judiciary. As provided in Sec. 1 of RA 910, the judges or
justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity, should have
rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the
government or both. They fall into three categories: XXX 2. those who resign by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at
least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or
both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. HELD: He belongs to
the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation, not
being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. COMELEC), resulted in his
incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have very well
held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. Retirement laws
should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited thereby. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 40b, 43c
175 Re: Gregorio G. Pineda
Case No. 132 A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No.
178

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ramirez v. Arrieta
Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No.
181

FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired
judges, namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de Lara, Montecillo, Paredes and Gerochi,
asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910, as
amended, in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. They
want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. ISSUE: W/N they should be
granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. HELD: No.
A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is
necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. The
rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring
employee. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges, there
are ample reasons behind each grant. The crediting of leaves is not done
indiscriminately. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if
the career of the judge was marked by competence, integrity and dedication to the
public service. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations,
id est courtesy resignations. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in
determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for.
It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their
courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found
wanting. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9e, 37, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of
a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation.
The CFI dismissed the complaint. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal.
The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following
Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The clerk of
court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing
it. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next
day. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was
filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. The judge disapproved the
bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Plaintiff interposed a petition
for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal
bond. HELD: Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according
to the SC. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the
defect. According to the Rules of Court, a personal appeal bond need not
necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suffice that the court approves
such. Furthermore, the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one
surety. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court, it should
suffice. Moreover, the defect in the appeal bond, even if indeed 2 sureties were
needed, the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed
within the reglementary period. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just
determination of their cases. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9e, 11b
176 International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Del Rosario v. Hamoy
Case No. 35 No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioners predecessor in interest

by mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for
her other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she
never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money
market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank
refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead to
the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private
Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money
market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court issued a
writ of execution against Petitioners property. Private Respondent filed an ex
parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the
money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the
said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by
erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rendered without
force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by
the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. ISSUE:
W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. HELD: Compensation is not
proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is
neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed
claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent
in the amount of the money market interest. The debt of P6.81M of private
Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This prevents legal compensation from
taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The filing of insufficient or
defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction
issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11b

FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for
pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent
Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the
Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in
dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso
documentary stamp. HELD: Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more
sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court
would have been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner
substantial justice. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the
documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not
have taken ten minutes. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the
Rules of Court themselves, fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal
construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice.
LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 9d, 18a, 18b
177 Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 69 No. L-73146-53 (August 26, 1986) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No.
181

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission
Case No. 52 No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for
Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a
petition for review. However, a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court
ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited a
Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. ISSUE: W/N Respondent
court erred in terminating the case. HELD: Yes. The Court rules, for the guidance
of Bench and Bar, that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
under Sec. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. 22(b) of the Interim
Rules, may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of
Appeals). The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as
follows: (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning
one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only 15 days for
filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the
corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. LATIN
MAXIM: 2a, 5b, 27

FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the

Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied
their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that
the 30-day period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of
the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for
appealing from final order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court. ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. HELD: No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly
refers to courts. The SEC is not a court. It is an administrative agency. Repeals
by implication are not favored. The 30-day period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic
law of the SEC, is still in force. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b
178 Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co.
Case No. 36 G.R. No. L-44970 (March 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No.
183

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Case and Nantz v. Jugo
Case No. 49 G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 1946) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No.
187

FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the
notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal
Revenue. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the
reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the appeal was not
deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. ISSUE: W/N the requisites
were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the
Petitioners. HELD: Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected,
The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace . In lieu of such
bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official
that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with
the Collector of Internal Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with
said requirements. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the
Petitioners failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that the
corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the
same in due time should not affect the remedy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a

FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with.
They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the
requirement. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. On
the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the
Plaintiff was present in his office. He asked the latter if there were objections
to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate
circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the
counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants
complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was
furnished a copy of such. HELD: Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable
circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of
this case. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see
that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. There was
substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriffs
office the Defendants counterbond. LATIN MAXIM 6d, 9a, 9d
179 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No.
189

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuez
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No.
192

FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the
opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her
appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days
to file her brief. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to
grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. HELD: Yes.
Under the Rules of Court the court may, on motion to the Appellee and notice the
Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The
word may implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the
sound discretion of the court. LATIN MAXIM: 9d

FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected in
behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked in this
case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner
(Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold
the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the
latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in
other litigation. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in
accordance with the requirements of law. HELD: A liberal construction will be given
to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that the property of
the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. Redemption of
property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that
the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a
check for the amount due. Any ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a
judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the
right of redemption. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending
the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the
contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent
judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 41
180 Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc.
Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-16215 (June 29, 1963) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No.
192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.
Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No.
192

FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of
Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as
indemnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a
claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being
forced to jump off the motor launch ISLAMA on account of fire. Defendant company
refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was only
said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. ISSUE: How
much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del
Rosario. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be
recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in
the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and
strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is
entitled to recover P3,000. The insurance company has already paid the amount of
P1,000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount
to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 38

FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy

underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest
participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on
the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head
hitting the rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage,
intracranial, left. Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with
the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy.
Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his
participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered
by insurance. ISSUE: W/N Eduardos death falls under the definition of the policy
against death or disability caused by accidental means. HELD: The terms
accident and accidental, as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any
technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces
or brings about the result of injury or death. The failure of the Defendant company
to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the
prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt
itself from the liability for such death. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 25a, 30a
181 Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.
Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No.
192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Capati v. Ocampo
Case No. 46 G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982) Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote No.
8

FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies,

among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him personal
accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed
the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was
injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability
of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice
of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the
policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason
that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability
suffered by him was not covered by his policy. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that
there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can
recover on the insurance policies. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the
insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation
through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar.
All that was found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that
the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand."
In addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between
the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only
amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability
not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 7a, 9c

FACTS: Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the

Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job for
the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what
was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an
action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly
laid. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper
venue. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue
was correct. HELD: No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI
is found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such
"actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants
resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates
to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be"
connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, b
182 Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office
Case No. 58 G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No.
10

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Guiao v. Figueroa
Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17

FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from
the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city
office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue
receipts for their remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an
unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of
Money Orders," effective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new
postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of
location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the
Central Bank at Manila. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post
office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1,
1968. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the
Petitioner bank were private, unauthorized arrangements and any claim for
settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier.
ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and
permissive in nature. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of
the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and
memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of
commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 9a, 36a, 36b
undated memorandum of

FACTS: In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio
Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus
Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of the
failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for
mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo
as accused in his information. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to
include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime
charged therein. HELD: Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act
No. 2709 states that, Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the
United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor, except in
the cases determined in Sec. 2 of this Act. A perusal of Act No. 2709 discloses
the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for
an offense should be included in the information. The use of the word "shall" and
of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 1 is mandatory, not merely
directory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 25a
183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 153 G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No.
22

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95 G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23

FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered
with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole
homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate
bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the
subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the
president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of
non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in
the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable
result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association
cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence,
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a
corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation
results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislatures intent is not to
automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word
must in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole
while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must or
shall. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b

FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original

registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and
his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to
continue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for
the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the
decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme
Court. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is
mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not
an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon
its context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term
must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of
due process. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a
184 Bersabal v. Salvador
Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No.
25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.
Case No. 133 G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)

FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The
subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the
court issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days
from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this
case to be submitted for decision by the court. After receipt, Petitioner filed a
motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of
submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the
case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioners appeal. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court
denied it. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned
memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to
prosecute. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the
mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that
Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
from the city courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It
cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance
to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of
P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them
under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo
rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents preferred shares HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in
question, stated that, On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said
preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said
stock certificates clearly allows the same. What Respondent Judge failed to
recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to
do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is
clearly the type known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set
forth therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory
construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a
185 Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Natl Telecommunications Commission
Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution)
Case No. 94 G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984)

FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment

Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP schedule
presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and
baseless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required
rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, The
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board of
Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared
policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this
purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ... ISSUE: W/N
Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes. P.D. 217
deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that existing substantive
and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP was so set up precisely
to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in
turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a
telephone facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be
confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers and the government
itself. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is
laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers.
Considering the multi-million profits of the company, the cost of expansion and/or
improvement should come from part of its huge profits. LATIN MAXIM: 8b, 9d, 11b,
12a

FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private

Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. The
decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of
P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications
as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said
Section 2. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set
rules and regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidered. HELD: Yes. The
basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be
given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law
itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean
"shall" or "must". LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c
186 Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No. 32

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Berces v. Guingona, et. al.
Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote
No. 34

FACTS: Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued

under RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay
certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304,
which provides that investment funds or banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable
funds accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years
such certificate for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended
however that the word shall used in this particular section of the law is merely
directory. The lower court sustained Respondent company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can
use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.

FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi,
Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang
Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in both
cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay
of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President stayed
execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to
Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that
an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. ISSUE: W/N
R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly
repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on
executive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any repeal, it was
by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. There is none
in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that an appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. It gives discretion to
reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term shall may be read mandatory or
directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found.
LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26, 50

HELD: No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is
imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may when
required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, at not
more than two per centum per annum for ten years., the interest to be charged,
that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses at not more but
the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay
certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been
issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when
the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a
contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be
subject to the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the
legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that
there are available loanable funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to
be permitted only if there are loanable funds. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 26
187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
Case No. 81 G.R. No. 123669 (February 27, 1998) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote
No. 35

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Fule v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No.
37

FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging serious
business decline, Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work.
The workers challenged the legality of Petitioners stoppage of operations. The
Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice, and
ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to
Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Despite the
reduction granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days, resulting
to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. Under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. The word only makes it
perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an
employers appeal may be perfected. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26

FACTS: Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made
out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the
reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP
22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence
and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming
the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the
Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based
on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel.
HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. Because of
the word shall, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and
phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory.
Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. LATIN
MAXIM: 9d
188 McGee v. Republic
Case No. 174 G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No.
37

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Penid v. Virata
Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983) Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No.
40

FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to

adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so under
Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction
cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 335,
the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states that
a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother can be adopted. ISSUE: W/N a
husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. HELD: No. One strong
argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold
otherwise would render Art. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must be
noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be considered in relation to each other.
That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. 335 that said parent cannot
have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. One principle behind
this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition,
under the laws of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Art. 335
is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While Art. 338 is positive: the
following may be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 15a

FACTS: Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It
is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been
falsely declaring their gross earnings on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00 to
US $1.00 defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes.
Further, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the
Confidential Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners
seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping
companies in payment for their deficiencies as provided by RA 2338. ISSUE: W/N
the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company which is not
included in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA
2338, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given by him
must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation and
results in the recovery of collection of revenues . Not only did the BIR rely on
the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation,
but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely
declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and,
consequently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this information was instrumental
in the discovery of the fraud or violation. In jurisprudence, statues offering
rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the
purpose for which they are intended. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d
189 Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.
Case No. 96 G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote
No. 63

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pimentel v. Festejo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote
No. 64

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban,

Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an
election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial
court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees
for filing an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner
filed a verified appeal brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did
not receive any notice of appeal from Petitioner. Petitioners appeal was then
dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the
verified appeal was validly dismissed. 2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed
the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees.
HELD: 1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief.
The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of
the notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the
prescribed period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail,
filed as of the date of mailing. 2. No. The docket fee was paid although
insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 40b

FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59
ballots which would have made him win. Appellants name in the 59 ballots were
written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the
provincial board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced
but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can
claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in
the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. For any ballot to be counted for a
candidate for mayor, it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in
the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, as provided by the Constitution,
is able to read. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written
within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. It is
impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is
clearly written in the space reserved for another office. Considering that in 59
ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the
space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate
for mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43
190 Roxas v. Rafferty
Case No. 264 G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No.
75

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Serfino v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 145 G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote
No. 75

FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the
construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all
respects on February 15, 1915. The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the
date of December 1, 1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25,
1914, requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year
1915. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, under
protest. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at
the legal rate from the date of payment. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. HELD:
No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice.
The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during
November. His attempted notification on December 25, 1914, was not given during the
time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for
the year 1915. Furthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the
obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. The city
assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not
yet completed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 19

FACTS: A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros

Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead Patent
No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by said office
in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in favor of
Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the
petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of
Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar
but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the property to
Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the documents for
registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said office
refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N
the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and
void from the beginning. HELD: No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which
prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years
from the date of the issuance of the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to
corporations. Since the grant was more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia
Baltazar was valid and legal. LATIN MAXIM: 37b, 43
191 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 137 G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote
No.84

FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved.
The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obligation of the
petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59.
Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his
outstanding obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897
(RA 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the
ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA
897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioners obligation is subsisting at the time of
the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressly provides that the
obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when
such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation
of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said
Act on June 20, 1953, such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the
certificates. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in
the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a,
6c, 1

FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with
respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of
the 1995 elections. HELD: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a
minor, petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As
domicile, once acquired, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the
being born in Manila, Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
Parenthetically, when she married then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged,
by virtue of Art. 110 of the Civil Code, to follow her husbands actual place of
residence fixed by him. Although Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and
even if he had designated one, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. Therefore, she did not lose her domicile of origin. LATIN MAXIM: 25a,
37, 39a
192 Portillo v. Salvani
Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.
130

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Querubin v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 247 G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948) Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote
No. 14

FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial
governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election
protest on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring
appellee Portillo the winner. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring
appellee Portillo is valid. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction.
The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be
terminated within one year. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals
that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to
stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the
legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. One year having already
elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction
rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2

FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of
Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal
thereafter. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to
dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost
their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. HELD: No. Sec. 178 of the Election Code
provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within
three months after filing. However, this provision is directory in nature since to
apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. The
dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in
Portillo v. Salvani should be abandoned. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2, 5b, 18b, 39b
193 Nilo v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 189 G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No. 59

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon
Case No. 138 G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951)

FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at

Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system.
Private respondent then filed for ejection citing personal cultivation on March
7, 1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that
RA 3844 was amended on September 10, 1971 removing personal cultivation from the
grounds for ejectment. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect.
HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless it is explicitly provided. The legislation involves social justice,
however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be
entitled to social justice. Furthermore, to rule against the small landowners would
be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 46a, 46b

FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA 546
was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. 4007.
By virtue of this law, a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President,
whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. ISSUE:
W/N it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the pre-
existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof.
HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the
intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent
with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007. In the
case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well
established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a
retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but
that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its
operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and
application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 46,
49
194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.
Case No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 14

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Gallardo v. Borromeo
Case No. 50 G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)

FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent
deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as
prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower
rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843 was
passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of
light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSUE: W/N
RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equality of
taxation clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code
was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only fix and
specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it in lieu of any
and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding, thus leaving no room for
doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws granted and
enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not
constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The Legislature
considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. RA
3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
9c, 46, 49

FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he

(plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a
letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that the
landowners desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for
dispossessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application
to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his
complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant
should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The
newer law, R.A. 6389 eliminated this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil
Code, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory
provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since
Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive, it may not
apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 46e
195 Cebu Portland Cement v. CIR
Case No. 52 G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 15

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros
Case No. 76 G.R. No. 14880 (April 29, 1960) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 41

FACTS: The case involves petitioners claim for refund of sales tax paid from
November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September
1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. Since 1952,
however, petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO
Portland cement, and on January 1953, it also protested the payment of the ad
valorem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of
Tax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent
are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955), producers of cement are
exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise.
ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. HELD: A statute
operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent
to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against
the retrospective effect. While the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the
explanatory note to the bill, was not only to accelerate the collection of mining
royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public
on the interpretative scope of the two terms, it certainly could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between
the taxpayer and the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e

FACTS: Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real estate

dealer. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale
of graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner assessed against
the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on
January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to the Court
of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a
decision in favor of it. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. HELD:
No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considering that RA 1612,
which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that said Act shall take
effect upon its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e
196 Laceste v. Santos
Case No. 140 G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No. 1

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Balatbat v. Court of Appeals and Passion
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992) Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote No.
73

FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect
before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena
de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner
continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty
through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal
ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of
Art. 344 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has
retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The
principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule
that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused
applies. Conscience and good law justify this exception. LATIN MAXIM: 48

FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490
square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respondent
Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126.
Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec.
36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have been
decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the respondent
still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7 of RA
6389 should be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code
provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by
law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision
stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not
embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action
with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times
but laws look forward in the future. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46b, 46e
197 People v. Zeta
Case No. 232 G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955) Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No.
72

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
Case No. 271 G.R. No. L-7766 (November 29, 1955) Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote No.
104

FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in
excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services
rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675
which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant
would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for
the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA
145 has a retroactive effect. HELD: No. It does not appear in the language of RA
145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell
the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot
be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision.
Furthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the
constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive
effect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b, 20, 46e

FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has
in her pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA
401, the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from
January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendant to return
the interest to the plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing
the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. HELD: Yes. RA 671 is made to
condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include within its term completed
payment and paid interest. Where a statute was amended and reenacted, the amendment
should be construed as if it had been included in the original act; but it could
afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment.
LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46e
198 People v. Sumilang
Case No. 226 G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) Chapter IX, Page 371, Footnote
No. 111

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 97
G.R. No. L-68043 (October 31, 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as principal defendants, and the five
(5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case.
Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds
that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions
pending between the same parties for the same cause. Respondent judge granted
private respondents' motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent, denying petitioner's motion for
approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal
within the period granted them. HELD: Yes. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on
appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively
the said law. Ruled in Alday vs. Camilon, "[t]he reorganization having been
declared to have been completed, BP Big. 129 is now in full force and effect. A
Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso
appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on
January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provision s may be applied
retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [19461.] " LATIN
MAXIM: 5a, 46e

FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional
to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed
the sentence of the lower court. Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of
the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioners
attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the
notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla
officer of the Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the
sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that
may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the
rights of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence
and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: No. It is a well
established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
to that extent. LATIN MAXIM: 46e
199 MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 78 G.R. No. 86675 (December 19, 1989)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ocampo v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 89 G.R. No. 7960 (December 8, 1989)

FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order
of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as
the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered
by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court.
ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: Yes. It is a well established rule of
statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. LATIN
MAXIM: 46e

FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner,
while being informed of P.D. 772. Petitioner never showed title to the land he
claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti
Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) he
succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or
threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; (c)
such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the
owner. Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that after
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of
squatting. 2. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his
evidence. HELD: Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to
substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 45a, 46b
200 Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 315 G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No.
117

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 21 G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119

FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising
from alleged criminal negligence, being without malice, cannot be filed
independently of the criminal action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N a
civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. HELD: Yes. Under the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 46e

FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223

of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis
of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively.
ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor
Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. HELD:
Yes on both counts. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic
reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor
arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contested
provision is then a police legislation. The questioned Interim Rules can be given
retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 46e
201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 25 G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 373, Footnote No.
124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binalonan
Case No. 117 G.R. No. L-8243 (December 24, 1915) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.
44

FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the
said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the
latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a similar
agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining
claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the total
mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9
mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of
administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal,
CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise
agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining
claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendants filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agreement which
BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by
reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction
pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D. 1281 prevails.
HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general
application. LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under

Sec. 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property
within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan on two
parcels of land. Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or,
at most, lands claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the
compulsory registration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes the
Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all
owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed
and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does
not permit of similar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no
mention of compulsory registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act No.
2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926. ISSUE: Whether Sec. 61
of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings
against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands.
HELD: Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation
on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it
amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this
conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 46e
202 Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980) Chapter IV, Page 175, Footnote No.
199

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al.
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 136

FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing
project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20
years. However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because
the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of
Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented
immediately for registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it
could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing
project in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge
of the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were
segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated
portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the
title. Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter
(RA 85), among which was Sec. 13. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the
amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147. HELD: Yes. One of the purposes of
Congress when it enacted RA 3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any
doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from
the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees
who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to
render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. LATIN MAXIM:
46e

FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines
and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural
firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay,
legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13 th month pay and service
incentive leave pay. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due
notice; Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent
to pay P5,369,909.30. In its appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned the Regional
Directors authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers, which NLRC
dismissed on the strength of E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, which
granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. ISSUE: W/N the
jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, by force of Art.
217 of the Labor Code. HELD: The Court held that E.O. 111 has the character of a
curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the
amendment. This was clear from the proviso: The provisions of Art. 217 of this
Code notwithstanding The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of
Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction. E.O. 111
therefore has retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9, 30b, 38b, 46e
203 Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and
Burgos
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Santos v. Duata and the Court of Appeals
Case No. 274 G.R. No. L-20901 (August 31, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No.
134

FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service

contract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his
position into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the
Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the
difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and
the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respondent
filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, creating
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the original
and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees
abroad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in
favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive effect
and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 797 is not a
curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on
prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative
intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in
force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, these were P.D.
1691 and 1391. LATIN MAXIM: 35, 46a, 46c, 46e

FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a
quarter part of Lot No. 37. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar.
For convenience, the title was issued in Santoss name. On August 3, 1955, private
respondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata spouses, instituted an action for
reconveyance of of Lot No. 37. Santos denied the spouses ownership, claiming
that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. The trial
court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of
Santos. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable
mortgage under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the
trial court. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executing the said private
document, intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. HELD: It is a mortgage.
Art. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of
sale with right of repurchase; it envisioned contracts of sale with right to
repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase
price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract
purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Said article is remedial in
nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the
effectivity of the New Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 17, 21, 46e
204 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.
Case No. 182 G.R. No. 103702 (December 6, 1994) Chapter IX, Page 381, Footnote No.
150

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust
Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979) Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote
No. 133

FACTS: President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon. Then by virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the
status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then
attacked of its validity. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA
7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto
municipality, they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed
prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested
right to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of
RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the E.O. creating the municipality of San Andres
was cured by Sec. 442(d) of RA 7160. HELD: Yes. The de jure status of the
Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. Sec. 442(d)
of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities, is also curative
statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which
had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. LATIN MAXIM: 46e,
6c

FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant
demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said
lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being
constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed
building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-
appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions
were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by
the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial
zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the
restrictions in question as against defendant. Resolution No. 27 was passed in the
valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Even if the subject
building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cannot
prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e
205 Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations
Case No. 35 G.R. No. L-17566 (July 30, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion
Case No. 237 G.R. No. L-46095 (November 23, 1977) Chapter X, Page 387, Footnote No.
3

FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which

required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation.
There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge
stating they did not authorize the filing. Respondent contends that petitioners are
barred due to prescription under Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any
action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years
after such cause of action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred forever. HELD: It
would have applied, provided that actions already commenced before the effective
date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. As the statute
shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it
retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude
the six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is
procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom.
Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in
order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants
whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of
one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such
claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

FACTS: On January 1963, Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a
loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo, Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and
Manuel Barredo. By May, 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. PNB filed
a case against all 4 signatories. However, before the case was decided, Manuel
Barredo passed away. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of
M. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. ISSUE: W/N the
Courts interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding
against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. HELD: No. Art. 1216 of the New
Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors, or some, or all. Thus, the choice is left up to PNB to decide. Sec. 6 of
Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against
the deceased debtor. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of
his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216. In this case, the Rules of Court may
not prevail over Art. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase of modify substantive rights. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 9c
206 Ongsiako v. Gamboa
Case No. 90 G.R. No. L-1867 (April 8, 1950)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Amandy v. People
Case No. 7 G.R. No. 79010 (May 23, 1988)

FACTS: In 1946, Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract
pursuant of Sec. 8 of Act 4054. This act provided that the palay would be divided
equally by the 2 parties. However, later that same year, Act 4054 was amended by RA
34. During liquidation, Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which
provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Ongsiako
insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given
retroactive effect. Because of this, the original contract starting an equal
sharing of profits should be followed. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and
should be given retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. In the past, laws concerning this
issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore, producing
retroactive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the
President concerning RA 34 that this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy
Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants
The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants
in the production of the land he is cultivating. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9a, 49

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuana.
Because he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of six years and 1
day (the minimum time for his offense). Petitioner then filed for probation
alleging P.D. 968. However, the petition was denied because P.D. 1990 had repealed
P.D. 968, no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for
probation. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandys petition for
probation. HELD: No. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who
arent. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been
sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years are excluded from the
benefits of the Probation Law. Because P.D. 1990 was promulgated after P.D. 968,
the former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken as it
is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 22a, 25a,
36a, 43, 49
207 Parras v. Land Registration Commission
Case No. 197 G.R. No. L-16011 (July 26, 1960) Chapter X, Page 390, Footnote No. 16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Diu v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 96 G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995) Chapter X, Page 391, Footnote No.
28

FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit
to the Commissioner's office, pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, otherwise
known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.00 as
estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the
hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such
insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be
exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered
to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can be
exempted. 2. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the
publication. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitioner relies on
was Sec. 114 of Act 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include
the said provision of Act 496. LATIN MAXIM: 11, 32, 38b

FACTS: On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various

articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7,862.55. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners brought the matter
before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing, but private
respondents failed to appear. When the parties met, they failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Private respondents in their Answer, while admitting
indebtedness, interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses
for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (2) another
for P12,0000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly
misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as
required by law. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of
the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508,
otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". It must be noted that P.D.
1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. The basic complaint was
filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC.
Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in
Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the latter law. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 5b, 9a, 36b
208 Government v. Springer
Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-26979 (April 1, 1927) Chapter I, Page 38, Footnote No. 166

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
Case No. 176 G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) Chapter X, Page 395, Footnote No.
45

FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in
accordance with its by-laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and
illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper
shareholders. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government.
The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company; however, it
ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. During the election of directors, three
members of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the
executive. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine
Government. HELD: Yes. Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Sec. 2 of Act No.
2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the
National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a, 38b

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA)
embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director II of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis
from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC
Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner
can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner
can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been
repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the
reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and
the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that
laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the
Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided
for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or
GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 32, 37, 38b, 49
209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee Voo
Case No. 20 G.R. No. 33281 (March 31, 1930)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ynchausti & Co v. Stanley
Case No. 174 G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917)

FACTS: The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be
committed to an asylum. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years
later on the strength of doctors reports. In issuing the order of release the
respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal Code. On the other hand,
Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the
authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. ISSUE: W/N
the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses
the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the
approval of the Director of Health. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory
construction that when there is no express repeal, none is presumed to be intended.
Likewise, when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand
together, this should be done. Art. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly
repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code. The powers of the courts and the
Director of Health are complementary with each other. Thus, any person confined in
any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code cannot
be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. The
converse proposition equally holds true. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 49

FACTS: The petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business, sought
to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement, which
states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each
vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 was not and could
not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614 being specific with
regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict
between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312 of the Administrative Code.
HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is apparent that there was no
specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine Legislature could not have
intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and
substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the
Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 49, 50
210 U.S. v. Tantoco
Case No. 164 G.R. No. 11338 (August 15, 1916)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Fabros, et al. v. Laya
Case No. 44 G. R. No. 70832 (December 18, 1987)

FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under
his control a certain amount of opium. The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the theory that Act No. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the
United States Congress. The Government appealed. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act
was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. HELD: That the United
States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the
subject of opium appears from the law itself. Whether or not an Act is impliedly
repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of
both statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and object of both. The
United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to
the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
49

FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental

proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in
Sec. 3(a) of P.D. 451, and thereafter, under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232).
Then Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No.
25, entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232, The
Education Act of 1982, relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986.
Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations,
which was granted to them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO
on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to
P.D. 451, which the Court thereby lifted. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D. 451
which thereby makes MECS Order No. 25 valid. HELD: Yes. Under P.D. 451, the
authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by
private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture, where Sec.
42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to
determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. P.D. 451 provides
that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or
used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other
employees of the school; while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied
or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. Hence, there
was a repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 39b
211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano
Case No. 127 G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965) Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No. 61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Brias de Coya v. Tan Lua, et al.
Case No. 16 G.R. No. 30756 (September 22, 1931)

FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice
and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may
designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as
embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners
contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government
from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the
same. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. HELD: The importation may be
illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties,
thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that
should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of
such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the
National Economic Council, the President may authorize such importation thru any
government agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common
objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The
two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative
expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a
repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 38b,
39a

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines

while she was in China. At this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encumber
her properties situated in the Philippines. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was
appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. Defendant-appellant executed a
mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. The
assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him.
ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal
considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer
has been made. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment
each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors,
according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property,
against which they may enforce their credits. Construing the Insolvency Law
together with the Land Registration Act, we reach the conclusion that in order that
the assignment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the
proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said
estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, both such proceedings
and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds, the former
from their commencement. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the
mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter, which was registered with a
Torrens title, is legal and valid. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a
212 Villegas vs. Subido
Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote
No.96

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Jalandoni vs. Endaya
Case No. 137 G.R. No. L-23894, (January 24, 1974) Chapter X, Footnote No. 62

FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City
Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. In an
Administrative Order, series of 1968, Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Manila,
directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of
the Assistant City Treasurer, saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such
designation. Petitioner, appointed Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer.
Respondent, disapproved the appointment, basing his action, on an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial
Treasurers is still governed by Sec. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code, and
not by Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Law, RA 5185. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization
Law should govern. HELD: No. It has been the constant holding of this court that
repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be
manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as
United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal
is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal
with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. A
subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to
be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative
purpose to do so is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 50

FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz
in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. During
the hearing of the libel case Cruz, through counsel manifested in open court that
under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, (the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense), Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as
noted, a negative response. Respondent still tried the case. ISSUE: W/N Municipal
Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. HELD: No. As is clear from
his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on what for him was the
consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828, Sec. 87 of which would
confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with
court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses included in
such category. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect
on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Art. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed by
implication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 49
213 CIR vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.
Case No. 79 G.R. Nos. 83583-84 September 30, 1991 Chapter X, Page 400, Footnote
No.64

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Valdez v. Tuazon
Case No. 111 G.R. No. L-14957 (March 16, 1920) Chapter X, Page 388, Footnote No. 9

FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two
separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974,978.50 and P424,303.33,
respectively, representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and
manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in
its operations as a mining concessionaire, using RA 1435 as basis. The Court of Tax
Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P.D.
231, 436 and 711. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of
Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been
repealed by subsequent statutes. HELD: Yes. We find that the disputed proviso found
in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the
miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased
rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highways from which
they did not directly benefit. Given the present concept of the general fund and
its wide application, then the proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an
anachronism. It is inevitable that, sooner or later, the miners will stand to
benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to
asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment
the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they
are not directly convenienced. While we generally do not favor repeal by
implication, it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are
left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has
been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious
inconsistency. LATIN MAXIM: 49

FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent
wife. Act No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage
cannot be granted except upon conviction. The respondent has never been convicted
of the offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce
based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 2710. ISSUE: W/N Act No.
2710 should be applied in the case. HELD: Act No. 2710 should be applied. Even if
the said Act has no repealing clause, when there is a plain and unavoidable
repugnancy between two laws, the later must be given effect. Negative statutes are
mandatory, and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all
conflicting provisions. The situation in this case does not require the application
of any of the artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute
is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 49
214 Estate of Mota v. Concepcion
Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-34581 (March 31, 1932)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Torrente v. Grove
Case No. 155 G.R. No. L-2340 (December 21, 1905)

FACTS: In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to
construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra
transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. In December of the same
year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the last sale, only part of
the price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota
registered the contract as an unregistered real property. ISSUE: 1. W/N a mortgage
over an unregistered property is valid. 2. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to
right of rescission. HELD: 1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castro, Sec. 194 of
the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between
the contracting parties. 2. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is
fatal to the right of rescission. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to
secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. LATIN MAXIM: 1

FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the
petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its
face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order
directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. It is contended
that the arrest and detention of petitioner, were illegal and void. ISSUE: W/N the
Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the
Philippines. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. 13 of G.O. No. 58, a justice of the
peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may
be in the Philippines. Due to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly
repealed the Spanish law. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. 59 is a
proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of
such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the
said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the
province, much less the archipelago. The court however said that the opinion of the
law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine
what the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration, but it is not
conclusive on the courts. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 49
215 Pamil v. Teleron
Case No. 195 G.R. No. L-34854 (November 20, 1978) Chapter I, Page 33, Footnote No.
148

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People v. Almuete
Case No. 200 G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote
No. 61

FACTS: Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for
Gonzagas disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which
stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. ISSUE:
W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. HELD: The vote was indecisive. Seven
believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five believed that the prohibition was
not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Though the five were a minority, the
votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective, hence it
was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. Dissenting Seven:
The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution, the supreme law,
which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for
ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons.
Also, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the
legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Minor Five: For a later
provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the
two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor
superseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there can be none.
The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. LATIN MAXIM:
Dissenting Seven: 9a, 30a, 32, 49 Minor Five: 6c, 7a, 7c, 37, 43

FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-
threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining
her consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the
supposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-
threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. HELD: Sec. 39 was
impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force
at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leasehold
system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibition against pre-
threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose is to prevent
the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the
harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenants act of
prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent
statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal
the former statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction
to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its
repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 10, 47, 49
216 Smith Bell & Co. v. Municipality of Zamboanga
Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-33318 (December 20, 1930)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Case No. 71 G.R. No. L-32979-81 (February 29, 1972)

FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its
machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 226. Plaintiff paid
the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to
impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. The defendant
argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. 2625(d)
of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment
of Act No. 3422. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3422 repealed Sec. 2625(d) the Administrative
Code. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its
repeal, it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in
expressly repealing Sec. 2407 of the Administrative Code. A general affirmative act
will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is
manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a) and
14 of C.A. No. 146, jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission
(PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power
of control over air rates and fares. On the other hand, respondents argue that
jurisdiction over air fares and rates were, under both statutes, exercisable
concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air
carriers rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. HELD: Authority to fix air
carriers rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. Under RA 776, the CAB can
fix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special rates charges or fares
for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers
that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. Furthermore, implied repeal of statutes
is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b
217 Villegas v. Enrile
Case No. 171 G.R. No. L-29827 (March 31, 1973)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Villegas v. Subido
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-24012 & L- 24040 (August 9, 1965)

FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. 4 of the

Decentralization Act be given effect, then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal
is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of
Manila. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing
effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila, which negates
the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the
Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of
Manila. HELD: No. The issue in this case was already decided in previous
jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. Subido. Furthermore, petitioner ignored
the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the
Decentralization Act. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 5a, 37

FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA
557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. The City Mayor
was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees
in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary
cases. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to
vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in
the competitive service. HELD: No. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension
by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil
Service. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other
body. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and
employees of the City of Manila, RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260
and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. RA 2260
contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of
Civil Service, instead of to the President. Repeal by implication is not favored
and if two laws can be reconciled, the construction will be against such repeal.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b, 50
218 U.S. v. Palacio
Case No. 301 G.R. No. 11002 (January 17, 1916) Chapter X, Page 406, Footnote No. 77

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Marin v. Nacianceno
Case No. 171 G.R. No. 5939 (March 29, 1911) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No. 100

FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 when he willfully
omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. He
posits that Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82 because of the clause in
Sec. 18 that states all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed.
ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. 82. HELD: No. Act
No. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act
No. 82. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that such is
the intention of the legislature. Act No. 2238 provides no penalty thus, Sec. 87 of
Act No. 82 continues in force. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b

FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix, but the testatrix did not alter
her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. The petitioners
are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides that When a devise or a legacy is made to a child
and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issues such issue
shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done unless a
different disposition is required by law. The executor of the will opposes the
payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died
before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa
Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did
not alter her will. HELD: Yes. The construction by the respondent would repeal or
annul the section absolutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature
enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to
the payment of this legacy, then Sec. 758 would have no value and might as well
have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11
219 Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary
Case No. 309 G.R. No. L-71855 (January 20, 1988) Chapter X, Page 412, Footnote No.
102

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Pacis v. Averia
Case No. 194 G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1966) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No.
105

FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP)
apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. An altercation
occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Anacorita,
the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there
exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner, with deliberate intent and with
intent to kill, shot Lozano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends
that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P.D. 1850 was repealed by E.O.
1040 & 1012. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. It is
specifically stated under E.O. 1012 that it is only the operational supervision
and direction over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary
to the city/municipal government. Under E.O. 1040, it is the exercise of
administrative control and supervision over units of the INP that was transferred
to the President. The allegation that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by
clear and precise provision of E.O. 1040 is inaccurate. Repeals by implication are
not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in
manifested. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 27, 37

FACTS: Petitioner, the Acting Collector of Customs, commenced a seizure and

forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the
incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed
cigarettes. On the same day, Marges, the alleged boat owner, filed a Civil Case for
replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. The fishing boat therein was
transferred to the Provincial Sheriff, and later on to Marges as commanded by
respondent Hon. Averia. ISSUE: 3. 4. HELD: 1. No. The jurisdiction of the Collector
of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the
Judiciary Act. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute.
2. Yes. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. It has also caught the Supreme
Courts notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the
boat owner. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of
the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just
the interest of a public official. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 49 W/N Marges could
recover the fishing boat. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for
failure to comply with the writ.
220 Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines
Case No. 123 G.R. No. 26802 (July 15, 1927) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 107

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al.
Case No. 239 G.R. No. 80593 (December 18, 1989) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No.
108

FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio

business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. and Radio Corp.) agreed to merge. The petitioner
herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in
consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was
agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of
the traffic department. ISSUE: W/N Hermans claim for salary has been expressly
waived in the final agreement. HELD: Yes. In Sec. 333 of the Code of Civil
Procedures, it mentions that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or
omission, intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
is true and to act upon such belief, he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Sec.
1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a
compromise. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later
expression of legislative will than Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
49

FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was
unable to pay its remaining employees. Two years after, AMEX entered into an
operation contract agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation, thus
enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. The unpaid workers
filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. The said Arbiter awarded
backwages and separation pay. AMEX did not appeal but PNB, as mortgage-creditor,
appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and
not the termination pay. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. Hence, this instant
petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not
create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the
employer. ISSUE: W/N Art. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring
the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. 2241 to 2245
of the Civil Code. HELD: No. Art. 110 of the Labor Code provides for worker
preference in case of bankruptcy. It specifically states that In the event of
bankruptcy of an employers business, his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as
regards to their unpaid wages, any provision of law to the contrary not
withstanding such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the
government and other creditors may be paid. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 49
221 David v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 85 G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 95022 (March 23, 1992) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay
elections should be held and questions the COMELECs schedule of holding such
elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the
Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner
David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A.
6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also
contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials is. 2. W/N there was a violation
of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. HELD: 1. It is basic in cases of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment
prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to
mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that the next
regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same
having been scheduled in May 1997. 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution
provides that, The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years It is not to be
construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. LATIN
MAXIM:
1, 9a, 20a, 49

FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL
Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. RA 4917 exempted the
GCL Retirement Plan, including all the retirement benefits given to officials and
employees of private firms, from income tax. Soon after, P.D. 1959 was promulgated
abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits
previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from
income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA
4917. Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA
4917 and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. ISSUE:
W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P.D.
1959. HELD: Yes. The deletion in P.D. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax
exemption under the old law cant be deemed to be applicable to the employees
trusts. P.D. 1959 is a general law, hence, it cant repeal a specific provision
impliedly. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is
general in character cant be construed as repealing a special or specific
enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. Also in
Villegas v. Subido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter
legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the
special act. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 43, 50
222 People v. Leachon, Jr.
Case No. 108 G.R. No. 108725-26 (September 25, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine Airlines Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
Case No. 118 G.R. No. 114307 (July 8, 1998)

FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate

information for violation of P.D. 772, also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the
RTC presided over by respondent judge. After presenting the evidence, the
prosecution rested the cases. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested,
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the
subject case. A month after, the respondent judge dismissed the case again, opining
that P.D. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of the
1987 Constitution, which provide that, urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just
and humane manner. ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the subject criminal case. HELD: Yes. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law
or adjudged unconstitutional by this court, a law will always be presumed valid. At
the time the order was issued by respondent judge, P.D. 772 was still effective.
Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social
justice provision of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by

petitioner PAL. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to
board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265,
as amended by CB Circular 383, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA 265, as amended. PAL
placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years and six
months after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of
the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. The said resolution
likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full
conformity to the action taken by PAL. Upon his reinstatement, respondent filed a
claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. ISSUE: W/N Castro
is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his
period of suspension. HELD: Yes. The rules clearly provide that a preventive
suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days, after which period, the
employee must be reinstated to his former position. If the suspension is otherwise
extended, the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that
may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 13b
223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc.
Case No. 127 G.R. No. 45355 (January 12, 1990)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De Joya v. Lantin
Case No. 31 G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)

FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and 6020 to
install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in Cagayan
de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Opol,
Villanueva, and Jasaan. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment
of all taxes of whatever authority except 3% tax on its gross earnings. The
Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental, however, demanded payment of the
provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.D.
231) and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. ISSUE: W/N
CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. HELD: No. No provision
in P.D. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247, 3570 and 6020. A
special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a
later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the
terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law
unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Also, the
Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax
Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting
clause. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 50

FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company
Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be
delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took custody of
the shipment. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction
on the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and
1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the
shipment. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws,
whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws
prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50
224 Arayata v. Joya
Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino
Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-8500 (February 27, 1956)

FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the
Government for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he
conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died
before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was
ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal
property. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for
liquidation and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the
widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements
of the law. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails
or Act 1120s full conveyance of the property to the widow. HELD: Act 1120
prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition, disposition, and
transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code
is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail.
LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the houses of the
six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were public nuisances
built on public streets and river beds. Petitioners contend that under the Civil
Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the district health officer who should remove public
nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila, grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City
Engineer. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances, the
health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. HELD: The
City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is a general law
applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a special law that
pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and a special law are in
conflict, the latter prevails. LATIN MAXIM: 50
225 Bellis v. Bellis
Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Philippine Trust Co. v. Macuan
Case No. 123 G.R. No. 32280 (March 24, 1930)

FACTS: Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3
illegimate children, all surnamed Bellis. After the execution of the decedents
will, which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were
situated, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the
benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their
respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children. Relying on Art. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides
that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law), which did not
provide for legitimes, the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. ISSUE: Whether
Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary
succession. HELD: Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the
Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make
Art. 16, par. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this intent, Art. 1039 provides that
the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. It is thus
evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the
succession of foreign nationals. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c

FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated.

Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the
person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain
land with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property. Subsequently, M.
Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by the Court, praying that
the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property
belonging to his ward. A special guardian, Philippine Trust Co., was appointed for
the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved.
ISSUE: 1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is
entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. 2. W/N
the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally
incapacitated wifes property, her undivided half of the conjugal property. HELD:
1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership, which
still subsists, in the inventory of her property. 2. The defendant, being the
guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said half of
the conjugal property. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedure, which is
general in character; and 2) the Civil Code, which is more specific, referring to
the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. Thus, Civil Code
takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 50
226 Tan Liao v. American President Lines, Ltd.
Case No. 153 G.R. No. L-7280 (January 20, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeal
Case No. 75 G.R. No. 44007 (March 20, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 115

FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of
P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to
the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of
a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York,
USA to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt
of the goods, and thereby, claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in
accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. ISSUE:
W/N the action for damages had already prescribed, and thus, barred the appellant
to receive compensation for damages. HELD: Yes, it has already prescribed. The
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought
within one year after the delivery of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous
cases, the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. 190 as to
goods transported in foreign trade, the former being a special act while the latter
is a law of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 50

FACTS: Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a

legislative franchise, pursuant to RA 808, which included a tax exemption from the
payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on
its real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos
representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative
for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits
the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. The Court of Tax Appeals
rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioners assessment
without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax
Code. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of
the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal
effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935
Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. HELD: No. The
legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is in the nature of a private
contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local
authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and
the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the
general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and
circumstances. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50
227 NPVC v. Presiding Judge RTC Br. XXV
Case No. 87 G.R. No. 72477 (October 16, 1990)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Lopez, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission
Case No. 150 G.R. No. 87119 (April 16, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 116

FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real
property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner contends that the court
has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the
adjudication of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which provides that disputes between
agencies of the government including GOCCs shall be administratively settled or
adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand respondent invokes P.D.
464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of
taxation by provinces, cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in
favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has
jurisdiction over the civil action. HELD: Yes. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on
the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and
collection of real property taxes. granted that the latter is a special law dealing
specifically with real property taxes whereas P.D. 242 is a general law that deals
with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes, claims and
controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. Special
laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the
appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding
Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. However, the City Budget of Manila
questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of
city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. The City
Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the
City Mayor and not the City Council. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila
has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials
entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint
all officers and employees of the city. HELD: No. Regardless of their date of
passage, a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the
Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. RA 5185 and BP 337 as
general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing
power. Also, since repeals by implication are not favored, conflict between the
statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time
repeals the other. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b, 50
228 Manzano v. Valera Garcia v. Pascual, et al.
Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-16950 (December 22, 1961) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote
No. 118

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 80 G.R. No. 122068 (July 8, 1998)

FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner,
who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
However, the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on
Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal Trial,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the
penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the
respondents acceptance of the case for the MTCs lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for
libel. HELD: No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the
Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Although RA 7691 was enacted
to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and does
not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, which is a law of special
nature. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the
jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R.A. 7691it must be maintained
that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general
law by mere implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38, 50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA
1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws
may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is
not repealed by a subsequent general law. Also, there being no specific grant of
authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court, the power to appoint
should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. Lastly, the intent of the law in
placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the
importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 32, 36d,
50, b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. FACTS:
Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligible, was appointed by the Justice of
Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers were
submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1551 has
repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Sec. 75 of the
Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the
expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. RA
1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296 provides that all
employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities
shall be appointed by the mayor.
229 Lagman v. City of Manila, et al.
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966) Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No. 126

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
Case No. 28 G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No.
83

FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal
for the transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila repealed
RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on
Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For Other Purposes. ISSUE: W/N
the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and
void. HELD: No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548
and the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions
of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth
Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were
not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over
motor traffic. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11a, 49, 50 of Ordinance No. 4986 is

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.
Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason
that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any participation
in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been
violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of
fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: What law shall govern the
publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised
City Charter or the Local Tax Code. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and
the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be
considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of
ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard therefore, the
Local Tax Code controls. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40b, 49, 50
230

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Latin Maxims
Chapter II CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a
statute acquires the force of law. Chapter III AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C.
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in
lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. Optima est legum interpres
consuetudo. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. Regula pro lege, si
deficit lex. In default of the law, the maxim rules. 3. Optimus interpres rerum
usus. The best interpreter of the law is usage. Communis error facit jus. Common
error sometimes passes as current law. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis
non convalescit. That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become
valid. 4. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent
to a mandate. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. The
interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Chapter IV
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6.
Index animi sermo est. Speech is the index of intention. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of the statute there should be no departure. Maledicta et exposition
quae corrumpit textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Littera
scripta manet. The written word endures. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Things thus
standing. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the
law is clear, no explanation is required. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh
but it is the law. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. It is
exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL
INTERPRETATION 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in
contravention of the law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. What is good and equal is
the law of laws. Jus ars boni et aequi. Law is the art of equity. 9. Ratio legis
est anima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives life.
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more
subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Benignus leges
interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed
liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Qui haret in littera haret
in cortice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep
into its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum
generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, but
the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression. 10.
Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut
evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of
such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Legis
construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be such as to
work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. An
argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operari melius
est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that
they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. The law
always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem
jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. An argument
drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De similibus idem est
judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where there is the same
reason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio
caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.
Lex injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum
. Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody is above
the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above the law.
14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri
locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger
should reap the pecuniary produce of another mans work. 15. Surplusagium non
nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. The
useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de
corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the
meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat.
Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is
sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is sufficiently
certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec
exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Where anything is granted
generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that nothing shall
be contrary to law and right.
232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest
injustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an
impossible thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an
impossibility. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the
impossible. C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication
of law. In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the
lesser. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus
jurisdiction explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means
essential to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is
a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur action.
An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua
propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari delicto
potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault, the
position of the defending party is the better one.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What cannot,
by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V INTERPRETATION OF
WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.
General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum
generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in its general
sense. 25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be
understood in the context in which it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per
communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus
est. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to
their common and ordinary sense. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be
explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Verba generalia
restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. General words should be confined
according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non
distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish. 27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things
dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. B. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A
thing is known by its associates. 29. Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie.
233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person,
thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argumentum a
contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which
is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 33. Ad
proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A qualifying word or
phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 34. Reddendo
singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or expression
to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place. C. PROVISOS,
EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the
general rule. Chapter VI STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER
STATUTES A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Ex tota
materia emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its
parts put together.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita
indicare vel respondere. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular
part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem
recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sense
and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole
and not of one part only by itself. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima
interpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which
precedes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae
certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a subsequent
section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. 37.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be
interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUTE
CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of the
same matter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura.
Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. - Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur
in illis. - Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutandis.
With the necessary changes.
234 Chapter VII STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. IN GENERAL 40. Salus populi est
suprema lex. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Statuta pro publico
commodo late interpretantur. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be
construed liberally. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. The private
interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. B.
STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The act
does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Actus me invito
facturs non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. 42.
Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis.
Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants
them. Renunciatio non praesumitur. Renunciation cannot be presumed. 43.
Strictissimi juris. Follow the law strictly. 44. Nullum tempus occurit regi. There
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. MANDATORY STATUTES 45.
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure. He
who is first in time is preferred in right. Chapter IX PROSPECTIVE AND
RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. IN GENERAL 46. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks
forward, not backward. Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito. The law provides for the
future, the judge for the past. - Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet
non praeteritis. - A new statute should affect the future, not the past. Leges quae
retrospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in
legibus. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus
has really no place in the laws. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare
formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praeterito
tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Laws should be construed as
prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to past
transactions and to such as are still pending. B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
47. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime without a
penalty, there is no penalty without a law. 48. Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa
restringenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.
235 Chapter X AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. REPEAL 49. Leges
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. 50. Generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not
nullify a specific or special law.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. The black
(body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric
of the statute printed in red).

BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ignorantia legis

neminem excusat. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN
AMBIGUOUS B. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque
fieri solet. When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be
more likely or what usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla
verificatione excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic
evidence. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ad ea quae frequentibus
accidunt jura adaptatur. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which
most frequently occur. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non
quae ex inordinato. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen
most frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Quod
semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Legislators pass over what happens
only once or twice. De minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itself with
trifling matters.