IIANTIBOOK OF FACTS ON:

THE NTTT:AI{-UP OF YUGOSI"A\TIA,,

rN' f I.] I INATIONAL POLICY,

t T
AhID TTIE TVAR IN
I ( } SNIA-IIERCE GOVINA

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HANDBOOK OFFACTS ON:

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA,

INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA-
HERCEGOVINA

By ALAN R FOGELQUIST, Ph.D.

Post-Doctoral Scholar
Department of History UCLA
Director of Research
Instirute of South Central European
and Balkan Affairs
Los Angeles, Califomia

O Copynght 1993
Alan F. Fogelquist
 'i' t*t
r, ; .
'r" . . a"t TIiE BnEAK-UP OF YL]GOST-AVIA,
Guide to prtmuiolaiion (parantra$h numbers): INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
1. Slobodan Milolevld, preeident of Serbia AIYD TTIE WAR IN BOSNIA"HERCEGOVINA
slow-boh-done moo.hXt-sheh-vich]
I
2. Dobrica Corl6 (alro {1, e0) SIJMIUARY
ldoe-breet le ohoh.rlchl
9. Aliia lzetbcgovld, prctldent of Bosnia The current war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is essentially a war of
lah-lee-ah Garc.at'bGj.oh.vichJ (also 2e, aggression ffom the outside, even though it has internal ethnic
g0-1, gg{, gg, {1, t6, tt, c6, c0.?0, 7?-8)
dimensions. The contlict is a continuation of the war of aggression
against Slovenia and Croatia, which temporarily subsided in those
countries but is re-igniting in Croatia. If the Serbian war machine is
uttl-ich] Croatian not stopped, the war can only spread to new areas and is likely to
result in a confrontation of continental proportions. In the meantime,
. chalrmln of Yutpdry hdrrrl pretidency
11. Fraqfo Tu{lrnrfr ffnhn.Wh tiqf .mahni
Milo5evid's allies in Bosnia are carrying out step-by-step destruction
of most of the country.
prclidcnt of Crurdr (rlro n, gt.!, gg.r,lr, In the name ofprotectingSerbs, no-onehas done more to endanger
66,98.9, 71,79) the lives of innocent Serbian people than MiloBevid and his political
L2, Milan Babic lnee-lahn brh.blohl allies. If inter-comrnunal violenco and "ethnic hatred" have
(elso tg, gz) leader of Ssrbhn rrbolllon energed in what was once regarded ae a model nulti-ethnic
in the Iftqflna rcglon or multi-nationalfederation, it io an ethnic violence lVlilo5evid
18. fuitn MarkovlC, [rhn-hh arrh-oh.vlchl and the federal army have manufactured, stinulated, and
last federd prlme ralnlrtrr (elro r, u) perpetuated in their last-ditch effort to hold power in an era
19. Vojislav SeSelj, lvoloo.lahv rhrh.rhrl,] of democratic and nationalist revolutions. It was his chauvinistic
Ieader of Serbian noo.farcht prrrmllltrry policies which culminatcd in the arbitrary abolition in March l9E9 of the
groups (also gU, 4g,E2.t8,8t) autonomous status of the provinces of bolh Kosovo and Vojvodina which
28. Party of Democradc Actlon (rho lg, gg, 4Zr, had been guaranteed by the Federal Constitution ofthe Yugoslav Federation.
led by Aliia lzetbotpvl6 Elections ond Independence. In March and April of 1990,
28, Sdepan lqtqlid, lrtt'r.Ddur hlyoo.lohl Slovenia and Croatia held their first multi-party elections in almost
leader of Bosnlan bruoh of Grortlrn fifty years. The Communist reformers lost the elections to parties
Democratic Unlon (alro tt.t) favoring national sovereignty within a reorganized Yugoslav
28. Radovan l(araduld, lreh-dohqrhn confederation. [n November and early December 1990, similar non-
kah-rah-jichl leader of thr Serbhn Communist democratic nationalist coalitions emerged victorious in
Democratic Party of Bornlr (rlm m.gt, multi-party elections in Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as well.
36.8,40-1,,18.6, 6?,88, ?1, ?&l) Throughout the first half of 1991, Bosnia's Muslim president Alija
31. Mate Boban, [neh.tch boh.brhn.l loadar Izetbegovi0 and Macedonia's president Kiro Gligorov desperately
of Hercegovinlan wlngof Crcatlan sought to find a democratic solution which wbuld allow the Slovenians
Democratic Union (alro tt,80,68.9, ?4) and Croatians to remain within a decentralized and reorganized
31. Gen. Martin Spegc! [rhpeh-gehli, union of sovereign Yugoslav states but announced their desire to
Croatian Defense Minishr leave the Yugoslav federation should the Slovenes and Croats refuse
(this list continued after I to remain. Izetbegowid and Gligorcv feared that if the Cnoatians
geographic names - see inside back cover page) and Slovenians left, Bosnia and Macedonia would be left to
the mency ofMilo6evid and otJrer intransigent Serbian leaders.
 Milosevic and tho fadcral mllltary leadership flatly rejected joint
slovenian and croatien prcpolllr for a Yugoslav confederation as btreir own army and police forces in the Kra.;ina. During Lhe spring
well as the Bornian and Mrordonirn cornpromise proposals for a of'1991, while negotiations weretakingplace between the republican
looser federation or unlon of rovcrcign Yugoslav states. Serbian g<lvernments over the future of Yugoslavia, armed guerrillas and
leadere appolntcd puppet npnrcntatives to the presidency agitators, with help from Milosevic, 'Yugoslav" army leaders, and
ftom tho no.longur.cxlrtclt lutonomous provinees of Kosovo Serbian offrcials, infiltrated village after village, town after town and
and Vojvodlna whoru rutotony hadahoady been arbitrarily district after district in the Serbian populated areas of Croatia.
and uneon*ltutlonelly abollrhcd by the Serbian parliament. These agitators broughtlarge quantities ofweapons provided by the
The last straw for the slovrnlrnr and croatiang came when the serbs Serbian police, the federal anny, and state. weapons factories and
and Montenegrint, togethor wlth thrm bogus representatives of no literally thrust them upon the Serbian villagers in these areas. T?re
longer existent Kosovo andVqfvodlnr, blocked the confirmation ofthe Yugoslav federal amy, led by an offr cer corys tha t was e ighty
very moderate, rational, and oonolllrtory Croatian Stipe Mesic as percent Serbian, then entered the rebellious districts under
chairmtn of the fedcral prerldlnoy, A0cording to the post-Tito the pretext of preventing ethnic violence. Long before the
conetitutlonal arrlngcmcnt, thr ohalrmanahip of the federal Croatians -rade their frnal and inevocable declanrtion of
presidency, thc hfihrtt.rmutlv. body ln the country, was to pass independence from Yugoslavia, the 'federal" army had
each year to tho ropralcntrtlvc of a dlfrerent republic who was to be completed the occupation of as much as one quarter of
chosen by hh ropubllc't parliament. It was Croatia's turn to select the Croatian teritory.
federal prorident and Stipe Mesic was the first non-Communist ever Recognition. Despite all the evidence, the American, British,
to be nominated tn head the federal presidency. lhe Croatians and French governments continued to harbor the notion that a
responded co serbian stonewalling and provoeations with a plebiscite unified Yugoslavia had to be preserved and that Croatia and Slovenia
in which the vast mqiority voted to authorize the Croatian Sobor to should be pressured into remaining in the Yugoslav federation.
declare independence at the end ofJune 1gg1 in the event that the Ignoring the months offruitless negotiations deliberately sabotaged
coming weeks' negotiations proved futile. by the Serbian and federal army leadership, in the final week before
Cowtitution ond Ciail Libertiec. In December 1990, the the Slovenian and Croatian independence proclamations, American
croatian parliament orsoborpassed a democratic constitution which Secretar5l of State James Baker and Under Secretary
guarantees the civil liberties of all of its citizens and provides for Lawrrence Eagleburger publicly opposed the Croatians' and
cultural and educational autonomy for the serbs and other national Slovenians' moves towards independeuce. The German
minorities in Croatia. Under this constitution, Serbs and government, which had followed evenls much more closely and
representativee of smaller minorities are given the right to have their carefully, rightly. advocated immediate recognition of the
own schools and to use their own language and alphabet as the ofticial independence of Croatia and Slovenia and an unambiguous policy
language and alphabet of distriets where they form a majority. In against Serbian or "federal'military intervention to prevent the
May 1002, urged by the United Nations and European independence of these republics. Had the Germans been heeded,
communlty, th Cruatian government went even further, much bloodshed probably could have been prevented. At times
paseing a law guaranteeing self.gover:nment and political European and American diplomats seemed str4ngely oblivious of the
autonomy to dlgtricts where Serbs make up a mqiority of the human suffering caused by Milosevic's war of agigression.
populntion. Because of these conciliatory measures taken by the Seizure ond Dedruction of Territory. In the course of their
croatian government, it seems clear that the legitimate goars and war against Croatia, Serbian and "federal" armed forces not merely
eoncerns ofthe serbian minority could have been addressed through entered Serbian-populated areas to "protect" Serbs but seized wide
negotiation and compromise, and that there was no need whatsoever stretches of territory where Croatians formed an
for an armed rebellion. overwhelming majority. In such regions, they embarked on a
Ineurgente in croatia. In the fall and winter of 19g0, serbian systematic effort to terrorize and expel the Croatian population. This
insurgents centered in Knin organized autonomous districts with has been well documented by international human rights
organizations. The same pattern was introduced simullaneously in
ii
lll

I
 vojvodina againrt looal Hun3rrlrnl, croatians, and other non-serbs.
rrYholeeectionr of crurtlr rnd now Bornra have been eonverted The Wor in Bosnio. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims ancl
into a wasGlend olnrbbh rad ohrrrsd rafiters. Factories and Croats were driven from their homes by the Serbian forces in a
buildingr' capltel roGultuhhd thrcryh decades of toil and deliberate campaign of territorial conquest and ethnic purifrcation. At
investment, havc bcoa totdly dotroyed. Hundreds of serbian the last count, the number of refugees from the Serbian war of
civillanr have becn kllhd by thr lndhcrrminate bombard ment destruction and extermination in Bosnia was approaching two million.
of villager of nlrcd artlolrllty lnd clfiee like vukovar and The "federal" military in Bosnia joined the fight on the side of the
sarajovo, wherc a lubrtratld pirt of tho populatioi is serbian. Serbian neo-fascist legions and added its weaponry tbr the step-by-
Hundredc of nalvo Eorblan rrnry roonrrti have also been killed step destruction of Sarajevo.
in the senselesl and wlntoa umultr on croatia and Bosnia. Wherever Bosnians and Croatians have been able to organize
Hercegovlna. The dortructlon rnd krilrng perpetrated first against defense forces to resist the Serbian attacks, the sysbematic mass
innoeent croats and Bornlrn m wdl m 6crbs by the serbian and killingand ethnic cleansing of these two peoples has been prevented.
"federal" forcec har bccn, ncvorthdcrt, of a far greaier magnitude and In areas where Bosnians handed over their weapons to the yugoslav
is the regult of conrclour g-ovcmnantally rponmred policyiather
than army or Serbian militias, the local non-serbian population has been
spontaneour outburrtr of "rthnls hatred.t totally defenseless and has suffered mass atrocities. Areas which
Pcac.a AClerypt!, For r rhort whlls ln the firct months of 1992, it were well defended by local Bosnian Muslim and croatian militias
appeared that the Yugorlav cririr might, indeed, finally be settled were spared this fate. Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces have
peacefully. Representatives of the Euiopean communily and later generally defended only areas where members of these nationalities
the unlhd Nations had spent manyrnonihr tryrng to find rot,rfion are in a majority. They have not engaged in systematic ethnic
acceptable co Milosevic. cynrs vance, ttre ctrier united" Nations cleansing, and their actions have been largely defensive.
negotiator, after months offoot draggingby Milosevic and the federal Retponae of the World to Aggrestioz. The nesponse of the
army' appeared to have convinced the serbian and "federal" military United States and Westet! European governm-nts, Russia,
leadership to agree to withdraw federal forces from croatia. united Nations officialdom and the European community to what is
But peace was not to be, and what followed casts grave doubt that clearly a serbian-Montenegrin or "Ytrgoslavt war of aggression against
Milosevic and the federal military readership had Iny inteniion of the now internationally recognized independent and iovereign nations
respecting uN or European community-sponsored agrelments. of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has been inesponsible with
After
con si d erabl e del ay, th e united Nation s sen t peace-k Jeping appallingly destructive consequences. The United States, France,
forces in to
th e desi gnated areas of croatia, but none to Bosn ia. mr L .ria.rat" England, and Russia failed to intervene in an effective and con structive
a.d
serbian military and civilian leaders have blocked the of way to mediate a democratic and peaceful disassociation of former
thousands of croatians who were driven out of their homes ""pal"iation
and are Yugoslav republics from the Yugoslav federation after its viability had
claiming the right to determine which croatians will be attowea into been destroyed by a series of arbitrary actions of Milosevic's serbian
the areas they control. lrh-e federal army handed .o.t oi it, t government and the Serbian-dominated federal army leadership.
weaponry over to local serbian militias in croatia, who have put ""ny
on The United States, France and England - by initially publicly
the uniforms of local police forces allowed by the peace opposing the democratic decision of the Slovenian and Croatian
Efforts by UNPRoFOR to collect $,eapons from berbian"forces "gree-"nt. in peoples when they declared independence after months ofserbian and
croatia have been ineffectual and are hopelessly behind Jedure. Montenegrin sabotaged negotiations- gave the {ugoslav" military
Because of th e UN failure, th e croatian government has now an open invitation to intenrene militarily to prevent the
I aun ch ed
military action to reestablish control over part ofthe occufi"d independence of these republics and to seize teritory for
The united Nations has been unsuccessful ln overseeing """ar. Greater Serbia aliac Yugoslavia.
th'e i"t,r"n or
any but a small handful of croatian refugees ail o"f *ho,n fu." By imposing an arnrs embargo on all of fomrer yugoslavia
dangerous and uncertain conditions. In the ieantime
the neigr"ae by Besolution 713 on September 28, lg0l, the United Nations
regime and its allies in Bosnia-Hercegovina have launehed
a new war Security Council effectively granted a monopoly on heavy
of aggression.
weaponry and airpowerto the aggressors in the conflict, the
iv

&
 'Yugoslav Netlonrl Atuyt rad ths various serbian rind
Montenegrln purnllltrry ltrct tupported by the army little to change the situation. While some prisoners were relerased
leaderehlp. from the mostnotorious camps, many others were merely transferred
- Human RQlttt, B-o,rnh,Htn0lfovlna and Macedonia were the
to unknown locations or perhaps killed.
only republicr offormcr Yryorhvlr to mcst the human rights criteria Vanae.Owen Peqae Ptan. According to the version of the plan
9et by the European c_ommunlty ln Dcccmber of 1991 as"a condition which Vance and Owen submitted in January 1993, the Bosnian
for recognition. Prerldrnt lr-rtbijovlo had already shown himsetf to Muslims who made up 44 percent of the population in Bosnia-
be a democrat and advocrtr of hufrrn rlghtr foratiiiiizens,ee"rdt".s Hercegovina before the war began are to receive 29 percent of the
of religion o_r nationallty, The only -rcnribre choice was'for the land in the republic for their three cantons,.the Croatians who rnade
up 17 percent of the population 25 percent and the Serbs who made
ilTltT'$i?l#H,Hl?;.:ff, f EIJ^ll.i,T*t?s#T*.ffi lg up 3 1 percent of the population 42 percent. This arrangem ent leaves
*a
demoeratie and peaceful trrnrlilon to rndependin.. t" provide
reasonablc Euaranteet to thc Srrblan mtnbriti Uv ,""Jine L ctear
approximately 44percent of the Muslims living outside the cantons
-Boinian where they are in the majority, 37 percent of Croatians outside the
mesnego to serbiarYugorlrvla rnd lh Berblan ctiSnts tt at Croatian controlled cantons and 48 percent ofthe Serbs outside the
they accept ruch, r pirorful and damocratic solution or fuce t},. Serbian controlled cantons. Nobody but the Tudjman government,
combincd force ofthe lhhrnrtlonal oomnunity andihe democ."ti.atty- the Boban wing of the Croatian Democratic Union of Herceg-Bosna,
elected govornnontt of Bornh.Hcrcegovina ana Cro*i;:-- - and some Croatians living inside the proposed Croatian controlled
sanotlorr anld Ald, The united Nations has failed to provide canton are satisfied with the Vance Owen Plan. In lzetbegovic's
effective rupport for a juet and democratic resol"tion ;iih" cri'sis a'd view, Bosnian unitSr can bo naintained only if Bosnia is
har_pauod a numberofineffectual resorutions lt
orwtrictr r,",,r" aon. organized as a democratic and secular state which stresses
the hu"'an and political rights of all individuals rather than
pt!r-ns lo- rlqp the continued_on-slaught by serbian .ititu.y'ro"..r.
on Mny 81, l9g2 the united Nations-imposed eoooo-ii the rights of national or confessional groups, and only a
on +q.ruqp Y_ugoelavla or Serbia'and Montu""gro. ""letions
ffri.
-serbi
united Bosnia can be economically viable. If the plan were
re solutlon for the-first time cin gred out yusoslavi;oi actually implemented, the Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslims
a
as tlre_ aggressor in the Boenian confliet. it rr*tio* t,urr. would receive the least and give up the most. Bosnian Serb forces led
created considerable eeonomie discomfort in serbia " Mon[un.gro by Karadzic and General Mladic would be required to relinquish
""a
but have had little effect on.serbia's poricy towards C"r;f-H;;;;govina about one third ofthe territory they have already conquered and
or the behavior ofthe serbian forces in liosnia. In sum-"i oiili5z, ethnically cleansed while keeping two thirds.
united Nations belatedly p:gq" p-ro-vr{i1g food qnd
tt,.
,"piri., An Alternatiue Solution: enUltimotum. Contrary to recent
-"ai.rr
F thg hungry, sick, and blockaied cirijlns ;f S;fi;;;lriJ otne,
Bosnian cities. The aid nis'ion has aone
statements of Lord Owen, his and Vance's approach is not the only
aidrJss tr,e one available. An alternative to more futile negotiations over a plan
fundamental causo ofhunger, diseaee, i4iury "ottringToau"ilr.-*rri"r, which no one has the intention of enforcing is to issue an ultimatum
is the war itserf. Ttre united Nations i"6r;;; "ia totlur"" to the Serbian aggressors in both Bosnia and Croatia: Either
humanitarian aid and monitor cease fi*;g"";;"iti'rr"rr* comply with all United Nations resolutions concerning the
beeome virtual hootagee. cessation of hostilities and the blockading of cities, transfer
For months after the outbreak of the conflict united Nations weapons to United Nations peacekeepers, free
officials failed to heed the maly csrnrnrrni4ations, and pernit the retriin.of refugees, fiee
leports of ethnic cie"n.ingl*p"
mass killingbe.ing canild out by serbian forces on a massive prisoners and meetotherhu'nanitarian demands orface the
scare."na
In
fgshi^on, the Bush administration for .;th; ;fiiessed air power of the world cornrnunity and the massive aming of
i_:i'''tl*
darty reports of atrocities in Bosnia which were reaching the^united the Bosnian and Cnoatianforces with sophisticated modem
states,Embassv
!n lqlcrade. onry after televisil ffi;';;D-orte.s weaponry.
showect the worrd public video footage of the appalling
treatment Military Ascistonae. In case the Serbian forces refuse to
prisoners at serbian-run camps didunited Gii;;;iffililiJo- of respond to an international ultimatum in either Bosnia-Hercegovina
o,
leaders of major world powers take notice
ot Ked uross monitors and united Nations "f
th";;i;-.^iir"*l.ri"ur orCroatia, airsupport and militaryaid shouldbe granted the elected
speciar missions have done governments of these countries immediately if they meet certain
conditions. Both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina should be required
vi in return for military assistance to allow the immediate ;bationing

vll
A
of lnternatlonel ptaohmplnf lbrocr and human rights monitors in
lnrgoly Eorblan aram whloh runandat [o govornmentforces. Croatian
militaty lbrsgr and leorl rdmlnlrtrrtlsnr within Bosnia-Hercegovina
THE BREAK-UP OT' YUGOSI.A\TTA,
rhould iwoar lolnW h thrcrlrtlnlWlUtutlon ofBosnia-Hercegovina INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
unl,ll r naw oonrtltutlon lr r$rbllrhrd, AIYD THE WAR IN BOSNIA.HERCEGOVINA
llrr ulthnrh md of mllllrry oprrrtlonr would be to force
oompllanor wlth rurolullonr rnboiUrd ln tho ULTIMATUM and to
brlnt rn cnd to tho rtlllrdon r5llnr! tha lcgitimate government of 1. The current war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is
Botnlr Hrrt{pv{nr pcndlnf thrllhbllrhmontof a new constitution essentially a war of aggression from the ouiside, even
hy a oonrtltucnt rframbly dJme*rtlorlly glectrd under international though it has internal ethnic dimensions. The conflict is
rupcrdrlon, Milltary rnd llnrnclrl mrliience from Ialamic countries a continuation of the war of aggressiiin against Slovenia
could provfule for a lirp pruportlon of thr effort ln Bornia. and Croatia, which tempoiarily subsided in those
Tho forcer of thc Scrblrn Y{Brlav rnny and itr paramilitary countries but is re-igniting in Croatia. The regime of
alller ln Croatia and Bornla aro not lnv{nolbla, Thoy have performed Se$ian president Slobodin Milo5evi0 lmee-trsl-sheh-
poorly in infantry battles and hand.to.hand combat, Thoir main skill
in in bombardingcities from mountrlntopr rnd pillaging and looting Fchl, the largely Serbian military establishment of the
places where they meet little rerirtance. The current war bears no former "Yugoslad Army, and Seibian ultra-nationalist
similarity to the partisan warfare of World Wa/ II. Tito's partisans paramilitary groups both in and outside Serbia are
were a multi-national, multi-confessional force fi ghting all over former respgnsible for initiating and perpetuating the war. If
Yugoslavia with an enemy that was over-extended. Unlike the the Serbian warmachine is notitolped, thJwar can only
Croatians and Bosnians today, they were not hampered by an arms spread to new areas and is liliely to result in a
embargo and received massive supplies of weapons from the United confrontation of continental proportions. Milo5evid's
States, Great Britain and Russia. Today's self-proclaimed Serbian recourse to violence rather than serious
Republics of Bosnia and the K.rajina are short of manpower and neg_otiation represents a dangerous pre,cedent for
overextended militarily. They are separated by miles of enemy deqling with t-he complex na-tional ind religious
territory from Serbia. There is little enthusiasm for the Bosnian war in Eastern Erirope, the former Soviet Llnion,
differ_e-nces
among the majority of the youth in Serbia who have made draft
and all othermulti-national multi-religious empires and
dodging a full time profession. In contrast the Bosnian and Croatian
people are well motivated to defend their homelands. It is not states that are likely to dissolve in the future. In the
necessar5r to send large numbere of gtround forces to Bosnia or meantime, Milo5eviC's allies in Bosnia are carrying out
Croatia to make the coste of aggreseion hlgh for the Serbian step-by-step destruction of most of the country.
neo-fascists, nor is it neceerartrl to carry the war into Serbia. In 1987, Slobodan Milo5eviC engineered a coup
All thatis needed ie to stop the afgr.etrlon againet Croatia and ?,
d'6tat in the Serbian Communist Party by fostering
Boenla and ln eo doing to pruvent aggneselon against the non-
Serblan populatlon of Kocovo and the Sandzah. United Nations Serbian paranoia and ethnocentrism diiecfed againsi
peace keepingforcea ghould immediately be dispatched to these areas the non-S_erbian peoples of the Yugoslav federation. It
as requested byAlbanian presidentSali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova, appears that Milo5evi0's initial intention was to become
the leader of the Koeovar Albanians. paramount leader of all of Yugoslavia using a Serbian
The world muet show its resolve to do its moral duty to humanity. power b_ase as a springboard.t- He was zupported by a
What is moral is also practical. The two go together. President gloup of intellectuals belonging to the Serbian Academy
Clinton has a golden opportunity to exercise leadership and bring who argued that Serbia andseibians had been placed in
about the neeessary coalition ofinternational forees. Ifthe leaders of an unfavorable position in fitoist Yugoslavia -and that
some Western European countries want to bury their heads in the the- Yugoslav federation must be reor[anized in such a
sand and allow this war of aggression to escalate out of control, the fashion as to give Serbia more power. Their assertion
United States should seek alliee in the Islamic World and establish that the republican boundaries oTTito's Yugoslavi a were
new links to build a wor'ld order that is more humane and just.
"essentially unjust to Serbs because man! Serbs were
viii lelt outside the Serbian republic" ignored-the fact that
most of the Serbs in question had}istorically lived in

&
onclavt, inaldc Botnle'Hcrcogovina and Croatia
nap.nr.aLed.by maRy hllomehrr frorii the republic of Seibia elsewherer. Ifrom f966 the administration ol' t,he
a4d that the bcrr{toder ln qutl,ion had never been parr Autonomous Province of Kosovo was controlled by
gf hlatodc EarHan rtetm'clthcr medieval or modlr.t. rg-presentatives of the Albanian rnajority, who, it was
l'hay_alro lporpd thp lb.ei lhat a much larger minority of alleged, were sometimes insensitive to the concerns of
non.Earbl liVed lnrldc the bordora ofserbia itself. These Serbs. There were occasional violent incidents between
Earblen lntcllaotuali alao obleitad to lhe ract itiat serri" Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Serbs maintained that
alone amgnE thc.Yrryorlai rupublf.cq had ils legal u,ttho.ity the largely Albanian authorities in the province were
weakaned by th prc!no ndthin its borders of two not acting energetically to protect Serblan lives and
H.utonomout pruvlnogr, Sgroyo gnd Vojvodina. Among property. In the early eighties there was a movement
tho I egd i nF proponsnh ofthe Bcrblnn Acadomy's nosi tion among the Kosovo Albanians to elevate the status of the
wns Serbiah lhtollcctual and nsvollnt, I)otiricir Cosic province to that gf a republic within the Yugoslav
Idoe-hrcet-sn choh-sichl, now presldont of what ramains of federation. A small group of Kosovar Albani ans, iro stly
former Yugoslavia, the -ropublict,of Sarbia and students, favored the annexation of 'Kosovo tb
Montenegro.z neighboringAlbania, atthat time under the iron control
of the Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha, but this group
3. Milo5evi0's desire for an authoritarian centralized was never more than a tiny minority. Probably
Yugoslavig was welcom-ed _by elements of the largely e_ncouraged by the Albanian regime, representatives of
Serbian oflicer corps of thg Yugoslav army and secu?ty this grolrp eyen tried to organize gueriilla warfare in
apparatus. After the death of fito in tg80 key eiements Kosoio birt failed to attrait suppirt for their plans.
in the militarydrewup plans to reestablish audhoritarian Serbian and federal authoritiris branded all members
centralized rule and eliminate the vestiges of federali sm, of the Albanian movement as pro-Hoxha separatists
if lecessary, by a military coup d'6taf. The efforts of and used separatism as a fretcxt for fiotitical
MiloSevid and the military to reorganize yugoslavia repression The early 1980s movement for elevation of
algng more authoritarian centralized lines domifiated by Kosovo's status was strongly repressed by the Serbian
a serbi an c ommuni st politico-mi litary clas s were re si stefi and federal security forces; and dozens of Albanian
everywhere by non-Seibs, but it was ds much the extreme activists were jailed. This repression resulted in greater
methods by which Milo$evit and his allies sousht to resentment against local Serbs by the Albanian majority
achieve their aims which drove non-serbiun iEsion. in the province and probably led io an increas e i n viol ent
towards independence from the.Yugoslav" federafiion. incidents. As tensions between Serbs and Albanians
rnounted in Kosovo, Albanians living in Belgrade and
I. Immediately upon gaining control of the Communist
I'arty apparatus in Serbia and establishine a virtual other Yugoslav cities outside Kosovo were flequently
monop-oly over the mass media, Milo5eviC orianized an suhject to violent attacks and persecution by local Serbian
anti-Albanian campaign focusing public atte-ntion on a authorities.
supp.osed "threat"- to-Serbs posea by the Albanian-
speaking majority in the Auton6mous piovince ofXo.o"o.
5. At the behest of Milo5evie, the: Serbian state-
controlled media played up every incident of Serbian
As a result of out migration and a lower birth rate than sufferin_g at the tianils of Albanians while remaining
that of the local Albanians, the percentage of S""l. i" silent about acts of violence and persecution against
Kosovo decreased from 27 percent in 195"g to less tn"., Albanians. The political views of the Albanians of
ten percent of'the total by the mid-lgg0s. Over the Kosovo were misrepresented, and truckloads ofMilo5evic
dccades qaly Serbs had left Kosovo provinee, largely in su,pporters were sent around Serbia to organize anti-
seerrclr of better jobs and economic opportu"ni[ies Albanian rallies. When Milo5evid tried- to send a
caravan of militants to organize such a rally in

d&
 II
SlovonJa, th 6lovgalea euthorities intervened to i

relbrmers lrom the republican Communist ptrrty

Itop tbenl lnehed.of tryinS to resolve the co.,hicts olgani zations, human rights activists, represen tativcs
bet,wen ttcrbt anel Albeninns b.y dialosue and
roconelIietlon, Mllolv.ld lntnrducad'Serbian--itii".y ot the ecolory and anti-draft movementsl advocates of
rule ln Korovo and trted to rqlve thc problem by Urrtritv multi-party democracy, and nationalists all came to the
roprerrlng thc Albanlent, Hh chauvinistii poticie-s conclusion that life in a Yugoslav f'ederation dominated
aulmla_atcd ls the rrbltrary abolition in March by authoritarians like Milo5evic and hidebound hard-
line Communists of the federal arrny was no longer
I 0tP of-the e u toaeuoua ;tr t'ur of ail-;;"itt".s possible. In both Slovenia and Croatia, democra"tic
both Koro-vo esd Vqfvoatna whicfi tira--ut"o "r
HuareFt qd bV tbs Farderal Conltltution- of it, reformers favoring multi-party elections and democratic
pluralism gqined-control-of the regional organizations
Yugotlav Fcdc-ratlon. Borblan polico wjth tho support
ot yugofllav tederal army unitt, int,roduccd a brutal of the already federalized Leazue-of Comriunists. In
roginre of military occupltion, uihich killad dozens of MiloSevid and his allies in the largely
c-ontrast,
pcace fu I protesters. Many Albanian-speaki ne omci ais of Serbian officer corps of the Y,ugoslav aimy
l,hc defunct Autonomous Province were jaifed, others steadfastly resisteil the introd"uction of a
were fired from their jobs, which were grven to Serbs. plurali_st multi-party systern, not only in
The Albanians ofKosovo respond-ed to the3erbian,"gi-" Serbia but in aU athei re-gions bf yugoslivia.
of occupation with non-violbnt demonstrations unfi trt. At the last congress of thd Yugoslav League of,
creati on ofnew democratic political organizations inspired Cornmunists inJanuary lgg0, Croalian and Sloienian
reformers withdrew from the federal organization and
Ly t!r. -recent East-European demdcratic revolutions. organized multi-party elections.
The leaders ofthese groupl have been subject [o constl"t
-SLiUiu"
harassment, prersecution, and arrest by the
occupation authorities.s
8. In March and April of lgg0, Slovenia and
Croatia held their nrst multi-par'ty elections in
6. In the name of protecting Serbs, no-one has done fifty years. The C ommuni's t reiormers I o s t th e
al m os t
more lo-.g"9"lqer the lives oflnnocent Serbian p"opt. elections t_o parties favoring national sovereignty within
than MiloSevid and his political allies. If inter_ a reorganized Yugoslav cohfederation. In November
communal violence and .,ethnic hatred" have and early December 1990, similar non-Communist
emerge{ in what was once regarded democratic nationalist coalitions emerged
"s " it-"a.i
-an victorious in multi-party elections in Macedonia
multi-ethnic or multi-national Tederation. is
ethnis violence Milo5evid and the fedirii and Bosnia-Hercegbvin-a as well. In Serbia and
perprt""r-va Montenegro former }ard-line Communists renamed
!av_e m anufacture drs timu! at_ed, their parties So-cialist and reluctantly agreed to multi-
in their last.ditch effort to hold bowei
"oa inin era ";, of
democratic and nationalist revolutions. MiloJ"uic't party eJections held in two rounds in-bofh republics on
p.olicies more than any other factor have .o"trin"t"d to December g and 23, 1990, which the Seibian and
the destruction of thd Yugoslav rederation, d".trovi"s Montenegrin Communists managed to win by playing
the uncasy-e_quilibrium, ciafted in the iiil ;*, *[,i.h on ultra-nationalist themes and makiig ude oT
had allowed Yugoslavia's national groups to co_exist. their control of the mass media and tf,e state
apparatus.
7._.- Theauthoritarian and ehauvinist policies of
Milosevid acted to stimulate the movement towards 9. On December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a plebiscite
national sovereignty or total separation r"b- in which almost ni-nety percent of the eligiSle voters
Yugoslavia. In eroitia and $;;e-ni;-aur*.ruti. authorized the Slovenian parliament -io declare
independence ifin six months the Slovenian government
 hnd no[ ntt on:titutional arrangement
that federal presidency. In the final weeks before Croatitr
democratic aspirafion for
tvREr
and Slovenia declared their independence, in the absence
80vrll lut 6hc flrut, half of 1901, Bosnia's
Murllni ofMesiC, Yugoslavia was nominaily governed by a Serbian
l6h-lee-ah ease-et- puppet "presidential coordinator," an Albanian army
prenident Kiro Gligorov
sergea+t frglr Kosovo named Seido Bajramovic [say-
raColy sought to frnd a dough by-rrihl|-oh-vichl. Bajramovic h-ad no politicll
demogratte mlfHoa rihtoh foouH luld 6ttow fhe Sioue"ia",
allow flro Slovenians
and Groatlanr to reneln wlthln a docentralized and experience and little education. The Croatians reiponded
rorgenllq{.uplo.n
rorEenllqd yugoglav srates to Serbian stonewalling and provocations with a pl6biscite
unlon of
Of eoverelm
aoverelgn Yugoslav states but in which the vast majoiityvoted to authorize the Croatian
annou
announod thclr dc:lre to loav6'the Yugonlav federation
Soborto declare indbpendence atthe end ofJune 19g1in
qhouJd
rhoulr the Elovonr and Croali iT";;
trethe.Iovld and Gllgorov feared inat ii tt
to- te-ui". the ev,ent that the cbming weeks'negotiations proved
Croatlanr and _Slo_venlant left, Bosnia and" futile.s
Megedonla would be left to the merby of UitoseviC L1. All the time that the non-Serbian republics were
end other lntranslgent Serbian lead-ers. u{rs_uccessfully attempting to negotiate a new constitution
L0. Milolevtd and the federal military leadership with the Serbians and Montenegrins, MiloSevi0 and his
flatly reJected joint Slovenian an-d Ct"atiai, allies in the federal aqmy we-re encouraging and
p-ropgsals for a Yugoslav confederation as well as supporting a1r amed iebellion'by the Serbian
the Bosnian anii Macedonian .o-pro-i"" Tinori_ty in- Croatia against the democratically
proposals for a looser federation or irnion of elected-authorities it'that republic. HardJinl
sovereign Yugoslav states. Serbia and its Montenegn; Serbian Communist officers tried -to find a pretext to
ally. blocked the efforts of the four other republici to ggny qut a miltqry coup and end all plans for d-emocracy,
Y3goslav confedeialism, or nationll independence f6r
lchleye a majority vote-in the federal presiddncy *t the lon-Serbianrepublics.o Milo5evi0's wife became the
serbian leaders appointed puppet rbpreseniatives "" i*ological- he-ad ofan organization of Communist military
to .the presidenCy from qhi no-Ioiger.eiistent
autonomous provinces of Kosovo ant Vo;vodina officers which advocatid preservation of the existing
whose autonomy had already been arbitrahlv and regime.and Yugoslav unity by military force. As a pretext
unconstitutionally abolisled by the Seibian tor actively tbstering armed rebellion and sedition in
parli?ment. The list straw for thd Sloveni-ans and neighboring Croatia, Milo5evi0 and the Belgrade press
Croatians came wh-en the Serbs and MonG*grirrr, under his control maliciously exploited-fears- and
together_with these memories of atrocities against Serbs committed during
.bogu s. .repte! entabives oi 13"e." the Nazi occ_upation of Yugoslavia, and deliberately
existent Koeovo and Vojvodini, "o
blocked the confirttruliort
gf !tt" y9ry.+9dgrate, ritional, and .o".itiuto"y Crouiiun propqgated the myth that the newly electeil
Ptlpe Mesr0 lsteep.pay mess-ich] as chairman of the
Croatian government ofDn Frarrio Ttrdiman tfr6hn-
federal .,presidenc;i. - According to itre-port-fito yoh tooj-mahnl and his party, the Croatian
col stitutional arrarigeqelt-, the dhairmansliip of-the
- Democratic Union, intended to -commit genocide
federal presidency, ihe-highest executiv; b;ai i" tti. against the Serbian minority in Croatia. Such
c,ggntry, was to pass each year to the representitive of a pccusations, while patently absurd, were highly
orlre.rent republrc who was to be chosen bv his republic's inllammatory.
parliament. It wes Croatia's turn i" sell?t-;E; 12. After an initial period of post-election euphoria,
fedelal prestdent and satp" -MA;iA *"i-iii'frrsr tpumplralism, and rather pompous nationalistic rhetoric,
non'comm'nist ever to beinominatea l" iurairr* the Tudjman government-adofted a conciliatory attitude
towards democratically -elected
parliahentary
 representatives of the $erbian minority in Croatia. In
the sqmmor of lg00 the Croatiin parliament 14. 'Ihe word Kraji.na [cry-eo-rrah] literally rneans
introduced e p_u4bor ol oonatitution'al changes frontier, and the Cordprises & liamow swath o?
aim_ed at ettablhhlng" Cro-afla as a ;;;;;i"gn ""grgr
territory yttigtt extends
and demoerallo nef,lonel etate in whicL-tF" tor rniles ol'ng thl borders of
uroatra with -tsosnia and serbia. During the long period
rights of ett oltlrrnr would be equal. g!$qbspury {ule in Croaria (which i*r["a t o-iEze to
Representqtivgs of t[o Serbian Domocratic party f"a by 1gl8),the Habsbyrg emperors settlsd Serbs irrifr" .ruu,
Jovan Rabkovi0 lyoh.vahn rnh.ehko-vich] aer"a"d"6 which was organi?id ui a speciai-mititu"y irb"li* ro,
special-proviaions- guaranteclng the national riei;is or purposes of defending their-empire from ihe Otto*an
the serbian minority.- Inltlafy lhey demanded cilltural Turks. According to ihe census bf iggi, o"iy uUo"t o"u
autonomy for-tho Sbrbp ln Oioatid, but soon escalated third of Croatia's approximately 600,bb'0-$;b, tivea in
their demands to include political autonomy. Th; this underpgpr!_ate-d re_gron,? In A;gult S.pdt;;r, and
Croatian governnFnt_ grprrtted willingiress to uctober of 1990, the Krajina ser5s led by extremists
negotiatQr .but Qerblei Democratid party belongilg to thb Serbiai Democratic partS *l
representatlve-a boyeotted parliament. anil barricades and armed gunmen blocked roads drid cut "p off
extnemlrt pqlty lgadeil lod by a'denrisr Milan naUic rail traffic between tlie heartland of crouiiu trru
lmee-lahn bah.bich] and a poli-ce officer Milan Martic ""a
seacoast. $rajina serbstook overlocal police stationsby
[me_e.lahn mar-tich] organized an a"mea,evolt of fbrce and broke into arms depots. wien the croatian
Serbs eentened in Knin, part ofa Serbian aominatea government sent policemen to reestablish control, they
region known as the Xiqiina. were attacked by armed Serbs. Milosevid n"'Uii.i!,
supported the, Knin Serbs and vowed to protect them
!3. In December tgg0, the Croatianparliament or
Sabor passed a demdcratic conitifutioo-*ni"f against- the Croatian regime, which hu'suid- *u, u
guqlanteeq _the elvil liberties of all of its citizens reconstitution of the ill-ff,med ustasho resime. tnu
an,{ provides for cultural and educationaf 3qi9.-tv of.the Serbs in Croatia tivsoiitside.the
agtongmy-fo{ the Serbs and other nationat r$aji_na legion and were opposed to the policies of
minorities in croatia. under this constituiion,b"ru, t-he r$qiina extremists. The federal air- force shot
a.n{ ryprgsentatives of smaller minorities down a croatian police helicopter, a"a iua"tui e"""tutt
tli.
".. si;""o*"
.nght to have- th9i1 own schools and to uJe-tfrei, legan to threaten military inteiwention aglT"ii
Croatian government. Cr<iatian nationai -and iocal
tnu
lqnpugse ?+.d qlphabet as- the- officiai tddile
alphabet of districls where they form a ma:o+iil?M"t
a"d authorities responded to the acLs of UV
".aiti"o
purgin g i ts poli ce forces an d goverrrment a gen ciei
l???: urgi.ed !y t4. United Nations
community,
ii"""p.ro of members of the Serbian Democratic pa-rtv. In
thq Croatian government "ha went 6rren
further, passing g..laW guaranteeing self- some cases local officials acted with excessive zeai and
e-xpe_lled Serbs who would otherwise have been loval to
ggverruFent political
and autonomy to dlstricts
where Serbs make up g mqiority of tht pop"f"li"o. the -croatian government. The serbian state-coniiolled
media^reqresented these acts as a wholesale campaig to
Eecause of these conc-iliatot| me-asures tikin bv-the expel Serbs.e
c roatian governmen t., i t seenis cleai ifiat tii"l.siii-ut.
goals and concerns of the serbia" mi"o"itv-.o-,ifJr-riuu 1Q, In response to local rebellion and a hostile federal
bee-n addressed through negotiation urd ",,o-pro*ir., mil.itary, .the Croatian and Slovenian leaders began
and that there was n,i need"whatsoeveirr.-"il^"r*"a palring mililary preparations for defense ofttrei" repuliics
rebellion. rn the case ofan attack bythe federal army. They began
building rlp local poiice and territb.i"t-i"f"-o".
lbrces and purchasing arms from abroad when

ir,'

[.tr
 federal weapon; factorlet ln Serbia and Bosnia
ref'sed to meet thelr ordern. 'l'he efforts in slovenia L7. l'rom the outset, the gyoups rebelling against
and croatia to build up ropublican defense forces were the elected govertrtt enf in eroatia reJorfed to
greeted with alarm anil hoitility by the federal military vi6lf nce, looting, kidnapping and hostage-taking
leaders, the mqiority of whom- were Serbs. Miloievie against local Croatians as rvell as to ac Ls oTviole nce
cultivated the support of tho pro-Yugoslav federal oflicer and intimidation against those local Serbs who
go{ps by portraying himeelf air n dcfdirder ofthe yueoslav were reluctant to join the insumection.rr
f'ederation and branding tho slovcnian and crdatian The
wanton acts of destruction and violence committed by
leaders as secesgionist. l[ in now known that the]ederal the Serbian rebels, organized, financed, and armed by
military already had plann to institute a coup J et.t, ttre MiloSevi0 regime nrith the active assistance of th-e
arrest the democratically olocl,ed lcaders of croatia- and federal officer corps, p_redictably and regrettably led
Slovenia and institute irn authoritnrian regim.. tn. to spontaneous outbursts of iruelty and violilnce
Knin revoltprovided them with a prctext foriritervention a gainst_loc al,Serbs by enraged Crolti an vi ll agers
in the interests of preventing "ethnic" warfare. Because
of divisions in the offieer c'orps and the fact that lhe
pnd political extremists. -Such acLs were iot,
however, part of,a-deliberate policy of the Croatian
majority. of tho onlisted mcn were non-Serbian. the govgrnrylent and have been vigorously criticized
prospectiv-o coup leaders did not feel secure enouetr [o in the Croatian press. The Croatian-government
$ry out those pla.ns prigr to the Slovenian and Croitian
declarations of independence.s
showed its goodfaith and its desire to stop tlie spreading
I a wl e s sne s s and vi ol e-nce by all owi ng the federal a rmy t6

16. In the fall and winter of lgg0, Serbian occupy large areas of Croatia on the condition that ihe
il?surgen ts ggo Fo9 d in Knin orgn n i 2s a a..'t"""-o" prmy act impartially and assist in preserving the peace ;
districts with their-own amy"and p"ub" i"r".r io" instead ofassisting the democraticaily electedand legally
Thgy later thi stalur-of tt"r" constituted government of Croatia- in preventing th-e
t|e $rniioU. elevaled
districts to that of gn- ind_ependent republic, and in t[e entry of armed guerrillas, however, the federal army
sometimes secretly, of[en openly, assisted the guerrillas
lnrips of 1991, proclaimed iheir unificbtio" i'itn s.rriu. in attacks on Croatian polic-e stations. Long before the
Ll unng the spring of 1 9.9-1, whil e negoti a ti on s were
taki ng Croatians made their final and iFrevocable
plqge between the reprrblican governments over the future
9f Yugo-9-lavia, arme-d guerrill"as a"a asitatori *itiit declaration of ildependence from Yugoslavia, the
from Milo5gFt, "Y-ug6-slav" army l.aEe"r,-"ira'S"iiir" "ip "federa-I" army had completed the odcupatio-n of
officials, infiltrated village after io;;;ft.; ;*" as much as one quarter of Croatian teritory.
"itt"Su, p"p"t"i.a
and district after district-in the serbii" 18. All of these events took place before Croatia and
of Croatia. These-agitators brought iu"iJq"""titi"s of "*", Slovenia's declarations of independence in the
weapons provided by the Serbian police,'the federal last week of June 1991. It should f,ave been patently
g.rmy, and st-ate_we3bons factories a"a Utlrrtiv-Chrust clear to any person who followed them carefully ani
!bu- qpon the Serbian villagers in ttreie ail'..- ih. obj-ectively ttrat the game plan of Milo5evi0 and the
t-ugoslav federal army,Ied"by an offieer c""p-" tl"t military leadership ofthe Serbian-dominated "federal"
was,eighty- percent -serbia-n, then -in*
arrny was to seize and occupy Croatian territory. The
reDe[rous districts undpr the pretext of"lrt"r5a preventing Croatians and Sloveniani-made no mad rush to
ethnic violenee. Except in a fe#caser *ri"rt t["r" ,rlru independence. Instead, they patiently and honestly
non-serbian officers, the federal units utilized tii.i.ir"u"y attempte-d to negotiate with MiloBevi0 anil the.,yugoslaf,
mi li
larv .hardware [o. protect ttre- posi ii;;ilffii ui' bi
the Serbian insurgents.ro r anTy and what was left of the federal civilian leadlrship
ynder_t_he-powerless and ineffectual prime minister
Ante Markovid [ahn-teh mark-oh-vich], the man
t0-
ll
 preferred Fy the U..S, State l)apartment and many
.Eur_opeq4leadere. 'Fho roeponno lrom the Serbia., arri !0.- "Qespite all the evidence, the American,
"federal" aido. w.qr..nothing- but stonewalling, British, and French governments continued to
intransi gen co,, dupli c-r tnur dou'lil-o- tal k, mi I ita"y .o.,p harbor the notion that a unifred Yugoslavia had to
threats, actg ofintimidation, nnd MiloseviC's sponjorshiir be preserved and that Croatia and S-lovenia should
of armed terroriam. be_pressured into remaining in the Yugoslav
19, Ily tho timo of the Croatian and Slovenian
federation. Ignoring the months of fruitless
negotiations deliberately sabotaged by the Serbian and
in depc nd ence cl.eclaration s on Juno 2F, I gg
l, the federal federal army leadership, in thifinai week before the
premicr Ante Markovid was tho virtual brisoner of Slovenian and Croatian independence proclamations,
Milo$evit and the hard-line authoritnrian cbmm,r.tist. American Secretary of Stat James Baker and
and/or ex-Communist military. Milo$eviC
""a
Serbian military_ !!en were rap-ldly_d iscovering
in" Under Secretar5r Lawrence Ea gleburger publicly
opposed the Croatianst and Slovenfansr moves
lhat greater Serbian ultra.naiion-atism or-o"o- tgvgard.s independence. This attitude only encouraged
fascisry was a good ideological and propag"odi"tic the hard-line military leadership with the help ofSerbian
substitute for the now discredited tfrarxism- extreme nationalist guerrillas to begin their assault on
Leninism or Titoism. A strange concoction of Croatia in the tame of stopping:secessionism and
hqc.kneygd Titoist phraseology andireo-faJcii- *u. prese-rving Yugoslavia. The German government, which
taking shape as the official ideology of the Serbian had followed events much more closely and carefully,
government and the-military- leadeiJhip. Milo5evid, rigtrtly advocated immediate recolnition of the
in a manner similar to that of Mussolini. was independence of Croatia and Sloienia and an
completi-ng his conversion from socialist to ultra- unambiguous policy against Serbian or "federal" military
nationalist. In the spring and summer of 19g1 the rntervention to prevent the independence of these
pro-Milosevic press cairieil articles praising voiiri"" ihe Germans be6n heeded, much
SeSelj [voice-lahv sheh-shel'], the le^ader ofi grdwing lgRublics. _Had
plgrodslqd probably could have been preriented.
?.rmy of fanatical-para--militaiy volunteerr, *fio, *itfi Milosevic's imperialist project could have 6een nipped
the assistance of serbian goiernment o{hciair in -the bud, ind the'd6struction of Vukov^ar,
federal arrny officers, had riovea i"io ta.ee ur."r'of ""a Dubrovnik, Sar{evo, Mostar, and a host of other
uroatia and was beginning to infiltrat-e serbian cities and towns might have been avoided. The
populated districts of Bosnia-Heiceeovin;. - I" ^;" United States, Great Britain, France, and the rest of
interview- with .the pro-Milo3eviC ,i.*J -lii, -ueuri"u Europe are now faced with a crisis of much greater
l"!.fyj,u,.Sedelj boast'ed that he anh i";;1;;;1lA dimensio4s, which will be much harder toiesolve
nol krll their enemies with knives but would employ even if resolute action is finally taken. At times
lusty ehoe*spo_ops so that the victim, il;id ei;';"f European and Arnerican diplomats seemed
|.gt"rllt,r,tz .Se6e\i's men were already putting similarly stra!-gely oblivious of the human suffering caused
tr-loo.dthirsty_ideas into practice in irie villa"ees of the
!,V MiloSevid's war of aggression.
-for Milo5efrC coyly
4raJrn-a and Eastern Slavonia. Se5elj was sublequently denied responsibility the actions of dhb
elected as representative to the Ser6ian
replace-a deceased member, a sign of t}e f;.til;;;;i, paramilitary invaders bfCroatia, while all the time
climate of providi.ng- political and military support and
frenzied ultra-nationaliet hysteria i; his ;iil;;. ideologica_l justification for their aCtions. -European
direct resulr of the insidfous ;;;i;t';;;;";;;'d, " leaders either failed to notice or ignored these facts.
sponsored month-after-month by p"ii-Ndiifs*"ie
.fournnlists. 2I. In mid-July 7992, as a result of mediation by the
European Community, the federal military leadeiship
l?
l3
 t
li
withdrawitF forcet flom Sloveniain exchange i
?S"reed to billion dotlqrs;, moreover, the self-styled
for permission to withdraw their heavy weaponrv and ,t
serviors a.d
protectors of the Serbian people have shown little re spect
qt
Tll",q ry- 9 9 st PF_o_t ! :
L;roari
t
Th lr, v o a p o n ry wa s .!r b-. ; dil ;ai
!_and Borni a. tVhite the military
for the lives of Serbians iir ttr-e areas they assault and lay
$::11q.T I to waste.t.t Hundreds of Serbian civilians have
f f, H?"H'ff#,rlll,ti,iffi ,,1*g;i:m,::t'il been killed by the indiscriminate. bombardment
pre.ventby. forge thc-ldm o[ Croatia wit[-lGirq, _of _villages gf mixed nationality and cities like
serbian mlnorlty. If thoy failad to crush croatian Vukovar and Sarqi evo, where a sirbs tanti al part of
resistance totally,-thqy at Ioaat hnpea to ;;ir. ilfu. the population is Serbian. Hundreds of naive
tracts of croatian terrilory for nnneiation to . r*rilu" Serbian army recruits have also been killed in the
Yr rgosl avi a or Greater sorbi a, th rnrehb"t J"r senseless and wanton assaults on Croatia and
u. Bosnia-Hercegovina.
n a ti ojr a I i s Ra ra
! mi I i ta ry vo I u n to o r s fr6 n i S. rui d n "rt""-
aL a
rnto Liroatia to sr.lpport tha Krqiina rebellion. Federar
"" 23. In the autumn of 1991, the European Community
military. .unite followed, proieciine [ii;-'ilriti*, and subse-qgeltly the United Nations made repeatei
:Ttlr1g $y !,nopationalirr militiaa with tanirs, heavy unsuccessful efforts to broker a ceasefire between S-erbian
aruuery. and atr r_uppo1!. In August the federai and Croatian forces. The ceasefire was broken cuickly
milttafo' leunched i luii:scat"
Croatld. -iiilrily "ir"iiii "" each time, in most cases when the "federal" and S'erbian
forces lega-n an ?ssault on a new area. The strategy of
the federal and Serbian forces was to emplo/ihe
-
22, In-the course oftheir war against Croatia, Serbian
and nfederal" armed forces not,freiely,;1;;d S";il;;_ c-easefires to regroup, to move in reinforcem6nt! and
pgnula-ted areas
!o "protect" SerbJ"b;T;;i;;,i'ffii. lhen tg conqluer new areas of Croatia. The poorly armed
stretches of teritory where CroaUans-fori;a;, Croatian defense forces responded by surroundinf federal
gyg,11l}r"hing rn.qiority. In suct .eeio"., the;;. army barracks in Croaiia. Bv a combinition of
Darked on^a systematic effort to tenrorizd and negotiation and blo_ckade, the Croatians induced "federal"
exp--el_ the Croatian population. This haJ-been garriso-n commanders to gurrender their weapons and
welldocumentedbvin0emaii-JriatU"-"o""frl-t" by suglr me^ans they were able to gain substantial
organizations. lhe _pame pattern was i;troAi..a qua-ntities of weapons and ammunition including some
simultaneousl;, in VojvoTini rgrifit-f"Jir lanks and heavy-artillery. The Serbian and "fideral"
-uunganans,. Croatians, and othel non-Serbs. forcers, however, still haii a large advantage in sheer
l n ere r s aI so erndence that the fede ral army has engased numbers of heavy weapons anii a total minopoly on
n the sys tema tlc destmcti il A-i;;i- ;iii ; guli_tary air powei through their control of the air f6rce.
i
prevent tens of thousands of non-serbs nofr- .'"", ;" ;;;il; In the s u m rn er a n d autumn of I gg2, federal mili tary
returning. to their former homes. rttJr.r"ii oItt.r" officers of Croatian origin defec te il to the Croa tian
acts, now being repeated in Bosnia with ;;;;;;;;;, side, where they becalme the backbone of the
tne.t argest ref bgee cri sis in post worl d war II professional of6cer cor?s of ttre newly forming
rustory' w hole sections of croatia and now Boinia
Europei' Croatian army, which has sho*n great
nave been converted into a wasteland of mbbie c-ourage and considerable skill in resi-sting
and charred rafters. fa"to"i"s and-buiidfr; the invading arrnies of an enemy with fai
eapital accu mulatea tnrou;h e;rd; ;itJi;i"di superror weaponry.
investment,have_U.rot"tilTvt"rtiirvih.-iit1"n" 24.- Despite the efforts to establish military discipline
beginning of 1gg2, ttt" rrti-"t"J'ai-ug. in property and. a.centrally controlled professional army, iome
loss in eroatia'alone ;;;;iltee"n ,n-a ,'["ir undisciplined local military units have committed acts
-14' of violence against innocent civilians of Serbian
l5
 nationality.. In_ono notorioun case, armed men..in
camouflageduniforms who holonged to a regionJ zuard the Serbian arld ..l'ecleral" military leadership to
unrt abducted to a hundred Serbs -from
-sixty ?gree- to withdraw federal forceJ from Croitia.
un d e rgro u:r d e h e I to ra i n t h e to w n o f G o s pi C t go -s pi c-h 1 ., i According to.the agrgeme-nt, United N;tio", puu.ul;pfig
T.hgse Serbs were n-vorheard from agal".S".t[.i, or tbrces woul d be stationed in areas of croatia sei zed nv tnE
tolence are morally. uqiurtifiatrre iil i"".."rirh". f"4.."1 army and Serbian paramilitary eutrriito*'rf,u
The croatian authoiitiei wourd be wise lo ptoi"*t.
aqd,qunis.lr tlle nepetratorJ, foi fi," .rlltv
lgdgtal grnly would withdraw from Crlatia, and the
:g,olglllf United Nations would disarm the paramilitary groups.
and The United Nations peacekeepers wo.ria f"otect
lumanrights of the seibirin popuration of croatii
and tlosnla-Herceg.ovina ia a mnttcr ofgreatimportance
to a definitive settiglnent ofloday's cinnicts iil-ro*",
I the local Serbian pofulations from the ven!i"o".
I
of angly roa ti qn s _alnd would oversee tne$ro mp t
Yugoslavia and to all decont humirn beinsJof;di;e" qelum of^C thousands of Croatians who hdd been
na ti onali ty. Amnesty Internationnr and tiJ ri"t i-ft i.r, driven out of their homes by t[e ieder*-f"rc*r. ffru
'have uncovered sev_eral othor ca'es
of atrociiies V"itu_d Nations wogld protecl ttte i"i"*i"g Crouliu",
committed by partic-ular milil,ary unitJ
agalnst serh' sincs thc war bagan. while these human
o;l"di;e;;i; from Serbian irregulars and_ the federai ur*i a"riil th;
peri-od of transition. A final peace settlemeht brokired
.ights organizations believe tfre c-roatian go".."-""t o;ati;;;;.iot" o?
by the United Nations would Le based
could.prosecute these-cases more vigorousli, t["v ha"" respect for existing republican boundaries dnd reipect
tbund a. completg lack of cooperation by lhe S6.li* for human rights Indielf-eour**ur,i f;; theSr-r6iun
au[nontles anct tugo,slav army in the investigation of
atrocities committed by the-Serbi"" *itil?rv"u"a ryrnority.__Unfortunately, no provisions were made for
paramilitary roups.rr destmctio"
-fili"i tne-large Hungarian and Albanian minorities in serbia
or the smaller Croatian minority.
""a -infi
--The
gerpetrated first qgainst innocent Cr"ats
Eosnians as welf as SerbG uv tt. s""6iJ" ?ira 26. The successful implementation ofthe UN sponsored
peace process in croatia and a peaceful tran'sition to
"federal" forces has been,.r.y.rthel6rr, fr#il.#."
"f "ernmt ntaliy
m agnitud-e an d i s the_ re sul t of cons ci o u s gov independence in Bosnia-Hercegoiina apDeared to be a
sponsored policy rather than spontaneour o"tu"rsts real,possibility
{hgt MiIoSeviE, the feh'erat milit""y
or lea de rs h i p, ?n d_t_he Cro
"ethnic hatied.'r Local drril"-Crr"tl" ;diuiu, a tian lovemme n t form a ll ]
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, $""Ur,
have unfortunateiv parti"ioit"a lgreed to the Vance plan. -It appeared that th'e
rn armed insurrection-against the demodr^aticallu u"a German-sponsored recogiition of Crohtia and Stovenia
lgsallvconstitutedauthdrities*ai"-i1"r-.iii""r?illi?l,t pV most ofEurope, the re6l possibility that Croatia would
the-ilnon-serbianneighbors.iil;;jil;t;?bffi ;,#, De aDle to obtarn arms to counter the serbian invaders,
and Bosnians merely #ant to live in p"'uc" d"a p-rorp"riiv and increasing dissatisfaction with ihe *u" u*o"g ttr.i
as the citizens of democratic indef,e"Je"i^Jtliiii'i"' population in serbia had persuaded Milosevid th"at it
was time for peace. He made a show of sunnort for
25. For_a short w_hile in the first months of 1gg2. it the-peace settlement by openly criticizing the
appeared that the yuglsl av crisi s migh t,i"- a.gd,
be s ettled. peacefully.?"p"ere.t"-t-iuE*
liif y
fi leaders of the serbs in cioatiia fo'r their-threitr to
oftn. nil""ril"" resist the LIN peacekeepers by fonce oi ar-sl-
uommumty- and later the united Nations had ipent
ll?.ny months rryrqg to find u ,ot"ti*-;;;;;;i""i" 27. Bgt qeace was not to be, and what followed casts
Milosevic. Cy ir Vry.",-tr,; ;iri;f U#;;"hi;ti;;. flaye {o.ubt- that Milo5evi0 bnd the federal *itiiu"y
negotiator, aftgr months orffi i;;'gstil bt Mii"if"ic leadership^|rad any intention _of ,rrp".tirrg--iN o,
a n d th e fe d ra I a rmy, pp""""
e d l;'ffi ;'."d";;l;;;d .tJuropean C_ommunity_-sponsored agre6mentsl After
" considerable delay,ih*i unitea Nitions s6''t ,rbr"u-
=16- keeping forces i" t6 ihe designa t"a ;4" ;f C;;"td,
_t7-
 butnone to Bosnle. The "Foclernr" and serbian military
a.nd civilian leaders havo blocked th;;;;;riuilo" pqgslde,nt of a tri-national, tri-religious coalition in late
or 1990, he was clearly a partlsan of a secular
thousands of Croatians who *ei. ari";;;;;;jir,"i,
4emocratic Bosnia aid a slecular and aemo-cratic
Hni?ufl:l.,n ir,t 1ilffi ji i ii: g,i :, ru :,:Hl Yugoslavia _ig which members of all religious
groups coFl4liv_e together in harmony, peace, and
The federal army handod ': i[. rt.L"v i"."Jp"""v
o-ver to I ocal serblan mi I i ti n',,ictt-nf
*[ oiu".T"t o"
s i n c roati 9-g.u$ty.tt .Thg leader of the Bosnian Ci6its, Sti"pu.,
", 5lj"ji9 [sty6-pahn klyoo-ich], leader of the'goinian
lH":fr :'#'dfi Jffstg:iift'rt6;.tg'r."Sr:f *um: branch of the Croatian Democratic Union, was equally
from serbian forces in croatia t ou. t oo" i""Ln .irifu"a I reasonable and moderate. Initiallv Radovan Kariaziit
are,hopelel$ly brhind schod ule.
uls R";;;;;^iii[t I
lrdh-doh-vahn krih-rah-jich], the l"eader of the Serbian
Democratic Party ofBbsni-a, forapparently tactical
l1_1llT",,the,.Croatlan government has- now reasons, cooperated with the other two leaders
rauncned military acfl_on to reestablish control
gygTla"t of the oceupled arean. The U"i t"a N;;;* but became increasingly uncooperative and
nas Deen unruceettftrl ln overseeing the return of belligeren_t-under the inflrleirce of his iolitical *.rrtot
anv but a nmall handful orcroaiia"?"f"g;*JJr Slobodan Milo5eviC.
yh gm face d an Ip rogq a n a uncl-"taii J"'iii'tt ,,r.
"r i 29. For a time after the Bosnian elections in November
!n thg moantimeTtre netgrade reeim;;d it.;iiJ.
-#r? i" I J99Q, it appeared that Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and
Bosnia-.Hercegovina haie t;;;;h;d
aggression. or ;';;; #
Muslims might be able to avoid bloodshed. The'first
c_rackin the government coalition occumed when
The. patterT of Serb-ian aggression in Bosnia_ T
I the Serbian Democratic Party expressed adamant
,2,8-.
Herc_egovrna has been similar to that in croatia. oppositigq to the Declaralion- of Sovereignty
After $ proposed !y _Izetlegovid's Party of Demociatib
il -b;^""iil;Tgixi,
the fi rst mutti.qarty eleeti;il
together the -thr6g mqjor p"tiii"* t; Action and the Croatian Demdcratic Union of
l"it"i., Bosnia-Hercegovina. KaradZi0's Serbian Democratic
Igpl_.".enting each of- Boinia;s- nalil-oaf- I
f lg*y was uncompromising in its demand that Bosnia-
f.Tff :ffi ;'if
ta tes m aiu he
il:T,',"i?"k:$:,'"?t:l*f"*i i
Ilercegovina remain withfi a federal yugoslavia. The
Bosnian Muslims were wiliine to re-main within
&i ttplo"riidfr ff- ;f l"'. i -
b6g-oh-victr], leadei "ofr". p"tv;iD;;;;;Jti.
-s - t
the Yugoslavia as long as Slovenia and Croatia remained to
fi.iio",
"
act as a counter to Serbian efforts to achieve hegemony.
The Bosnian Croatians, like those in Croatifproper,
[::ffi1?Ti?3'J,HJi't*iili?*iat'i#;11*[#S1i were willing.to remain in Yugoslavia only if ft dere
iliff qg''3:,0,i?'iT:'*H;:ligJtTf i%:'.i;1',Ts$:l transformed into a confederati6n of soverei-gn states.
30. After the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of
fi ilBf, 1H,:f,tf,
:;,11tr_li:i*r**i"":i*tif"'ftTlt
-Ui independence and the beginnineofall-out warin Croatia
Croatians and Serbs to trt"- i;;;;. T;";;"e;;-;id i,"a
m c rely written *qr\ g of pol i ti cai phi t" J*lV 19?1, Izetbegor.i0 [ea1e-et-b6g-oh-vich] and
speculated about 'ethic;i -ft'a"-o..iti.
i;i, ";;;
il;rr. il"rir,iir, President Kiro Gligorov [key-roh gJee-go-rov] of
Macedonia sought to ieach an aicommdaatiin witlr-the
_the
goverr'nent in an Isramic society and-the pdiliiJi
Islam in-the modern *;;ia. - Hi. i,riii"e. leadership of the federal army and thus avoid the
proposals to cre.ate. an Islamic state in "r ;;;;il;? bloodshed that was occurringin Croatia. IzetbegoviC, in
Hercegovina. By the time Ir.tGiriC assumed Bosnia_"" particular, believed that if f,e showed moderat'ion and
office as accommodated the legitimate interests of the Bosnian
l8-
l9-
 serbs, he mightbeable to nogotinte Bosnian sovereignty
or in dependen ce wi th ou t wa i. Izetbegovic'smoaliate should be made part ofa special self-governing confbderal
:lrqtegy was actl_vely encouraget by the Unitea unit within Bosnia with close political, ctiltural, and
States, eqpegiaffy by the Unttd Starejambassador economic ties to Croatia. On this matter, Tudjman,s
to Yugoslavla, Warnen Zlmmermnn, and migli t a"e attitude was similar to that of Karadzic except that the
latter stated openly that the Serbian cantbn should
iff ! :ff ff i'5*i,?1,''i:J[?1 lllt ff ll'ft: f#tffi*
pre-dominantly Serbian leaders of the,,yu goJlav;u.*y.
ifj eve^ntually-be annexed to Serbia. At the end of April
_1_991, Tudjman met privately with Milosevif at
31. .4" *qqsy relationship developed between the Karadjordjevo at which time h-e is believed to have
presidents ofBosnia-Hercegovina and croatia and their I
't
proposed the division of Bosnia.rg On at least two
gr..ccasions, onc_e in January and again in July of 1g92,
respective governme_nts which hampered joint efforts to
contain serbia. Tudjman's attitudi was echoeJlu nit
Tudjman.paqe public stitementl indicatin-g that ne
principal. supportei in Bosnia, the leader-od tn. was considering a compromise with MiloSefrC which
would entail the divisionbfBosni a-Hercegovina be tween
$elcegoyrnian wing gltbs Croatian Democratic Union, Croatia and Serbia.zo
VUE Boban tm6!-teh b6h-bahnl. In the ;;;ih; b;fbr; i
the Croatian and Slovenian dectaritions,1il4;p;;Ii.,.u, I
13. Jq4jman's attitude and his private overtures to
i
Tudjman was lukewarm towards Izetbeeo;ab';;;;r"d i,, the Serbia! regime alarmed Izetbegovi0 and all those
ggmprgn}se between a federal and corifederai rvii"*. ,
Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and othdrs who identified
The mild-mannered ar.rd moderate lie[bee;;t;;'r;or. themselve,F p-nma4ly as liosnians. They feared that the
optimistic about the possibility o? ;-;;;*uf"t creation of ethnically-based cantons or confederal units
reorganization of Yugoslavia than Tudjman,'*fro ,u, wogld be merely a pielude to their annexation to Croatia
alreadv facing an arried rebellion iG;rii"r 3eru. or Serbia. T\pV were adamantly opposed to any
bv ysgosr av Mi "fthd attempt_ _to _divide up Bosnia.Hercegovina. Th-e
1}1
-ta;i:?r,th Tf;%i!:llt'gm Jj Bosnian Muslims, in particular, wanted to-maintain the
D"];r;ri,ii"dd,l,rting"l[i]3i.-"nnlrepeatedry qgly and tenritorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina as
expresse-d a view common -among C'roadian their one and only hoheiand. Unlike the"Bosnian
qationalist historians that the -nisnialr ana Serbs and Croatians, the Muslims have no outside
flelgeSovinianMusliqsyrereierUyC-""*i"lrrino mother co_untry. In lzetbegovid's view, Bosnian
had-been converted to rslam. The Eosnian serbian unity-can be maintained only if Bosnia is 6rganized
Ieader Radovan Karadlr-c, iq ;trni6;;iffi"n as a democratic and secular state which Jtresses
eonsiders the Bosnran MusHmJ F rs-se"uJ the human and political rights of all individuals
converted to Islam. This interpretation ornirio.y -rr.i rather than the iights of na-tional or confessional
is rejec.tejl by most Bosnian M.irti**i;;h;;il; groups, and only a united Bosnia can be
gparate Bosni an or Muslim identity. M^"v nos"i"""
.s
economically viable.zr .,
Muslims see thernselves otiiu'" ;itir;"; ;;ir;
""a o. S*bst;t.il;it
repj:blic not as Muslims, Croats, 34. Izetbegovi0's and the Bosnian Muslims'fear that
as Bosnians, heirs tothe medieval no;"i;;ki;fi;; Ju{jpan pight be willing to strike an agreement with
Serbia behind their bac[s was a constant source of
32. Acco.rding t9 ludman, as members of the least irritation between the Bosnian and Croatian
numencal group in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Croatians governments. The fear persisted even after the outbreak
neeoed specral guarantees for their national rishts.ra of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the establishment of
'I'heret'ore' areas where
croatians formed *ijuty an alliance of necessity against a mutual enemy. F'or
" their part, the Croatians resented lzetbegovid's
z0-
2t
 neutrality dur{ngSerhla't lnitial war of aggression
against Croatla and the ute of Bosnia as alase for established a headquarters in the region of Mount
federal troope flghltng Croatia. Many Bosnian Roma'ija by spring of 1991 In the I'all of' 1991,
Croatians and Muslimi aliko saw Izelbegovid's federal army units which were withdrawn from Croatia
colciliatory approach to the Sorbian regime aid the and Slovenia were massed in Bosnia-Hercegovina.23
federal military as naive. fluch critics bel-ieved that he While distributing weapons openly to Serbian militias,
failed to take adequate stqpn to prepare Bosnia militarily the federal units beganharassingCroatian and Muslim
for the Sero-ian onslaught and that he tmsted to6 villagers in an effort to confiscafe weaponry. In fall of
1nugh in promises of eupport by western leaders.zz 1991, Yugoslav military forces bombarded the
Izetbegovid, neverthelees, Fied to prevent the yugoslav o Hercegovinian Croatian village of Ravno, razing it to
a.rrny from using Bosnian and Hericgovinian recriits in I
the ground and nendering its inhabitantS hombless
the war against Croatia. Alao, subsiantial numbers of gq-dqr the pretext of searchingfor weapons.24 In
Bosnian-Hercegovinian Croatians and Muslims fought fall of 1991iir response to the actiois ofthe fe-deral army
as volunteers in the fledgling Crontian defense forces. and Serbian armed groups, Bosnian-Hercegovinian
Becausc of Rosni a-Hercogovi na'e land-locked geosraphic Croats, especially those in we stern Hercegovina and the
position, thc prcsenco ofilisloyal Serbs in theiepirblican Posavina region (along the Sava River) of northern
security_and- police forces and the huge concentration of Bosnia, began arming themselves in self-defense. They
"federal'military forces in the republic, it was much received help and encouragement from the Croatian
more difficult for the Bosnihn government to government and political groups inside Croatia. The
acquine weaponry or build an indefbndent defense federal army and Serbian iriegular units began a
force in anticipation of a future-conflict than il wholesale military campaign against the
had been for the governments of Slovenia and I
il
*t]
Croatians in these aneas ih the weeks before
Croatia. Bosnia's declaration of independence at the
beginnisg of March 1992. Afterlhe outbreak of full-
35. In the autumn of 1991, reDeatinE the pattem l$

$ scale war in April 1992, the majority of the Croatian

which had occunred earliei in Croatla, gr6ups of militias became part ofthe Croatian Defense Council
lgitators gld gUerrillas began appe"arin-f in
$

(Hwatsko vijde dbtante, Iilfo) of Herceg-Bosna.

Serbian. villagei of Bosnia. - In tfid meantlme,
j

Izetbegovi0, hoping to avoid a confrontation with thd

A smaller group of Bosnian and Hercegovinian
mili tgry, all owed the "f"4"I4" Croatians joined the militia of the right-wing
to con fi scate weapons
ttom -Bosnian territorial defense"rmy
ornational guard uirits. nationalist Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska
Many ofthese weapons were almost immedia"telv ha"aea stanka pnava, [ISP). This paramilitary force was
over to local serbian militias and to serbian known under the acronyrn ofHOS (Hryatske oruIante
paramilitary groups-sqgh gs-!_hose led by Vojislav
".io-rus.ist
SeSef: nage). S ubstantial numbers of Muslirn s also j oined
lvoice-lahv sheh-sh9lJ, Zeljko RaZnjitoviC lzh6l-kofi both the local militias which became the HVO and
razh-nydh-t9lvich] "Ari<an,; and Miiko Jovit tmeer_ HOS paramilitary formations.
koh yoh-vichl. Tlrg organization of partisan defense
groups was p:rrt of the original program of the Serbian 36. As ultra-nationalist paramilitary forces flom Serbia
uemocratrc part-y, a manifestation of KaradZid and began fl ooding into Bosnia with the blessing of Milosevic
Mi Io angJi [o Se.b s-. " io;;l S;;b;."
Sevid's theme-of "the d
and protection by federal army commanders in Bosnia,
grolps had been acquiring -weaponry even befor. liiu some members of lzetbegovit's own party became
multi-party electiond of N"ovemter tggo nna-Voll.i"u alarmed and started organizing Muslim militias. In
scKel.j's ultra-nationalist paramilitary forces t,aa response to the increasing belligerence of Radovan
KaradZit and the Serbian Democratic Party (SD.S) and
-)1 -
-23
 the massive armingofthc Serbs, Yugoslav armyofficers
of Bosnian Muelim origin left the ra-nks of the nfederal" of other national confes sional and political group s. OuIy
prmy and organized a clandestine military organization by the intervention of United Nations and
known as the Patriotsha liga or Patriotii Leigue.2s European Community representatives was mqi or
37. On Novcmber 9 and lO, 1991, KaradZid bloodshed temporarily averted. Spurred by the
had German plans for immediate recognition of Croatia and
staged a"plebiscltett in which more than one hundned
percent of the Serbian population of Bosnia was Slovenia, the European diplomatic community and the
said to have voted in favofofbn "Independent Serbian United Nations began applying greater diplomatic
llepublic ofBosnia" encompassing mori than two thirds pressure on Milo5evi0 to use his moderating influence on
of Bosnian temitory inCludine the capital city of
Sarajevo. Such a demand wai patentiy absuid if
I
i
his Bosnian Serbian stepchild. Unlted Nations efforts at
this time were, nevertheless, ineffectual, and the world
one considers the fact that Scibs comprise only organization paid no attention to President lzetbegovi0's
SL pcrccnt of the population while-Muslims urgent appeal for the dispatch of United Nations peace-
re-present 44 percent, Croatians 18 percent, and keeping forces to Bosnia to prevent the outbreak of full-
others 7 percent. ln staging such a- "plebiscite," scale war.26
Karadlid was folloyirlg tiie fattern set earlier by 39. In mid-December 1991, the European
th e Serbi an extremist leaders of the Krajina Republic Communit5r announced its willingness to necognize
in Croatia led by a former Communist hentist from the independence of those former Yugoslav
Knin, Milan BabiC. KaradZiCs extremism wasthe Republics which satisfied certain human rights
last straw for the moderate Muslim and Croatian and other criteria, such as the governmentts
leaders and those Bosnian Serbs who rejected KaradZit's effective control over its temitory. In January
confrontational attitude. The Muslim.-Croat mqiority 1992, the members ofthe Community formally recognized
in the Bosnia parliament voted in favoi of a the independence of Croatia and Slovenia but withheld
declaration of sovereignty in December of 1gg1 recognition from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia.
and sought diplomatic recognition from the United States Macedonia failed to receive recognition because of the
and the nations of the Euiopean Community. objections ofthe Greek government. Greece made the
38. Radovan KaradZiC threatened war against the absurd demand that Macedonia change its name
Croats and Muslims if they_dared try to impldment their because a Greek region had the same name.
plqns for independence. ihe Serbiin nenis media both According to the twisted logic of the Greek government,
in Bo snia and serbi a carried arti cl es accusing Izetbeeovic use ofthe name Macedoniawouldimplythat the former
and_the Party of Democratic Action of plannjne to d;te Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had territorial claims
an Islamic fundamentalist state in 'Bosnia. " In press on the Greek region. Since that time the Macedonians
interviews and television interviews Karadzic rep6ited have offered to sign a treaty renouncing all claims
the charges in an effort to convince the gosnian'SeilJ to Greek teritory and to renaqe the country New
that they were in mortal danger from ,,Islamic Macedonia or Nbrth Macedonia,,but the Greek
f'undamentalists." The vast majoiity of the Bosnian government continues to block Macedonian
Mgslims are Muslim by-are heritage but hoid modern secular recognition by the European community.
poliJical yiews and noT strict practitioners of Macedonia remains in a dangerous diplomatic limbo.
traditional "fundamentalist" religion. A" l""rio"s President Kiro Gligorov alone of all the non-Serbian
mounted,_ there were a number o-f violent incidents leaders offormerYugoslaviahas managed to obtain the
between Serbian supporters of Karadfil;;a *..b.* peaceful withdrawal oflfederal" troops from his country.
The reasons for the tYugoslav'military leaders'
willingness to withdraw from Macedonia seems to
24
-25
 be that they could not at the time afford to risk the
openiqgof a new.front and possible Bulgarian or ethnic lines. Boban, with the moral and political supp.ort
even Greeh or Nbanlan mllitary inte-nrention of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, had succeeded
while they were tied up ln Bosnia and Kosovo in pushing aside Stjepan Kjujic [sty6h-pahn klyoo-ich]
faced the prospect of a rebellton of the Albanian as leader of the Croatian f)emocratic Union tbr Bosnia-
mqiority. Until recently MiloHevi0 and his supporters Hercegovina. Boban's stance was supported by Croatians
in the federal anny have avoided fighting on mbie than inwestern Hercegovina and parts ofthe Posavina where
one front. Croats formed a compact majority. Kljuji0, who, like
Izetbegovi0, favored a democratic, unified, and secular
40. The European Community (EC) initially
withheld recognition from Bosnia because ofthe confliit I Bosnia with strong provisions':for human rights,
represented the view ofmany Croatians in Sarajevo and
between the Muslim-Croat mqiority and the Bosnian central Bosnia, where Croats represent a minority or
Serbs who followed Karadli0 but lihally recognized plurality of the population. Each side represented at
Bosnia at the beginning of April 1gg2 after an Lisbon presented maps and proposals frlr the
internationally monltoled p[ebiscite held on administrative and territorial ilivision of' Bosnia-
Febmary 29 and March l. On this occasion the Hercegovina. EC experts in Lisbon immediately began
o_verwhelming majority of the Bosnian Muslims and
Croatians voted !n favor of independence, while the drawing up proposals for the cantonization oflBosnia
based on ethnic principles.2T
mSyority of the Serbs, influenced by KaradZid and
other intransigents, boycotted the piebiscite. Some 42. Because of the tremendous national-confessional
sixty-eight percent of all elieible-voters voted in heterogeneity of much of Bosnia, such a division could
fayoq of.-independence. In the city of Sarajevo not easily be based on ethnic criteria. No matter how
substantial numbers of Serbs vot6d in favdr of Bosnia-Hercegovina were divided many people would
i4dgpendence and against the recommendations be forced to reside in areas where their national-
of Karadlid's extremists. confessional group is a minority. The only alternative
4L. At the Lisbon Conference which began in January is a unified state with strong institutions to
1992, the Egropelq Congm.qnity p-roposed thir
guarantee human rights and the right of national
cantonization of Bosnia.Herdefovfna along self-expression of the constituent peoples. Such a
national-confessional lines as a s6lution to tEE state could also include some form of regional and local
Bosni an dilemma. As a re s ul t of negotiation s brokeied self-government with guarantees for minority rights at
by the E c and the united Nations andlnuch int"rnutio.tat
the local as well as national levels. A large gSoup of
pressure, Radovan KaradZiC and his Serbian Democratic Bosnians of mired background as well as those
who had voted for the opposition parties favored
f ulty appeared willing to accept Bosnian a unified secular Bosnian state. Such views were
i_4dgpe4dence on the condition thAt Bosnia be especially strong in the ethnically mixed Tuzla area,
divided into self-govenring cantons based oo tn"
national and religious idefrtity of the inhabit"ot" where many Muslims, Serbs, and Croais alike had voted
of each district. President Izetb6govic, in theint.""rt* for the non-nationalist non-religious Party ofDemocratic
of a. pea-ceful settlement, agreed to"accept somelorm of Change. People who had voted for thenon-natlonal
regionalizafion based on "a variety of economic and parties were not represented at the Lisbon
o grap hi c, but no t exclusively etf,nic
C_o4gfess or in any of the subsequent peace talks,
93 cri teri a. tvlate although they represented approximately 22
f?obql, the representative of tlie Bosnian C"oatia"s at percent of the electorate in the elections of
the Lisbon talks, favored cantonization of Bosnia on
December 1990.28 Altogether if one adds together
Muslim supporters of the Party of Democratic Action,
26-
27
Kljujie's supporters among the Croatians, and the
supporters of the non-national parties, one finds a president of the Serbian half of the federation. At the
substantial majority in favor ofa unified non-cantonized beginning of July Lgg2 at the behest of Cosi0 and
Bosnia. MiloSevi0, the "Yugoslav" parliament invited Milan pani0
43. The negotiations mcrely provided KaradZid's Imee-lahn pah-nich], a Serbian-American
Bosnian Serb militias, the fedeial arrny, and ultra- businessman who had become an American citizen,
to become Prime Minister ofYugoslavia. Milo5evi0
nntionalist paramilitary gloups from Serbia, time to hoped that Panid could be used to-convince the United
complete military preparations for an all out assault on I
States, European and world leaders to remove the
Bosnian independence. All that was necessary was a
p-retext to initiate armed action. The pretext came when I economic sanctions which the United Nations
Seqq"ity Councilpl,aced on Serbia and Montenegro
the United States, European Community and other
nati.ons officially recognized Bosnian indeiendence on 9n-M ay - l, l9g2.2s Pani C s urp ri s e d Mil o S evi C by tak-i n g
independent steps to compromisewith theCroalian anii
April 5, 1992. Two days later on April ?, Serbian extremist Bosnian leadership and to find a peaceful solution to the
r-epresentatives gathered in Banja Luka and proclaimed
conflict, but he was-unable to defelt nnilo5evi0 in elections
the_Serb-ian Rgpublic of Bosnia-Hercegovini. On the
to the Serbian presidency in December 1992. After this
night of April 6 I 7 1992, the Serbian bombardment electoral defeatr- Pailc resigned as ,Yugoslav"
of Sarqievo began !n an effort to take the city by p_rimq lninis_te_r, laving failed-completely to stop
force and forCe the Bosnian government intb IbradriC and the Serbian mititary frbm coLtinuing
submission. At the same time, Serbian paramilitary their merciless war on Bosnia. 30-The m ain effec t oT
forces invaded Bosnia in mass and with asdistance from
federal arrny units,_unleashed a wholesale military Panid's premiership, as it turned out, was to ward
assault on the newly recognized nation. Armed offactive military intervention by Uiited Nations
battalions of marauders led bv the Belerade forces against Serbia and./or intern ation al military
underw-orld figure Arkan and Voji-slav SeSeljt tteo- assistance to the Bosnian government.
fascist legions joined KaradZi0's Bosnian Serbian 45. In creatinga new"Yugoslavia," the Serbian regime
militias in a campaign to seize teritory. The hoped to inherit the Unite? Nations seat and asse"ts of
heavily armed Serbian paramilitary invaddrs could the forrner Yugoslav Federation. Yugosl avia had ceased
not have entered Bosnia without the blessing and to exist both in reality and on paper-by December 1991
support of Milo5evid's government. yhgn the European iommunityigree"d to recognize the
independence 6fthose former Yug6slav republi"cs which
44. The Serbian/federal government in Belsrade applied formally for recognition and satisfied certain
devised a crude scheme to avo-id admitting responslbility human rights and other criteria. The leaders of the
for the war in Bosnia. On April 27:191i2, a new recons titu te d (Yugoslavt or Serbo-Montene glin
"Yugoslavia' consisting of Seibia and Monienegro state,,acting at the behest of Milosevic, fired sbme
was proclaimed. The Serbian nationalist novelist Ind genernl s, and-reorgar'lized the federal army. General
intellectual Dobrica CosiC ld6e-breet-sa choh-sich]-took
was Zivota Pani t I zhee -voh-tah pah- ni ch ] re pl ac-e d Bl agoj e
elected president of the new federation and Adzic-lblah-go-yeh ah-jichl as head ofthe yugoilav
office on June 15, 1992. Cosid, though more moderate armed forces. The new niilitaryleaders then anno-unced
in lis -methg-ds, shared Milosevic's 6ssential political the withdrawal of all "federal" troops of non-Bosnian
gg-al that- all Serbs must live in one state, either
"Yugoslavia" or Greater Serbia. The real Dower in the gri-gn{rom Bosnia, claiming that eighty percent of all
new Yugoslavia remained Slobodan MiloSevid, the federal troops in Bosnia were of loial-oiigin. These
troops and all of their military hardware were placed
under the command of General Ratko Mladi0 [rairt-koh
-28
29
mlah-clichl,-a Yugoslav army general born in the Krajina Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has also left,more than
region of Croatia. Mladid was already belng two million people as war refugees. Whole cities. from
prosecuted for war crlmes ln Croatia and has Dubrovnik and Vukovarin Croatia to Sarajevo, Mostar,
subsequently been nRrned by llelsinki lVatch, the and a host of other localities in Bosnia-Herbeeovina
Bosnian governmenf and fonner acting secretary have beenrazed to theground orhave hadlaree Ji.fiont
of state Lawrence Eagleburger as a-suspected. destroyed. Litgral]y thousands ofchurches, m6nast"ri"r,
perpe trator of mqi or war cri mes in Bosnia. 3f The se
forces, including a substantial part of the Yugoslav air rygsques, and other historic monuments have been
force, equippedwith jet fighter planes, fighter-bombers, 4gliberately targeted and destroyed by the
and attack helicopters became the armed forces of
KaradZi0's Serbian Republic of Bosnia; the creation of
this Bosnian Serbian arrny did not stop the in{lux of
heavy weaponry and manpower irom Serbia.
t Cities and towns are mercilesslybombirded "egr.r*o"r.
ai"d shelled
every day, and Serbian or "Yugoslav" military airplanes
repeatedly fly on war missions in violation of-the United
Nations air embargo. Ethnic cleansing continues.
Paramilitary volunteers from Serbia continued to move 48. Vlrherever Bosnians and Croatians have been
in and out of Bosnia; federal army uniLs from Serbia able to organize defense forces to resist the Serbian
have qe-gularly _ provided- weaponry and attacks, the systcmatic mass killing and ethnic
ammunition and have frequently participated -Many cleansing of these tyo pgoples has bedn prevented.
$rggtly in.military ac-tiong lnside Bosnia.
Serbian soldiers captured by Bosnian forces have been
In areas where Bosnians handed over theifweapons to
the Yugoslav- army or Serbian militias, the to.ii
found-to be carrying documbntation showing that they Serbian population hae been totally defenseless and"o"-
has
were born in Serbia, not Bosnia. Despite aU tha suffered mass atrocities. Such was the case in the
evidence, Milo5evid and the..Yugoslaf" i.e. Serbo.
Montenegfln governmentr, continue to deny !9*+. of men
Muslim
Priiedor in northem Bosnia, where,
met and decided not io offer
responsibility for the war of aggression againsl resistance to the Y_ug-oslavarmy. Afewdays after
Bosnia. the Muslims handeii over their weaponi to the
46. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats lugoslav army, Serbian neo.fascist p-aramilitary
were driven from their homes by the Serbian forces in a
forces entered the town and began-abusing thb
delibjlrate campalgn-of territorial conquest and ethnic
local inhabitants. Most of the me-n of militarf age
purification. At the last count, the nuirber of refugees wene led off to eoncentration camDs such ai tfie
from the Serbian war of destruction and exterminaiiort
ill-faTed Maqiacha and Omarski. Many were
in Bosnia was approaching two million. The "federal" terrorized into handing over tlqeir property to Seibs and
into leaving perhaps forever. Musiirnwoiren who went
rylltary in Bosnia joined the fieht on the side of the to the center of town to collect humanitarian aid were
Serbian neo-fascist legions and_idded its weaponry for beaten mercilessly by Serbian soldiers. Aneas which
the step-by-step destruction of Sarajevo. were well defended by local Boiinian Muslim and
47. .By_the late_st estimates in Febn ary lggS the Croatian mititias wene spared
-forcesthis fate. Bosnian
war in Bosni a-Herce govirla has already -produced Muslim and Croatian have generally
over a hundred thousand dead, betwidn twenty defended only areas where memberJ of these
and fifty lhqff"g! rape{ wonlen, and property nationalities are in a nrtqiority. Ihey have not
enga ge{ in systematic ethnic eieansin!, and their
$.amag.e of 200 billion llollars.
property d:amaee it
$lovenia is estimated at approximately z billion do-ilars aetions have been largely defensive,
and that in Croatia at 18.5 billion dollirs.s2 The war in

30- =31
 have established control over most of Sarqievo,
49. Initial resistance to the attacking Serbian forces Central Bosnia, and the anea of no*heaitcrn
came from local police and Territorial Defense Bosnia around Tuzla [too-zlah]. The Bosnian
(Teritorijalna od,_brdrw, TO) units loyal to the Bosnian Territorial Defense forces in the Saiajevo and turla
government, local Croatian militias which ioined areas include amongtheir officers and soidiers Muslims,
together to form the Croatian Defense Council (Hr'uatsko croatians, and serbs. In Tuzla the forces lovai io ttr,i
uijece odbrone, I{VO) of Herceg-Bosna, and in some Bosnian government have achieved some ,uira"kubi"
nlqges-from qnits of HO S, the army of the Croatian Party successes. The multi-national multi-religious Tuzlans
qf Rights, {gmer Yugoslav rirmy officers of thir managed-to seize substantial quantitijs of infantry
! otr!.gtsko_lig a (latriotic League), mostly Bosnian weapons from local weapons depois and to capture some
Uuslims, he_lped mold TO units-into I regular heavier weapons from tlie forced ofthe serbiafuyuno.t""
Bosnian and Hercegovinian Army known as the
Oruzone anoge Borne i Hercegoaiie,Os BiH. In the ?rmy. -Dqriqg the summer months of 19g2, Trizlans
drove the serbian forces from inside citylimiis to some
first weeks ofthe war Serbian forces sucieeded in seizine twenty kilometers from the city out of ieach of shorter
between 50 and ?0 percent of the republic's territorv.33 r?nge artillery.35 Although much of Eastern Bosnia
In general, the Serb! were able to seiZe those towns #th
a substantial Serbian population but failed to take area s ?Jor_g the Drina liv_er was occupied by Serbian forces in
the first weeks of the yaq, thg_city irf Croralde tgd-
where Muslims, Croais,br Muslims and Croats formed ahz_h-dehl, although totally iurrounded'ind
a solid-majority. tlre Serbs had hoped that their isolated from the worldr {as able to resist a long
superior weqponry, better preparedness and an4 bloody siege by Serbian and monteneodi
surprise would allow them to tdke the capital city military_ and paramilitary forces. The Muslirfr_tea
of Sarajevo in a matter of days, but t-he local Bosnian forces broke the siege atGorazde and captured
inhabitants pnoved nnexpectedly resounceful in substantial amounts ofweafons from the neeins3;;bo-
preventing this despite an almost total lack of
heavy wealx)nry. Sarajevo defenses have held and the Vontenegrin _forgss, The largelv Muslim i6*ln of
Srebrerric-a lsr6h-breh-neet-s-ah] was also able to
area glder government control has expanded more than r_esist Serbian efforts to eonqu-er it. Throughout
twofold since the initial Serbian attac[, even though the the war, Bosnian Muslim forceC bval t6-tfi
Serbian forces have blockaded Sarajevo and bomb-arded government have sueceeded in defdnding the
it with heavy artillery, rockets, and-grenades. Saraievo enclave of Bihad and Velika KIaduSa in the far
was initially defended by a host of local lightly armed northwestern corner of Bosnia.S6 To the south and
gro_ups which were spontaneously organized-, soinetimes west there are Serbian forces loyal to the Serbian
by local gang membbrs and ruffians. Ammunition and Republic of Bosnia and to the north and wesi foices
rifles were in such short supply that men in the trenches
had to take turns usingthe avaiiable weapons. Gradually, lelongrqg to the "serbian Republic of the Krajina in
Croatia."
with assistance offormer federal arrny 6fficers and locli
policemen, a semblance of order was dstablished over at 51. IqJuly lgg2forcesoftheBosniangovernmentand
least part of these forces.34 Bosnian Croatian forces their allies in the croatian Defense coriircit were driven
belo-nging to tbglM have succeeded in defending and out of Odz.ak [6h-j-ahk] and Derventa [dare-vent-ah] in
holding onto Western Hercegovina, parts of Ceitral the Po s avina. At the begi nning of October lggz,Serbian
Bosnia, and part of the Posa-vina region in Northern forces captured the key crosEroads town of Bosanski
Bosnia. Brod directly across the Sava River from the Croatian
town of Slavonski Brod.3? These conquests have
5q. Teritorial Defense Forces pledging loyalty allowed the Serbs to establish a nino* land
directly to the govermment of Bosiia-Herdeedvina
-32- 33-
 themselves against the ruthless Serbian
corridorfrom Serbia eastwards to the core area of
thesSerbian Republlc of Bosnia' centered in Baqi a flggressi^on, butdefend themselves they nave. lne
Serbian forces show no signs of being abldto .o-plet"
Luka lbahn-yahluke-ah]. The corridor is very thin aid their conqu e st of Bosnia. The Bosnian-s' lack of ad eqGte
the Serbian forces have been unsuccessful in overcoming weapons will only mean that their defense will'take
resistance of CroatianDefense Council brigades around
Oradje. In December 1992 and January 1993,
longer and cost more blood and lives; in the long
ho_weve_r, the poorly motivated Serbian finces
*o,
Cnoatian Defense Council (H\fO) forces at OraSje y1llnropably lose the wan Bosnia will be Serbia's
[oh-rash-yeh], joint I{VO and Bosnian Armed Afghanistan.
Forces (OS BiH) units locatedbetween Gradacac
lerah-dah-chahtsl to the outskirts of Brcko lbirch- 13. Thereslrcnseoftheunitedstatesandwestern
kohl, and OS BiH fonces from T\rda defeated all Egrgpgan go-ve-rnments, Russia, United Nations
Serbian efforts to widen the coridor, destroying officialdom and the European Community to what is
large numberg of tn"ks and amed vehicles and clearly a Serbian-Monteriegrin or .yugoslav,' war of
capturing tanks and artlllery in the process. aggression against the nowinternationllly recognized
Bosnian Muslim forces massed on Mount Igman to the indepen_dent and sovereign nations of eroatii and
south of Sarqjevo as of February 1993 had not yet Bosnia-Hercegovina has been irnesponsible with
attemptcd a mqior offensive to break the blockade of the lpnallingly destmctive consequenies. The United
capital city, partly because of disputes between States, France, England, and Russlia failed to intervene
commanders of various units and because of disputes in an effective and co structive way to mediate a
between certain OS BiH and HVO commanders.ss democratic and peaceful disassociation of foi-",
Yugoslav republic- from the Yugoslav federation after
52. In general the military performance of the OS its.viabililylfa been^destroyed 6y a series of arbitrary
BiH and IIVO forces has been remarkable in the actions of Milosevic's Serbian iovernment and th6
face of the ovennrhelming superiority in tanks, armored Serbian-dominated federal armly leadership. Th;
personnel carriers, heavy artillery, rocket and missile United States, France and England - by'initially
launchers of the Serbian/Yugoslav arrny forces and the plrblicly opposing the democrafic decisidn of th"e
total monopoly on air power of the Serbian forces who Slovenian and Croatian- peoples when they declared
have inherited the entire arsenal of the former independence after monthi ofSerbian and M6ntenesrin
Yugoslav army. This tremendous arsenal was sabotaged qegollatf gns - gave the..Yugoslav' mihtlry
paid for mostly by tares extracted from the non- an open invitation fo intenrene militarilv ti
Serbian repubHcs of fomer Yugoslavia and by prevent the independence of these republics-and
considerable assistance from the United States to seize territory for Greater Se,ibia, alias
and NATO. The arsenal was seized and usurped by the Yugoslavia.
Serbian and Montenegrin Serb military officers, who
made up approximately 80 percent of the entire officer $. Byi4pgsinganamsembargoonallofformer
cor?s of the former Yugoslav army from generals at the Yugoslavia by Resolution 713 oln Sentember 28.
top down to non-commissioned officers. The United 1q.91, -the_ United
Nations Securily Council
Nations arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia effectively granted a monopoly 6n heavy
and now applied inappropriately and probably weaponry and air lx)wer to the Cgsiessors in the
illegally to sovereign and internationally conflict, the_ iYugoslav National"Army' and the
recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina has gravely various Serbian_ plrd Montenegrin palamilitary
hampered the Bosnians' ability to defend forces supported by the army lebdership. Because

35-
-34-
of its geopolitical location on the Danube next to former
Communist states eager to eell weapons, Serbia- ii'4ilHisr':"#'ff'",i1"ff lH,;F:T"g:ffi :
llonte.negri_nfonces,loc-al-noo-S""U-iaop""poiiii""*
Montenegro hag been able to circumvent easilv the as well as Serbs who hr"ted to delend tf,&i"ll"lr-
United Nations arms embarso and to import-both
weapons and advanced tecf,nology with'military !:*lgpeig_hborsornetuiediopa"tt"ii"tilo"tn.
a_ggression faced expulsion, ferro, ioa E"""
aoolicabilitv. Durine the same oefr-od the European slaughter. If first the c-roati;; ild t;i", tliEoioiu"
Communiti pressuret the Croatiins into endine their government forces
blockade of Yusoslav armv bases and installations in had not been prevented-nv- fiiu
Croatia. As a re-sult, the Yugoslav armywithdlew large embargo from obtaining
aggression, much
weap;ifi.:;;il; tiJtt tn.
amounts of heavy weaponry and arms manufacturing .terd-tory iould have b;;;,i""d"u"a
equipment whicb further enhanced the already enormous manv civilians might have been ru""a i[. liiilirut"
weapons superiority of the Yugoslav army. Arms
manufacturing nachlnery and technology f:.Tp:'^ry ?{J?Tor,
by tbrces
maiss killing, ana .i;;;i";
"tn"i.have been
lE"".qleq as.suspectedwhose chief leaders
withdrawn from Croatla and Slovenia under lq:I!!.$ war
numan nghts organizations.
criminals by reputable ;"rta
European Communlty aueplces have made the
truncated Yugoslavla or Serbia-Montenegro
nlrn s6f sempletelV eelf.Bufficient in heavy weapons
production Most of the forces and equipment were rorces ilsffi *lTJ,t?Igl,,Tffi
i!o3,lfa tree hqlrd to launch ;eT#f;tff
tndbi;war of
the
then stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina wheie they were
later used in the Serbian assadf,on the independ6nce of
that republic. Forces and equipment earlier-withdrawn ftsfiinft:f{n}1i$lui'f ar;s*;ru"yf, 'fg
from Slovenia nnder EC auspices were also concentrated flecu.ritv.C^o,uncil failed to hJei lrr" ,r"g.rrt appeal of
presrdent Alija Izegbegwic in December igg r fo'"'pi.u-
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which was used as a staging r(eeprng tbrces in
area in the Serbian war against Croatia. A similai losnia. If the united N;ti-o-fs Lad
withdrawal was arranged early in 1 992 from Macedonia.
respondedin a timell{ashion tp prJsidlnt
i"riliio"i.',
All in all, according to the Zagreb newgweekly Globus, ffi 3#-ffi1."-:l,lf ti:ltiflL%.ffr",5tr;iiij",:::"1:
the Yugoslav aruy was allowed to nemove some war, the entire bloody confl ict mi ght have b..t, pr"rr.rrt"a
f20 tanks and 46 planes from Slovenia, 310 tanks or greatly reduced.
and 210 rnilifuy aincraft fron Cnoatia, and 120
tanlrs and 86 planes from Macedonia. In addition, 57. _ Some Britis-h poli_tieialq andjournalists who
the federal army was allowed to remove some 200 pieces wish to rationglii" thg fniled E-u6pe;"p"it"y
of artillery from Slovenia, 260 from Croatia, and 80 from have sqsgps.F{ that rhs war
Macedonia. Many of these weapons have been used by prevented if Germany had -i?-tff,il""il."o
no-t pusnea- tne
the Serbo-Monteriegrin forces in Bosnia. It is an irony
that Slovenia and Croatia alone had paid more ^Eyronganpopmu!_ntyt",eJogni".i"iiTiii"lra
Drovelran indgpengence in December of lggl.It is
lhqn frfty percent of tlre Yugoslav militdny budget. clear. that by t[at time, neither the Slovenians,
the
Today, neither Croatia nor Slovenia noi Bosnia- uroatrans, the Bosnians, nor the Macedoni"rrs-iu"r"
Hercegovina nor Macedonia has an air force with which willing- to rem.ain ir q yugoslavia A;;il;da" * t"
to defend itpelf.se brutal serbian poritic6--iiiiarvltrT.. Sil.r,"
indivijluals. ign-ore the that-the dar in si""""i;
55. The military superioritywhich the United Nations and Croatia be_gan_before -fact
the independence of
arms embargo assured the Serbian aggressors has
allowed them to seize approximately one third of Croatia
thes e cou ntrr es f, a d bee n re*-o grti re?.T a,iiiiti,
-37 -
-36-
 Communi ty ilr December of lggl as a condition for
Yugoslav federation was clearly impossible because had President Izetbeg, oviO had already sho*r,
Yugoslav-wide elections taken place throughout former Sgcoqgition
himself to be a democrat and ailvocate of tiumah tiitrtJ
Yugoslavia, the non-Serbian votes plus those of the for all citizens regardless of religion or natio;Aitv. hh;
Serbian opposition would have ousted the neo- only sensible choiie was for the iite.pqgio"ri .o*ri^L"itv
Communist leadership of Serbia and would have pgcled up by the military power ofNATO u"a-tt u Urrit.i
implemented drastic changes in the officer corps of the Nations to assist Bos_nia-Hercegovina to achieve a
Yugoslav arrny. The Serbian potitico-military elite democratic and peaceful transition"to i"aepe"a""ce u"a
could maintain Inwer and domination only in an to provi-de reasonable guarantegs to the.seruian mi"oritu
authoritarian Yugoslavia. None of the non-Serbian ;i;;;;;;
republics could alford to remain in such a federation.
pv qe.ndi gS a cl e arrne s sage to Serbi alyugo i;;
DerDran Sosruan clrents that they accept such a peaceful
The "Yugo-nostalgists" in the United States and Europe and democratic solution orface the combi""a roriu oltrr.
are clearly wrong. "Yugoslavia" afber the Croatian and international community and the democruti.uiiv-.r..t.a
Slovenian declarations of independence was simply a goverrrments of Bo snia-Hercegovina and Croali a.
thinly veiled disguise for Great6r Serbia. By Deceinber
1991, given the arbitrary and belligerent stance of 59. If the world community did virtually nothing to
Radovan lGradzic and the Serbian Democratic Party of plevent ttre_spread of the cioatian war t6 nosnialits
Bo snia, the recent bloodj' war in Croatia, the destructi on etlbrts to lFle a just end to the Bosnian conflict have
of the town of Ravno in Hercegovina, and the massive been equally lacking. The united Nations has f,ailed to
military preparations for war in Bosnia, which had provrde ett-ective support for a just and democratic
already been put into effect by the Yugoslav federal resolution of the cribis and has -passed a numuer or
army and the Bosnian Serbian militias and other ineffectual resolutions all ofwhichhave ao"e
paramilitary groups, there was no chance that the "ottri"gto
ltop !!e continued onslaughtby Serbian milita-rv?ortes.
majority of the people in the republic would accept On May 31, t99Z the-Unfted NatiooJ-ifrnosea
continued membership in a Yugoslav federation. economic sanetions on the nrmp yugostafia or
Bosnia's continued membership in the federation Qerbia and Montenegro. This reiotuEo;i;; th;
would have rendened the republic subject to the frrst time singled out-yugoslavia ot Sertia ;; aG
same kind of Serbian colonial oppression that had Fggressor in the Bosnian conflict. The sanctions
already been intrcduced in Kosovo. The pattern of have created considerable economic discomfort in serbia
wanton criminality, violence and ethnic cleansing of and Montene-gro but have had little
policy tgwards Bosnia-Hercegovina or"ffe.t
o" S;bdt
non-Serbians was already patently clear not only in the behavior of
Croatia but in Vojvodina. The Bosnian government the Serbian forces in Bosnia." In summeiof iggt; tti;
has uncovered military documenLs which show United Nations belatedly began providing iood'a"a
that Karadrid and the federal military had made medical supplies to the hunfrry, slick, anf blocladed
preparations to seize Bosnian territory by force citizens of sarajevo and otherr Sosnian, cities. Smali
long before the war began"lo All negotiations that detachments of UNPROFOR troops were stationed at
took place during this time were simply used as a cover S.apj gyo pirport to oversee the airlifting ofhumanitaf an
for Serbian military preparations against the ai d to the besieged capital and subsequeitly UNpROFOR
democratically-elected Bosnian government and the tlggpr were stationed in other localions io oversee the
people loyal to it. delivery of.aid by lgq!. _The aid progr.- ta, U"*r,
fraught with many difficulties, technicd. political. and
58. Bosnia-HercegovinaandMacedoniawere the military. Yundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees,
only nepublics of fomer Yugoslavia to meet the both in and outside Bosnia, have no pnesent prospdet of
human rights criteria set by the European
-38- -39-
 done little to change th-e situation. While some prisoners
returning to their homes. Tbe aid mission has done were released from the most notoriouJi.6r
nothing to address the fundamental cause of others were merelytransferred to unknow"lo6iio", -""v
o,
hunger, diaease, irfiury and death, which is the perhaps killed.
war itself, the deliberate blockading of cities, towns and
targeting of civilian objects by the Serbian forces. The 62. United Nations Seeretary General Boutros
United Nations fonces sent to deliverhumanitarian Boutros Ghali Ers been espedialv-"ttr"" i" ni"
aid and monitor cease fire agneements have beeome 4pproaeh to the Bosnian situation. Ghali s-uesested
virtual hostages. Countries such as France and that the situation in somalia and other piacer fr-airi."
England are opposing stronger military measures against was much worse lhan that in Bosnia lut naa t"c.iued
the aggressors because of fear for the lives and safety of greater attention from European leaders. He presented
the relatively small detachments which they have lhe gnattended sufferings ofthe somaiianJ"r!"
stationed insido Bosnia. "*."r"
for the lack of effecrive iction by the urit;d N;iio"i i"
Bosnia. In tate June tggz,g6uiroJcfii;tiilt a
60. UN-sponsored cease fires have been repeatedly to a Security_Couneil Resolution to,e-oie ana
violated bV ttr. Serbian forces. Thusfar the pr6sence of place under Uni,te.$ Nqtigqs supenrision tle-heary
UNPROFOR forces has provided little more than a y_e1p9\ry^*hich the Serbian for_ces were oJni tb
shield for Serbian military conquests. United Nations noTlbard Sarqi_evo on the grounds that the UniTed
officialq on the ground have assumed a false neutrality i\.af,rons tacrred nesounces to inplement the plan.
which has played into the hands of the aggressors. R-ather than requesting reso_lrrces' to i-ptut"""T-Lrr"
Military efhrts by Bosnian government forces to break plan, he offered-the cuirent budget consiraints as a
the Serbian stranglehold have been hampered by the reason t-o oppoqe it. Boutros Ghalfs attitude is notone
Unitd Nations cease-fire policy. In summer of 1992, expected ofthe leader ofwhat should be the woridls most
Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, commander of important h-u-manitarian organizaii;; ;;d-q"uri_
UNPROFOR forces located at Butmir airport in Sarajevo,
and other United Nations officials malle an issue of
rninepnilitary actions by the Bosnian govemment
ti;'ffi iff tlH3'+$,f,lSltia*:##"HAffi ,$
Yontenegro_aF the aggresso"-in- ihe%;iilct,
fonces in Sarqievo, which were primarily defensive, Boutros Ghali h.as persiEtiently oppor.d proposald
while ignoring a massive military offensive which "ll
toapRlls-reatermilitirypressurbaE"iinsts"iuia.t'ro"."s
Serbian fonces wene carrying out all over Bosnia. and continues to endorse the arns embargo which
61. For months after the outbreak ofthe conflict United {epriv_qs Eqs,oie of a nooe eme"ti"" ,i.dii t
Nations officials failed to heed the many reports of defend itself. unitedNations speciar En"ot c'*,r"
eth'lic cleansing, rape andmass killingbeingcarried out Vance has similarty insistea _on ,"rrEo,iiog
by Serbian forces on a massive scale. In a similar negotiations while reiusing to endors" unv coaintE
fashion, the Bush administration for months measures to enforce the resulting resolirtions or
suppressed daily reports of atnocities in Bosnia agreements.
which were reaching the United States Embassy Q3. With much fanfare, General Secretary Boutros
in Belgrade.al Only-after television news reporters p_gulros Ghali representirig the UN a"d g"itirt Fri-"
showed the world public video footage of the appalling M i ni s ter Jo-hn l-\4aJ_or pre si de-d over a spe ci al c o nference
treatment ofprisonere at Serbian run camps did United o-n Yug_oslaviaheld in London-from August 26
Nations officialdom or leaders of major world powers tlroug! August 28,lgg?l2 The London Coilference
take notice of the problem. The an{val of Red Cross adoptect seven measures pertaining to Bosnia-
monitors and United Nations special missions have

-40- -4t -
Hercegovina: "1) a cessation of all hostilities in the bre-aches of the Geneva conventions and other
Republic ofBosnia-Hercegovina; 2) an end to all ouLside violations of Humanitarian iaw. tii*Giltilio",
involvement in the current conllict either in terms which contained no provisions- foi actua[piori.iiio"
of material or human support; 3) the gathering of all yaT, c+Tinals. was-weaker than u p"oplo*.I *"a;-bt "r
hgqvy _weaponry undei interrrational supen'ision; u ni ted s ta te s se crelrrr of s tate La wrte n ci E a gG-burge r.
4) the demilitarization of large cities with oversight
by international observers; 5)-the establishment"of
refugee centers and centers of humanitarian
loT"lt'#1.FJfJsf,"Haffi
consisting of Serbia and-Iylont
ifl'n?;;iliF,if;
assistance for citizens ofBosnia-Hercegovina who have innerii-tntmilnbqrs-lipi4tn"'ti?Ha*Rt?liflj3?
been driven from their dwellings or ihose dwellings lhe former Socialisi Federal n.i"Ut"rt of
have been destroyed until such time as their return can luggslapa. The passage of thi; E;"fi;i;ii"""t*
be_assured;6) thri erpansion;f [nfiniaarian aid tt doubt the valiii-ty _5f tn-arms embarso io of
all areas of Bosnia.-Hercegovina where it is needed
in cooperation with local participants: 7\ the *s,Tfr?"f
establishment of DoaG.keepiiq fordes urider the n_on-existent "fj;infi:S,;t:tt*Y":L;*:"{:*
gttitr Socialist "f"so;i;ii ^frra
auspices of the Unftd Nation6 in order to maintain effe crivelv. cea sed to exiit wiitr ltr e re siex"?i"; ;i ite last
the-cease-fire,the supenision of all military movements, tderal priqe minister, Ante Markovi"c in Decemter of
and the estdblishdent of other confiddnce buildin{ 1-9.91. on octoHgT
o'- 1992, ararmed-uv-Jii,'iiio*a
measureg." As on previous occasions, there were no flights of mili-taiy aircrart -"".it-"li""ii"-
effective provision-s for the enforcement of these
provisions. "Supervigion" of heavy weaponry did not H;"J"iif'"#ffi
mean control, and Serbian bombardment of cities and
tow_ns throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina continued
":*:fr:ntll,l**l*-rd''3*
Lh:::f.*li:.JlitS,"'uanangurs";ir;ffi;?i;;it),,
rne qocument taire-dto name the principal violator.
without cessation. Not a single city oi town was made tlie
safer for its residents by these resolutions. The London L.-*:::'^{.lylqhhasavirrual-monoilli;;TliU,y
ajr power and had been b-ombing cities a"a t"o*"J
Conference established- the framework for yet another
Ji o"u,
BosniaandHercegovinaform;iG.Tt'iS;;bi;;#i,iLry
Conference on former Yugoslavia, which was held in responded to the-ban ty aimini;ffi; -t# hi?r,ir" r'il"t
Geneva be ginn i ng Septe-mber I 8, I 992under the C o-
Chairmanship of Loril.Iames Owen who replaced
aircraft over Bosnia iut coniinued to uEe attact<
helic.opters whigh were less eaby fo; th; u"ii*a-rGiio",
Lord Carington as the chief mediator for fhe EC monitoring equipment to detecf. tn aG firsl;lrilii
and special United Nations envoy Cynrs Vance. trre ban alone, Nations monitoring "r
64. OnAugust 13, 1992 afterthe world news media's equipment pickbd_Unite*{
up 6g violati""s of-tiJbr".
rrosDran: government authorities on the ground
revelations of concentration camps and widespread reported many more violations.
atrocities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the United Nations
Security Council belateldly passed a resolution 65. The attitude-of-the international communitv has
".

prgvidigg for the gathering of information on war adverselv. affected the relatio".fiip 6.-i;-;;'F,i'r"i"-
crimes by "internafional humanitarian organizations" Hercegovina -and croatia. The defe.tse o? nor"i"-
and c_alling on the Secretary General to subinit a report
based on the information r,rt^Lus gathered. On Octobdr 6,
Hercegovina has been hampered Uv ai.p"t;
f,ne s'sruangovernment-and its military forces on the
#il;""
1992,_ the Security Council passed resolution 780
militarv telaeist iJoiit .
one hand a"q tJte political and
which called for the Secretary General to establish s'snran and Herce_govinian croatians on the'other.
a Commission of Erperts to review evidence on These disputes partlv reflecr th" ti""ri*J-;ri;;iffii;ip
-42- -43-
 between presidents lzetbegovid and Tudjman and their of Herceg-Bos_na, (Hruatsha zajed,nica Herceg-Bosne)
re-spective governments wrhich was discussed earlier. the Croatian flag flies, C-roatiai."r"L".v i*
Although. tlre. C-roatian government immediately there is little to iidica!{fitacitxise regrions
are"?#, "a
anything
leco gni ze f
4 -thg i n d e pe_nd e nce -a_nd terri to ri al i n te gri ty o g:#tf n;t*;r*r*t"n"l"T
Ros{ria while Serbiah leaders Milo$evit
sichl have steadfastly refused to do so, the Croatian
and Cosic[cn6U- !!:elb'"",trirxf
mi.litgv.assist-ance ttre croatGn g"""'**"ii
private individual s lroqr
government maintqlns that [tt[""?ii
government's behavior towards Bosnia has been in croatia.
. ""a
ifr"'bio?tiu"
ambiguous eno-ugh to lead many to wonder whether or HVO T"oops-aiJ aff
not croatia really supports the territorial integrity ofits
neighbor. This imbihroos attitude to;;;a;tsoJ"ia is
stimulated by the international community,s fiailure to
iliEiffii?,tr#sf,H.a**,ri*".;:.lm:el*
the HVO units.
support unequivocally the independence arid territorial 67 .
ln the H ru at s k a 3 ajed. nic a H e rceg - Bo s ne,Croa ti an
sovereignty of either Croatia or Bosnia in the face of monopolize- local administrati;; .fi;i;;i
fiJ -naliJi_,s
military ag.gression by a much_better armed enemy. complain thar they. .i.t"a.d
Lqck of stnong lntematlonal rupport for a iuit importance. _rn Zeiiea "".,rA;;;i"n il.iiil", or
solut_ion to the Balkqn conflict hras producdd a central -an4 northeastem "iilJJii'#ili r"
moo4 of desperation rind helplessnesjin Croatia. Bo;"tA-M;ffi" t"r,"
'Ihe Croatian capital is only about thirtv miles from the ;f; :'3lf,**ffif [fi:833fltt$'"'ii,f ::lffiff in
cease'fi re line with the serbian forces arid could easily be localwartimeoligarctti"itept!#;i"g.;;;"#tj'o'it"ritv
!,qrgeted by Serbian longer-range artillery and missiies. flifi;rdil;;;""
to seek domination.tras caus-ea Uit]:i"
When the international community gives indication that croatians and Muslims- The". ir iro-;fiffi ilEi#.""
it is ready to ratify Serbian territoiill gains or to resolve
the conllict in Bosnia-Hercegovina bj' Oviaing it into
Io-cal factions wirhin
"".ti
of the central eovepnnent
rt iiiiii"o
ttrTiori"igro,rp.
a;;t" fi" uro*]i"ft
semi-independent cantons, wfu ch can -easily be innexed
3i[]iih"n,a*,*"{g,,mx d t'-;;ii#' o"tr
-
to Bosnia's more powerful neighbors with th; hon's share i
going to Serbin, the reaction of the Croatian leadership
has been to_ sglvqge qlrat it can even ifit is at the expense
6a-;;6;&. rn other-qrdJ lrtH;"?d;t":""9:
northeasternBosnia,an_dinsara.i.*;il;;;"6..ri"?rt.fl{
ofits erstwhile ally. Tbose who urge Croatia to dgree
to a cantonal division of Bosnia.Eerceqovina waile -unils of os BiH and r{vQ fr;a;
leaders.hip. {p Salaje.'^o ana th; ffirt"
;;;;iloiiffo".
accusing Croatia of favoring the disfremberment iiiH
of Bosnia are indeed hypociitical. i: 1l ..ttt"ically mix6d force,
"iaho"sh
B*;#ii';fi*,
"ri"1lJ'OS
66. Almost immediately after the outbreak of war and
the.severing-of tle capitil city of Sarajevo from the rest
iiruf :ff63,iifi 3ilH.Tf$3,r_tlllT:":'":y,g
Muslim officers.
of the replblic, Croatians in westerrr Hercegovina
succesefully resisted Serbian advance! and
organized a virtual state within a state under the
?;,,8*l,ifl
flleader .i,l#,"ral:#l:*;r*ff iffi 'd:Ifi,,"'j
Radovafr GTa{iiqi;e;d"A"stria ostensiblv
leadership of Mate Boban lmrih-teh b6h-bahn]. In to
pockets of central Bosnia where Croatians form a
discuss ways to end rhe nos"irni;"ftfi:"iil'BH#""
pajgrity, the Posavina Croatians organized their own g1:nT111t suspected.that the meeti"s ;;fire"t"a
local government, police, and military forces under the X19!1.." qtF*pt to part_itlon Bosnia betweln Slrbi"
uroarra atthe exnense ofthe Muslims and otheis
umbrella of the Cioatian Defense iouncil, HVO. In ""a
avo"ing
these areas, whichthe Croatians callthe Croatian Union
a unified Bosnii. U""y c.J"ti,iiii ilrid;;a
o"iria"
-44- .45 "
 Croatia proper had similar fears and wrote letters of' Ii!., lve-glqzl vqlley._The clashes caused mistrust
protest against the meeting. Boban responded to the between I{vo and _oS BiH forceJ a;f;Hii r# iity or
outcry with the explanation that the Gratz meeting was
{ajce [yah.ee-tsehl and contributed 6]ffi 6if if tr,*
merely_an extension of the peace negotiations orgafuzed !o*It to attacking. Serbian forces. O; pr"slae"t
by th-e European Communiiy at Lisli6n.as Boban pointed Izetbegovic's iniFar,ive- a joint crorti"" i"{ rii.ii""
out that the London Conference had called each party to commi si on was formg{ toinve stigal" ni o"iefir"oi
meet separately with each of the others as well as to
s
fi ghting and the c-o1fl igt *"r- u"o""g[i--to
tt .
participate in discussions involving all three parties. tensions remained high
]ti u"t
in centraigo;d:- l"-r"ia-
"na".'
Boban created a simil"t, uproarwhen he officially 1993, there were ttew a"*ea.-t"rf,., U"i*"."
proclaime d "The C ro atian-Union of Hence g-Bosna-" *1ll,q"y
uroaf,ran and bosnian government forces at BusovaDa
9n Jul-y 3,_1992. When confronted with strong protest l bo_o- so -vah- ch ah J, g ofrS i V" LgT
iS";-,ii;
-iiirrlJi*L
rr"fr -"t o ofl
from the Bosnian government, bad review6 in the and..adjacent areas in ce-ntral B;ffii*
international press, and letters of,protests from many writing, it p.ppears that once agai"j oi"C"fort. ofg;r;iu" or
C_roatia{r_s, Bota! again backtrackei, claiming that thb gt: y rr"-rl"n political and mi litary I e ad e-rs have s topped
Union of Herceg-Bosha was not an independenf, state but f,ne anned encounters, but the underlying causis
a temqorary wartime administration which had emerged distrust still remain.az' of
from the need to establish law and order in the regiirns
under his control.aa 71. The Bosnian gg.vernment has complained
repeatedly.thp! humailtarian ai-dl weaporrrvEd;th;;
69. The Herceg-Bosna declaration led to a call for
sanctions against Croatia and demands that Croatian fr"8trfr s&t"f #fl?ittu:;'i,1fr'lr3z6lb#ff.Iil';tTr
forces withdraw from Bosnia. It is possible that f;erceg-Bosna" anp .war-lords foelonsrnt to the-IIito:
llterna4onal pressu"e on Cioatia i.r"tfi"g T"oh ttte uro_atian sources claim that onry abolt[wen[v perclnt
Herceg-Bosna-declaration was a factor in 6 Croatian :lt|^"^{o-o*irgonfi scatedas-a"r.i"alrGil;rfi il-i;n
decision to withdraw a small artillery unit from northern wnrle the Bosnians maintqrn that often it amounli do
Bosnia which led to a collapse ofloint Croatian and mor-e than half. Spq. goo-ds d&tin;A fo; d;t;-ilh;
Muslim defenses a{oqndqdzak [rih-jahk] and Derventa nortreast of Bosni-a haie been .6iiiir."iia 6"^tr,ii,ii-
ldare-vent-ah] and the fall of the western Posavina to warl ord s in C enrral Bo sni a. B;h""fi; iri,"ifi.if
g gz
grouqs of voluntee!:B- from IsJamie-cb-unt"i"s'LJs""
the Serbsas. After the Herceg-Bosna incident, presidents
Izetbegovid and Tudjman- met and signed a joint 9lt"I"g Bosnia to fight as "mujairldi;;;; th; sidE oi
me, rr.gsryan government. Ttre Croatian government
agreement on diplomatic and military iollaboration
and the Hvu ar.e-uneasy about the arrival of these
Qgginst th-e new Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia. volunteers from Islamic iountries ;iro; t-h;;f;;":'*ili
Subsequently each time a major dispute arosJbetween
the Bosnian and Croatian governments, it was patched contribute to a risein "Muelim extremisir; i;"8;;;;: S;
over with a joint declaration.a6 Izetbegovid spent much far, est-imates of the total n"-6";-ir".iiioid6.",
-to
time traveling back and forth between Saiajevo and lange f"g*_ no more than several iidrdred
thoqsand. More importantty, in l[L i"il"" tt"tfrrlg9z,
;?*
Cro_atia and Sarajevo and Hercegovina to m-eet with
j
T\r,djman, Boban, and other Croatian leaders in a series the
losnian governrie-nt force begar
p"..hu'"a
of desperate efforts to iron out disagreements. ii-*i"ra black *""GT. #;f;"ffiff 3#Hi
by I sl ami c copn triqs._Mp st of iiie ;"tfidffi il! iiliil- a
70. In the last week of October and first week of into Bosnia throur
N-oye4ler L992,armed clashes took place between units
of the HVO and the OS BiH in cential Bosnia at Prozor
we,, a s F;* ;ffi','Hiheikffiififfih
variousAraucouniri-eilap;;;;6i";;ffi lilri,il"ti"lirr'';*#ii
[prose-or], Novi Travnik [n6h-vee trahv-nick], and the
-46- -47.
 contributions. The Croatian authorities have allowed policy would be in the hands of
substantial arms supplies, some ofwhich are confiscated ;il[" a
to be o".ti3th?t riT'rHno'jfi
go ve rn";h;-;;tters
ments. Accordi n g.to. the pl.an, fo. oiui; g ; fi'fi;i y
!y^t!r". HVO, to reaitir Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Oclober !! I
1992, in order to-maintain a pretenie of obserwing the lsreqd ces_s ati on of hostilities,'the ;iii t"ry F";." J lr tr,
arrns embargo, the Croatian government searche? an B o s ni a n M u i m s, C roa t! a-n s, dn d SLrb;
sI ;;"i ;;;h;., *"
Iranian.plane and handed ovdr a load of weapons and into the resrg_nq asglgne! theio."a i";;;*r;h;ii
weapons to united.Nations-peacekeepe"s. r-tils.
nluuy
ammunition to United Nations officials. The irickle of 6r.",
arrnaments to the Bosnian goverrrment forces has in would be increas-ed in numb." rilru;ilJ;i;;I tnu
recent weeks contributed to a substantial improvement A;ffi.'"'ii;il;"th"
borders of each region_oI ".a
constitution p19nos94. Uv ViFe ,-dl*6*"o,
in their battlefiel{performance as*witnessed by a January
1 993 offensive in Dastern Bosni a. In January fhe Bosni
ai elements from the.eTistini nitit;r??;;iioo,
Qrc,es succeeded in retaking substantial ireas around
are to be integrated intd a ir"il,i"o.
Srebrenic_a[sr_h-breh-ne-e-tsah],Bratunactb"att- "oin".a.
too-nahtsl, qn{ Zvornik and were moving southward ffi:"r*"xtffi 'Hri,la.,ll:.*lx.T;lr,lilT*ii
f,
nationalities nume.ricaily proporti oilJ Io lh;;ilillii o"
flln9;51pr[8or-ahzh-deh]towardst"hesandZak
ffi ::t"fi"tthT,.l,*,i:nagi;tii'"ifrj':fr fi .iur
fl
72. The Serbian forc-es in Bosnia-Hercegovina have ed.,rm.llFfli?frgTr:ffi :ti
received assistance from ultra-nationalist Russian "..uiroioh";;lpecifi
ach n ati onal -confei si on al group-a.t a*
voluqteers who have at'peared in various pu*s ofBosnia
e
pasls.Accordin-gtogeff ailt"il;dliilrirT"ii"a ri-il
and Hercegovina and may number seviral thousand.
"*i". " ",
bgf gre_national-andreEionai;iAG;;,a-"""irl"n
Among these forces is a group of several hundred g th !h'9. replesegtaliveJ oa ;;h- ;f tii"tlr_"
"Cossaclrso under the tomfoand of former Red
Army General Filatov. Radovan Karadzic has r*:ii3g"f .f; :ffi iJ
threatened that he and his Russian allies will launch a li$::"i:,fi3.";;fJ$,i?,'*f
has representatives of the three"majo;h;;i;;liiiJ,
generqlreligious war between Christian Orthodoxy and the republic.
i"
Islam if necessary to counter the assistance the Boinian
government is receiving from the isiami. *otia.nb- !!vanceAccording to the version of the plan which
and Owen su_bmitted in
73" In late December L9!t2, UN Special Envoy Cyrus Januafo, lgggJh;
Bosnian Muslims w-ho nade ..p-r+ ffieiil? in*
Vance and EC Negotiator Lord Robert Owen announced ponul a tio n i n Bosnia- Heree gofi o" 6Jrb-t tli--",
the completion of a peac-e plan which they had developed be gap_ are_ to receive_ 29 peretnGa the i;lra ii
republic for thell threa cantons, th;-C"diiir" in*
{uring the Geneva Confeience. Accordirig to this Varice-
Owen plan, the solution to the Bosnian cjnflict is a new who made up.-tz_pe_rcent th;;o;;I;l",
con:titution, which would provide for the division
of Bosnia.Hercegovina into ten autonomous
25 perceot q''4 tue s6ruJ *n" "a
of the populati on 4?_percent. Thi;
il";;""fifl;;lJ."t
regions. Each of the three major national-confessional ap.pTgxillatety 44 percent of"fr"iriiii"rt
the lliuslims
gg:rps, Muslims, Croats, ald Serbs would form a majority l9aJes
uvtngoutside fire cantons where they are in the
-of
in three ofthe ten regions. In the tenth region, that thb majority, BZ .pe-rce_nt of Ctoatians -6"tria? in"
capital city_of Sara.ievo no ole group worlld constitute a u roa ti an controlled caqtons and ag percenior
majorilV. Eq..h fel'igr.r would have its own legislative, in"
-*"it"or,
executive a-n$ ju{ic{al branches, their organizalion to be Fpfbq outside thg Serbian iont.oifed
dj ma sgy"rnilen t, tli; B, b;; *i,,
determined locally. Foreign, monetarj, and military l!:h"^tXl I !, l!-"J"
or lne uroatran 1.
Democratic Union e
of Herceg-Bosna, and

-48- =49-
 the serbians s{ll
some Croatians living inside the proposed Croatian -controlled the area where they had
controlled canton are-satisfied with tlie Vance Owen Flg"tr up-the ]vlaslenica uriasi across an Adriatic
P-lan.-9-"lVthe Croatian side has actually signed the
inlet,andtheirforceswgrepr_E""r*;;tGC"t"ti"o
government from_ construiting g
plan. Ifthe plan were actuallyimplemented, the-Bosnian ;r""ot""ilfiag.
io ilg plgce. This bridge is-o?-c""iti;;t il"friLn..
government and Bosnian Muslims would receive the
least ?14 grvg rry the most. Bosnian Serb forces led by
KaradZi0 and General Mladid would be required tb f":'h:"EtHtHiffs::rbh*?lir*HtfJ*if [?
croatia. Also of coqcern d ldC;;tid#;ilment
relinqJrish about one third of the tendtory they have was the continued
cgnqrrered and ethnically cleanseO wtrite t<i.prnt serbian. oecupati-on-oi tne
-alreg.dy
two thirds.so
7F. Under extreme pressure from Vance and Owen, the
if.E:l,l"i:#ilffiH,H"'i:'".H:F,1f
Nations'failure flmne
to enforce theVance pL",,;;Jii, F"it.r.u
to resolve the issue ofthe tvtart""icu-f,*asJ"ia
United Nations anii Western Europe, the Bosnian F.ir.t,
goverrunent and the Bognian Serbs- have expressed 9u-, the croatian government took matters into it own
willingness-to acc_ept the general principles of the plan hand s. c roa ti an rfritlta.y ro-rce s" sei r-ed Ivr"riL"I#, trr.
but both sides refulse to aEcept thi proposed territ6rial Perucha dam and the Zeniun uirpo"l, aiip".t;ilili;pink
zones" or areas where
division. Although Serbian pr?rsidenf Sl6bodan Milosevic Qr-oats f;*r;d;-;;jJriTv"of the
ifyt'fi ;;:l'^ffi::i j;,#Ho?;f,.d;;?;il;i.ii,ia.
professes general agreement with the plan, the Bosnian
Serbs refuse to sign. Karadzic has told his supporters in
Bosnia tlfat in pietending to accept the plaif now, the meanr *','dngthatifth; 0;iihlrHrutrf*Sffi
Bosnian Serbs hqve no need to give up their goal of communitv", " failed to enforce the piovisio"r biiii.Tl"..
plgll, the Croatian governr4ent wouid-h;;; io
unification with Serbia or "Yugo-slavial" tVarflre in
Bosnia-Hercegovina has actually intensified since
t["
ir.r.
the announcement of the Dlan. Past experience
would leave one to predict thativen if the plan leads to
trJ
tilit':fri:rs:;:f
expelled from the
;F Sr,*r"ftHhrt HJTff :
area.sz --'
4 sela_se fire, and a temporary cessation of hostilities, the 77. _ The VaDC-Own plan has also sparked new
Serbian forces are unlikely to relinquish conquered armed
territories and hundreds of thousandd of Muslim and
gonflicts between croglisq 4f.;; d;;;li
tisSj'""a
tgqnian sovernment.(gs niH) io"ceJi" e;;d;i i6rniu
Croatian refugees who have been driven out of their
native regions will have no chance to return home. T*:::- sglSs.e_Serbian camRaiqn ofa;;;il;
eth_-.
Serbian controlled areas will remain in the hands of
sadistic war criminals and new armed conflicts will
ili,:ffiro"iliiqq ryqffi gs,f ,# flfl::'sHx
develop, as they did in Croatia aft,er the failure of the ylgBozoBajidlbo-zhohrah_ichl,lh"-a;?;;;;iiister
earlier Vance Plan.sl 9, ooqry-ttercegovi4s,
armed -B Croatian, ordered Bosnian
.t'orces i4 tlre area of Gornji Vatuf ig""_
"+itq
lyg g va,! - koof I whi ch th e Va n ce -O wd FG; h;"i ri fr," a
76, In January 1993, the C:oatian government became
fld up with the lhilure oft INPROFOFforces to implement to the Croatian canton to ptace th;;;1";ilfia#tn.
command of the IfVO. The drea h"d 6;;;;;;;;i
the-most impo-rtan! part ofthe Vance Plan, the disarming
of the renegade mililias of the Krajina republics and thE
; th.
safe returm of more than two-hundied thousand
Croa_tians who had been cethnically cleansed, or
iliiff lf ;Rft ,:*:*#,3.11-*.itisf :l*lj j3;
that tne no* a""Ji"""""i."f i, a
Raj ic's order, stating
expelled from the areas under Sei:bian control. not Tcepted tlre teri:itorial division
"i p"6por.a by v"n.u
The Croatian government was especially concerned that and owen. when the Bosnian-.omtitr"?Jrr to
"rto*"a
-50- - 51 -
obeyRajid's order, the HVO leadership sent armed units
Hercegovina ftop serbia.b? At the time this article
complete with tanks qnd heavy artillery to force the went t9 press, the serbian forces in eastern Bosrria *ere
Bosnian government forces to submit. Iieavy fighting e,ngagrng in a new and brutal campaig"-o-f'"tlr"i.
ensued and there were by all accounts dozens of casilalties 91eg1sifrg. A,s a result of the Serbiarr off6nsive, ,o*.
100'000 peoplerrvere cut offfrom h"-r"ila"iu" ald
on both sides.58
as m-any as 20,000 people driven out of theitho;;.
a"a
During the fighting, Hercegovinian Croatian town of Trebinj.
I;
78. _
authorities in the "Union ofHerceg-Bosna" blocked relief L1,Il_:.::ggyinian
rierbran extremists expelled
tftii-il;_;rehi;
4,000 Muslims. The seiuiaii
supplies to areas under Bosnian government control, lorcps |ppear to be-moiivated by a"ri".1o L*pl-rlif
confiscated the automoliles and belongings ofMuslims, " to them inihe vance-
DerDs rrom areas that are assigned "o"-
a-nd pu-t a 4umber of Muslims in jail. troatian sources Owen plan.
claim that Bosnian government ufuts attacked Croatian
villagesin central B-osnia and burned down houses ofthe 80. United Nationsofficialj,.Eulgp.eaq heads of state,
inhabitants.Ea Bosnian Bources claim that IIVO forces and influential members of the ttfrril $il;"il;is;
attacked and burned the homes of Muslim townsmen.Sb
poli cv. e stablishment_lgy." applied such
il il;
i"rr rr.*
American pre.sident william 'cti"to" t-tt;t il;h;; lsr""a
President Izetbegovid, after consultins with to sgpRolt the Vance--Owen plan uiU"ii-*iif, ?o_.
representatives-of the OS BjH, IIVO, and UNPF,OFOR,
concluded that the reports ofBosnian attacks on Croatian
modifications to m.ake it more fato"abi;ir trt" n"Joi"r,
towns were untrue and wrote a letter to President Muslims. clinton has agreed tJappoini i rpJ.iri.""ri,
Tudjman urglng him to consult more than one source to partici,pate in negotiations o*reiihe n".i"ior-;f;h;
before reaching conclusions about who had caused the
ptan and has promised to contribute united sGtes
conflict. Izetbegovid appealed to Tudjman to.ioin him in mrlrtary tbrces to--enforce it. According to the iatest
a joint investigation at the scene of the conflict.56 With
statement of policy.gf Se_c-retary ;i Bt"t"-W"]".r,
the help of IJNPROFOR mediators stationed in Central Chri.stoph"t rnd pr,jsident Ctiirt"il dr; ;ffi ;rro,ia u.
Bosnia and the efforts qf high OS BiH and IIVO officers, modified in such a way gs to malie ft ;il;Aii;Jo alt
a truce was arranged. Warringunits on both sides were
parties.and no party ri'itt be forced t" il;;l t[; ;1";:
jlt t_p^" lTy-r_epre se lrts a retre at fr om C l i ntods camf ai gn
ordered to lift the banicades between them and to direct ]pte-dge to exert milita_ry pressure on the serbs- -No*
th-eir acti_ons against the Serbian aggressor and not each "6"."r
other. The Croatian press has blamed the conflict on $liF"y pr.essure on-serbia 1[J s.*i"" i"
Muslim extremists belonging to the OS BiH. The real ii;;i;t;i
Bosnia has been indgfi 4 telv postponed""a i" iiit
problem however seems to have been a combination of favor of more negotiatiotts. Wesi;*bd;;;;G;e.r;
andPresidentye'irqi"oiffi sri";ii;;iliifil*i,"fr"tr,.
mistrust which had developed between HVO and OS BiH
new American president that they were stronelv
opposea
gor-nryanders, disagregment over the Vance-Owen Plan,
Rajid's prov-ocative orde-r, thel{VO's effort to enforce it by -i""Ji -limbiican,
ro rncreasect mili+,?{{ nrgsggre on serbia.
use of deadly force, and the OS BiH's armed response. P::lf
bureaucrats _
udi t'e a Na ri on s
:_t _11 d and gi-;;il;;
cautious military" an-atvsti
79. Even more alarming than the skirmishes between gppgsed to i_ntenrention of any
kda-#e-T"-fr"""
the I{VO and OS BiH inCentral Bosnia is the massive f"igtrlenedthenevAmericania-i"iri""tiJ"-ilt"
Serbian military campaign in eastern Bosnia in response
!::Itlq_"Ily_ from its moraristic-
to recent successes of the Bosnian Armed Forces in the
area. At the end of .fanuary and beginning qf
promises
scenarlos. According
""di"isn
qy evoking pessimistic worst-""".
to such individuals, liftins of the
Febnrary 1993,large amoreduniUs of thl yugoilav gTbargo against Fosniu, ,"ppiyi"S tfr"-."oi"t.v
army were reported to have crossed into Bosnia. f11r
wrth weapons, and air strikes againlt-sefuian military
--53-
-52-
targets in Bosnia would be ineffective and to strike legitimate ?n4 democratically elected Bosnian
military targets in Serbia would risk provoking the government is,-in.effect, peing- asked to agreJ to an
retaliation of the Yugoslav military and might provoke arrange.ment-which is likely to-leave two mi'hion olG
right-wing forces in Ruesia.68
people. t-r.qmelgq-s qrth no lrospect of refurni"e to u
normal life, while their victimiz^ers are allowed li k""p
81. Unfortunately President Clinton is being most of what they have seized.
persuaded to abandon his own initial impulse, the 82. _The costs of a solution whieh put_s pressure
right one, in favor of another policy, the wrong _on the weak andpenalizes thevictidsa"e-Iikei" t"
one, a policy crafted by the same bonstituency be much higher thag toda/s Nevi-lie-Cnamb;;G6;
responsible for all of the past policy failures in this lmagrne-. Unless the world finally shows Serbian
conflict. The Vance-Owen plah is little more than a military leadership, Milo5evi0, SeSeli, and other ,rtt""-
repackaging of the United Nations resolutions and nationalists that it is readli -to stop their_ military
pres,criptions which have thus far proven to be totally adventures by_force, they are-likely tocarry the-war to
ineffective, because the requirement that the Serbian new regions. If they g.arry the w_artd Kosovo it will surely
side give up some of what ft has taken from the other lead to war with Albariia and Turkey. If the West,
parties is made without any credible force to back it up. be-traying iqs own values, fails to"support a iusf
Unfortunately, in some re spects the plan even appears to solu tion to the wag-ig- posnia, _Wes terd de mociacy
be a.step backward. For example the unambiguous call will lose all cnedibttttv in ihe *orta. n;itd i;-
for immediate placing of heavy weaponry under United democratic solutions in Eistern Europe tne?oi-.,
Nationg supervision embodied in the London resolutions U_ pion yi ll diminis h,""a
rep Sbl i cs of the Sovie t a"a ditta tors
ofAugust 28, 1993 appears to have been abandoned.seAs and della_g_ogues will seek to imposd their will bv
long as there is no penalty for aggression and no force. If Western democracies fail to come to th6
indication that the Serbian side will be forced to defense of the most baeic human rights of i[e
fulfiil its obligations, there is no reason to believe BosnianMuslimsr lvho ane the prtneipil victims in
that it will comply with any stipr lation that is not !$" Vl", the_chasm between Euiope aid the Islamic
World will deepen Ifthe United Nations continues to
to its liking. Thus far the Serbian stratery has been to
pretend to asree with conditions laid down bv United p-ush s^olu tions that are based on expe diency rather
Nations or EC mediators whenever there apne-ars to be than justice, it_will be discredited as-morally Sankrupt
a real threat of militarv action to force comofii,nce. Once and become totallyineffective as an honest b?oker. Tfie
the threat of military-force is removed, the aggression chief victims of this war of aggression mav aDDear weak
continues. The fuida"'ental problbm w6lch the and defeated, but they will Jo-oner or latei.nLht back as
negotiators have refused to address is the they are now doing in Qro-atig. Even if a tEmporary
imbalance of power artifrcially maintained by the cease-fire is re_aehed, it is unlikely to providir
arms embargo against Bosnia-Hercegovina and lasting peac_e if fundhmental infusiices'are left
Croatia which leaves ninetv oercent of the unaddressed. The Bosnian Armed trtorees show no sign
weaponry of the fourth largest-ariny in Eunope in 9f b.eing defeated and thousands of Bosnian refugees]if
the hands of the aggressor. It is this imbalance of their needs are not addressed, hay join tomo"rrow's
power wtrich allows the aggressors to continue creating terro ri st b and s or ave-n-gi-n g armi es. Mri sli m gove rnm ent s
thousands ofnew victimsJ,o influence in their own favor throughout the world have already indicated openly
the terms of any agreement, and to choose to comply or that they_maybreak the arms embari;o and step uptheir
not comply with any ofits provisions. The victims are supply of men and arms to Bosnia.
fgr all frlrctical purposes being asked to give in to
the insatiable demands of the aggressor. The

-54- "55"
83. Given the experience of the Vance Plan in Croatia ULTIMATUM should contain a demand that
and the experience of many months offutile negotiations Bosnian Serb fo_rces withdraw to a few aeJignatea
and- unkept agreements, there is no reason to expect the aneas and hand over their weapons to N^rrrTO or
Serbian side to comply with any provisions of the Vance- LJNPROFOR forces, which wouid be statiorrea ilr
Owen Plan which aie not to itslildng. The acceptance tlepe ar_eqq to protect and guarantee the t
by the Clinton administration ofone more round of rights of all irylividuals. The ultimatum to the"-"rr
serbs
neg-o-tiations represents one more postponement in croatia should be that in return for protection oittreir
of effective action. Unfortunately postponerirent means human mqhtp by NATO or UNpROfOn p."r. t uliu".,
continued _iqjustice, co_ntinued et[nic cleansing, they should immediately- hand over all weaponry.' Ali
rape, murder- and death of innocent victims, an-d weap_ons handed over to interhational
moTe _g_ains for tbe aggressor. Worst of all, it peaceke_eping forces should then be taken orrt of
probably means the s-pread of the war untii it fbrme-r Yugoslavia for immediate destmction. The
becomes so big it can no longer be ignored. The united Nations Protected zones in croatiu und desiilated
long-gr the_world waite to take effective action, the areas ofBosnia-Hercegovina where serbians roim%d trre
costlier solutlons become. There is no indication'that ove-rwhelming majority before the war should be pla.ed
Greater Serbian imperialism will be satisfied with its und.er temporary mandate of the international community
gains in Bosnia. Fibhtihg has returned to Croatia, until such time as human and minority rights of civilians
because ofthefailuie oftAe UnitedNations to fulfili of all national-confessional groups citr 6" s"a.a"leea.
its commitments there, and a campaign of ethnic war criminals livingin these areds should b6prosecuted
- r- -----
cleansing has already bezun in Kosovo and the by an InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal.
Sandzhak. Vojislav SbSeli-and the Serbian Radical
P-arty are openl_y calling for the ethnic cleansing of 85. In case the Serbian forces refuse to respond to an
Kosovo, and the international community has international ultimatum in ei ther Bo sni a-H6tcusorrinu
thought ofnothing more effective than to send a few or Croa!i?, ail support and miHtary aia sn".ila Ue
unarmed monitors. grante-d the elected governments of'these couot"ies
im_mediately if they meet certain conditions.
84. Contrary to recent statements of Lord Owen, his Mili_taryaid to Bosnia and croatia wouldbeissued on the
and Vance's approach is not the only one available. An condition that human rightg_moni-tors be preseni aio.rg
alternative to more futile negotiations over a plan which with miliFry advisors from United Nationi, NAIO,
no gne has the intention ol enforcing is to issue an lstamrc Conf'erence or Arab Leazue countries. The ""fi
ultimatum to the Serbian aggressors in both Bosnia military force-q receiving aid should"agree to dismiss any
and Croatia: Either comply *ith all United Nations officers or enlisted men indicted for ivar crimes. Bot[
resolutions concerning lhe cessation of hos ti lities Croatia and Bosnia.Hercegovina snouta te
and thg blockading of cities, transfer weapons - to required in retunr for mili tary:assistance to allow
United Nations peacekeepers, free the immediate stationing- of international
communications, q nd perinit the retumof refu gees, peacekeepiqg fglces and huhan rights monitors
free prisoners and meet other humanitalian in largely Serbian areas which Eurrender to
demands or face the air power of the world gov_ernment forces. Militarv aid to Croatia should be
coqr unity and the massive arming of the Bosnian
rln made conditional. on_the couirtry's cooperatiott i.t ttt"
and Croatian forces with sophistlcated modern defense of Bosnia-Hercegovind, and'r"spu.iirrg it.
weaponr)r. Such assistance should be provided to tip territorial integrity and slvereignty. To'the eitent
the balance ofpower away from the aggressor and make necessary, Croatia should serud ad a safe base and
the cost of continued aggression prohibitive. The training area for Bosnian military forces. A formal
-56- -57-
mili?ry alliance between the two sovereign countrics tanks, armored personnel carriers, road build.
should be established and international lidison oflicers ;;;hih"'y, ;;;;"Ei;{;E eilii*",,t. Mititarv a'*H
fr na n cial issis tance frori tslainic c;fi ffitJ do"ra
sho_uld be_ appointed to monitor the joint military effort.
All I{VO forces should be required tolntegrate wiihin t}re provide -{o-.r a large proportion of tFJ iE"* in
command structure of the OS BiH. HVOofficers should Fosnia. Where neces_sary,-supplies ."" UJaiop-p.a i"
become officers in the OS BiH with rank and position by pgrachute, but with ttie coriferation oibro.iiu u"a
commensurate to their ability. International'liaison the lJosman uroatia_ns mqch sophisticated equipment
oflicers should mediate and monitor the integration
plocess. Croatian military forces and-local
il{ yt+polg csFl{ be deliver6a .r"oq Slrid;iilou;i;
central Bosnia all the way-to Tuzla. cro?[ian ioi."t
nistrations within Bosnia.Hercegovina should
ad nri
from the north and Bosniai forcesfrbm t[;;;;th ,ffi"ia
s wear loyalty to the eristing cons ti tutlon of Bosnia-
easily be.able
-to
clt qff the strategic;;*ia;; ;[i;[
Hercegovina until a new constitution is established.
connects both the Bglje-L,lka regirih *o.t ;f tk;
Croatian Krajina with Serbia. t? Sernia ""a -i"ri"i
to
All-government oIfices and buildings should be required introduce new force-s into Bosnia or croatia."tt"*ii.
-iis[r]t
lo flJr the Bosnian llagin leturn for a guaranteed ribht to bombardment ehould be-applied to rtop ttrein. ..
fly the Croatian flag should the legitimate organs oflocal against. blr.dggF,. roads ^and tranipoitation -and
g_overnment so _determine. The rZajednica -(Union) of communication links between Bosnia ahd serbia pio.tre
H_erceg-Bosna' should be integrated into the ineffective, -tfep-_massive bombardment-Jf ffifii.r"
administration ofBosnia-Hercegovina until such time as targets should.follg* ip orde-r to deal t;*ift-firJi"."u
,.iti,ii"t
a constitutional asseFlly changes the existing Bosnian blow to serbia's offengive qilitary capacitv.
constitution and establishes new regional enti-ties. th re ar o f a mil i rary
.a
ction o f th. rlh6*,;i"r i a,iii?iii U

86. The ultimate goal ofmilitary operations would be to "

tit-if,h^lft ,}ft :tiP,#b?::3ff .:.n',irf:""HT"i3i
force compliance with resolutions embodied in the in the b.egnnins t-o show ttre'aggressorith; ,Eill"u;"d
ULTIMATUM and to bring an end to the aggression deternunatron ofthe world community. Iflimited strikes
against the legitimate government ol-Bosnia &{"d to deliver the message a maiiiie ilsil""r;;ilirta
Hercegovina pending the establishment of a new follow.
constitutio{r by a constituent assembly democratically
elected under international supen'isioir. The proposeil 88. The forces of the Serbian yugoslav arrny and its
Vance-Owen constitution could be offered as one model paramilitary_allies in Croatia aird BoJnia"are-not
for consideration. invincible.. . They h?ve performed poorly in infantry
battles and hand,to-hand combat. Their-main skill ii
87. The military strategy should be to close off the i1__bolnbarding cities from nountaintopJ-ana
corridors between Serbia and the Serbian forces in the pi[.a$ng andJooting plaees where they mebt Httle
Banja Luka and Croatian Krajina areas in order to resistance. 'r'he current war bears no simllaritv to the
prevent new Yugoslav or Serbo/IUontenegrin partisan warfare ofWorld War II. fito's pa*isrfis*er"
military forces firom entering either Croati6 or a multi-national, multi-confessional force fiehtine all
Bosnia from Serbia. Although dassive air support and over former Yugoslavia with an enemv that"was 6*rer-
supervised military assistdnce may not biine an extended. Unlike the Croatians and "Bosnians todav.
immediate end to hbetilities and conipliance witl all they.were not hampered by an arms u-UuieJaiiai
resolutions, it should ver.y rapidly halt the offensive received massive iuppliei of weapoil f"Ah th;
capacity of the aggressor -forces. 'The capacitv of the U4ited _States, Great-Britain and nussia.-- ftre
Bosnian Armed Fdrces can be rapidly iniproved with Italian defeat in 1943 followins the Allied invasion of
logistical assistance from the inteinationaf communitv Italy resulted in the Italian forcet in Dalmalia;s ]ia"ai"g
in the form of transport planes and helicopters, truck6, over large supplies of weapons to thc I)almatian
-58 5q-
 FOOTNOTES
Partisans who were mostly Croatians. Today's self- I A collection of political speeches reflecting MiloSeviC's ideas during
proclaimed Serbian Republics ofBosnia and the-Krajina
are short of manp-ow6r and overextended militaitly. his rise to power is presented in: Slobodan MiloSeviC, Godine Rasoleta
(Belgrade: Beogradski izdava0ko grafi0ki zavod, 1989)
ThgV are separate-d by miles of enemy territory from
Serbia. The-ne is littl-e enthusiasm firr the Bdsnian 2 The views of the Serbian nationalist intellectuals were set forth in 1986
waramong the mqiority of the youthin Serbia who in a famous'Memorandum'. See Srpkska akademija nauka i umetnosti,
have made draft dodging a flll.time profession. 'Memorandum,' in lzvori velikosrpske asrsi i e (R ijeka: Tiskara Rijeka,
Only the ultra-nationaliSt fanatics of Se5eli and Arkan l99l), pp.256-30O.
have sho'n'n any enthusiasm for fi ghting in Bdsnia, mostly 3
on relatively riasy looting and p-lundErins expeditions. See Dimirije BogdanoviC, Kniiga o Kosovu (Belgrade: Knji2evne novine,
They h"yg-ofteri-_scatteigd arid run wf,en'faced by 1990), pp. 301452: 224-230; J.F. Brown, S_urge to Freedom: The End of
Communist Rule in Eastem Eurooe (London: Durham University Press, l99l);
reasonably well-armed opponents. Serbian DnaS (Zagrcb), 1987-1990 issues; East European Newsletter, 1988-1990
invincibiliJy is a myth offereil !y the nay.sayers as issues; Alush A. Gashi, M.D. Ph.D., The Denial of Human and National Rights
an excuse for appearement and inaction. In contrast of Albanians in Kosovo. (New York: Illyria Publishing.Co., 1992); Slobodan
the Bosnian and Croatian people are well motivated to Milo5evid,'U interesu pravde i progresa za sve ljude koji na Kosovu Zive,'
defend theirhomelands. Itis nbtnecessarv to send larse in Godine rasBleta, pp. 340-346; Pedro Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in
numberg of ground forces to Bosnia or Cr-oatia to ma[e Yueoslavia 1963-1983 (Bloomingon: IndianaUniversity Press, 1984; pp. 156-
the costs of aggression high forthe Serbian neo-fascists, 171; Sabrina Petra Ramet,
nor is it necessary to carry the war into Serbia. All that Yuqoslavia (Boulder: NIN (Belgrade) 1987-1990
is n_eo4ted is to stop the lrggression against Croatia issues; Mark Thompson, A Papgr Heusc: Thc Endine of Yugoslavia @antheon
and Bosnia and-in so doing to preient assession Books, 1992), pp. 125 -146.
against the non-Serbian popufation of Kosovi"and the 4 For discussions of multi-party clecdons in Yugoslavia see East European
Sandzak. United Nati-ons peace keeping forces should Newsletter (London), l9February 1990, 30April 1990, 28May 1990,
irnmediately be dispaJclre! to these areas is req ues ted by l9November 1990 and TJanuary l99l; and newsweeklies Danas (Zagreb),
Albanian pigslde-4t Sali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova, Nedielja (Sarajevo), MN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues forNovember
the leadefof the Kosovar Albanians. 1990toJanuary 1991.
89. The world must show its resolve to do its 5 For discussions of negotiations over reorganization of Yugoslavia, see East
moral duty to humanity. What is moral is also EurolpanNewslener(London),SOctober 1990, lgNovember l990and?January
practical. The two go together. President Clinton has I 99 I , 4 Febru uy l99l ,2 April I 99 I ; and newsweeklies Danas (Zagreb) , Nedjelja

a golden opportunitf to exercise leadership and bring (Sarajevo); NIN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues for November 1990
about the necessary coalition of internation-al forces. ff to July 1991.
the leaders of someWestern European countries want to 6 Yugoslav military intelligence chief General Aleksandar VasiljeviC
bury their heads in the sand ahd allow this war of revealed plans for the arrest of hesident Tudjman of Croatia and
a_ggression to escalate out of control, the United States
President KuIan of Slovenia in his interview with Novosti Extra edition
should seek allies in the Islamic World and establish new 1992 (Frankfurt). Interviews with Vasiljevid werc.also published in NIN
links to build a world order thatis more humane and just. July-August 1992 and in Viesnik August-September 1992. General
Martin'Spegelj, Croatia's first Minister of Defense, who until 1968 had
been commander of Yugoslav army forces in Croatia and Slovenia,
discussed his knowledge of federal military plans for intervention in
Croatia with me in a personal interview inZ.agreb on September 1,19912.
7 Republic of Croatia, Republicki zavod za statistiku, Pspis.$anoynlltyg
l99l (Zagreb: Republilkl zavo{ s6 statistiku, 199?),

-60-
 slavonijc, 1992); croatian Informarion service, The
8_ For brief but precise accouns of the Krajina rebellion
sec Easr E,urc4rcall
Npw__lletter, 27 August, 1990 and l8 March 1991. For an accounr of rhe frajina
rebellion which pays more anendon to fte subiective fears
rather than actual facts.and is ov-erly iridulgent in accepting thc
of the Sei-bs
ffi,
Chronoloey of the Aeercssion asreb,

Times, and rhe Egropean

Vuir"ffi
m
lom lunerggTttrffihTanffirmtSffi
consulted were Belgrade, Zagreb, and saraj""o-o.ii"---o
war in croatia: A

weekrv
Kraj ina leaders' rationalizations of rh6ir e xuelmis r ac tionsi see fiaisna newspapers and news_ magaines for. rlre. period. "
provided information gnthe organizati6n
censrJ-iurri; S;Gij
Glenny, Thg Fallof Yqgosl=avia (London: Penguin Books, 1992). A rnuch fuller
Army in his interview of Septembe-r
,m6;;
--" oFlri i.*trun
-d
picture can be obtained by following the acrual course of rhe rebellion in zagreb l,lgg}in Zagreb.
and Belgrade newspapers and news magazines of the period. Some relevant I 7 For a good r-eview por.itigar
articles can be found in Danas 2lAugust 1990, pp.13-15 and 30.October of deveropm ents in Bosnia from l 990 to il
fa rggz
199_Q, pn.2-l-22 and N.edjgUa l2August 1990. Day by day developmenrs in
the Knin rebellion can be followed in the pages of vjeshit (zagrebj, polirika
(Belgade), and BorbA @elgrade) issues foi August througttOcbber t990. An
ffisle&f"i'$ilfl'*
Hels i nki warch,-
sar-elqnglil-Bosn ia- Herceq;vina &; v#f,'
interviewwiththe-politicat leadcrof the Knin scrbs, Milan Babidappears in NIN
-
Rights Warch, 1992,pp. t947--- H uman

9
l4December 1990, pp. 18. 19.

See interview by Yugoslav military intelligence chief General

Aleksandar vasiljcvid with Nqvosti Extra edition 1992(Frankfurr); inrerviews
r"d;;A,d;.;;ffi f,"i{j,lffi
18 See Aliia lzetbeqovld. Islam Retwepn

j:8"'jiT:il'#,T"*
,ff
,*il?,Hlf
;

with vasiljevic wcrc_also pgblished in MI! July-August tggz and in viesnik r'11"1.';%i
August-Septembcr 1992. General Martin Spegelj, Croatias frst tvtinGer of g.ofi
I nsri
e
""1sarajevski
tur,
f ,it *.tionat pubt ication
"1r*itf oroces (Zurich: gosansri'insrit r, ldir y,ffi "' sN v\
Defense, who rntil 1968 had been commandei of Yugoslav army forces ii,'iqg7)."
in croatia and slovenia, discussed his knowledge of feoerat initirary
plans for intervention in croatia with me in a personal interview in ]f rol exaqples of pre.sident Tudjman's view on Bosnia-Hercegovina, see the
Zagreb on Septcmber 1,1992, ln:'il,H':yH;,i"fffi
croatia seeks a cease-firc;@!tiz Aug[st rgg2l, p.H.-fioliiou-',
l0 For accounts of events from the beginnings of the Knin views on rhe eve of Bosnian fiagryn[enci, righdfdi
rebellion to the declarations of independence, see newsweeklies Danas h; G[a;, p.oil'rit or tr,"
croatian Democraric union of'Bosnia-Heftelouina, see the
(agreU),-&djdia (Sarajevo), NIN (Belgrade), and Vreme (Belgrade) issues for
Mate Boban in Globus (6lvlarch 1992),p,6.
Inir*rc* *in
Aug-ust 1990 though July 199 1. For a good chronology of week by week evenrs
see "llrvatska 1991," Vjesnik 13-18. to.l a. plgn on_the
?3 ^ Karadjcdjevo meeting see "Susret ?a razlaz,, Danas
ll Seenorc6above.
(2 April, 1991), pp. 7-8.

12 Vojislau SeSelj, "Ja nisam voda, ja sam vojskovoda," Interview with 31,InoTo:o.n ,l:?gz and Helsinki Watch, p. 43. For a Bosnian reacrion ro
Verica Lazovid ald MomCilo Perovid in Intervju (June 7, j^uoJman's Jvty r99z siatement,about the possibility of dividing
l99l), p.18.
'samo nepodijerjena Bosna - mima Bosna,'N;aj;rj; Bosnia, sei
13 Foran estimate of wardamages, see Croatian Informarion Service, The Wzr tzriiiry,'iig'ii, o. r r.
inCroatia:AChronoloeyoftheAggression (Tagreb:Vedernjitisr,tgg2),p.63.
D A collection of essays the identity of the Bosnian-
Hercegovinian Muslims {e{ing-t"rusiim-cto"tian
-and -with
the rcrationsrriil uy u

ffiti'
14 For details on GospiC, Glenny, "The lvlassacre of yugoslavia."
see
ryrgeptive H_ercegovinian Muslim intellectuar c;
b" i;;i'ili6rarrim
l5 For accounrs
further repprts
of the war in Croatia, see Amnesty Internarional, Yugoslavia:
of leirture and deliberate and arbitrary killings in war zones B.osnian president in N,edielja (SDejgmber l99l), pp,
r,::"ul****tntt
(Amnesry lnternational, March 1992); aulrd, Helsinki Warctr, Utefgrules_U discussions of cantonization]Gt iecim sarac, -Kantoniliao
iO-ii. fo,
Bosniq:Herc=egoVina (New York: Human Righrs Watch, 1992) especially rcpubrike,,,
l!.4.t.[r {?_8lyly I9e-l), p.18 Dr.raran
pujic, "rh;ik, nrj"uri"ni'iti.rc,"
appendices C and E which deal wirh Croaria, pp.230-273 and pp. 310-356. Ncdjelja (22March t992j, p. 6.
16 For accouns of the war in Croatia see Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: 23 croatian news articles which

ii;.ffi
reflect this view are "svak je mio ko je Bosnu
lprther reports of orture and deliberate and arbitrary killings in war zones
(Amnesry Inremarional, l{arch 192); Croatia Minisry of Heailr, Mass Kitting
qnd CenaiCe in Croada tqglry (Zagreb,Minisuyof Healrh, 1992), MisE
lf,
aruc_re goes so tar as to
'aft gf;l il;ti
Tx*'f f" T'# I
charge that the Bosnian Government and Armed Forces
, Th9 Massacre of Yugoslavia," New York Review of Books (30 Janrnry,
Q^l91gf nrc full of agcnls of the yugosrav (serbian) inteiligcncc -rni*
1992), pp. 30-35; Mladen Kevo, Rat za Hrvatsku (Vinkovci/Osijek: Glis ,.r"ir", *os.
 33 uelsinti Warch, pp,29-38.
charge has often been repeatul in article.s in the Croauan press. Fcw of rhese articles
nametheir sources orproduce any reliable documentation. The Commanderof the 34 Telephone con_versation of February 15, 1993 wirh theBosnian-Hcrcegovinian
Bosnian Armed Forces, Sefer Halilovid has repeatedly denied such charges United Nations l-egation; Croatian Information Service, The War-Aeainst
abouthimself. See the interview with SeferHalilovid in LjiUan (a January 1992), Croatia, p. 63.
pp.5-6.
lj fped ilgryiew wirh retugee husband and wife, both Muslims, from prijedor
24 Nedjetja (19 lvlay l99l), p. 17; Nedielja (16 June l99l), pp. 9-10 and 16; october l,1992. The husband and wife asked to remain anonymous. The man
Nedjelia (25 August 199 I ); Nedielja (22 December I 99 I ), pp. 5-7; and Nedjel ia was an engineer who had wo*4 paly ygan for a local indirsrial enrerprise.
(26 January 1992), pp I 1-12. They showed thedocument which the serbian occupation authorities had fbrced
25 "Ravno: Savjest Herceg-Bosne," Hercegovadki Tjednik (17 Ocober 1991), t"rg sign-relinquishing their home and propertibs in hijedor ro rhe serbian
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
pp.12-13.
36 Interview with General-Bojnik Anre prkaLin, Commander of HOS at
26 Iruerview with Sefer Halilovid, Commander of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-
StardeviCev Dom Zagreb, August 27, 1992.
Hercegovina in Ljilian (4 January 1992), pp. 56.
37-,- For general information on Bosnian govemment and Croatian
27 For awounts of ovents in Bosnia-Hercegovina during ttre latter months of m.ilitary groupq in Bosnia-Hercegovina, see fruman Rights Watch, W.32-
1991 see Danas (l Octobcr l99l), pp.28-29; lnterview with Bosnian President 34. For general information on the course of ttre war in Boinia-Herceg6vina, I
Alija lzetbegovid, Danas (22 October I 99 I ), pp. 3G3 I ; Danas (29 October I 99 l, have. consulted numerous newspapcr and joumal articres from Behar-press. a
pp. 15-17); DruAS (26Novembcr l99l), pp. 14-15; Danas (10 December l99l), publication. of-.y.oung Bosnian wlu reporten who work rrom' %EtEiE
p. 3 I ; Danas (24 December l99l),pp. I 1- 13; Nedjelja (l September I 991), p. I ? ; EksklssryJsplit); --Dalas (Zqgrt); Gtobus (Zsgreb) Ljitian (Sarljevo ana
-war
Nedielja (8 September 1991), p.l4; Nedielja (15 September 1991), lagreb);..S$9jgje, ?Wrcb and Zenica editions, Nedieljna
nannac .rh (Spltt); Novi Danas (Zagreb); Novi viesgik (hgeb):pogm, ilC
p,p. 8- I Q Nedjelia (22 Sepember 199 I ), pp. I 5- I 6: Nedjelja ( I 7 November,
serbian nationalist newspaper published inTffimush CanaitaGng' ttre
1991), pp.l2-14; and Nedjelja (l December l99l), pp. 8-10; NIN economic emt_argo againsr serbia, slobodnr Dalmacija (Spli0; and Vecemji list
(27September, 1991), pp.?"U21; NIN (25 Ocober l99l), pp. 15-17; Vreme (Zagreb), and Vreme (Belgrade) for months fromTpfri tSeZ tnrougtr feUilary
(28 Ocober, l99l), pp. 2ol2l; and Vreme (18 November l9l), pp. 26-27. 1993.
28 See Danas (31 December 1992),pp.24-25;Danas (14 January lgy2), 38 t"p"d int"rview held in Zagreb on Seprcmber 7, I g2 wi rh Senka Ba I iC, war
pp.16-17; Danas (21 January l99lz), p.l0; Danas (28 January 1991), reporter for Behar Press; Taped intcrview with Dr. vlado pandzic, president of
pp.l0-16; Danas (25 February 1992>, pp.34-35; Javnost (21 December the Parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Muinko Pejid hesident of the HVo
l99l); Javnost (4January 1992): Javnost (25January 1992): Javnost (Croatian Defense Council) Sarajero, held in Zageb on September 22, 1992, and
(29February 1992); Nedielja (l2January 1992), pp. 8-10; Nedielja Interview witl sefer Halilovic, commander ol tne nrmeo Forces of Bosnia-
( I March 1992), pp. 9- I I ; and Nedjelia (8 March lg92), pp. 1 3- 14.
Hercegovina in Ljilian (4 January 1993), pp. 5-6.

29 Kntan MaleSevid, 39 Personal interview held in Tagreb, September 4,lgg2 wirh lvica NosiC,
"Marginalije o Be Ha izborima 901 Reviia za
citizen ofruzla and warreporrcrforNovi vjrxnik, and twoofficers of the oS BiH
sociiologijq,22, No. 34 (June-December l99l), pp. 315-326.
Tuzla region, who requested that their names not be printed.
30 I discussed the reasons for the Serbian leadership's invitation to Panid to 40
become prime minister in a telephone conversation on August I l, 1992, with lapeA interview by amateurradio with Dr. Irfan Lulbijankid, Mayorof Bihad
and Director of Bihad Hospital, Tagreb,Septembr 12,lg9}.
ioumalist Smian Cerovid of Vreme in Belsrade. Cerovid said that oeople in
Belerade oboosition circ-les -were sivine that Panid was like the lfTimes
CaqolWilliams,'Serb forces capture key crossroads town," Lns Angetes
win-dow drbising in a store windolt' wfiile the real product was (8 October, 1992),p. 44 and taped inrerview with Or. Semso tanfovrc,
Milo5eviC. See "Fani0 and hope,' Newswegk QTJuly l9 4t2, pp.36-37 nd President of Party of Democratic change and acting Bosnian Ambassador to
'Kapialisa s ljudskim likom," NIN (l7July 1992), pp.10-11. Croatia, 7 agreb, October 14, 1992.
3 I Uihn MiloSevid, "Izbori 92: Stvarno i mogude,' Vreme (28 December I 992), 42
pp. l0-13.
.$Etstlusu (Split); Danas (Zagreb): Globus (Zagreb) Ljiljan (Sarajevo
!n{ Zagreb); O.s,lobpdjefrie,7.agreb and Zenica wai editions, N_edjsuta
32 Globus
pdnaqrjs (Splig; Novi Danas (Zagreb); NoJi vjesnik (Zagreb); S!aba.d_!a
14 February lW,p.20; Helsinki Watch, p.6; Norman Kempster,
"Eagleburger seeks Balkan Atrocity Trials," [ns Angeles Times (lTDecember, "t).alugstia(Split)l and Vecemji list(Zagreb) foimonth.s lrom April 1992
t hrough Fchruary 1993. Also scc articlcs on the war in Bosnia-Hcrccgovina
1992),p.1.
 52 'Posavina u plamenu i kvi," Novi 192), pp. 8-10.
danas (6 July,
in the Los Angcles Times and New York Tinres lbr rhe santc pcriod. 53 Joint Communique on Talks Between President of the Republic of
43 For information on how the "Yugoslav" army took advanhgc ol'the EC- Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman and President of the Presidency of the
brokered withdrawal of "federal'forces, weaponry, and equipment from Republic ofBosnia Hercegovina Mr. Alija lzetbegoviC,Zagreb, I November
Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia see "Srpski oklopni bataljuni prcSli su I992;"Realizacija sporazuma izmedju dr. Franje Tudjmana i Alije
Drinu!,'Globus (5 February 1993), p.2 and p. 10. Izetbegovid,'_Slobodna Dalmrib (29 August l9{2), p. 3; and'Vojska bez
zajedniCkog vodswa,' YgI@iL[g! (26 Septembcr 1992), p. I l; 'Izetbegovid
44 See John F. Burns;'Underground in Sarajevo, the Ethnic Groups Share f'ozvao Bobana u Sarajevoi Novi vjesnik (23 Octobcr 1992), p. 9A.
the Tenor and the Hope,'New York Times (10 June 1992). 54 See"U Sarajevu izrnsen vojni pr[," Slobodna D. almapija (21 October 1992),
45 nre betraviorof the Bustr Administration had been revealed in a series p.4. This articleis an account of a HVO press conference at which Bo2o Rajid,
of news articles by George Kenny, the formerhead of the Yugoslav desk then the Vice-presidentof the IIVO, now Ministerof Defenseof the Republic of
at the State Department. See George Kenny, "Truth as a policy casualtly,' Bosnia-Hercegovina, lold newsmen the fantastic sory that the reason for rccent
The Washineon Times, 7 Ocober l9/2 and George Kenny, "Sarajevo confl icts between Bosnian govemment forces and the HVOwas thatEjup Ganid,
99 l,' Washinqton Post, I 5 October, 1992. Both the Bosnian gov ernment one of the members of the Bosnian Presidency; Sefer HaliloviC, Commander of
and the Bosnian Rcd Crcgs, a non-govemmental organization, presented the OS BiH; Jovo Divjalc, vice-commander of Bosnian government forces in
evidence of prison camps, mass killing, and systematic ettrnic cleansing Sarajevo; Arif PaSaliC, commander of the OS BiH Mostar region; and several
weeks before the sightof emaciated prisoners onthe world'sTV cameras other high officers had canied out a coup d?tat against president lzetbegovi0 in
made it impossible to ignore the Ovidence. Such evidence can be found concert with KOS (Kontra obaveltajna slu2ba) or the Yugoslav (Serbo-
in a document of the Bosnian non-govemmental organization World Montenegrin) Counter-Intelligencc Servicc. None of thesd charges has been
Campaign Save the Humanity, Renort on War Destructions.Violation of substantiated in any way and appear uttcrly fantastic. How Defense Minister
Human Ri ghts and Crimes against Hurn anity in Bosni a and Herce gov i na. BoZo Rajid, is today able to work along side of Ejup GaniC, Sefer Halilovid, Jovo
3 June 1992, (Sarajevo: Save ttp Humanity, 1992) and Repon on War Divjak, and others he accused of being KOS qgents would malce an interesting
Destructions. Violation of Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity story. Other aticles on HVO and OS BiH tensions in central Bosnia are found
in Bosnia and Herzeeovina. Part II, 7th July, 1992, (Sarajevo: Save the in Nedjelina Dalmaciia (21 October 192),p.31; Noviricsnik (22 October
Humanity, l99zr. These reports contain signed depositions by witnesses 1992), p. 7A; Globus (30 October 1992), pp 5-7; NewYork Times (30 October
to atrocities and are presented in a professional marmer similar to that l992),p. A5; Newsweek (2 Novcmber 192) p. 60; Interview with BoZo Raji0,
used.in rports by Helsinki Watch and Amnesty Intemational. Slobodna Dalmacija (5 November 1992), p. 12; New York Times (6 November
1992),p. A4;
46 United Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and the
55 See Carol Berger, "Bosnian Muslims hrn to Kuwait for money, arms'The
Former Yugoslavia 25 Segtember l99l - 30 October lD2 (New York: United
Nations, 1992),p.9. Christian Science Monior (28 January I 993), p. 6; and Steve Coll, "Despile U.N.
Embargo Weapons Snealc lnto Balklni,' Washington Post News Service,
47 "Sedar rccaka za BiH,'Novi viesnik (28 August 1992), p. 3A. (15 February, 1993); Askold Kruschelnycky, "The Arms Trail," The European
(28-31 January 1993), p.6.
48 UniteO Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and
56 One of the early reports of Russians in Bosnia Hercegovina was in Veternji
the Former Yugoslavia 25 September l99l - 30 October 1992,pp.3642,
list (28 November, l9V2),p.9. I warched Radovan KaradliC make these threats
49 Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Lettqr to rhe Security on several occasions in press reports and interviews on Banja Luka Television in
Council dated 13 November 1992 (New York: United Nations Public October 1992.
lnformation Office, 1992). 57 See "Hrvatima bi pripalo 25A% powsine BiH," Globus (8 January 1993), p.
50 "Bomba iz Graza potresla Mostar, NedjeJjna Dalmacija Q7 lvlay 19912), p. 14 5. A copy of the Vance-Owen constitutional proposal for Bosnia-
and Mate BaBiC, "Rogovi u bosanskoj we0i, Danas (12 tvtay 1992), pp. 18-20. Hercegovina can be found in United Nations Security Council, Report <lf
the Secretarv General on the Intemationsal Conference on the Former
5l See interview with lvlate Boban in Globus (10 July, 1992\,p.5. Also see Yuqoslavia (New York United Nations, November I I, 1993).
*Henzeg-Bosna
Decisions lllegal,'Report of B-H Press News Agency of
Bosnia Hercegovina (5 July 192), Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Informa- 58 For reports on ongoing negotiations over the peace ptan I have consulted
tion," "Croal.ia recognizes sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and January and February 1993 issues of The Christian Science Monitor. Los
Hercegovina,'Press Release 279 Q June 1992); Laura Silber, Washingtqq Post Angeles Times, New York Times. and the Croatian newsweeklies Danag,
(6 July 1992); 'Tudjman i IzetbegoviC sklopili su Vojni savez," Globus $_lobus, and Ned iel ina Dalm acij a. For Bosn i an poi nts o f view see i ssues
(l9June 1992), pp.3.
of BiH Eksklusiv and Ljiljan.. For Iranian and Islzrnic viewpoints I have
gonsulted tlrc_newspapers Elala'at, Keyhan. Jahan-e Eslami, Jomhuri-ye Eslami,
Resalat, and Salam for the same months. Guide to pronunciation -
59 See^The ghristian=S=cielgq Moniror, l.os Angeles Times, New york Times 9eographlc names (paragraph numbers):
from January 23, 1993 ttroughFebruary t5, t993 for anicles on the
i_ssues 2. [movo (also 4, 5, 10, 39, 5?, 8a 88,88)
Croatian military actions. Also see Foreign Press Bureau Z,agreb repons t2, !9tilfl"ry-ee-nuhl (also L4, i6, ig, Zt, gt, BZ,
for the same period. Detailed articles on the Maslenica operation aric its {6, 60, 76, 97, gg)
iTpgnangqto Cro-atia are "Maslenicaopet premoSCuje," Danas 29 January 42, luzla (alro 60, 51, 67, 7L,87) [two's-luh]
1993, pp 5-7, and'Hrvatska na prelrremici," Danas. 29 ianuary telf , pp.8-9.-
48. Eq$te Lqk" (also 51, S?) tbahn-yuh lukl-ahJ
$ qqlottn I'.. Burns, "Croats vs. Serbs vs. Muslims: Guns define borders," New 48. Pr[iedor [pre-yeh-door] - city in northern gosnia
York Times (l February 1993), p. 43 and UPI Report (19 January 1993):
60. Gor_al-de [gor-ahzh-deh] (a[so ? 1), Srebrenica
6l Foreign Press Bureau Tageb,see repons January l4-February 3, 1993.- -
hreh-breh-neet-sahl_(also ?1), Bi'[aG lbee-hotch],
62 fWne ness Ccnrcr Zagreb Report (9 February 1993). lgti[e Kladuia [veh-lee-kutr lUaU-aew-shah]- "
51.
9l t**t of Juruary 28. lgg3 from President Alija lzetbegoviC of Bosnia- Qdzgk [oh-jockJ and Derventa [dare-vent-ah] in
Herceggyila to Prcsidcnt Fnnjo Tirdjman of Croatia Po_savina (aleo 6g); Bosanski Brod, Orasje
(l
iublishedln Ljiljan Feb- _th_e
ruary 1993),p.4. loh-rah - shy_e hl, G_ra d adac grah-d
I ah-cir utz ], "
64_Ctruck Sudetic, ?eac-e planspurs new Serb attacks," New york Times
Br[ko lbirch-koh]
(8February lP9_3), p. A8 and "Arresh-e serbesran vued-e bosrliffiGtResalar 70. Pro-zor [proseor], Novi Travnik [no-vee
fiehran) (8 Shaban t37ll 30 January 1993). !r ghv_-n e_ekl, a nd the_Vi tez lvee-lez ] vall ey,
65 Cnuct Sudetic, ?eace plan .laj ce. gl1- e e_-tseh], Busova[a [boo - eo -va]i *huhl,
qpurs n"* S"rU a[acks," p. A8. [y
Gornji Vakuf [gore-nyee vah-koofl
f + +: waning days of the Bustr Administration, Vance was so heavy-
handed in pushing his and owen's Peace plan that he called rhe while
71. Eratunac [brah-too-nuts], Zvornih [zvor.neek],
the Sandzhak, Split (also 8?)
House, StateDepartment and ttre clinton transition team asking them not
76. Maslenica [ma-sleh-neat suh] bridee across an
to meet with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic at the time of-the latte/s
visit to the united states in early January I99g. vance was afraid ttrat $driatic inlet; Peruda [peh-root-ctrlh] dam,
Izetbegovlc might try to convince the American leaders to assist Bosnia Zentun [zeh-moon] airport
militarily thus undermining his peace plan. Elaine sciolino, "Bosnian 79. town of Trebinje [treh-bean-yay]
Arrives, Embarrassilg U.S.," NewYork TimCs (January 9, I 993), p. A5. See also
(cantinuation ftom inside front couer page)
lloward laFranchi, "Europe Puu Tough ralk on Hold," The ihristian science
So4tor
(3February 199_3), p. 6; and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Reporred Witting ro 35. Zeljko RaZ4iatovid ; tzhel'-kotr
Put Troop-s_in.Bosnia""
*Mediators !o! Aneqlg.s Timgs (10 February 1993), p. Al; Stariiey razh-nyah-toh-vichl "Arkan," (also 48, gg)
Meisler, Push Peace Plan at security council," L,oi Aneeles Timei 35. HVO (also 49, 5L-2,6G-7, ?0-1, ??-9, 85)
(9February 1993), p. 46.
35. HOS (T/ruatske orufane snage) - (aleo 4g)
fl OCS_(t2february
See._11yge disappoinrrnenr from Clinton on Bosnia,,,Los Anseles qg. lglriotgha liea - Patriotic League (also 49)
$ 1993, p-B6 and*Marching Blind lnro gosnia@ 44. Milan Pani0, [mee-lahn pah-nichl Serbian-
York Times (11February 1993), p.A22. American invited Jdy fggZ to become prime
68 This point was emphasized by leaders Minister of Yugoslavia
of Islamic conference Nations
at a meeting at the end of January 1993. See "Hamid Al-Ghabid rarh-e 46. Gen. Ratko Mladid lreht koh mlah-dich],
X3man-e-melal va
jame'e-ye orupa-ra taqsim-e bosni racl kard,- Etela'at Yugoslav general from Iftajina (also za)
(Iehran, 3February 1993), p. 16. -
49. TO - Territorial Defense -units loyal to the
government, which develofed into:
lg.ryql (Oruiane
4e. oS BiH sndge Bostte i Hercegouine)
* armed forces of Bosnia-Hercegovina
 The author of this paper, Dr. Alan F-. Fogelquisr, is ir
post-doctoral scholar in Modern Ilalkan and cornparative
History, wirh aPh.D. in history from UCLA and an excellent
knowledge of the Bosnian language (also known as croatian
or Serbian, or croato-serbian or Serbo-croatian) as well as
knowledge of other languages (including Spanish,
Portuguese, French, B ulgarian, Macedonian, Slovenian,
Russian, Persian, Tadzhik, Arabic and Italian). He lived in
Sarajevo from I 98 I - 1984, thus acquiring direct experience
in addition to scholarly study of modern Balkan hisiory. He
recently returned to "the former yugoslavia" in a fact-
finding mission toZ.agreb(Sept-Oct l9g2)and worked in
February 1993 as a consultant researcher for Helsinki
Watch on War Crimes.
The editor of this paper, Colleen B. London, is an
American linguist and formerresident of Sarajevo (1969-
1976) who worked for sarajevo Terevision as a translator
during the winter olympics in lg$4. with the belief that in
order to understand what is happening in Bosnia at this time,
there is need for adequate interpretation by those with a
goodpriorknowledgeof thelanguage and culture from the
point of view of both an "insider" and an ',outsider,,' she
founded the sarajevo News Network (sNN) Newsletter in
November 1992. In Dr. Fogelquist she has found ,'an
excellent source of reliable and accurate information and
interpretation."

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