Politicsof Identity

EthnicNationali~mand the Statein Pakistan

Adeel!Shan

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Copyright AdeelKhan, 2005

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-:Publication Data

Khan, Adee!, 1958-

Politics of identity: ethnic nationalism and the state in Pakistan/ Adeel,
Khan.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Pakistan-Ethnic relations-Political aspects. 2. Nationalism-Pakistan.
3. National state. I. Title.

DS380A1K43 320.54'095491---<lc22 2004 2004021321

ISBN: 0-7619-3303-4 (HB) 81-7829-427-3 (India-HB)

0-7619-3304-2(PB) 81-7829-428-1 (India-PB)

Sage Production Team: Vidyadhar Gadgil, Sh:wetaVachani,

Stishanta Gayen and Santosh Rawat

JAMES JBRAlY
M.MILNE
STATE
UNIV.
COlLEGE,
ONEONTA,
NY
For Rafat
 The whole is the false
TheodorAdorno
Minima Moralia: Ref/edionsfrom DamagedLife
 Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements 11

Chapter 1 Introduction: Crude Thinking 15

Chapter 2 Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Modem State 28
Chapter3 Colonial State and Colonial Difference in India 45
Chapter4 Nationalisation of the Colonial State in Pakistan 61
Chapter 5 Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism:
From Separatism to Integrationism 83
Chapter 6 Baloch Ethnic Nationalism: From Guerrilla
War to Nowhere? 109
Chapter 7 Sindhi Ethnic Nationalism: Migration and
Marginalisation 127
Chapter 8 Mohajir Ethnic Nationalism: El Dorado
Gone Sour 161
Chapter 9 At a Crossroads as 'Ever Before'! 187
Appendix A: The MQM's Charter of Resolutions and
Revised List of Demands 192
AppendixB: List of Interviews and Informal Conversations
(1997, 1998) 195

Bibliography 198
Index 207
About the Author 213
 Prefaceand Ackn9wledgements
-
I

Nationalism is a way of dealing with a world where 'evs:rythip.gielt~

into thin air'. It is a form of self-love in.,which i~Qividuals celebrate
their group identity, and like 'all forms of self-love.gets its strengtli
more from, its hatred 0ot~rs than its love for its, self~Here lies the
secret behind ~ome of the most intractable conflicts i,n the }Vorld.
Nationalism is probably the, only form of self-love that gets its Me-
blood from an institution~ the modern state. Had the state not been
there to support the stlf-love of tb.e Germans, they.would not have
been able to torture and vwrder so many J~ws iQ such a-short period
of time. Likewise, had the west not helped,the Jews to establish thei{
own state,irf Palestine, the Jews would never h~ve been able W dispJace
and kill so.many ]?alestinians. ,, ' , 1
Nationalism is not the .'pathology; ohhe m9dem wqrld, but is, as a
sentim<:ntand as a. doctrine, rper~ly a,pithetic wayof dealing M'.).th
a pathologically uheven and asymmetrical ~orld order. Nationalism, as
a game of power, as politics, however. is lethal ;i,nddestrq,ctjv~,As;,tsen;
timfnt and as a doctrine nationalism may be t,he child 4)f,an unstable
and fast changing world bvt as a,(Orm of politic~ it is the cpil<;lo.f the
nation-state. Since my concern here is not na,tion,alism~ a sentiment
or doctrine but nationalism as a fotrP of polit,ics,my emphasis thn:mgh-
out is,,on the most powerful container 'opolitical power, the state,.
I would like to thank the Sdciology Program' and tI:,.eSchgol ;of
Critical Enquiry at the University of Wollongong. whert.,I .cond4cted
and presented this study for the Ph.D. award, for helping i;nc;to tra,vel
to Pakisfan twice to do my &eldwork.
In Pakistan there are very many people who have heJp~d m~ in mai;iy
differ~rtt ways. lam grateful to all,those academics,jourpalists, pbliti-
cians, lawyers and activists who spared their time to speak to me. I am
12 Politicsof Identity IE

indebted to Ahmed Shah and Ayub Shiekh for organising a most

entertaining as well as productive trip to Hyderabad, where they
arranged meetings with Ibrahim Joyo, Rasul Bux Palejo and other
Sindhi nationalists. In Lahore I had the pleasure of the company of
Khawar Malik and Imtiaz Alam in one of the most dramatic months in
Pakistan's history, when the chief justice and the prime minister were
caught in a bizarre battle of ego that created a serious political crisis. In
Quetta, Abdul Sarni Kakar, a former Pukhtun Student Federation
activist who was introduced to me by Tahir Mohammad Khan, made,
for wonderful company and was a great help in organising interviews
with Baloch and Pukhtun nationalists. In Islamabad I shall always miss
the late Eqbal Ahmed with whom I had some most stimulating dis-
cussiorls. In Karachi my jdumalist friends Mazhar Abbas, Sabihuddin
Ghousi and Tausif Ahmed Khan were extremely generous with their
time and information. Mazhar not only prdvided mc;with very useful
information and contacts but also arrangedmeetings with MQM leaders.
My gratitude to all of them~
My thanks to Omita Goyal, General Manager, Editorial Department,
and Mimi C:houdhury, Deputy Acquisitions Editor at Sage Publications,
who made the process df publishing this book an exciting task for me.
I am ih'Clebtedto Partha ,Chatterjee, Dipesh Chakrabarty and Gyan
Pandey for their invaluable comments. My colleagues at the
University of New England, How;trd Brasted and Victor Minichiello,
have been a consistent source of support and encouragement for the
publication of this'bdok. I feel duly obliged to them.
Stephen Castles has been an unrelenting source of encouragement
and inspiration. He not only encouraged me to think as deeply and as
critically as possible, but also at times forced lne to explore different
aspects of the argument, whenever he felt I could do better. I have I5ar.!
ticularly benefited from Stephen's knowledge of European history.
My wife; Rafat, deserves more than a few words of gratitude, as she
is the one who had to put up with my anxiety, self-doubt, writer's
block, mood swin~, and all other 'hazards' that come with a person
who agrees with Adorno that 'only those thoughts are true which fail
to understand themse1ves.' I am obliged to her for bearing with me.
As is customary, and in a legal sense as well, I mi,st admit that I alone
am responsible for the mistakes and weaknesses in trty wotk; but as
I havemadeit obvious.that I would not have been able to produce this
work without the help of all those mentioned here, morally they
 Affi: HI Prefaceand Acknowledgements13

cannot escape the responsibility. The only consolation I can offer them
is that I apologise for the mistakes and weaknesses and promise to try
harder next time to fail better.
I wish to thank the following publishers for granting me permission
to reprint here articles which were first published in their journals:
South Asian Studies association for 'Ethnicity, Islam and National
Identity in Pakistan', SouthAsia special i~sue, 1999, Vol. 22, pp. 167-83.
Chapter 4 of this book is a revised and expanded version of this article.
The Regents of the University of California for 'Pakistan's Sindhi
Ethnic Nationalism: Migration, Marginalisation and the Threat of
"Indianisation"', Asian Survey, 2002, Vol. 42: 2, pp. 213-29.
Taylor & Francis Ltd. for the following three articles:
'Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism',
Asian Ethnicity,2003, Vol.4: 1, pp. 67-83:
'Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to
Nowhere?',Asian Ethnicity,2003, Vol. 4: 2, pp. 281-93.
'Mohajir Ethnic Nationalism: El Dorado Gone Sour', Asian Studies
Review,2004, Vol 28: 1, pp. 1-16.

Adeel Khan
University of New England
Armidale, Australia
[email protected]
 1
Introduction:
CrudeThinking

I
1
All the problems of politics, of social organization, and of education
have b,een falsified through and through because one mistook th<:;
most harmful men for great men-because one learned tp despise
'little' things, which.means the basic concerns qflife itsel
1
-'Nietzsche '
.,
One of the serious challenges that the state of Pakistan has been
confronted with sihce its creation in 1947 is the self-assertion' of various
ethnic groups. Out dfthe initial five'ethnic groups_:._Bengalis,Punjabis:
Pukhtun, Sindhis and Balocq-four have actively contested the iegiti-
macy Of the ad'ministrative structure of the state, with one, the Bengalip',
succeeding in breaking away and creating their own s'tate, Bangladesh.
Even before the partition. of British India, die ~ukhtun and Balocli
nationalis~ had opposed the ,accession of the1t regi<?nsto Pakistan. After
partition they continued to hurture'a desire to establish their owrl intie-
pendent national states. Just before parti~on; Bengali leaders frombbtli
the Muslim League (with the acceptance of''Jinnah) and the Indian
National Congress had made an unsuccessful:last' minute bid iri May
1947to secure a unitecfi~depen'c.lltnt~engal.2 The Sindpis h.td supported
the, idea of Pakistarr,out only in die hope that it would be adecentraljsed
confederation 'of the Muslim majority provinces.,After the establishment
of Pakistan, however, they became' disenchanted with the centralising
poli~ies oftbe s~te: and those like G.~. Sayed, who had been.enthusias-
tic' suppofters of the Muslim League and its demand for a separate
Muslim state, termed the partitioh of the shbyontjnent on the basis of the
so-called tw'o-nati6n theory''unnatural, inhuman' and unrealistic'. 3
After partition yet anbther' ethni~ group was added to the five
in'digehotis ones, in the shape of the Indian M'1sli'm migrants, the
Mohajirs, who had not only been at the forefront of-the movement fat
Pakistan''but were after its creation the most ardent supp0rters of the
16 Politicsof Identity

centralising policies of the state. After three decades of Pakistan's

existence, however, they too began to express their disillusionment
with the administrative structure of the state, and in the early 1980s
they formed their own ethnic political group, the Mohajir Quami
[National] Movement (MQM). By the mid-1980s the MQM
emerged as the most organised ethnic group, with widespread popular
support among the Mohajirs. Soon the MQM transformed into the
most violent political group, confronting other ethnic groups as well as
the state establishment.
The only ethnic group which seems to have been content with the
Pakistani state structure is the Punjabis. The reason is simple: from the
very beginning they have been over-represented in the state appara-
tuses like the military and civil bureaucracy, as well as in sectors like
industry, business and commerce. Moreover, after the separation of
East Bengal (Bangladesh) in 1971, they have become the overwhelm-
ing majority group in Pakistan, further consolidating their control over
the state structure.
It is amazing that despite the all-pervasive ethnic discontent in
Pakistan, there is little analytical work available on the national
prl!dicament of the country. The dominant trend in the literature on
Pakistan is that of narrating the trials and tribulations of the country's
political life in a descriptive manner, mainly focusing on individuals.
Even if, at times, there is some analysis of events, it is more in the
manner of untheorised interpretations rather than rigorous theoretical
examination. 'The danger of untheorized history, as John Breuilly has
pointed out, 'is that it either smuggles in unacknowledged definitions
and concepts or substitutes ill-focu_sed narrative for clear analytical
description' and explanation.' 4
Most of the literature on the politics of Pakistan is by those whom
Foucault has called the 'users of history' rather than analysers: those
who conduct their research on the basis of facts and figures alone. 5 But
facts do not speak for themselves, they need to be analysed. And analy-
sis demands what Brecht has called 'crude thinking', which means a
referral of theory to practice and to facts.6 Unless such crude thinking
is adopted, history itself has little significince other than as a faprica-
tion, a fable that signifies major eveqts and the heroic or villainous role
ofindividual actors whose actions triggered them. Such historiography
may make interesting reading but does not help to understand the
importance of social and ~conomic struggles and the changes that these
struggles effect, the power relations that they produce and the various
 II ii!\-- Introduction:CrudeThinking17

methods of control and coercion that they engender. As a result,

history is reduced to the achievements and failings of a few individuals-
their 'good' intentions and 'evil' deeds. In the process, history becomes
story and the historian a storyteller.
This is not the case with Pakistan alone; most scholarship every-
where in the '}VOrldsuffers from this malaise. What is special about
Pakistan, however, is that there is a particularly significant paucity of
analytical work. The dearth of theoretical analysis becqmes all the
more striking when one notices that acros.s the border, in India, there
is a considerable amount of remarkably high-quality analysis. For
instance, even if one has to consider only the members of the
Subaltern Studies Group,,the list is a long,one. The Group has, in fact,
set a new trend in history writing by questioning conventional wisdorq,
demystifying the 'grand narratives', confronting the repression of
'specific rationalities' ,7and exposing the lies and mischief behind the
'truths' of nationalist ideology and its most powerful upholder, the
nation-state.
In recent years, another trend has emerged under the influence of an
approach that has become standard in western academic institutions: a
cJescription of the theoretical literature is given, almost always,uncriti-
cally, at the ,beginning of the study; bibliographical details in the field
are provided, some disagreements among various authors highlighted;
and then in the next section the same storytelling with the usual
prominent heroes and villains is t:esorted to. Hardly any synthesis of
the theory with the 'story' is sought to be made. This, too, is a global
trend and not restricted to Pakistan alone. The problem with. such
writings is that they have a tendency to oversimplify, stereotype, and
moralise.
Let me make it clear at this point that my objection is not to the
mention of individuals, but to the overestimation of the i)nportance of
individuals and their contributions. What I am trying to say is that
,unless individual actors are seen in the context,of socio-economic and
cultural backgrounds, history is reduced to a narration of their achieve-
ments and failings; it is turned into fiction. In other words, my pbjec-
tion is to presenting history in a manner which turns individuals into
larger than life figures, where they seem to be not the products of cer-
tain socio-economic trends but rather' the creators of those trenqs. Of
course, the modem history oflndia cannot be narrated without men-
tion of Gandhi and the creation of Pakistan cannot be easily under-
stood without Jinnah. However, if it is assumea that India would not
18 Politics'ofIdentity

have achieved independence without Gandhi, and that Pakistan would

not have come into being without Jinnah, the mechanism of power
(signified by certain cultural, economic and political trends at that
point in Indian history) is reduced to irrelevance.
What I am suggesting is 'that powerful individuals need to be seen
and presented in the badq~round of the techhologies of power'at acer-
tain point in history and not vice versa. As I shall try to demonstrate in
the following pages, powerful individuals are nothing but the most
skilful operators of the technologies of power, and their successes and
failings have as much to do with their own calculations as they do with
the requirements of the ,technologies of power. I hope my disagree-
ment with the writers mentioned below will be seen in the light of
these two points about the pitfalls of untheorised history and an
overemphasis on the role of individual actors, and not as an intention
on my p'art to run anybody down. After all, !,have chosen for my cri-
tique sortle leading scholars, from whose work, as far as information is
concerned, I in fact benefited the most.
It is neither possible nor relevant here to give a detailed critiq_ueof
the general ttends indte historical literature on Pakistan. It would per!.
haps reqrtire a separate study to include the writings of all those who
have wittingly or unwittingly accepted the official line and those whose
work is influenced by their'own nationalist preferet'l.tes. Just to,giye a
glimpse of the main currents in the literature, I have chosen here,
rather arbitrarily of course, those portions of the ~ork of some inde-
pendent writers, which dear with the issue of etbnic conflict in
Pakistan. - - ~---
There is a tendency among the so-called liberals in Pakistan to sug-
gest that Pakistan is ndt a nation-state but a state-nation. 8 So much so
that even a schofar like Hamza Alavi, while citing Benedict Anderson's
statement that an imagined community is 'conceived as a deep hori-
zontal comradeship', declares that the 'peoples of Pakistan have not yet '
fused into a single community. 9 Then Alavi goes on to say that whereas
in Europe, nations were constituted into states, in post-colonial societies
the problem is inv~rted.
The first point is that conceiving is part of imagining, and imagining
is part of the reality of the nation. Therefore ifis not correct to say that
the Pakistani nation as,animagined community is not 'conceived as a
deep horizontal community'. The depth of Pakistan's conceived
nation-ness should be judged by its hatretl of others; especially India,
and not by its love for itsel That there is very little to love
 Introduction:CrudeThinking19

oneself for being a Pakistani, unless one thinks of one's ethnic identity,
and still there is such strong hatred oflndia is one of the most pernicious
effects of state nationalism.
The second point i,s that 'nations do not make states and nation-
alisms but the other way round. ' 10 Those who believe that they do tend
to take nations as a given, as an eternal reality. In this they fall prey to
the rhetoric of nationalism itsel Otherwise, as Gellner has said:

Nations as. a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an

,inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth;
nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and
turns thein into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality,,fo.r better. or
worse, and in general an inescapable one. [emphasis in original] 11

The tendency to overestimate the role of individual actors, without

analysing the mechanism' of power relations is,best illustrated in one of
the thost interesting books on the early political history of Pakistan,
The Stateof MartialRule by AyeshaJalal.Jalal's sinewy prose and assid-
uous research have earned, her well-deserved accolades from Narious
quarters.
Jalal repeatedlywarns against the pitfalls of simple and one-dimensional
explanations of.Pakistan's complex situation. She rightly says that 'the
unseemly doings of politicians may be less controversial, ,even enter-
taining, but hop~lessly inadequate ... as the sole basis for an analysis,'12
and that weaknesses in the party system as explanations for the fre-
quency of mili.tary rule 'have done more to obfuscate than to lay bare
the complex dynamics which have served to make military rule the
norm rather than the exception in Pakistan.' 13
Despite such awareness that individual actors--or a group of them or
even a one.-to-oiie clash ofinstitutions on the basis of their strength and
weaknesses-are fragile tools for analysis, J alal howevet. resorts to the
same methods, though with more vigour and eloquence than many
others in the field. In Jalal's work there is,an excessive emphasis on
indiviclual ,actors, an abundance of stereotyping, and an uncanny ten-
dency to explain institutional interests in isolation from their power
relations with social and econot;nic interests. Let us take a few exampies.
Treating the American embassy's dispatch as an authoritative com-
ment on the aftermath of the assassinationof Pakistan's first prime
minister, Jalal says: 'Anyone could see that after Liaquat's assassination
r,, 20 Politicsof Identity

and the "evident weakening of central authority", the "provincialists ...

[were] entering a period of increasing strength and influence." The
"cehtrifugal trend of provincialism, .. [was] becom[ing] stronger";
people almost "instinctively" thought of themselves "as Bengalis,
PunjaDis, Sindhis, or citizens of other provinces rather than as
Pakistanis."' 14
Thus, the issues of centre-province relations, the oppressively cen-
tralising policies of the Pakistani state, the absence of representative
rule and provincial autonomy, ethnic and regional discontent, and the
existence of multiple identities are all reduced to a single individual's
disappearance from the scene. Jalal has a propensity to stereotype a
people and a region with majestic ease. For example, she says: 'True to
South Asian political traditions, the groupings revolved around key
personalities, not principles or programmes ... anything is possible in
South Asian politics.' 15 It is difficult to distinguish this statement from
one that would be made by a reckless journalist, stereotyping South
Asian politics as something unique.
The point is that politics is about power, not morals, principles and
programmes. The problem with seeing politics in terms of good and
bad is that it blurs one's perspective on politics, itself, and does not
allow one to deal with political intrigues as part of politics as a power
game but rather obliges one to see it as an aberration from the 'normal'
course of politics. Hence, politics itself is made sacrosanct whereas the
actors are turned into heroes and villains.16 When politics is viewed in
such moral terms, social and economic structures, powq relations,,and
class antagonism and struggles become secondary to individual inten-
tions and interests; and history therefore becomes the story of the rise
and fall of powerful individuals.
In Jalal's account the serious issue of ethnic conflict in the first
decade of Pakistan's history that eventually cost the ~tate its eastern
wing, Bangladesh, emerges as a mere conflict of interests between the
bureauFats and politicians. She claims that 'it was not provincial but
institutional interests that demanded unitary instead of a federal form
of government.' 17 The demand for a unitary form of government was
not that of the bureaucrats and generals alone, and Jalal has herself
recognised this by noting that 'the Puajabis were worried that
Bengali-Pathan alliance would result in their being denied "a fair share
of control of the country" .' 18
Without explaining what she means by 'institutional interests', J alal
adds that the 'refusal by senior bureaucrats and military officers to
 Introduction:CrudeThinking21

accept the implications of a Bengali majority had placed state-building

on a collision course with the political process.' 19 Clearly, it is a con-
tradiction of sorts to suggest that the Punjabi-Mohajir-dominated
central establishment's interests were institutional rather than provin-
ciaVethnic, and then add that the same establishment was not willing
to accept a Bengali majority.
The One-Unit Scheme of 1955 is one of the many black spots in
Pakistan's hisJory. It was an effort by the Punjabi-Mohajir establish-
ment to lump together the smaller provinces with Punjab to neutralise
the Bengali majority. ButJalal insists that 'the proposal was not accept-
able to all Punjabi politicians' [emphasis mine], which 'suggests yet
again that the centre's interests were not always those of the J?unjab's
or that the bureaucratic-military alliap.cewas necessarily working from
a provincial perspective.' 20
There are two points in the above statement which beg explanatibn.
Despite being a researcher with an eye for meticulous detail, Jalal has
given neither the number of those Punjabi politicians who were
opposed to the scheme, nor has she named even one of them. She per-
haps had in mind th,e sole left-oriented politician, Mian Iftikharuddin,
who was an exception to the norm. Otherwise, available information
indicates that all those Punjabi politicians who were in the thick of the
power games, like Daultana, were so chauvinistic that they were not
only opposed to the idea of parity for East Bengal but also refused to
accept the possibility of representation on the, basis of population. 21
Jalal's other asse1;tion that the centre's intetests were not always
those of the :Punjab's or that the bureaucratic-military alliance was not
necessarily working from a provincial perspective, is, indeed, beyond
belie The history of Pakistan is the history of Punjabi domination.
Throughout Pakistan) history the interests of the centre and Punjab
have been one and the same. Tliis is so because P;ikistan's state struc-
tqre has been dominated and controlled by the bureaucracy and the
miliqry, the two institutions that have since the creation of Pakistan
been dominated by the Punjabis. 22 Therefore, to separate the interests
of the Punjabi,dominated central establishment, which is generally
called 'the Punjabi empire', from the provincial interests of Punjab is
to.displ3 an ingenuity irrelevant tq,the reality of,Pakistani politics.
As a 'user of h,istory', Jalal is a storyteller at her best. In her capable
hands the political history of Pakistan has become.,an interesting tale of
intrigues, It is a historiography full of sound and fury, dominated
by heroes arid villains. Exploration of the struggles and. resistances of
9

'
22 Politicsof Identity

various classes, the technologies of power, and the mechanism of

power relations-all these become issues of minor significance. It is a
historiography exploring 'evil designs' that thwarted the pious march
forward of history.
Another leading writer, Shahid Javed Burki; has developed a thesis
of power struggles in Pakistan on the basis of a typical modernist
binary opposition between the modern and the traditional, and
between the bourgeois and the feudal. Like all modemits, Burki sees
tradition as oppressive and undemocratic, and modernity as participa-
tory and democratic. 23 Under the all too clear influence of American
modernisation'. theory, Burki deduces that the early years of Pakistan's
history were traumatic because there was a clash between two systems,
the 'older (traditional) indigenous system' of hierarchical rigidity and
the 'broadly participatory' (modem) one imported by migrants. In the
former, according to Burki, the principal actors were individuals (land-
lords), while in the latter they were not individuals but social and eco-
nomic groups like merchants, industrialists, lawyers, teachers, etc.
'The indigenous system was stable but archaic ... the migrants' system
was unstable but modern ... the older system espoused political and
economic paternalism; the newer system had embraced laissez-faire
economics and liberal political institutions.' 24 The dubiousness of
Burki's formulation can be explained on two counts:

1. The migrants may have been more literate and more exposed to
modernity but they were by no means more democratic or more
open to participatory and liberal political institutions. On the
contrary, it was the indigenous people who were more inclined
towards secular (modem?) politics and had therefore kept away
from the religion-based nationalism of the Muslim League, into
which they were only drawn just before partition. Also, the
most important Mohajir leaders, like Liaquat Ali Khan,.
Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, I.I. Chundrigar, etc., were aristocrats
(landlords) from Muslim minority provinces and not mod-
ernised entrepreneurs. As far as the mass of Mohajirs was con-
cerned, they were trained in the modernist-conservative
tradition of Aligarh Muslim University, which had indoctri-
nated them as the loyal subjects of the Crown, rather than
democracy-loving, open-minded anti-colonialists. They were
not evert what Macaulay wanted them to be-'a class of persons,
Indian in blood and colour, but English-in taste, in opinion, in
 Introduction:Crude Thinking23

morals and in intellect.' 25 They were a class of conformists, who

had learned to rationalise their 'inferiority' to the colonial m'asters,
much as they would later rationalise their 'superiori~' to the
indigenous people of Pakistan.
2. The second point, which is .even more objectionable than the
first, is that in the insider-outsider dichotomy Burki has com-
pletely ignored the Bengali majority and its effects on Pakistan's
early politics. Pakistan's politics till the creation of Bangladesh in
1971 were marred not by a clash between insiders and outsiders
but between the minority Punjabi-Mohajir nexus' control over
the state system and the Bengali majority's exclusion from the
same. Whether it.was the Punjabi-Mohajir politicians, bureau-
crats or generals, they were all unwilling to hand over power to
the Bengalis. In their efforts to block the Bengalis' wayto
power, politicians, bureaucrats and generals were preoccupied,
in unison, with palace intrigues; finally, the militarisation of the
bureaucratised state in Pakistan, as we shall see in Chapter 4,
soon placed the military at the helm of affairs.

Marxist writer Feroz Ahmed was particularly interested in the ethnic

conflicts of Pakistan. In 1975 he edited a small book, Focus on
Baluchistanand PushtoonQuestion,and in 1997 published another book,
Ethnicity and Politicsin Pakistan,which includes some of the earlier
essays with some changes. His serialised articles in the daily Dawn of
Karachi in 2000 also focused on the question of ,ethnicity and have
some important insights. On the whole, however, his work suffers
from excessive Marxist jargon, cliches, and moralistic recommenda-
tions. The gap of over two decades between the two books does not
seem to have broadened his perspective on nationalism. Even in his
last essays, published well after his death in 1997, he continued to
deploy the ideas of pre-World War II Marxist writers on nationalism
like Lenin, Stalin and l{autsky, but none,ofthe post-World War II writers
figured in his writings. Hence, he could never recover from the
Marxist line, which saw nationalism in terms of progressive and reac-
tionary, i.e., good and bad nationalisms. 26 On that basis he accepted
some nationalisms, like_Bengali and Sindhi, as modern nationalisms,
while. rejecting Pukhtun nationalism as medieval particularism, and
Mohajir nationalism as fascism. Like Emile Zola's novels, in Ahmed's
work the working class is composed of angels whereas:the ruling clas;;
is composed of rogties.
24 Politicsof Identitylili\iMiiC/,fl

Because the intelligentsia in Pakistan is fed on these untheorised

accou'nts, there is pervasive confusion about the issue of ethnic con-
flict. During my field work in 1997 and 1998, I met numerous politi-
cians, academics, lawyers, journalists, writers and activists in Pakistan,
but except for some academics who have developed their own theories
~nd some journalists who have first-hand information about ethnic
groups (which I have duly cited), in most of my interviews and infor-
mal conversations I heard variations on the same old theories.
Therefore, after days of transcribing interviews, when I got down to
writing I decided to use the published work from which these theories
emanated rather than attribute them to the interviewees. Likewise I
had to devise my own means to deal with ethnicity and nationalism, by
theorising and reinterpreting the whole issue afresh on the basis of
available information.
My main concern is to analyse ethnic conflict in Pakistan as a polit-
ical issue, and politics for me is not about morals and principles but
about power. For that I have used Foucault's schema. According to
Foucault there are two major systems of approach to the analysis of
power: the contract-oppression approach and the domination-repression
approach. 27 In the contract-oppression approach, power is 'an original
right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty' as a social
contract. In this approach, whenever power over-extends itself it becomes
oppression. On the other hand, in the domination-repression approach
there is no contract, and therefore no question of abuse of power. Here
repression is not p9wer over-extended 'but is, on the contrary, the
mere effect and continuation of a relation of domination.' In the dom-
ination-repression schema, 'the pertinent opposition is not between
legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle
and submission.' 28
The story of ethnic conflict in Pakistan is netther a question oflegiti-
macy of state nationalism nor a question of illegitimacy of ethnic nation-
alism. The question of legitimacy and illegitimacy is itself a creation of
the state. It is a struggle for power between the dominant and non-
dominant groups.--and I am clearly on the side of the non-dominant. My
ethnic background as a Pukhtun and the ease that I feel in speaking my
mother tongue, Pashto, have little to do with my preferences. Ifl have no
sympathy for Pukhtun politics the reason is simple: for me it is not my
'ethnicity or nationality that gives me a sense of identity but my sense of
justice. Given the choice between my mother and justice I will side with
justice 29-not with some abstract concept of justice but my own sense of
 di!R!!M Introduction:CrudeThinking25

justice, which I have developed through my learning and unlearning, and

which has become part of me, my choice and my identity.
I see Punjabis as the dominant group, and Mohajirs ad Pukhtuns
as comparatively more privileged groups and therefore allies of
Punjabis at different points in their history. I have no illusions that
Bengalis or Sindhis or Baloch would have behaved differently had they
been in the place of Punjabis; such idealism is not one of my major
failings. For' ... I see what is-human, alas, all-too-human!' 30
I agree with Benedict Anderson that 'the difference between the
inventions of "official nationalism" and those of other types is usually
that between lies and myths.' 31 The official lies of the Pakistani state
present the country as one united nation with a common history, com-
mon culture, common language and common religion. But various
ethnic groups refuse to accept those lies and, despite a common reli-
gion, challenge them with the myths of their own distinct history, cul-
ture and language. In the end, however, I am more sympathetic
towards ethnic nationalism, because it at least 'faces up to the negativ-
ity of the existing world. ' 32 But at the same time I an:imindful that the
moment ethnic nationalism achieves its goal-the state-it inexorably
becomes part of the same negativity.

estate

For an understanding of ethnic conflict in Pakistan, I start off with an

examination of the role the modem state has come to play in the lives
of individuals. The state as an institution of political power may be as
old as organised human societies, but the bureaucratic state that we
have today is a modem phenomenon, a rather recent development.
The modern state is an extremely interventionist institution which
tries to penetrate almost every aspect of human life, and it is this aspect
of the state that has acquired vital importance. As a result, some
remarkable work on the changed nature of the state has come out in
recent years. While making use of this work, my intention here is to
show not what the state is but what it does to individuals. But as the
main concern of this study is nationalism rather than the state, it does
not attempt a systematic examination of the historical evolution of the
state, or of theories of the state.
My purpose is to highlight those aspects of the state which will help
us to identify its relationship with nationalism. Another point is that
26 Politicsof Identity

whatever shape the modem state takes-whether liberal democratic,

socialist, communist, fascist or military authoritarian-its int~rven-
tionist nature does not cliange. This does not mean that there is no dif-
ference between these state systems. What it means is that the basic
structre of the modern state is the same in all these instances, and the
difference is in the methods adopted under each of these systems. For
instance, ideological engineering is an important part of every modem
state structure, but to achieve that goal various states adopt different
methods, ranging from suggestions to coercion, persecution and obt-
right repression. And it is these methods, which differentiate 'variou~
forms of state of.the same type of state'. To put it in anoth$!rway, 't1lese
modifications do not affect the very matrix of relations ... they consti-
tute differentiated forms of these relations.' 33'
The modem state was introduced to Indian society in the fot;m of
the-colonial state. It w:asan altogether different form of power as com-
pared to what India had before colonialism. To highljgh~ tht difference
between the two systems and the significance of the impact of the new
system on Indian society, Chapter 3 looks at the pre-colonial ,state
system in India, and then examines the colonial state system and the
changes that it effected till the partition and independence pf Inclia.
Chapter 4 assesses the state system in Pakistan and endeavours to
explain the role that it has played in causing ethnic discontent. In
Chapters 5-8, four ethnic movements-Pukhtun, Baloch, Sindhi and
Mohajir-are studied separately. Despite my aversion to putt,ing too
much emphasis on personality, I have had to repyatedly mention
Ghaffar Khan and hisf;~ily in the ;hapte; qn,Pukhtun nationalism,
because the two are almost synonymous. Pukhtun nationalism has alJ
along b<;en personality-oriented rather than issue-oriente,d. The
majority ethnic group, qie Punjabis, is not ~tudied separately, because
it i~1:hemost privileged group, with control of state power, and therefqre
the only one which has never had an ethnic movement confrontiQg the
state.

References
1. Nietzsche, 1989, p. 256,.
2. Alayi, 1989c, p. 224.
3. Sayed, 1995,p. 122.
4.- Breuilly, 1996,'p. 146:
'
 Introduction:
CrudeThinking27

5. Foucault, 1991b, p. 125.

6. Cited by Arendt, 1992, p. 21.
7: This terminology is from Foucault, who thought that 'the word rationalization is
dangerous: What we have to do is tq analyze specific rationalities rather than always
invokiug the progress of rationalization in general.I See Foucault, 1982, p. t10.
8. During my fieldwork I heard this from many persons.
9. Afar,, 1989b, p. 1527.
10. Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 11.
11. Gelfner, 1983, pp. 48-49.
12. Jalal, 1991, p. 270.
13. Ibid., p. 295.
14. Ibid., p. 144.
15. Ibid., pp. 155, 190.
16. It is no wonder that when po\itics is seen in such moral, terms, an extremely con-
servative former US President, Ronald Reagan, reaches a conclusion that is the exact
opposite of our liberal scholar. Reagan once said: 'Politics. is supposed to He the sec-
ond oldest profession. I have come to realize that it bears a very'close resemblance
to the first.' See Metcalf, 1993, p. 168.
17. Jalal, 1991, p. 175
18. Ibid., pp. 114-75.
19. Ibid., p. 175.
20. Ibid., p. 191.
21. r:,loman, 1990, p. 10.
22. During the first two and a half decades, the Mohajirs were the senior partners in tqe
bureaucracy. ,
23. Bu~ki, 1980, p. 15.
24. Ibid.
25. Cited in Anderson, 19tJ1,p. 91.
26. Ahmed, 1998,'p. 186.
27. Foucault, 1980, pp. 91-92.
28. Ibid., p. 92.
29. !~version of Albert Camus' famous statement in which he said that given a cholce
between his mother and justice he would choose his mother.
30. Nietzsche, 1989, p. 283
31. Anderson11991, p. 161.
32. Fine, 1999, p. 152.
33. J:?oulantzas,1973, pp. 147--48.
 2
Ethnicity,
Nationalismand the Modern
State

Madness is something rare in individuals-but in groups, parties,

peoples, ages it is the rule.
1
-Nietzsche

Ethnic and nationalist violence is one of the great group madnesses of

modem times. 2 Millions of people have died in the twentieth century
as a result of this madness and hundreds continue to die every day.3If
judged by the number of societies that are affiicted by it, it is more
widespread in Asia and Africa, but its intensity and destructiveness is
by no means less menacing in Europe where, on the one hand, Nazi
Germany and Yugoslavia alone have caused the genocide of the largest
number of people in the shortest periods of time and, on the other
hand, Irish and Spanish nationalist groups' at-random terrorist activi-
ties have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent victims in British
and Spanish cities.
As far as Asia and Africa are concerned, it was nationalism which led
to their independence from colonial rule. But that was not the end of the
nationalistjourney, only a beginning. The real project of nationalism was
to manifest itself only after the establishment of the nation-state. By all
standards, it has been a bloody and destructive project. Many of these
new nations have spent more resources and energies on fighting inter-
state and intra-state battles than on facing the challenges of a complex,
interdependent and asymmetrical world economic. system.
It is a general observation that whenever there is ethnic violence it is
regarded as something 'primitive' and 'uncivilised'. All available evi-
dence, however, demonstrates that while ethnicity and ethnic conflict
may be as old as human societies, their intensity, which has recently
touched monstrous proportions, is something new, something modem 1
 Ethnicity,Nationalismand the Modern State29

that is directly related to modernity and its most po\\;erful manifestation,

the modem state. 'All ethnic and national struggles are centred around
the state. In fact, the state itself has caused ,some of the most brutal
ethnic violence, as was the case in ,Nazi Germany and rec~ntJy in
Yugoslavia. In other parts of the world as well, state-sponsored vio-
lence has led to the death of thousands of people.
Ethnic and nationalist violence generally appears in two forms:
either by the state Ol' for the state. The state sees any voice of dissent
and demand for autonomy or self-determination as 'provincial',
'tribal' and disruptive. On the other hand, ethnic, linguistic au.d reli-
gious groups feel alienated and see the' state as not their own, and
therefore struggle to either make it more responsive to their demands
or, if that is not possible, to create their own state. Emphasising a
direct link between the state and nationalism does not mean tha( all
other factors such as industrialism, communication and market econ-
omy are considered less important-far from it. What it does mean is
that the interventionist nature of the modem state and its penetration
of almost every aspect of individual life make,it a focal point of all
struggles. These stru~les might not be just political, but may also be
economic, cultural, regional, ethnic and religious. But in every cas~,
because of the pivotal role of the state, it is looked up to for reparation.
It would be wrong to suggest that every national movement is about
creating a state ofits,own. But there should be no doubt that all national
movements demand that the state ought to behave as if it is their own.
In the world of nation-states, it would be naYvetb believe that ethnic,
lirlguistic and religious struggles are simply aboqt the preservation of a
group identity. Nationalist movements arise in many different guises, in
many different forms and in many different circumstanct:s. It is also not
correct to suggest that it is only the deprived groups among whom
nationalist sentiment is the strongest. For instance, the Basques and.
Catalans in Spain and the Sikhs in India are relatively more prosperous
than the rest of the ethnic groups in their countries. But that does not
mean that most national movements are not launched by those who
perceive themselves to be deprived-if not economically, then cultur-
ally, linguistically or politically. Once again, whether it is the privileged
or the deprived groups, the state is the issue. Neither Basques nor Sikhs
nor Quebecois in Canada see the state as their own.
Nationalism as a modem form of politicsis as intricate a phenom-
enon as modernity itsel It is relevant here to mention that modernity
is not something that emerges out of traditional, 'as one constant- ,-
30 Politicsof Identity

the "modern" -growing at the expense of another constant-the

"traditional"', but is rather a phenomenon that transforms everything. 4
Modernity is a rupture, a discontinuity and a decisive break with tra-
dition. Modernity is a combination of political and economic institu-
tions, like the modem state and industrial capitalism; social and
political concepts, like class and citizenship; and technological,devel-
opments, like communication and transportation. Since about the
seventeenth century these modes of social life or organisation emerged
in Europe and gradually became global in their influence. 5
The modem state, as an instrument of capitalist expansion, has
played the most important role in the global spread of modernity. It was
the European colonial state, which first introduced the colonies to a
centralised bureaucratic state system, and later when these colonies
gained independence the nation-state took it upon itselfto launch moderni-
sation. Unlike Europe, in most Asian and African countries modernity
did not come about predominantly via market means, but through
politico-military means,6 through the state. This may partly explain
why most Asian and African states are militaristic and authoritarian.
What has happened in these societies is that the state has not devel-
oped as a result,.of a change in social and economic relations, as was the
case in Europe, but has been placed on top of society without the con-
solidation of new power relations and without the strengthening of
new economic forces. In Europe the absolutist state was transformed
into a liberal state by the struggles of new classes and status groups. It
took long periods of time for these groups to consolidate their position
and make the state responsive to their requirements. The great revolu-
tion of 1789-1848 was the triumph of the middle class or 'bourgeoisie'
and its concept of a liberal society.7
In the colonised world, however, the liberal state of. the empires
played an absolutist and authoritarian role. It replaced the segmented
authority of local communities with the centralised bureaucratic sys-
tem. Likewise, nationalism too has not emerged as a concept that, due
to social and economic changes, replaces the old concept oflocal com-
munity and localised authority with an anonymous relatedness to the
nation and the centralised authority of the state. In the colonis!!d
world, nationalism had more to do with the bureaucratisation of the
state than with anything else. It developed in a social set-up that was
disturbed by the intervention of the state but not yet transformed by
the social and economic forces of the market economy, industrialism
and infrastructural development. The inroads that the market economy
 P Ethnicity,Nationalismand the Modern State31

and capitalism made were selective and limited as compared to the

inroads of the state itsel Hence nationalism made its appearance at a
time when t>ldeconomic relations were intact, and nascent 'classes and
status groups were taking shape under state patronage.
Understandably, ~nti-colonial nationalism was unambiguously anti-
state. It united the colonised people against a common enemy, the
colonial state. But after indepenqence, nationalism in postcolonial
societies became unabashedly statist. The major preoccupation of the
postcolonial elite has been the formation of the state and the building
of a nation through the state machinery. This is in sharp contrast with
nationalism in the West, which identified itself with the state from the
start. Unlike the native elite of the colonies, the ~uropean.elite did not
have to fight to capturethe state: they simply had to struggle for mak-
ig the state less absolutist and more responsive to their requirements.
In 1?urope the national bourgeoisie and its nationalism transformed
the absolutist state into a'liberal', racist .and imperialist institution. In
the colonie~ nationalism led to independence from foreign'rule' and the
imposition of a highly centralised state system, which in most instances
turned into militaristic, authoritarian regimes that imposed a kind of
'native' colonialism on the non-dominant groups.
Let us take a look at the emergence of the modem state in the West
and its interventionist role, and assess the relationship it has with
nationalism.

rn State

It is difficult to find a better description of the role that the modem

state has come to play in the lives of individuals than what Woody
Allen says in one of his earlier films, Sleeper.He asks Diane Keaton:
'Do you believe in God?' Keatoi;ireplies: 'I believe there's someone out
there who watches over us all the time.' Allen quips: 'Unfortunately
it's the government [state].' Doubtless, the state has assumed the role
that God is presumed to play: watchful all the time, seeing through
every individual and keeping tabs on their activities. There is hardly
any aspect of human activity, whether social, cultural, economic or
eyen 'private', which is, in one way or another, not monitored by the
watchful eyes of the state through its'elal:Joratesystem ofrecord keep-
ing, policing and surveillance: Also, like God, the state is impersonal
and claims to be neutral and impartial. /
32 Politicsof Identity Rilif 11111

The state is the most ubiquitous, massive, powerful and violent

container of political power. Because of its omnipresence it seems as if
the state has always been there, at least since the beginning of human
societies. But it has not been so. 'Most of human history has not been
graced by the presence of the states,' 8 and even when the state
emerged, most people remained outside its orbit. It is only during the
last two centuries that the state has spread its tentacles to encompass
almost the whole of planet Earth. In feudal societies, for many the state
was an option. And before that, at the hunting-gathering stage, it did
not even exist. As Gellner put it, 'once none had the state, then some
had it, and finally all have it.' 9
Today every human being is a citizen of one state or another: not
only a citizen but also a national because every state is a nation-state. In
the nation-state system everyone has an officially certified identity,
whether one likes it or not. In most cases this identity is internalised
and adored, but in many other cases it is resented and rejected. Hence,
many of the most intractable conflicts in the world are either ethno-
national or posses_sa strong nationalist component, 10 and whatever the
actual reasons behind them might be, they are predicated on the issues
of identity: cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, regional, national, etc.
The state as a manifestation of political power is, to use Adorno's very
useful neologism, the arena of all 'identitarian thought' and all 'identi-
tarian' struggles. 11 All ethnic and nationalist struggles are either against
the state, for the state or by the state.
To explain the role of the state, it would not be out of place here to
briefly define the forms of social power. There are three main forms
of social power: economic, ideological and political-in other words,
the powers of production, persuasion and persecution. Bobbio has
defined the!;e three forms thus: economic power is about the posses-
sion of certain rare or held to be rare goods, which empower a person
or a group to force those who do not possess them to adopt a certain
conduct, to perform a certain kind of labour. Ideological power
belongs to those who have a certain cultural, economic or political
authority to formulate the rules of social conduct. Political power
rests with those who possess the means with which physical violence
can be exerted. 12 The state, the most massive container of political
power that 'claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory', 13 its significance, its paramountcy, its ulti-
macy and its functional priority over other bases of power in today's
societies cannot be overemphasised.
 Ethnicity,Nationalismand the Modem State33

The modern state is not only a container of political power but also,
as a manager of economy, health, edufation and ,social welfare, has
control over pther forms of social power. The overarching managerial
nature of the modern ,state, its salvation oriented role, is a feature that
makes it distinctively different from the pre-modern state, and it is this
distinction that needs to be understood.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries some very significant
changes occurred in Europe, which led to the emergence of a different
kind of society, with a different set of requirements. The kind ~f eco-
nomic, social and political upheavals that were arising from the capitalist
mode of production gave birth to a new form of power relations. Thus
came forth a modem form of political power in the shape of the absolutist
state. This was a quite unique institution, almost unrecognisably differ-
ent from the erstwhile state systems. The emergence of the absolutist
state was 'a decisive rupture with the pyramidal, parcellized sovereignty
of the medieval social formations,,with their estates and liege systems.'14
Coinciding with the disappearance of serfdom, 15 a core institution of
the original feudal.mode of producti<;>nin Europe: and the develop-
ment of capitalism, the main characteristics of the absolutist states
were 'standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a
codified law, and the beginnings of a unified market.' 16 The state now
was not only an active player in the. political,,economic and ideological
power gamesbut had also become a dominant partner. In the eighteenth
century, with the spectacular development ofinfrastructure and bureau-'
cratic penetration of society, the administrative state was transformed
into a nation-state and ,the 'subject' into a 'citizen' :11
Foucault has outlined three great forms and economies. of political
power in the West:

1. The state of justice, a political dispensation in the feudal type of

territorial regime based on laws-either customs or written laws-
with 'a whole reciprocalplay of obligations and Htigations';
2. the administrative state, a regime of regulatibns and discipline
that V1Cas 'born in the territoriality of national boundaries in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries'; ,and
3. the governmental state, the state that we live iri, where the
emphasis shifts from its territoriality. to the mass of its popula-
tion, its volume and density, though ,territory continues to
figure as one of its component elements. The governmental state,
while referring to and making, use of the instrumentation of
 34 Politicsof Identity

economic savoir,rules the population by apparatuses of security.18

This is a state of policing and surveillance, and, the police being
'the most solid basis of civilisation', 19 this is the most civilised
and the most dangerous state.

The important points in Foucault's schema, which explain the role of

the state, need some elaboration.
The concerns of the state of justice were quite limited in their scope.
The sole function of the state was that of administering justice on the
basis of 'reciprocal play of obligation and litigation', with the tools of
customs or written laws. The state 'functioned essentially through signs
and levies. Signs ofloyalty to the feudal lord, rituals, ceremonies and so
forth, and levies in the form of taxes, pillage, hunting, war, etc.'20
However, with the emergence of the administrative state, which is
generally known as the absolutist state, the functions of the state
increased and their significance intensified. National boundaries came
into prominence. Regulation and discipline acquired eminence. Standing .
armies were established for the protection of national boundaries, per-
manent bureaucracies with codified laws were created for regulation and
discipline, and public taxation was imposed for the maintenance of these
armies and bureaucracies: A whole regim~ of duties and obligations was
erected. Prior to these changes a capitalist economy had already emerged.
The new state helped to develop a unified market. Since then the state
and its powers have been continuously developing.21
The state has developed into a governmental state, which exercises
its power through social production and social service: a system that
obtains productive service from individuals in their concrete lives.
Such a system demanded a real and effective 'incorporation' of power,
so that access to th~ bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and
- modes of everyday life could be gained. Hence, schools were estab-
lished to discipline and prisons to punish. A new science of the state,
'statistics', came into being for managing populations, for accumulat-
ing individuals. 22 From then onwards, the problems of demography,
public health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity, fertility and sex
became the concerns of the state.23
With the change in the role of the state, its relationship with the indi-
vidual has also changed. In 'the pre-modern states there was no direct
relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Whatever relationship
they had was symbolic and indirect rather than factual and concrete.
But the individuals' relationship withtheir labour, their produce, and
 Ii Ethnicity,Nationalismand the Modern State 35

their community was direct, real and personal. In the new regime of
capital the individuals lose their direct and concrete relationship with
their labour, their produce and their community, and are required to
replace it with a direct but impersonal link with the state, and an
abstract and anonymous bond with the nation.
Industrial capitalism and the modern state have also transformed the
pre-modern concepts of class and status groups. Class, which has under
capitalism acquired new meanings and a new form, is a major defining
point of the modern state. The state is essentially an institution for
managing and mediating class relations to maintain the dominance of
some over the rest. But it is not only an organisation for managing the
collective affairs of the bourgeoisie, as Marx believed; it does far more
than that. 24It manages the affairs of every individual, group and class,
and, depending on its development, as many of those affairs as possible.
The state has monopolised the means of violence and coercion. No
other institution or individual can lay claims to these means. This has
led to immense centralisation of political power. In pre-modern states,
especially in the European states, the ruler did not have a monopoly
over the means of violence. The church and estates were strong con-
tenders for political power. Therefore, violence was shared, 'represen-
tative, scenic, signifying, public-and collective', unlike the violence of
the modern state, which is 'coercive, corporal, solitary, and secret' .25
Pre-modern states can be regarded as 'composed of numerous soci-
eties'26and numerous cultures. This was not a choice of the state but
its limitation. Due to restricted means of transportation and commu-
nication, a single central authority could not be established. The
absence of a central authority facilitated the existence of autonomous
societies and local sources of authority. The segmentation of the state
authority and the autonomy of the locality meant the existence of frag-
rented, varied and diversified cultures. Local communities, not the
state, were the source of identification, and communities were inte-
grated not on the basis of abstract laws and regulations, but on the basis
of traditions, customs and values. These traditions, customs and values,
being part of the culture and belief systems, were internalised.
This was quite different from the regime of rules and regulations,
which is inculcated through rigorous schooling and ideological engin-
eering, and maintained through constant and regular policing. This
feature of policing and surveillance, which has been continuously
becoming enormously sophisticated, did not even exist then. In the face
of a segmented authority it was quite impossible for a state to have ,,---
36 Politicsof Identity twml'lt3M

well-defil}ed borders. Thus, instead ofborders there were only frontiers,

which required neither passports nor immigration. The question of
national identity did not arjse.
But the modern state, which is also a nation-state, is a rigidly cen-
tralised regime that thrives on the concepts of simil;ifity and differ-
ence, unity and differentiation, and inclusiveness and exclusivity.
Interpally, it prefers to have one language, one culture and one nation,
and every citizen is included for the attainment of homogeneity and
unity of the nation. At the same time, it imposes the concept of differ-
ence, which is manifested in the categories of 'good', law-abiding and
produs;tive citizens, and 'bad', anti-social and parasitic ones. The ppcial
point with respect to these categories, these classifications, is the very
basic and concrete question of one's willingness to submit or a tendency
to resi:,t. Resistance is an anti-state activity and therefore against tqe
interests of the nation.
Externally, the modern state excludes everyone beyond its borders as
~he 'other', 'foreign', or 'a,lien', to highlight the internal unity an1 indi-
vtdu~lity of the nation. Adorno and Horkheimer said of the
Enlightenment that it 'recognizes as being-and bccurrence only. whai
can be apprehended in unity: its ideal is the system from which all and
everything follows.' 27 One can say exactly the same about the modern
state, which recognises nothing but the unity ,and one-nes~ of a single
phenomenon, the q,ation. The nation-state sits on top of a society that
'... is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar comparable by
reducing it to abstract qtJantities.'28
,.The question- of reciucing the dissimilar to abstract quantities is c:f
paramount importapce for understanding the relationship between, th~
modern state, ethnicity and nationalism.

d the State

The question here is: p.ow should one examine nationalism and
nation-ness? There can be two approaches to the explanation of
nationalism and nation-ness: subjective and objective. The subj.ective
approach..is the one adopted by nationalists, for whom nation-ness is
an eternal reality and nationalism is an awareness of that reality.
The opjective approach is the one taken by students of nationa~ism,
wh9 believe that nation-ness is a modem phenomenon created by
nationalism.29 The former approach requires faith, whereas the latter
 ~I Ethnicity,Nationalismand the ModernState37

demands the negation of that faith. For nationalists it is a simple issue:

the fact that they feel and think that they are a nation is en6ugh.,But
historians insist on more solid a basis than the nationalists' feeling and
thinking. In the end it is the historians who are faced with the para-
doxes and complexities-and therefore within the objective approach
there are many different approaches to nationalism; like modernist,
primordialist, Marxist and functionalist.
As Anderson has aptly pointe<Jout, the historians' irritation begins the
moment they start brooding over the objective modernity of nations :md
their subjective antiquity, the formal universality of nationalism and the
irremediable particularity of its cot;icrete'manifestations, and of course
the political power of nationalisms and their philosophical poverty.30 As
a result, it is not surprising that every serious theorist of nationalism has
shied away from defining.the nation; what theydefine is nationalism.
For some nationalism is a doctrine, for others it is a sentiment <}ndfor
still others it is politics.31 As a doctrin(! nationalism suffers from its own
philosophical poverty; as a sentiment it may be very strong but too.sub-
jective to judge. As politics, however, its power is undeniable and its
presence too real to ignore. Therefore, probably a more suitable way to
deal with nationalism is to treat it as a form of politics. Such :mapproach
also provides an opportunity to deal with the doctrinal and sentimental
side of nationalism as a marufestation of political power.
Gellner' s definition of nationalism, as 'primarily a political principle,
which holds that the political and the national unit should Be congrn-
ent,' is a useful one to begin with. 32 What is important about this defi-
nition is that it explains both official nationalism as well as n,ational
movements which are launched against the encroachment of the state.
For, as Gellner adds: 'Nationalist' sentiment is the feeling of anger
aroused by the violation of the prirtciple, or the feeling of satisfaction
aroused by its fulfillment' [emphasis in original]. Thus, a group or
groups who have control over the state and its res<?urcesdeveloy a feel-
ing of satisfaction, because they believe that their naiional unit, i.e.,
ethnic, regional or religious group identity, or culture, and the political
unit, the state, are congruent. "
At the same time those groups which perceive themselves to be mar-
ginalised in the state structure develop a feeling of anger because they
do not see the political and national vnits to be congruent. As a result,
nationalism becomes a struggle between t)Vbopposing sentiments, two
different kinds of nationalism. The satisfaction of the,dominant groups
leads to the creation of an overarching nationalist ideology that
38 Politicsof Identity H'!JWM,,?;'j

demands homogeneity and one-ness. On the other hand, the anger of

the non-dominant groups engenders nationalist movements that reject
the official ideology of the one-ness of the nation and demand recog-
nition for their particular identities.
The difference between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism is
that the former belongs exclusively to the political sphere, whereas the
latter is essentially founded in the sociological sphere, and only takes a
political shape in the process of its struggle. State nationalism is pro-
grammatic from start to finish and is imposed from the top through
ideological engineering. Ethnic nationalism arises from below, essen 7
tially from a non-programmatic base, and in the process may or may
not espouse a programme and become political.33 As long as it does not
demand political autonomy within the state or does not struggle for a
separate state, it continues to.be non-p;ogrammatic and apoliticaf, but
the moment it charts out a programme for itself, its confrontation with
state nationalism becomes inevitable.
The most important difference between state natibnali~m and
ethnic nationalism is that the former has a state, whereas the latter strives
to have a share in state p<'>weror, if that is not possible, to have a state of
its own. In most cases, state nationalism before the establishment of the
state is but ethnic nationalism. After acquiring the state, however, the
character and the ideology of ethnic nationalism become unrecognisably
different. Indeed, it adopts the methods, the ideology and the policies
against which it once struggled. Renan was right when he'said that the
basis of national identi~ is not memory but amnesia.34 But he was most
certainly thinking of a national identity that comes with a state. The
same cannot be said about ethnic identity. The basis of ethnic identity is
memory, not amnesia.. It is the refusal to forget, despite the state nation-
alisms' insistance on forgetting, that politicises ethnicity.

f Natiqnalism
It is always the modernised and mobile sections of society which first
become conscious of their ethnic and national identity. An economic
and material issue is co1c1chedin ethnic and cultural terms, and the
'n;ition-ness' of the group is presented as a historical reality with a
distinct past and hi~tory. The perceived threat to economic and mate-
rial privileges is translated into a threat to the very identity of the
group, whether regional,,religious or ethnic. This does not, however,
 I
Pil/ilPP Ethnicity,Nationalismand the ModernStat~ 39

mean that ethnic and nationalist politics is merely elite politics. That
used to be the Marxist argument against national movem,ents, which
termed nationalism a:j a bourgeois ideology aimed at empowering the
national bourgeoisie. But that argument failed to explain the role of
those devout supporters of ethnic and natioqal movements who come
from groups as varied as peasants, factory workers, professionals, office
workers, and state officials like civil and military personnel.
Nationalism is obviously a form of politics that aims at the acquisi-
tion of power through control over the state.35 But nationalism speaks
the language of culture and identity to achieve, power. This makes
nationalism a populist rather thaq elitist form of politics. Populism is
the mobilisation of the people as individuals, rather than as members
of a particular socio-economic group. 36 Nationalist populism requires
mobilisation of individual;, as members of a particular ethnic, regional
or religious group, regardless of their socio-economic background.
That is why nationalist movements are culture-based rather than class-
based. They appeal, in the name of ethnic. and national identity and
rights, to people belonging to all classes. The underlying assumption is
that identity can be preserved and rights achieved only through control
over the state.
As noted above, cla~s and status groups as we define them today are
a mode.rn phenomenon that owe their existence to the modem !itate
and industrial capitalism. The defining feature of class and status
groups is their mobility. Unljke pre-modem societies where class and
status were hereditary and therefore fixed, class and status in industrial
capitalist societies are, acquired, fluid, unfixed and unstable. That
means that everyone can aspire to be anyone. It also means that every-
one is in competition with everyone else. W4ereas the modem state, as
a major employer for its large standing armies and permanent bureau-
cracies, was the first institution that gave rise to large and differentiated
status groups, it was industrial capitalism that gave rise to classes.
Theoretically industrial capitalism encourages equal rights. and
opportunities, but in practice it introduces uneven development and
unequal access to resources. Especially in its early stages1 industrial
capitalism causes social, cultural and economic upheaval, triggered by
rapid urbanisation, labour migration,:population growth, low ~ages
and scarcity of housing. When waged,emplqym~nt becomes the norm,
labour turns into a commodity and individuals are dragged into an
endless competition. With uneven development being a basic featre
of industrial capitalism, a regional fOmpetitiQn involving , r;egional
40 Politicsof Identity

communities is encouraged. As a consequence, competitiort-based

'identitarian' struggles at individual as well as collective level ensue.
Under these circumstances two kinds ofindividuals and two kinds of
collectivities are affected by the same kind of processes in two diametri-
cally different directions: (a) those who benefit from the modem state
and industrial capitalism, and, (b) those who are adversely affected by
state intervention and m:'ieven development. It must be pointed outl
however, that the simultaneous emergence of the m'odem state and
industrial capitalism witnessed in Eu.rope did not occur in many parts of
the world. And it is here that Gellner's emphasis on nationalism as an
effect of industrial social organisation becomes problematic. 37 In some
regions of Europe, like the Balkans, and 'in the colonised regions of Asia'.
and Africa, the modern state came 1ong before industrialism.
Nationalism irr these societies had more to do'with the interventionist
nature of the mbdem state than with industrial social organisation. Some
of the most radical national movements, like those of the Pukhtuns ancl
the Baloch in Pakistan, arose in.,those regions which were not touched
even by,the indirect effects of industrial social organisation.
The state as a maJ:,r source Qf political power and as the largest
employer in pre-industrial societies offers a more plausible explanation
for the rise of ethnic and regional movements, because, before indu~-
trialism turns societies into homogeneous social and political units
with its requirement for common language and culture, the modem
state had already started the process. Industrialism only mikes t~at
process faster ahd more effective.

Nationalism
,I

Partha Chatterjee has complained that the claims' of flationalism to be

a political mo1ement have'beetf taken too literally and too seriously.38
He has come to this conclusion by observing that the standard nation-
alist history in India takes the formation of the 'In'dian National
Gongress in 1885 as the poirit of departure and tends to underplay the
preceding year~ as the 'period of preparation' or 'social reform'. My
objectiorts tb Chatterjee's argument are these: first, the standard
nationalist history always, everywhere, claimsto be what it is not; second,
,I am not' convins;ed that nationalism ,claims' to be a politicalmovement.
Nationalism' always tend~ to underplay its ''politics' in favour' of its
'mission' to preserve the cultu,ral ana' historic'idehtity of the 'nation'.
 dii!ialll8 Ethnicity,Nationalismand the Modem State41

And this is one ofthe most hazardous, lies of nationalism because it is

for this reason that many are willing to kill and die for the 'nation'.
Therefore, if the nationalists emphasise a certain date as th~ starting
point of nationalism, they want to highlight the 'beginning of their
'struggle', the 'reawakening' of the' 'nation! at that point, rather than
claiming that nationalism is a political movement. In other words, the
nationalists pretend that the identity of the 'nation' had come under so
much stress that they had no option but to turn nationalism .into poli-
tics, implying that nationalisll). islsomething more than politics and the
pursuit of material interests. Thatis why I feel thai the politics of nation-
alism to downplay its politics needs to be taken seriously.
Unfortunately this is exactly what has not happened. On the cont,rary,
nationalism as a doctrine, as an ideolbgy, has been taken too literally and
tooseriously to allow a thorough investigation ofits political agenda and
its material interestS. Chatterjee has taken the i'deology and doctrine .of
nationalism so seriously that the better part of his book I:'(atipnalist
ThoughtandtheColonialWo_rld is replete with lengthy quotes from nation-
alist leaders (which he critiques in a remarkably creative manner,
though). What we learn from Chatterjee's work is the inner working of
the'nationalist mind, itsJanus-facedness, its deceit and cunning, and of
course its rhetorical vigour and philosophical poverty. Doubtless it is a
significant contribution to the literature on nationalism.
By excessively focusing on doctrine and nationalist ideologues,
however, one tends to exaggerate their role and 'to see the expansion
of nationalism in terms of the conversion of people by the ideo-
logues.'39By doing so one also tends to underestimate ,another aspect
of nationalism-its political power despite its philosophical poverty.
That power, whether we like it or not, needs to be taken seriously, for
it is no less lethal.
Anderson has a point when he says that it would 'make things easier if
one treated it [nationalism] as if it belonged with "kinship" and ~religion",
rather than with "liberalism" or "fascism".' 40 For instance, Chatterjee's
statement, that nationalism is 'one of Europe's most perniciotls
exports, for it is not a child of reason or liberty,,but of their opposite:
of fervent romanticism, of political messianism whose inevitable con-
sequence is the annihilation of freedom,'' is not very helpful for a better
understanding of nationalism. 41 We have heard 'that one before. Tom
Nairntermed nationalism as 'die pathology of modern developmental
history'; 42 but that' has not helped us to deal with nationalism more
effectively.
42 Politicsof Identity IWiMHirW

The problem with treating nationalism as an idea is that orle gets

caught in the labyrinth of its 'pathology'. One tends to forget that
behind the idea of nationalism is an institution, the modem state, that
is a more pernicious and more enduring European export because it is
not only the most powerful upholder of the idea of nationalism but also
the most potent reason for provoking various kinds of nationalism.
Chatterjee, of course, has not overlooked the role the modem state has
played in the nationalist narrative and whenever he deals with that
aspect he has loads of insights. But all the same his preference remains
the doctrine rather than the politics of nationalism. My disagreement
on the emphasis has, however, not reduced for me the immense impor-
tance ofChatterjee's work, and therefore I feel inclined to say that such
an inspired work is a must for all those who have been taken on a fan,
tastic trip of exploring the 'mysteries' of nationalism by Anthony Smith
and the like.' In a recent piece, Smith has claimed that the modernists'
(meaning Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawrn) emphasis on the materi-
alism of nationalism is often quite misleading because:

Nationalism can emerge in all kinds of socio-economic milieux-

in rich Quebec and poor Eritrea, in areas of decline as well as
improvement, in pre-industrial as well as industrial conditions.
Nor is it easy to explain. the content and intensity of particular,
nationalisms through the workings of global capitalism or the
dynamics of relativ~ deprivation. 43

If the materialism of nationalism ,is misleading, ,how then should one

approach it? Through,its spiritualism? Through its sentimentalism?
Smith has, indeed, mystified the whole issue of nationalism. The mate-
rialism of nationalism is never misleading, if one sees it in real-life situ-
ations rather than merely philospphising about it. It is true ,that
nationalism cah emerge in all kinds of socio-economic milieux. But
there is one condition in which nationalism cannot emerge: a stateless
society. But then in today's world of nation-states that milieu does not
exist. And this is the point Jo note: ,whether it is the relatively prosper-
ous or relatively deprived groups, the degree and the intensity of their
nationalist sentiment can easily be judged by their proximity to and dis-
tance from the state. But for that one needs to study national movements
,in operation. It is for this reason that, despite the.encyclopaedic impor'-
tance of Smith's innumerable books, Miroslav Hroch's single book is far
more rewarding when it comes to a better understanding of nationalisin.
 liWMNdl Ethnic!ty,Nationansm and the Modern State 43

Hroch, whose path-breaking book, Social Preconditionsof National

Revivalin Europe,has, as Hobsbawm has rightly said1 'opened the ,new
era in the analysis of the composition of national liberation move 7
ments,' 44 anp forced Gellner to concede that it,has 'made it difficult for
him to open his .mouth for fear of making some mistake.' 45 Hroch
argues that one should not just analy!;e nationalism but rather study
national movements, because 'the terni. "national movement" has a sig-
nificant advantage over "nationalism" in that it refers to empirically
observable activity by concrete individuals', and therefore 'their goals
and demands, their forms of organization, their numbers and their
social composition' can be analysed.46
Hroch is right when he points out that by regarding 'nationalism'
as the prime mover, 'we merely shift the explanation from the leyel of
empirically grasped social ac#vity to that of a "state of mind", ~hich
is not susceptible to historical investigation.' 47 This is sound aovice to
those who treat nationalism as a defining factor in the narrative of
national movements: Studying national movements is a more appro-
priate tool for scholarly analysis because in concrete situations on~ ~an
better understand the ideology, the discourse, tlie rhetoric and the ..
myth-making techniques and processes of nationalism. This is exactly
what this study is trying to achieve in the following,.pages.

References
1. Nietzsche, 1973, p. 85.
2. Ethnic and national movements are not always the same. For every ethnic move-
ment is a nationalist movement, but every nationalist movement is not necessarily
ethnic. For instance, the movement for Pakistan was a nationalist movement,
which brought together various Muslim ethnic groups; but the movement for
Bangladesh, which dismembered Pakistan, was a purely ethnic nationalist move-
ment based on a single ethnic group, Bengalis.
3. (Horowitz, 1985, p. xi). In 1985 Donald L. Horowitz quoted the figure of 10 million
killed since World War II, from a source published in 1975, but that figure needs to
be updated to include the millions more murdered in Europe, Africa and Asia sinte
then.
4. Breuilly, 1996, p. 158.
5. Giddens, 1990, p. 1.
6. Mouzelis, 1998, p. 160.
7. Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 13.
8. Hall and Ikenberry, 1989, p. 16.
9. Gellner, 1983, p. 5.
10. Anthony D. Smith, 1999, p. 37. /"
44 Politics
of Identity

11. Said, 1993, p. 182.

12. Cited in Poggi, 1990, p. 4.
13. Weber, 1991, p. 78.
14. Anderson, 1983, p. 137.
15. Ibid., note 1, p. 149: 'The absolutist states in Eastern Europe-in Prussia,Austria
and Russia-were "device(s) for the consolidation of serfdom". In the more back-
ward social conditions of Eastern Europe, the aristocracy did not have to contend
with a rising urban bourgeoisie, and Eastern absolutism was more militarised than
in the West; for example, "The Prussian Bureaucracy ... was born as an olf;;hoot of
the army."'
16. Ibid., p. 137.
17. Mouzdis, 1998, p. 159.
18. Foucault, 1991a, p. 104.
19. Cited in Pasquino, 1991, p. 108.
20. Foucault, 1980, p .. 125.
21. Foucault, 1982, p. 213.
22. Foucault, 1991a, p. 96: 'The economic system that promotes 'the accumulation' bf
capital and the system of power that ordains the accumulation of men are, from the
seventeenth century on, correlated and inseparable phenomena'.
23. Foucault, 1980, p.,125.
24. Mann, 1996, p. 303.
25. Foucault, 1977, p. 131.
26. Giddens, 1985, p. 53.
27. Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986, p. 7.
28. Ibid.
29. Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 5--8;Anderson, 1991, p. 5.
30. Anderson, 1991, p. 5.
31. Breuilly, 1996, pp. 146-48.
32. Gellner, 1983, p. 1.
33. Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 257.
34. Cite'd in Gelfu;r, 1994, p. 192.
35. Breuilly, 1993, p. 1.
36. Marshall, 1994, p. 404.
37. Gellner, 1983, p. 40.
38. Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5.
39. Breuilly, 1993, p. 13.
40. Anderson, 1991, p. 5. v'

41. Chatterjee, 1986, p. 7.

42. Cited in Anderson, 1991, p. 5.
43. Smith, 1999, p. 39.
44. Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 4.
45. Cited in Hall (ed.), 1998, p. 6.
46. Hroch, 1998, p. 95.
47. Ibid.
 3
ColonialStateand ColonialDifference
in India

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases

the bourgeoisie over the whole face of the globe.
1
-Marx

One of the most momentous contributions of colonialism. to the

colonies was the introduction of the modem state system that had
emerged in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteeuth centurjes. It,vr,t5
through the state administration that some of the most significant
structural changes in the colonies were brought about. It vya!j,through
conscious and deliberate. efforts by the colonial state th;it cultural
changes were effected, new classes and status groups created, new rela-
tions of power e!itablished and new methods of control and coercion
adopted. So effective and far-reaching yva~the {:olonialstate's interven-;
tion that after independence the prn;tcolonial elite not pnly continued
with it, but in most cases further 'imp;rovised' on it and expanded it.
The impact of the modern state system on Indian society cannot be
fully understood unless the nature of the pre-colqnial state struqure in
India is examined. The idea is not to compare the two systei;ns,ap.d to
prove which system was better or worse-that would be preposterous-
but to identify the structural demands of these nyp altogether different
forms of power. After discussing the nature of the pre-colonial state,
I go on to examine the ideological uderpinnings of,the colonial state,
the methods it adopted, and the changes ,it effected.,The purpose here
is to examine the manner i which the centralised bur.eavcratic state
was placed on Indian society by; ~he' colonialists: \lS an instrument of
control and coercion, and how dre posts;olonial elite adopted it as the
only authentic tool for managing soGiety.'
46 Politicsof Identity iliiMIMR

'State'in lndia2

There is a kind of infectious trend among historians of India to see

pre-colonial Indian society in terms of division and unity. This trend is
common in both colonialist and nationalist discourse. The colonial.
point of view was that ' ... the first and most essential thing to learn
about India-(is) that there is not, and never was an India, or even any
country oflndia, possessing according toEuropeanideas,any sort of unity'
[emphasis mine]. 3 The nationalists claimed: 'There is no country
marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single
whple as India.' They romanticised the geographical wholeness of
India by emphasising its 'urge to political unification in defiance of vast
distances and immense difficulties of transport and communication.' 4
Both colonialists and nationalists used the argument to legitimise their
respective claims to rule India. The colonialists' insistence on the divi-
siveness of Indian society legitimised their rule and their claim that
they had united India for the first time in its history. The nationalists
asserted the unity of India to counter any regional and ethnic claims
and to prepare the ground for the nation-state of a united India.
The very instrumentalism of the argument precluded a serious
inquiry into the nature of Indian society. Therefore such discourse
continues to prevail among those historians who are inclined to
depend on simple and rhetorical categorisation. For instance, one such
historian, Francis Robinson, starts his book on Muslim separatism
with this statement:"'The British united the peoples oflndia under one
government but left them under two.' 5 The rhetoric of the statement
not only fails to understand the 'nature of Indian society, but also
ominously obscures the"very fact that the British colonised the peoples
oflndia, not united them.
Judging Robinson by his'work, one has no doubt that his statemeht
is a sign of naiveterather than malice. While taking the claim of the
colonial state at face value, 'he seems to believe that the imposition of
the centralised colonial state on top oflndian society was 'an act of uni-
fication. He simply has not been able to recognise that the basic dif-
ference between pre-'colonial and colonial India was not that of
division and unity; it was a difference between the forms of power.
Anyone looking at Indian society through the prism of the modem
concept of political unity and division introduced by the modern state
is doomed to regard pre-colonial India as a divided society. But seen
 ffljlillN!)j ColonialStateand ColonialDifferencein India 47

through the difference in the mechanism of power one realises tha.t

neither was pre-colonial Indian society divided nor did the British
unite the people oflndia.
J There is a difference between a divided and a fragmented society: a
divided society presupposes a unifying centre and a centralised authority,
whereas a fragmented society does not have a unifying centre and a cen-
tralised authority. Also, there is a differeflce between a centralised author-
ity imposed from the top, which the colonial state did, and the unity of
the people, which did not have much relevance in pre-colonial India.In
the fragmented society of pre-colonial India the concept of political unity
did not figure, because authority there was segmented rather than cen-
tralised. Therefore the whole exercise of applying the modem concept of
political unity and division to pre-colonial India is superfluous.
There was a basic and profound difference in the state system of the
Mughal empire and the one that the British imposed on India, and that
difference cannot be understood unless a transformation in the nature
of power is comprehended. Notwithstanding the fact that the Mughal
empire had succeeded in imposing 'a centralised administration, a uni-
form revenue policy, [and] a network of inland trade', it was far from
being 'a firmly unified modem nation state' and except for the most
commercialised regions 'subsistence agriculture sustained a hard core
of economic isolation.' 6
Like any pre-modern state, the Mughal state's authority was con ..
strained by the limits of communication and transportation. The
emperor was the king only of the plains and open roads, and those who
lived among or beyond the mountains knew nothing of the king. 7 It
was a decentralised state system that did not interfere with the affairs
of the l"egional elite, as long as order was maintained and troops and
tribute were supplied to the emperor. There' were, however, some
aspects of the Mughal state which made it different from the pre-modem
state in Europe. In Europe the church and estates were powerful con-
tenders for political power. No' such institutions existed in India.
Neither Islam nor Hinduism has the institution of the' church. Also,
there was no concept of private ownership ofland. The emperor, i.e.,
the state, was the supreme landlord. Even though the Muslim elite had
large landholdings, they did not own the land. For all practical pur-
poses, the land belonged to the emperor, who would assign specific
areas to the members of a small ruling class 'through a 6ystem of tem-
porary alienations of the claim.' 8 In the absence of private ownership,
the Zamindars{landholders) expressed their control of the l'and not in
48 Politicsof Identity ffiJ,,.IIM'flll

terms of ownership but through their command over its occupants and
produce. 9 Revenue played as important a role as rent in a feudal'sys-
tem, but it was not really rent or a land tax, but rather a tax on crops. 10
The system of control and coercion was based on rituals and. cus-
toms rather than on the law: as long as the Zamindar managed.to com-
mand authority over the occupants, collect a share of the produce and
provide the emperor with troops and tributes, he was the lordof the
estate and enjoyed a degree of political autonomy within the empire. 11
It was a system in which, the empire ensured the independence of the
Zamindar from the top end of the power hierarchy but could not guar-
antee his protection from the bottom end. Therefore, the Zarrtihdar
was left to devise his own methods of authority and control for the
maintenance, of his status. In other words, the autonomous status' of
the Zamindar impiied a consideraple degree of erp,etual in~ecurity.In
a system where no individual cortld lay claim to permanent legal own-
ership of land, no uni'form system of lam;lholding, like feudalism,
could emerge. Thus, the management of land depended mostly on the
ability of inclividual Zamindars and their specific circumstances.
The absem;e of the, church and private ownership did not necessar-
ily mean more powers for the st.ate:Indeed, the insecurity of the local
lords was reflected in their mistrust of the state. The fact that there
existed no, other institution outside the state adll}inistration ,can be
interpreted as the weakness of the state rather than its strength. For
unlike the feudal states of Europe where the church; estate.and the
state as permanent institutions were in. alliance to dominate society,
Indian society lackeothe mechanism of permanent dominance. 12 The
concept of rulership in India was not based pn the idea of contract but
of incorporation, 'in which rulers not only ,outranked everyone' but
could also encompass those they ruled.' LocaUords maintained a spcial
order based op cosmological concepts and through, ritual actipn. 13
Although the king sat at the apex of a.vertical military hierarchy, he
had to establish personal, relationships in a horizontal field: with the
high-ranking officials and notables, b~cause of a lack of hierarchical
commap.d structure. 14,The system of incorporation and horizontal link-
ages implied that although the state did not interfere with local affairs,
it was always actively involved with local disputes',,because social order
and harmony were prerequisites (or the, cpntviuous., supply of troops
and tributes. There was one area; however, whiC;h,s:alledfor state inter-
vention. The Mughal state was depeQdent on a hyqraulic economy. It is
a '!imitation Qf a hydraulic econolJly that it d11J1otbe mana~d without
 ColonialStateand ColonialDifferencein India 49

state intervention. Thus the state interfered with the economy through
what,Wittfogel has called a 'bureaucratic landlordism' .15

ial State

Foucault has outlined three methods of distancing which came to be

applied by the colonising powers of Europe for the maintenance of
their capitalist economies. Those methods were the army, colonisation
and prisons. Soldiers were recruited predominantly from amongst the
peasants. This had two objectives: first, to drain off significant numbers
of over-numerous peasants who could not find jobs; and second, to use
them against workers in case of unrest. Colonisation too was used for
draining off these elements and to eliminate the possibility of an
alliance of the proletariat. Those sent to the colonies were separated
from both ends-whereas their links with the working class in the
home country were clipped by distance, their distance, from the
colonised was maintained through the ,racist ideology and policies of
the,colonial administration. The third method of distancing was erected
around the prison system, based on an ideology about crime, criminals,
mob, degenerates, and 'animals', partly linked with racialism.16
Foucault made the foregoing observation in an interview. Like most
of his interview statements, which are notorious fox:being inadequate
as far as elaboration and explanation is concerned, Foucault has only
touched upon the crux of the matter and has.left the rest to the reader's
imagination. But all the same it provides a good starting point, because
what it highlights is that the goal of these 'dividing practices' was 'to
preclude the possibility of any threat to modem capitalism and its.most
important instrument of power, the-modem state. The emergence of
the modem state was a necessary condition for the rise of capitalism,
and, colonialism was a requirement for the expansion of capitalism. It
is part of the story of the rise of modem capitalism that it created
national boundaries and then violated them to reach various comers of
the world.
This rather contradictory role of capital is understandable when one
realises that capitalism is the most protectionist as well as the most
expartsionist of all modes of production. The protectionist na~re ,0f
capital led to the ,creation of regional boundaries and the formation of
local markets, which in tum gave rise to the establishment, of the
nation-statt'!.17 On the other hand, capitalist expansionism required it
 50 Politicsof Identity

to cross the boundaries that it had itself erected. The Janus-facedness

of capital led it to introduce the concept of national sovereigntY,and
then violate it by colonising various lands and people. It is important
to remember that protectionism is a limitation of capitalism whereas
expansionism is its true nature. 'Capital by its very nature tolerates i:io
geographical limits to its expansion.' 18 As Wallerstein has pointed out:

Capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world economy

and not of nation states ... capital has never allowed its aspirations to
be determined by national boundaries in a capitalistworld ecovomy,
and the creation of 'national' barriers-generally, mercantilism-
has historically been. a defensive mechanism of capitalists located
in states which are .one level below the high point of strength in
the system. 19
1
Theories of colonialism are usually about colonialism in general, ap.d
the colonial state is only treated as an instrument of colonialism. l;'huS',
the natur<; of the colonial state and the policies that it adopted ar~ all
part of the story of colonialism in general. 20 That story, despite great
variations between colonial policies in various parts of the world, had
some significant points in common. 21 One of the major, comi;nop
points was the introduc;tion of the centralised bureaucratic state system.
The moden;1,state, which has by now become a universal phenome-
non, was initially introduced to most parts of the world through colo-
nialism. But despit~ the structural similarities of the modem state in
Eurppe and }.unerica and the::colonies,.,the methods {md ideology, of
this institution were strikingly different in the colonies.
Structurally the colonial state. was a replica of the modem s~tf.
A J;mreaucratichierarchy,'<l largestanding army,a market economy, regio~
bouhdaries, rules and regulations, discipline, control and coercion--;-these
were common featt.lresof both. Also, capitalistexpansion remained at thr
core of both te modem and colonial state's concems. 22 But despite its
.structural similarities with die moderh state the colonial state's methods
to achieve its mission were different in very significant ways.
Tqe ideological underpinnings of the modern state were t9 filay
dok the difference between the rulers and the ruled, to attain cultural
homogeneity, and to inculcate individual and collective conformity.i,
the name of the nation. In contrast to that, the ideological nderpin-
nings, of the col(!nial state were to play up the difference between lh~
rulers ~nd the rule~, to highlight the cultural difference bc;~een the
 ColonialStateand ColonialDifferenc~tn lnc!ia5-_l

two1 and to d~pr~ciate the cu~ture of the colonised, Th~ 9,asisof the
modem state was, the rule of i;iational uniformity,, while the ba~is of
colonial sqte was wha\ Chatterjee has,called colonial qifference.23 1
Bt the question ~rise~:what }VaSthe need (or ymphasisin$ colC?rv,l
difference whe~ the colour, langpage, c~lture and military superiority
of the colonialists set the~ far apart from, the,col~qi~ed~ Ironic~l}y~it
was not eyomekind of innate racisll} that. forced the colonialists. to
emphasise the diffe~ence'lbut a very ~asic:reguirement of the mode{ll
form ofpqwer: the modem state dqes not clairp authority.on the bas\s
of the hereditary rank of a monarchical li,n~ai; the ba~is of its authoi:1
ity is the nature of t
relationship
(
,between
,;:
the rulers and
the ruled.,, 24
The, modem state req~ires what .H,abi::ryp.<}s h~ called a 'legally
mediated solidarity am<;mg,c;tizrns',25 in other words it needs secular
legitimation. ,
.:\nother basic tenr! of \h~, mo~em state is the coqcept of so1er,
eignty-a coq<;ept that privile&esthe geographJ<;lnational4?tJn~aries
of.state~. By conlluering foreign l;mds cqlol}ial powers violated, the
principle of sovereignty, and by i?Ipqsing folonia{ states on c,olo,nies
they~qlated the principle of le~t:im~cy-~The.problemarose yvhe1'91e
colon(alists' modem, rational. an?, ,'ci';\lised,' self-irpage, wht~h had
fou~d its full express,ion in'the, sq~pe of the modem state's r~\ionalitt
\).nd emphasis on the 'rule of ~aw:,.wi15C(li;ifronti::d by ~geir cli~reg~rd
[pr the ,1,:ulesof the game ~P* c~nq4ering 1~qd occvpying,,foq:ign
l:tds. :rhere w;is nq other, :Nayfor, the co\on~alstate to establish,legitj.:.
m~cy bt on thf basis of raci~l,sup,erioriW,ap~ there was no otJis!~
method to ratjqpflise the vio\1tjon 6( a,nother coutitry's ~ov;~r~igqty
bdt to claim that in the conquered land there existed neither st!tte nor
so~reignty.
The anomaly of the colonial state entaile,d1the PN~l!ction of an ei~b~
orate ideology of colonial justification. Thus came into being what
J;dward SaiP,calls 'a ki{\d of~lled)J-umaH work', Ori<sntali~m-'a ere-:;
atfd body of /heory ~nd pr;:i~tice\P Y'-rhl~h~ for n;iai;iygener;itions,,there,
26
has ~.een a consisferapJe m~Jeri~l i1:y~5ithJ~F,' .Q[iept,a}#rn as a d~-
co1;rse of,P,ower,,doW-iqatipnand qeg(;;rpony;. built,an,in,tricate syste,m
o{ relationi,hip Qt;~een, the coloni~er ano the coloni~<;d~hat1va\id<\ted,
colon}al.rule o,n fh~. basis of racirl 1md civilisational diffe,rence. It was
as~~1p1e.~
tqat \tariou~ r;t<;fSin,the wqrld, w;ere at diff~rent stages'of evo-
luti?n, and the :West and .t:ast 'Vere th~n ~qmpared tp, prove thf
adja~~ed stage of th,e West comNred to the el<;mentary stage,of !P~
f'.ast.The more 'enlig!iteqed' ;md,,liberalone~ l}OI}gst,th~O~ienlists,
52 Politicsof Identity

such as John Stuart Mill, 27 however, de~reed that East may not be
inferior racially but it certainly was so civilisationally.
Therefore, there was no question of placing the modem state system
on a society that was at only an early stage ofits march towards 'civili-
sation'. A distinctively different colonial state was the answer to thi::
colonial conundrum. The modem state had come into being as a result
of the growing influence of a bourgeoisie that was struggling to break
the traditional feudal hold on various aspects of social and eqmomic
life. Naturally the modem state was more responsive to the require-
ments of capital, which included supremacy of the rule of law and
individual rights. The colonial state, however, was ah altogether differ-
ent story: it was an instrument for an established bourgeoisie in its
mission of capitalist expansion. For instance, India was penetrated by
colonial capital long before the establishment of the colonial state in
1857 following the Great Revoft. Till that 'time India was ruled by the
merchants of the East India Company, not directly by a state. The need
for establishing a colonial state arose when the European merchants
felt threatened by the intensity of the Revolt. Hence \he emergence of
the colonial state in India was purely a matter of the interests of colo-
nial capital. Under the circumstances, the colonial state could nbt be
expected to carry out the role the rvodem state, played in the mother
country. Therefore, the modem state was stripped of the liberalism,
which allowed individual rights, while keeping its modernity, which
made it a centralised bureaucratic regime, intact. As far as the rule of
law was concerned, that was not a problem as long as it could be i:Qter-
~reted according the specific circumstances of colonial rule.

toteat Work
By placing the modem state system on Indian society the British intro-
duced an altogether flew form of political power. Brit the modernity of
its lnethods of control and coercion was mote in line with its absolutist
phase rather than its later liberal phase' into which Britain had already
entered. 'It was' a tule-bourld state that was imposed on India by break-
ing the basic rule of national sovereigfity.It was a i;-ationalstatf basep on
the' irrationality of racialism. The methods of distancing demanded that
the colonialists placed themselves at the top of the colonial state app;i-
ratus, without ahy direct' involvement with society at large. But the
modern regime of power, as already noted in Foucault's woras, entuled
 ColonialStateand ColonialDifferenc~in India 53

the penetration of society, because. this particular ~orm of the state

obtains productive service from individuals in their concrete lives. For
that it demands a real and effective incorporation of power, so that
access to the bodies of individuals, -to their acts, attitudes an? modes of
everyday life, could be gained for managing popt,tlation and accumulat-
ing individuals through the ne\\'.'scifnce of the state, 'statistics'.

From surveys of land and crop output to prospecting for minerals,

from measuring Indian brains (on behalf of the false .science of
phreq.ology)to measuring Indian bodies, diets and life-span (laying
the.foundations qf physical anthropology) and modem medicine ll1
India, the British had the length and breadtp. of India, her history,
culture and society mapped, classified and quantified .in detail that
was nothing but pretjse even when it was wrong-headed. 28

For effective control 0 a society whose main source- of income was

land revenue, it ~s imperative to devise an elaborat~ system qf
revenue collection. But to etploy British citizens would have cost the
government c;learly.Thfreforc. a system: of local collaborators ~
erected, in which the willing collaboration of certain Indians was used
to carry out the tasks that the British administrators were not able to
perfprm. 29 Unlike the horizontal involve,rentof the Mughals, a sysiem
of vertical and hierarchical invplv~mept '}'a5 set in motion. for dealing
with society without personal involvement the cplonial administration
turned individuals and collectivitie~ into abstract social and legal cate
gories.30 Categories like ruling cJasses,m~ races'and nobl~ blood were
constructed. By introducing-private ownership, a tlass of landqwners
was created. As Daniel )'homer has pointed out, 'In Q.O9ther period of
Indian ..history, can we find so large, so well-established, and so ~ecure.
a group of wealthy landholders as that which grew p and flo1,1r4,hed
between the 1790s and 1940s.' 31 1
The concept of ownership was to achieve two objectives: to ,itppose
land revenue, :id to separate the s~te from s9ciety. Initia\ly, whep. th~
colonial officials began to impose land revenue they lookfc,i for the
owners of the land,, 'but there were no owners i,nthe sense in which
they understood the word.' 32 Long before the establishment of the
colonial state the colonial administration of the merchants of the East
I11;diaC9mpany had alrf?QYintroduced the Permanent Settlement Act
of 1793 in Bengal, whic~ gave the Zamindars proprietary rights over
land. The Act constituted a sjgnificant rupture with tl}.epast.
 54 Politics..of Identity

Under the Mughals th~ state as a supreme landlord was directly

involved with society. By handing over ownership rights to 'the land-
lords, the colonialists reserved power and the use of force while refus-
ing to get involved in'local affairs.33 With the expansion of colonial rule
tl'te system was e?(ter{ded'to other parts of India. The introduction of
the new system had far-reaching consequences for Indian soaiety: it
ushered in a feudal system based on legal ownership of the land; it
imposed a land revenue that was a tax on land rather than on crops, as was
the case during the Mughals; it provided state protection to the Zamindars
and gave permanency to their status on a legal basis; in legal and scx:ial
terms, it delineated 'the status of the landowners and the landless.
Indeed it was this' aspect of the new system which led nationalists like
Jawaharlal N ehru 34 to view the change in the nature of landholdings' in
terms of communal empowerment and disempowerment, for they
believed that indiviqual ownership had deprived the village community
of all control ov~r land. The nationalists were led to such romanticism
by the fad that in the pte-colonial system there was a degree of mobility
which facilitate'd a local 'circulatiori of elites', and 'Zamindats, often if
not always; originated as peasants'.35 Under colonialism, when prMte
ownership was legally 'sanctified and the status of the landlord and lap.d-
less peasants became perrp.anent, feudalism was introduced.
But the romanticised nationalist discourse fails to appreciate a' tnore
important aspt!ct of the development: the change in the nature of the
state system was, in fact, a change in the methods of control and vio-
lence. The decentralised state system of the Mughals was not con!
cemed with the - mems of violence that the Zamindars used for
maintaining their authority. The colonial administration however, by
bestowing legal 'sanctity on private ownership, replaced the private
control of the means of violence with the legality of state violence:
With such 'nationalisation' of the means of vit.Hehce,the Za'mindars'
dependence on the willingness of the. commutiity, which tpey would
\yin through manipulation, coercion and the use of force, losJ its
importance in comparison with their dependence on the legal coercion
of the state. Therefore the issue needs to be seen in the light of a "trans-
formation in thenature of power rather than in terms df communal
empowerment and disempowerment.
Another significant development under colonialism was the intro-
' duction ~fstate employment. Building an elabor;;i.teadministrative
structure required a large number of traihed'personnel. Therefore, a
modern schbol system was introduced to train Indians.as clerks to help
 ColonialStateand ColonialDjfferencein India 55

in the smooth running of the administration. Further, a large standing

army-comprising Indian soldiers was erected for the regional defence ,
of the empire.36 As a consequence th<;, state became the largest
employer, giving rise to a large group of salaried individuals who were
solely dependent on the $te for their livelihood. At.the same time, the
development of modem means Qf communication and; ttansportatioh
made the administrative penetration of society less cumbersome and
more effective.
Irtitially, due to its structural limitations the colonial administration
allowed political autonomy to the newly established landed elite for
the. maintenance of order in their respective regions. Indeed, the local
elite's power and prestige was further boosted by the.extensiort of offi-
cial patronage and honours., Hence the landlordt indebtedness to
colonial rule was two-pronged: they owed 1:lielegal establishment of
their ..property rights as well .is the mainte,nance of theit power and
pre~ige to the state administration. As the state's penetration. of society
widened, so did its dependence on the local collaborators. New methods
of control and coercion came under the guise, of systems of nomina-
tion and reprc:sentation, which made the local elite vie for state pa!fon'-
age to maintain and ehh"ance their power and prestige. Nationalist
sentiment may have alreapy been there, but its politicisation had much
to do with the new developments.

Nationalism
The <WO developments mentio]J.ed. earlier-the, introduction of
landownership and the state's assumption of, the. role of the largest
employer-changed power relations .in Indian' society and divided it
from within. For ,the first time in Indi~ history. one i,nstitution-the
state--,becai;ne the centre of,all attention for various interest groups
and individuals. 4s an,emplQyer and a manager of the economy, the
stat~'became an arena of competition, and the status and prestige of
individuals and groups became dependent on their proximity tp the
state. Anti-colonial nationalism emerged as an effort to ,attain proximity
to th~ state, and later itself became a contender foi; state power.
Nationalism, to qubte Gellner qnce again~ 'is primarily a political
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be
con~uent.'~ 7 The two units could not be more incongruent than thi::y
were under colonialism. British colonialists controlled the .political
56 Politicsof Identity

unit, the state, whereas Indians inhabited the national unit, society.
The relationship between the two was that of domination and
exploitation. With the passage of time, however, when the power rela-
tions within society itself had undergone a sea change with the emer-
gence oflandowners, state employees, and an indigenous middle class,
the relationship of Indian society with the colonial state was no longer
merely that of domination and exploitation. It had turned into a com-
plex web of networks in which the state and society were both found
asserting themselves agaist each other.
No longer a fragmented society with a segmented authority as it was
before colonialism, colonial India was an interdependent society with
a highly centralised authority. The colonial state sat uncomfortably on
top of an tlnhappy society for whose agrarian economy the colonial
structure constituted a 'built-in depressot' .38 The last decades of nine-'
teenth century were a depressing time. of 'increased landless labour,
subdivision of holdings, heavier indebtedness of the peasant and a dis-
astrous series of famines.' 39 Moreover, th"eintroduction of the capital-
ist mode of production replaced the isolated uneven development of
the pre-colonial India with a state-sponsored and planned uneven
development. While the material side of Indian life was becoming
more and more difficult, the cultural and spiritual aspect of life was
also hit hard by the blatant racism of the colonialists that had perme-
ated the state and society.
But anti-colonial nationalism was not just a response to that rela-
tionship, though it presented itself as exactly that. Anti-colonial
nationalism was an effort by the new classes and categories to find
their own niche in the new state system. Here it should be bdtne in
mind that we are not dealing with nationalism as a sentiment but as
a form of politics, and are therefore l6oking at nationalist strate~es
only, not at nationalism as a doctrine of self-awareness of a people.
We see it as a political principle, as a form of power, and as a method
of control and dominatioJ.t.,Therefore, there is no question of.think-
ing in terms of good nationalism and bad nationalism. Nor is there
any question of seeing it as something that plays a positive role in one
situation and a negative one in another. There is no assumptio'n here
th;it anti-colonial nationalism was, a. positive form of nationalism
because it led the colonised to independence. Just as the greatrevo-
iution of .1789-1848 in Europe was not the triumph of liberty ,and
equality in general but of certain classes and groups, 40 the ttiumi,h of
anti-colonial nationalism enabled the native elite to replace the alien
 dtllW/iM ColonialStateand ColonialDifferenc~in,lndia 57

rulers but by no means empowered, the people in general. An end to

colonial racism was no doubt an, achievemeqt, put even that was
not a clean break with colonial ideolpgy, .because th~ pationalist
elite, under the influence of modernity and .enlightenment, haq
developep. their ow racism as far as the r,.on-dom,in::\fitgroups were
concerned. 41 ,
The point beingemphasise.d he{e is that the modern state canpo.t
claim effective authority over a population without being in,terven-
tionist and ideological. Colonialists, iQSropuced "a, highly, cen,~aJised
bure;mcratic state structure,. which tr~edto reach s0ut to every nQok and
corner of society-not for inteqcting with ~ociety but for dominating
it. Anti-colonial nationalism started off as a mpveme11t of the native
elite for a share .in state power, went 01;1 tQ,become a-poplat mass
movement, and then culminated in the replacen;iep.tof colonial rulers
by the native elite. QJlonial rule was legitimised, by the ipeology of
racial difference between the rulers and the, rule9. Po~tcolonial rule is
legitimised by the ideology of state nationalism, .which, while legally
eliminating racial difference, goes on, in the p.ame of nationhood, tQ
the other extreme of refusing to accept local and ethnic identities. In
both cases the objective is the same: to control and dominate. 'The
nationalist project was in principle a hegemonic project.' 42 It.was a pro-
ject launched by the categories constructed anJ created by the colonia\
state. It was a project for capturing the state, and for replacing colonial
violence with nationalist violence,.43 and in th:1t project.the nat,ionalist
leadership did not show much ingenuity.
By the beginning of the twentieth century the colonial administra-
tion was under increasing pressure from varibus sections oflndian
society demanding representation in the government and autonomy
in the provinces. The tightly centralised government, exclus!vely
ruled by colonial personnel, had degraded provinces.into agents of the
centre. Whatever the rights and duties of the provinces in running
their affairs, the central government reserved an unquestioned right
of entry.44
In 1919, in the face of changi~g administrative requirements and
growing political pressures, reforms were introduced, but the'%were
only cosmetic, for they may have changed the working arrangements
but did not affect the centre's control of the provinces. Although a sub-
stitial elected element at the'provincial levels w~ introduced, as far
as the, questiol\ of provinci~l autonomy was concerned the situation
remained unchanged.,The reforms-did not represent concessions; they ,,,--
58 Politicsof Identity

represented 'an attempt to extend and improve the existing system of

control by a new method.' 45 It was a strategy to put power in the hands
of those who cooperated with the administration, rather than to
empoyver those.who demanded the reforms. 46
Though the 1935 Gbvemment of,India Act increased the size of the
electorate from six-and-a-half to thirty million, the discretionary powers
of the governors in the provinces remained intact. As far as ministers
were concerned, they could give advice, 'but their views could be
rejected on matters like minority rights, privileges of civil servants, and
prevention of disctimination against British b,usiness interests.' 47
U rtder the notorious' Section' 93 the governor could indefinitely run
the administration of a'province'.48
Because the Act was aimed at prolonging British rule, it was devoi'd
of any clause tO' empower elected representatives. Undetstarldably,
:il~Ost all sections of Indian society criticised the Act. But after irtde~
pendenc'e 'and partition b'oth India and Pakistafl aclopte'1 it aS"the
i1'terim constitutiorf. The next,chapter loobi at the nationalisatitm'of
the 'colonial state in Pakistan.

eter~nce~
1. <::;itedin Anderson, 19911 p. 139. ...
2. It is a bit problematic to chll the pre-colonial empire the state, but I use the term for
the sake of.convenience.
3.'Cited id S~al, 1973, p. 2.-
4. Cited in Pandey, 199!), BP 247-48.
5. Robinson, 19"~4,p. 11
6. Raychaudhuri, 1983, p. 3.
7.f!eesterman, 1978, p'. 44.
8. Habib, 1982, p.241.
9! Fuller, 1989, p. 29.
10. Habib, 1982,p. 235.
11. Fuller, 1989, p. 30.
12. The logic of the argument that the caste system in India became more oppressive
during colonial rule i!I understandable 1n the light of.the introd~ctio~ of private
ownership!
13. Cohn, 1983, pp. 172-73.
14'. HeesteJ"I\lan, 1978, p. 36.
1
15,,Ayubi, 1995, P~13. M:IJIWeber believed that India, f.ikeChina and Egypt, was one of
'the countries with 'the earliest development of bureaucracy' based on irrigation. See
ibid., p. 42. Interestingly il is this feature of the Muglial state which has fed many an
l\.istorian to believe that it'Mc! a tilell~establishe'dbureaucratic. :tdministration. But it
 'in lndid 59
ColonialStateand ColonialDifference

must be pointed out' that the fuhction of the bureaucracy of irrigation was very
limited in its scope, unlike the bureaucracy of the modem state that interferes with
everr aspect of social life.
16. Foucault, 1980, p:17.
17. Mandel, 1983, p. 526.
18. Ibid., p. 526.
19. Cited in Giddens, 1985, p. 165.
20. Among the theorists of colonialism, Wallerstein places particu1ar emphasis on the
role of the state, for he considers it as a 'creation of the capitalist world economic
order' that has its roots in colonialism. See King, 1986, pp. 215-16.
21.Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 329.
22. King, 1986, p. 209.
23. Chatterjee, 1993, p. 18.
24. King, 1986, p. 54.
25. Habermas, 1996, p. 285.
26. Said, 1979, pp. 15, 16.
27. Ibid., p. 14.
28. Chakrabarty, 1994, p. 147.
29. Seal, 1971, p. 8.
30. Heesterman, 1978, p. 53.
31. Cited in Sarkar, 1989, p. 35.
32. Fuller, 1989, p. 33.
33. Heesterman, 1978, p. 51.
34. Nehru, 1981, p. 304.
35. Fuller, 1989, p. 29.
36. The colonial regime's military expenditure accounted for 41.4 per cent of the budget
in 1881--82, 45.4 per cent 10 years later, and by 1904-~ it had gone up to 51.9 per cent.
See Sarkar, 1989, p. 16.
37. Gellner, 1983, p. 1.
38. Cited in Sarkar, 19891 p. 36.
39. Seal, 1971, pp. 32-33. Seal has also included increase in population in the list but
Sarkar has denied that population growth was one of the causes of Indian poverty,
and has given the following figures which prove there was relatively little increase
in population at the tum of the century: 282 million in 1891, 285 million in 1901,
303 million in 1911, and 306 milliqn in 1921. See Sarkar, 1989, p. 36.
It is noteworthy that almost at the same titne, the viceroy, t,he main representative
of those who claimed to have introduced India to 'good governance' and the rule of
law; was enjoying the services of 700 servants and a salary double that of the British
prime minister. See Sarkar, 1989, p. 7.
40. Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 13.
41. For instance, the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated state fnPakistan treated the majority
ethnic group, Bengalis, as a lesser race.
42. Chatterjee, 1993, p. 36.
43. Anyone who has a problem with this statement need only remember the words of
the architect of modem India,Jawaharlal Nehru. In his auto~iograJ'lhy he says that
it is not violence itself that is bad but the motives behind it, as he believes that 'there
can be violence fo( a good object :IS well as for an evil objeq.' See Nehru, 1980,
p. 551. Therefore, for nationalist Nehrut'State violence is preferable to private /
60 Politics
of Identity

violence in many ways, for one major violence is far better than numerous petty
private violences. State violence is also likely to be a more or less ordered violence
and thus preferable to the disorderly violence of private groups and individuals, for
even in violence order is better than disorder .... But when a sta~ goes off the rails
completely and begins to indulge in disorderly violence, then indeed it is a terrible
thing.' Quoted in Chatterjee, 1986, p. 166, fn. no. 118.
44. Seal, 1973, p. 11.
45. Page, 1987, p. 12.
46. Ibid., p. 13.
47. Sarkar, 1989, p. 337.
48. Ibid.
 .
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Nationalisation
of the <:olonial
Statein
Pakistan
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Pakistan, the peeling, fragmenting palimpsest, increasingly at war

with itself, may be described as a failure of the dreaming mind.
Perhaps the pigmen~ qsed were the wrong ones, impermanent,
like Leonardo's; or perhap~ the place was justJnsufficientlyimagined,
a picttJre full o,firreconcilable elements, midriff-baring immigr~t
saris versus demury, jndige~ous Sindhi Shalwar-kurtas, Urdu
versus Punjal)i, now versus then: a miracle that went wrong
[emphasis in original].
-Salman Rushdie 1

Here lies the root of our postcolonial misery: not in our inability
to think out new forms of the-modem community but in our sur-
render to the old forms of the modem state.
-;Farth1 Cha~e.rjee2

A constitutional histqrian said of postcolonial India that it 'inherited

the British system of government and apministratton 'in its ori'ginal
form. The framers of the new constitution couldnot think of an alto-
gether new ~tern' [emphasis in origin:].,3The case in.Paki;tan was
even worse-originality was as much in short suppfy in Pakistan as in
India, but at le~t in India a new constitution was'framed. Pakistan had
difficulty dping even that much. The Pakistan 'movement was thf
.Muslim elite's project to capture stafe power and replace colonial con-
trol and coercion with their nationalist version. Therefore, instead of
doing a~y wjth the coercive methods of the colonial state appara~
and its racist and discriminatory ideology, the postcolonial leadership
1
1
indigenised'the'tn to build a nation-state.
62 Politicsof Identityk!li\Miiil

For instance, one of the contentious issues, which became a reason

for the creation of Pakistan, 'Yas that the founder of the state,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was opposed to the centralised state system
baseq on t.hsGovernment of.India Act 19~5. While ts::rmingit a,'dan-
gerous scheme' that, if made the basis of the constitution, would
impose a highly centralised federal. government with no room for
regional autonomy, he insisted that it 'must go once for all.'4 But after
the creation of Pakist,an, he not only adopted it as an interim arrange-
ment, but also made it more centralised and more authoritarian with
more arbitrary powers for himsel
The Indian Independence Act and emergency powers of the gover-
nor general were to expire seven-and-a-half months after partition, but
1
Jinpah extended them by anoth~r yeai-.As if the colonial Act was' not
coercive etlou'gh', on 16 July 1948 he inserted into it S'ectio'n 92A,
which gave the governor'generalmore arbitrary powers of directing a
provincia'f governor to Sl,lSpendthe normal constitutional machinery
on 'the plea of agrave emergericy.5 It took Pakistan nine years to work
out i constil:uti~n a~d,that too was abrogated before becorping opera-
tive. fn its first' 26 years Pakistan hatl three 'constitutions. The sourc~ of
inspiration for all of them was the same colonial Act .
.Opring th~ periQd of over a year th;,i.the lived after partition, Jinnah
had made it clear by his words and deeds that Pakistan would have a
highly centralised political system. By becoming the all-powerful first
governor general qf Pakistan,Jinnah founded a unitary po)itical system
that retarded the growth of the parliamentary system, which was more
suitable for the multiethnic society,of Pakistan. By ):iimselfholding the
three most importap.t positions of governor general, president of the
Constituent 1\'ssemblyand president of the Muslim League at the same
,time, Jinnah set a tradition by which a powerful individual came to b,f:!
)
more important than 'the institutionalised distribution of state power.
(j " ~ ~ ~ f
'No constitutioitl ruler and few autocrats have possessed such a plen-
itude' of po~er.' 6 ' '

Br,amending, the, coloni'al 'Government of India Act '1935, Jinnah

"made it more unitary and less federal. On the one hand, the'powers of
'the gm;ernor general y,ere increased, an? <?nthe o*er, !~C. powers 9f
the provincial governments, w<;re d~creased. In 'a bid to further cen-
1tralisethe s~stem, sales 1:pcwas removed from the provincial list 'arid
put on th!;.central gmlernment list.'Within two weeks affer part~tiori,
he dismi~srd,the eleyted government of Pukhtun nationalist, Dr Khan
~aheb, iri the North West Frontier Province, repltcing, him with His
 Mi HI Nationalisation of the Colooial Statejn Pa~i~tan63

OW)l party man. Later, he dismi~sed another elected government, that

of MA Khuhro in Sindh.
One of the'most disastrous contrilmtions ofJjnna to the futur~ of
Pakistan was 'a demotion of #le political leaderspip in favour of the
bureaucracy'.7 He cfeated the post of'secretary geQ.eralfor pne of.Jiis
lieutenants, Chaudhri MoharnmaclAli, to, rqn the gov~rpq;ient si:t;1gle-
handedly through the central and provin~ial bureauq:acy.8,As a conse-
quence, the ,British-trained civil servants ass1,1:r;ntd,p.niminence i the
state system at the exp~se of the politjcal leader~hip. Oq the other
hand, Pakistan's insecure leadership, which, in the face o(Indi~n spe-
ulations that the new state would not surviveyery long, was no,( ~ur,e
abput the viability of the;;Pakistani state, divertcq qational,re~ources to
the build-up, o(a strong military for~e.;rhis set the Pakistanj state on a
path that would soon lead to. a military-bureaucratic authoritarianism,
which (;Ontinues to plagt'.lePakista1;;i'~;pgijtical
system4:i11today.,
The predominance of the bureaucracy apd mili~ry not only
retarded the political process but also adve~eJy affected te, ethnic
compos,itiod of the state managers, fu;-the c;,i.yilian,.sta~e.
aclrIJ.iistr:,i.t01;.s
we;;repredomin:\fitly Mohajirs and,P,unjabis.:.an1tb,e a'Qllywa~..over-
whelmingly from one province, .Punja~, Ib.erefor~, Pakist;an came tp
be ruJed by minority ethnic grops;,MohajirstJnd:J>unj~bis, 'Yith the
almost total exclusionof thl:!Rengalimaj?(ity fro.m,the .~iyil bure~u-
cracy and milit;ary.In 1948: E~t,P~st:m, (noyv Bangladesq), which lpp
54 pei; cent of Pakistan's tot;il,populatit;m,.~had,only,11.J Rer ~ept .l>liare
in the civil service-ad the, rest of the persoqnel, 8~.9 P,!c!f<;en,~,w~re
(r01j].West Pakistan.9

ir Dor.nination
I "
It j~ ironic that the state created by the Muslim',mjnm;ity, fearing
Hindu majority rule, came to be domio.ilte;;dand ru4;d: b)[ two rpi,\1pr-
ity ethnic groups, Punjabis an.cl.Mohajir~t\Yi.tha remarkable, excl.u~ion
of' the majority ethnic group, Bengalis,..,:(rom th~, decjsion-makip.g
.process. It was one of the, peculi~i;;itiesq( the Pakistani situation that
whil~ it inherited ~ome of the least developc;.dregionsil~f. as ingu~-
tri:ilisation was concerned 1 two of its-provinces, Punjab'ilnd the;:North
West Frontier Province, were, majdr st,1ppliers.for, the British ~p.dian
an;ny services; 4s Ptmjabis and Pukh):uns were the so-call~d martial
races.
64 Politicsof Identity

On the other hand, Mohajirs, especially those from the United

Provinces of India, were one of those groups whose share in the colo-
nial administration far exceeded their share in the population. It was a
situation where a state came into being, on the one hand with some of
the least developed regions, anp on the other with some of the people
who had the largest share in the colonial state apparatus.
The two dominant groups, Mohajirs and Punjabis, had been the
most favourably placed communities under colonial rule. The reason
for this was the colonial administration's dependence on the loyalty of
the big landlords for the maintenance of its control system. The
United Provinces (UP) of India, from where the majority of the
Urdu-speaking Mohajirs had migrated, was the traditional power base
of the Muslim landed gentry and they continued with their privileges
even after the colonial takeover. For instance, in 1913 Muslims were
only 14 per cent of the UP population but they occupied 35 per cent
of the most important jobs. 10
And it was the Muslim elite of UP who first started thinking in
terms of communal politics and launched the Muslim League, with
the support of the British government, to counter the Indian National
Congress' increasing influence. First, the Muslim elite had felt that the
Congress' demands for representation in colonial government would
adversely affect their privileges, and later they demanded the creation of
Pakistan because they feared that in an independent and 'democratic'
India the Hindu majority would rule. The political party, the Muslim
League, which succeeded in partitioning India, was not only founded
by the Muslims ofminority provinces but also dominated by thetn,
-before as well as after partition.11
On the other hand, although not the traditional elite like the UPites,
the Punjabis endeared themselves to the British authorities by helping
them in putting down the armed resistance movement of 1857. The
British showered their favours on Punjab through the irrigation
schemes that led to the reclamation of large areas of West Punjab. 12
Thus came into being a large class of Punjabi landowners, who played
an important role in strengthening the colonial system of control by
providing men for army service. Punjab had the highest share in tqe
British Indian army. Over 50 per cent of the British Indian army per-
sonnel were from Punjab, especially those parts of the province which
were later to become Pakistan. Before the First World War, Punjabi
Muslims were 75 per cent of the total number of Muslims in the Indian
army, and after partition the Pakistan army was 60 per cent Punjabi. 13,
 Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan65

This led to the militarisation of the bureaucratic structure of the

province, 'as nearly all aspects of its activities were geared towards the
provision of men and material for the war effort.' 14 Initially, Punjabis
gave little support to the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan,
but later, when the appeal for Pakistan caught the imagination of the
people, the 'Muslim landed elite chose to use the League as its vehicle
for carrying over its authority into the post-colonial period.' 15

of the State

The new state was an El Dorado for the British-trained civil bureau-
crats who cherished their dominance of the state system, but that
arrangement soon had to change in favour qf the militarisation of the
state. The paranoid ruling elite, continuing with the colonial tradition,
set aside a large portion of the central budget for the build-up of a
strong military,' at the expense of the social sector. The United States'
strategic interest in Pakistan as a satellite state against the Soviet Union
made the rulers' task easy when the US offered generous military aid.
First came the bureaucratisation of the state system by demoting the
political ,leadership, followed by the militarisation of the state by devot-
ing the lion's share of the state resources to military build-up.
Even before entering into defence treaties with the US, by 1949
Pakistan was spending nearly two-thirds of the central revenue on
defence. 16 The two institutions that had sustained colonial rule also
became the paramount pillars of the nation-state of Pakistan. But that
was an extremely shaky foundation for a nation-state, because the process
of increasing ethnic imbalance, which had started with the increasing
powers of the civil bureaucracy in the state system, was further accen-
tuated with the privileging of the military, which was predominantly
Punjabi. Understandably, it was not only that the state structure that
emerged in Pakistan was a replica of the colonial state apparatus, but
also that the non-dominant ethnic groups saw it as such.
This, of course, had serious consequences for the state structure of
Pakistan. After running the state for almost a decade without a consti-
tution, when a constitution was finally worked out it was abrogated
before becoming operative. One commentator has aptly summed up
the political instability of the period: 'During 1950-58, Pakistan had
seven prime ministers and one commander-in-chief, whereas India
had one prime minister and several commanders-in-chie' 17 For the
66 Politicsof Identity MW1$MM

next 13 years, from 1958 to 1971, the country had no,prim~ minister
at all-just two military dictators. During this entire period Mohajirs
played an important role as ruling partners in the Punjabi-dominated
state system. '
The Punjabi-Mohajir ruling elite had two main concerns: the per-
ceived Indian threat to the survival of the state and the Bengali major-
ity's challenge to their control of state power. The extern:\! 'threat
required a strong military, and the internal challenge required that
electoral politics and representative government should be avoided.
The Bengali threat was, however, more, tangible, and therefore
demanded better planning and manoeuvring. Bengalis were 54 per
cent of the total population, and any genuine representative arrange..
ment would automatically have led to .their rule., To avoid, such an
eventuality, the Punjabi-Mohajir axis devised various political and
administrative schemes.
In 1955, a scheme of One-Unit was devised for the '\;'lestenipart of
the country; in order to arbitrarily amalgamate the four provinces and
trn them into one administrative unit, West Pakistan, for themere
purpose of neutralising the Bengali majority. When the first elections
were due to be held under the 1956 constitution, martial law was
imposed and elections indefinitely postponed. During the first two
decades of Pakistan's'existence, the central government's bias aITT,inst
the eastern wing turned the comparatively more educated Bengalis
into a less educated group, and their lower representation in the civil
services was then rationalised on that basis.18
When ethnic discontent was growing, the state establishment, instead
of addressing regional grievances, resorted to methods of culttlr~ imp~-
rialism with its centralising and homogenising strategies. Not only was,
the language of 3.7 per cent of the ,population, Urdu, imposed as a
national language, but Bengali legislators were warned that if they used
their own language they would be tried for treason. The songs .of the
Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore were banned on Radio Pakist.iill,In
Sindh, the Sindhi language was replaced by Urdu'as,the medium of
instruction. Though these discriminatory policies triggered ethnic and
regional protest, in a state being run without any representative chart-
nels the voices of disaffection carried little weight.
,More than two decades afte:r;partition, when elections were finally
, held in 1970, the results were not honoured, for that would have
meant the transfer of power from the Punjabi-Mohajir oligarchy
to the Bengali majority. A, civil war ensued; which resulted in the
 itii#t&:ffl Nationc;:ilisation
of the ColonialStateinPakistan67

dismemberment of P.akistan and the creation of an ihdependent state,

Bangladesh.
In the truncated Pakistan, Punjabis became the majority ethnic group.
Although, Pakistan had its first elected govemment in 1972, the political
system continued to be intolerant and authoritarian. The first elected
prime minister; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,,had little patience for opposition,
and when the Balochistan ~overnment asseftedi,its authority, Bhutto
unceremoniously dismissed ,it. The NWFP government 1 in protest
against the arbitrary decision; resigned. The central government's
repression of the nationalist' groups in Balochistari led to underground
activities that sooh cuhri.inated in a ,guerilla,war with the armed forces,
which claimed thousands of' lives.19 Within less than half .a decade the
Pakistan army was fighting its second war against its own citizens.
Just-when Pakistan had its second. general elections 'in 197:7and it
was hoped that the days.of.militai,: di1ttatorshiphad passed into history,
the oppo'Sitionpartiesl refusal to accept the.election results, which they
thought were rjgged by the ruling party, led to a mass agitation against
the government. After days of unrest, right at the time when the gov-
ernment and opposition had agreed on another election, the generals
struck for the third time, deposing art'elected government and impos-
ing martial law.Within two years, after a dubious trial, an elected prime
minister;Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was hanged. 20
,B'5"that time it had become obvious that the real rulers of Pakistan
were the uniformed niil'hary personnel. Not surprisingly, with the mil-
itarisation of the state, the Mohajirs, whose dofninance,was restr.icted
to the civil administration, had already begun to lose out. And it was in
the order of things that the other 'martial race', the Pukhtuns, who
afte't the Punjabis had the largest share in the military, emerged as the
second most powerful ethnic grtmp in the state structure. Today,for all
practical purposes, Punjabis and ,Pukhtunsare the rulers of Pakistan
and are therefore die most ardent supporters of the,officia1,nationalism
of Pakistan. The Mohajirs' share in the dvil bureaucracy continues to
be the second largest after the Punjabis' 1 but their decline in the State
hierarchy, dominated by the military in which they have'.little share;
has been so sharp that they cannot foresee a..v'ery happy future. .,..
It is the irony of power politics that the Mohajirs, the harbingers of
Muslim nationalism, were till a few decades ago the most spirited sup-
porters of the official nationalism of Pakistan and the most intolerant
opponents of ethnic and cultural diversity and dissent .. On the other
hand, the Pukhttlns hao opposed the creation of Pakistan and were for
68 Politicsof Identity

a long time regarded as the most potent internal threat to the state. But
today the roles have changed: Mohajirs talk about secession (see
Chapter 8), and Pukhtuns have increasingly integrated into the system.
The execution of Bhutto, who was a Sindhi, created deep feelings of
anger among the Sindhis. In 1983, when the opposition alliance,
Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), launched a mass
movement against the military government, it looked as if Sindhis
were waiting for the moment. The movement got out of the leader-
ship's control and turned into street battles with the armed forces,
resulting in the death and imprisonment of thousands of Sindhis. 21
In 1984, yet another ethnic movement was launched. This time it
was the creators-and for a long tim~ virtual rulers--of Pakistan, the
Mohajirs, who felt that they had lost their privileges to.the Punjabi
majority. In 1986, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) had violent
clashes with Pukhtun settlers in Karachi, which marked the beginning
of protracted ethnic strife in Sindh province that continued through-
out the 1990s.

ologyof Pakistan
Ideological engineering is one of the main concerns of the nation-state,
because,it has to justify its individuality, its separateness and its nation-
ness. For Pakistan this has been a daunting task for many reasons, and
the rulers' inep!_i!qdehas been as pronounced here as it has been in the
area of state formation. A country that was created in the nai;ne of reli-
gion has not, even after over 50 years of its existence, been able to
determine what role religion should have in the affairs of the state.22
Also contentious is the very definition of Pakistani cultre-this has
sparked debates on whether Pakistani culture is different from Indian
culture and, if so, what makes it different. Before discussing the id,eo-
logical and cultural Confusion of Pakistan, however, it is in.order to
point out some important features of the demand,for the creation of
Pakis,tan,because they have had serious repercussions on the ideolog-
ical engineering of the state.

1. One of.the, most significant features of the demand for Pakistan

was that it 'was not based upon the grievances of the pll.st(or for
that matter of the present), but upon those of the future.' 23
Before colonial rule Muslims had ruled India for centuries, and
 mmawmNationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan69
it was therefore not possible for them to base their demands on
the grievances of the past. Instead, they erected their nationalism
on the basis of a fear of an independent Hindu majority Inaia.
2. Pakistan did not come into being as a result of a populan mass
struggle24 but through what the official Pakistani version calls
'constitutional means'. 25 The party that created Pakistan, the All-
India Muslim League, was an elitist group of aristocratic Muslim
families, predominantly from the Muslim minority provinces of
India with a very few members from the future Pakistani areas.26
As late as 1937, the Muslim League's support in the future
Pakistani areas was so meagre that the only province where it
could win a respectable number of provincial assembly..seatswas
Bengal; .apart froni this it had woh only one seat in Punjab and
none in Sindh and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). 27
Even in the 1946 elections, one year before,, the creation of
Pakistan,.when the Muslim League emerged as a major force in
most of the Muslim majority provinces, only 13 per cent of the
people had the right to vote. 28 Still, at the time of partition none
0 the Muslim majority provinces, whicH were to form the state
of Pakistan, had a pro-Pakistan provincial government. 29
3. The demand for Pakistan was a, secular nationalist demand of a
section of Muslims who felt threatened, not religiously but eco-
nomically, by the Hindu majority. Had the threat been religious,
Muslim religious groups would have been the first to demand a
separate homeland. But 'the Pakistan movement was not a
movement oflslam but of Muslims.' 30 The Lahore Res.olution
of 1940, which became the basi~ for partition, 'can be explained
withoutreference toIslam,though not without reference.to Muslims'
[emphasis in original].3~Understandably, almost.every Muslim
religious group was opposed to th~ Muslim League, its leader
Mohammad AliJinnah and its demand for J>akistan.32 But:thete
is no denying that the rhetoric and slogans for the demand were
couched in religious symbolism.
4. The Muslim League was fighting for a better deal for Muslims
within the federation, of India and a separate state was not its
goal. In 1946, the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission
Plan for a confederal India 'with .greater autonomy for the
provinces. 33 But it.did not work out, and the Muslim League
demaQ.dedthe partition of India and the creation of an ihdepen-
dent state.34
70 Politicsof Identify -{I

These factors had created great confusion about the idea of Pakistan
well before its creation, whereas afterwards they contributed to the
ideological quagmire of the new state. Jinnah's contribution to the
future confusion regarding the ideological basis of the Pakistani state
has been as remarkable as his contribution to the lack of clarity on the
nature of the political system of the state itsel By making contradic-
tory statements, which emphasised democracy and secularism at one
time and the role of Islam at another, he left the field open for the
adventurist rulers who followed him to play with these concepts
according to their own political requirements.
As Gellner has pointed out, nationalism 'eliminates the alien high
culture, but it does not then replace it by the old local low culture; it
revives, or ipvents, a local high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture
ofits own, though admittedly one whicli will have some links with the
earlier local folk styles and dialects.'35 In Pakistan, that 'high culture'
was the culture of the north Indian Muslims whp had proximity to the
Mughal court in Delhi. The local representatives of that culture were
the north Indian Muslim migrants, the Mohajirs, whose mother
tongue was Urdu. With their control over the civil l:iureaucrafy,which
had come to rule the new state, these people were favourably placed to
impose their culture on Pakistani society.
Urdu was made the national language of Pakistan despiteresistance
from the indigenous ethnicgroups. When Bengalis, as the majority
ethnic group, expressed their unwillingness to accept Urdu as the
national language eff~stan,Jinnah in an authoritarian manner declared
that Urdu alone would be. the national language. He claimed that
Urdu embodied the best in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition, 36
thus denigrating Bengali and other regional languages as being some-
thing less than Islamic.
The imposition of an alien culture and language has confronted
Pakistan with a clash between the cultural reality of the state and its
ideology. The reality of thePakistani state is that it is a composite of
various regional and ethnic cultures, which cannot be defined as
Islamic or un-Islamic. Islam is a very important part but not the basis
of these cultures. The ideology of the state, however, is based on ratio-
nalisi, modem.ist IslamJand the Urdu language, both imported from
elsewhere. The role oflslam in all regional cultures of Pakistan cannot
'be overemphasised; in fact, it is diffictilt to im'agine these cltures
without Islam. But that is an Islam which the people live and
breathe-it is a belief system that has become part of everyday life. It
 et ISH Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan71

is ap Islam based on the syncretic Sufi traditions, whereas the ,Islam

that i~ projected by the state is an ideology, an instrument to deny
diversity and difference-a tactical Islam strategically deployed by the
rulers to legitimise their miscondqct and to ~over up th~ir failings.
As,fat as Urdu is concerned, it is by now an established linguafranca,
though it has not been able to becom,e as natural a part of the ethnic
p~cp.e as is Islam. Jt has been imposed from the top to seryS'!the nation
state's fi$!edfm- a national language. Therefore, the idea of a nation
based QQ ide9logicaUslam and tl}.eUrdu language is more ,of a fictjon
than, reality.37
'the t,actical use of !;;lam and the confusion about its, role in the
affairs of the state ~lso owes muclrto the founder of Pakistan. Evidence
suggests that Jinnah's.use of I~lam as a rallying force was a politiql
tactic,,not a conviction and that is why his.'appeal to religion WilSalw;iys
ambiguous. ' 38 Jinna,1:tpased his demand for Pakistap on the premise ,that
Hindus ancj.,Iyiuslims were two different peoples who could never
beco~e Olli! nation. In,1940, he said that Islam and flinduism 'are not
religion'!;in tP-t;strict ~ense of the, word, but ~e, iq fact, different and
distinct spcial orders and it is a dream thauhe Hindus and M,uslims ca
ever ~volve a common nationality.... '39
In his famous presidential address to the Constituent;.Assemqly of
Pakis,taqon 11 August 1947, however, he claimeg exactly the opposite
ofhi,s words aqove. He said: ,1

You may belong to any religioo or caste or creed-that has noth-

ing to do with th.e business of the state ... yov wilLfinq that in,
cou,rse of tne ffindus wo1,tldcease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be ly1uslims, not in the religious sen~e, because
that _is the personal faith of each individual, but in. the political
sense as citizens of the State.40

It is no won.de,r that even today ,those wh.o want to prove Jinnah';,

r,eligious credentials, quote the form~ statement and those )Vho try to
present him .l/i ~ seq,1laristquote the l:}tter.
P,.fter.finnah, although, some of the early rulers categorkally denied
link$ between religi~ and politics\ almost all used,Islam.to justify their
coerciye and ,authoritarian, methods in dealing with, ethniq regional
and s.conomio discontent: ,The leadership's 1 inabilitY, t~ provide a
coqeremideological basis for the new state, confronted ;witl1not jQl,t
diverse but .conijicting ethnic and regional inter:e~ts,,obliged it to
 72 Politicsof Identity

present Islam as a symbol of unity. The hypocritical use oflslam plunged

the country into an ideological wilderness that further widen_edthe divi-
sions and ruptures in the polity of an already confused natiofl.
Despite Jinnah's secular leanings, his exhortation that the founda-
tions of Pakistan's democracy must be laid on the basis oflslamic ideals
and principles tilted the political discourse in Pakistan towards vague,
confusing and contradictory interpretations of Islam. Moreover, in
March 1949 the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan,
moved the Objectives Resolution in die assembly, which said J:hat
'sovereignty belonged to God, and that the authority He had delegated
to the state of Pakistan, "thrmtgh itS' people", would be exercised
"within the limits prescribed by Him"; that the state would fully observe
the principles of &mocracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social
justice as enunciated by Islam; and that it would enable Muslims to
order their individual and collective lives according'to the te.fc;hirrgs
and requirements oflslam as set forth in the Quran and S'uhnah.'41 1
Significantly, Liaquat did not stop there and went on to declare that,
as Pakistan was created for the Muslims to live by Islamic teachih~ and
traditions, the 'state would thetefore do morethan merelyleavethemfree to
profess and practice their faith' [empltasis mine]. 42 This was an obvious
aeclaration of the government's intention to interfere witli the llves of
individuals on the pretext oflslamic teachings. To pacify the liberals and
Hindus, however, Liaquat concluded by ~aying that the goat'l:tefore
Pakistan was 'to build up a truly liberal Government where the greatest
amount of'freedom ... [would] be given to all its membets.' 4:\ Such
self-contradictory claims-intending t6 do more than merely leaving the
citizens free to'prbfess and practice their faith and at the same 'time
claiming to build up a 'truly liberal government' with the 'greatest
amount of freedom' -were bound to set in motion ari'unending debate
on the actual role of Islam in the affairs of the state and society.
To further obscure the already blurred picture, the governor general,
Ghulam Muhammad, declared that, 'Pakistan is a secular, d~mocratic
and not a theocratic state.' 44 His interior minister, Iskander Mirza, who
would later become the fidt presldent of Pakistan, went' so'far as to
warn that 'teli~on and politics should be kept apart otherwise .there
will be chaos.'1 5 Ironically, in 1956 th'e prime minister, H.S.
Suhr:1wardy,even declared that' die two-natiort theory; on the basis of
, which Pakistan was created, had 'ceased to be valid as soon'.as Pakistan
was established', thus calling 'the oft-repd1ted Islamic bond between
East and West Pakistan fal:uous.'46 Despite these occasional references
 UfM\\'Nj Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan73

to secularism and democracy, however, the Objectives Resolution

p~ved to be a preamble to the three constitutions that Pakistan would
see\being made and broken duriflg the next four decades.
The first consHtution of Pakistan, which.is known as the 1956 con-
stituijon, declared the state to be all' Islamic repoblic where no law
repugnant to Quran and Suhnah could be enacted. :But interestingly,
Islam was not declared the offitial religion of the 'Islamic Republic' of
Pakistah. Another amusing feature of the constitution was that the
head of state was to be a Muslim, buuhe speaker 6f the assembly need
not be a Muslim, though he was to assume the officeof the head of
state under certain circumstances.
According to the constitution! the president was to appoint a commis-
sion, which would recommend measures. to bring the existing laws in
cohformity with Islamic injunctions. Btlt the president, Major-Gendal
Iskander Mirz:i,!who had once said that the mixirrg of religion and poli-
tics would create chaos, m'l.derstandably never appointed that commis-
sion. In the chaotic political culture of Pakistan theconstitution wa"S'not
going to last long in any case. In OcWber, 1958, Mirza 'impo~t;d martial
law and abrogated the constitution to ensure that there were no elections,
which according to the constitution were' ro be held in February, 1959.
In 1962, the military regime of General AYJ.J.h' Khan prmnulgated
:U1otlter constitution., Although the new constitution was 'not' much
different from the previous one, the role 6flslam was significantly dimirl-
ished in thefirst draft. The preamble started With the sarne 'sovereignty
of the entire universe belofi'gsto Almighty Allah alone and the mthority
exercisableby the people is a sacred trust';ht.rtthe wotds 'within:,the limits
prescribeo by God' were removed, 47 an obvious indicatibn that the
regime did not intend to limit its powers by such :tmbiguous,wotds.
Unlike the previous constitlttion, Pakist'an was not declared, an
Islamic republic, but just 'Republic df Pakisetl'I.',,and,there was nb' pro-
vision to suggest that the laws of the cbu't!try would be brought into,
conformity with the principles of Islam. The words 'in 'accordance
with the Holy Quran and Sunnah' wefe substituted with 'irt, accot"L
dance with the fundamental principles and basic conceptsoflslam'. 4s
The orthodox sections took great exception to the diminished ro~e
of Islam, and the regime easily gave in. The first amendment to the
constitution added the dropped word Islamic to th~ 'Republic .of
Pakistan', and stated that 'all disting liws sh;>illbe'brought i11conformity
with the Holy Quran ahd Simnaft.'49 Islam's still,not declared the
official religi'on of the state. In 1969, Ayul';viblated hiS'own'constitution ,,.-
74 Politicsof Identity S

by inviting General Yahya Khan to take over, and thus came to an end
the second constitution of the country.
In 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave the third constitution to the Ij.ow
truncated Pakistan (after the creation of Bangladesh). Indeed it W the
first unanimous constitution of Pakistan, signed by the elected, rppr,e-
sentatives, including the religious ones. The 1973 constitution IT)).ynot
have been very different from the previous two constitutions ir, many
respects, but as far as Islamic symbols wete concerned, it was o~rflow-
ing with them. For the first time, Islam was declared the offici 1religion
1
of the state. Freedom of seech and the ptess w~e piade subject to,
among other things, considerations of n.ational security and the 'glory
of Islam'. 50 'Jhe .head of state as well .as the head of government yvere
required to hav;e 'a belief in the unity of God, the finality of
Muhammad's prophethood, the Quran as the Jast of tl{e hqly books,
and the day~fju.dgment', and to 'strive to presi:;rvethe I~lamic id~plogy
which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan.' 51 It was made ipcurp,b,et
upon the government to. Islamise the laws within IJ.ine'years.
During Bhutto's rule, for the first time in Pakistan) history, !he p,@st
of minister for r~ligious affairs was created ip the central cabi,net.
High-class.hqtels were jl}.strucJ:edto have a copy of the Quran placed
in every;roopl. Among the most regressive actiol).s of Bhutto, ho,we,yer,
were the ones in which, under the pressure of the r~ligious loglzy, Jie
declated'theAhmedi sect oflslam noI\-MusUm, shut down nigp.tclqbs
and banned gambling and liquor for Muslims, and instead of Sunday
made Friday (the Muslim prayer day) the weekly holiday.52
Ironically; ):he ,fh;tt'l who was by all standards, one of the "htbst ~est,
ernised of.P.akistani rulers and the first, elected prime mini:;,tef of the
country used Islam the most. But still, nqne of hjs action:, ndear~Q
Bhutto to Jhe religious lobby. In fact, never befpn; in tp.$!hi~tocy of
Pakistan had th,e cpnservative sections of society, whether religioqs or
otherwise, hated.and dreaded anyone as much as they did BhJltt:o.
Though Bhutto talked about change more than anyone else,. h,is desire
to keep the existing system intact was also no less t9an anyone else's.
He was feared not becauseJ1e did, or intended to, bring about change,
but as the one who had tpe ability to do so if he desired.
Bhutto's.unintentional ~ontribution to the politics of Pakistaq was
to alert the forces 0reaction against a apange that he had no int~ptioo
ofbringing about; his irttentional coptribution was to alienate t}i.ose
vtho really wanted -a change: By th!;!end of b,js first term in office aJI
forces: whether reljgionists, secularists, ot 9emocrats, were qnit~d by
 111&1F ,r 1111Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan75

their fear and hatred of Bhutto under the banner of Pakistan National
Alliance (PNA), which launched a campaign of Islamic fervour with
the slogan of'Nizam-i-Mustafa' (the system of the prophet).
In the dark of the night, on 4 July 1977, the army stepped in,
deposed Bhutto, and two years later executed him. During his trial in
the court, Bhutto once said: 'I appointed a Chief of Staff [General
Zia..ul Haq] belonging to the Jam:tit-i-Isl:lll\i [a'fundamentalist Islamic
group] and the result is before' all of us.' 53 U nfortuhately, it wa!I not
only Bhutto who had to pay with his life for his misdeeds-the whole
country had to experience the worst crimes of political coercion, social
repression, widespread corruption and religious bigotry dur.ing the
more than a' decade long dictatorial rule of Zia.
Zia's period (1977.88) might l;iavebeen the darkest in the otherwise
not so bright; history of Pakistan:' marred by public hanging, wide-
spread' flogging, sexism' and the worst kind of religious bigqtry and
intolerance, :ill in the name of Islam. Zia did not abrogate the consti-
tution. Instead he suspended.it and then brought in drastic ch?lnges,
which facilitated jrlstification of his rule and a constitutional role for
the army, all'for the 'glory oflslam'. He declared:

Pakistan was achieved in.the name oflslam, and Islam alone could
provide the basis to run the government, of the country and
sustain its' integrity.... The present government would provide
opportunity to others. to serve the tountiy after it achieveditsobjec-
tive ... [but}'noflln-I_slatnic government would be allowed to
succeed the present regime. [emphasis mine ]54

The brutal 'Islamia' rule of Zia continues to haunt Pakistan in the

.
shape of ethnic and sectarian violence and endemic corruption:
Zia's ,military dictatorship,, imbued with Islamic fundamentaJisin,
brutalised society and 'increased the divisions, ruptures' and bitterness
within an insecure nation.' 55 Consequently, Pakistan today is a less
tolerant ind more aggressive society. Its biggest ity .and industrial
centre, Karachi, was classified in the mid-1990s, due to ethnic violence
and other crime, as one,of the most dangerous cities ip.Asia. Its biggest
province, Punjab, has .for over a decade been under the spell of sectar-
ian violence, ,and the country on the whole is plagued by lawlessness,
corruption, and the drug and arms trade.
What emerges from a study of the politics oPakistan is that all rul<:r~.
whether military or. civilian, has used Islam to justify and legitimise ,....
76 Politicsof IdentityBWllzi51

their repression and coercion. As far as national integration is concerned,

Islam has been projected in order to obscure the ethnic and regional
divisions in society. In the absence of a coherent national ideology,
Islam has been cynically used to suppress the voices, of regional and
ethnic discontent. This is why many different kinds oflslam have been
projected at different stages in Pakistan's history according to the
demands of the times. For instance, the early rulers' Islam was a 'liberal-
modernist Islam', Ayub Khan's 'developmental Islam', Yahya Khan's
'nationalist Islam', Bhutto's 'socialist-populist Islam', and Zia's 'revivalist-
fundamentalist Islam'. 56
These were different faces of politic~l Islam. Cultural Islam, how-
ever, has no resemblance with this. Cultural Islam is a belief, a way of
life, and a source 0 identity for, the people and thrives on their spiri-
tual and emotional insecurities. Political Islam, on the other hand,
plays upon those insecutities and exploits them. This has caused a
rather ambiguous and confctsing interaction between political and cul-
tural Islam. -Asa result ofthis confusion, the Pakistani intelligentsia has
yet to agree on a broadly acceptable definition of Pakistani culture.
As it is, there are .at leasuhree main interpretations. One school of
thought believes that Pakistani culture came into existence with the
creation of the Pakistani state. Another claims that it began with the
Arab invasion of Sindh and flourished during the more than a thousand
years of Muslim rule in India. The third view holds that Pakistani cul-
ture is 5,000 years old and that the ruins of ancient civilisations that
have been excavated in various parts of Pakistan should be owned as a
national heritage:
The first two views emphasise Muslim nationhood and Islam as the
basis.of culture, at the expense of regional and ethnic cultures, whereas
the third view assigns greater importance togeographical and histori-
cal factors and regards religion as an important but secondary part of
the culture.57 Understandably, the first two views are more acceptable
to the state, since on the one hand its ideological engineering requires
it to disowh the subconti,nental id~ntity and on the other to discourage
indigenous identities. 58
Whereas the subcontim;ntal identity tends to be more universalistic
in that it encompasses various regional, ethnic, racial and religious
identities.in dtle whole and therefore undermines the religious basis of
Pakistani identity, indigenous identities become problematic when
they assert their local and ethnic characters, demand regional autonomy
and resist the homogenising.project of the territorially demarcated and
 -- Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistan77

officially constructed and imposed national identity of the state based

on Urdu-Islam ideology.
It is instructive here to take a look at the findings of a survey con-
ducted by the Herald magazine (January 1997) on the occasion o(the
50th annivers'ary of the founding of Pakistan. According to the survey,
if given the choice 82 per cent of Pakistaniswould pref er to leave for
another country. Only 56 per cent, belie.ved that Muslims of the sub-
continent are better off now than before partition. Forty-sevep. per cent
of Pakistanis held politicians and the army responsible for the break-
up of Pakistan in 1971. On the issue of whether Pakistan was intendea
to be a religious state or a modern democracy, Pakistanis seem to be as
confused as the state managers-thus 52 per cent thQUght that their
country was meant to.be a religious state, whereas 47 per cent believed
it was meant to be a modern democracy. As fat as mixi,ng of religion
with politics is concerned, 72 per cent thought that religious parties
have done more harm than good, and an even larger number (81 per
cent) felt that l:he Imams (priests) of the mosque must not politicise
their sermons. The gap between the perceptions of the Pakistani state
and Pakistani society-between-the official ideology and the lived re~l-
ity of the people-is self-explanatory.

ive State
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the problems that Dne faces
while working on Pakistan is that there is a remarkable paucity of
theoretical analysis. So far, Hamza Alavi has been the only writer who
has produced a worthwhile theoretical analysis of the structure of the
state and classes in Pakistan. Alavi's work, however, is not'only limited
in its scope but has also long become dated. The scarcity of theoretical
analysis in Pakistan has allowed neither a critique of Alavi',.5work nor
any improvisation on it; what has been .attempted instead is a rather
uncritical and unimaginative use of his analysis to explaih the state
system in Pakistan to date.59 Without denying the value of Alavi's con,,
tribution one has to say that his explanation of Pakistan's predicament,
lls a conflict between the 'overdeveloped' state-and 'underdeveloped:
society, is grossly misleading.
Alavi's thesis of an 'overdeveloped' state is based on the assumption
that the state is overdeveloped because it has excessively enlarged its
powers of control and regulation. 60 He seems to have mistaken
78 Politicsof Identity

the overdevelopment of the military and civil bureaucracy for the

overdevelopment of the state itself
Alavi's one-to-one linkage between the 'overdeveloped' state and
'underdeveloped' society fails to explicate the intricacies of': society
where the interactions and contradictions 0 various. classes are not
well defined. Another important point is that a state that depends
solely on coercion and violence betrays weakness rather than strength
or development. Resort to frequent violence indicates a lack oflegiti-
macy on the part of the state; whereas the lack of legitimacy indicates
the ideological frailty of the state.
For instance, if developed states do not resort to frequent and explicit
violence, the reason lies in the development of sophisticated networks 0
surveillance, coupled with a high level ofideological,production, distri-'
bution and engineering. But in a sta~ like Pakistan, which suffers from
the inability to expand its writ, violence, is the norm. Such a state might
be called 'fierce' rather than strong because the expression of interests
here is not mediated, as Alavi believes, but direct, and relations between
the state and society are contradic;tory rather than complementary. 61
The militarf an4 the bureaucracy are no doubt the most powerful
institutions of the mqdem state, but they are not the state. And wher-
ever these two institutions presume that they themselves are the state,
as they have done in Pakistan, other institutions of the state like polit-
ical parties, legislative assemblies and the judiciary become redundant;
they lose their power and relevance. But the iroy is that no state can
claim effective cop.tr_olover society through the military and bureau-
cracy alone, because the effectiveness and strength of a state depends
on its capacity to penetrate.and organise society. For that the state needs
many more actors, than just the military and bureaucracy-it needsa
well-developed infrastructure and an institutionalised system through
which it can expand its authority.
By that starl'dard the state in Pakistan can only be dlled fragile: a
state that can make laws brtt lacks the ability to implement them. As a
result, as the saying goe~, 'There are thousands of laws ... but there is
no law.' It is the frailty of th~ state, not its strength, which makes it so
vulnerable to militaryintervention. Frequent resort to military rule is
an. indication that the state strutture is unable"'to provide efficient
governance. The weakness of civil institutiohs in a.stlte like Rakistan
makes the military a paramount force with unparalleled power.
As a result the modem state, which clai111s its legitimacy by represent-
ing the people, suffers from a crisis of legitimacy.The lackpf legitimacy
 II Nationalisationof the ColonialStatein Pakistar179

creates an atmosphere of illegality,where individuals lose theirfaith in

the rule oflaw. Therefore, the state is, for all practical purposes, strjpped
of its most basic objective and rationale, the Weberian 'mC>nopoly
of legitimate violence'. The interventionist nature of the modem state
makes this all the more problematic.
The modem state is a state that does not restrict itself to'organising
only the public life of its citiz'ens: it tries to penetrate every aspect t>f
their life. It is a state that insists on being proactive, 'not to play the part
of a neutral observer.' 62 It is a state, which, as Article 35 of the 1973
constitution of Pakistan states: claims to 'protect the marriage, the
family, the mother and the child.' 63 It is a state that "discbttrage [s]
parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the
citizens' 64-in order to impose, in the name of national unity, the
prejudices of the dominant ethnic groups.
Notwithstanding all these claims, however, when it comes to, the
state's obligations to its citizens it fails even to provide them with basic
amenities like clean drinking water, a proper sew~rage syst<:;m'and
housing facilities, leave alone healthcare, education, ~nd social security.
In a 'fierce' state like Pakistan, any voice of disaffection from the
ethnic groups is treated by the ruling elite as a challenge to the stability
and sovereignty of the state from which their privileges emanate. This
siege mentality of the power elite forces therh to concentrate' on
strengthening the state's security agencies at the expense of the social and
economic sestors. According to a,,recent UNESCO report, of the nine
countries surveyed, Pakistan is the only one where military expenditure
exceeds spending on education. The latest UNDP estimates show
Pakis~'s military expenditure as 4.7 per cent of GD}f arid edpc~tion
and health expenditure as 1.,8and 1 per cent of GDP respectively.65
One of the salient features of a state system with weak institutions is
that it tends to depend ona network of patronage and personal loyalty.
In an institutionalised state system: decision-making at yarious admin-
istrative levels becomes less personal and more rule-bound. Rules and
regulations take preced~nce over personalised social relations.,The rule
of law attains a certain amount of autonomy and independenc~ from
customary familial and social interests. Individuals find themselves
restrained by the rules of the system. Th<:!'intetests of 'institutions
acquire a certain degree of sanctity, and any violation is therefore trans-
lated as a threat to the com~unity. This sanctity of Iii~tit!Jtiqns anq
rules and regulations subordinates the powers and, privileg~s of the
individuals to the system. An institutionalised politic'al system 'is 1d
80 Politicsof Identify

modem form of power in which institutions are geared towards

serving the interests of the qominant classesrather than those of powerful
individuals.
In a state like Pakistan, however, the weakness of institutions gives
excessive powers to individual power-holders and they are for all prac-
tical purposes ahove the law. Loyalty to individuals rather than institu-
tions is the norm, and to maintain that loyalty these individuals abuse,
the powers that are available to them for patronising their followers
and supporters. What emerges from a situation like this is a captive.
state held together through corruption, cronyism and, ultimately, the
barrdof the gun. I
:~:-

-References
1. Rushdie, 1995, p. 87.
2. Chatterjee, 1993, p. 11.
3. Cited in ibid., p. 15.
4. Jinnah, 1991, pp. 3, 6.
5. Sayeed, 1968a, p. 258.
6. Callard, 1957, p. 20.
7. Alavi, 1983, p. 78.
8. Talking about his job, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali said, 'On my recommendations ...
the central government decided to amalgamate the various provincial cadres into
a single cadre that would meet the needs of the provinces and of the nation as a
whole. It was my responsibility as Secretary-General to keep every front supplied
as well as I could and to maintain its morale.' See Ali,Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973,
pp. 357,360. -
9. Although the new recruitment policy,was geared towards increasing Bengali share
which by 1958 rose up to 41.7 per'cent, the key positions were still controlled by
senior bureaucrats from West Pakistan. In 1955, of the 19 secretaries in the federal
government, none was a Bengali. Of the total 41 joint secretaries only three were
from East Pakistan. Likewise, out of 133 deputy secretaries and 548 undersecretaries
only 10 and 38, respectively, "Yerefrom the east wing. In the military elite, out of 894
army officers, 593 navy officers and 640 air force officers only 14, 7 and 60, respec-
tively, were from East Pakistan. See Jahan, 1972, pp. 26, 25.
10. Page, 1987, p. 8.
11. In 1946--47out of23 members of the Muslim League Working Committee only 10
were from the future Pakistani areas. After partition, in December 1947 at the
Muslim League council meeting, out of 300 members 160 were immigrants. See
Waseem, 1989, pp. 106-7.
12. Page, 1987, p. 9.
13. Cohen, 1984, p. 42.
14. Yong, 1998, p. 202.
15. Ali, Imran, 1991, p. 47.
 Nationalisation
of the ColonialStdtein Pakistan81

16. Noman; 1990, p. 19.

17. Sayeed, 1980, p. 32.
18. Ahmed,Feroz, 1998,pp.26,27.
19. For a detailed account see Chapter 6.
20. One of tl\.ejudges m the Bhutto trial case, Justice Qaiser Khan,wlio had resigned
fron't the bench, told me in an interview in 1998: 'The whole trial'was a sham and
legally untenable, for Bhutto was not presented as a murderer but 'the one who con-
nived in the murder and therefote there was no legal justi(!cation for Bhl.itto'to be
tried as a principal accused.' In 1997 when I asked the public-prosecutor in Bhutto's
case, Ijaz Batalvi, whether he really thought that Bhutto was given a fair trial, he said:
'I am convinced thafBhutto was iltvolved irl the murder. But then I am also con-
vinced that that was not the only murder he was responsible for.'
21. See Chapter 7.
22. On 28 August 1998 the Nawaz Sharif government announced that changes would
be made to the constitution to make it truly Islamic. Why would a constitution that
says Islam is the religion of the state and that no law repugnant to Quran and Sunnah
shall be passed need further Islamisation? For a detailed report and comments see
Newsline, September 1998.
23. Hayes, 1986, p. 55.
24. In an interview with this writer in 1997, Sindhi historian Ibrahim Joyo'said: 'The
masses had nothing to do with Pakistan movement, nowhere in India and at no stage
of the movement. It was purely and exclusively a movement of the' elite.'
25. During the turbulent years of the independence movement, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and the president of the Muslim League, \vas the
only top-ranking Indian leader who was never imprisoned by the Britis&
government. '1
26. At the Simla deputation of 1905, which led to the formation' of th'i:Afl-india Muslim
League in 1906, out of 35 me~bers only 11 were not titled and qnly 8 out of 35
members nominated by the Mtislim League were' from th~ future Pakistani areas,
See Waseem, 1989, p. 64.
27. Talbot, "1988,p. 61.
28. Ibrahim Joyo, interview with the author, 1997.
29'. Callardt1957, p. 14.
30. Alavi, 1983, p. 22.
31. Leonard Binder, cited in Noman, 199()!p. 4.
32. Alavi, 1983,p. 21.
33. Noman, 1990, p. 5. 'Some of Jinnah's followers were bewildered by his accepdnce
of aplan which explicitly rejected Pakistan in its preamble.' See ibid. p. 23; n. 18.
34., For a detailed account of this vietv, see Jalal, 1992.
35. Gellner, 1983, p. 57.
36. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973, p. 366.
37. I.A Rehman, interview with the author.
38. Jalal, 1992,'p. 5.
39. Jinnah, 1991, p. 18.
40. Ibid., pp. 36-37. Interestingly, this speech, according to MA Zuberi, editor: The
BusinessRecorder,was held back by the early managers of Pakistan without the knowl-
edge of Jinnah and was released to the media only after midnight f~r fear of Jinnah's
wrath. I owe this information to AR. Siddiqi. It should also be noted that General
82 Politicsof Identity

Zia-ul Haq's military regime (1977-88), which had an added emphasis on Islam and
the ideology of Pakistan, removed this portion of the speech from the textbooks.
Commenting on this statement, Shahid Javed Burki (1986: 42) asks: 'How could
Muslims cease to be Muslims and Hindus cease to be Hindus in the political sense
when the religions to which they belong were, in Jinnah's passionately held belief,
so utterly different from one another? Was Jinnah giving up the two-nation theory,
the ideological foundation of the state of Pakistan, once the new state had come into
e:xisteni;e?Was the speech a clear signal to the people of Pakistan that the new'state,
though founded to preserve Islam in South Asia, was to be run on secular grounds?
Was Jinnah providing a confirmation of the view shared by many of his opponents
that he had cynically exploited the issue of religion to divide India?' See Burki, 1986,
p. 42.
41. Syed, 1984, p. 80.
42. Ibid.
43. Jalal, 1991, p. 285.
44. Noman, 1990.p. 8.
45. Ibid.
46. Sayeed, 1987, pp. 171, 170.
47. Choudhury, 1969, pp. 179-80.
48. Ibid., p. 181.
49. Ibid., p, 18.4.
50. Syed, 1984, pp: 145, 146.
51. Ibid:, p. 146.
52. Ibid., pp. 149-5,0.
53. Nasr, 1994, p. 172.
54. Ahmad, 1988, p. 232.
55. Noman, 1990, p. 214.
56. Ahmad, 1988, p. 231.
57. For discussions on Pakistani culture, see Faiz, 1988 and Babree, 1997.
58. I owe this insight to Zulfiqar Gilani of Peshawar University.
59. Feroz Ahmed, who had consistently tried to analyse ethnic conflicts in Pakistan till
his untimely death in 1997, had even in his 1996work referred to Alavi's analysis of
the state as the final word. See Feroz Ahmed, 'Ethnicity, State and Integration',
Dawn, Karachi, 11-19 April 2000.
It is amusing that a recent book titled Powerand Civil Societyin Pakistanshies away
from defining what is meant by civil society and opts for a rather narrow term of
Alavi's 'salariat'by ~aying: 'It may be more useful,to move away from the state-civil
society distincpon and utilize-the more complicated concept of the salariat.'The edi-
tors, however, do not explain what is useful about the term and what is complicated.
See Weiss and Gilani, 2001, p. 6.
60. Alavi, 1983, p. 42.
61. Ayubi, 1995, pp. 399-400.
62. These are the words from the speech of the first prime minister of Pakistan in the
constituent assembly. Al Mujahid, 1976, p. 4.
63. Article 35 of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan.
64. Article 33 of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan.
65. UNDP, 2004.
 s.
, PukhtunEthnicNationalism:
Frorn
Sepqratismto 1ntegratiorii$m

It would be poor psychology to assume that exclusion arouses

only hate and resentment; it arouses too a possessive, intolerarit
kind oflove, and those whom repfessive culture has held at a dis-
tance can easily enough become its most diehard defenders.
1
-Adomo

Whep the ~ukhtun ethnic move{nent, l\hudai l)hidmat~r (~erv~ntsof

god), emerged in 1929, it had many interestipg fe~tures. It W:l;>an
uncompromisingly anti-coloni;tl eyhnic movfment t,hat was opposed
to the partit,ion ,of Indi;,i and the creation of Pakis~n. It was a -sec;ular.
movement tliat origin,ated in one of the most religious regions oflndia.
It was a non-violent moven;i.ent,'o(a people )Vho are among the m~st
violent in the "'.orld. After the l;'artition oflndia the mall;ag~rs?f.the
new state1 of Pakistan treated ,it as the most potent it;J.ternalthreat to the
! , \. J i I '

state. But despit<r that, the Pukhtuns, who, were one qf the, least
educated p7ople of Idia, became the thir,d most powerful partner in
the, Ppnjabi-Mqhajir domtnated civil anp militaIY, bureauc;\~cy of
Paki~tan within three dt;cades.
All these f~~tors havt; led mf py to believe that th; Pukhtuns had a
'more developed political and ethnic consciousness' compared tt> other
i "'... i l l '
ethnic groups in Paktstan.2 But available evidence ihdicates that this is
an overblown and overestimated view of a people ;hose ethnic ego
had already been overfed by the myths created about them by the
orientalists. This cp;ipter criti<;allyexarpines and reassesses Pukhturl
nationalism by looking at the myths about the,people and the actuality
of their changing socio-economic situ 4ti0)1.
' I I
There is a widespread trfnd to either see atiopalism a~a group feel-
ing, that is reawakened by the,spread of mopemity or to interpret it as
84 Politicsof Identify H'iBMl\'!\\\1

a feeling created by industrialism, print capitalism and communication.

Anthony Smith is the advocate of the former viewpoint, whereas
Ernest Gellner emphasises the role of industrialism and Benedict
Anderson that o(prirlt capitalism and communication. 3 The theoreti-
cal perspective here, however, tries to qemonstrate that neither of these
1' I"\'. '1 ( ~ f

two major trends can explaiii the emergence of Pukhtun nationalism.

I find the argument of Anthony Smith and people like him on the
reawakening of-ethnicity particularly misplaced, not only for Pu~tun
nationalism but for nationalism of any kind anywhere, because it fails
to distinguish b!!tween ethnicity as a racial, cultural and linguistic
group feeling, and ethnicity as a political movement.
My argument is that ethnicity may be as ,old as human societies 9ut
the politicisation of ethnicity, its emergence as a pol~ical movement, is
something ne\Y and must be seen as a modern phenomenon thiltJl)ay
not have muc,h to do with its a,ntiquity.On th'e other hand, I fiqd most
of Gellner's and Anderson's arguments convincing, but their emphasis
on industrialism and print capitalism, respectively, less so. Gellner's
and Anderson's emphasis becomes especially problematic f9r explain-
ing nationalisms like that of the Pukhtuns because, as we 'shall ~ee,
Pukhtun nationalism emerged at a tirrie when Pukhtuh sodhty was
neither industrialised nor literate. My framewo~k here is more.'in )in~
with John Brueilly's argument that 'the ke1 'to an understanding of
1
rlatfohalism lies in the chaqtcter of the modern sfate, which national-
1
ism both op'po'sesadd claims as its own.' 4 Throughout this cliaptet, my
fo~us retnajtis on thf role o'fthe int,;'rvehti,ohistmoderp. state in creat-
ing, liardeningand.-ilicaJising'_'nat1o~al sentiment whep \:he group
(Pukhtuns) sees it asnot'its' own, and later in rerl.egotiating, softening,
~rtdeventually'integratin&
1 1
that sentiment into' the mainstrea'.~ State
nationalism wH:enthe same group comes to see th'!!state~s.its own. It
is this perspective that has motivated ~e to reinterpfet Pu1htbn
J ' .d
nationalism td see how and why radical Pukhtun Qationalists have
turned into a group of conform,ists that shies away from aJi~in$ jtself
with any nationalis't sttuggle.

istoricai'Backgrouna
J'" ..f "

,The Pukhtuns 5 are the people livihg in th.~sou~hern parts'of'Afg_hanistan

and northern palts'otPakisbn, divided by the ~i;itish-imposed Dur:md
Line of 1893. Whereas in Afghartistan they constitut'e an ethnic maj'6rity,
 - f& PukhtunEthnicNationalism85

in Pakistan th~y are only about J 4 per cent of the total population. Th~
chapter deals with the natjonali~m of the Pukhtuns of the North West
Frontier.Province (NWFP) ofPakistan,,where their share in the-provin.,.
cial p6pulatiot;1is betwee11;70 :ind 80'per cent. 6
W}iat is known of Pukhtun history indicates that the s(ructure of
Pukhtun society has been trib~l. Mo!l't of the Pukhtun l;l~ comprises
dry mcmntainous regions c1ose to the Hindu~sh, and even the,plaio:;
in the region, except for the fertile Peshawar villey, ~rt mostly dry.
Thus, the agricultural land had not been able to sustain the populafe,
and tb'eir ~utvival had always.been precariously dependent on warfai;~
and plunde;r. The Mughal king, Babur, described the Pukhtuns as a
people given.to plundering and iFis believ.ed that their politicaf influ:.
enct grew \rjth a sudden increase in their numbers as well as.their role
as' mercenarits in ,the Persian and Mughal armies.7
.Afthtmgh the strategic importance of the NWFP as a gatewa1 to India
attracted invadets from the north, the inhospitability.,qf,the ,land ;was
such that they would only pass mrough. without establishing. t~ir rule.
Cut off from the outside world, Pukhtun society remained dependent
on not'l.-productive economic activities like war and plundering, forcing
Pukhtuns to be conscious of their, sptv.jval aqd security on a daily basis,
whereas social and cultural isolation made therp inward-looking.
The Sikhs,, cc;,mtngfrom the south, h,ac\c;aptured the southern part
of Afghanistan, and mad-e it part of the Pnjabi empii;e, but their rule
was cut sh9rt'by the ~ritish. Unlj}ce tl:;e invadyr-frqn;i the, nortJ1, the
Britis};\not only coqquereq the land but. ;ils9 P,en~.tratec)it ~th thei;
military arn;Iapministr~tive structure and trned it into a buffer .zone
be~e~n Bi;itish In,dia :,.nd Russia. But,eyen the British did not e~tab-
lis,h,direft r.aj<;jn the region, apd prefep-ed to conti;oLit frotl}.Pelhi
thi;ough tqe locaJ.k~ans (landlords),pirs (sgiritqal leaders) and mullahs
(priests). There were two reasons fi;irsucl;i special tre,a,tm'ent.First, t4e
region had only,.strategii;:importaQce for the Britis!J.and ha,d'failed to
attract any economic and commercial interests. Secoqd, the Pukhtun
tribes ;were xiru~ently resistapt.to colonial,rule an<,ialmost every 09-t of
tpese ,tribes fougl;it ;igainst the B~itish .~nd all),bush~d.and Jsi11e,d
Jheir
perspq.nel a9d,fivilian~, to which the Brttish ,retali;ited qy burning
villages and crops, destroying wells and fruit ~ees 1 anc;Istarving,woipen
and "Children by blockade. 8
Siqce yie Britisp. had t;.i.kenover the regi<;mfi;om the Sijdl~ who had,
during iheii;,,10-year ru\e, made it part of their J;>unjabiempirf, the
.r
regjdn was)nitially retained as p~rt o(Punjap Province. Iq~l901. it was
 86 Politicsof IdentityWiMIII' ~I

accorded the status of a separate province of the North West Frontier.

But the tribal territory between the NWFP and Afghanistan, which
consisted of two-thirds of the province's territory, was excluded from
the six settled districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, Hazara and
Dera Ismael Khan, and was instead given the special administrative
status of the political agencies of Malakand, Kurram, Khyber, North
Waziristan and South Waziristan.
The NWFP became a province with two kinds of boundary: one that
separated British India from Afghanistan, 'and the other that distin-
guished settled areas from the tribal belt, which was part of,British,India
on the map but no-man's land in reality. Special laws like theFrtmtier
Crimes Regulation, under which people could be summarily sentenced
to transportation for life, were devised to deal with the unrelenting resis.!
tance. The colonial autltorities were so apprehensive of the Pukhtuns
that'whe'n they introduced reforms in India in 1909 and 1920,? the
NWFP was entirelJ excluded and those who demanded reforms wdre
punished by'usinglhe regulatibn that was meant for citjl crimes.

and OrientalMyths

In 1849, w);ien the British captured the southern part of Afghanistan

and made it part of their Indian empire, the Pukhtun tribes offered
bloody and protracted resistance to the'colonial army. So overwhelmed
were the British-by.tho resistance that they seemed to have fdund the
exact opposite-'the Other'--'---Oftheir 'civilised' selves,'in the shape of
the insolent Pukhtuns-the noble savage. Thus started the orientalist
discourse of Pukhtun society as a wild land of'tinruly'and independent
people, 'who could neither be conquered nor tamed by the invading
armies. They were eulogised as a martial race that would rather die for
its Pukhtunwali (Pukhtun code of honour) than submit to the will of
the ;lien power.
The most detailed and tHe most popular book on Pukhtun history,
The Pathans,'writtenby a British governor, OlafCaroe, is a good exam-
ple of such stereotyping. Although the first section of the book isbased
on extensive research and explores the origins and history of Pukhtuns
, in great detail, when it enters modern times Caroe's account hims
into the history of a relationship betweerl the 'high-minded' British
officials and the 'valiant' Pukhtun tribal chiefs and khans.10 In a rhetorical
style, replete with laudatory adjectives, hestereotypes Pukhtuns as a
 PukhtunEthnicNationalism87

special race of brave and shrewd people. The following paragraph

illustrates the' point:

The force of Pathan character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier,

,the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once
carried the forefathers of this people to high positions of authority
outside their own country. So it will be again, and the more easily _
in the light of the renascence in the home-land, to which in their
, hearts they return, however far away.They need have no fear that
they cannot pull their wei~ht in the larger organism; they are like
the Scots in Great Britain. Likci'other highlandmen, the Pathans
of Pakistan will be found before long to be largely in control of
the, fortunes of their country. 11

Such egregiously:istereotypicaland relativist portrayal ofPukhtuns has

become the norm and even ,the work of professional histdrians
suffers from it. American archaeologist and historian Louis Dupree's
rather poetic 'description, for instance, in the following paragraph is
hardly distinguishable from Caroe's:

The insolence of the Afghan (Pukhtun), however, isinot the frus-

trated insolence of urbanised, dehumanised man in westerrr society,
~ut insolence without arrogance, the insolence of harsh freedoms
set against a back drop of rough mountains and deserts, the inso- ,.
fence of equality felt and practiced (with an occasional touch of
superiority), the insolence ofbravery past and bravery anticipated.12

This orientalist discourse has become so widespread and so influential

that the modernist Asians too have resorted to such hackneyed images
of Pukhtuns in their presentations. For instance, one of the most damn-
ing ,descriptions of Pukhtuns came from Jawahatlal Nehru, when he
said: 'T.hey are a very child-like people, with the virtues and failings of
children. It is ot easy for them to intrigue and so t4eir actions have a
certain simplicity and sincerity which commands attention.' 13 This is a
typical modernist approach that smacks of the seventeenth-century
European product, the modem concept of childhood, asan inferior
version of adulthood-to be socialised, trained and educated. 14
The trend that such discourse has set has obscured the significance
of the actual geographical and economic conditions of the region in
shaping the Pukhtun psyche', and has led the Pukhtuns to live the
88 Politicsof Identity

myths created about them. The nationalists have, indeed, worked on

those myths to create a sense of a Pukhtun nation. The notions of
bravery, honour, freedom and egalitarianism, all encompassed in
Pukhtunwali,have beenHown out of proportion. What these accounts
of affectionate affectations and romantic notions have done is to make
the Pukhtun reality stand as an eternal category, larger than its material
social conditions and relations. A critical look at Pukhtun actuality,
however, demonstrates something quite different.

undetColonialRule
Despite indirect rule under the British, there were some significant
developments that caused some far-reaching changes in the region.
These were 'the introduction of a new land revenue system,. recruitl
ment of Pukhtuns,. to the British army, a market economy, modern
education, and construction of roads and railw4y lines. The new revenue
system imposed through the local khans and pirs on the one hand
changed the landowner-tenant relationship by introducing perm,anent
landownership, and on the other hand led to the landlessness of peas-
al'lts..who, were unable to pay the exceedingly high taxes. By the-,19,30s
over 60 per cent of all arable land had been taken over by the landlords.
During the 1,911-31,period the proportion of peasant owners dropped
from 72.5 to,42 per cent. 15 The introduction of a market economY'gave
rise to a class,of Pukhtun merchants, whose trade was furtlier boosted
by the i11troduct1.onof roads and railways. The capitalist econ,omic
relations adversely affected the local artisans who had to compete with
the British factdry-made articles.16
As noted earlier, the NWFP had two kinds of boundary: one that
sel:JaratedBritish. Indi~ from Afghanistan and the. other that' distin-
guished the so-called settled areas from the tribal regions. The colonial
administration did not interfere with the tribal regions and for allprac-
tical purposes they were maintained as no-man's land. Naturally, when
new economic relations .were introduced they were restricted to the
settled areas. Thus, with a dual boundary, th~ NWFP was alsq intro-
duced to a dual economy. .
In the settled areas, the introduction of a new revenue system
treated a few big landlords and a large number oflandless. peasants; the
market economy gave birth to a Pukhtun bourgeoisie and an increas-
ing number of pauperised artisans and other proletarian groups. Inthe
 PukhtunEthnicNationalisrflp9

tribal areas, the old economic relations remained .intact, though not
necessarily unaffected. The new revenue 'system was not exteqded to
the tribal-areas for a good re~son: most of the tribal regions-comprise
rugged and dry lJ1ountains and patches bf infertile land, which meant
that the colonial administration could not expect much in terms of
land revenue. But the very fact thatthe tribal regions were infertile
forced the inhabitants to look elsewhere for their livelihood. In the
face of the expanding marketeconon\y in the. settled areas, the tribal
belt developed its own market economy of smuggled goods and began
to smuggle out the arms that were manufactured there.
That the colonial authorities regarded Pukhtuhs:as one.of the so-
called martial races provided the people of the ,region with an oppor-
tunity to become.state employees. Recruitment to.,the British army and
bureaucr:tcy created a class of salaried individuals, who had to not only
interact with the British but also compete with other indigenous
ethnic groups. As far as competition was' concerned, ~e ,emergent
Pukhtun bourgeoisie too bad to deal witli its ,counterpart belongi,ngto
other ethnic groups: The emergence of the new classes, new status
groups, new interests and new demands gave way,to the kind of social
mobility that w,ould soon shake up the existing social and economic
relations and the patterns of control and authority.
The newclass'oflandowners, which had acqired a prominent posi-
tion in tl\e power hierarchy through a legal right to own land, was soon
conf~onted,with challenges of new economio formations., Under the
new dispensation, the bomgeoisie wa~ gaining power and the .salaried
class ,and urban proletariat were loo.king eHewhere for their liveli-
hood.17 The colonial' administration, soon. realised that in order to
maintain the local power r!!lationships there was a,needfor actixe state
patronage of the 1ot:alelite. It was in the logic of colonial tule to oblige
the most loyal ah~ the most powerful among the khans ana pirs.A con-'
flict of interests 'between 'the big khans,and the srliall khtins enstted~
Among thesmall khans a sense of being left out gave rise.to a feeling of
resentment against the colonial' government that eventually turned
into contempt and opposition.
The small khans were, left with ho optidn but to appeal to popular
sentiments. T~ey found-,a responsive audience among the peasants
resentful of the high taxes that had led to their landlessness, ainohg the
traders who were:unhappy with the influence of the landlords, among
the educated searching for jobs, and among,the state employees seek~
ingpromotions .. The process of social mobility sell in motion by the
 90 Politicsof Identity PMi IN

introduction of the market economy, modern education and state

employment was accelerated by a conflict of interests between the local
elites, as the disgruntled small khans began to translate their sense of
alienation into nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually
took the shape of a movement.

onalistMovement
The first thing that strikes one about the emergence, of Pukhtun
nationalism is that Ernest Gellner's claim, 18 that the tise of national
sentiment is a re!mlt of industrialisation, is quite inadequate. If ihdus-
trialisation is taken as a measure of development, the Pukhtun region
was one of the most back.ward and underdeveloped in British India.
Even toaay, the NWFP is one of the less.industrialised and modernised
provinces of Pakistan .. Gellnet:'s 19 characterisation of agro-literate
polity to explain the rise of Pukhtun nationalism is also not useful,
because in so .doing he treats agrarian society as a single whole, and
does not differentiate between tribal and feudal set-up. He overloo~
the existence of the agro-illiterate semi-tribal set-up that Pukhtun
society was at the time.
Gellner is right in saying that in an agro-literate polity a small ruling
minority is rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricul-
tural producers OF peasants, and that the ideology of such a polity
'exaggerates rath<:r th~n underplays the inequality of classes and the
degree of separation of the ruling stratum.' 20 But that does not apply to
the agro-illiterate semi-tribal Pukhtuh polity, because here there :is no
concept of a ruling:class but' only of 'respectable individ'uals'. This
means that their status is not hereditary but contested-it is a )restige
competition' in which individuals seek to influence the tribe by their
qualities of moral rectitude, courage, wisdom, wealth, etc.21 Such a
society therefore precludes.the possibility of a ruling class that can be
separated from the rest of society. This does not mean that such a soci-
ety is classless.
What it does mean is that there is no apparent class stratification
within the community and the tribe, and therefore only those who are
outside the community-the small minority of occupational groups,
' like artisans, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, mullahs (the priest) and
barbers--constitute a separate class on the basis of their professions,,
which are looked down upon. This is a kind of stratification based on
 5Ei& & PukhtunEthnicNationalism91

caste rather than class>.The ideology of Pukhtun society, Pukhtunwali,

exa'g'geratesthe notions of honour, freedom and bravery, but not those
of inequality, hie_rarchyand authority. In fact, Pukhtunwali-abhorsany
authority other than that collectively imposed by.the community. Even
today, when Pukhtun society 'Cann6t be described as tribal, its value
system (tho'ughnot the legal system), continues to be regulated by
tribal codes and customs.
The rise of Pukhtun nationalism 'can be explained as a' result of the
centralised bureaucratic state system's effort to replace the decen-
tralised agro-illiterate semi-tribal system of control! Even in its indirect
form,. the colonial state tried to expand its writ through the extension
of patronage and imposition ofrevenue. Nationalism thus became the
small khans' protest ,against selective patronage on the out hand, and
the peasants' opposition, to the burden 'Of revenue on the other, The
dis'tonte_ntof the newly emerged status groups universalised and,legit-
irrtised the nationalist sehtiment.
Interestingly, even the external factors that contributed to the rise of
Pukhtun nationalism w<!rerelated to the changes in the state system in
neighbouring Afghanistan. During the second half of the nineteenth
century, the Afghan ruler, Abdurrehman Khan (1880-1901), made an
attempt to modernise Afghanistan by devising a policy to 'make the
state institutions efficient enough to penetrate societyand control trib-
alism.22With these efforts of state formation came the project of nation
building. 23 The most ubiquitous symbol of the nation, the national
f1a!s,accompanied by the most widely celebrated ritual, the national
day, was introduced.
The succeeding regime of Habibullah Khan'(1901-19) continued
with the project of modernisatitm and nation building, setting up the
country's first school of modern education and introducing, the
national anthem. During' the same period the country's first printing
press and first newspa{1er.appeared. The stagt was set for the first truly
modernist and nationalist rule!!,Afnanullah Khan (1919-29), who gave
Afghanistan its first constitution,,which defined the country as a nation
with equal citizenship rights for all, regardless of their religion. The
constitution was written in the ,Pashto language, which was later, in
1936, declared to be the national,language of Afghanistan, replacing
Persian, which had hitherto been the language of the court.21
History was rewritten tO' prove that Afghanistan as a nation had
existed since time immemorial. The national sport; Bozkashi,25 and the
national dance, At:in (a provincial dance from Paktya), were made part
92 Politicsof Identity f 1#14

of theAfghan history and culture. Amanullah's nationalistic policies

succeeded to a large extent in creating a sense of Pukhtun nationali'sm,
but his centralising policies threatened to weaken the local power base
of tribal chiefs, who launched a movement, supported by the British,
to depose the monarch. The Pukhtun nationalists in the NWFP con-
sidered this a colonial conspiracy against an, independent-minded
nationalist ruler. Alt this was happening at a time when anti-colonial
and nationalist movement under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi
had already gripped the Indian subcontinent.
In 1929, a minor. khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, laundied a peasant
movement: Khudai Khidmatgar. Itwas a,r,eformist movement,that
claimed to struggle for social justice. 1:he peasant base of the.move-
ment was understandable in an overwh!;!lruinglytribal and, agrarian
society, which was introduced to modernisation, thro.ugh the. expand-
ing system of the,modern bureaucratic state and the market economy,
rather than through industrialisation or even, large-'scalerural.industry
and mechanised agriculture. Despite the emergence of new status
groups and their new interests, aspirations and frustrations, however,
it was initially the qiinor khans and peasants who were it.hardest hy
the COlOnialpolicies. I

In 1900, whett the NWFP was,still Rart oPunjab Province, refo:cms

in the form of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act .~ere inttoduced.
Although the Act helped to relieve the Punjabi peasants from the grip
bf voracious Hindu morteylender_s,it did. not disentangle them from
the grip of landlords and pirs.26 The Act was of little use for the
Pukhtun countnrs.ide, where there were hardly any Hindus; the dom-
inatio~ 0 the khans and pirs remained untouched.
GhaffaF Khan's two main sources of influence were Amanultah and
his nat~onalist policies and Gandhi and his non-violent anti-colonial
movement. 27 His, Khudai Khidmatgar was an anti-colonial natioqalist
movement which professe<t to awaken Pukhtuns and, to unite them
against colonial rule by reminding them of their 'glorious' pa~t.28
As noted earlier, it is not ealiyto trace-the origins of.I,>ukhtunhistocy.
The ruins of the Gandhara civilisation in the regipn may indicate the
exis~nce of a great civilisation, but they.do not prove that this civilisa-
tio.n was related to P,ukhtun cultute in any significant way, as no link
of continuity canbe established. But to create a national sentiment
there need not be a national history-it is also part of the nation:.rlist
project to.create a national history. Ghaffar Khan set himself:this goal.
He started his public career as a social reformer. Even when he. turned

'
 tti Mit 4 PukhtunEthhie Nationalism93'

his social organisation, Anjoman-e-Islahe Afgha11ia(Council for' the

Betterment of Afghans),, into ?;t btoader organi$ation, Khudai
Khidmatgar, 'he categorically declared 'th/it it, was, a social movement
rath'er than a political one.29
A mah of great integrity and perseverahce,, Ghaffar Khan was.not
famous for,his intellect. Hist'main .weakness was his lack of under-
startding o(the Complex sociaf and politidl changes that were occur-'
ring in his 'society, and evenweaker comprehension of tlie colonial
system 6f control that had triggered those changes. He, cottld noli
grasp the' reasons behind the economic and social, changes that' had
brought about a change iffthe attitudes and p~rceptions of tbe p~ople.
He was,more of an idealistand ,a dreamer rather than a cunning, cal-
culating politician. He romanticisec.f the past and, glorified Pukhtun
history in a mannef thatbetrayed incoherent thinking and a, inoralis
tic apptoach. Rk instahce, in his autobiogr:trthy he goes into the
details of what Pukhtuns used'.ito bi and what has become .of them,
artd 15abl'Sles:, t ,. 1
,,
Food us~tlito 'b~ simple and because of that 'people's-health,' was
good, they were not as weak'as they are today. T,here wereno
spices, no tea.Usl.111,alcohol :ind,sex withouf~dlock wei:e coti.-
sidered very'bad ahd if anyone was su~ected ofindulging in these
things he would b'e ostracised ....there was no moral bankruptcy
1:kein today's vtorld. A guest woufabe treated tO,agreasy chicken
curry ... as far as food was concerned there was no "difference
between therich and the'poor. The. rieh and the poor US'f:d to dine
together. Just like dress and food, 'houses ,were ,also'sirriple'.The
huge and comfortable Houses m"tod!l:5'did not exist, yet the kind
of happiness and content that was 'tnere in people'.s life does not
exist today. There we're no' dise:tses;'men and Women had iocJd
and strong bodies. Grown-t1p girls'and boys ;would play'tdgethe~
tilr late in the night. They woutd look upon each othet as brothers
ali!:lsisters. Moral standards'were very higli.30

Such inchoate and trifling ideas could hardfy produce 'a workable
agenda based on -a pdlitic:al ideology and gujded'.by a cle~rly thought
OU~ strategy,for action. The result was a politics-of cbntradiction and
ambivalence. Initially, Ghaffar Khan was in contact with'various polit-
ical ahd religious groups,'includingthe Khilafat movement, the Indian
Natfo11alCongress' and ,the l'vl\tslim'Uagu~ .. So'bn .he {)pted for an ,,...-
 94 Politicsof Identity G~.4511

alliance with the Congress, while finding it difficult to cooperate with

the Muslim League, which he regarded as pro-British.
One reason for his alliance with the Congress, doubtless, was the
Congress' avowedly anti-British politics. Another important reason, it
seems, was his belief'that the Congress could never have popular sup-
port in a province that had the highest percentage of Muslims of any
province .of India, and would therefore have to depend on his s1,1pport.
He worked tirelessly among the Pukhtun peasants and secured a large
following for himsel With.tJie support of his Khudai Khidmatgar, ,the
Congress won 17 out of 50 seats in the 1937 provincial elections~The
Congress victory looked all, the more impressive with 15 out of 36
Muslim seats, in comparison with the Muslim League, which could
not win a single seat.
Already wary of the increasing-popularity of an anti-colonial group
like Khudai Khidmatgar in the ~trategically.most sensitive region of
India, the British authorities were alarmed by the results. Although
Ghaffar Khan had no radical social or political agenda except for his
uicompromising anti-colonialism, the big khans too became increas-
ingly apprehensive of his growing popularity among the peasants who
had already shown signs of discontent with the colonial.system ofJand
revenue., ,Moreuver, when Ghaffar Khan's elder broth~r, Dr Khan
Saheb, formed the provincial government, he stripped the big khans of
their power and privileges by depriving them of their positions as
honorary magistrates and subordinate judges which the British had
conferred on them.
The British authorities soon realised that their policy of,patronising
the big khans, which they had so far been pursuing, was not go~ng.to
work in the face of the Congress' emergence as a popular party. To
counter a political party they needed another political party. The
Muslim League (though almost completely rejected by the PuklJ.tuns),
with its claim of being the sole representative of the Indi?.1:}Muslims,
and its anti-Hindu r:1therthan anti-colonial politics, quite,comfqrtably
fitted into the slot. The big khanswho had already begun to look!up to
the Muslim League, were further encouraged by the colonial patron-
age of the party. Shortly aftei;wards almost all the big khans, most of
diem with colonial honorary titles, j~ined the Muslim League.31but
already hated as th~y were by the peasants, these khanswere in' no posi-
' tion to win popular support.
It did not take the British authorities and the Muslim League lead-
ership long to realise that the only way to divert popular support from
 Hl"ii m i I PukhtunEthnicNationalism95

the Congress and its ally, Khudai Khidmatgar, was to project the
Congress as being a Hindu organisation .. The Muslim League, with
colonial support, began to enlist the suppo~ of mullahsand other reli-
gious leaders in various parts of th~province, claiming that whoever
supported the Congress was working against the interests ..oflslam. At
the same time the Muslim League was launched in the non-Pkhtun
districo ofHazara by one Maulana Shakirullah, President ofJamiat-ul-
Ulama, who became the first president of the Muslim Leagut, ::tSSisted
by the secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulama as the secretary of the Muslim
League.32
The British Governor, Cunningham, instructed the big khans to
meet each mullahon an individual basis and tell him to serve the 'cause
oflslam', for which he would be 'duly paid. The mullahswere told that
in case of good progress they would also be tonsidered for govenitnent
pensions. A Cunningham policy note of 23 ,September 1942 ,reads:
'Continuously preach the danger to Muslims,of connivan.ce witq th~
revolutionary Hindu body. Most tribesmen seem to respond .to-this.'33
In another paper he says about the period 1939-43: 'Our propaganda
since the beginning of the war had been most successful. It had played
througliout on the Islamic theine.' 34
In the semi-ttjbal Pukhtun _s9ciety,the pirs were quite influential as
they were the only non-Pukhtuns who could own land. This en:tbled
them to build their own power base outside the traditional assemh.lyof
elders (Jirga),of which they were not entitletl to be members. The dual
status.of being a spiritual leader and a landlord empowered them to
mediate not only between god and inan but :ilso between man and
man. 3,S.,Likethe big khatis, the pirs too were the recipients of official
patronage. Wherl the government-sponsored Muslim ~ague cam-
paign for the 'cause oflslam' was launched, the pirs extended their full
support and started propaganda against the Congress and Khudai
Khidmatgar.
But despite all these efforts, the Muslim I.,eague coufd not muster
the support of Pukhtuns. In the 1946 elections, many big khanswere
Muslim League candidates. 36 The Congress once again defeated the
Muslim League and emerged as the majority party, with 30 out 6f the
total 50 seats. In the Pukhtun areas the Congress' victory was-particu-
larly impressive, with 16-out of22 seats.
Aside from the Muslim League'~ internal feuds and ,orgahisational
weaknesses, thr main reason for.its defeat was that'its ant~I.Hindu pr6-
paganda and demand for Pakistap. were not comprehensible to the
96 Politicsof Identity

majority of Pukhtuns. The number of Hindus in the towns of the

NWFP was extremely small, whereas in the countryside they did not
even exist. Therefore the Muslim League propaganda against Hindu
domination was simply 'laughable' to Pukhtuns. 37 Also,difficult for the
Muslim League was to persuade Pukhtuns that Ghaffar Khan, being a
friend of the 'Hindu' Congress, was a lesser Muslim, because despite
his secular politics Ghaffar Khan was a deeply religious man-a prac-
tising Muslim-and always referred to the words and deeds of the
Muslim prophet, Mohammad, in his speeches.
According to the British and Muslim League plan, the NWEP, as a
Muslir majority province, had to become part of the future Paki~tan.
Ghaffar Khan, who did not believe in the idea of Pakistan and 'Yas,a
staunch ally of the Congress, could not perhaps even think of the
NWFP becoming part of Pakistan.
When the creatioq of Pakistan became a reality and the Congress
accepted the partition oflndia, Ghaffar Khan was 'completely. stunned
and for several minutes he could not utter a word', ~ for him it was
'an act of treachery' on the part of the Congress, which had 'thrown
Khudai Khidmatgar to the wolves. 38 'Fhis obviously,demonstrates,,on
the one hand, his total dependence on the Congress and; on the other
hand, his lack of understanding of the pqlitical developments that were
taking place in the late 1940s. For, a while, Ghaffar' Klian and his
brothel) Dr Khan Saheb, were perplexed and did not know what to do.
At lasuliey came up with the idea of an independent state of Pukhtuns
and a formal call was made in June 1947 at a meeting of the Khutlai
Khidmatgar for'an independent Pukhtunistan.
lr<inically, th(! very demand for a new independent Pukhtun state
when a Pukhtun state, Afghanistan, already existed became a confirc.
mation of the British division of Pukhtuns.3 9 The logic of this demand
is understandable if one is convinced that nationalism is not abQut
preserving the history, culture and traditions of a people as the nation-
alists claim, but' ab'Out gaining and maintaining political power by
appealing to popular support in the name of commbn history,. culture
and traditions.
Pukhtun naticmalists demanded an independent state because they
could see that in a future Pakistan they would be dominated by ,the
Punjabis, whereas if they be,came parf of Afghanistan they would have to
give up the politics of Pukhtun nationalism becau'seAfghanistan was
already ruled by Pukhtuns. 'Thus a new national identity was imagined
and constructed, which shared the past with Afghanistan but did not
 PukhtunEthnicNationalism
97

want a future with it. Afghanistan's support for the idea of a new state
was acceptable but not Afghanistan itsel40 Moreover, .Ghaffar Khan,
who continuously evoked the past glory of the Pukhtun nation; con-
temptuously said about Afghans .(majority of them Pukhtun): We do
not want to be one with those naked people.'41 Thus,. the ,anti-colonial
nationalist made the colonial DurandLine;which dividedPukhtuns, the
basis of his brand of Pukhtun nationalism.
By that time, however, the plan for the partition ,of India and
creation of Pakistan had already been finalised and no new demand
"7as tlierefore to be entertained. When Ghaffar Khan insisted,. the
British only agreed to a plebiscite in the NWFP..Ghaffar Khan and his
brother, Dr Khan Sahel>, did" not like the idea but- had to accept it
because Dr Khan Saheb was the elected chief minister of the province
and his refusal would have meant an admission that he was no longer
sure of his support among tho electorate.
The plebiscite was t6 be based on the question of, whether
the NWFP should remain part of India or become part of Pakistan.
The Khan brothers demanded that the question should be whether the
NWFP be declared an independent state of Pukhtunistan or b~come
part of Pakistan. The British, authorities refused to oblige. The Khan
.brothers boycotted the referendum, saying that the whol~ idea was
preposterous;when elections had already been held,0nly a year ago-and
an elected Congress ministry was in office, unless the new demand for
an independent state was incorporated.
The Muslim League, once again with the full support of the BritisH
officials, launched a vigorous campaign by sending its workers to the
villages and denouncing the Congress boycott as un-Islamic and
exhorting people to vote for Pakistan as their religious duty.42 BJ, that
time the Hindu-Muslim riots had already begun td take an ominous
tum and the deeply religious Pukhtuns could not be expected to:remai~
untouched,,even if they did not persortally suffer from the carnage.
In the emotionally charged atmosphere, with the Congress.not in
the field, the officially supported Muslim League propaganda worked
very .well indeed. Out of the total 572,799 eligible votes; 292, 118
(51 per cent) were polled, of which 289,244 (99 per cent)'went in
favour of Pakistan and only 2,874jn favour oflndia. 43.Although,the,
Congress alleged massive rigging, the referendum had.sealed the fatq
of the NWFP and it became part of Pakistan. The Kh:i.n,brotherswere
left with no option but to change their strategy according to the new
political situation.
98 Politicsof Identity M St W

After the creation of Pakistan they declated' tltat their demand for
Pukhtunistan did not mean an independent state but an autonomous
province withinJ?akistan, where Pukhtuns would have the free<;fomto
live their life according to their social and cultural norms, withoot the
domination of Punjabis. 44 But t4emanagers of Pakistan were not will-
ing to trust Pi.tkhtun nationalists, evenif they had changed their minds
in conformity with the demands of the new political reality. One of the
first acts of the founder of Pakistan was to dismiss the elected Congress
government in ,the NWFP. This was the btginning of a highly cen-
trafo;ed and authmitarian rule irr Pakistan, which had no ropm for any
demands of provincial. autonomy and regional self-assertion.
Although Pakistani apoldgists argue that Dr Khan Saheb's Congress
ministry was opposed to Pakistan, an~ the central government could
a
not afford to have a hostile government in strategically sensitive
regi6n like the NWFP, future events proved that he, unlike his brother
GhaffarKhan, was too much of a conformist and opportunist to have
oreated any, proplems for .the Pakistan government. He h~'d given, a
clear ass(lrance 'to the .governor, Cunningham, that .no anti-Pakistan
activity would be encouraged and that there was tio question of declar-
ing the independence of the province. 45 The worst example of
pr Khan Saheb' s opportunism was his concurrence to bfcoming the
chief minister ofWest Pakistan under the notorious One Unit, which
was imposed against the wishes of the smaller provinces.
What seem to be mo~e plausible reasons for the dismissal of the
NWFP government by Jinnah are: (a) his autocrati~ style of governance
and a distaste fora -difference bf opinion; and (b) the early managers'
sense of insecrtrity regarding the future of a couqtry tliat 'was termed
'orlnatural' by. its adyersaties. The most objectionable part of Jinnah's
decision to dismiss the NWFP government was that he drd not as~ the
governol'to dissolve the assembly and hold fresh elections, but advised
him to dismiss the'.rninistry and invite a Muslim League man,to (~rm
the: goverm\1ent.
, Ghaffat Khan, however, after taking an oath of allegiance to Rakistan
on 23 February 1948, continued to struggle for ptovincial autonomy.
Pakistan's' response to. liis activities was even worse thanithat of the
coloni;tl rulers. Soon after parti,tionhis party paper, Pukhtun, was sus-
pended, and withjn a year'he and,, his associates and followers vvere
, back in prison. In 1956 his property wa~ confiscated in lieu of fines,
whereas prison terms and house arrests continued till his death in
1988.4~ Bt.lt the undemocratic and intolerant political culture of
 i4*Mii.lla PukhtunEthnicNationalism99

Pakistan, in a way, proved to be a blessing in disguise for Ghaffar Khan,

as it saved him from getting dowri to serious political thinking and
worltj.ng out a clear politic;alagenda and strategy. Otherwise, h'.ewould
have faced two obvious challenges:

1. After partition, when tb,e British had left, anti-colonial national.:

ism needed to be transformed into ethnic nationalism. This
requited new nationalist rhetoric, a new ideology and a new
strategy.
2. So far Ghaffar Khan had .depended almost completely on
Gandhi and his polities,, but with the :Mahatma no longer
around he had to prov~ bis political credentials, which he had
hitherto avoided by claiming to be a social refortner rather than
a politician. 47

In the face of continued state persecution and imprisonments, however,

these-challenges were averted. During the first 23 years i.'JfPakistan's
existence there was hardly any democratic political activity (like elec-
tions) that would have required the Pukhtun nationalists to 'legitirhise
their demands by popular support. The absence-of eleetoral politics, the
successive governments' intolerance for dissent, 'Glraffat Khan's exemi..
plary stubbornness, as well as the vagueness of his political agenda, all
helped to tum him into a legend. He became a saintly character adored
by Pukhtun nationaliscl. BJt' irl the 'profane' world of the market econ-
omy and j~b competition, saintliness is not of much use.
Initially, a large rrumber of Pukhtuns were sympathetic Cb~artls sep-'
aratist demands. The reason was that geogr:rphically and historically
the NWFP and Balocliistan have not 15een part;' oli''S,dtlth' Asia.
Physically and culturally Pukhtuns and Baloch are quite different from
the rest of the South Asian people. Everttheir;-Ianguages have little in
common with Soutl}.Asian languages and therefore, despite the influ:
ence of Urdu, the Pashto and BaJochi languages are stiU tfilint'elligible
to the neiglibouring Punjabis and Sindhis.
Such cultural and linguist\C differences were btmnd to play a role in
shaping the political asl;)irationsof the people.:.__ina direction contrary
to the integrati~nist policies of the Ptmjabi-Mohajfr domirtated
Pakistan government. The sense of a lack of participation bedme evM
more jarring due to the absence of electoral politics for tnore than
two decades after ,th~ creation of Pakistan. Under the circumstances,
nad there been a strong political organisation behind the separatist
 100Politicsof Identity WNRZB

sentiment, it had the potential to become a serious threat. But the

ineptitude and ambivalence of the nationalist leadership precluded the
possibility of any such eventuality.
The directionlessness of Pukhtun nationalism, however, did not
stop the government from taking it a bit too seriously. The real danger,
probably, was not Pukhtun nationalism but the support it was getting
from India and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the only state that
opposed Pakistan's application for membership at the United Nations.
Interestingly, Afghanistan's policy on the issue was as ambivalent as
that of the Pukhtun nationalists.
On the one hand, Afghanistan claimechhat after the departure of the
British the Afghan border with British India, the Durand Line, had
ceased to exist, since it had lost its validity the moment one of the par-
ties to the agreement, the British, were no longer there. On the other
hand, it supported the Pukhtun nationalists' demand for a separate
state, which would only further cement the Durand Line. All this con-
tributed to the fears and insecurity of Pakistan's rulers, which res~lt;ed
in the persecution of Pukhtun nationalists. Despite the power tussle
between the nationalists and the government, however, Pukhtuns have
become well entrenched in the socio-economic system of Pakistan and
for quite understandable reasons.

PakistaniStateSystem
Like other regions of Pakistan the NWFP ~ has been faced with the
rigours of modernisation, accompanied by its attendant dislocation,
uprootedness and insecurity. What has exacerbated the problem is that
it has been one of the most neglected regions of Pakistan. Whether it
is governmental development projects or private sector investments,
the NWFP has been the recipient of less than its due share. As men-
tioned above, the colonial regime's interest in the region was solely for
strategic reasons and it therefore built only cantonments and military
training centres in the region. ,As far as ,mechanised agriculture and
industrialisation \vere concerned, the region had Jailed to attracfcolo-
nial interest. The infrastructure in the NWFP was developed only as
, much as was required for defence logistics.
After partition Karachi became the hub of industrial activity that
gradually expanded into Punjab. The NWFP proved to be such an
unattractive area for industrialisation that even the local investors shied
 NiiMiliillfi PukhtunEthnicNationalism101

away from investing in their region and instead opted for the established
industrial regions ofSindh and Punjab. By 1967, although the NWFR
had 17.7 per cent ofWest Pakistan's population, its share of fixed assets
was only 7 per cent, and of production in manufacturing industries
around 6 per cent. 48 Fur:therinore, the cen~ral government's bias in
favour of Punjab adversely affected the mechanisation of agriculture in
the NWFP.49 But such disparity has failed to accentuate ethnic discon-
tent because the benefits that Pukhtuns have accrued from Pakistan
have outweighed it.
Being the so-called 'martial' race, the Pukhtuhs h:rd,been one of
those. peoples whom the British tegarded as 'good' soldiers and thus
recruited them to the army in large numbers. Amon-g the Indian
Muslims, the Pukhtuns, after Punjabis, had the larg'est numb~ in the
British army. After partition, it was estimated that 77 per Cent .of
wartime recruitment was from those parts of Punjab which li(!came
part ()f Pakistan, whereas 19.5 per cent recruittne'nt was from the
NWFP.50 This situation continues to be the same, making Punjabis
and Pukhtuns the two over-represented ethnic groups in the army.51
In a political system that came to be dominated and later controlled by
the army, this share was certainly going to favourably position
Pukhtuns in the power hierarchy of the state, and therefore make
them more inclined towards integration in the state rather than sepa-
ration from it.
The concentration of economic activity i'n the southern parts of
Sindh and Punjab obliged Pukhtuns to look S'outhwards 'rather than
northwards (Afghanistan).Pukhtun inyestors, transporters and labourers
have been increasingly moving tow;irds the south for better investment,
business and jobs. '
Unlike Sindh and Balochistan, where there is strong resentment
that their land has been taken away by Mohajir and Punjabi settlers and
their resources are in the control arid ust of tlr~ central governrtlent
and Punjab, the NWFP's land and resources are firmly in local hands.
lndeed, tnany Pukhtun civil and militarypersonnel share the spoils
with Punjabis and Mohajirs in Sindh.
Administratively too-,unlike Sindh and Balochistan, where Mohajirs
and 'punjabis dominate, the NWFP is ruled by Pukhtuns. Even in the
public sector there is no, sigrtifica:ntpresence of people froth other
regions.
The army-dominated system has enabled the Pukhtuns, who at
the beginning of twentieth century had one of the, smallest I1Umberof
102Politicsof Identity

educated youth compared to many other ethnic groups of India, 52 to

gradually increase their presence in the civil bun~aucracy.53
By the late 1960s, Pukhtuns were well integrated in the state system
of Pakistan. When the first free elections were held in. 1970,, their
preferences were quite obvious. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) .
with its 7 seats emerged as the main winner (although it had polled less
votes, 22.6 per cent, than the Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam's QUI), 25.4 per
cent),. whereas the nationalist party, National Awami Party (NAP),
headed by Ghaffar Khan's son, Wali Khan, won only 3 seats anctJ8.4 per
cent votes. The com_binedvotes of ,the centralist parties like the PML,
the Pakistan People's Party (PPP),JUI andJamaat-i-Islamiwere 69.'.l-ver
cent.54 Even today this pattern continues to be more or less the same.,
'.fhe political parties that won the highest numb~r of votes in the
1993 and 1997 elections were the centralist Pakistan People's Party and
the Pakistan Muslim League, Througp.out these. years.the NAP-now
ANR (Awami National Party)-ha:, be~n winning only in the prosper-
ous region of Peshawar and J\1ardan.55 This region is not only the'tnost
fertil,e in the NWFP but also ~e one with the highest level ot educa-
tion, and J:hus has a 'larger share in power. As a real beneficiary of p9wer
and privileges,jts ~upport for the ANP obviously means not a desire for
separation but for a bigger chunk oi"power and privileges. The ANP's
politics of ethnicity represent these desires very well indeed.
As mentioned earlier, even when Ghaffar Khan, the 'champion' of
the downtrodden, was leading the party, it was not clear exactly what
the nationalists' pla for the future of.Pukhtuns was. The iain issues
that were mised were-either the esta,plishme_ptof an indep~ndent state
or a share in the existing one. I}espite being a social reformer and peas-:
ant leader, Ghaffar Khan never favoured any radical social or a~arian,
reforms,that,}Vould have broken the ho\p of the landowners and ben-
efited the peasantry; On the contrary, the Congress ministry's action to
strip ,the larlded gentry; of its privileges was not to his liking, at J1e
tttougnt 'it,llfOUld,,antagonisethe big'kh"ns. 56
His s9n, Wali Khan, has, faithfully followed in his footstep~. at least
as far as the lack of a clear political plan and commitment to certain
social and pplitical programmes are concerned. What he has not
learned,fi;om his,fathtr, hpwever, i~ the populism of Ghaffar Khan.
Under Wali Khan, the party lost its populist aura and ended up becom-
ipg an elitist pressure group, whose politics was restricted to entering
into or withdrawing from one alliance or another ,to make or break a
government.
 PukhtunEthnicNa1ionalism103

Unlike his father, who always remained'in contact with the'masses

and,launched mass movemepts despite state persectitiqn, Wali Khan's
preferred political strategy till the 1980s was to coutt arrest or. g6
abroad at a time of political crisis.57,:Nevet in his long political career
has Wali Khah elaborated his pblitical objectives. Instead he has tried to
distance himself from goal-oriehled politics and programmes"tltat could
lead to confrontation. He. had an aversion to socialism and had broken
his alliance with the 'Bengali lddfa Maulana Bhashani in 1967 on
account of Bhashani's: socialist leanings. 58 Although in .his public
rhetoric lie .talked about' democratic.,.rights,. secularisrn, provincial
autonom'y and cultural ..Jiriguistic, rights,, for Pukhtuns, 'irl 1979 he
objected to the1Baloch leaders' use of the term:'nationalities' ani:lsug:,1
gested that they be characterisect'aS 'distinctive cultural and linguistic'
entities' .59
In 1972, when his party' formed the, government in, the NWEP~'in'
alliance 'with a religious party, Jamiat Ulaina-i-Islam;l.Jrdu was.made
the official language, liquor was banned, workers' sh-ikes!banrted:md
police brut'alit)( used against peasants., Not only1did theNAJt agrte' to
the continuation of emergency. but' it also signed the 1973 constitution,.
which gave less powers to the provinces than the colonial G~rmnent
oHndia Act 1935 ditl.6</,Althoughbe suffered y~ars 0persecu#6n an'd
imprisonment by the Pakistanistate;, he contented pimself with: criti-
cism ofi individual ruler~ and <avdidedt:oqfronting the ,state ,establish ..
n;ient;itself, which in ,Pakistan's case nieans.tlie army;N&wonder Wali
Khan was cleared of treason' charges and released b,ythe ru.iliciry,die~
tator, Gen'eral Zia-ul Haq. All these factors led the leftist and radical
elements to quit~the party, and by.the,1980s.Wali Klfan's part)t had no
fangs lefo,
I '

sion
,, ri
Pukhtun nationalism had emerged as an anti-coldnial mbvetnent 'Ofi
the small khans and peasants. After partition it turrfe<l'irito tlfe party of
those who aspired to"corrtrol adm.in:istrativepbwer,in the''profinceJmd,
to have a sizeable'share in the Pakistanntate systerrl.i!Irtits thitd pltas'e
the party' has' become a platform for the provincial 'investbrs, civil
servants and ';trmy personnel.' lb the 119,97elections, thf -ANP wbrl8
out of its f(f National &sembly seats from the Ptshawar arid'M'lll'dan,
region 61-not only its traqjtional support'base but a~o tllb:te'gl6n'with, ,,,,,.
104Politicsof Identity

the largest number oflocal investors, civil servants and army personnel.
For these groups, nationalism means the protection of their privileges,
which emanate from the private and public sectors of Pakistan.
Although separatism did not suit them even before the:1970s, after the
war in Afghanistan and that country's destruction even the few ideal-
ists cannot thinkof any future beyond Pakistan.
Moreover, the Afghan war has created a -classof drug and arms deal-
ers that includes not only the tribal drug barons but also army person-
nel who made fortunes out of the clandestine western (especially
American) arms supplies to the Afghan fighters. Most of these arms
and drug dealers have become financiers of various political parties and
quite a few have even become members of the legislative assemblies.
On the other hand; most of the dirty work against Afghan govern-
ments, whether communist or mujahideen-which led to the Taliban
rule and civil war-was carried out by Pukhtun officials.62
It needs to be mentioned here that the Pakistani establishment's
support for the Taliban was not for the ethnic Pukhtuns of Afghanistan
but for the Sunni Muslims of that country, which the Pukhtuns hap-
pen to be. The reason was that Pakistan did not want to see the Shia-
dominated government in Kabul which was, under the predominantly
Shia Mujahideen group before the Taliban, more friendly towards the
Shia Iranian government. It is also for this reason that the United
States supported Pakistani efforts to dislodge theMujahideen and help
install the Taliban-the United States too had no patience with a group
favourably inclined 'towards one of its arch enemies, Iran.
Recent developments have, however, changed the perceptions of the
United State:;, and in the wake of the 1t.September 2001 attacks it has
secured the support of Pakistan's military government to eliminate the
Taliban, who have proved to be no less troublesome for the United
States than Iran. As far as the Pukhtun nationalists of Pakistan are con-
cerned, they have little sympathy for the Taliban, even though the
Taliban are predomina~tly Pukhtuns. As stated above, Pukhtun
flatiqnalist,<;have by flow completely integrated into the state.system of
Pakistan, and their main concern now is their place in the power hier-
archy ,rather than their ethnicity. h:onically, the Pukhtuns of Pakistan
have playi::d a major role in the destruction of a state, Afghanistan,
whi<;hw~ once the most potent supporter c,their nationalism.
Under tl)e cirsumstances, it is not surprising that the ANP has
becoJI1ea:pressure group with its politics revolving around bargaining
f6r Ill).ni,sterialportfolios and government permits for its leaders to
 PukhtunEthnicNationalistn105

set up factories. Till 1998, the party had two .issues with whicli to
emotionally charge its supporters: opposition to the construction of
the Kalabagh dam and a demand to change the province's pame from
the NWFP to Pukhtunkhwa. After the Nawaz Sharif government had
shelved the Kalabagh Dam project, the only issue that was left was the
name of the pro\fince. Since then it has appeared that at last a nation-
alism that had virtually 'become nationalism only in name had'finally
become a nationalism for name alone. Recently howev~r the mili~ry
ruler, General.Pervez Musharr.af, has reignited the issue by saying that
the Kalabagh Dam would be constructed. So the ANP once again has
more than one issue.63
Otherwise, not surprisingly, the ANP is not :(member of the nation-
alist alliance, Pakistan's Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM),
which was formed in 1998. After all, the Pukhtuns of the NWFP are
no longer an oppressed 'nation', even if the majority of them continue
to be as oppressed as any people in any of Pakistan's four provinces.

eferences
1. Adorno, 1978, pp. 52-53.
2. Sayeed, 1980, writes, ' ... there was no ethnic group in Pakistan in 1947 'that was
more conscious of its separate linguistic and cultural i'dentity than the Pakutuns'
(p. 17). He cites the fact that in Punjab the Muslim League was pitted against the
government-backed party whereas in the North West Frontier Province it enjoyed
government support as proof that NWFP was. 'a world of more developed political
and ethnic consciousness' (p. 16). For other such unsubstantiated statements, see
Hussain, 1990, p. 79.
3. For Anthony Smith's ideas on nationalism see Smith, 1981 and 1991. For Ernest
Gellner's emphasis on industrialism see Gellner, 1983 and tor Benedict Anderson's
ideas on the role of print capitalism see Anderson, 1991.
4. Brueilly, 1993, p. 15.
5. The word Pukhtun is a northern variant used by the Pukhtuns of the Peshawar
Valley and the northern parts of the NWFP. The Pukhtuns t>f the south and of
Afghanistan, whose accent is a softer version of the Pashto language, pronounce it as
Pushtun. However, we should stick to the formeI" because the membhs of the
NWFP assembly, while demanding a change of name for the province, used the
word Pukhtunkhwa (land of PukhtunsJ rather.than Pushtunkhwa.
6. As there is no mention bf the ethnic groups in the 1998',census, these figures are
based on the 1981 census, according to which Pukhtuns were 68.3 per cent of the
total population of the NWFP, excluding some predominantly Pukhtun regions of
the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of the province. See Ahmed, Feroz,
1998, p. 190.
106PoliticsoJ Identity

7. Roy, 1986, p. 233. Citing various,.sour7es, Roy writes, 'Not very ~uch is known
a~out the ethnic origins of the.Pukn.tuns; it is clear that,they embrace a range of
peoples of diverse origins. They are not ofien mentioned before the eighteenth century,
although Babur describes them as a community given to plundering who livt!to the
south of Kabul.'
8. Tendulkar, 1967, pp. 1-11.
9. These were the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909-and the Montagu-Chelmsford
Reforms of 1920, aimed at granting constitutional rights and electdral participation.
10. Moreover, Caroe's colonial self becomes too entangled to conceal his hostility
towards anti-British 'hati~malistsand his admiration for the pro-British khansand the
Muslim League. The Pukhtun leader, Dr Khan Saheb, once told the British Viceroy
in the presence of Caroe' that if he ever wanted to meet a Muslim League leadet He
did not have to look far for such a leader was standi'rig right in front of him in the
shape of Governor C~roe. Quoted in Khan, Wali, 1987, p. 116.
11. Caroe, 1983, p. 437.
12. Dupree, 1980, p. xvii.
13. Tendulkar, 1967, p. 223.
14. For details of this conc,ept, see Nandy, 1983, p. 15. A passage quoted by Nandy (p. 5)
in a footnote deserves to be reproduced here: 'The notion of the African as~ mjor
... took very strong hold. Spaniards and Boers had questioned whether natives had
souls: modern Europeans cared less about that but doubted whether they had minds,
or minds capable of adult growth. A theory came to be fashionable that mental
growth in the African ceased early, that childhood was never left behind.'
15. Gankovsky, 1971, p. 198.
16. Ibid., p. 199.
17. According to Gankovsky (1971, p. 200), at the beginning of the nineteenth century
there was not a single town with a Pukhtun majority, but by the 1930s there were
Pukhtun majorities in 15 out of the 26 towns of the NWFP.
18. For ;i elaborate description of the pivotal role that industrialism plays in the rise of
nationalism see Gellner, 1983'and 1996.
19. Gellner, 1983, p. 9.- ~ - -
20. Ibid., p,10.
21. Jon Anderson, 1975, pp. 575-601. ,
22. This account and the following information on Afghanistan is frorri Roy, 1986,
,pp. 15;18,and Anwar, 1988, p. 17.
2J. It is interesting to note that in order to build the nation and contain the influence of
tribalism, Abdurrehman imposed the Muslim law,the Shariat,to ~ake'the state laws
0

effective. See Roy, 1986, p. 15.

24. Rahman, 1996, p. '142.
25. This was originalJy a Turkish sport, a kind of polo in which horsemen try, to pick up
a dead goat with a large arrow.
26. Sayeed, 1968i, p. 283.
27. Ghaffar Khanwrites in his autobiography:'! havt been told that Amanullah Khan
used to call' himself the revolutionary king of the Pakhtuns. And inqeed it was he
who inspired us wiih the idea of revolution'.' Quoted in Sayeed, 1980; p. 18.
28. 'O Pathans! Your house has fallen into ruin. Arise and rebuild it-and remember to
what race you belong.' ?haffir Khan, quoted in.Easwaran, 1984, p. 25.
 PukhtunEt!inicNationalism
107

29. Tendulkar, 1967, p. 65.

30. Ghaffar, 1983, pp. 12, 13. The translation is mine.
31. Talbot, 1988; and Khan, Wali, 1987.
32. Khan, Wali, 1987, pp. 55-70.
33. Sayeed, 1980, p. 20.
34. Ibid.
35. Talbot, 1988, p. 5.
36. Among the leading khans were: 'Nawab Sir Muhammed Akbar Khan, the Khan of
Hoti, Nawab MohabatA!i Khan, the Khan ofKohat, Nawab Qutbuddin Khan, the
descendant of the pre-British rulers of Tank, and a major jagirdar,Mir Alam Khan,
one of the largest landlords of the Peshawar valley, and Muhammed Zaman Khan,
the Khan ofKalabat'-Ibid., p. 17.
37. Cunningham wrote that for 90 per cent of the people the demand for Pakistan was
not intelligible, and for the 'average Pathan villager in these parts, the suggestions
that there can be such a thing as Hindu domination is only laughable'. Quoted in
ibid., p. 29.
38. Azad, 1988, p. 210.
39. Anwar, 1988, p. 30.
40. Ibid., p. 31.
41. Quoted in ibid., p. 31.
42. Talbot, 1988, p. 27.
43. Khan, Wali, 1987, p. 131. The referendum, like the elections, was based on
restricted franchise, as only 572,799 people were eligible to vote out of a population
of3.5 million in the settled districts, whereas the tribal areas and the frontier states
were not eligible to vote. Sayeed, 1980, p. 24.
44. Azad, 1988, p. 213.
45. Sayeed, 1968a, pp. 271-72.
46. Ironically, he willed that he be buried in the Afghan town of Jalalabad, across the
Durand Line (a line which he had made the basis of his Pukhtun nationalism) and
among those 'naked' Pukhtuns w~om he had so contemptu01,1sly rejected.
47. Ghaffar Khan was probably the only Congress leader who had the 'fullest faith' in
Gandhi's purity and 'held almost identical views on many a problem' with his mentor.
Tendulkar, 1967, p. 404.
48. Ahmed, 1998, p. 195.
"9. Ibid. The NWFP accounted for only 5.4 per cent tractors and 3.3 per cen~ tubewells
\ out ofWest Pakistan's tractors and tubewells.
50. Cohen, 1984, pp. 42, 44.
Si.At the same time the Sindhis' percentage was 2.2 and the Balochs' 0.06. Ibid.
52. Page, 1987, p. 12.
53. Pukhtun army officers, like Punjabis, have benefited from military governments'
policy to entrench army officers in the civil bureaucracy.
54. For details of the number of votes and seats see Choudhury, 1974, pp. 128-29.
55. In 1973 the Bhutto government banned the NAP. Later, when Wali Khan was in jail,
Sher Baz Khan Mazari formed the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was'
joined by the Wali Khan's supporters. In 1986, Wali Khan formed the ANP.
56. Sayeed, 1980, p. 21.
57. Waseem, 1987, p. 111.
108 Politicsof Identity

58. Ibid.
59. Harrison, Selig S., 1981, p. 89.
60. Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 200.
61. Election Special, Herald,Karachi, 1997.
62. As a journalist I encountered many of them personally.
63. See a report, 'Damned if we do', by Ilyas Khan in HeraldOctober 2003.
 .
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BalochEthnicNationalism:
FromGuerrilla
Warto Nowhere?

To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization

is to neglect the fundamen~l point that nationalism is, above and
beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power.
Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the
state.
-John Breuilly 1

Baloch nationalism is one of those pheno~ena \Vhich defy theoti~s

that see nationalism as an-effect of industrial social formation or print
capitali,sm. Balochistan is the ,least indusqialised region of Pakistan
with ,the lowest level, of literacy. Baloch nationalism emerged in a
tribal set-up well before the partition of India, and was oppose.cl to
Balochistan's accession to Pakistan. After partition, however, the
Pakistani state's treatment of the region turned Baloch nationalism
into a potent force, which attracted interI}ational attention 'in the
1970s, when a guerrilla war was launched that culminated in a bloody
confrontation with the Pakistan army.
This chapter reinternrets the, emergence of Baloch ethnic nation:\l-
ism as a response tq the imposition of the centrali~ed modern state sys-
tem by the British colonialists, aqd goes on to argue that the highly
centralised state of Pakistan and.its unwillingness ~oallow regional and
ethnic ,autonomy forced the nationalist forces to launch a guerrilla war
against the state. My argument is that intionalism has too qften been
interpreted in terms of _good and bad, tribal and JllOdem, civic and
ethnic, etc., which blurs the most important aspect of nationalism-
that in today's nation-state system, nationalism is always eithc_rabout
share in the existing state power structure, or, if that is not possible,
about creating its own state. ""
110Politicsof Identityii; rn
The fact that most often the mechanism of the emergence of
nationalism is misunderstood has much to do with the tendency to see
it as a given, as something that is inbuilt in human societies. Such argu-
ments are mostly influenced by the claims of 1:he natimplists rather
than by historical and sociological evidence. Historically and sociolog-
ically, however, nationalism, as Ernest Gellner has pointed out, 'is not
the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it
does indeed present itsel It is in reality the consequence of a new
form of social organization ... nationalism emerges only in milieux in
which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted'
[emphasis in original] .2
Thus each and every nationalist movement, whether based on ethpic,
religious or regional identity, is about state power. Therefore categories
like tribal, II\odern and civic nationalism are not very helpful for
understanding the phenomenon.3

ction

Balochi~tan is the larges~p'rovince of Pakistan with the smallest number

of peo}Jle.With over 222,000 square kilometres area, the province covers
42.9pet cent of the total area of Pakistan. Its population of6.5 rllillion
(according to the provisional results ofl 998'census) is just 5 per cent
of Pakistan's total population. It is the most impoverished province of
Pakistan with the 19\Y~SJ: per capita income as compared to the other
three provinces. Ethnically and linguistically it is the most divefse
province ofPakistan. The Balocn are Hie largest ethnic group:in their
province, but do not- constitute a majority. They are closely followed
by Pukhtuns. The third largest ethnic group is Brahui, followed by a
substantial number ofSindhis and Punjabis. Interestingly, the majority
of Baloch live outsitie Balochistan, mostly in Sindh and Punjab.
Althougli rich in 'mineral resources like coal, iron ore, marble and
sulphur, .Balochistad is the driest province of F'akistan and there is
therefore very little' irrigation and' farming. Because of severe weather
and scarcity of fertile land, the' social mode of Balochistan has 'pre-
dominantly beert hotnadic pastoralism, complemented by patbhes df
settled a~iculture. It was around 'these patches that tribal life' was
drganised. The livelihood of die people' has been dependent on
myriad ecorlomic,activities, such as growing crops bnsmall plots 6f
land, tending pasture land, cattle breeding, sheep and goat breeding,
 BalochEthnicNationalism111

trade, and work in mines. The social organisation of the, province

continues to be based on tribalism to this day.-i.
B1;forecolonial rule, Balochistan was a highly fragmented society. The
concept of sta~ authority did not figure very prominently in the tribal
mode of localised social life. Whatever pockets 0 power and control
existed 'were based on the internal organisation of local tribes. Although
various conquering armies lik'.ethe Persians, Afghans, 'Sindhis and Sikhs
continuously overran the region, all avoided permanent control of the
tribes. 5 Internal efforts at political :Unity and the establishment of the
stat<;had not been common either. lt~s only in.the eighteenth century
that the sixth Khan of Kalat, Nasir 'Khan,.established' a unified Baloch
army of25,000 meri and 1,000 qunels,,and organised the major Baloch
tribes under an agreed military and administrative systrm.1
Nasir Khan also, set ,up a oureaucr_atio state structure through
appointing a nurr,.ber of administrators with specific portfolios arid
duties like management of',intemaLand foreign affairs, 'collection of
revenues from, crown lands, tribrttes, blodd cot'npj;:nsation, etc. But
' these innovations there was a structural yv-eaknes~
despite ' in 'the Kalat
state: it did, not have an organio bureaucracy that could }ncorporate
various tribes. The tribes were only.a fighting force of the state, to be
awarded-wit,h. land grants for the supply of troops and maintenance of
order.,, Therefore, .despite some,,semblance of ,political unity, 1 there
e_xisted a considerable degree ,of tension Oftweeri the centraJising
authority of the Khan and 'the localised powers of the tribal chiefs. 7 It
was,.a ~tern that owed more to the powerful personality of die Khan
than to an institutionalised stf\Jcture, and therefore after the ddth of
Nasir Khan his system came crumbling down.

of Balochistan
l

Mtefr annexing Balochistan in 1884, tlre colohialt admifiistration

explotted 'the'ten~ion beween the I4anate,(tne Khan dynasty) and the
tribes, with oisastrous effects. The.British needed a safe' passage from
Sindh 'to Afghanistan through Balochistan. The Kharr guaranteed their
safety but failed to control the ahti-Btitish tfibe~.'The Britis~ tlsetl thi~
as ,.an excuse to attack Kalat, clait:ping that tne tril:lal attacks were a
breach of die treaty, and when die Khan refi/sed to' surrender he was
killeg and his state dismembered. 8 Thus encted the~rst (and 'sb far the
last) political organisation that had brought the whole' of Balochistan
112Politicsof Identity

(including those regions which are now part of Iran and Afghanistan)
under one state authority. Baloch nationalists nostalgically remember
the era as a glorious period in their history.
In the face of continued tribal resistance, the colonial administration
restored the Kalat state, but only in order to divide it with more preci-
sion. The Khan of Kalat was forced into a subordinate position to the
British government. He was not allowed to negotiate with any other
state without the consent of the British; he was obliged to allow British
troops on his territory and was responsible for checking any outrages
near or agaiqst British territory and to provide protection to merchants. 9
As a reward for his cooperation the Khan was granted a Rs 100,000
subsidy, whereas subsidies to the tribes were made conditional upon
their loyalty to the Khan and their ability to maintain peace.10
SQon the colonial administration began its divide-and-rule practices,
playing off rival chiefs against each other. Balochistan was divided into
seven parts. In the far west, the Goldsmid line assigned roughly one-
fourth of the area of Balochistari to Persia in 1871, and in the north the
Durand line resulted in. handing over a small strip to Afghanistan in
1893. Part ofBalochistan was named British Balochisfan, to be centrally
administered by.British lndia, whereas the rest of itwas divided into a
truncated remnant of the Kalat state and three puppet principalities.11
Colonial interest in this economically unattractive region was purely
strategic, as Balochistan shares a long border with Afghanistan and Iran.
While reducing the powers of the Khan of Kalat, in 1876 the British
forced him to accept a contractual notion of sovereignty, according to
which the trihaTmiefs were to accept the authority of the Khan but had
the legal right to refute that authority in certain circumstances. 1t
An administrative system that was called the Sandeman system of
administration was imposed on Balochistan, which treated it as a polit-
ical agency ruled indirectly through the political agent of the governor
general. Rather than a direct administrative authority, the political
agent acted as an advisor to the Khan ofKalat. In the new arrangement
the tribal chiefs were allowed to devise their own methods to manage
their day-to-day local affairs, but when it came to i~ues of importance
they were required to consult the British official. The issues of impor-
tance for the British 1 of <;purse,were strategic access to Afghanistan and
safe movement of troops in the frontier areas.
Under this indirect rule a council o(chiefs, Shahi Jirga, was estab-
lished, in which the tribal leaders could repi:esent themselves politi-
cally. The Shilii Jirga was not an independent body, but an.institution
 Nii \\ BalochEthnicNationalism113

working under the tutelage.of the colonial administration and answerabl~

to the British chief commis~ioner. The special status of Baloc;histan
was not affected by the administrative changes in other pa;rts of India
during the first, and second decades of twentieth century. Although
colonial intervention ,increased in the twentieth century, and by the
1930s the powers of Khanate were usurped and the powers of the
council v1rtually eliminated, constitutional reforms were not extended
to Balochistan. 13

ondPauperisation
By the end of the nineteenth century the landscape of Balochistan had
undergone a considerable change, when railway lines, roads, post
offices, rest houses and a cantonment of British troops were con-
structed. With that even the neglected economic sector of the region
saw some changes. The establishment of railway lines boosted mining,
especially coal mining in northern Balochistan, and the amount pf coal
extras:;tedwent up.from,122 tons in ,1886to 47,300 tons ii-11903.14 At the
same time the. market economy mad~ its entry, migration to the.more
economically developed areas started, the number of nomadic and
S~Pli-nomadic tribes decreased, and the settled population increased.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 95.5 per cent of
Balochistan's population lived in the countryside, following their
nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle in which cattle breeding played an
important role. By J911 the settled population had gone up to 54.3 pen
cent of the total population, and by 1931 it had further increased to
62.7 per cent. Economic ahanges did not, however, bring prosperity to
the region; instead, they ttigg~ed economic deterioration and pauperi-
sation. During the last decades of the nineteenth century,there was an
astronomical increase in taxation. For instance, between 1879-80 and
190Z-03 there was an 82.pet: cent tax increas.e in Sibi; between 1882
and 1895 there was a 350 per cent increase in Quetta r.egion. The tax,
which was collected in kind (wheat) for ,the British troops, led to the
landlessness of many peasants. Till the beginning of the twentieth
century most of the land was cultiv~ted by peasan11owners; tenants
were few and agricultural labour non-existent. By 1931, however,
ther~ emerged a considerable number of tenants and labourers,
The development of ,commodity-money relati.Pns converted
Balochi,staninto 'an agrarian appendage o( the metropolis', as the import
 114Politicsof Identity

of factory-made articles coupled with high taxation led to the !bankruptcy

of local artisans, whose numbers dr<?pped 63 per ce~t during '.the
1921-1931 period alone.' 15 On the other hand, the new mercantile class
catering to the needs of the British garrison was wholly imported fro'm
Punjab and Sindh. Therefore settlers came to control whatever modem
economic relations developed in Balochistan,,to the total exclusion of
the indigenous Baloch. By that time economic conditions in most parts
of Balochistan had progressively deteriorated.

and Accession
to Pakistan
Despite economic, changes,' however,, the structure of Baloch society
remained predominantly tribal. It was ihtroduced to-capitalist economif
relations but was far from entering an industrial c:Ipitalist economy.
Hence the emergence of nationalism in Balochistan was not the effect of
industrial social,.OFgallisation,which Gellner regards as the cause bf
nationali~m.16 It was also not caused by print capitalism,wliich Andef-son
believes is a trigger for nationalist sentiment. 17 Rather, it was tpe Baloch
nt1tionalistswho first introduced Baloch society to print media.
Baloch nationalism emerged a'sa response to the interventionofthe
state: Initially the 'highly fragmented nature of Baloch society did Mt
allow the emergence of an organised nationalist movement, t4ough
sporadic resistance to colonial rule continued throughout. The' first
successful nationalist campaign was launched in 1929 ag:tinst ,state
recruitment, whih turned into an armed mutiny. The following Jear,
1930, several underground political groups were formed 1 and ah anti-
colonial 'Quit Balochistan' movement was launched.
1n 1935, the first, nationalist party, the Kalat National Party,,was
formed with' the object,ive of achieving all' 'independent, united
Balochistan' after the departure of the British. At the sant:e'time,
Baloch newspapers appeared and one of them,Al-Baluch from Karachi,
published a ,.map of independent Balochistan that included Iraniah
Balochistan, Kalat,,Baloch principalities, British Balochistan and some
parts of Punjab and Sindh. 18
As the ,British withdrawal from India approached, Baloch natibhilc.
ists speeded up their activities in support of an independe11t
. Balpchistall'. The Khan of Kalat argued, ironic:i.lly,with the "help of
Jinnah as his legal advisor, that the legal status of Nepal and Kafat was
different from the rest of the princely states in India, as the two, unlike
 BalochEthnicNationalism115

other states, maintained their treaty relations directly with,Whitehall

rather than dealing with the British Indian government. He main'l
tained that the 1876 treaty'ha'd pledged that the British 'would respect
the sovereignty and independence of Kalat.' Jn,a memorandum to the
1946 British Cabinet Mission, the Khan emphasised that a government
or governments succeeding the British would only inherit the states
that had treaty relations with the colonial government in India and not
those whose treaty relations ,were with ~itehall. 19
This was a legal and legitimate demand but the government of a
country that had been ruhng India illegitimately was not .impressed by
the legality of the argument. As the Cabinet Mission could not ques-
tion rhe legality of the demand, it left the issue unresolved. 20 ~ter, an
unrepresentative council of tribal chiefs,' the Shahi Jirga, established 1;,y
the colonial regime, and the .Quetta murlicipality, Wfre entrusted by
the viceroy with the task of deciding the fate ofBalochistari; Th~ mem-
bers of the Shahi Jirga and the Quetta .municipality obligingly
endorsedithe official plan by supporting accessi.9n to Pakistan. 21
One day after the creation of Pakistan, on 15 August 1947, the Khan
declared the independence of .Kalat, ,w'ith ah qffex to Pakistan fol:
special relations in the areas of defence: foreign affairs, and communi-
cation. Pakistan rejected the offer and after a nine-month tug of war
Kalat was forcibly annexed when the Pakistan army's garrison com-
mander in Balochistan was ordered to mar"h on Kalat and arrest the
Khan ifhe refused to agree to the accession. Nationalists rejected the
Khan's capitulation and his brother launclied a revolt against Pakista,n
tliat continued till, his arrest in 1950. 1
Pakistanis interest in and treatment of the region was rtot vecy dif-
ferent from the colonialists-'--in fact, Pakistan's treatment was ~orse
than the colonial regime's because the new nation-state was more
interventionist than its predecessor ..During colonial rule the provinoe
was treated as a special'adminitrative zone; the ..Pakistani state contin-
ued with, that legacy. The colonial administration'sreforms towards
rep~sentative rule in fodia did not include Balochistan, and there was
therefore no legisl~tive assembly .there at the time 0partition. Jinnah,
in keeping with the colonial tradition,.constituted a governor general's
advisory council for Balochistan to.;be ruled directly by him. 22
To strength~n his grip on Balochistan and other. frontier areas,. the
governor general created a ministry of states arid ,frontier regions and
in an unparliamentary manner kept the ministry under .his own
control. To rule Balochistan as a governor generaVs province was so
 116Politicsof Identity IMH&W

peculiar that at a press conference Jinnah was asked if 'he was in favour
of a dictatorial form of government, rather than a democratic one.' 23
Whatever territorial identity Balochistan had left was eliminated when,
in 1955, the One Unit scheme that amalgamated the four western
provinces into one was imposed.
The actual physical resistance to the One Unit was more pro-
nounced in Balochistan than :inywhere else, and at one point it seemed
as if the province had seceded, because there was an open defiance of
the central government's'authority. 24 Just before the imposition of the
martial law for the first time in 1958, the army moved into Kalat ahd
arrested the Khan, his retainers and Baloch political leaders in various
parts of Balochistan. The unrest increased further when the army
demanded that weapons should be handed in at police stations and the
tribesmen refused to comply. The Pakistan army deployed tanks and
artillery, and resorted to bombing of villages. The chief of the Zehri
tribe, Nauroz Khan, organised a guerilla force to fight the army for the
return of the Khan to power and the withdrawal of the One Unit. But
N auroz Khan was arrested, and later died in prison, whereas his son
and others were hanged on treason charges.25

Insurgency

It took Pakistan 23 years after its creation to grant Balochistan the

status ofa province in 1970. The same year the National Awami Party
(NAP) won the largest single block of seats in the provincial assembly,
and in 1972 ,in alliancewith a religious party, Jamiat, Ulama-i-Islam
QUI), fornred the gcwernment.
Before going into the details of the insurgency of 1973-77, we
should look at the status ofBalochistan as compared to other proviiices
at that stage. Although the year 1972 saw elected &overnments at
the centre as well as in th~ provinces for the first time in Pakistan's
two-and-a-half decades' existence, for Balochistan this had an added
significance-so far the province had been ruled by the central estab-
lishment like .a colony. The problems this had caused in terms of
a~ministrative control of the province by Punjabis and other non-
Baloch, the extremely low rate of literacy, the exploitation of its
resources by the central government, and its overall impoverishment,
are staggering to judge from the following figures"provided by econo-
mist Omer Noman. 26
 "'" 1BalochEthnicNationalism117

Balochistan's per capita income at US$ 54 was, 60 per cent of

Punjab's. Whereas the literacy rate for Pakistan was 18 per cent, for
Balochistan it was only 6 per cent. Despite its mineral res.ource ,mdow-
ment; its share in industrialisation was as insubstantial, as 0.7 per cent.
Balochistan provided 80 per cent of Pakistan's gas production, saving
an estimated US$ 275 million in foreign exchange per year, but the
royqlty that the province received for the gas was as trivial as US$ 1.2
million. The majority of the administrative personnel in the province
were from Punjab. Out of 830 higher civil personnel in the province,
only 181 were Balochs. In 1972, out of twenty provincial department
heads only one was a Baloch.27 Punjabis and other settlers also con-
trolled business and whatever little industry there was. Even develop-
ment plans like building of infrastructure and exploration of mineral!i
were carried out by the central government'.
When the NAP came to power, the major task before it was to
rectify these imbalances and to redress the long-standing Baloch griev-
ances. At that time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party wasin
power at the centre. The People's Party had a majority in PutJ.jab and
Sindh but had won only oneseat in the North West Frontier Province
and none in Balochistan. Bhutto was as centralist as any of his prede-
cessors, and the fact that he had little say in the affairs of the two ~trate-
gically important provinces was a thorn in his flesh.
Bhutto's centralist tendencies and his 'support base in Punjab
warranted that a check be placed on the reforms of the nationalist
administration in Balochistan.Just before the appointment of the NAP
gov~rnor, Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Bhutto wrote a letter to him whicq
focused on central government's concern about its control over the
province. Of the seven points that Bhutto emphasised, three need to
be quoted here as they highlight the major :treas of tension irr centre-
province relations. The letter, as publisht;d in the Government of
Pakistan's White Paper on Balochistan in 1974, goe,s:

The Provincial Government should take steps to ensure,that all

inhabitants of the province, both local and non-local, receive
equal and fair treatment, and that 'the non-locals are ,not in any
manner harassed ....
'The Sui Gas installationsare located in the province ofBaluch,istan.
They are o(national importance. Every effort should continue to
be made to ensure that there is no disruption in the prpper run-
ning of these installations or in the transmission/distribution of
118Politicsof Identity fi!IB'Mlilf,tttD

gas from Sui. The Provincial Government shall continue to ensure

the maintenance of law and order in the Sui area and a smooth
labour-management relationship ....
Every effort should be made to preserve national integrity.
Fissiparous ten'dencies are not only harmful to the nation but' also
affect our international relations. Therefore, movements like Azad
(independent) Baluchistan Movement, however nebulous, should
be firmly put down, and not be permitted to affect our relations
with foreign powers, particularly friendly neighbouring countries. 28

As noted earlier, the majority of the administrative perSpnn~l in

Balochistan were Punjabis ~d other settlers, and this was one of the f<\C,-
tors that made the nationalists think that Balochistan was being treat<i!d
like a colony. Naturally, Bh1,1ttoand the Punjabi b~reaucracy expected
that the first elected government in Balochistan would most certainly try
to change that arrangement. Bhuttq's instruction-with an emphasis on
'non-locals' was meant to register the concerns of Punjabis.
The, instruction about ensuring the proper running of the Sui gas
installations and undisrupted transmission/distribution was indicative
of the central government's, fear that the _nationalist administration
might deman1 a fair share of revem~e for its gas supply. Indeed the
issue was not only the revenue but also the fact that when the rest of
the country was benefiting from natural gas from Balochistan 1 the
province itself had no gas supply.
The third point is significant in a geopolitical sense. The Independent
Balochistan Movement was aim~d at,establishing an independent state of
Balochistan, comprising all the Baloch areas of Iran, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The Shah oflran w.asvery;sensitive to the nationalist tendencies
in Iranian Balochistan as well as the Soviet Union's support for national-
ist forces. With Pakistan anq. Ir~n both being in.the .American camp and
Iran being a rich oil-exportingcountry, ijhutto did not want to harm his
cordial relationship with the Shah. The NAP leader, Wali Khan, had
charged in the national assembly.and later during his trial in the Supretne
Court that ,Bhutto was reluctant to install the NAP government in
Balochistan because the Shah had expressed his disapproval.29 ,
The above three,issues may have been at the core of the centre-province
relatio~hip, but the real reason for the tension was the centri11govern-
.meht's unwiflingness to allow provincial autonomy. It is in the nature of
the nation-state that)t regards demands for regional and ethnic autonomy
as proy;incialism, tribalism and ~rrow nationalism. The nation7s,tate
 I\ b m11BalpchEthnicNationali$m119
recognises. only,one form of nationalism as legitimate, anq that is the
nationalism of the state, itself But some,states are more repressive ,and
intolerant th;m others ~nd the Pakistani state has undoupte,dly pe~n one
of the .most repressive and intoler.u;it. As o.oted earlier, from ,the .,very
b,eginning it has been insensitive,tp provincial griey:q1.cesand 9versesitive
to the voices of dissent. ::fhe provi.ncial detnangs have ,always been tepned
as 'narrQw provincialism', harn;iful to the integrity pf the state.
In Balochistan's .case, ethnio qemands and tbe NAP government's
actions were translated ,as a threat to. J;he 'survival of l?ak:is~ as aIJ.inte-
grated stite'. 30 Also, as a harbinger of'progress and.modernity', the state
establishment blamed the trouble on 'a viY,id~ontrjlSt bet\1\7eenprimitive
life and progress'. 31 Thus, the provj.ncial,goveITlJllent's actions, aimed at
ass~rting its,.n;gional atlthority and dis;tllowng the central governrqent's
interference in its affairs, were,descriped as the tribaJ chiefs' efforts to djs,r
courage developm.ental plaps, that the centraJ govemment had inte]Jckq
for the pr;pvince. This ~ an interpretation designed t9 gloss over th~
actuaJ.'causes of the tension. The real issue,~ simple: Bah;>chistanqad
betn the most underdeveloped province, ruled alwo~t entirely b)( non,.
Baloch. J'he nationalist goverru;pent,was set tp tackle that is:,pe on a pri<;>rity
basis, and it rightly, believed that Ba,lochistan's UQderpevelopme;,nt'was
caused not only ,,by th~ central governm~t'fl negligern;;ebqt,also b)(,the
explojtation of provincial,n;::sources by the J:entre,
Therefore,. om; of the first acti9ns of t~e nati9nalist goyernqitnt was
to. transfer no)l-Balocp administrative st:\ff to their respectiye
provinc;.es,,as it iustifiably felt th.at wj.thont. the indigenisatioQ 9f the
adroinistratiol), provincial reso4,rces would not ,come p.der the c~m-
trol of th,e ptovincial govetnment. In priciple, Bhutto was ii;i favov,r
of an iQcrease in Baloch representation in the adn;iinistrationi He Had,
indeed, prtsided over the governor's confer.ence in whis;h the decision
tQ rep;itriate Puajabi and, othe,r non-Baloch bureaucrats to their own
provincei, was takeJl. But later the Bhutto government's White faP.er
oh Balochistan listed the transfer of Balp~histan ,Reserve, Police
personnel as one of the misde~ds qf-the, NAPadministration.
Selig H;urison has noted that there were. two q>,ntradicti9ns in the-
Balochi~tan situation. 32 Th~ first one~ qetween the, n;gional ~aloc);t
elite and the s:;eniral eljtp q( Pakistan. The, under-representation of
the .Baloclt ,in ,thr ct.ntral as well as provincial administrations 4nd the.
Punjabi-Mqbajir domination of the ~tate S1:fllct1Jreh;i.cl'clearly put t~
f:Wointer~sts.,in"con,Aict. The emergence of the ,electec;l.goverpment of
the P)?P (::puldno&mitigate the conflict because the paf1Yhad won not a
 120Politicsof Identity

single seat in Balochistan. The second contradiction was between the

population ofBalochistan (which was largely rural) and the Baloch elite.
One has no reason to disagree with Harrison in identifying the dual
contradiction. Buf his conclusion that the NAP government of the
Baloch elite was interested in tackling only the first contradiction
misses an important point. Ironically, the nationalist government's
reforms had set it against the local elite, and therefore the first challenge
to its authority emerged in the form of a resistance from the tribal elite.
This can be understood in terms of the nature of nationalist politics.
As discussed iil Chapter 2, nationalist politics, though undoubtedly
class-oriented, is not necessarily class-based. Nationalism is a populist
form of politics which tries to mobilise people on the basis of common
culture, language, history and ethnicity, regardless of their class. The
nationalist elite endeavours to replace outside domination with the
local and indigenous version. To achieve this, it appeals to every mem-
ber of the community in the name of self-determination and self-rule;
and as soon as it comes to power it,employs all those methods against
which \t had struggled. For instance, it struggles against state interven-
tion but the moment it captures state power it starts intervening in
society in the name of the collective good of the community.
flalochistan's extreme poverty demanded that the nationalist leader-
ship mobilise and unite various classes for a state-sponsored utilisation of
provincial resources. But the problem was that Baloch society was based
on localised interests and tribal social organisation. If the selective inter-
vention of the B.ri1iiih,and later the Pakistani state, had led to the under-
development of the province and its people in general, it had also ensured
the maintenance of the power and privilege of the local elite. In its efforts
to gear provincial resources to the 'development of the province; the
nationalist government soon realised that most parts ofBalochistan were
beyond the authority of the state administration. Therefore it felt that
unless 'these so-called tribal areas were brought under the provincial
authority, it could not carry out its programme of reforms. This brought
the localised tribal interests in conflict with the nationalist government.
Soon tribal stirring and unrest erupted in various parts of the
province. Settlers were attacked and government officials kidnapped. In
some cases even the NAP-affiliated Baloch Students Organisation
(BSO) was reported to have been involved. When the unrest took a
more serious, tum the provincial government requested the central
government's help. It did not take the NAP government long to realise
'that the central authorities were more interested in handling the situation
 BalochEthnicNationalism121

on their own, rather than working under the command of the provincial
administration. Thus, an essentially provincial matter soon turned into a
clash between the centre and the province. The short-sighted central
government, as if already waiting for a situation to undermine the
provincial government, immediately blamed the unrest on the inability
of the provincial administration, and later (in the White Paper) accused
the NAP government of not cooperating with the central authority.
The tribes in revolt had blamed the situation on the partisan actions
of the NAP. The central government followed suit and ctjticised the
NAP administration for having launched a campaign of victimisation.
The irony was that the NAP was trying to expand the writ of the state
authority, but the central government, rather than appreciating its
efforts to bring various tribal areas under control, instead encouraged
those who were threatening the state authority. Ako, without appreci-
ating the NAP government's rather federalist and moderate policies,
the Pakistani establishment resorted to its usual methods of demonis-
ing the NAP by saying that the party was b:tsically anti-Pakistan, as it
had opposed the creation of Pakistan. 33
Manipulating the unrest for its own designs, the central government
did not confine itself to charging the provincial government with exceed-
ing its constitutional authority, but in a well-orchestrated operationgave
the Balochistan problem an international and conspiratorial dimension.
Early in 1973, Pakistani ~uthorities entered the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad
and discovered a cache of300 Soviet submachine guns and 48,000 rounds
of ammunition. While displayingthe arms to diplomats and the media, the
government alleged that they were destined for Balochistan, more than
1,200 kilometres to the south. 34 The elected government of the NAP was
dismissed and governor's rule imposed on the province.
In resistance to the central government's intervention, Baloch
nationalists launched an armed struggle, which soon turned into a
bloody war with the Pakistan military. There were around 55,000
Baloch fighters; including 11,500 organised combatants, fighting
against the over 80,000-strong military force that was called out to quell
the resistance. The conflict lasted, for four years, claiming the lives of
5,300 Baloch guerrillas and 3,300 army men. At the height of the con-
flict, when the Pakistan air force,was indiscriminately bombing Baloch
villages, the United States-supplied Iranian combat helicopters, some
of them also manned by Irani.an pilots, joined in. Iran also provided
US$ 200 million in emergency and financial aid to Pakistan.35 Ironically,
the Pakistani state's brutal use of superior firepower, less than subtle
122 Politicsof Identity

portrayal of ethnic intet;ests as feudal and tribal interests, and attac~ on

the so-called 'feudal relations' antagonised almost every Baloch tribe
and therefore reunited the warring tribal fac;tionsagainst the centre.36
It was only after the fall of the Bhutto government in 1977 that an
uneasy and temporary truce was affected. The military r~gime released
the nationalists who were being tried by the Bhqtto .governn;i.ent.
Although General Zia-ul Haq's emphasis on Islam ai;id Pakistani
nationalism hadi little attra~tion fQr Baloch nationalists, they had
realised that it was not possible for them to achieve their objectives by
fighting the massive and well-~quipped armed forces of Pa~tan.
While Baloch nationalists might hav:e bs:en considering theii; next
moye, political developments in the region took the initiative away,
from them and made the future of the region more dependent 9n,what
was happening across the border in Afghanistan.
In 1978 communist rule was imposed on Afghani&,tan. By the end of
1Q79factional fighting led to the instability of the communist regime, and
Soviet forces entered Afgh\lillstan to help the shaky government. The
Soviet presence in Afghanistan led to unprecedented westerp
milii:arysupplies to the region, through the military.regime of Pakistan.
For the next decade or so the northern frontier regions of Pakistan-the
North West Frontier Province and Balochistan-becarpe an arena for the
combined efforts of the Afghan resistancegroups, Pakistan army and west-
ern defence and intelligence personnel to fight against the Soviet forces.
During that period, due to the strategic importance of Ba(ochi:,t;m,
massive Wester,n aid poured in. In 1982, the military regime launched
a special (,ievelopment programme funded by the US, the European
Economic Commission (EEC), Japan and Arab states.37 The extent of
infrastructural dexelopm(ynt was such that five new airports~ one naval
harbour and three fish,ing harbours we~e built. The objective heh.ind
these projects is well explained by a RAND Corporation Trip Rep,ort,
which, while recommending the US assistance, said that it 'would be
politically less provocative because while it would .have a clear c,1,1t
military utility, it could be disguised as ec;onomic aid.'38
After the fall of the communist n,gime in,Afghanistan.an,d tho col-
lapse of the Soviet U riion itself, Baloch nationalisp; found, ~pemselves
surrounded by hostile forces,in Iran, Afghanistan and 'Paki,stal).The
1973-77 insurgency was a war of political adventurism ra,ther tl].anone
of national tiheration, It.was a spontaneous response to th,e interven-
tion of the central government and the undemocratic dtsrqissal of an
elected provincial government. As one Baloch politician put it, after
 BalochEthnicNationaltsrtl12~

the Pakistani establishment's refusal to accept the will M the people in

East Bengal (Bangladesh) in 1971, the dismissal of die nationalist
government in Balochistan was the second time that the establishment
viplated the principle of representative rule. 39
But the nationalist leadership's reaction was impulsive and lacked a
political strategy. Therefore, the insurgency started as a sporadic revolt
against state authority and gained momentum wlien more and more
tribes joined in, bt had no clear goal to achieve. 'It was clear frotn the
start tp.at Ba,loch nationalism was ,lost irr a bli.qd alley. It wanted space
wjtliin Jhe state, but, launched .f struggle,against tliat state.' 40 It was a
m,is'fortune of the Baloch that their leadership did not take into
account. the intolerance of the Punjabi establishment, especially ~he
Punjabi army's penchant for brutality, which had been graphically
demonstrated only a few years earlier in..Bangladesh. 1'

There is a view in Balochistan that Bhutto was.willing to give in and

reach an agreement wirthe nationalists, but tl].ePunjabi establishment
did not allow him totake that course, as that w.ouldhave meant-con-
cessions to the leader of the-natibnalist party,Wali Khan+ the Pukhturl
nationalist bitterly hated bythe P1,1njabiestablishment in those .days}1
As far as the Pakistan army was concerned, it could not afford yet
another defeat after its humiliation in Bangladesh-even when .the'
Bhutto government decided to pull out the army, the generals resistedi
arging that.after a considerable loss they had better 'clean up'. 42
FOl"two decades (1978-98) Baloch nationalists remained tather clue-
less; some stayed in exile, some in seclusion, some opted for mainstream
politics and some even came to power. If the losses and di'sappointments
of the insurgency have disheartened the raoical nationalists, co-optioriby
t;he state and benefits from the developmental schemes have neutralised
the pragmatic (opportunistic?) ones. One of the, radical nationalists,
Attaullah Mengalt whose government Bhutto had dismissed, was so dis-
enchanted' that.during his self-exile in 1980 he said: 'We can't live in a fed,.
era!ioq becausethe Punjabis,would always dominate us.' 43 But in ,1997
his party supported his son to become the.chief minister of Balochistan.
Mengal continu<;:s'tolive in England and is on<tof the most vocal leaders
of the Pakistan's Oppressed Nationalities Movement (PONM).
Another significant development in the politics of Balochistan during
the last two decades is the split between the Baloch and tp.~Pukhtuns~
Although the process had started with the change of heart of the Pukhtun
nationali~ts of the NWFP w;hen,,their leader, Wali ~an, opted for mo~9
c,qnciiiatory and less confrontati<;malpolitics (see Chapter 5), the split .,.,-
124 Politicsof Identity l!I

between the Baloch and Pukhtuns ofBalochistan took an organised shape

when a Pukhtun leader from Balochistan, Mehmud Khan Achakzai,
formed the Pushtunkhwa Milli Awami (national people's) Party (PMAP)
in 1989. Except for the PMAP's view that 'Pakistan is a Punjabi empire
subjugating other nationalities',44 which is in line with the feelings'Ofthe
Baloch and other nationalists in Pakistan, the demands of the PMAP go
directly against the interests and aspirations of Baldch nationalists. The
PMAP believes that it has three options: (a) Balochistan should be
declared as a two-nation province comprising Baloch and Pukhtuns; or,
(b) a new province for the Pkhtuns ofBalochistan should be established;
or, (c)Pukhtun areas ofBalochistan should be made part of the NWFP.45
After the military coup of 1999, however, the fight against a com-
mbn enemy has once again acquired more urgency than group inter-
ests. The military regime's desperate moves to manage Pakistan's
dwindling economy, for which it seems to believe that the exploration
ofBalochistan's oil and gas resources hold some hope, have once again
radicalised the nationalists in Balochistan. The military ruler, General
Pervez Musharraf, announced in December 1999 that exploration
work would soon be started. 46 Since then Balochistan has experienced
various violent incidents, including th~ murder of a high court judge.
The government believes that these are'the work of elements opposed
to the exploration. One of the radical nationalists, Khair Bux Marri,
who had played an active role in the 1970s insurgency, but has been
living a secluded life for the last two decades, seems to have been chosen
for the role of one such element, and the government has implicated
him in the judge'!nffllrder and put him behind bars.
Press reports suggest that Baloch nationalism is once again becoming
active.47 This may be true for the nationalist elite but not for the majority
of the people ofBalochistan, as is obvious from the results of the October
2002 elections, in which most of the prominent tribal and politicaliead~rs,
who have been dominating the nationalist politics of the province for
years, hav~ failed to win their own seats. Indeed, some of the nationalist
parties have been completely routed, as they did not succeed in winning
a single seat either in the provincial or national assembly.48

usion
What emerges from the history ofBaloch nationalism is that despite its
regional and ethnic self-assertion it has always been more concerned
 BalochEthnicNationalism125

about its political power than about some primordial identity. This is,
true about any nationalism anywhere in the world. It also proves that
seeing nationalism in terms of good and bad'; tribal and modem, civic
and ethnic etc., is riot a very useful tool for understanding the mecha-
nism of nationalism. For a better understanding one needs to go
beyond these facile 'categories. One also needs to remember that
nationalism is not really about identity, culture and traditions (though
that is what the nationalists would like us to believe), but about polit-
ical power. And the ;;tate being the most powerful container of political
power, nationalism is about the state. As showrr above, Baloch nation-
alism has always been directly linked with the state, so it is likely that
its future also deperlds more than anything else on what tum the
Pakistani state takes.

eferences
1. Breuilly, 1993, p. 1.
2. Gellner, 1983, pp. 4, 48.
3. An anonymous referee commented that I do not 'try to put a label on what type of
nationalism the Baloch one is' and that this weak.ens 'the theoretical status of the
paper'. My position is that much of the mystification pf natlonalism is due to the
lab~lling game.
4. Qasir, 1991, p. 26.
5. Wirsing, 1981, p. 4.
6. Harrison, Selig, 1981, p. 16.
7. Hewitt, 1996, p. 50.
8. Swirlier, 1977, p. 91.
9. Siddiqi, 1991, p. 22.
10. Swirlier, 1977, p. 91.
11. Harrison, Selig, 1981, p. 19.
12. Hewitt, 1996, p. 51.
13. Ibid., p. 52; and Ahmed, Aijaz, 1975, p. 21.
14. In this section I have extensively drawn on the seminal work of Russian anthro.pol-
ogist Gankovsky, 1971.
15. Ibid., pp. 203-5.
16.. Gellner, 1983, p. 40.
17. Anderson, 1991.
18. Siddiqi, 1991, pp. 25, 31; Harrison, Selig, 1981, pp. 22-23.
19. Harrison, Selig, 1981, p. 23.
20. Jalal, 1992, p. 275. Jalal claims that the last viceroy, Mountbatten, tried to 'find a
more "democratic" method to determine the future of Balochi (sic) people, if that
was possible.'
21. Harrison, Selig, 1981, pp. 24, 25.
22. Chaudhri, 1973, p. 252.
126Politicsof Identity

23. Sayeed, 1968a, pp. 239,250.

24. Feldman, 1?72, p. 203.
25. Harrison, Selig, 1981, pp. 27-28.
26. Noman, '1990, pp. 64-65.
27. Akbar Khan Bugti, the chief of the Bugti tribe and former governor and chief
minister of Balochistan, while commenting on the regional disparity recounted an
;interesting anecdote to me in 1997 in Quetta. He said: 'In 1948 when I was at the
civil services academy, there was only one Bengali out of over two dozen CSP (Civil
Service of Pakistan) candidates. When I visited East Pakistan in Feb~ary 1971,just
before the army action (that led to the creation of Bangladesh) I met that same
Bengali who was then a senior civil servant. When he embraced me-he said with tears
in his eyes: "You remember, I was the only Bengali at the academy. Andhere we see
the result of that."'
28. WhitePaperon Baluchistan(Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974), pp. 9, 10.
29. Sayeed, 1980, pp. 115---16.Senator'Abdul Hayee Baloch, leader of the Balochistan
National Movement (BNM), also pointed out to me in 1997 that the Shah of Iran
was one of the most important factors in the Balochistan crisis.
30. White Paper, p. 15.
31. Ibid., p. 32.
32. Harrison, Selig, 1981, p. 116.
33. White Paper, p. 14.
34. Iraq denied any involvemet'lt, claiming that it was an act of the anti-Saddam Hussain
plotters. The Iraqi diplomat, from whose house t~e arms were discovered, had dis-
appeared three cl,ays before the operation and was exei;uted by the Iraqi
government"'at'ter a few months tor an attempted coup. Many journaiis~ in Pakistan
agreed with the Iraqi version and believed that the Iraqi diplomat had collaborated
with Iranian and Pakistani intelligence for the drama. See Harrison, Selig,' 1981,
p. 35 fn.
35. Harrison, Selig, 1996, p. 298 and 1981, p. 36.
36. Hewitt, 1996, p. 59.
37. Noman, 1990, p::202.
38. Cited in ibid., pp. 202-3.
39. Abdul Hayee Baloch, interview with author, Quetta, 1997.
40. IA Rehman, interview with author, Lahore, 1997.
41. Tahir Mohammad Khan, who was minister of information in Bhutto'~ cabinet,
expressed this view in an interview with me in 1997 in Quetta.
42. Abdul Hayee B1loch, interview.
43. Cited in Harrison, Selig, 1981, p. 66.
44. Mehmud Khan Achakzai, interview with author, Quetta, 1997.
45. Ibid.
46. The following details are from Haroon Rashid's reports in the monthly Herald,
Karachi, November and December 2000.
47. Herald,Karachi, August 2000, pp. 44-45.
48. Daily Dawn, Karachi, 11 9ctober 2002.
 7
Sihdhi
. 'EthnicNationalism:
.,
Migrationand Marginalisation

t t
In systems where ~cribed' cultural diffei:;ecfSrationalise structures
of inequality, ethnicity t;ikes on a cogent e:i;cist<;ntial
reality.
-John &Je'an Comaroffk

It' is a measure of the political system of,Pakistatl that Sindh is' the
most developed 'provinceof the country, w'hile its indigenous people
are; after the, Baloch, the most marginalised. 1ri rio other region of
Pakistarl is the divide between urban prosperity' and rural 'deprivation
as \Vide as it h in Sindh. 'Dtieto the concentration of commetc:e and
industry in its, capital, city,'Karachi, Sindh has die highest per 'capita
income ih Pakistan but its rural inhabitants are among the poorest in
the country.2 l
Such a striking disparity has made Sitldh the hbtbed of variouskinds
of nationalism, ranging trom separatists and right-wing autonomists to
socialist intellectuals and left-wing p1asant groups. An intere~ting
characteristic of Sindhi politics, however, is that since the first free
national elections in 1970, Siitdpis have,ovefwhelmingly been voting
for the federalist Pakistan People's Party, founded by Sindhi politician
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and now Jed by his daughter Benazir Bhutto.
This chapter examines the ethnic , nationalism., qf tl;i,ein9igenous
Sindhis, whoare'predominantly rural-based.,J'qe main thrust of the
argument here, as in preyious chapters, is that nation?Jjsm is the prod-
uct' of and a response to ,the interventionist nature of the 1modem
bureaucratic state. Although,identity, cultur~, industriali~;ition, print
capitalism and 'class.doplay a r,ole,it is only an auxiliary one, a response
to the treatment these categories ge! from tl}.estate.
,
,,,-
128Politicsof Identity MMi AUi

ral Region
The social and political landscape of Sindh has traditionally been
characterised by isolation from the power centres, repressive feudalism,
the stranglehold of the pirs (religious guides), and exploitation by the
settlers. Due to its geographical location, Sindh was a peripheral region
for the invaders from the north as well as for the rulers in Delhi.
Although the first Muslim invaders (AD711-712) had landed in Sindh
from the Middle East, the subsequent invasions were all from the north.
The most long-lasting Muslim rulers of India, the Mughals, who had
come from Central Asia, chose Lahore and Delhi as the centres of their
empire. At the peak of their rule, the Mughals tried to impose a revenue
system throughout India, but Sinqhi clans resisted the central state's
attempts and rebelled against its heavy revenue demands, and the system
could therefore not be applied in its entirety.3 Hence, the political and
socio-economic structure that developed in Sindh was different from
the northern regions of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.
In 1843, when the British took over Sindh (and four years later made
it part of the Bombay Presidency), the autonomous status ofSindh came
to an end, but the power and prestige of the local elite wasleft intac~ for
political and administrative reasons. Gra,dually, however, the modem
state apparatus started to intervene 'all.clthis brought ~bout some signifi-
cant changes in the local power relations and economic structure. But
due to its different histqrical experience, the mod~~ history of Sindh
has taken a shape quite distinct from other regions of Pakistan.

udalismin Sindh
In Chapter 3, on the colonial state in India, we have noted that the colo-
mar officials had difficulty identifying the owners of, land; there were no
individual. owners, b~cause the pre-colonial state itself was the supreme
landlord. The situation in Sindh was quite different from the Test oflndia.
Here, the colonial officials did not face much difficulty in finding the
owners ofland, for in Sindh, by the time of the colonial takeover, power-
ful individuals had already become the de facto owners ofland during the
Talpur rule (1782-1843) and had established one of the most repressive
feudal systems in the Indian subcontinent. As one colonial official said:
'There is no trace of anything like right of cultivators, or any right except
 lililrn SinclhiEthnicNationalism129

that of the Zamindar.'4 Therefore, Sindh had developed more into a

fiefdom of the local elite rather than a part of the central power. This did
Q.Otchange under colonialism, because no uniform agrarian policy was
applied to all regions-it varied according to the particular conditions of a
regi9n and the influence and power of the local elite.
' For instance, in n\any parts of India, Muslim landholdings were
m:ide 'subject to critical scrutiny, detailed itlquisition and frequent
resumption and commutation to pension', and the lancl was used for
buying'loyalty to the administration. 5 But in Sindh, such interference
witli the Muslim estates was avoided by the state, which treated the
landholders 'as "the aristocracy of Sind" and despite reservations con-
firmed 'them in their incomes and privileges.'6 Consequently, waderos
(landlords) and pirs not only continued with somF of the largest land-
holdings in India but also became legal owners of that land. The inter-
ventionist colonial state ha~ imposed its authority on the region but
continued to treat it as an outpost of the Bombay Presidency. '.fhe eco-
nomic and social discrepancies that existed between Sindh and the rest
of the Presidency remained as wide as ever before. The gap between
the rest of the Presidency and Sindh wa~ all the more conspicuous,
-because the former was ohe of the hiost prosperous regions of India
whereas, the latter was bne of the most pauperis~d.
Despi'te colonial interest in developing Karachi as a port city, the rest
ofSindh remained isolated across its mountains, deserts, salt flats and
swamps, as 'a backwater, out of touch with the rest of the Presidency
and out of sympathy with it.' 7 Thougl\ administratively 'part of the
Presidency, its legal and governmental system remained different.
Most of the Bombay legislative Council enactments did not apply to
Sindh, which was ruled under a separate system of government and an
almost irl.dependentjudicial system. 8
Such duality of policy was a logical outcom!! of tpe main objectives
of colonial rule: a system that aimed at gaining maximum control and
profit with minimum change in 'the status quo; a system that judi-
ciously exploited the productive sector, while consciously neglecting
the social services sec5or. The state tried to change the economic and
political structures of so'ciety according to its own requirements for
profit, while restricting corresponding change in the social sector to
the minimum. This objective was achieved by selective intervention,
uneven development and discriminatory policies, all unde,r the guise of
the much-glorified 'rule 'of law'. The effects of this system on Sindhi
society were alarming.
130Politicsof Identity SF

Hinterland
Prior to colonialism, the rulers ofSindh, especially the Talpur Mirs, were
more interested in game than in agriculture. Therefore_during their reign
large tracts of fertile land were converted into hunting grounds. 9 Contrary
to this, the colonialists r~garded Sindh as an 'irrigation provi,nce' which
could, like Punjab, be developed into a fertile and lucrative agricultural
region. They brought the existing inundation canals under the manage-
ment of the Public Works Department, and elaborate surveys were !hen
conducted to estimate the pot~ntial irrigability of the land and to convert
the inundation canals into perennial systems so that agriculturF was pot
dependent on rain alone. 10 By the twentieth century, Sindh came to,be
classified alongside Punjab, the United Provinces and Madras, ~ a
province with the best prospects for investment. 11 With the opening of
the Sukkm; Barrage Scheme i9 1932, an ~dditional 7 million acres came
under cultiva.tion,and by the time of partition in 1947, Sindh had become
'a surplus province to the tune of some 500 million rupees.' 12
But the economic benefits ofboomin~ agriculture in Sindh did not
improve th\! life of ~he local population, as the province was relegated
to the status of agricultural hinterlanq, providing 'food grains to the
deficit regions of India and raw. cotton to the textile mills of Bombay,
Ahmedabad as well as in England.' 13 Moreover, the irrigation system,
which was geared to enlarge the,rev1:;nue base and to increase produc-
tion, was used for extensive rather than intensive cultivation, which
precluded the possibility of any structural chan~e. 14 But th,e pressures of
market economy, which forced cultivators to produce cash crops on a
large scale, in any case changea' the rural iand;cape by devaluing the
'self-sufficiency' of rural life and making it increasingly de.pendent on
urban centres. As a result, a redefinition of the ha.lance of, power
between urban and rural sectors, as well as a sea change in the structure
of power relations between various social classes, was unavoidable.
During the last ~o decades of the nineteenth century, only 1.4 per
cent of the Muslims (who accounted for 78 per cent ofSindh's popu-
lation) were literate. 15 The illJ.mense poverty of the Mus'lims, the stran-
glehold of the oppressive feudal system, the lack of education facilities,
al).dthe high cost of whatever edqcational institutions were available-
all worked agaipst the 'luxury' of educ;ition.
Traditionally, government service in Sindh had been the exclusive
prerogative of Hindus and had been avoided by the predominantly rural
 SindhiEthnicNationalism131

Sindhi Muslims. 16 But under the new circumstances, when India was
virtually run by the district officers, and each one of them was' the 'mother
and father' of the area, 17 state employment had become the source of
power, prestige and influence, and therefore sought after by the rich and
poor alike. The low level ofliteracy among the Sindhi Muslims, however,
severely restricted their entry into the state employment sector. In 1895
there was no Muslim magistfate in Sindh, and in 1917 the Hindu share
in the higher ranks of the judiciary was as high as 80 per cent. 18 Eve~ as
late as 1947, there was only one Muslim official in the Sindh secretariat. 19
During the last decades of the nineteenth ~entury, when India was pass-
ing' thrdugh a grim period of economic depression caused by growing
population, state policies that had led to increased landless labour and
greater indebtedness arnong the peasants, and natural disasters like famine,
Sindh had its own share of economic hardships and rural indebtedn~s.
The burden of the land revenue imposed by the British forced 'the rural
community to ,borrow more than ever before~from the Hihdu moneylen-
ders, the banias,in order td be able to pay taxes to the government. The
indebtedness of the rural Muslims was so widespread that by 1936 barely
13 per cent of them could manage to stay free from it.~ Many who could
n~t pay their debts had to' lose their land, for under British law the credi-
tors were allowed to cl;i.argeunlimited interest, and if the debtors were
unable to,pay, tHeir property could be taken over by the moneylenders. 21
Also, when land had become an alienable resolirce, which required
neither force nor local influence to retain, but only a legal procedure,
the Hindu moneylenders became increasingly interested in it. Prior to
colonial rule, the Muslim rulers did not allow Hindus to acquire lail.d
and therefore only a handful of them;.had lan'd, but by the beginning
of the twentieth century almost half the cultivabie land in Sindhi i.e.,
ov~r 3 millioniacres, was in their poss~ssioh. 22

ri Politics
All .these [,actors, contributed to the shapi1,1gof the future course of
Sindhi politics, especially the post-partition politics of regional and
ethnic nationalism. It is important to note here that the gro~ng inter,.
est, of the Sindhi elite in modern politics musf not be seen as a .reactjon
to colonial rule-that is only the hationalists' rhetoric, iilld ther~fore
not only a fragile tool for analysis but a misleading one. For an analy-
sis of the rise of Sindhi politics calling for Sindhi rights, one needs to
 132 Politicsof Identity 1111 PIIB

ask this question: Sindh was made part of the Bombay Presidency
more than half a century ago, then why was it that the Sindhi elite
became active in politics only in the early twentieth century? 23 Here I
will identify some of the factors that encouraged the Sindhi elite to
take up politics as a vocation.
There were two important factors: (a) the emergence of new social
classes and interest groups; and (b) the colonial administration's polit-
ical and administrative reforms. If the first factor was the result of the
introduction of the modem bureaucratic state and its market economy,
the second was the state's response to the emergent situation. At the
beginning of the twentieth century there were five discernible social
groups in Sindh: the traditional Sindhi landlords, the waderosand pirs;
cultivator landowners; Hindu absentee landlords, moneylenders and
traders; state employees; and landless tenants/labourers.
As noted above, the class of waderosand pirs continued to dominate
rural life in Sindh even after the colonial takeover. They had suffered
the least from the economic hardships of the province. The Hindu
baniasand absentee landlorps were the beneficiaries of the new system.
The two groups that were adversely affected by the new system were
the cultivator proprietors, who were burdened by the land rev~nue
which led to their indebtedness, and the landless tenants/lahour,ers
who were the creation of the feudal system that made legal distinction
between the, landowners and the landless and turned the latter into
haple;s serfs. The Hindu traders and the state employ~es' position had
become precarious due to the increasing competition in trade, and the
job market.
Small wonder then that the demand for the separation ofSindh from
the Bombay Presidency was first made in 1913 by a Karachi-based
Hindu trader-politician, Harchandra Vishindas. His call was couched in
the usual nationalistic jargon of 'Sindh's distinctive cultural and geo-
graphical character'\ but in actual terms it was the voice of the compar-
atively fragile commercial class of Sindh that felt threatened bx the
more prosperous B.ombay traders. 24 Vishindas was soon joined by a
Sindhi Muslim politi,cian, Ghulam Mohammad Bhurgri who, t~ough
originally a wadero,was a successful London-educated lawyer repre-
s~nting Muslim urban interests. 25
It was not a coincidence that only a few years earlier, in 1909, the
colonial administration, faced with the growing radicalisation of the
nationalist forces, had adopted a strategy 'to encourage provincial
ambitions, and particularly Muslim provincial ambitions, to offset
 lifj/ iiil SindhiEt~micNationalism133

challenges to its authority at the centre.' 26 The Morley-Minto Reforms

introduced an elected element to the provincial councils and, for
the first time, provincial grievances could be voiced and provincial
governments confronted with these grievances.27 With the official
blessings, Sindhi waderosand pirs too became active participants in
provincial politics.

of Sindh
In l 936, Sindh was separated from the Bombay Presidency and
accorded the status of a province. The campaigq for the separation of
Sindh was based on the belief that Sindh had lost its distinct identity
under the Presidency, but the underlying reason was the stepll}otherly
treatment that Sindh was subjected to by the Presidency administra-
tlon. The fact that Hindus had a majority in the Presidency'and Sindhi
Hindus had grown more prosperous during that period had helped to
create a communal wedge between Hindus and Muslims. After the
separation, communal feelings dtd not .disappear altogether; but
undoubtedly lost their intensity because Muslims enjoyed -a solid
majority in the province and therefore had little reason to worry about
the dominance of a Hindu minority, though a prosperous and influen-
tial one. It was also'the Muslim majority status of Sindh which shaped
its attitude towards the politics .of the Muslim League.
Sindhi politics during the decade before partition were marred by
interpersonal and factional squabbling between the waderos,but soon
they' had to decide on whether or not Sindh .should become part of
Pakistan.,Within a few month& after the separation of Sindh, a non-
communal party, the Sindh Ittehad Party, was formed on the pattern of
Punjab's Unionist party, with the sole objective of protectii;.igthe inter-
ests of .the Sindhi rural elite, both Muslim and Hindu. The following
year, in the 1937 elections, the party won 1:helargest number of seats.28
Till that time the Muslim League was virtually,hon-existent in Sindh
and could not win even a single seat there.

r Pakistan
In the decade before partition Siiidh was a politically unstable province
where ,the making and .breaking of governments and ministries had
134 Politicsof Identity

become a routine. A colonial official very rightly summed up the situation

when he said, 'There are really only two parties in Sind, those who are in
and those who are out, and the main question is how those who are out
can get in. '29 The details of the intrigues, corruption and opportunism of
the Sindhi politicians makes inter~sting reading and are part of almost
every study dealing with the Muslim politics of that period, but such
anecdotes do not explain the growing communalisation of Sindhi pdlitics
and the support for Pakistan.
The task of exploring the Sindhis' aspirations becomes ,all the more
difficult when one realises that Sindhi Muslims consisted of mainly
two classes, the waderosand the haris (landless tenants/labourers); the
middle classes were numerically insignificant ..According to the 1931
Census oflndia, 81.1 per Cent ofSlndhis were haris,7.5 per centculti-
vating proprietors and 11.4 per cent non-cultivating proprietors. 3Q
More than 80 per cent of the cultivated land was in the control of a few
thousand absentee landlords. 31
What had made matters worse was tl}.atthe hariswere virtual 'Slaves
with rlo freedom of opinion or action. The note of dissent by a mem-
ber of the Government ,Hari Enquiry Committee in 1947 illustrates
the conditions of the harisquite well: '

The hari, who .has cultivated a piece of land for several' genera-
..., ....
tions, does' not know how long he will be allowed to stay on it.
Fear reigns supremein the life of the hari-fear of imprisonment,
fear oflosing his land, wife or life .... He miglit have to leave his
crop half ripe, his cattle might also be snatched and .he might be
beaten put of tlie ;village. He might suadenly find himself.in the,
fetters pf police und~r an enquiry for theft, robbery'or fnurder .. . 1
As soon as the Zamindar appears on the fields the.hart and' his
children go and bow before him till, they touch his feet,, then rise
up to kiss his hari8'. A good-looking wife is a constant source of
,danger even to his life. The hari is asked to surrender her and he
is subjetted 1:0 intimidation, threat or coercion. If he does not
yield, the wife is kidnapped or he is sent behind the bars in a false
criminal case and the wife left alone is compelled to live with the
Zamindar. 32

Yet another source of repression was the pirs, who were not only sdme
of the largest landlords but also, as religious guides and messiahs, held
sway over the spiritual life ofSindhis: Such almost totaJ.control,over"the
 Sindhi Et~nicNationalism135

temporal and spiritual beings of the majority of Sindhi Muslims,

coupled with the lack of communication and education facilities~made
it very .diffis;ultto know theit real desires 'and preferences. ;;r'he19.c43-44
annual report of the Muslim League aptly described.the situation when
it saiq: '... we should require years to create 1>oliticalconsciousness
ampng the Muslim-masses of the-province, where on account oflorig
distances, scattered villages, illiteracy, and local influences, it i's rather
difficult to easily approacl:1the people.' 33 Under the circt\ffistances,
what we are left with is the politics and preferences of a handful of
waderosand pirs.
Despite their less than issue-oriented politics, however, there is
ample eidence that the Sindhi elite desired to maintain the
autonomous status ofSindH, and tliat therefore any plan or politics that
w6uld jeopardise this objective was unacc,eptable to them. The bitter-
memory of the Presidency period was fresh enough to put them on
their guard~against-anyalliance that would tum Sindh into an insignif-
icant unit.irr the-fort.Ire administrative arrangement of the Indian sub-
continent. But the problem was that in the 194Qsthere were only two
political forces, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.
In order to have a say in the politics of the day, Sindhis had to choose
between the two.
The pitfalls of an alliance with the Congress were many. 'the
Congre~s' ,raqical anti-imperialism and confrontationli}politics did:p.ot
suit the interests of the Sindhi eltte; the dominance of the Hindu
minority over the economic and administrative sectors uf Sindll
remained an unhappy feature and from the Sindhi Muslims' point of
view could become even worse in the wake of -a Hindu-dominated
Congress hile., Fur,:hermore,.,at least two of the Congress' professed
objectives looked ominously threatening to the interests of the Sindhi
elite<:(a) The Congress' promise of land reforms, which the Sindhi
elite, who inchldetl some of the largest lahdownei:s ofindia; did hot like
eventobementioned, leave alone implemented, and (b) The Congress'
plan for a strong centre which did not allow much:autonomy to the
provinces. Yet another aspect of the Congress that might have made it
an unattractive proposition was,.itspolitics of mass mobilisatibn. Sindhi
wadero.Y. abhorred the idea of any contact with the- haris,as that might
have led to the awakening of their political consciousness. and to the!
weakening qf the wnderos' control.
On the other hand, the Muslim League'selitist and communalist
politics was more palatable to the Sindhi elite's taste and more suited to
136 Politicsof Identity Miliidiiii

their interests. As the recipients of official honours and titles, the Sindhi
Muslim elite felt more comfortable with the Muslim League's so-called
'constitutional' rather than confrontational politics,.Also appealing was
the Muslim League's demand for autonomous Muslim sta~es within
the Indian union. Therefore, in 1943, the Muslim League members
in the Sindh Assembly passed a resolution demanding 'independent
national states', on the basis that 'no constitution shall be acceptable ...
that will place Muslims under a Central Government dominated by
another nation. '34
This did not mean that Sindhi politicians were in favour of the
Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. One of the most influential
Muslim League politicians, Ghulam Hussain, was 'an outspoken enemy
of the Lahore resolution (later called Pakistan Resolution)' and 'all
against Pakistan', and believed that even Jinnah himself did not have his
:heart in the proposal at all.'35 For the Sindhi elite the situation was one
of being placed between the devil and, the deep blue sea. They feared
Hindu domination under Congress rule and Punjabi dpmination in the
case of Pakistan. In any case, in the end Sindh opted for Pakistan.

dhi Nationalism
A Sihdhi nationalist, Allah Bux Soomro, who was a staunch opponent
of Pakistan and was killed before partition, is reported to have said to
G.M. Sayed, a separatist Sindhi nationalist who had once supported
Pakistan: ~

You will get, to know that our difficulties will -begin after Pakistan
has come into being . .'.. At present the Hindu trader and money,
lender's plunder.is worrying you but later yottwill have'to face
the Punjabi bureaucracy and soldiery and the mind of UP. ... After
the creation of this aberration [Pakistan] you will have'to struggle
to fight its concomitant evils.36

Froqi the Sindhi point of view, it was a prophetic warning. Soon after
pa,rtition-Sindhis realised that Pakistan did not mean independence
for them, but a domination of another kind, in fact of a' rather worse
kind. They had to face, as Allah Bux had warned, the Punjabi bureau-
cracy and military and the mindset of the UPite Muslim migrants-, the
Mohajirs. Soon Sindh would lose the regional identity that it had
 SindhiEthnicNationalism137

regained after its separation from the Bombay Presidency and see its
language, Sindhi, being replaced by the north Indian Mohajirf lan-
guage, Urdu, something that had not happened even during colonial
rule-. It is not surprising then that most Sindhis believe that for them
the most repressive form of colonialism started after the creation of
Pakistan. 37 Unfortunately, the events, the facts and the figures that will
be presented in the following sectiorr graphically substantiate this
belie
One important point, which needs to be noted while analysing the
creation of Pakistan and the politics of ethnicity there, is that national
identity is a complex process of interacting and intermingling identi-
ties and interests. Any effort aimed at building such an identity on the
basis of a single religious, linguistic, regional or ethnic identity is
bound to be a tenuous one unless the importance of these. multiple
identities is well recognized, because various identities surface at dif-
ferent points in time tinder myriad political, social, economic and
cultural pressures.
During the years leading to partition, Muslims had become conscious
of their religious identity because they perceived Hindu-majority rule
to be the main. threat in the wak~.of independence. But soon after par-
tition, regional, ethnic and linguistic identities that lay dormant among
the Muslims were bound to surface- once the perceived threat to their
religious identity had disappeared,, they had to determine their place
within tlre Muslim community 6n the basis of other identities which
were no less important. That was a natural thing to happen ,in a multi ..
ethnic state like Pakistan. In fact, there did exist the potential for these
identities to be quite explosivebecause colonial rule had led to an uneven
development that had created extreme inequalities between regions,
ethnic groups and linguistics entities.
A measure of sensitivity on the part of the early managers of Pakistan
might have diffused the situation and channelled it in a direction that
could le:td to the identification of commonalities rather than differ-
errces, but that was not to be part of Pakistan's fortunes.,(:)n the con'-
trary, the founders of P.akistanproved to be more.osensitivetowards the
denial' of any expressions of difference, grievances regarding inequa1i-
ties and-demands for a fair share rather than towards their acceptance
and resolution.
As described above, Sindhwas one the JilOStimpoverished provinces
of Pakistan despite being ;m agriculturally surplus region. Its capital;
Karachi, had however by this time become an important commercial
 138 Politicsof Identity IIMW:\\>:Nliil

and industrial port city. Due to its infra-structural capacity and also,
perhaps, on account ofbeing the birthplace of the founder of Pakistan,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Karachi was selected as the capital of the p.ew
state. As a prosperous and promising town that had also become the
capital, Karachi attracted the bulk of the Urdu-speaking .Muslim
refugees from India. These two developments were initially welcomed
by Sindhis, who had little clue that both were going to be a bane rather
than a boon.

f Refugees
The partition ofBritish India led to the biggest cross-border migration
in recorded history. Around 17 million people moved ih opposite
oirections across the newly established border between Jndia and
Pakistan.38 Naturally, it was a daunting problem for the administration
of the nascent state of Pakistan. But the pto~ess of rehabilitation of
refugees in itself is not the issue here. The main question here is to
explore why Sindh, one of the more peaceful provinces that was c;om-
paratively less affected by. communalism, had to suffer the most ftom
the influx ofrefugees.
There were, many political, economic and cultural reasons for the
Sindhi -response to the refugee problem, and all have left an indelible
mark on the ethnic interaction within the provinc~-the relations
between Sindhis and other ethnic groups of Pakistan, -especially
Punjabis and Mohajifs.._and, 0 course, betwet;n the province and the
central government.
The initial sympathetic Sindhi response to the refugees;did not ttim
into opposition and antagonismfor reasons of provincial partictJlarlsm,
of which Sindhis have been accused by the Punjabi-Mohaji.r domi-
nated Pakistani establishment. 39 The economic dow.nslide,.the social
,upheaval, the deteriorating law and order situation, the, fea.rof being
swarbped by, outsiders and the Pakistani state's less than_,sympathetic
.response to Sindh's grievances-all these were verysolid reasons.for
the growth of ethnic nationalism.
After the initial influx of refugees, it became obvious to Sindhis that
, for theiv it'was not going to be just a matter of welcoming their
Muslim brethren. The whole process was going to change their life for
 IIMH:h2 SindhiEthnicNationalism139

the worse~ The reason was simple: the incoming Muslim refugees
were. destitute, 'while the outgoing Hindus were those prosperous
people who had been managing economic and-commercial life in Sindh.
Another problem was that the number 0 incpming refugees was too
large to manage and therefore led to social disorder in a comparatively
peaceful province. Sindhis also believed that the Muslim refugees were
responsible for the communal violence. that-had led to the lar&e-scale
Hindu exodus.
For those .Sindliis who dreamt of replacing the outgoing' Hindus
there was'no consolation'in the fact that most of the skill~djobs were
being taken up by the Muslim refugees, who were more qualified and
skilled: For Sindhi harisit was disheartening to see that the land ther
had tilled for Hindus was being awarded to the Muslim refugees rather
than given to them. 40 Yet another disturbing .thought was that the
H'ntdus, de~pite being believers in a differe'nt religion, sl}ared a com-
mon language and culture with Sindhi Muslims, whereas the Muslim
refugees (Mohajirs) shared a religious belief'wit~ ,the Sindhis 'but
nothing else-the language, culture and, social and historical experi-
ences df the Mohajirs, a majority of whom were north Indian Urdu-
speakers, had little in common with Sindhis.
Sindhis, in fact, soon realised that most ofthe Mohajirs,considered
them:,elves to be the desc,endants of Muslim rulers, and due to the
United Provinces' proximity to the centres of power and ,their e-arly
exposure to modernisation, looked down upon Sindhi culture as
'feudal, primitive and bac~ard'. The fact was that communal,Muslim
politics had started in the tJnited Provincesand the Muslim League
that'had created Pakistan,was founded by tlre UPites,iwhereas the
Muslims belonging to the,majority provinces that had now fonned
Pakistan were only late <:ntrantsto this process. 'fhis,Ied the,Mohajirs
to pr'e'!mme-thatthey were the 'real founders' ofRakistan and tlrerefore
it1Jelongt:d to them as much as (inot more) than to the indigenous
people of Pakistan. The Mohajirs had an air of arrogance about 'beihg
th(ue 'not by kind invitation but by, right' .41
1 In thefacei of Sindhis' social, economic, cultur.al and psychological
quandary the,new state's' actions-were, to'put it mildly, less than a con-
solation. Indeed, the insensitive and authoritarian attitude of the state
only<n1bbed salt in the wounds ofSinclhis. As a majoFityof Mohajirs
opted .for settling in the major towns, Karachi ended up with, the
largest number. Before Sindhis would lose their capital city to
140Politicsof Identity I 1 'IN!

Mohajirs, however, the central government had come up with a plan

to separate it from Sindh and turn it into a federally administered area.
This implied huge financial losses for Sindh because Karachi was the
major commercial and industrial centre, not only of Sindh but also of
Pakistan.
Although Sindh had a Muslim League ministry at the time, the
provincial governinent could not successfully resist the centre's deci-
sion, which it believed to be harmful for the province's interests.
Governor General M.A. Jinnah's response to the Sindh Muslim
League's opposition was that 'he would hold the Sindh ministers to
their promise.' 42 The initial promise, however, was not about the-sep-
aration of Karachi from Sindh, but about making the city Pal6stan's
capital and providing accommodation and other facilities to the
government. A delegation of the Sindh Muslim League called upoh
Jinnah to apprise him of the unanimous opposition of Chief Minister
Ayub Khuhro, his cabinet and the provincial League to the plan. But
Jinnah angrily refused to 'budge and instead told his party men that
Pakistan was his creation and the Muslim League was 'nothing but a
mob ... [that] had played no part in it', 43 and ordered them to make all
the necessary arrangements. When the orders were not followed,
Jinnah, in a swift, severe and scandalous manner, retaliated by advising
the governdr to dismiss Chief Minister Ayub Khuhro on charges of
corruption and malad,ministration
In May 1948, when the constituent assembly, after a heated debate,
resolveo44 to turn Karachi into a centrally ad~inistered area, Sindhi
politicians protested that their province was being 'beheaded' and the
Sindh Muslim League Council adopted a resolution censuring the
l:lecisionfor creating a 'grave and;deplorable' situation. 45 Turning adeaf
ear to the protest, Jinnah urged the Sindhis to accept 'willingly and
gracefully' the decision of the 'the highest and supreme body in
Pakistan', and on 23 July 1948, Karachi was placed under the control
.9f the central administration. 46
At the time Sindh was under severe economic stress caused bythe
departure of the pr,osperous Hindus, the arrival of a large number of
destitute Mohajirs and '1evastating floods. The situation was exacer-
bated by the loss of Karachi, which was a majo, source of Sindh's
revenue. The central government had promised to paycompensa-
. tion, but what it paid was little. more than a brutal joke: for an esti-
mated loss of around 600 to 800 million rupees; Sindh was paid only
6 million. 47
 SindhiEthnicNationalism141

The centre's interference in Sindh's affairs did not stop there-

more draconian actions were yet to come. The reason for the dismissal
of Khuhro government was not only Khurhro's opposition to the
separation of Karachi but also his refusal to take more refugees.from
Punjab. The ouster of Khuhro, however, did not end the widespre:\d
opposition to the further inflow of refugees. To muzzle that' opposi-
tion, in August 1948 the governor general issut;d a proclamation under
Section 102 of the Government of India Act 1935, and declared a state
of emergency on the grounds that the 'economic life of Pakistan is
threatened by the circumstances arising out of the mass movement of
population from and into Pakistan.' 48 Even more refugees from Punjab
were forced on Sindh.
While being tried on charges of corruption and maladministration,
Khuhro continued to enjoy majority.support in the Sindh assembly. In
December 1948, the Sindh Muslim League elected him as its president.
The central government was at its wits' end in dealing with this embar-
rassi11gsituation. An undemocratic action that could not be justified
through a democratic process required further high-handed action.
Hence, to deal with the 'anomalous situation', as the main architect of
the Act, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali,49 put it, the constituent assembly
passed the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act
(PRODA)'. The purpose of this act was to give the governof
generaVgovernor the arbitrary powers (whichdidnot require hipl td
consult his ministers) to disqualify, through 'highly ,abnormal opera-
tions', those politicians who 'incurred the displeasure of the central
government.' 50
When the court declared the appointment of Jinnah's handpicked
chief minister, Pir Illab,i Bux, illegal, an unelected politician, usuf
Haroon, was given the job. 51 But the unhappy province did not prove
to be an easy game, and after some time governor's rule was imposed,
placing Sindh under the direct control of the central ,government.
Commenting,on the situation, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, one of the
most influential government officials, who' would sdon become
Pakistan's prime minister, complained that 'Sind politics reverted to
the old pattern of strife among the ministers and constantly shifting
loyalties among the members .of the assembly.' 52 A degree of fair-
mindedness on his part might well have enabled him to add that
the Pakistan government itself had adopted the old pattern of colo-
nial coercion, control and imperious tactics. in dealing with the
provinces.
142 Politicsof Identity ilEIIH\s.Ui

it Scheme

One ot' the most damning acts of the Pakistan government to under-
mine the regional identities of various ethnic groups was the imposi-
tion of the One Unit Scheme on the four provinces of West Pakistan.
The idea of amalgamating the four provinces into one unit might have
been as old as Pakistan itself; because the state had come into existence
with an anomalous power arrangement-Bengalis formed the major-
ity of Pakistan's population, but state power was in the hands of the
Punjabi-Mohajir axis. In any representative dispensation Bengalis
could overturn that arrangement. The ruling elite had no intention of
allowing such an opportun,ity.
Due to the Bengali majority in the constituent assembly, the issue of
One Unit was never discussed there during its seven-year existence.
When the proposal was put before the Muslim League parliamentary
party it was defeated by 32 to 2 votes.53 But that did not stop the
Punjabi-Mohajir-dominated establishment from pushing through a
proposal which they had begun to articulate soon after Pakistan's
creation on the basis of'admini~trative efficiency, greater economy and
as a foil against provincialism.' 54 The general opposition to the plan was
based oI1 two considerations: that it was an attempt td obs'truct die
Bengali majority and create a semblance of parity between the two
unequal y.rings,and that'the intention and the methods adopted aS'well
as the content of the scheme itself were arbitrary and in violation of
democratic norms. 55
This \\7as the first serious blow to whatever little political process
tqere was 1uPakistan, for the implementation of the One Unit Scheme
had necessitated the dissolution of an unwilling constituent assembly
on 4 October 1954, followed by the ,dismissals of provincial govern-
ments opposed to the scheme and their replacement by pliable ones. 56
On 27 March 1955 the governor general amended the Government of
India Act 1935,through an ordinance that empowered him to create
the province of West Pakistan, comprising Punjab, Sindh, the North
West Frontier Province and Balochistan.
Sindhi reaction to the plan wasresounding and unequivocal. They
saw the plan as an attempt to es4blish Punjabi domination over the
~maller provinq:s and. to negate their regional autonomy and ethnic
identity. The Sindh chief minister, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, was sup-
ported by 74 of the 110 Sindh assembly members in his opposition,to
 '
El SindhiEthnicNationalism143

the plan, but that did not impress the.central government. 57 Instead the
elected chiefminister was dismissed ano replaced by the unelected
Ayub Khuhro, who had been disqualified under PRODA, barring him
from holding public office for seven years.
Punjab was the only provinceto benefitfron1 the new arrange-
ment at the expense of the smaller provinces. Sindh, probably, would
bear the heaviest burden. During Pirzada Abdus Sattar's chief minis-
tership, the Sirtdh government's agend'a included the demand for .the
return of Karachi, resistance to Sindhi land being awarded to civil
and m,ilitary personnel, building' of irrigation works, and promotion
of Sindhi culture and literature. 58 After the implementation of the
One Unit Scheme~ all Sindh-oriented policies were shelved and
resources were channelled to tnational' projects. Under th~
Pl\Iljabi-Mohajir bureaucrats, rural Sindh was ignored and Rs 330
million from Sindh were diverted to counterbalance Punjab's 1 billion
rupee deficit. Of the Rs 2,000 million that the Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporatiort, allocated for development schemes,
Sindh received only Rs 200 million. The promotion of Urdu as a
national language was expedited, and the Sindhi language was sys-
tematicalfy discouraged by banishing it from the Karachi Municip:tl
Corporation and the University1of Karachi, and.by rewriting road
signs, signboards, voters' lists, etc., in .IJrdu. 5.9The efforts to do away
with Sindhi identity were stretched to such preposterous limits that
postmen were advised not to deliver mail that catried the word Sindh.
in the address. 60
Compared to other ethnic grdups of Pakistan, Sindhis have had the
highest literacy rate in their mother tongue. According to the 1951
censu~, Sindhis were five times m9re literate than,P'unjabis, 'Puklituns
and1 Baloch.61 Also, compared to other indigenous langoages of
Pakistan, Sindhi has the largest number of publications; including daify
newspap"ers. Unlike other provinces where the mother tongue had
never been the meaium of instruction, Sindhfhad this,st;tm, since
1851.62' But in utter disregard of its importance in Sindhi society,
Sindhi :Is a medium oinstruction was replaced by Urdu in 1958.
Yet another development, which has its roo~ in, colonial rule but
whose pace and magnitude iqcreased during.the One Unit period, was
the award cff Sindhi land to non-Sindhis, especially, Punjabi and
Pukhtun civil and military officials/ The irrig.d:ionschemes of the late
nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries, which had,created lutrative
agrsiculturafland in Sinh, had attracted a large number of outsiders ..
144Politicsof Identity

Two factors,_which the colonialists believed would help to increase

their control and profit, accelerated the settlement of Punjabis in rural
Sindh: (a) to make rural Sindh more stable, i.e., more loyal and sub-
servient, Punjabi military pensioners were allotted land; and (b) to
increase productivity, Punjabis, who according to the racist stereotypes
of colonial discourse were more 'industrious' than the 'lazy' Sindhis,
were encouraged to settle in Sindh. 63 By.1942-43, the government had
sold or leased more than 1.5 million acres of newly irrigated land, most
of it to the Punjabi settlers.64
After partition, the-issue was no longer that of stability and produc-
tivity but of sheer land grabbing by the dominant Punjabi-
Mohajir-Pukhtun civil ahd military officials. After the construction of
the Kotri Barrage, Punjabi settlement suddenly increased in the 1950s;
when the newly irrigated land was allotted to army pensioners. Of the
land irrigated by the Guddu Barrage, 598,525 acres were reserved as
state land and 142,473 acres were allotted to non-Sindhis, mostly
Punjabis, by 1971.65 The Sindhi nationalist, G.M. Sayed, quoting a
Punjabi writer, Azizuddin Ahmed, claims that most generals were
among those who grabbed Sindhi land, ,and that during the first five
years of military rule, i.e., from 1958 to 1963, 75 per cent of the allot-
tees were non-Sindhi. 66 Under the circumstances, it is not surprising
that Sindhis believe that for them real colonialism started after the
creation of Pakistan.

gnum(1971-771
On 30 March 1970 the PrQvince of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order
was promulgated and after three months the former provinces of
Punjab, Sindh and the NWFP were reconstituted, with Balochistan
also being accorded the status of a province. Thus came to an end the
one-and-a-half decades long period.of the One Unit. In the same year
the first free general elections were held in Pakistan. Instead of leading
to an elected government, the results of the elections provided a stim-
ulus to Bengali disenchantment when the P3:kistani establishment
refused to transfer power to the majority party, which belonged to East
"Pakistan. In one year's time, af~r a bloody civil war and the armed
intervention of India, the eastern wing separated to become an inde-
pendent st,ate, Bangladesh. In the western wing, the defeated"and
humiliated Pakistan military handed over 'power to Zulfikar Ali
 SindhiEthnicNationalism145

Bhutto,who!i$; Pakistan.People's Party had won a majority of the

national assembly seats.
-Bhutto was not only the first elc;cted prime minister of Pakistan
but also a Sindhi. Bhutto's People's Party.had won 62 out of82 seats
in Punjab, 18 out of 27 in .Sindh, one in the North West Frontier
Province and none in Balochistan. 67 Obviously, Bhutto had come to
power on the ba~is of support from the largest province of Pakistan,
Punjab, ,md therefore he could not be expected to go against its inter-
ests. But neither could he ignore his support ba~e in Sindh. It was a
difficult situation irr which the two provirrces that had voted for
him had a clear clash of interests. But that did not become ~ serious
problem for Bhutto, who was essentially a centralist, with a clear
,distaste ,for decentralisation of power and, therefore, for pr0,vincial
autonomy. He, indeed, played the Punjabi game as well as his prede-
cessors did. ,
,Without hurting Punjabi interests and provoking the wrath of}lis main
constituency, he however encouraged certain policies at the feder:i;larid
provincial levels which benefited Sindhis. He did this at the expense of
~nother dominant grqup, Mohajirs,.which was already losing its privi-
leges to Puajabis, who had .also become the overwhelming ~thnic
majority after the, separatiqn of Bengalis. In all fairness to Bhutto, it
must be said that he had no anti-Mohajir agenda. But it was a curiqus
coincidence that he had come to power at .a time when the Mohajir
,position in the power-hierarchy had been seriously eroded by Punj~bi
dominance. Thus, while some ofBhutto;s actions mjght have acceler-
ated-the process of Mohajir downsli9e frqm the very privileged posi-
tion that they had been holding since the cre~tjon of Pakistan, they
c<:;rtainlyhad not started it. Also, the actions that favoured Sindhis wer~
not necessar:jlymeant to be anti-Mohajir but were rather,an effort to
redress Sindhi griex,inces. Ironically; however, any step in favour of
Sindhis would obviously hm;t Mohajir interests, for they had acquJred
their privileges 'at the cost of tlit; former.

age Riots

'J'he termination of the, One Unit Scheme was forSindhis only. a

partial recognition of their regional and ethnic identity, since unlike
other provinces Sindh had. also been deprived of its lap.guage as a
medium of instruction during the One Unit period. Therefore Sindhi
146Politicsofldentity WAMiiii-

nationalists and intellectuals, demanded that the Sindhi language

should be restored as the medium of instruction and that the status
that it enjoyed before 1958 should be re-established. When Mohajir
students protested against the move, violence followed, which resulted
in 'Sindhi students burning the pictures of the Punjabi 'poet
Mohammad Iqbal, who is perceived to have first 'dreamt' of an inde-
pendent state for the Indian Muslims and is therefore a major symbol
of Pakistani natiohalism. Mohajir students retaliated by burning Sindhi
books in the Institute of Sindhology.68
The clamour of the Sindhi demand became all the more boisterous
after the People's Party tame to power in December 1971. Shortly,after
Bhutto pronounced in unequivocal terms 'that Sindhis must riot be
made tO'suffer the fate of die' Red Indians of America,69 in July 1972 a
bill was moved iii the'Sindh,assembly to make Sindhi the mediumof
instruction.
The bill clearly stated that 'Sindhi and Urdu shall be cdmpulsory
subjects for study ii) classes N to XII in aninstitutions in which such
classes are held' b'Ut the pro-Urdu lobby interpreted it as a'funeral'
of Urdu, which led to Mohajir violence against Sindhis in Karachi
and the burning of the Department of Sindhi at Karachi U niversity.7
One of the ~xtreme actions that'had annoyed and scared the Mohajifs
the most was the unofficial movein the Sindh assembly-to make it
compulsory for governmentemploy'eesto learn Sindhi within three
m6riths. 11' The Situation d~teriora'ted !md the acrimony'betW'een the
two groups increased when 'Sindhi and Mohajir delegates to the
central gove;ii""ni"ent-appointedcommittee~ach came up with some
profligate an8 bizarre demahds that were unaccept:tble to fhe other
party. ,
Some of the Sindhi demands re1ated to provincial autonomy,
thougH hn.rea1istic'considering the highly centralised state system in
Pakistah, seemed quite justifiable. Thoseqetnahds were the recogni-
tion of Sindhi not only as the official language ofSinah but'also as one
of the national languages of Pakistan; the recognition of the ,four
provincesas 'four nations living in a confederation'; the return of tl,ie
land that was given away to non-Sindhi military and civil officials; the
provindalisation of the railways, post, electronic media, 'organizadons
conc~rned with' the development of industry, water and power, and
the Civif,Serviceof Pakistan';,and an increased share for Sindh in the
Indus w~tet's 'to the levd a~eed to in an 1intet-'provihcial compact in
. J
 i4ii 4 W SindhiEthnicNationalism1-9,7

1945'.72 But' some other demands that, called for the setting up of 'a
militia consisting only of the old Sindhis', and the appointme~t of old
Sindhis to a1Lthe top posts in the province 73 [ emphasis mihe] ,were
outrageous, as they tended to not fecognise the existence ofthe 'new
Sindhis'. 74
No less excessive ,were most ,of the Mohajir demands, either. Their
ratio iru Sindh'.s population at the ,time was ~round 20,p~r cent,75 but
they called for equa1 status for"their Janguage'; Urdu, 50 pet' cent share
in all-the higher, posts.in the province,. parity irr high political and
administrative postings, and an.e;Xclusive.reservation of technical :\rid
professictnal colleges in Karachi for themselves/ 6 One of tneir
demands, the last, irt the ,list. of eigh"t, that Karachi should be lade
autonomous.and placed under an elected mayor with additional powers
and functions, was just ah&reasonabl~ because !{arachi, as town plan;-
ner Ariffassan has pointed out, is. probably 'the only big city in,the
world ;which has.no ,confrol.over, its affairs.:77 But as..is obviousSrom
the rest-of the demands, they had,rtiore to.do with the Mohajirs' con-
trol over the city.:inwliich they had a majority than to its better and,fair
management. Willi such over~he-top demands from both sides,.it was
certainly not possiblo to reaclr an agreement, ,N everthe)ess, as a com-
promise, the' government issued an, ordinance, which,.,whiTe keeping
the Language Bill intact, prohibited any discrimination in,the ,provin-
cial civ.ilservice appointments or prohlotions on the basis of a person's
inability t9 communicate in, either,tSindhi or, Urdu ,for a period of
12 years.78

a System
Ahother'!=ontentious issue was t;he-quota'.:System.Since 1948, whel\ the
qubta systerh w'as introduced to cqrrect the regional irtequality in repr
resentation in employment; it was unjustifiably biased. in favour of
Monajirs. So.lopsided was the .system that,Karaclii ~ity was separately
mentioned by name but the three provinces werecbbbled together in
the c;itegory of- '.All other provinces 'anti princely .states of West
Pakistan'., Kara'chi's share,was 50 per cent more 'th'.arritsshare in popu-
lation could justify. It was giv<rnan additional 15 per cent share fqi-the
potential migrants,from ,lndia. 79 Furthermore, whehthe systepi was
revised in 1949 ahd 20 per cent qU<?tawas allocated to the merit
 148 Politicsof Identity M i

category, Karachi, being the most developed city of Pakistan, had

naturally become the biggest beneficiary.
By 1951 Sindhis had become a minority in Karachi, as 57.1 per cent
ofits population now consisted ofMohajirs. 80 Before Bhutto, the mar-
tial law government of General Yahya Khan (1969-71) had already
worked out a new formula to rid the quota system of its urban bias by
~llocating representation for the rural and urban population in the pro-
portion of 60:40 respectively in provincial and federal services.81
During Bhutto's period, further changes were made to the system.
Karachi's separate share was scrapped and the merit category was
reduced froth 20 per cent to 10 per cent. While all four provinces were
designated a share on the basis of their total population; in Sindh, con-
sidering the huge gap between 'the rural and urban sectors, the provincial
share was sub-divided as.11.4 per cent rural and 7.6 per cent urban.
Where:rs Sindhis saw the new quota distribution as an acknowledgement
of their long due share, Mohajirs v.iewed it;-asa yet another setback to
tlteir already'declining privileged position.
The Bhutto government had made a conscious effort to increase
Sindhi representation in the state and public sectors, but their decades-
long under-representation was so dismal that it requireq years of con-
certed efforts to rectify. The majorobstacle in the path of balancing out
the Sindhis'share is the structural disctimination that has become part
of the Pakistani'state system. The Putrjabi-Mohajir-dominated civil
and military bureaucracy, continuing with the colonial legacy of ais-
crimination bas':d on racial stereotypes, has all alone; been treating
Sindhis with contempt for being neither industrious like Punjabis nor
brave like Pukhtuns. 82 Disregarding the oppressive feudal system in
Sindh, Punjabis and Mohajirs have also madeASifidhis the target of
their modernist disdain by labelling them backward, parochial, and
inward-turned. 83 It has"also been suggested that. the. military bureau-
cracy.has not entei;tained the idea of. employing Sindhis because they
are mistrusted for, having ethno-nationalist tendencies. 84 As.a result,
most of the key' Rolice and civil pc1sitionsin the interior of Sindh are
entrusted to non-Sindhis.
A list compilecl in 1970 revealed that during the one-and-a-half
decadesof.the One Unit, only 53 out of184 postings of deputy inspec-
tors general of police and 41 put of 150 postings of commissioners and
'deputy torrnriissioners were given to Sindhis.8? Under the circum-
stam:es,the increased share in qu9ta has only partially worked in favour
. of Sindhis, and even after almost three decades of its implementation
 B M 11I SindhiEthnic.Nationalism
149

they remain grossly under-represented, the details of which we shall see

in the following section.

le (1977-88)

In July. 1977, after weeks of unrest that followed the results of ,the,
1
general elections, which the opposition had alleged were rigged,-General
Zia-ul Haq deposed the elected government of Bhutto, imposed
martial law,,suspended the con1>titutionand within two years, after a
dubious trial, hanged Bhutto.' Sindhis were in a state,of trauma from
which they would take years to recover. Punjab, where Bhutto's pop-
ularity was close to that in Sindh, was also shocked,86 but foJ Sindhis it-
was-avery personal loss: the foss of the person they loved the most in
more than two centuries, since the death of the saintly poet, Shah
AbdulLatifBhitai, in 1752,87 and that too at th_ehands of the Punjabi
generals and Punjabi judges. It may have been a coi~cid!!nce, but a
curious one nonetheless, that out of the seven judges.on the bench, the
three who gave a .verdict in favour of Bhutto were from the three
smaller provinces, whereas the four who decided against Bhutto were
all Punjabi. 1

For Sindhis military rule means rule by an occupying army, because

they have almost no representation in the,military. The Pakistan arm}!'
is almost exclusively Punjabi and Pukhtun, accounting for over 95 per
cent share of its strength (60-65 per cent Punjabi anq ,3Q-3j pel! cent
Pukhfon). 88 On the otper hand, despite reforms irt the quota system,
Sindhi representation in the civil setvices has, been marginal.
According to tlie 1981 censm~.Sindhis were 11.77 per'cent of Pakistan's
population, but their share in gazetted posts was only,2,7 per cent,
which r<_:>seto 5.1 per cent in i 983; at the officer level, Sindhis were
4.3 per cent, going up to 6.1 pef cent in.1989; and in the'senior,posts
their share of3.6 per'ce~(in 197,4went tip to 6.8 per cent in'i983.~~In
1984 the chief martial law adminis~rator secri::tariathad ,1,445officers,
out of which only two were Sindhi, whereas out of2,606 oflice_rsin the
20 departments and divisions of the federal se.,::retariat,, only 77 were
Sindhi. 90 Even in the mid-1990s, though their share al the officer level
had increased to 9.25 per cent, their number below grade 17 remained
'virtually invisibld. 91
UI'lder military rule, when public representatives lose vieir power
and influence and all powers are concentrated in the hands of the
150Politicsof Identity

military and civil bureaucracy, for Sindhis the channels through which
they can articulate their interests become scarce.92 ,Hence, whenever
there is military rule, Sindhis feel more alienated than ever. During the
first spell of military rule they lost their language as a mediui;n of
instruction, and tens of thousands of acres of land to Punjabi and
Pukhtun military and civil personnel. Under the third spell of military
rule their leader was hanged and alhhose employed during his rule
were expelled from government and public sector jobs.
The pent-up Sindhi anget against the military exploded ih' August
1983 when the Moverrtent for, Restoration''of Democracy (l\1RD)
cilled for' a countrywide protest against military rule. The resp'onse to
the' call in the'rest of the provinces was lukewarm, but in Sindh it
tum!d iritoa massive populai; agitation. 1So spontaneous and wide.,,
spread was the unrest in Sindh that not:only were the military rulers
perturbed.hut even the MRD le~dership itself w:is shocked. The inten-
sity and potency of the unrest was unprecedented in the history of a
repressed people who have generally been stereotyped as docile and
cowat"dly. During 'the agitation ,Sindhis resorted to jailbreaks and
attacks on police statim'ls, banks and trains. It soon became obvious
that the administration in ruraL Sindh was faced with an upsurge
bordering on a civilwar. The army was called in and a massive witch-hunt
of political workers 'and Pakistan People's Party sympathisers was
launched: But, Sindhis did' not shy, away, even from confronting the
h~avily armed milietry force. T,here'were armed encounte'rs and it took
days for the army.to contain thesituation. 93 Interestingly, Sindhi sepa-
ratist G.M, Sfyed'described the spontaneous popular re~ction as a 'save
Pakistan fno\rementl, whereas die military regime.called it 'a cortspir-
acy tocreate Sindh1.1Desh'. 94 The biutal treatment at the hands of the
Punjabiarmy once ag.tin remind~d Sindhis tfiat expecting a fair deal
in
from the existing state "systemWas vain. 95
On the other ltand, 'the agitatiotr proved tb be the firs~ serious blow
to the military regirne, andthe generalshad ever:y i.;easonto takethe
intensity of Sindhi sentiments against.,their rule s'eriously.'That 'they
certainly did; but instead of giving serious thought to the Sindhi griev-
ance~ and their repar~tion, they intensifietl their persecution of Sindhis
and devised' trlethods of dividing them and bluntin'g their opposition.
lt .was obvious to the generals that one issue on which the majority, of
'Sindhis stood united was their support for Bhutto. Also, known to the
genefllls was the .Sindhi nationalists' 'hatted ,and distrust of Bhuitb. 96
Yet ab.other point, which.could no( have gone losron the generals,, was
 SindhiEthnicNationalism151

the ,indi(ference of the urban centres of Sindh to the happenings iq

rural Sindh.
Soon the military regime, started harnessing anti-Bhutto forces in
Sindh. Oe 0 the problems in Sindh was that 'Sindhis had almost
totally rejected the nationalists and had voted for Bhutto. In the 1970
elections, dut of 27 national assembly seats in Sindh, Bhutto's People's
Party had won 18, whereas out of 60 Sindh assembly seats it had
secured 28.A majority of the Mohajirs had voted for two religious
groups, th'e Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam and Jima:tt-i-lslami, while the rest
o1 the seats were won by two groups of the Ml,lslim League and i~de.:
pefldent candidates. 97 But the nationalists ,could not win a single seat'
and,even the so-called father.of Sindi,nationalism, G.M.'Sayed, lpst
his constituency to the People's,Party candidate. The trend continued
in,,the 1~88 elections, when all nationalist groups-and by that~time
tere wen; many-were rejected by Sindhis in,favour ofthe,:People's
Party, which had increased its pei.:centageof v'otes from ,44.9'per cent in
1970 to 47 per cent.98

Nonetheless, the regime cajoled the nationalists. The.military ruler;

General Zia-ul Haqi the great chimpion of Islam ~nd .Palcistanideol-
ogy, pai(\ a '?sit to one ?f the most yocal opponents of t,hat ideology and
an U{!flinchingseparatist, G .M. ,Sayed. On the other harld, the .Mohajir
constituency, which had al~along been anti-Bhutto,wa~ encouraged in
i~ incipient ethnic politics. The erosi~n of Mohajir, pr~yilege~,whith
had accelerated with the separation of East Pakistan and the initi;ltion
of Bhutto's policies; h,;id ma1e th~ Mohajir youth,res~less. They had
already ,expressed ,their ,djsenchantment with th'e exis,ting politital
groups by forming the -Ni-Pakistan. Mohajir Students Orgahisation,
(APMSQ), in 1978. Just a few months after,the Sindh agitation, the
organisation was turned into a broader political group, Mohajir Quan;ii
[National] Movement, the MQM. Circumstantial evidence shows
that the formation of the MQM was encouraged and even financially
supported by the military regim,e.99 '

Interestingly, the unabashedly anti-Sindhi and anti-Bhutto MQM

found its first sympathjsei:; in the person of G.M. Sayed. The Jiye
Sindh guards in the interior of.,Sinr;lhsuppQrted the MQM chief.Altaf
Hussa,in, and in return h~ bowed his head tp the Jiye, Sindh anthem at
functions in Karachi.100, Apai.:t from the two groups' links with the ..
regimej there were some other, ,common~lities. in their, interests. The
reason for the nationalists' support to the MQM was the.realisation
after the abortive Si11-tlhiagitation that unless the major towns of the
152Politicsof Identity IM M

province, which are predominantly Mohajir, are mobilised in favour of

Sindh's case, there is l.ittlehope for positive results. The MQM flirtation
with Sindhi nationalists too was based on some pragmatic thinkil}g-
it neither considered Sindhis as serious a threat as it perceived Punjabis
to be, nor did it want a Bangla~esh-like situation, where Mohajirs had
antagonised Bengalis by siding with the Pakistani establishment and
later suffered.
Ironically, despite their anti-Punjabi-Pukhtun the"t:oric,both the
MQM and the Sindlii nationalists were pam'pered by the
Punjabi-Pukhtun-dominated army that was haunted by Bhutto's
ghost. Anyway, it was not a workable alliance because, while Sindhis
and Mohajirs may have had a common enemy in the shape of
Punjabis, their mutual clash of interes~ itself was too serious to
put aside for very long. So gravt! was the clash that one group's self.:
a~sertion would automatically fead to' the negation 'of the other'$
interests-Mohajirs were calling for the recognition of an ethnic iden.:::
tity which the Sindhis believed to be undermining their struggle' for
provincial autonomy.
Also important was the fact that the MQM had by 1987 become an
important political group with widespread support among Mohajirs,
and was therefore not obliged to play the establishment games-it hid
its own games to play and its owrl agehda to pursue. It had become the
sole representative of Mohajirs, but the Sindhi nationalists were by no
means the representatives of Sindhis, who had cho!ien Bhutto's
People's Party for the role. Therefore, the MQM must have realised
that courting the nationalists would fiot earn them the sympathies of
Sindhis. Shortly, Sindhis and Mohajirs werelocked in bloody violence
against each other, beginning with'. the September 1988 killings in
Hyderabad.

TheViolentProvince
It is the tragedy of countries like Pakistan, where an institutionalised
political system does not exi~t,that individuals rather tlian institutions
play a decisive role in any political change. The Pakistani political sys-
tem, whifh has all along been dominated by the militaty and civil
bqreaucracy, has always been dependent on the appearance of individ-
uals on the political scene or their disappearante from it. After the
mysterious death of military dictator General Zia-ul Haq_in a plane
 SindhiEthnicNationalism153

crash ih 1988, the Paki~i state establishmenl: opted for genenl

elections. In the November 1988 elections, despite the establishment's'
attempts to defeat Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan Pet>ple'sParty by
creafing the right-wing alliance bf the Islami Jamhooti Ittehad (Islamic
Democratic Alliance) the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the
majority party in the national and Sindh provincial assemblies. But the
People's Party's majority was a rather thin one: in a house of207 seats
the People's Party had won only 93 seats. Obviously, the party was in
no position to form a government on its own. It had to muster the sup-
port of other parties, groups and individuals. The MQM h:td emerged,
after the IslamiJamhoori lttehad (IJI) with 55 seats, as the third largest
group with 13 seat!:.'In Sindh, although the People's Party had swept
the rural vote, winniitg 67 out of the total 141 seats, the MQM had
emerged as the second largest group, sweeping the urban vote and
winning 26 seats. Sindhi nationalist groups could not secure even a
single seat.101
Under fhe circumstances, it was only natural for the People's Party
to seek MQM support, for by doing so-itwould 'not only be able to
form government at the federal level but could also be in a better
position to de~l with the deteriorating situation inSindh. This, how-
ever, was no easy task. The MQM was avirulently anti-Sindhi group,
whereas the People's Party was the representative of Sindhis.
Whether it was the recognit1on of the fact that Sindhis and,Mohajirs
had to live in the same province, or sheer political expediency, the
People's Party and the MQM did reach a compromise deal and
the MQM supported the PPP in its bid to form a government in
Islamabad.
At tliat point the Pakistan army seemed to have decided to hand over
power to the political leadership. In December 1988 Benazir Bhutto
became the prime minister. After 11 years a popular Sindhi leader was
once again ruling Pakistan. Btit it was not going to be easy sailing for
the People's Party. The 11 years of brutal military rule had militarised
the political system and criminalised society at large. Thus the shaky
elected government of Benazir Bhutto was under attack from various
fro'n'ts.The military establt!;hment had conceded the top government
job to a politician, but had by no means given up its paramount role in
the tunning of the affairs of the state.
The Zia )fears had led to the entrenchment of the army's Inter-
ServicesIntelligence (ISI) into almost every sector of the state and society.
So powerful was the ISI that it not only created the main opposition
154Politicsof Identity W-

party, the IJf, and ensured that the People's Party did not wip an
overwhelming majority, but it also made it difficult for the prime
minister to take any action without the prior apprqval of the top mili-
tary brass. 102 On the other hand, although the PeoRle's Party,haq won
a majority of the national assembly seats in Punjab, it hag lo,st the
Punjab proviqcial assembly to the IJI. In Sindh, although the P;ople's
Party had secured the support of the MQM, the bitterness be~een
Sindhis and Mohajirs could hardly allow a tension-free alliance. \Vith
the largest province out of its control and. ruled by its arch enemy, the
IJI's Nawaz Sharif, with Sindh in the grip of rural dacoits and urban
terrorists, and with the army fully entrenched in all sectors 0ths.:s.~te
apparatus, the People's Party had little chance to last long. The politi-
cal ineptitude ofBena:uir Bhutt~ and her coterie further weakened th!'l
already weak government and soon its adversaries in the military and
civil bureaucracy used its weaknesses as a rationale.for dismissirtg;it in.
August 1990.
But by that time Sindh's law and order situ:.\tionhad det,eriqrated to
a state of almost total breakdown, with antagoni~m between the two
major ethic groups, Sindhis and Mohajirs, having re~ched., new
height:9: The People's Party can be blamed for its inability to arres~
the, det~riorating situati~m in Sindh, but no independent observc;r
can accuse it of having made its own cop.tribution to the worseJJip.g
situation,.D.1,1ringthe less than two years' rule of Benazir Bhutto, how<:Ver,
a~
the ISI, part of,its overall strategy to undermine the People's Party
government, had,played an active role it).keeping the Sindh situation
as explosive~ pqssibl;. 103
After the 1990 elections the MQM entered an alliance with the IJI,
which formed gqyernments at the ceptre as well as in Sin,dl;_i_. But
despite being part of the govc:;rQment,the MQM ,contin,u~d wi\h.its
terrorist atti,vities in urban Sindh. On thi::other,hand, ru~al S,inc\hcon-
tinued tobe under the control of Sindhi dacoits; p:i bo,th cases unem-
ploy~d ~outb playep a significant role. A cop;,iderable numb,er of the
dacoits consisted of those ;young Sindhis who were. from amongst the
70.per C!,!ntunemployed gradate1iof the interior of Sindh, includi1'g
doctors and engin,eers, ~nd those wb,ose jobs. were terminate~ by the
military regime. 104 It is .not surprising .that in 19~4 somf of th.!! most
notorious dacoits were operating from the hostels of Sindh University,
wher!;! they were staying, witq the nation:\list Jiye Sindh Studt,nts
Federation (JSSF) activists,105 In a chilling commenry on t,he situa-
tionr a JSSF activist said: We wanted to lllake these Sindhi dacoits our
 MB& i I SindhiEthnicNationalism15,S

comrades in the nationjl struggle, but they made us dacoits instead.' 1?

No less depressing was the situation,in urban Sirtdh, where unemployed.
Mohajir youth, seeing little hope of a better future, were attracted to
the MQM and were turned into terrorists wlio would,wreak havoc on
thelife of urban dwellers. ,,
In mid-1992 the IJI government launched an army action,
Operation Clean Up, against both the Sindhi dacoits and the MQM
terrorists. Although the operation succeeded in its crackdown on the
former, it was less successful in breaking the latterls hold over the
urban centres of Sindh, despite extensive arrests of the MQM leaders
and workers. In Karachi alone 1,113 people were killed by the snipers
in ,1994-.By 1995, when the number, of people filled had shot up to
2,095, Karachi had become the most dangerous eity bf ,Asia and iwas
termed the 'city of death'. 107
In '1993, the People's Party was. once again voted to power. As the
army operation had failed to control violence in urban Sindh,. the law
and prder situ~tion in, die province was one of,the main challenges for
the P";pplb's Party government. In H)95, when: violence had further
eScalated:'the People's party government launched yet another and even
more brutal crackdown against the MQM, usin9 the combined force of
variolls 'security agencies under the commartd of the interior ministry.
Although this time the operation was more successful, and the urban
centres may have become less violent as a result, they still are fai; from
being safe. The success of the operation had more to do with the fish-
ing out of the MQM terrorists than with improving the general law and
order situation.
As the decade of the, 1990s saw many governments. coming, and
going, in' 1996 the People's1Party was once again dismisseq.. After the
ele"ctionsof '1997 the Pakistan, Muslim League of N avyazSharif came
to power for the second time. Despite, the successful operation by the
People's Party in 1995, however,'Sindh remained a problem province.
Using violel}ce in Sindh as' an excuse, the Nawaz Sharif government
dismissed th1r elected'provincial government in.Sindhiq ,1998,'and
imposed direct rule with the appoihtment of one oNawii.Sharif's
advisers as the centre's representative. -That arrangement remained
unehanged till the military taReover in October 1999,
As far as Sindhi,ethnio nation,alism is concerned,, the decade of
the 1990s can be termed as one of indifference. The lack of interest
in.,ethnic-based nationalismin the pbst-Zia period i!l the' most strik-
ing aspect of Sindhi politics. An ove1whelming majority bf Sindhis
156Politicsof Identity

voted for the centralist People's Party and none of the Sindhi
nationalist groups could succeed in winning their support. But then
this has always been the case with Sindhis. However, their politics
tend to get radicalised during military rule. The reason for that is
quite obvious: Sindhis have almost no representation in the Pakistan
army.

usion
From the facts and figures given here it is quite obvious that Sindhi
nationalism is a response to the modern state system, which was
introduced by the colonialists and became even more interventionist
after the creation of Pakistan. Under colonialism, Sindh was rele-
gated to the status of an agricultural hinterland, where its resources
were exploited but the social services sector was neglected. After par-
tition, it was turned into a refugee centre, its land given away to 'out-
siders', its.resources channelled to serve the centre and Punjab, its
provincial autonomy violated and its regional identity eliminated
through the One Unit Scheme, and its language replaced. To' booi:,
~nder every bout of military rule it was denied the right to voice its
grievances.
Under the circumstances, to designate Sindhi sentiments to the
misleading charge of 'provincialism' and 'narrow' nationalism not
only betrays the repressive assimilationism of the P:tkistani state but
also reveals the dominant groups' attempt to deny the existence of the
inequality and exploitation that Sindh has been subjected to. That, the
Sindhis h:}ve remained suspect in the eyes of the establishment,
despite their support for the federalist People's Party .tnd their rejec-
tion of nationalist and separatist groups, speaks volumes about the
nature of the Pakistani state system. After the two operations carried
out by army and security agencies Sindh may no longer be the most
dangerous province, but it continues to be the troubled rather than
the troublesome province that the Pakistani establishment likes to
present it as. And, it shall remain troubled till the highly centralised
a.n9discriminatory state system of Pakistan, dominated by some
ethQ.icgroups at the expense of others, is not changed. That does not
seemvery likely in the near future, especially in the face of yet another
spell of military rule that has been imposed on the country since
Ottober 1999.
 SindhiEthnicNationalism
157

References
1. Cited in Ranger, 1999,p. 20.
2. Syed, 1992, p. 191.According to one estimate, Sindh's per capita income soon after
partition was 40 per cent higher than that of Punjab's. See Wright, 1991, p. 301.
3. Ahmed, Feroz, 1984, p. A-150.
4. Quoted in ibid., p. A-153.
5. Hardy, 1972, p. 39.
6. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Seal, 1971, p. 68.
8. Ibid., p. 69
9. Divekar, 1983, p. 333.
10. Whitcombe, 1983, p. 691.
11. Ibid., p. 678.
12. Talbot, 1988, p. 55.
13. Ahmed, Feroz, 1984, p. A-156
14. Ibid.
15. Seal, 1971, p. 84.
16. Alavi, 1988, p. 76.
17. Page, 1987, p. 2.
18. Ansari, 1991, p. 185.
19. Braibanti, 1963, p. 378.
20. Ahmed, lshtiaq, 1996, p. 189.
21. Ansari, 1991, p. 185.
22. Boreham, 1998, p. 69.
23. The Sindhi Muslim elite had formed the Sind Mohammadan Association in the
early 1880s, but this was more of an elite social club for the promotion of their
social and educational interests rather than a political platform.
24. Ansari, 1991, p. 186.
25. Boreham, 1998, p. 90.
26. Page, 1987, p. xii.
27. Ibid., p. 4.
28. Sayed, 1995, pp. 18, 19.
29. Cited inJalal, 1992, p. 114.
30. Boreham, 1998, p. 53.
31. Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1967, p. 87.
32. Cited in Ahmed, Feroz, 1984, p. A-157.
33. Cited in Talbot, 1988, p. 34.
34. Jalal, 1992,,p. 110.
39. lbl'd., p. 109.
36. Sayed, 1995, p. 46.
37. Most of the Sindhis that I interviewed in 1997 and 1998 expressed this view; the
most prominent among them being politicians like Imdad Mohammad Shah and
Rasul Bux Palijo and historians like Hamida Khuhro and Ibrahim Joyo.
38. J alal, 1992, p. 1.
39. Whenever the provincial government complained about the centralisation of
powers in the centre, it was termed provincialism. Callard, 1957, p. 185.
158Politicsof Identity

40. Around 2 million acres of land is estimated to have been awarded to the Muslim
refugees who claimed to have left their land in India. See Ahmed, Feroz, 1998,
p. 71. According to Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya, 'Of the 1,345,000 acres
abandoned by Hindus as many as 800,000 acres were seized by Sindhi Landlords.'
Cited inJalal, 1991, p. 87.
41. Ansari, 1998, p. 92.
42. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973, p. 199.
43. Sayed, 1995, p. 131.
44. The resolution stated: 'All executive and administrative authority in respect -of
Karachi and such neighbouring areas which in the opinion of the Central
Govemll)ent may be required for the purposes of the capital of Pakistan shall vest
in and shall be exercised by or on behalf of the Government of Pakistan and the
legislative power shall vest in the Federal legislature.' Cited in Ali, Chapdhri
Muhammad, 1973, p. 252. I
45. Ansari, 1998, p. 97.
46. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973, p. 252.
47. Qasir, 1991, p. 24.
48. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973, p. 267.
49. Ibid., p. 369.
50. Callard, 1957, pp. 81, 102, 103.
51. Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 73.
52. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, 1973, p. 370. ,.,.
53. This was pointed out by a Sindhi member of the constituent assembly, ..Pirzada
Abdus Sattar. Cited in Callard, 1957, p. 187.
54. Jalal, 1991, p. 197.
55. Callard, 1957, p. 189.
56 1 'Sayeed, 1987, p. 79.
57. Ibid., p. 78; Callard, 1957, pp. 187, 188.
58. Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 73.
59. Sayed, 1995, pp. 140-43; Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 74. Karachi University students were
qisallowed to answer examination questions in Sindhi. See Rahman, 1996, p. 114.
60. Ahmed,Feroz, 1998, p. 74.
61. Qasir; 1991, p. 24.
62. East Bengal was an exception, but is not being included because it is no lo1,1gerpart
of Pakistan.
. 63. Ansari, 19~1, p. 188.
64, 4hmed, Feroz, 1984, p. A-157.
65. The allottees included civil and military personnel, Punjabis -displaced by the con-
struction of th/M:lllgla dam, federal capital areas, Islamabad,.,and some frontier
tribesmen. For detailed figures adopted from Sind Annual -1971, published by the
Government ofSind, Films and Publications Department, see Feldman: 1976, p. 57.
66. Sayed, 1995, p. 146.
67. Rizvii 1987, pp. 176-77.
'68. Rahrh;in, 1996, pp. 121-22'.
69. Syed, 1992, p. 192. .
70. Rahman, 1996, pp. 124-25.
1171. Sayeed, 1980,p. 154.
72, Cited in Sayed, 1995, p. 194.
 SindhiEthnic
Nationalism
159

73. Ibid.
74. At that time indigenous Sindhis were called old Sindhis, while Mohajirs and other
settlers were called new Sindhis.
75. Even as late as 1981, according to the census, Mohajirs were 24 per cent ofSindh's
population. See Kennedy, 1991, p. 941.
76. Syed, 1992, pp.193-94.
77. ArifHassan, Personal communication, Karachi, 1997.
78. Sayeed, 1980, p. 155.
79. Waseem, 1997, p. 227.
80. Burki, 1980, p. 12.
81. Waseem, 1997, pp. 228-31.
82. Burki, 1980, p. 85.
83. In an interview with a Mohajir intellectual, Husnain Kazmi, in 199_7,when I
pointed out this anti-Sindhi bias, he said: 'This is not bias. It is a fact. Sindhis had
no skill, no ability, nor education. We brought education with us, but they created
obstacles for education.' Also see Wright, 1991, p. 304.
84. Waseem, 1989, p. 409.
85. Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 75.
86. Sayeed, 1980,p. 152.
87. Kardar, 1992, p. 312.
88. Sayeed, 1968b, p.276. Also see Kennedy, 1991, p. 946.
89. Kennedy, 1991, p. 943.
90. Waseem, 1989, p. 409.
91. Ansar Abbasi, 'Regional quotas, federal services', The News, Karachi, October 14,
1994, p. 11.
92. Waseem, 1989, p. 409.
93. Hassan Mujtaba, 'Sindhi Separatism: Myth or Reality?' The Newsline, Karachi,
February 1992, p. 46.
94. Ibid.
95. Imdad Mohammad Shah, interview with the author, Karachi 1997.
96. One of the Sindhi nationalists,' Hamida Khuhro, told this writer in an interview
in 1997: 'It's very cfifficultfor me to say,anything p6sitive about Bhutto.' Another
Sindhi nationalist, G.M.ISayed, is reported to have said: 'These brainless Sindhis
worship Bhutto who was hung by the Punjabis after he had served their purpose.'
Cited in Mujtaba, 'Sindhi Separatism', The Newsline, p. 41.
97. Choudhury, 1974, p. 128.
98. Herald,Karachi, special issue, N~v/Dec. 1993.
99. Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi, former director of the Pakistan army's Inter-Services
,Public Relations, told me that in those days the MQJ'vi chief; AltafHussain, was
'very close to the deputy;martial la;v administrator of Sindh.' Hamida Khuhro told
me that when the Sindh Chief Minister, Ghous Ali Shah, was accused of giving
Rs 30 million to AltafHussain, the chief minister said: 'I helped it (MQM) to cut
Jamaat-i-Islami to size.'
100. I owe this information to Khalid Mumtaz, a Karachi lawyer.
101. The 1988 election figures here have been taken from Herald,Karachi's Elections
1993, Special Issue.
102. Interviewsby Benazir Bhutto and General Hamid Gu~ former Director General of the
ISi in the January 2001 issue of Herald,Karachiare quite revealingin this connection.
160PoliticsofIdentity

103. I am indebted to some senior police officials in Karachi and Hyderabad, who did
not want their names to be disclosed, for the information on the ISI's intervention
in the civil administration and its clandestine activities.
104. Kardar, 1992, p. 312.
105. Mujtaba, 'Sindhi Separatism', The Newsline, p. 45.
106. Cited in ibid.
107. Special map, 'City of Death', Herald,Karachi 1996.
 8
(V\ohajir
EthnicNationalism:
ElDorado
GoneSour

To build Pakistan it was necessary to cover up Indian history, to

deny that Indian centuries lay just beneath the surface of Pakistani
Standard Time. T~e past was rewritten; there was nothing else to
be done.

Who commandeered the job ofrewriting hisfory?:...._Theimmi-

grants, the mohajirs.In what language?-Urdu and English, both
imported tongm!s, although one travelled less ,distance than the
other. It is possible to see tHe subsequent history of Pakistan as a
duel between two layers of time, the obscured' world forcing its
way back through what-had-been-imposed.
-Salman Rushdie 1'

The Urdu-speaking Indian Muslim migrants, the 1\1.ohajirs, who'

m1.&ratedfrom the Muslim minority provinces of India to Pakistan after
the partition of British India, were the most ardent supporters of the state
nationalism of Pakistan until the 1970s. In the l:}te1970s, however, they
began to think of their separa,teethnic identity, and in 1'984th~ f~rmed
their 6wn political.group, the Mohajir Quami Moveme,nt (MQM) to
assert that identity. By the end of the 1980s the MQM nqt only succeeded
in winning the overwhelming support of the Mohajirs but also became
an increasingly organised and violent p6litical group, turning the majpr
towns ofSindh province into the mo~t dangerous places in Palqstan.

Mohajirs?
Although the Indian Muslim migrants.were from various ethnic groups
like Punjabis, Gujaratis, Memons, etc., it W:\s the, Urdu-speaking
162Politicsof Identity-1

migrants from north India, especially the United Provinces and Bihar,
who came to be known as Mohajirs. lfhe reason was that Urdu was not
the mother tongue of the people of any region that formed the new
state o(Pakistan. The number of Punj<}bimigrants was the largest but
they easily assimilated into the Punjab province of Pakistan. Till the
1970s the Mohajirs highlighted their Muslim and Pakistani identity
and looked down upon ethnic identity as 'provincial' and 'parochial'.
Thus, they voted either for the Muslim League, the founding party of
Pakistan, or the Jamaat-i-Islami, an extremely conservative religious
group, mainly based in urban centres. This chapter examjn:esthe politics
of the Mohajirs and argues that so long as they were over-represented
in the state system of Pakistan they were the most spirited oppon~nts
of ethnic politics, but the momeqt their share in state power began to
slide they ,turned to ethnic politics.
It is in order to note here that I use the word Mohajir as ~ broad
appellation, but do not ~y any means intend to generalise that anyone
whose mother ton~e is Urdu is automatically a Mohajir and supporter
of the MQM.. 'Fhere are many Urdu-speaking people who neith<;r,Ji~c.
to call themselves Mohajirs nor are supporters of the MQM. Tis
chapter, therefore, is not a\:>outa people generally called Mohajir~1qut
about the politics of those among the Mohajir community who;suppprt
the ideology and politics of the MQM.

_e~of the MQM

Although the MQM was launched in 1984, it became a force to reckqn
with in 1986,' when violent ethnic clashes occu;red in Karachi 'and
Hyderabad. 1 The MQM's gro~h introduced Pakistan to an ;!together
new kind of ethnic movement .. Before the MQM, almost all ethnic
parties were domi~ated and led by an elite, whether la,ndpwners or
other propertjed groups, even if they also drew on strong middle class
support. Th~ MQM is a departure from the traditional ethnic politics
of Pakistaq.: an ~rban-based middle class grqup, led by predominantly
lower middle class university graduates.
Another distinctive aspect of the MQM politics is that, unlike other
ethnic groups that have been fighting for their :tights, the Mohajirs as
a group have been relatively privileged people, especially in compari-
son to Sindhis. In fact, it was only when .they started to lose some of
their privileges ~uring the 1970s and early 1980s ,that they began to
 Nw i E Mohajir EthnicNationalism163

assert their ethnic identity. Also, the MQM's rhetoric may not be very
different from other ethnic parties, but its organisational structure and
IJlOdusoperan<;liof rpan terrorism is in sharp contrast with the rest of
the ethnic groups, as is the MQM's urban middle clas~support base. It,
is in order 1here to note that the nature of violent, populist and semi-
fasci~t politics, which the MQM has introquced to the urban centres
ofSinqh and will be described in the following pages, is directly li~ked
to its class composition-predominantly young, urban middle class
andJower middle c;lassstudents and professionals.

istoricalBackground

The United Provinces (UP) of India, from where the majurity of the
Urou-speakingMohajirs ~d migrated ..to Pakistan, was the traditionaf
power base of the Muslim landed' gentry of the Mughal Empire since
the"twelfth century. When the coloniaLadministra'tion took over pmyer
froth the Mughal king in 1857, the Muslim elite of UP whp were asso-
ciated with the Mughal court maintained their position oi privilege by
continuing to serve the colonial 'administration. Theil; sltare in land-
holding too was not radically affected under colonialism.2
Howe~er; when the colonial state began to establish itself as a modern
bureaucratic 'rule-bound' administrative system and to expand its writ1
its requirements for employment chmg'ed.3 Modern-style education,
with its emphasis on training rathe'r thah social ano cultural fefinement
and etiquette (as was the ca'sewith traditional education) became a pre-'
requjsite,for state employment. Although the UP elite's adaptatioll'to
th,e changed political and economic conditions in which modem edu-.
cation .and. state employment had become. important sources of status
and prestige was rather smooth, they could not avoid the challenge of
competition from other sections of society, who were encouraged by
the bureaucratic neutrality of the modern state and capitalistic mobility,.
of tlre market etonomy.
So seriotts was the challenge that the Muslim UPites' share in the
high-ranking subordinate judicial andexecutive jobs tleclined from
6,3.9 per cent in 1857 to 45.1 per ceht' in 1886-87 and 'was further
reduced to 34.7 per cent by 1913.4 Nthough the Muslims, being only
13-14 per cent of the province'~ population,,had an unjustifiaoly large-
share even then, they developt:d a sense of insecurity andresentment
as a community losing out some o(its privileges:5 It was.,during thi1
164Politicsof IdentityFMH!ltM

period of gradual but steady decline in the number of Muslims in

privileged positions that the Muslim UP elite launched the reformist
and educational movements. It was also during this period that they
resorted to exclusionist communal politics as against the inclusionary
Indian nationalism of the Indian National Congress. The purpose of
such politics was two-pronged: to weaken the nationalist movement
and prove loyalty to the British, and to secure state employment and,
later, higher representation in the legislative assembly. These efforts
paid dividends when in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 Muslims were given
50 per cent representation in the UP assembly, against their mere
14 per cent share in the population. 6
The leading persohality behind the Muslim reformist, educational as
well as communal movement was an aristocrat from Delhi, Syed
Ahmed Khan (1817-98). It is instructive to analyse the main currents of
Syed Ahmed's ideas, not because he was the most influential Muslim
thinker of modem India, but, more importantly for our purposes,
because he was arguably the most significant contributor to the politics,
culture and psyche of the Mohajirs of Pakistan, who consider him their
spiritual leader. The analysis here is restricted to only those aspects of
Syed Ahmed's thought which had a direct bearing on Mohajir politics.
A prolific writer who wrote on almost every social and religious
issue, Syed Ahmed was socially and religiously liberal but politically
conservative, and looked at any change in the existing, order or any
opposition to British rule with suspicion. So enamoured was he of the
British and their modernity that when he travelled to Europe, he wrote
to a friend: 'The -natives of India, high and low, merchants and petty
shopkeepers, educated and illiterate, when contrasted with the English
in education, manners, and uprightness, are as like th~m as a dirty
animal is to an able and handsome man.' 7 He termed colonial rule as
'the most wonderful phenomenon the world has ever seen:' 8
Syed Ahmed was a representative of the Muslim landlords and what
Hamza Alavi has called the salariat9-a group of individuals equipped
with modem education to serve as scribes and functionaries in the
colonial administration., Himself being one of such functionaries
employed in the colonial administration, Syed Ahmed's main concern
was to dispel the impression that-Muslims, as erstwhile rulers oflndia,
were a threat to the British colonialists. He denied that 'Islam was
essentially an advocate of.independence.' 10 He presented a modem
rationalist version of Islam that was dismissive of the folk, syncretic
Sufi Islam'of the countryside.
 H Mohaiir EthnicNationalism165

After the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, Syed

Ahf\led changed his mind.on many of the issues that.he had so far so
vehemently supported and began to oppose them with the same vigour.
for example, in the beginning he was an advocate of Hindu-Muslim
unity and believed that, religious distinction apart, Hindus, Muslims
and Chtjstians all befongeq to one and the same nation. But soon. he
turned into a stauhch adversary of Hindus and declared, We do not
want to becpme subjects of the Hinpus jnstead of subjects of the
"people of the Book".' 11 He had oppQsed the government's encourage-
ment of the vernacular, arguing that these languages, especially Urdu,
were unfit for higher education; he therefore had called for the promotion
qfEnglish. But later, in a rather dramatic volte-face, he came to regard
English as 'the bane oflndian educatiol}.;ind Urdu its panacea.'12 First,
he was all pr;iise for Bengalis, saying that 'it was only due tQ them that
knowledge, liberty and patriotism have progressed' in India, but before
long he turned about and decreed that 'Bengalis can in no way assist our
wogress,' and warned that if 'we join the political muvement [the
Congri::ssl of the Bengalis, ou.r nation ,will reap l9ss.. : .' 13,
Gi;owing into a formidable commnalist, he demanded a special
quota for Muslims in the Indian Civil Service and favoured commu-
n,;11rather than Joint electprates. 14 He opposed the lndian National
C<'.>ngress'deman,d for repres~ntative . rule on the' ground that this
would be detrimental to Muslim interests and would bepefit only the
Hindu majority.t5 Instead,.he demani:led parity in government jobs on
the basis of quality, which he believed the Muslims ,had, rather than
quantity. 16
Syed Ahmed's ideas had disastrous consequences for the rclation-
ship between not only the Hindus and Muslims, but also between the
modernised UP Muslims and the rest of the Indian Muslims. These
same ideas were later to determine the Mohajirs' relations with the
indigenous Pal9stanis. As a spokesman of the aristocratic UP Muslims,
his concerns were restricted to the losses of his own class and the
impoverishment of tbe lower classes among the Muslims of UP did
17
not attract 4is SYIIlpathies. The main themes of his discourse were so
rigidly organised 'albng caste, birth, class and ,status .lines', that he
denounced 'the Congress for basing itself on the principle of socia)
equality among the "lowly" and the "highly" born.: 18
Syed Ahmed's class-based ideas, with ah emphasis on racial superi-
ority reflecting the Darwinian concept of natural selection that defined
communities in terms of superior and inferior races, did not, despite
 \

166 Politicsof Identity $;zrnfiillf'>

..U1

his communalism, distinguish between Hindus and Muslims-some

classes of Hindus were to him as superior as some classes and races
among Muslims were inferior. For example, among the Muslims, he
believed that it was only the 'Pathans, Syeds, Hashmi and Koreishi
whose blood (smelt) of the blood of Abraham', and therefore he hoped
that they would 'appear in glittering uniforms as Colonels and Majors
in the army ... provided (they did) not give rise to suspicions of dis-
loyalty (to the British).' 19 Naturally, in such a schema, there was little
room for Bengali and Sindhi Muslims who, mostly being Hindu con-
verts, did not have the 'blood of Abraham'.
Syed .:Ahmedis rightly regarded as the instigatdr of the two-hation
theory that termed the H1ndus and Muslims as two separate nations. It
was his d~mand for a special quota for Muslims and separate electorates
that created a communal wedge Between the Hindus and Muslims,
which later became the basis of the partition of India. Although the
details of the Muslim League's formation in 1906 are beyond the scope
of this thapter, as the concern here is only to highlight the cultural
background of the Mohajirs, it is necessary to point out that the ))atty
that created Pakistan was' founded by the 'men of property and influ-
ence' from UP who had graduated from Syed Ahmed's Aligarh Muslim
University. 20 :Jt is important to note here that because Syed Ahmed's
modernist rationalist interpretation of Islam turned it into an ideology,
he is' orie. of the main pillars of the, ideological state appatatus of
Pakista,rt'.The ideological Islam of Syed Ahmed, which had before par-
tition provided ju~fficatjon for"colonial rule and denigrated the folk
Sufi Islam ot the Indian Muslims as irrational and superstitious, bec:ime
after partition a tool in the hands of the Pakistani rulers, who have used
it to legitimise their misrule and to deny regional anci ethnic identities.

cs1947-71

The All-India Muslim League, which led Muslims to the partition of

India and th~ creation of Pakistan, was ndt only founded by the
Muslims from the United Provinces (UP) and other Muslim minority
provinces but also was domi'natea by them, before as well as after parti-
tion. In 1946-47, only 10 out of23 members of the Muslim League
Working Committee were from the future Pakistan areas. After parti-
tion, at the MuslimLeague council meeting in December1947, 160
out of300 members were 1n1migrants.21 Aftet Jinrtah's death in 1948,
 Mohajir Eth(lic~atiqnalism167

an ,aristocrat from Luckrtow, Chaudhrj Khaliqu:z;~aman,,became th<;,

Prc,sident of the 1'(1.uslitnLeague. Between 1947 and 1958, sorpe pf
tbe tnO!'iJilllportant government posts like the prime ministership, the
qiinj~tepaJ.portfolios of educatir,;m,infoml.i?-tiopand refugee rebaWlita:
tjon~ ~nd varios.pr~vinc,i,algovernorships were all held by Mohajirs. 22
1 These facts acquire .addition~! significance bt:c;:auseonly 2 per cept
of the millions oflndian Muslims who migr;i.tepto Pakistan,were from
UP. During the same period Mohajirs, pn the whole, were only.3 per cent
of the total population of Paki:,tap.,23 but, due to their over-representa-
tipn,in high-ral)kingjopsin th,e colonial administr~tion, they,came,to
dominate th~administrative structure o.f the, qew state. Af ie time of
partiti~n, there were 101 Muslim officers jn the Indian Civil Service
(JCS) and,the Indian Politi~alService fIJ?S)..Pfthese 95 (83 IC~, ~2,IPS)
op,ted for P,akistan.24-0ut of the 83 ICS officers, 49 were Urdu-speakers
frolJl minority prpvince!\.25
When tjie Mohajir-domin~ted govellJ.ment.of the first prime minister,
,Li,!qat Ali Kh,an, iqtrod4ce,d a q4q~ system for the civil sell{iq: in
September 1948, in order to increase the nm;nber 9f ,Bengalis w,h,o
were under-represented thqgil numerically a m,ajority,it wa~ framed
in a mamJhr that doubtless incr~:tsed l3engali i;epresentation but, did
not. affect the over-representatioi;i of t,,Iohajirs and Punjabis. For
il)star;ice,East Bengal ~<;;countedfqr ~6.75 per,cet of the total popqla
iion of P:\kistan, but its share in the quota was J2 pe,r.c;et;1t,V{\i!rreas
We~t Punjab had 24 p~r,cent quot:\ with 28 per, cent.share jn the pop-
ulatio. L*e\}'ise, Karachir wlwre the largest number of Mop.ajirss~t,
t).ed,receiv~d a 2 per cent sh:-ethough its population )Vasoi;ily1.Sger
cent. Furthermore, an additional 15 per cent allocation was made
e~clm1ively for potential migrants-from India. 26
The revised quot:t of N9verp.qer 1949, which redu5=es,l.theBengali
and non-:Punjabi areas'. share by 2'J.ler,q:nt an,q,allocated ~O:IJerc~nt to
themerit category, brought ev~n more bentfits to.the Mohajirs, who~e
literacy ra.~ ,at 70 per cent was the highest in P~kist;ul,,By 1950, 'o/hen
Molnjirs wer:t,2 per cent ofSinph's p9pulation,, their ~hare among the
suq;essful candidates of.the oivil, service ,examip;ition was ..~s \arge as
.46.(>p~r..cent,27 Although Moh~ir~ ~hare in no-officer ranks in te
military qas beytl mar,ginal, in .~~iqr pq~itions. (above, tqe i;an~ of
~riga,dier) it was,qisproportioQ,ately foglJ,as much1,as 23 per ffnt in
1968, '&"hent}ley he\p 11 out o4~ po:;itios.28 , ,
With: .such over-represe9t;ttion; it is ,und~rstandaple ,that Mohajir
'anp pureaucrats showed little in,clinatj91).for a 'democratic'
P,<;>litici~ns
168Politicsof IdentityriiiiiiMI

and representationa1 system of government. 29 The other dominant

ethnic group, Punjabis, was also over-represented in the power hierar-
chy, at the expense of the Bengali majority which was completely mar-
ginalised in the new state system. The fear of the Bengalis' gtowing
impatience with a system dominated by Punjabi and Mohajir politi-
cians, bureaucrats and generals became the single most important item
on the policy makers' agenda.
Playing on the Punjabi-Mohajir politicians' fears of the majority, the
bureaucrats trained in the colonial tradition devised some ingenious
plans for administrative restructuring as well as for ideological engin-
eering of the Pakistani state and society. In the process, pdlitical power
gradually slipped out of the politicians' hands and into the' control of
the bureaucracy.30 Heric'e, in addition fo their role of policy implemen:..
tation, the bureaucrats also acquired the role of policy makers. In 1955,
a scheme called One Unit was introduced to amalgamate the provinces
of West Pakistan into one province. The bbjective was to somehow
neutralise the Bengali majority, which looked to6 large in comparison
to the rest of the ethnic groups.
On the ideological plane, a 'Pakistani' identity based on the negation
of ethnic identities was projected and Urdu, the languagl:! of the
Mohajits, which the Punjabi elite had already adopted, was made the
'nationai' lahguage as well asa symbol of unity. Ethnic languages and
cultures were not only discouraged but also suppressed wherever they
tended to be more assertive. Any pro'test against these homogenising
moves and any demands for regional autonomy, representational rule
and equitable' disfrwution of resource&were translated as a direct threat
t~ the integrity of the state.
In terms of economic development, regional disparities wer'e allbwed
to increase by making Karachi and Hyderabad, where.a m;rjority of the
Urdu-speaking Mohajirs had settlecf, the centres of economic activity.
The Karachi-basea'industrial houses controlled 96 pet' cent ofMuslim-
owned private industries, over 80 p~r cent of the assets of priv.ite com-
mercial banks and almost 80 per cent of insurance companies.31 These
'robber barons' treated the east wing, whose jute export earned 60 to 80
per cent of Pakistan's foreign exchange, as a colony, and allocated most
of the earnings to support industrial development in West Pakistan}2
Such concentration of political, administrative and economic power
in the hands of M~hajirs and' Punjabis was bound t6 accentuate the
existing ethnic tensions in !he multiethnic society of Pakistan. So
almost inevitably, after the first fre'e national elections in 1970 when the
 diii i Mohajir Ethnic-Nationalism
169

Punjabi-Mohajir axis refused to hand over power to the elected Bengali

majority party, a civil war erupted in the east wing of the country, and
led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladiysh
in 1971. Before discussing post-1971 Mohajit politics, it is necessary to
examine the roots of conflict between Sindhis and Mohajirs, .asthis has
been th'e most important factor in Mohajir politics after 1971.

ajir Conflict

As noted earlier, although the Indian Muslims who migrated to

Pakistan as a result of the partition of British Irtdia belonged to many
different ethnic groups and came from various regions, it was only the
Urdu-speaking migrants who came to be known as Mohajirs. Unlike
other migrants, i.e., Punjabis, Bengalis, Gujaratis', Memons, etc., the
Urdu-speaking Muslims had no ethnic or linguistic' lini{s with the
areas }hat formecl Pakistan. Except for a literate elite, particularly
among die Pmtjabi!l,the people of Pakistan did not speak Urdu.
Mohajirs considered themsel'ves to be the real founders of the new
state, becaf.tsethe Muslim nationalist movement.was hiunched by the
Muslims of UP and had all along enjoyed the strongest support among
them, whe're.'ls the MusHins'of tltc!"Muslim-majority provinces that
fotmed Pakistan hatl warmed up to the movement only during the last
years before partition. Unlike the m.tjority of the Punjabis, who were
fofced by the cc,mmunal violence to migrate from East'Punjab to West
Punjab, Mohajirs' miwation was largely a conscious choice in the hope
of better prospects for jobs and status.33 Asthe most vocal section of
the Indian Muslims, Who came to dominate not 'Onlythe st~te struc-
ture but also the media,in Pakistan, they portrayed the whole process
of migration. as an act of sacrifice and therefore 'presumed themselves
to be there not by kind invitation but by right.' 34
Moreover, a sense of r:tcialsuperiority based on 'the 'bad science' of
a
the nineteenth century, which was inculcated in them by generation
of Aligarh graduates, coupled with a higher rate ofliteracy, made them
look down upon the indigenous people of Pakistan. Unlike these
elites, none of the ethtiic groups of Pakistan tould claim either ances-
tral links to the 'Delhi Darbar' (the Mughal Court) or a privileged
place in the colonial administration.
', Mohajirs had, and continue to have, a particularly condescending
attitude towards Sindhis.35 The unfavourable historical and political
170Politicsof Identity MM 1111

developments that have l~d to the Sindhis' socially and economically

disadvantaged position have instead been interpreted in terms, of infe-
rior and superior cultural mores. 36 Most of the Mohajir intellect.uals
have not realised that if the proximity of UP to the centre bf' the
empire had allowed Mohajirs to become a privileged section of society,
the distance and isolation of Sindh from the same was a disadvantage
for the people of Sindh, who were ruled by a local elite which had
turned the region into a land of powerful waderos(feudals) and hap~ess
landless haris(peasants). As described in Chaptet 7, the colonial system
of control continued along the same pattern, thus turning UP
Muslims into one of.the most literate groups and leaviiig Sindhis
among the least literate of the Indian Muslims.
Mohajirs' attitude towards Sindhis also betrayed a strong urban bias.
Traditionally, Sindhi Hindus dominated the urban centres ofSindh. l}ft~r
partition, most of,these Hindus migrated to, India and were replaced. by
Mohajirs. Unlike Sindhi Hindus, who despite different religiol,1beliefs
shared the culture and lan&"ageof ~indh with Sindhi Muslim~. Iy1ohaj-s
were from a different culture and ,spoke a different language. Cultufal
and linguistic. tlifference, urban and rural disparity, as welJ as,Mohajirs'
arrogance as descendants of the Muslim ruling elite, all coo.tr,ibuted to
their contemptuous attitude towards Sincl.his. ,Both Mohajirs and
Punjabis 'stereotyped Sindhis as backward, lazy and provincial.' 37
The only common link between Mphajirs and Sindhis was religion.
But that, too, could not become the basis for a cordial retatioship
because the Mohajirs' ritual, rationalised, modernised and ideological
Islam was in sharp contrast.with the folk, Sufi-influenced, S)PCr~tic
Islam of the Sindhis. 38 l'n addition, Mohajirs, rather than aqopting the
local culture and language, tried to impose their own cQ,ituralpatterns
on the local population. Fo~thetn, 'if there was to be integratiqn, it ha,,d
to be from the top of the: soc;ial:status pyramid where ,they stoqg apd
not from the bottom.' 39 The conflict between ,Mohajl,rs ang 'Sindhis
took, a serlQus turn .after the first elected prime minister of Pakistan,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi, came to power in 1971.

r tl:le1971Break-up

Pakistan's first free national elections in 1970 had some drastic-conse-

quences for the geogra'.phical,political and administrative, structure of
the:!state. As noted earliet 1 because of the Punjabi-Mohajir-dominated
 In "- Mohajir EthnicNationalism171

state establishment's miwillingness to transfer ,power to the Bengali

majority party, a civil war erupted in East Pakistan and ,resulted in the
dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in 1971. After
the dismemberment; 'Punjabis became the overwhelming ethnic
majority of Pakistan. A group that was already ruling,the country ev~n
when it, was a minority began to look like an ominous threat to the
other ethnic groups when'it became the'majority.
Ironic;tlly, the first casualty were the Mohajirs, who had previously
been partners with Punjabis in suppressing regional dissent in the
name oflslam-Urdu-Pakistan ideology. After the defeat of the army in
East Pakistan, the military handed over power to the leader, of the
majority party in the west,wing, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Sdmt! of the
Bhutto government's policies, at the federal level as well as in Sindh
province, had far-reaching consequences tor the privileged Mohajir
coAfmunity.The policies that Mohajirs, perceived to be damaging to
their itfterests included the'Ifitiohalisation of private 'sector enterprises,
teforms'in the' stn1ctbre of the civil ServiceS',the reformulation of the
qitota system and the reintFOduction of Sindhi language as a,medium
ot' insttuction in Sindh. '
As noted above, since Pakistan's creation, Karachi-based industrialists
were in almost tobl control of resources in both wings of the country.
With the separation of tlie east wing they lfbt only lost assets but also a
major soutce of foreign exchange. The Bp.utto government's' national-
isation bf banks arid insurance companies was yet anothet blow to theit
'interests. Some of the big industrial houses lo.st50 to 75 per cent of their
:t'ssets due tdnationalisation. 40 Although tl1'.egovernt'nent'genetously
compensated these industrialhouses and in actual terms a considerable
section of these 'families remained unaffected, 'they certainly lost the
official patronage which had hitherto been shc:lweredupon them. 41
Interestingly, none of'the 12 big houses,belonged to the Moh'ajir.'s
Mohajir, i.e., the Urdu speaketi ifJ.fact, half of them were Punj'abi.42 It
was not, therefore, the lo'ss of these hop~es :ts such,whichthreatened
Mohajir interests. The' damaging aspect lbf the nationalisation for
Mohajirs was that when these enterprises becamepart of thepublic
sector owned by the state, entry for employment had tb be made
through a quota-system of regulating emplo)"fnent. Dndet the circum-
stances, it was Natural for Mohajirs, whbse share in industrial labour
was as high as 90 per cent, to feel anxious, indeed frightened. 43
Although the ,quota system Had been irt existence s1nce 1948, its
reformulation was not to the liking ofMohajirs. During.General Yahya
172Politicsof Identity

Khan's martial law regime (1969-71), a new formula based on a ratio

. of 60:40 representation for rural and urban Sindh respectively was
introduced to appease the under-represented Sindhis, who were pre-
dominantly rural. 44 This was a major shift from the previous ..urban-
biased allocation, which neatly delineated the share of Karachi city, but
cobbled together the smaller provinces under 'all other (except East
Bengal and West Punjab) provinces and princely states of West
Pakistan'. 45 Under the 1973 constitution, the Bhutto government abol-
ished the special status of Karachi and brought down the percentage of
merit seats from 20 to 10. After over 25 years of privilege, Mohajirs
were for the first time confronted with the spectre of representation
based on population rather than special status.
Bhutto's reform of the civil service was yet another blow ,to
Mohajirs .wh.o, after Punjabis, had a dominant position in the bureau-
cracy. Whereas Mohajirs held almost half the senior positions in,pub-
lic enterprises, their share in private business enterptises was even
greater.46 In 1973, after the separation of the east wing, when they were
less than 8 per cent of the total population, their share pf the higher
positions in the civil service was as high as 33.5 per cent.47 MohajirS' '
may have seen the Bhutto government's dismissal of 1,300 civil
servants on charges of corruption as against their collective interest but
the more serious setback came in the shape of a system oflateral entry.
The system was introduced by Bhutto to facilitate the entry of tech-
nocrats into the state apparatus without the formality of a competitive
examination. In practice, however, it opened the gates of the state
administration to the supporters 0Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party.
Mohajirs, a majority of whom had not voted for the party, could not
expect to benefit from the system in any significant manner.
Although all these factors contributed to Mohajirs' fear of losing
their privileged position in the state system as well as in. private enter-
prise, there was real horror at the prospect of representational rule. It
is an ironic and rather unhappy aspect of Mohajir pol~tics that: before
partition they feared Hindu majority rule in an independent India, and
now, in a state they. had helped to create, they still feared majority rule,
this'time by Sindhi Muslims. Bhutto was a Sindhi and the first elected
pri.r;neminister of Pakistan. In Sindh, as in Purtjab, Bhutto's party had
won a majority. Thus 1 after one and a half decades of the One Unit,
Sindhis were once again ruling Sindh.
In July 19,72the ruling Pakistan People's Party moved a bill in the
Sindh Assembly, to reintroduce the Sindhi language as the medium of
 I Mohajir EthnicNationalism173

instruction, which status it had earlier enjoyed for more than 100 years
(1851-1958). Even before the bill was passed, Mohajirs reacted violently
and riots broke out in the urban centres of Sindh, forcing tl~e govern-'
ment to call in the army'to restore law and order. 48 It was not the first
time that Mohajh-s refused to accept the language of the majority. The
same Urdu-speaking people had, before partition, turned the United
Provinces into the main battleground in the Hindi-Urdu controversy
by refusing to accept the language of the Hindu majority. After partition,
when the constituent assembly accorded equalstatusto the language of
the Bengali majority in 1954, Mohajirs had rioted in Karachi. 49 Behind
all these protests, the real issue was that of privilege, which for its
speakers results from the dominance of a language and the jobs that
this' provides.
By the 197~, Mohajirs' jobs and phvileges had become a target
from many different directions. A'yub Khm's 'decade of development'
had widened the gap' between the rich and the poor. Although the
fuodernisation policies of the regime had led to large-scale migration
from' the countryside to urban centres, hardly any policies were
devised tQ encourage the absorption of such an influx into modern
enterprises. An increase in industrial output did not result in a match-
ing increase in the real wages of the workers; on the 'Contrary, they
declined. 50 According to an estimate; there was a fall of nearly 12 'Per
cent in industrial workers' wages irt the period 1954-67. The decline
in living standards of the majority, neglect of social seryices like health-
care and education, and growth in population were common features
in the 1960s.51
By the time Bhutto came to power, the country was economically in
shambles andshaken and demoralised by the civil war and the subse-
quent'defeat of the military in East Pakistan. Then came a devastating
oil price rise in 1973. Bhutto's erratic economic policies further wors-
ened the situation, and when available resources were 1iverted to
defence and public atlministration the already neglected social services
sector had to be squeezed e'tren tighter. 52 Duting the',Bhutto period
(1.971-77), industrial growth, which stood at 13 p'er cent during the
1960s, witnessed a 10 per cent drop', coming down to a mere 3 per
cent. 53 By 1977 the urban middle classes were under severe economic
stress. A large section bf Mohajirs belonged to these classes.
Thete was one iirtportant aspect of the Bhutto period that led to a
sea change in Mohajir politics. 'Unlike the 1947'-71 period, during
which Mohajir bureaucrats ruled and the Karachi-based industrialists
174Politicsof Identity--

prospered, the Bhutto period had weakened the bure~ucrats' hold over
state pow~r and deprived the industrialists of official patronage. Bhutto's
unintentional contribution to the political system of Pakistan was the
ascendancy of the army to the role of the most important player in power
politics, superseding its erstwhile senior partner, the civil bureaucracy.

wth of the MOM

The Bhutto government had confronted Mohajir,s with their worst

nightmare-the spectre of representational rule-a development that
they had tried so hard to avoid for decades. General Zia-ul Hag's
military dictatorship also proved to be no solace for a 'declining former
elite minority'. 54 The Zia regime was,the first truly military and aJso
the first unadulterated Punjabi rule in Pakistan. By 1983, almost,allJ9p
positions in the military administration were headed by Punjabi~.55
Many civilian departments and institutions were also brought undei;
direct military tutelage by the extensive appointp1.ents of military~"
sonnel ,to top' positions. Zia institutionalised his dictatorship through
'the military colonisatiot:\ of other institutions'. 56 To further infiltra,te
both public and private institutions, an allocation of 10 per c~nt job
quotawas made for armed forces personel. 57
During the same period, Mohajirs wttnessed a gradual decline ,in
their share of government jobs and an increase in the Sindhi share.
The Mohajir share of 46.8 per cent in senior positions in 1974 came
down to 31.5 pe,r cent in 1983. In the same category, Sindhis' ,s};iare
almost doubled,jumping fror 3.6 per cent,in 1974 to 6.8 per q:nt in
1983. Moreover between 1974 to 1989 Mohajirs lost over.SO per ,cent
of their share ,in ~he officer level posts, when their share of 30.2 ~~i;
cent dropped tp 14.8 per cent. 58
General Zia's-military.rule brought Mohajirs to tl;ieunhappy conclu-
sion that under the chang~d political circumstaces an autjioritarian
regime was as unfavourable to their interes~.as was a representational
one. Th.is was a bitter realisation for a people for whom Pakistan wasno
less than an El Qorado. Sopn the erstwhile champions of Islam and
P~kistan ideology, who had hitherto contempt9usly, opposed any,form
of ethnic and regional politics as 'narrow' and 'provincial', were ready
to embark on a political joqrney in which they would not support 'any-
thing which doesn't include the word Mohajir', not eyen the cpnstitu,
tion of Pakistan.59
 fflllliifvtill Mohajir EthnicNationalism175

,In March 1984, a group ofyoting Mohajirs, led by AltafHussain,

converted the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO),
which' they had formed in 1978, into the Mohajir Quami Moverpent
(MQM), an exclusively Mohaji'r political group advocating the rights
ofMohajirs. The son of a junior government servant from Agra, the 33
year-old Altaf Hussain carhe from a conservative religious family t~l}
lived in govem111ent quarters.6()
Initially, like the majority of Moqajirs, he was a supporter of the fun-
damentalist, Jamaat-i-Islami and its student wing, Islami Jamiat-i-
Tulaba (IJT). Later .he became disenchanted when, according to his
own account, he 'got an opportunity to see the IJT at very close quar-
ters.' The immediate reason for the formation of the APM~O was the
diffi~ulty that he and his Mohajir friendshad faced in getting admis-
sion to Karachi University, but his search for a political identity had
resulted from the hostility that he was subjected to as a Mohajir in
school, during a short military: service, and at the university. 61
.Jn August 1986, the MQM held an impressive public ri,llly' at
Nisht-ar Park, Karachi. What catapulted the MQM to fame, however,
were<the bloody Mohajir-Pukhtun clashes in Karachi,at the epd,ofthe
sable year. Although' it w:is ,not' the first time that Mohajirs and
Pukhtuns had clashed, the methods deployed' on this occasion were
unprecedent~d. There was an organised ambush 'Of selected Mohajir
localities by heavily armed men, to which Mohajir~ retaliated in the
same organised inaJJ.ner,equipped with the same,kind of sophisticated
weaponry.',What made the clashes.curious and indeed incomprehensi-
ble was that Pukhtuns and Mohajirs had little real conflict of interests.
The majority of Pukhtuns in Karachi are construction, transport and
domestic labourers living in shantytowns: jobs and accommodatioh to
which Mohajirs do not aspire ..'J'here was one tangible area' of conflict,
however,, which developed after the creation of Bangladesh. Urdu-
speaking migrants from Bihar haa after the partition oflndia settled in
East Bengal and subsequently migrated to Karachi in the 1970s. A con-
siderable pumber of these Biharis ~ere forced to live'inshantytowns
and seek jobs :of arty kirid. Pukhtun land grabbers controlled most of
the shantytowns' in Karachi. 62
This may explain why the Mohajir-Pukhtun clashes were.initially
Bihari-Pukhtun clashes, which erupted in Orangi town in April 1985 1 ~
after a Pukhtun-driven mini-bus ran over a yotiftg B,iliari girl. But the
ethnic cbnflict in Sindh and the emergence of the MQM cannot be
relegated to the status of a localised' dash of interests.
176Politicsof IdentityMW iii llil

A situation that defies a plausible explanation usually tends to

be explained by conspiracy theories. One of the theories that made
the rounds at the time suggested that the clashes were organised by the
infamous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Although the extent of the
ISI's involvement in the clashes can never be determined, its contri-
bution to the creation of the MQM is backed by ample circumstantial
evidence. 63
As noted in Chapter 7, the hanging of the popularly.elected Sindhi
prime minister, Bhutto, by the military regime in 1979 caused wide-
spread anger and resentment among Sindhis. In 1983, when the ,oppo-
sition alliance, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD),
launched an anti-martial law movement, it turned into a populat
Sindhi agitation that was put down by the armed forces after days of
clashes. One reason for the failure of the Sindhi movement was that it
was mainly rural-based and was not joined by the major towns of
Sindh, which were Mohajir-dominated.
Despite its failure, however, the Sindhi agitation shook the regime
out of its delusion of stability. It was quite obvious from the intensity
and potency of the agitation that, with the support of urban centres, it
c(;mldhave delivered a fatal blow to the regime. That propability could
not go unnoticed by the regime. After a few months, the MQM was
formed. It may have been a coincidence, but a curious one nonethe-
less, because at that time Altaf Hussain was 'very close to the deputy
martial law administrator of Sindh' .64 Later, the Sindh chief minister,
Ghous Ali Shap, ~as_,accused of giving Rs 3~ million to AltafHussain,
in response to which the chief minister is reported to have said,
'I helped it [MQM] to cutJamaat-.i-Islami to size.' 65
Doubtless, Jamaat-i-Islami's student wing, Iff, after years of support
for the military regime, had by that time become a problem as it was
protesting against the ban on student unions. But that was aminor irri-
tant. The real threat was Bhutto's PPP. It was the hatred of the 'PPP
which forced Zia, one of the most ardent supporters oflslam-Pakistan
ideology, to visit one of the most vocal opponentsof that ideology:
Sindhi nationalist G.M. Sayed. Zia's relations with Sayed, Sayed's rela-
tions with Altaf Hussain and his support for die MQM were further
indications that the MQM was created with the consent and assistance
of the regime. 66
Initially, the MQM's rhetoric was anti-Punjabi-Pukhtun and pro-
Sindhi.67 It had such cordial relations with one of the separatist Sindhi
nationalist groups, Jiye Sindh (Long Live Sindh), that the latter's
 p Mohajir EthnicNalionalism177

guards in the interior of Sindli actively supported Altaf Hussain. In

return, Altaf Hussain bowed his head to the Jiye Sindh anthem at
Ayesha Manzi! arid Liaquat Medical College 'functions.f8 The reason
behind the' Sindhi nationalists' support to tho MQM was the realisa-
tion, after the abortive Sindhi agitation, that without 'ihe help of
Mohajirs the major towns of Sindkcould 'not be persuaded to blck
their programme. The MQM's flirtation'.with Sindhis too was a tacti-'
cal move rather than a conviction-it did not want a Bengal-like situ-
ation, where Mohajirs had sided with the Pakistani establishment
against Bengalis and therefore.had to suffer'a(ter the defeat of Pakistan
aryny. It should be noted here that despite the MQM and Sindhi
nationalists' anti-Punjabi-Pukhtun rh<rtoric, the Punjabi-Pukhtun-
dominated army pall}pered them. The reason ~s theii; comIJ}on
hatred for and fear of Bhuttp's People's Party.69
The Sindhi-Mohajir-alliaqce was a,nunnatural ooe because Mohajirs
were denying.the very regional identity that Sindhis'werc; fighting for.
Therefore, it became increasingly difficult for the MQM to ally its,elf
with Sindhis and press.for its ownd~mands at the same.,time. Also,
within the MQM there.were two groups: one anti-Punjabi, te Qth.er
anti-Sindhi. 70 By.Septernber 1988, it s~emed, the anti-Si:t;idhigroup ha,d
prevailed, as the MQM had its first major clash with Sin~his.
The MQM's rise to popularity among Mohajirs has J:ieenphenom-
enal. After the Awami League of :past Bengal, the .MQM is the on!~
ethnic group in Pakistan with widespread mass support among its target
community. In 1987, it swept the local bodies elections in the urban
centres ofSindh. In the 1988 national elections, it emerged as the third
largest bloc in tb.e national assembly and, the second largest political
force in Sindh assembly.
Despite such impcessive electoral support, 11owever,the MQM
resorted to urban terrd~sm, which soqn transformed Karachi and
Hyderabad into cities of violence, looting and murder. Structurally the
most organised ethnic group in Pakistan, the MQM had a sizeablenum-
ber of hardcore criminals among its members, who, with the support of
many of its leaders, terrorised, tortured, and murdered with ,impunity.71
It introduced tb,ebhatha(forced contribution) system to which Mohajir
sbopkeepers, businessmen and industrialists were obliged to contribute.
Refusal to pay, or a sign pf dissent in MQM strongholds, could resu,ltin
torture, loss of property and even loss oflife, 72
Altaf Hussain was 'transformed into a cult figure. Initially, he was
called Altaf Bhai .(brotlter Altaf), but was soon elevated to the status of
 178Politicsof Identity

a pir (spiritual leader) and called Pir Sahib. So devout was the MQM
cadre that young Mohajirs were shot dead simply for, failing ~o qill
their leade'r Altaf Bhai.73 Journalists were terrorised into submission
and those who refused to toe the line were threatened with dire con-
sequences. The thr.eats of the MQM wern never just threats; in most
instances the)t were translated into practice. Newspaper offices were
attacked and jourd:tlists held hostage, abused and beaten.?4

er of Resolutions
Th~'People's Party's slim majority in the1988 elections obli~e&ifto
seek the MQM's support to form the government.k a condit\OI}),for
its support, the MQM pr~sented tl;).ePeople'!l Party with a,25:.point list
of demfads that was called a 'charter of resolrttions'. The ch~rter w~s,
in fact, the 'MQM policy statement, which clear1ydelineart:d its aims
and aspirations.75
The listof demapds gives a good;insight ito the dilemma Qf,the
MQM's position as well as its interests and preferences. For instance,
on the' one hand it tried to secure a separate'identity for Mohajirs by
demandin~ aseparate,nationality,repat'riatiorr of'Biliaris and' a propor-
in
tionate spare po..Ver,and on the other hand it attetnpte8 fo fotin a
eollective tegionaf iclentity wilh Sindhis by asking for issuaQ.ceof arms
licerttes-to Mohajirs and Sindhis, provisiopof plbts to 'all local resi-
dents d17indhl,' and an end to inter-provincial migration and to allot-
ment ofiocal-landt-t:omm-locals. '
1
II,'he M.QM1s,demahd for the issuance of arms licences was quite
, telling for an tJrban-based P,eople. Also noteworthy, wasthe' fac,t that
~lthdugh bne of the demands clearly asked for giving prefyrence \6,t,he
locaH in alH1.pf>0intments~ rectuitttient oflocalsto the::potice and ihtel-
ligt;nce departfn~rits'v.tas furthePemphaiisedifo a separate demand,
inditatin~tihe MQM's propensity f6r reliapce on,agencies of cohtrol
and 'cQet'citm.l;he demand for an ,'honest cdisus' was base'd on the
MQM cl:iirfl.that Mohajits wereSOper cent of the Sindh population. 76
The People'!; Pa,rty:acce'ptedthe demands out of'p6litical expediency,
and its leader, I!"enazirBhutto,l:ven,weht'~otthe extent of stYing tl:pt
'i75per cenf'ofthe points mehtiofied irt th'e-MQN.1ch:lrter of demands
. are actually from the theme ofPPP's elec'tioti,manife'stbY7 Butiihey
were'tlev~r 'irpplemente&. The' MQM Broke its alli'ance{vi.J:h'the
Pepple's Pitty' id 1989, and after die 1990 d~ttl:ons'eit\ered' a new
 Mohajir EthnicNationalism179

alliance with tqe IslamiJamhoori Ittehad (IJI). Despite the fact that th,e
MQM legislators were given ministeria(pqrtfolio~ in the federal and
Sindh cabinets, its terrorism and violence continued unabated.
0

By that time the Palastan~ esublishJilent had. lost patience. First, if

hefP.edto form the MQM Haqiqi [real], c,omprising the ~QM dissi-
dents, in order to counter the,MQM's t,tnch,allengedpower base and to
divert its supporters. When that strategy did not work, an arfny action,
the so-called 'Opera\i9,n Clean Up', was launched in 1992 to flush out
c~minal elements ai;id destroy the organisationalt structure of th\!
fv-1.QM.fit the time, Altaf Hussain wai, alre<).dyout of the country,
while, vierest of.the leadership went underground to avoid arrests.
After ,years pfterror, during ~hi~lt, l\arachi had ,viqually become a,
besieged city at the, 1I,1ercyof the MQM, normality was restored. The
optration continue~ for months and it ,c,e~inly sucq:eded in breaking
the organisational structure of the MQM. l3ut none ofits leaders could
its support ~ase be erodep. 78 Th~ continued sup-
pe arrested, nbr co1.1;Id 0

port for the MQM amqng fvi<?hajirshad,rnuch to do with the nature

anq methods of the operation itsel Fpr th~ person.nel ~arrying,out.the
oprrr,tiol}-in most cases Punjabis---every MQM sympatp.ise,ror !iym-
patliiser'~ finily ,member was,,a suspect and therefqre peservin~ of
humiliation,,aqest aqc(~ven torture. Thu~, th,e MQM's r~ign of terror
and, torture c<;llswas replaced py the r,eign of tem:,r of the army's and
Rther law enfortement agenc,ies'field investigation tf;ams.79 '

f Dem,a;ds'
In 1994, the: ~QM came up ~th a new list of dem;nd~ for,.~trikingan
alliance1\}'ith the,govemment or the opposition. A)though th~ ~eoplf s
Party gov:emment anq t!ie Muslii League oppositio1t,~oth, tri~d to
strike a deal with ~he MQM and gain, its suppo[!, the nature o(tlie
1demands,npdeit ipipossible for, both, parties to aq::epttli,em.80
Tp~, new list was unabash,edly. anJi-Sindhi a,nd urban-centred.
Unli)ce tl;iech.,arterc;,fresql~tjon~, in,whi!=h,Mopajirs a~d Sindl,iiswere
listed together for certain rights; in the new list Sindhis were men-
tioned o~ly in competition with Mohajirs., The UPite fear of repre-
sentational rule con,tinued to be the spirit of Mohajir RQ.litics,as not
only was proportional repn!sentation advocated but the rotation of
1\;:lohajirs,and S,indhis as governor ~np, Fhief ivinister ,was al~o
demanped, i~ tot~l ,c,lisregardc;,fmajpri!Y ru\e. The MQM con~inued
180Politicsof Identity t!W 41'!tla

with its exaggerated claims regarding the Mohajir population, and

hence an increase in urban quota was demanded.
Interestingly, the first demand of tHe charter of resolutions--cdnsti-
tutional declaration of Mohajl.ts as the fifth nationality-was dropped
and withdrawal of criminal cases against MQM workers and leaders
was given first priority. Unofficially however, the MQM has, instead
of a fifth nationality, floated the tdea of a fifth province. si.The deman'd
for declaring Karachi a separate province is not new. During the 1972
language riots, Mohajirs had demanded the separation otKarathifrom
Sindh. 82 The MQM's change of heart from fifth nationality io fifth
province, it seems, is the resftlt of a realisation that whereas the
demand for redrawing of administrative boundaries and establishment
of a new province is well within the prescribed limits of the constitu-
tion, the nationality aemand js ,unrealistic because the const'itution of
Pakistan does not recqgnise any nationality other than 'Pakistani'.
Despite the army operation ;md 'wide~pread arrests, however, the
law and order situation in Karachi and other cities of Sindh further
deteriorated. In 1994, in Karachi
1
alone 1,1 f3 people were killed by
snipers. By 1995, Karachi had become the most dangerous city of Asia
and was termed the 'city of death', when the number of people killed
shot u~ to 2,095. 83 For tis reason, the same year the combined forces
of various security agencies under die command of the interior
ministry were used to flush out the MQM activists. It was a more
brutal and more successful operation than the previous army opera-
tion. As a result, an 'artificial' peace was restored to the urban centres.
Violence may notbe as widespread today as 1t was in 1995, but it
continues to be part of Sindh's urban life. The Punjabi-dominated
administration's response to the issue has, as usual, been of use of
brute force against the MQM activists. Also, by creating and support-
ing the MQM Haqiqi, the establishment has been successful in weak-
ening the MQM, 'a_sthe two factions have been killing one another's
supporters with impunity. The MQM's accusation of state-sponsored
genocide of Mohajirs tnay well be an exaggeration, but the killing of
numerous Mohajirs by the security personnel cannot be denied.

usion
The MQM presents an interesting case of a privileged grouP' that has
become conscious of the gradual erosion of its dominant position in
 ~ Mohajir Ethnic
f
Nationalism
n ~,
18l

the :;tat~ ~tructure. As long as !~ere w~ unreP,resentative ,rule it;t

Pakistan and Mohajirs had an unjustifiably large share in public and
private sector ,institutions, they were the champion~ of the official
nationalism of the P~kistani state. However, the moment the balapce,
?f power shifted away from Mohajirs and the s~c'ture of job distri-
bution WjlS a\tered, tgey started, ~q express their, dis<;ontent with tl?-e
~tat~.. . ...
The paradox of Mohajir politjc~ is that viey ar1;pitted agai~st a dis-
criminatory state,and one of worst victims of thaqtate, the Sind~i~, at
the ~~me ti,rpe.Mohajirs ha,vebe~q ppp9sed to Puajabi don,iinatio of
the Pakistani state. In, Sindq, hoyvever, they_\Ia,vebeen fighting against
Sindhis~ who are equally opposed to P,!-!nja9idomination. Since the
MQM's e111ergence,it is this dichot9my of.its position, which has
made .it unacceptable on the one hand to a highly centralised, intoler-
ant and non-accommodatig Punjabi-doJllinated state establisl}plent,
and on the other hand to those npi;-ginalis!,!deth11ic groups, like,
~tdhis and,Baloch, wqo wi:;h to change .tq.e existipg administrative
str,ctu,reof the state. 1
,, 1
Jt is an irony of Mohajir politics that they are pitted ~inst a st.ate
systell1 ;o/hich they played the most significant;:role in buiJ.ding.
Throughout P<lkistai;i'shistory, Mohajir,s supported the centralising
an9 hpmogenising policies of ,the state and regarded demands for
r~giona,land ethnic par,ityas nar,row, provindal and unpatriotic. They
b;icked centralist aqd cqnservative politjcal and religious groups a!].d
looked at any change and reform,~th suspicion. In 197!, 'Yhen c,iv~l
war ,br<;?ke out in East Pakistan, Mohajirs side<;iwitp the violent bands
ofJarpaat-i-Islami 1 J\I-Shains and Al-;Baq~.~ndsuppor;ted,the Pa\cistan
army;s 1trocities against Bengalis. Dring the language rio,tsof 1972, it
wa~ the .cqservative religious _groups, Jamaat~i-Islami and J:imiat
Ulama-i-P:ikistan, who we,~ le~qing the Mqhajji;s.
As fa~ as the, Molpjirs' conflict with Sindhis is concerned, it coqtin-
ues to be ,t confrontatiqn betweell; 9t;tJr.-0f
!he most privileged and one
of the plOSt margipalis(iq, grovps. in P~stan. Despite some. gain~
during the last quarter of the 20th cer~tury:Sindhis. simtipue to be a
m;irginalised grouP,. Likewise, d.e.~piteso:rpe significant losses during
!he saine pepod 1, Mplpjirs c5mtinue to be an oyer-represented group~
In 1993,whereas urpan Sindh had an excess of95 civil ser:vants,rural
Si~dh h~<;ia,sho~~ge of106. 84 ' '

In 1998, nationalist groups formed f1\lalliaqce, Pakistan's Oppressed

~~tions Movei;nent (PONM),, for ,provinfial autonomy, but the
182Politicsof Identity

MQM took nd part iti it. Indeed, the MQM is the only ethnic group
in Pakistan that has never been able to gain the sympathies of other
ethnic groups. It is perqaps this realisation that has'led to a significant
change in the MQM's rhetoric and nom~rtclature. In 1998, it changed
its naine from Mohajir Quami Movement to Mutahida Quami
Movement (United National Movement). To drop the word Mohajir
is a significant strategic change for a group, wliich had once said tha,t it
would not accept anything that d6es not'indude the word Moliajiu
Iha rather unexpected development, the MQM has allied itself with
a separatist Siqd&i gr;oup an&in a London rally on 22 March 2000, led
by some of its top leaders, its. supporters chanted anti-Pakistan' :tnli
anti-army slogans' and resolvea to achiev;e ihdependence. 89 Alsb, its
self-exiled leader AliafHussain had mee'tings with the PONM leaders,
Attaullah Mengal and Mehmtio Khan Acnakzai, and then in
Septeinber 2000 demanded a new constitution for Pakistan in accor-
dance with the Lahore resolution. '
~The MQM's new line has brought it closer to the thinking bf Sihcil1i
and Baloch nationalists, whose' main target is the administrative struetilre
of the Pakistani state. For the first time, the MQM'has maqe provincial
autonomy rather th:m Mohajir rights the main issue. :In an interview,
Altaf Hussain said: 'Once Sindh attains fo)l provincial autonomy; the
people of urban and rural Sindh 'can sit'together and amid1.bfyres~lve tlie
question of.rights for the people <>fthe urban and'rural areas. Sindllis and
Mohajfrs are ,sons of the land ofShah'Latif(a revered'Sindhi mystic p~et)
a
.1dhave to live a,rlddi_et9.gether in ihe province of Siiidrr.'86 This is f:i,r
cry from the MQM's'anti-'Sindhi politics. This new stance inay have
surprised many but then the !vlQMhitsne\rer been'shoit Ortsufprise's. t
1
Changes in the MQM's stance', its p'olitical strategies and organ-
isational tactics, h'c.Mevet, have little to do with those hundreds of
.thousands ofMohajirs w'ho struggle oha daily oasis for a semblan~e of
a decent life for themselves ahd their fan\ilies. Mohajiri may have been
the'most privileged ethnic_foup in'Pakistan for decades, but a 1arge
number of them live in shahtytowns 'and slums with almost no bisic
am;nitieg<.Also, as an url:fan'...basedgroup: they are, amo'rfg'the best
educated, but many of them are unemployed. The emergence of the
MQM inay have' been caused by tHe Mohajir elites' frustration at
losing their privileged" position, 'but its' pheno'menaf popularity has
mo're to do with the pain that the Mohajirs have to suffer in 'their day-
to-day life rather than its ideologicar antics:''The violence that'the
MQM wreaked on the niajdrtfowns ofs'i"ndh can also be ~lained as
 Mohalir EthnicNationalism'l83

the reaction of frustrated unemployed urban youth, who could hardly

see'any prospects for a better future. The Pakistahi state may have been
successful in breaking the organi;ation;I structure of the MQM but
has. not been able to dent its support base. For that tht s~te net;ds to
respond to the needs and aspirations of Mohajirs.

eferences
1.IRushdie, 1995, p. 87.
2. !Page:1987, p. 8.
3. For a d~tailed account of the administrative cl\.anges see Misra, 1977.
4. Sarkar, 1989, p.77. '
5. Alavi, 1988, p. 72.
6. Bengali and Punjabi Muslims were 52.6 and 54.8 per cent,, respectively, of the pop-
ulation in their provinces but sc:!tured only 40 and 50 per .cent s'eats respectively in
the provincial assemblies. Mmecl, Feroz, 1998, p. 95. ~
7. Smithi Wilfred Cantwell, 1946, p. 17.
8. Ahmad, Aziz, 1967, p. 33.
9.'A!avi, 1988, p. 68.
10: Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, 1946', p., 16~Later one of his lieutenantsi Sliibli Nomani,
vterit so far .as to say that.'fidelity to the ruling power was a 'religiops ,duty for a
Muslim.' ,Ibid.;p; 43. Anti-imperialist Muslim thiitker Jamal~ Afghani vilified Syed
Ahmed as a Britillh lackey. See Choueiri, 1990, p. 38.,To ridicule his bicultural social
life and single-m'inded '.political loyalty to,.British rule, an Indian Muslim, novelist,
Nazir Ahmed,'wrote a novel Ibn al-fHiqt (The Tirrie-Sever), in which the protagonist
was a caricature bf Syed Ahmed.
11. Ahmad, Aziz, 1967, p. 43. ,,
12. Robinson, 1974, pp. 91, 96.
13. Seal, 1971, 'p. 319; Hardy, 1972, p. 130'.
14. Smith,'Wilfred Cantwell, 1946, p.'26.
15. Sayeed, 1968a, p. 18.
a6. Alavi,'1989b, p. 1529
17. Tarachand,1967, p:354.
18. Chandra 1989, p. 415,
19. Hardy, 1972, p. 130. ;t
2q.Robinson, 1974, pp. 148-49.
21. Waseem, 1989, p. 106-7. , ,, ,
22. Out of seven prime ministers during the period 1947-58,.fwo, Liaquat A1iKhan and
'I.I. Chundrigar, were Mohajirs. A conservative Mohajir ideologue, Ishtiaq Piiissain
Qureshi, was mirtister of refugee rehabilitation and thert minister of information. 'A
Mohajir educator, Dr Mahmud Hussain, was education minister. Chaudhri
Khaliquzzaman and I.I. Chundrigar were governors of East Bengal :id Punjab
respectively. See Callard, 1957, pp'. 342-45;:and Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 132.
23. Waseem, 1989, pp.,110, 114
24. Bl'!libanti, 1963, pp. 366-67. .. ' '
184Politics
of Identity

25. Sayeed, 1987,pp. 132,156

26. Waseem, 1997, p. 227. The remaining 17 percent was apocated to all other provinces
and princely states ofWest Pakistan. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 228.
28. Sayeed,'19t8b, p. 278. Sinc'e 1988, out of five chiefs of army staff, two, General
Mirza Aslam Beg and the current military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf; happen
to be Mohajirs.
29. A motion demanding a ban on all parties except the Muslim League for 21 years was
debated in the constituent assembly in 1954. S_eeNoman, 1990, p. 24.
30. For an interesting narrative of the first decade ofPakistan,'seeJalal, 1991.
31. Maniruzzaman, 1966 p. 85. Also see Arnjad, 1983, pp. 247-48.
32. Maniruzzaman, 1966, p. 89;
33. In an unpublished paper based on interviews with women from rural and-.11rban
Sindh and Punjab, Nighat Said Kha has noted that the 90 middle and lower income
interviewees said that they had not come to realise a dream but fled from a disaster,
whereas the 10 upper income women with professional backgrounds said that theirs
was a conscious choice to migrate. But the paper does not indicate the place of ori-
gin from which these women migrated, and is therefore oflittle help. The paper was
presented at the Goethe Institut Karachi's' seminar in 1996. I am grateful to the
Institut for providing me with a copy.
34. Ansari, 1998, p. 92. '
35. In an interviewwith the MQM ideologue, Hasnain Kazmi, in 1997 in Karachi, when
I pointed out to him this condescending attitude, he responded: 'It is not a conde-
scending attitude. It is an attitude based on facts. Sindhis did not have education; we
ihtroduced modem education to them.' They were under the. traditional ahd ~uper-
stitious version of Islam; we introduced them to rational Islam.'
36. A highly respected Mohajir journalist who was among the founding members of the
Marxist Progressi~e Writers' Association of India told me, off the record: 'I have no
sympathy for the MQM and its politics but I do believe that Sindhi culture is
uncouth and unimaginative.'
37. Wright, 1991, p. 304.
38. It needs to be noted here that there is a widespread romanticised secularist view of
Sufi Islam aJa very tolerant version. As Sudhir Kakar, 1995, p. 21, has pointed out:
'Many a Sufi was openly hostile to the religion and social practices of the Hindus,
paranoid--even at the zenith of Muslim power-that the Hindus would obliterate
Islamic laws, Islam, and the Muslim community if they ever captured .,political
power.' It is more useful to see Sufi Islam as a culture-belief-based system, and mod-
ernist Islam as an ideology-based system.
39. Wright, 1974, p. 191.
40. Arnjad, 1983, p'.255.
'41. Nomad, 1990, pp. 76-77.
42. Pap:viek, 1972, p. 27.
t43. Sayeed, 1980, p. 155.
44. Waseem, 1997,,p. 228.
45, Ibid., p. 227.
46. KennMy, 1991, pp. 942-43.
47. Ibid., p. 942.
48. Ahmed, Feroz, 1998, p. 41; Sayeed, 1980, p. 155.
 MohajirEthnjcNationalisrri
18S

49. Wright, 1974, p. 199.

50. Burki, 1980, p. 46.
51. Noman, 1990, p. 41.
52. Ibid., p. 86.
53. Hussain and Hussain, 1993, p. 3.
54. Wright, 1974,p.200
55. Noman, 1990, p. 41.
56. Ibid.
57. Waseem, 1997, p. 237.
58. Kennedy, 1984, p. 943.
59. The MQM chief, AltafHussain, while responping to a question whether his support
for 'a free, democratic system, with no interfere1we froqi the army' meant his sup-
port for the 1973 constitution, and the MRD's (Movement for Restoratiqn of
Democracy) demand for fresh elections, he said: 'No. We don't support anything
which doesn't include the word mohajir.' See Herald,Karachi, September 1987,
60. Information in this and the following paragraph is taken from AltafHtissain's inter-
view with HeraldKarachi September 1987.
61. Ibid.
62. I owe this information to journalist Mazhar Abbas, Sabihuddin Ghousi and Tausif
Ahmed Khan.
63. I owe this insight to a senior police officer who provided me with detailed accounts
of how the ISi would instruct him on dealing with the MQM.
64. I owe this information to Brigadier AR. Siddiqi, former director of the Pakistan
Army's Inter-Services Public Relations.
65. Sindhi nationalist and historian, Dr Hamida Khuhro, told me this in an interview
that was published in The FrontierPost, April 1990. In the same interview, she also
said: ~d it was not just by chance that the situation became' worse after the 1983
movement in Sindh. Immediately after that we saw the rise ofMQM which was cre-
ated by the military rulers to counter the Sindhis' anger at and dislike for
martial law.'
66. I owe this insight to Sabihuddin Ghousi of Dawn, Karachi.
67. One of the early MQM slogans goes: Sindhi MohajirBhai Bhai, Dothi NaswarKahan
sayaiee(Sindhis and Mohajirs are brothers. Where have these Punjabis and Pukhtuns
come from).
68. I am indebted to Khalid Mumtaz, a Karachi lawyer, who was an MQM supporter in
its early days, for this information,
69. Sabihuddin Ghousi, interview with author, Karachi 1998.
70. I owe this point to Zafar Abbas, the BBC correspondent in Islamabad.
71. See Mohammep Hanif's report 'Operation MQM', Newsline, Karachi, November
1992.
72. During the 1992 army operation against the MQM, quite a few torture cells were
unearthed at its heaqquarters.
73. Khalid Mumtaz told me that he personally witnessed such an incident.
74. One such attack occurred at the daily Dawn, Karachi, in the early 1990s. The MQM
workers forced their entry into the Dawn offices, held the editor, Alimed Ali Khan,
hostage, and threatened him with further action if anything against the MQM
appeared in the paper. The BBC correspondent, Zafar Abbas, was attacked and
beaten at his residence.
186Politics
of Identity

75. The list was published in The News, Karachi, 14 October 1994. See Appendix A.
76. A former MQM provincial minister, M.A. Jalil, made this claim in an interview with
me in 1997.
77. Amir Mir, '.Accord and Discord, Charters and Demands', The News, Karachi,
October 14199;4, p. 11.
78. Hanif, 'Operation MQM', p. 27.
79. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
80. The News, Karachi,October 14, 1994. See Appendix A.
81. Mir, '.Accordand Discord', p. 11.
82. Sayeed, 1980, p. 155.
83. Herald,special map 'City of Death', 1996.
84. Ansar Abbasi, 'Regional quotas, federal services', The News, Karachi, October 14,
1994, p. 11.
85. Dawn, 23 March2000
86. Herald,November ~000.
 9
At a Crossroaqs
as 'EverBefore'l

Pakistan today stands at the crossroads of its destiny-a destiny

which is in pur hands to make or break. Fifty-lwo years ago, we
started with a beacon of hope and today.that beacon is no more1
and we stand in darkness.
-General Perve~ Musharraf1
d,1 i,J ,t l
1

There can be ljttle dispu'ie over the righ~ of indivi?als or

groups to
insis~ on their i individuality and their separatenes~. Therefore 'the
Muslim -League's. insistence and empliasis' onthe separateness of the
In<;lianMuslims was as justified as._the Inaian Nati~nal 1 c;ongress'
emphasis on all-India nationalism. But the J~us-facedness of nati~n-
alism is such that the moment it achieves its go;ils it repudiates w4at it
!it1d.foughtfat. On 23 March 1940 Jinnah had said:'' '

Notwithstanding thousand years of close cohtact, ~ationalities

~hich are as 'di;ergent today as ever canbot at ''ar;iy'time be
expected to transform themselves into pne nation merely by
mean~ of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and hold-
ing them forcibly together by unnatural and'artificial'methods ~f
British P;rliam~nt;arystatutes.... It is inconceivable that the fiat or
the writ of a government ... can ever command a willing and loyal'
ol",edience.. .,'except by,me~s of armed force behind it/

But'aiM-ach1evingthe state,Jinnah and oth'errulers of Pakistantr(~d the

'incon'ceiv'\ble': to build a nation through die fi,at'9r the writ ofa govern-
ment; on the basis'ofurau and Islam. Qisinissing elected governments in
tfie provih<;;es;fprcing Bengalig to adopt Urdu as a national langage;
terming any voice of ethnic discontent as provincialism and against the
int'erestsof the national sclte-all were a tepudiation of what the Muslim
League had proclaimecl to stan'd fot before partition'.'
188Politicsof Identity!PtftrnM

But this fact is ignored by those historians, Pakistani as well as western,

who like to present the political his.tory of Pakistan as a kind of derail-
ment from the democratic and constitutional path to a bureaucratic-
military authoritari;mism.; The obviqussimpljcafion v,tha! Pakistan's
1

founder had placed the country on a democratic path 'but his death
allowed the rise of power-seeking politicians and bureaucrats who had
no desire to see the country as a democratic state. This is an officially
certified lie! It has two purposes: first, to place the founder of the state
on the high pedestal of a champion of democracy, and second, to lam-
bast the rest of the politicians who followed Jinnah as the destroyers of
democracy.
Military dictators have followed this reasoning to justify their repeated
disruptions of the political process. The official historians of, Pakistan
have used it to legitimise various spells of misrule. This is understand-
able; But the irony is that even many independent and left-wing writers
have succumbed to this trend. For instance, a leftist writer, IA Rehman,
while writing against the Nawaz Sharif government'~ iqtentions to
further Islamise the constitution, resorts to such rhetoric: 'The struggle
for Pakistan was led by people who wanted to create a mode~de~o~-
ratic state' in which the will of the people would be supreme.'.f
Who were those people and what proves that they wanted to establi~h
democracy? The writer does not spell it out, but it' is obviou~ that he 'has
the leaders of the Muslim League in minq. A rather unhappy aspect of
Pakistan's history, however, is that aU.avail;bleevidence indi~ates that the
struggle for Pakistan was led not'by those ,who ~t~d the supremacy of
the will of the people, but by those who fe~ed this; it was ~.movement
led by th?se vyhowere not willing to accept a Hidu majority rule unde,r a
represe~tative (democratic?) system.,
My main concern in the preceding chapters has been to demystify
nationalisll}. It seems to me that it is not only thf nationalists who have
alwar,s tried to ;my,stify nationalism, but al~o all those theoretici 1ns
who, like Anthony Smith, insist that 'ethniF nationalisms do qot gen-
erally correlate with economic trends,' and that the 'power of these
pqlitical forces must be traced back to the "ethnic substratum" of cqllec-
tiye identity and community.' 5 On the contrary, my argun:i,enti; !hat
while ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are_not new, ethnic nationa\ism-
the pqliticisation of ethnicity-is a recent phenomenon, whiFh owes
much of the credit for i~ rise to modem institutions like the moaem
state, indu;trial capi~alis~ and communicati?,n~. Of the~~. 'owe;,~r:
the modern state plays the most pivptal roly, because it copstructs,
 IRA I At a Crossroadsas 'EverBefore'!189

preserves and transmits national identities, and connects them to other

interests through the parliament, popular literature, courts, schools,
labour markets, etc.6 Jt should also oe noted that because the modem
state, as the manager of economy, requires that individuals, groups and
classes 'look up to it, ethnic nationalism is al~;ys centred around the
state.
The politics of the four c:!thnicgroups that I have' studied clearly
demonstrate that 'it is not only economic' trends that are correlated to
their' prefererlces, but that there is also adirect link between their poli-
cies and their distance from or pro?{imity to the state structure. The
Pukhtun nationalists' journey from separatism to integrationism l'ias
been a journey from Pukhtuns' exclusion from state institutions to
their present qver-representation., Likewise, Mohajirs' }'mmey from
ardent support for state nationalism to separatist rhetoric is rather too
obviously linked with th~ir downslide from their position of dominance
in the state structure. On the 6thet hand, the two most marginalised
groups, Sindhis and Baloch, have been as consistently nationalistic as
their distance from the state has been unchanging.
Yet another interesting po.int that emetges from the fout movemen~
is that the P.owei:bf dies~ political forces cabnot be traced back to the
";tlinic substratum' ot collective identity and commtinity. On the con-
trary, it lies very much in their social, econon'lic and' political location
within the state system. Culture, history and language have been part
of the symbolic and rhetorical armoury of these movements but not of
their actual political agendas. As we have seen in the case of Pukhtun
nationalism, a return to the ethnic substratum of collective identity can
sometimes well go against the political agenda of anethnic movement.
For instance, despite Pukhtun nationalists' rhetoric about their glori-
ous past, when it came to the question of rem;iiting with their ethqic
substratum in Afghanistan they refused it, saying that they tlid not
want to unite with those 'naked' people. Also, Pukhtun nationalists
have shown little concern for the Pukhtuns of Baloc;histanwho want
to be part of the NWFP.
The MQM too presents a good example of the fact that tracing the
power of a political group back to the ethnic substratum can be mis-
leading. Mohajirs are not a monolithic group but a combination of
various ethnic groups from different parts oflndia. It is not the ethnic
past but their present distance from the indigenous groups in Pakistan
0

that has given them a sense 0fidentity and community. For strength-
ening that sense they do not look back beyond the partition of India,
190Politicsof Identity .

except in symbolic terms-by extolling Syed Ahmed Khan and

Maulana Hasrat M,ohani as ~eir spiritual leaders for instance.
Ethnic n~tionalism in the case of Pakistan is, ft seems to me, no,t too
complex an issue, because. there is.neither subtlety nor scphistication
in the state system of Pakistan. One ste~ a clear pattern of ethnic dis-
affection and an unambiguously crude response of the state to such
disaffection. Ethnic movements in Pakistan have always been centred
around pro~ncial autonomy and a share in the central government.
But the iSta~eh~s l:}belledthem secessionist and thus for~ed them into
that role. The Bengalis succeeded, the Baloch failed, and the .lv\ohajirs,
it seems,,are figh~in,ga ]osing battle. ,
Paki,stan'sis only one tale in the huge anthology of the nation.states.
Thfi )iistcmr of Pakistan is the hist~ry of the formation ~fa natfop ..state,
and ,the n,tion-state is,.a worldwide phe~~menon. Tqeref9re,, many
aspects of Pakistan's history havs a remarkaqf~ similaritx with oth~r
postcolonial states. The'names of the characters
i ,.. fl
in the Pakistani drama
'f

may be diff:rent, but t}:ieirroles have a striking;-~s~mbl,ancewith t,hose

of players elsewhere. Pakistan is one o( those unhappy; ~ountries
t I .J
that
l' 1

have some hope only when a,,new government comes tp.,power, but
that ];iope n~ver lasts more thaq a 'few months. ;rp.at is.w:hy,9eneral
Musharraf talked, about the pr~vailing darkess when he. carpe to
power, 19nly (q im1;>ly. that a new era s~.all davvn now thit ,he, l]as
deposed a corrupt pripie ministq; But qothing pas changed si'nce t,en,
and once again t~e hope i~ lost. P;ilqstan is certainly standing at a cross-
roads, pt,' 1unfortnatelx, not one whe~e one path leads to. 'a beacon .of
hope' and the,ot~er to-darkness, ~s the, generalyut it. But at a cross-
roads vyhere, paraphrasing Woody Allen, one path leads to despair and
hopelessness, and the other to more poverty, repression, corruption
and ethni~ and sectw-ianviole11ce.L~t us pray p~kistanis have the wis~
dom to choosr c9n;ectly.7
I'

eferences
1. General Pervez J14usharrafs address to the nation on 17 October 1999. Excerpts pub-
li;hea'in'He,~ld, Karachi, November 1999. '
2. Jinn'ah, 1991, 'p.'17.
3. It is this 'group of historians who like tb term Pakistan' a 'failirlg state' and a 'failed
. state'. Recently, an American writer, Allen McGrath, has titled his book The Destruction
ofPakistan'sDemqcra,CJ' (~rachi: Oxford \Jniversity Pres~ 1998), de~cribing the palace
intrigues and filibusterin of the early year,;.
9

 At a Crossroads
as 'EverBefore'!191

4. I. A Rehman, 'The Divine Right of Nawaz Sharif?', Newsline, September 1998,

p. 19.
5. Smith, Anthony, 1995, pp. 73, 58.
6. Breuilly, 1996, p. 154.
7. Woody Allen's saying goes: 'More than any other rime in history, mankind faces a
crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total
~nction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.' Sherrin, 1996, p. 60.

....
 AppendixA

er of Resolutions
1. Mohajirs be constitutionally declared a separate nationality in Pakistan.
2. Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh be accepted and repatriated as
Pakistanis.
3. Sindh domicile should only be given to those who have been residents
of Sindh at least for 25 years, except those who settled in Sindh after
the fall of Dhaka.
4. Only locals be recruite<;Ito all police and intelligence departments, and
appointed in the province.
5. Arms licences be issued to Mohajirs and Sindhis and the procedure be
simplified as in the case of radio and TV licences.
6. Afghan refugees be shifted to camps near the Pak-Afghan border and
not be allowed to buy property in Karachi and Hyderabad.
7. All immigrants into Sindh from other provinces be providedjobs in their
respective areas in order to arrest the increase in Sindh's population.
8. KachiAbadis(slums) set up by; 1978 be relinquished and land grabbing
_bedeclared a crime.
9. Locals be given first preference for all government, semi-government,
corporations and administrative jobs, from the lowest to the highest
level. All ~on_-localsalready posted in the positions be sent to their
respective provinces.
10. A modern and fast transport system be introduced in Karachi and
Hyderabad and government transport be given to municipalities.
11. Only locals of Sindh be given the right to vote as hundreds of thou-
sands of non-locals are enjoying voting rights in Sindh.
12. Minimum voting age be reduced to 18 years.
13. An honest census be held to determine the population of Sindhis and
Mohajirs; Mohajirs be given their proportionate share in power, jobs
and educational institutions, both in the centre and the provinces.
14. A joint committee comprising elected representatives of Sindhis and
Mohajirs be set up to implement the quota system in a fair and just
manner.
15. Uniform service and retirement rules be made for all federal, provin-
cial, government and semi-government departments and corporations.
16. The Khokrapar rail route with India be immediately r~opened.
 AppendixA 193

17. The same postal tariff be fixed for India as is applied to other
neighbouring countries of Pakistan.
18. A new hospital be set up, attached to Sindh Medical College.
19. Land allotments as reward to non-locals be stopped.
20. All local residents ofSindh who do not own a house, be provided plots
at concessional rates and loans be given to help them build their
houses.
21. Karachi Electrical Supply Corporation (KESC) be separated from the
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), and all non-
locals in KESC.be deputed to WAPDA.
22. Municipal committees be given the right to collect motor vehicle tax.
23. Fuel adjustment charges be made uniform throughout the country.
24. Sindh government be authorised to collect sales tax.
25. Annual ursof Shah LatifBhitai and death anniversary ofLiaqat Ali Khan
be declared national public holidays and observed as national days.

d Listof Demands
1. Unconditional withdrawal of all criminal cases registered against the
MQM workers and leaders during the army's Sindh operation includ-
ing the cases against Altaf Hussain.
2. Windi.J].gup the army's Sindh operation and withdrawal of all military
and paramilitary troops from Sindh.
3. Constitution of a tribunal to probe extra-judicial killings during
Operation Clean Up.
4. Mohajir representation in the national and provincial assembl\es and
in the senate in accordance with their actual population.
5. The long-awajted national census be conducted under an impartial
authority to ensure proportionate representation of Mohajirs.
6. Revision of the electoral boundaries of Sindh.
7. Enhancing the urban,quota from 7.6 per cent to 9.5 per cent and from
40 per cent to 50 per cent in the federal and provincial services respec-
tively in accordance with the strength of their population.
8. The spirit of democracy demands that all sections of population are
represented in the gove'rnment. Therefore, the positions of governor
and chief minister Sindh be shared in rotation by Mohajirs and
Sindhis.
9. The urban areas of Sindh should receive proportionate share of the
federal and provincial funds for development.
10. Repatriation of stranded Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan be carried
out without further delay.
194Politicsof Identity

11. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, Hyderabad Municipal

Corporation and other municipal bodies be made autonomous and
allowed to govern their affairs freely.
12. All employees arbitrarily sacked or removed from federal, provincial
and semi-government services since July 1992 be reinstated.
13. Recruitment of Mohajirs be made in the Sindh police on emergency
basis to make it proportionate according to their population ratio.
14. Effective measures be taken to.ensur~ access ofMohajir students to the
educational instifutions of interior Sindh .
.15. The ban on MQM's political activities be lifted, and its constitutional
and democratic rights to freely participate in political activities be
restored.
16. Those affected during Sindh operation be fully compensated for their
loss of properties.
17. The arbitrarily superseded elected local bodies of Sindh be restored
forthwith till fresh LB elections e held.
18. Official patronage to the MQM Haqiqi be stopped and those involved
in crimes be arrested immediately.
 AppendixB
Listof Interviewsand Informal
Conversations !
(19'97,1998)
; l !

chi
1. Mazhar Abbas - Journalist
2. Ghafoor Ahmed- Naib Amir ofJamat IslaJlli
3. Manzur Ahmed -Academic
4. Hameed Akhund - Civil s~rvan,t
5. Hamza Alavi - Sociologist
6. J\ararnat Ali.- Labour aptjvist
7. Baber Ayaz - Journalist
8. Ishtiaq Azhar - MQM Senator
9. Hussain Haqani - Former advisor to prime ministers Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
10. Arif Hassan -Town plaiine; and writer "t
11. Karar Hussain - Former vice-chancellor of Balo,chistan
University
12. Zahid Hussain - Journalist ,
13. Fakhtudin G. Ibrahim - Former judge, governor of Sindh
and federal minister, Karachi
14. Khalid Ishaq -Former member'ofZia's Majlis.:.i:Shura
15. Ghaurul Islam - Journalist ,
16. JameelJalibi - Former vice'chancellor of Karachi University
17. MA Jalil - MQM leader, former minister of education in
Sindh
18. Hasnain Kazmi - MQM Ideologue
19. Tausif Ahmed Khan - Jour:di~f .
20. Ahmed Ali Khan -Editor-in-chief, Dawn
21. Makhdoom Ali Khan - Lawyer
22. Akhtar Hamt;ed 'K1i:tn----;,tO};lf\derof O,rangi pil9t Project ,
23. Harnida Khuhro - S.ind\ii nationalist po,litic;ial\and_historian
24. Nisar Khuhro -;- President, Paki~tan P~ople) Party, ~indh
25. ~her Baz Khan,~~ari - Natio,Qalistpoliti,cian1
26. Khalid Mumtaz - Lawyer, former MQM member
196 Politicsof Identity

27. YusufMustiklfan - Bal:xh natio1t1.alistpolitician

28. Farooq Sattar - MQM leader and former mayor of Karachi
29. Ghulam Mustafa Shah -Academic and former federal educa-
tio~ 'minister "
30. Imdad: Mohammad,Shah - Sjnqhi qationalis~ pplitician
31. A.R. Siddiqi - Former director, Ihter-Seivices Public
Relations (ISPR)
32. Tasp.e~mSiddiqi - Senior civil servant
33. Zohra Yusuf- Journalist

bad
1. Zafar Abbas - Journalist
2. Eqbal Ahmed'- Academic, ~ctivist
3. Aslam Azhar - Founder directot general of Pakistan Television
4. Sikandar Hayat - Academic
5. IqbalJafer - Senior"civil servant
6. Omer Asghar Khan - Founder of an NGO, 'S.11ngi',and
federal minister 1999-2002

ore
' J
1. Durre Ahmed - Academic
2. Mubarek Ali -Academic
;3. Ijaz,Batalvi,- 'fublic,,prpsecutor, in.Bhutto trial case, defence
council in Nawaz Sharif case
4. I.4-Rehtpan , - ,Dir~ctor I-Jman Rights Coll].mission of
Pakistan
5. Rubina Saigol,-.1\cademic
6. Aziz Siddiqi -,Journ~.li~t.

sadda,Mordan ,
'
1. A,shraf.(\deel - Academic
2. 'Latif Afridi ......!.!Pukhtun nationalist politician
3. 1zi:i1fiqar Gilani _!... DirJctor, 'Edticati'on' and Resource Centre,
how vice-charl'cellor of Peshawar U ni~~rsity
4. Qaiser Khan ___'.!D,i~senting high c<?urtjudge in Bhutto trial case
 AppendixB 197

5. Wali Khan - Vetera ,Puk!i~n pationalist politician, son of

Ghaffar Khan
6. Afrasiab Khattak - Pukhtun nationalist, director of human
rights commission r
7. Iqbal Tajik-Academic
8. Khalid Saeed .---Acaaemic
9. Asfandyar Wali _:_ President, Aw,\-miNational Part)!

' t
1. Mehmud Khan Achakzai ---" President, Pushtunkhwa Awami
Milli party '
2. Abdul Hayee Baloch - President Baloch National Movement
3. Akbar Btir-.+?
51,..1.- Baloch
. politician, fomier chief mirlistef
{ .r
and
governor of Baloch1stan '
4. Tahir Mohammad K4an :..._Former federal information minister
5. Inayatullah Kh:tn - Pukhtun n;~io~alist politici:u'i

abad
1. Ibra\iimJoyo - Sin9hi a,ctivist and historian
.~. Rasu) Bux Palijo - Sindhi :nationalist.politician

,.l
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 Index
absolutist state, 30, 33-34 Balochistan Reserve Police, 119
Achakzai, Mehmud Khan, 124, 182 Baloch ethnic group, 15, 25-26, 143,
administrative state, 33-34 181,189
Adorno, Theodor, 32, 36, 83 Baloch national movement, 40
Ahmed, Azizuddin, 144 Bengali nationalism, 23
Ahmed, Feroz, 23 Bengalis' ethnic group, 15, 20-21, 23,
Ahmedi sect of Islam, 74 25,63,66
Alavi, Hamza, 18, 165 Bhashani, Maulana, 103
Al-Badar, 181 Bhitai, Shah Abdul Latif, 149
Al-Baluch, 114 Bhurgri, Ghulam Mohammad, 132
Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, 63, 141 Bhutto, Benazir, 127, 153-54, 178
Allen, Woody, 31, 190 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 67-68, 74--75,
All-India Muslim League, 69, 166 117-19, 123,127, 144-46, 148-52,
All-Pakistan Mohajir Students 170:-74, 177
Organisation (APMSO), 151, 175 Bizenjo, Ghous'Bux, 117
Al-Shams, 181 Bobbio,32
Alvi, Hamza, 77-78 Brahui ethnic group, 110
Anderson, Benedict, 18, 37, Brecht, 16
41-42, 84, 114 Breuilly,John, 16, 109
Anjuman-e-Islahe Afghania, 93 British Cabinet Mission (1946), 115
anti-colonial and nationalist Brueilly, John, 84
movement, 92 bureaucratic landlordism, 49
anti-colonial nationalism, 31, 55-58 Burki, Shahid Javed, 22
Awami League, 177
Awami National Party (ANP), 102-5 Cabinet Mission Plan, 69
Azad Balochistan Movement, 118 capitalism, development of, 33, 49-50
captive state, 77-80
Babur, 85 Ca.roe, Olaf, 86-!87
Baloch nationalism, 109-25; accession centralised state system, 62
to Pakistan, 114--16; colonial Chatterjee,Partha,40:-42,61
administration and, 111-13;' Chundrigar, I.I., 22 '
economic change and, 113-14; colonial administration, system of,
emergence of, 109-11, 114--16; 54--57, 64
insurgency during' 1973-77, colonial state, colonial difference and,
116-25; pauperization and, 113-14 45-58; in India, 49--55;
Baloch Students Organisation nationalisation of in Pakistan, 61--SO
(BSO), 120 Comaroff,Jean, 127
Balochistan, accession to Pakistan, 109, Comaroff,John, 127
114--16; colonial division of, Council for the Betterment of
111-13; economic change and Afghans, 93
pauperisation, 113-14; insurgency, Cunningham, 95, 98
116-25; socio-cultural and
historical aspect, 110-11; White Daultana, 21
Paper on, 117-19, 121 Dawn,23
208 Politicsof Identity

Delhi Darbar (Mughal Court), 169 ideological power, 32

divided society, 47 Iftikharuddin, Mian, 21
Dupree, Louis, 87 Illahi Bux, Pir, 141
Durand Line, 84, 97, 100, 112 India, colonial state in, 49-55;
pre-colonial state in, 46-49
East India Company, 52-53 Indian Independence Act, 62
economic power, 32 Indian National Congress, 15, 40, 64,
ethnic conflict, ethnicity and, 28; in 93-98, 135-36, 164-65, 187
Pakistan, 20, 24-26; nationalist lndi~ society, impact of modern state
violence and, 28--29 system on, 45, 55-56
ethnic nationalism, 23-25, 38, 188--90 indigenous middle class, 56
ethnicity and nationalism, 24 industrial capital, and modern state,
EthnicityantlPoliticsin Pakistan,23 35,39-40
ethnicity and state, 23-25, 28--31 Institute ofSindhology, 146
European Economic Commission Intet'-Services Intelligence' (ISi),
(EEC), 122 153-54, 176
Iqbal, Mohammad, 146,
feudal system, 48 Islam-Urdu-Pakistanideology, 171, 176
feudalism, in Sindh, 128--29 Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic
Focuson Baluchistanand Pushtoon Democratic Alliance): 153-55, 179
Question,23 IslamiJamiat-i-Tulaba (IJT), 175-76
Foucault, Michel, 16, 24,
33-34,49,52 Jalal, Ayesha, 19-21
fragmented society, 47 Jamaat-i-Islami, 7'?, 102, 151, 162,
Frontier Crimes Regulations', 86 175-76, 181
Jamiat Ulama-i-lslam (JUI), 102-3,
Gandhi, Mohandas, 17-18, 92, 99 i 116,151
Gellner, Ernest, 19, 32, 37, 40, 42-43, Jamiat Ulama-i-Pakistan, 181
84, 90, 110, 114 Jamiat-ul-Ulama, 95
Goldsmid line~ 112 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 15, 17-18, 62,
Government of India Act. ?f 1935, 69-72,98, 114-16, 138, 140-41,
58,62, 103, 141-42 166, 187-88
governmental state, 33-34 Jiye Sindh, !51, 176--77
governor general, powers of, 62 Jiye Sindh Students Federation
Guddu Barrage, 144 (JSSF),, 154.
justice, state of, 33-34
Hari Enquiry Co'mmittee
(1947), 134 Kalat National Party, 114
Haroon: Yusuf, 141 Kalat state, 111-12, 114-16
Harrison, Selig, 119
,, Kautsky, 23
I;Iassan 1 Arif, 147 Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhri, 22, 167
Herald,77 Khan Saheb, 62, 94, 96--98
Hindu-Muslim riots, 97 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, 26, 92-94,
Hobsbawm, Eric)., 42-43 96--99, 102
Horkheimer (Adorno and)".36 Khan, Abdurrehman,,91
firoch, Miroslav, 42-43 Khan, Arnanullah, 91-92
Hussain, Altaf, 151, 175-77, 179, 182 Khan,Ayub, 73-74, 76,173
Hussain, Ghulam, 136 Khan, Habibullah, 91
 Index209

Khan, LiaquatAli, 19, 22, 72, 167 Sindhis, 169--70; ethnic

Khan, Nasir, 111 nationalism,' 161--81; language
Khan,Nauroz, 116 issue, 172--73; MQM and, 161--63,
Khan, Syed Ahmed, 164-65, 190 174-79; politics of (1947-71),
Khan, Wali, 102-3, 118, 123 166---69;post-1971 politics,
Khan,)"ahya, 74, 76,148, 171-72 170-74; Pukhtun clashes, 175;
Khans,88--92,94-95, 103 Sindhi alliance, 177; socio-
Khilafat movement, 93 economic and historical
Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of god) background, 163--Q6
movement, 83, 92--96 Mohajirs ethnic group, 15--16, 21-23,
Khuhro, Ayub, 140--41, 143 25--26,63-64,66---68, 70,101,190
Khuhro, MA, 63 Mohani, Maulana Hasrat, 190
Kotri Barrage, 144 Morley-Min'to Reforms, 133
Movement for Restoration of
Lahore Resolution of 1940, 69, 136, 182 Democracy (MRD), 68, 150, 176
landownership, 54-56 Mughal empire, state system of, 47
Language Bill, 147 Muhammad, Ghulam, 72
Latif; Shah, 182 Musharraf; Pervez, 105, 124, 187, 190
Lenin, 23 Muslim 'League,15, 22, 62, 64, 69,
liberal state, 30 93--98, 133, i3S--36, 139-40, 142,
Lucknow Pact of 1916, 164 151,153,162, 166---67,179, 187--88
Muslim nationalist'movement, 169
Macaulay,' 22 Muslifn separatism, 46
Marri, Khair'6ux, 124 Mutahida Quami Mo\fement (United
Marx, Karl, 35, 45 National Movement), 182
Mengal, Attaullah, 123, 182
Mill,John Stuart, 52 Nairn, Tom, 41'
Mirza, Islcander, 72-73 nation-state system, 32--33; 36, 49,
Modem state, as imtrument of 65,68:190
capitalist expansion, 30, 52; basis National A~ami Party(NAP), 102--3,
of, 51; character of, 84;emergence 116--21
of, 31-36, 39-40, 49; forms of, national movements, 29, 39-40, 43
33--j4; ideological 'underpinnings nationalism, anti-colonial, 31, 55--58;
of, 50-51, 57;irtd'ustrial capitalism Balo<!hethnic nationalism,
and, 35, 29-40; powerful 10g-25; Bengali, 23; dealing with,
institutions of, 78--79; role of, 42; 40-43; definition of, 37;
seealso,.state; ~tern of, 45, 109; em,ergence of, 109--10; etli'ni~ity
tenet of, 51 ' and, 23--25, 28--31, 38; materialism
Mohajir nationalism, 23 of, 42; Mohajir, 23; 'hation-ness
Mohajir Quami (National) Movement and, 36; p~litical power of, 37, 41;
(MQM), 16,68, 151-55, 161--63; politics of, 41; Pukhtun ethnic
charter of resolutions, 178--79, nationalism, 23, 26, 83-105;
192--93;ctemands, 179-80, 193-94; Sindhi, 23; social bases of, 38--40;
distinctive features of, 162-63; state and, 29, 38, 57, 109;
haqiqi, 179-80; rise ~d growth of, unwl!rsali~ of, 37
174-78 nationalist and ethnic violence, 28--31
Mohajirs, 138--40, 142,-43, 145--48, nationalist movc!metn, em'ergence of,
,151-53, 190; conflicts with 90-100
210 Politicsof Identity

nationalist populism, 39 Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 102, 117,

NationalistThoughtand the Colonial 127, 145-46, 150-56, 172, 176-79
World,41 Pakistan Resolution, 136
Nehru,Jawaharlal, 87 Pakistan's ()ppressed Nationalist
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15, 28 Movement(P()NM), 105,123,
Noman,()me~ 116 181-82
Pathans,The,86
()bjective Resolution, of Liaquat Ali Permanent Settlement Act of 1793, 53
Khan, 72-73 Firs,88-92, 94-95
()ne Unit Scheme of 1955, Pakistan, political power, 32-33, 35; forms and
21,66,98, 116, 142-45, 148, economies of, 33-34; of
156,172 nationalism, 37, 41
()peration Clean Up, 155, 179 populism concept, 39
()rientalism, 51 pre-colonial state, in India, 46-49
pre-modem states, 34-35
Pakistan, Baloch ethnic nationalism print capitalism, 84, 109, 114, 127
and, 109-25; captive staJe, 77-80; Province ofWest Pakistan (Dissolution)
centre-province relations in, 20, ()rder, 1970, 144
116-19; constitution of 1956, 73; Public and Representative ()ffices
constitution of 1962, 73; (Disqualification) Act (PR()DA),
constitution of 1973, 74, 103; 141,143
contract-oppression approach to Pukhtun, 98
power in, 24~demand for creation Pukhtun nationalism, 23, 26, 40
ot; 68-70; domination-repression Pukhtuns ethnic group, 15, 24-26, 63,
approach to power in, 24; election 67--68, 110,143, 148-50, 175,189;
in, 66-67; ethnic conflict in, 20, economic changes under colonial
24-26; ethnic discontent in 66-68; rule, 88-90; ethnic nationalism,
ethnic groups self-assertion in, 15; 83-105; from separatism to
institutional interests, 20-21; Islam integrationism, 83-105; integration
and ideology ot; 68-77; language into Pakistani state system,
issue, 66, 70; martial_,-.u;_c::,,
6;3---64; 100-103;Jawaharlal N~hru on, 87;
militarisation of state in, 65-68; Lc;>uisDupree on, 87; martial
military-bureaucratic races, 86, 89,; 101; nationalist
authoritarianism in, 63, ~5; movement, 90-100; ()lafC':aroe
nationalisation of colonial state in, on, 86-87; Pukhtunwali,86, 88, 91;
61-80; political history, ot; 18-20; resistance and "Orientalmyths,.
political instability in, 65-66;. 86-88; socio-econm;nic and
political life in, 16; politics ot; 16; historical aspect, 84-86
power struggles in, 22-25; Punjab Alienation ofLand.4ct, 92
Pukhtun ethnic natidnalism and, Punjabisethnic group~ 15-16, 20-21,
83-105; Punjabi-Mohajir 23, 25, 63--64, 66-68, 96, 98-99,
domination in, 63--66, 83, 99, 119, 101,110, 142;-45, 148-50, 167--69,
138, 142-44, 148,152, 168-71, 171, 174, 179, 1?1
177, 180; role of state in, 25-26 Pushtunkhwa Milli Aw.ni (nation
Pakistan Industrial Developmc;oi people's) ,Party (PMAP), 124
Corporation, 143
Pakistan.Musljm League (PML), 102 Quit Balqchisn movement, 114
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 75 Quran, 72-74
 Index 211

RAND Corporation Trip Report , 122 social power, definition of, 32

Rehman, I.A., 188 SocialPreconditions ofNationalRevivalin
Renan, 38 Europe,43
Robinson, Francis, 46 Soomro, Allah Bux, 136
rulers and ruled, racial differences sovereignty, concept of, 51
between, 57 Stalin, 23
Rushdie, Salman, 61, 161 state, administrative state, 33--34;
colonial difference and, 45-58;
Said, Edward, 51 colonial state, 49--55; emergence of
Sandeman system, of administration, 112 modem state, 31-36, 39-40, 49;
Sattar, Pirzada Abdus, 142-43 ethnicity and, 36-38;
Sayed, G.M., 15, 136, 144, 150-51, 176 governmental state, 33--34;
Shah, GhousAli, 176 ' industrial capital and. 35, 39-40;
ShahiJirga, 112, 115 militaris;tion 9f, 65-68;
Shakirullah, Maulana, 95 natioqalism and, 29, 38, 57; of
Sharif, Nawaz, 105, 154-55, 188 justice, 33--34; pre-colonial, 46-49;
Shia Mujahideen group, 104 pre-modem, 34-35; role of; 25-26,
Sindh, agriculture in, 130-31; Bhutto 32, 34, 42; role of religion in
interregnum, 144-45, 148; affairs of; 68-77; seealso,modem
feudalism in, 128-29; language state; sponsored violence, 29
riots, 145-47; legalisation of state employment, 54-56
feudalism in, 128-29; literacy rate State ofMartialRule, The, 19
in, 143; military rule (1977-88), Suhrawardy, H.S., 72
149-52; One Unit Scheme, Sukkur Barrage Scheme, Sindh, 130
142-44; post-Zia period, 152-56; Sunnah, 72-74
pre-partition politics, 131-33;
quota system 147-49; refugees in, Thomer, Daniel, 53
138-41; separation of, 133; Sindhi two-nation theory, 15,
nationalism, 136-38, 151; social
and political condition, 128; UNDP, 79
support for Pakistan, 133-36; UNESCO, 79
Talpur rule in, 128, 130; violent Unionist Party, Punjab, 133
province, 152-56
Sindh Ittehad Party, 133 Vishindas, Harchandra, 132
Sindh Muslim League, 140-41
Sindhi language, 143 Whitehall, 115
Sindhi-Mohajir conflict, 169--70 Wittfogel, 49
Sindhi nationalism, growth of, 23,
136-38, 156 Zamindari system, 48
Sindhis ethnic group, 15, 20, 23, 25--26, Zamindars, proprietary rights, 53
68,99, 110,181,189 Zia-ulffaq, 75-76, 103,149, 151-52,
Sleeper,31 174,176
Smith, Anthony, 42, 84, 188 Zola, Emile, 23