Chapter 1

Expected Utility and Risk

Aversion

Asset prices are determined by investors’ risk preferences and by the distrib-
utions of assets’ risky future payments. Economists refer to these two bases
of prices as investor "tastes" and the economy’s "technologies" for generating
asset returns. A satisfactory theory of asset valuation must consider how in-
dividuals allocate their wealth among assets having different future payments.
This chapter explores the development of expected utility theory, the standard
approach for modeling investor choices over risky assets. We first analyze the
conditions that an individual’s preferences must satisfy to be consistent with an
expected utility function. We then consider the link between utility and risk-
aversion, and how risk-aversion leads to risk premia for particular assets. Our
final topic examines how risk-aversion affects an individual’s choice between a
risky and a risk-free asset.

Modeling investor choices with expected utility functions is widely-used.

However, significant empirical and experimental evidence has indicated that

3
4 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

individuals sometimes behave in ways inconsistent with standard forms of ex-

pected utility. These findings have motivated a search for improved models
of investor preferences. Theoretical innovations both within and outside the
expected utility paradigm are being developed, and examples of such advances
are presented in later chapters of this book.

1.1 Preferences when Returns are Uncertain

Economists typically analyze the price of a good or service by modeling the

nature of its supply and demand. A similar approach can be taken to price an
asset. As a starting point, let us consider the modeling of an investor’s demand
for an asset. In contrast to a good or service, an asset does not provide a current
consumption benefit to an individual. Rather, an asset is a vehicle for saving. It
is a component of an investor’s financial wealth representing a claim on future
consumption or purchasing power. The main distinction between assets is
the difference in their future payoffs. With the exception of assets that pay a
risk-free return, assets’ payoffs are random. Thus, a theory of the demand for
assets needs to specify investors’ preferences over different, uncertain payoffs.
In other words, we need to model how investors choose between assets that
have different probability distributions of returns. In this chapter we assume
an environment where an individual chooses among assets that have random
payoffs at a single future date. Later chapters will generalize the situation
to consider an individual’s choices over multiple periods among assets paying
returns at multiple future dates.

Let us begin by considering potentially relevant criteria that individuals

might use to rank their preferences for different risky assets. One possible
measure of the attractiveness of an asset is the average or expected value of
its payoff. Suppose an asset offers a single random payoff at a particular
1.1. PREFERENCES WHEN RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN 5

future date, and this payoff has a discrete distribution with n possible outcomes,
P
n
(x1 , ..., xn ), and corresponding probabilities (p1 , ..., pn ), where pi = 1 and
i=1
pi ≥ 0.1 Then the expected value of the payoff (or, more simply, the expected
P
n
payoff) is x̄ ≡ E [e
x] = pi xi .
i=1

Is it logical to think that individuals value risky assets based solely on the
assets’ expected payoffs? This valuation concept was the prevailing wisdom
until 1713 when Nicholas Bernoulli pointed out a major weakness. He showed
that an asset’s expected payoff was unlikely to be the only criterion that in-
dividuals use for valuation. He did it by posing the following problem that
became known as the “St. Petersberg Paradox:”

Peter tosses a coin and continues to do so until it should land "heads"

when it comes to the ground. He agrees to give Paul one ducat if
he gets "heads" on the very first throw, two ducats if he gets it on
the second, four if on the third, eight if on the fourth, and so on, so
that on each additional throw the number of ducats he must pay is
doubled.2 Suppose we seek to determine Paul’s expectation (of the
payoff that he will receive).

Interpreting Paul’s prize from this coin flipping game as the payoff of a risky
asset, how much would he be willing to pay for this asset if he valued it based
on its expected value? If the number of coin flips taken to first arrive at a heads
¡ ¢i
is i, then pi = 12 and xi = 2i−1 so that the expected payoff equals

1 As is the case in the following example, n, the number of possible outcomes, may be

infinite.
2 A ducat was a 3.5 gram gold coin used throughout Europe.
6 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

∞
X
x̄ = pi xi = 12 1 + 14 2 + 18 4 + 1
16 8 + ... (1.1)
i=1
1
= 2 (1 + 12 2 + 14 4 + 18 8 + ...
1
= 2 (1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + ... = ∞

The "paradox" is that the expected value of this asset is infinite, but, intu-
itively, most individuals would pay only a moderate, not infinite, amount to play
this game. In a paper published in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli, a cousin of Nicholas,
provided an explanation for the St. Petersberg Paradox by introducing the con-
cept of expected utility.3 His insight was that an individual’s utility or "felicity"
from receiving a payoff could differ from the size of the payoff and that people
cared about the expected utility of an asset’s payoffs, not the expected value of
Pn
its payoffs. Instead of valuing an asset as x = i=1 pi xi , its value, V , would
be

Pn
V ≡ E [U (e
x)] = i=1 pi Ui (1.2)

where Ui is the utility associated with payoff xi . Moreover, he hypothesized

that the "utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely
proportionate to the quantity of goods previously possessed." In other words,
the greater an individual’s wealth, the smaller is the added (or marginal) utility
received from an additional increase in wealth. In the St. Petersberg Paradox,
prizes, xi , go up at the same rate that the probabilities decline. To obtain a
finite valuation, the trick is to allow the utility of prizes, Ui , to increase slower
3 An English translation of Daniel Bernoulli’s original Latin paper is printed in Econo-

metrica (Bernoulli 1954). Another Swiss mathematician, Gabriel Cramer, offered a similar
solution in 1728.
1.1. PREFERENCES WHEN RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN 7

than the rate that probabilities decline. Hence, Daniel Bernoulli introduced the
principle of a diminishing marginal utility of wealth (as expressed in his quote
above) to resolve this paradox.

The first complete axiomatic development of expected utility is due to John

von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).
Von Neumann, a renowned physicist and mathematician, initiated the field of
game theory, which analyzes strategic decision making. Morgenstern, an econo-
mist, recognized the field’s economic applications and, together, they provided
a rigorous basis for individual decision-making under uncertainty. We now out-
line one aspect of their work, namely, to provide conditions that an individual’s
preferences must satisfy for these preferences to be consistent with an expected
utility function.

Define a lottery as an asset that has a risky payoff and consider an individ-
ual’s optimal choice of a lottery (risky asset) from a given set of different lotter-
ies. All lotteries have possible payoffs that are contained in the set {x1 , ..., xn }.
In general, the elements of this set can be viewed as different, uncertain out-
comes. For example, they could be interpreted as particular consumption levels
(bundles of consumption goods) that the individual obtains in different states
of nature or, more simply, different monetary payments received in different
states of the world. A given lottery can be characterized as an ordered set
P
n
of probabilities P = {p1 , ..., pn }, where, of course, pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0. A
i=1
different lottery is characterized by another set of probabilities, for example,
P ∗ = {p∗1 , ..., p∗n }. Let Â, ≺, and ∼ denote preference and indifference between
lotteries.4 We will show that if an individual’s preferences satisfy the following
conditions (axioms), then these preferences can be represented by a real-valued

4 Specifically, if an individual prefers lottery P to lottery P ∗ , this can be denoted as P Â P ∗

or P ∗ ≺ P . When the individual is indifferent between the two lotteries, this is written as
P ∼ P ∗ . If an individual prefers lottery P to lottery P ∗ or she is indifferent between lotteries
P and P ∗ , this is written as P º P ∗ or P ∗ ¹ P .
8 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

utility function defined over a given lottery’s probabilities, that is, an expected
utility function V (p1 , ..., pn ).
Axioms:
1) Completeness
For any two lotteries P ∗ and P , either P ∗ Â P , or P ∗ ≺ P , or P ∗ ∼ P .
2) Transitivity
If P ∗∗ º P ∗ and P ∗ º P , then P ∗∗ º P .
3) Continuity

If P ∗∗ º P ∗ º P , there exists some λ ∈ [0, 1] such that P ∗ ∼ λP ∗∗ +(1−λ)P ,

where λP ∗∗ + (1 − λ)P denotes a “compound lottery,” namely with probability
λ one receives the lottery P ∗∗ and with probability (1 − λ) one receives the
lottery P .
These three axioms are analogous to those used to establish the existence
of a real-valued utility function in standard consumer choice theory.5 The
fourth axiom is unique to expected utility theory and, as we later discuss, has
important implications for the theory’s predictions.
4) Independence
For any two lotteries P and P ∗ , P ∗ Â P if for all λ ∈ (0,1] and all P ∗∗ :

λP ∗ + (1 − λ)P ∗∗ Â λP + (1 − λ)P ∗∗

Moreover, for any two lotteries P and P † , P ∼ P † if for all λ ∈(0,1] and all
P ∗∗ :
5A primary area of microeconomics analyzes a consumer’s optimal choice of multiple goods
(and services) based on their prices and the consumer’s budget contraint. In that context,
utility is a function of the quantities of multiple goods consumed. References on this topic
include (Kreps 1990), (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995), and (Varian 1992). In con-
trast, the analysis of this chapter expresses utility as a function of the individual’s wealth. In
future chapters, we introduce multi-period utility functions where utility becomes a function
of the individual’s overall consumption at multiple future dates. Financial economics typi-
cally bypasses the individual’s problem of choosing among different consumption goods and
focuses on how the individual chooses a total quantity of consumption at different points in
time and different states of nature.
1.1. PREFERENCES WHEN RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN 9

λP + (1 − λ)P ∗∗ ∼ λP † + (1 − λ)P ∗∗

To better understand the meaning of the independence axiom, note that P ∗

is preferred to P by assumption. Now the choice between λP ∗ + (1 − λ)P ∗∗
and λP + (1 − λ)P ∗∗ is equivalent to a toss of a coin that has a probability
(1 − λ) of landing “tails”, in which case both compound lotteries are equivalent
to P ∗∗ , and a probability λ of landing “heads,” in which case the first compound
lottery is equivalent to the single lottery P ∗ and the second compound lottery
is equivalent to the single lottery P . Thus, the choice between λP ∗ + (1 − λ)P ∗∗
and λP + (1 − λ)P ∗∗ is equivalent to being asked, prior to the coin toss, if one
would prefer P ∗ to P in the event the coin lands “heads.”
It would seem reasonable that should the coin land “heads,” we would go
ahead with our original preference in choosing P ∗ over P . The independence
axiom assumes that preferences over the two lotteries are independent of the
way in which we obtain them.6 For this reason, the independence axiom is
also known as the “no regret” axiom. However, experimental evidence finds
some systematic violations of this independence axiom, making it a questionable
assumption for a theory of investor preferences. For example, the Allais Para-
dox is a well-known choice of lotteries that, when offered to individuals, leads
most to violate the independence axiom.7 Machina (Machina 1987) summa-
rizes violations of the independence axiom and reviews alternative approaches
to modeling risk preferences. In spite of these deficiencies, von Neumann -
Morgenstern expected utility theory continues to be a useful and common ap-
6 In the context of standard consumer choice theory, λ would be interpreted as the amount

(rather than probability) of a particular good or bundle of goods consumed (say C) and
(1 − λ) as the amount of another good or bundle of goods consumed (say C ∗∗ ). In this case,
it would not be reasonable to assume that the choice of these different bundles is independent.
This is due to some goods being substitutes or complements with other goods. Hence, the
validity of the independence axiom is linked to outcomes being uncertain (risky), that is, the
interpretation of λ as a probability rather than a deterministic amount.
7 A similar example is given as an exercise at the end of this chapter.
10 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

proach to modeling investor preferences, though research exploring alternative

paradigms is growing.8

The final axiom is similar to the independence and completeness axioms.

5) Dominance

Let P 1 be the compound lottery λ1 P ‡ +(1−λ1 )P † and P 2 be the compound

lottery λ2 P ‡ + (1 − λ2 )P † . If P ‡ Â P † , then P 1 Â P 2 if and only if λ1 > λ2 .
Given preferences characterized by the above axioms, we now show that the
choice between any two (or more) arbitrary lotteries is that which has the higher
(highest) expected utility.

The completeness axiom’s ordering on lotteries naturally induces an order-

ing on the set of outcomes. To see this, define an "elementary" or "primitive"
lottery, ei , which returns outcome xi with probability 1 and all other outcomes
with probability zero, that is, ei = {p1 , ...,pi−1 ,pi ,pi+1, ...,pn } = {0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ...0}
where pi = 1 and pj = 0 ∀j 6= i. Without loss of generality, suppose that the
outcomes are ordered such that en º en−1 º ... º e1 . This follows from the
completeness axiom for this case of n elementary lotteries. Note that this or-
dering of the elementary lotteries may not necessarily coincide with a ranking
of the elements of x strictly by the size of their monetary payoffs, as the state
of nature for which xi is the outcome may differ from the state of nature for
which xj is the outcome, and these states of nature may have different effects
on how an individual values the same monetary outcome. For example, xi may
be received in a state of nature when the economy is depressed, and monetary
payoffs may be highly valued in this state of nature. In contrast, xj may be
received in a state of nature characterized by high economic expansion, and
monetary payments may not be as highly valued. Therefore, it may be that
ei  ej even if the monetary payment corresponding to xi was less than that
8 This research includes "behavioral finance," a field that encompasses alternatives to both

expected utility theory and market efficiency. An example of how a behavioral finance - type
utility specification can impact asset prices will be presented in Chapter 15.
1.1. PREFERENCES WHEN RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN 11

corresponding to xj .

From the continuity axiom, we know that for each ei , there exists a Ui ∈ [0, 1]
such that

ei ∼ Ui en + (1 − Ui )e1 (1.3)

and for i = 1, this implies U1 = 0 and for i = n, this implies Un = 1. The values
of the Ui weight the most and least preferred outcomes such that the individual
is just indifferent between a combination of these polar payoffs and the payoff of
xi . The Ui can adjust for both differences in monetary payoffs and differences
in the states of nature during which the outcomes are received.

Now consider a given arbitrary lottery, P = {p1 , ..., pn }. This can be con-
sidered a compound lottery over the n elementary lotteries, where elementary
lottery ei is obtained with probability pi . By the independence axiom, and using
equation (1.3), the individual is indifferent between the compound lottery, P ,
and the following lottery given on the right-hand-side of the equation below:

p1 e1 + ... + pn en ∼ p1 e1 + ... + pi−1 ei−1 + pi [Ui en + (1 − Ui )e1 ]

+pi+1 ei+1 + ... + pn en (1.4)

where we have used the indifference relation in equation (1.3) to substitute for
ei on the right hand side of (1.4). By repeating this substitution for all i,
i = 1, ..., n, we see that the individual will be indifferent between P , given by
the left hand side of (1.4), and

à n ! à n
!
X X
p1 e1 + ... + pn en ∼ pi Ui en + 1 − pi Ui e1 (1.5)
i=1 i=1
12 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

P
n
Now define Λ ≡ pi Ui . Thus, we see that lottery P is equivalent to a
i=1
compound lottery consisting of a Λ probability of obtaining elementary lottery
en and a (1 − Λ) probability of obtaining elementary lottery e1 . In a similar
manner, we can show that any other arbitrary lottery P ∗ = {p∗1 , ..., p∗n } is equiv-
alent to a compound lottery consisting of a Λ∗ probability of obtaining en and
P
n
a (1 − Λ∗ ) probability of obtaining e1 , where Λ∗ ≡ p∗i Ui .
i=1
Thus, we know from the dominance axiom that P ∗ Â P if and only if Λ∗ > Λ,
P
n P
n
which implies p∗i Ui > pi Ui . So defining an expected utility function as
i=1 i=1

n
X
V (p1 , ..., pn ) = pi Ui (1.6)
i=1

will imply that P ∗ Â P if and only if V (p∗1 , ..., p∗n ) > V (p1 , ..., pn ).

The function given in equation (1.6) is known as von Neumann - Morgenstern

expected utility. Note that it is linear in the probabilities and is unique up to
a linear monotonic transformation.9 This implies that the utility function has
“cardinal” properties, meaning that it does not preserve preference orderings
for all strictly increasing transformations.10 For example, if Ui = U (xi ), an
individual’s choice over lotteries will be the same under the transformation
aU (xi ) + b, but not a non-linear transformation that changes the “shape” of
U (xi ).

The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility framework may only par-

tially explain the phenomenon illustrated by the St. Petersberg Paradox. Sup-
pose an individual’s utility is given by the square root of a monetary payoff, that
√
is, Ui = U (xi ) = xi . This is a monotonically increasing, concave function of

9 The intuition for why expected utility is unique up to a linear transformation can be

traced to equation (1.3). The derivation chose to compare elementary lottery i in terms of
the least and most preferred elementary lotteries. However, other bases for ranking a given
lottery are possible.
10 An "ordinal" utility function preserves preference orderings for any strictly increasing

transformation, not just linear ones. The utility functions defined over multiple goods and
used in standard consumer theory are ordinal measures.
1.1. PREFERENCES WHEN RETURNS ARE UNCERTAIN 13

x, which, here, is assumed to be simply a monetary amount (in units of ducats).

Then the individual’s expected utility of the St. Petersberg payoff is

Xn X∞ ∞
1 √ i−1 X − 2i
V = pi Ui = 2 = 2 (1.7)
i=1 i=1
2i i=2
2 3
= 2− 2 + 2− 2 + ...
X∞ µ ¶i
1 1 1
= √ −1− √ = √ ∼= 1.707
i=0
2 2 2 − 2

which is finite. This individual would get the same expected utility from re-
√
ceiving a certain payment of 1.7072 ∼
= 2.914 ducats since V = 2.914also gives
expected (and actual) utility of 1.707. Hence we can conclude that the St.
Petersberg gamble would be worth 2.914 ducats to this square-root utility max-
imizer.
However, the reason that this is not a complete resolution of the paradox
is that one can always construct a “super St. Petersberg paradox” where even
expected utility is infinite. Note that in the regular St. Petersberg paradox,
the probability of winning declines at rate 2i while the winning payoff increases
at rate 2i . In a super St. Petersberg paradox, we can make the winning payoff
increase at a rate xi = U −1 (2i−1 ) and expected utility would no longer be finite.
If we take the example of square-root utility, let the winning payoff be xi = 22i−2 ,
that is, x1 = 1, x2 = 4, x3 = 16, etc. In this case, the expected utility of the
super St. Petersberg payoff by a square-root expected utility maximizer is

Xn X∞
1 √ 2i−2
V = pi Ui = 2 =∞ (1.8)
i=1 i=1
2i

Should we be concerned by the fact that if we let the prizes grow quickly
enough, we can get infinite expected utility (and valuations) for any chosen form
of expected utility function? Maybe not. One could argue that St. Petersberg
14 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

games are unrealistic, particularly ones where the payoffs are assumed to grow
rapidly. The reason is that any person offering this asset has finite wealth (even
Bill Gates). This would set an upper bound on the amount of prizes that could
feasibly be paid, making expected utility, and even the expected value of the
payoff, finite.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility approach can be general-

ized to the case of a continuum of outcomes and lotteries having continuous
probability distributions. For example, if outcomes are a possibly infinite num-
ber of purely monetary payoffs or consumption levels denoted by the variable
x, a subset of the real numbers, then a generalized version of equation (1.6) is

Z
V (F ) = E [U (e
x)] = U (x) dF (x) (1.9)

where F (x) is a given lottery’s cumulative distribution function over the payoffs,
x.11 Hence, the generalized lottery represented by the distribution function F
is analogous to our previous lottery represented by the discrete probabilities
P = {p1 , ..., pn }.

Thus far, our discussion of expected utility theory has said little regarding
an appropriate specification for the utility function, U (x). We now turn to a
discussion of how the form of this function affects individuals’ risk preferences.

1.2 Risk Aversion and Risk Premia

As mentioned in the previous section, Daniel Bernoulli proposed that utility

functions should display diminishing marginal utility, that is, U (x) should be
an increasing but concave function of wealth. He recognized that this concavity
implies that an individual will be risk averse. By risk averse we mean that
11 When the random payoff, x h, is absolutely continuous, then Uexpected utility can be written
in terms of the probability density function, f (x), as V (f ) = U (x) f (x) dx.
1.2. RISK AVERSION AND RISK PREMIA 15

the individual would not accept a “fair” lottery (asset), where a fair or “pure
risk” lottery is defined as one that has an expected value of zero. To see the
relationship between fair lotteries and concave utility, consider the following
example. Let there be a lottery that has a random payoff, e
ε, where

⎧
⎪
⎨ ε1 with probability p
e
ε= (1.10)
⎪
⎩ ε with probability 1 − p
2

The requirement that it be a fair lottery restricts its expected value to equal
zero:

E [e
ε] = pε1 + (1 − p)ε2 = 0 (1.11)

which implies ε1 /ε2 = − (1 − p) /p, or, solving for p, p = −ε2 / (ε1 − ε2 ). Of

course since 0 < p < 1, ε1 and ε2 are of opposite signs.

Now suppose a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer whose

current wealth equals W is offered the above lottery. Would this individual
accept it, that is, would she place a positive value on this lottery?

If the lottery is accepted, expected utility is given by E [U (W + e

ε)]. Instead,
if it is not accepted, expected utility is given by E [U (W )] = U (W ). Thus, an
individual’s refusal to accept a fair lottery implies

U (W ) > E [U (W + e
ε)] = pU (W + ε1 ) + (1 − p)U (W + ε2 ) (1.12)

To show that this is equivalent to having a concave utility function, note that

U (W ) can be re-written as
16 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

U(W ) = U (W + pε1 + (1 − p)ε2 ) (1.13)

since pε1 + (1 − p)ε2 = 0 by the assumption that the lottery is fair. Re-writing
inequality (1.12), we have

U (W + pε1 + (1 − p)ε2 ) > pU (W + ε1 ) + (1 − p)U (W + ε2 ) (1.14)

which is the definition of U being a concave function. A function is concave

if a line joining any two points of the function lies entirely below the function.
When U (W ) is concave, a line connecting the points U(W + ε2 ) to U (W + ε1 )
lies below U (W ) for all W such that W +ε2 < W < W +ε1 . As shown in Figure
1.1, pU (W + ε1 ) + (1 − p)U (W + ε2 ) is exactly the point on this line directly
below U (W ). This is clear by substituting p = −ε2 /(ε1 − ε2 ). Note that when
U (W ) is a continuous, second differentiable function, concavity implies that its
second derivative, U 00 (W ), is less than zero.

To show the reverse, that concavity of utility implies the unwillingness to

accept a fair lottery, we can use a result from statistics known as Jensen’s
e is a random variable, then
inequality. If U (·) is some concave function, and x
Jensen’s inequality says that

E[U (x̃)] < U (E[x̃]) (1.15)

Therefore, substituting x̃ = W + e
ε, with E[e
ε] = 0, we have

E [U (W + e
ε)] < U (E [W + e
ε]) = U (W ) (1.16)

which is the desired result.

1.2. RISK AVERSION AND RISK PREMIA 17

Utility Concave U tility Function

U(W +ε 1 )
U(W )
[- ε 2 U(W + ε 1 )+
ε 1 U (W +ε 2 )]/(ε 1 -ε 2 )
U(W +ε 2 )
= p U (W +ε 1 ) +
(1-p) U (W +ε 2 )

W +ε 2 W W +ε 1 W ealth

Figure 1.1: Fair Lotteries Lower Utility

We have defined risk aversion in terms of the individual’s utility function.12

Let us now consider how this aversion to risk can be quantified. This is done
by defining a risk premium, the amount that an individual is willing to pay to
avoid a risk.

Let π denote the individual’s risk premium for a particular lottery, e

ε. It
can be likened to the maximum insurance payment an individual would pay to
avoid a particular risk. John W. Pratt (Pratt 1964) defined the risk premium
for lottery (asset) e
ε as

U (W − π) = E [U (W + e
ε)] (1.17)

12 Based on the same analysis, it is straightforward to show that if an individual strictly

preferred a fair lottery, his utility function must be convex in wealth. Such an individual
is said to be risk-loving. Similarly, an individual that is indifferent between accepting or
refusing a fair lottery is said to be risk-neutral and must have utility that is a linear function
of wealth.
18 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

W − π is defined as the certainty equivalent level of wealth associated with the

lottery, e
ε. Since utility is an increasing, concave function of wealth, Jensen’s
inequality ensures that π must be positive when e
ε is fair, that is, the individual
would accept a level of wealth lower than her expected level of wealth following
the lottery, E [W + e
ε], if the lottery could be avoided.

To analyze this Pratt (1964) risk premium, we continue to assume the indi-
vidual is an expected utility maximizer and that e
ε is a fair lottery, that is, its
expected value equals zero. Further, let us consider the case of e
ε being “small,”
so that we can study its effects by taking a Taylor series approximation of equa-
ε = 0 and π = 0.13 Expanding the left hand side
tion (1.17) around the point e
of (1.17) around π = 0 gives

U (W − π) ∼
= U(W ) − πU 0 (W ) (1.18)

and expanding the right hand side of (1.17) around e

ε = 0 (and taking a three
term expansion since E [e
ε] = 0 implies that a third term is necessary for a
limiting approximation) gives

h i
ε)] ∼
E [U(W + e = E U (W ) + e ε2 U 00 (W )
εU 0 (W ) + 12 e (1.19)

= U (W ) + 12 σ2 U 00 (W )
h i
ε2 is the lottery’s variance. Equating the results in (1.18) and
where σ2 ≡ E e
(1.19), we have

U 00 (W )
π = − 12 σ 2 ≡ 12 σ 2 R(W ) (1.20)
U 0 (W )

13 By describing the random variable h

ε as “small” we mean that its probability density is
concentrated around its mean of 0.
1.2. RISK AVERSION AND RISK PREMIA 19

where R(W ) ≡ −U 00 (W )/U 0 (W ) is the Pratt (1964) - Arrow (1971) measure

of absolute risk aversion. Note that the risk premium, π, depends on the un-
certainty of the risky asset, σ 2 , and on the individual’s coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. Since σ 2 and U 0 (W ) are both greater than zero, concavity of the
utility function ensures that π must be positive.

From (1.20) we see that the concavity of the utility function, U 00 (W ), is

insufficient to quantify the risk premium an individual is willing to pay, even
though it is necessary and sufficient to indicate whether the individual is risk-
averse. In order to determine the risk premium, we also need the first derivative,
U 0 (W ), which tells us the marginal utility of wealth. An individual may be very
risk averse (−U 00 (W ) is large), but he may be unwilling to pay a large risk
premium if he is poor since his marginal utility is high (U 0 (W ) is large).

To illustrate this point, consider the following negative exponential utility

function:

U (W ) = −e−bW , b > 0 (1.21)

Note that U 0 (W ) = be−bW > 0 and U 00 (W ) = −b2 e−bW < 0. Consider the
behavior of a very wealthy individual, that is, one whose wealth approaches
infinity:

lim U 0 (W ) = lim U 00 (W ) = 0 (1.22)

W →∞ W →∞

As W → ∞, the utility function is a flat line. Concavity disappears, which

might imply that this very rich individual would be willing to pay very little
for insurance against a random event, e
ε, certainly less than a poor person with
the same utility function. However, this is not true because the marginal utility
of wealth is also very small. This neutralizes the effect of smaller concavity.
20 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

Indeed:

b2 e−bW
R(W ) = =b (1.23)
be−bW

which is a constant. Thus, we can see why this utility function is sometimes
referred to as a constant absolute risk aversion utility function.

If we want to assume that absolute risk aversion is declining in wealth, a

necessary, though not sufficient, condition for this is that the utility function
have a positive third derivative, since

∂R(W ) U 000 (W )U 0 (W ) − [U 00 (W )]2

=− (1.24)
∂W [U 0 (W )]2

Also, it can be shown that the coefficient of risk aversion contains all relevant
information about the individual’s risk preferences. To see this, note that

U 00 (W ) ∂ (ln [U 0 (W )])
R(W ) = − = − (1.25)
U 0 (W ) ∂W

Integrating both sides of (1.25), we have

Z
− R(W )dW = ln[U 0 (W )] + c1 (1.26)

where c1 is an arbitrary constant. Taking the exponential function of (1.26),

one obtains

U
e− R(W )dW
= U 0 (W )ec1 (1.27)

Integrating once again gives

Z U
e− R(W )dW
dW = ec1 U(W ) + c2 (1.28)
1.2. RISK AVERSION AND RISK PREMIA 21

where c2 is another arbitrary constant. Because expected utility functions

are unique up to a linear transformation, ec1 U(W ) + c1 reflects the same risk
preferences as U (W ). Hence, this shows one can recover the risk-preferences of
U (W ) from the function R (W ).

Relative risk aversion is another frequently used measure of risk aversion and
is defined simply as

Rr (W ) = W R(W ) (1.29)

In many applications in financial economics, an individual is assumed to have

relative risk aversion that is constant for different levels of wealth. Note that this
assumption implies that the individual’s absolute risk aversion, R (W ), declines
in direct proportion to increases in his wealth. While later chapters will discuss
the widely varied empirical evidence on the size of individuals’ relative risk
aversions, one recent study based on individuals’ answers to survey questions
finds a median relative risk aversion of approximately 7.14

Let us now examine the coefficients of risk aversion for some utility functions
that are frequently used in models of portfolio choice and asset pricing. Power
utility can be written as

U (W ) = γ1 W γ , γ < 1 (1.30)

14 The mean estimate was lower, indicating a skewed distribution. Robert Barsky, Thomas

Juster, Miles Kimball, and Matthew Shapiro (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro 1997)
computed these estimates of relative risk aversion from a survey that asked a series of ques-
tions regarding whether the respondent would switch to a new job that had a 50-50 chance
of doubling their lifetime income or decreasing their lifetime income by a proportion λ. By
varying λ in the questions, they estimated the point where an individual would be indifferent
between keeping their current job or switching. Essentially, they attempted to find λ∗ such
that 12 U (2W ) + 12 U (λ∗ W ) = U (W ). Assuming utility displays constant relative risk aver-
sion of the form U (W ) = W γ /γ, then the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 1 − γ satisfies
2γ + λ∗γ = 2. The authors warn that their estimates of risk aversion may be biased upward if
individuals attach non-pecuniary benefits to maintaining their current occupation. Interest-
ingly, they confirmed that estimates of relative risk aversion tended to be lower for individuals
who smoked, drank, were uninsured, held riskier jobs, and invested in riskier assets.
22 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

γ−2
implying that R(W ) = − (γ−1)W
W γ−1 = (1−γ)
W and, therefore, Rr (W ) = 1 −
γ. Hence, this form of utility is also known as constant relative risk aversion.
Logarithmic utility is a limiting case of power utility. To see this, write the
γ
power utility function as γ1 W γ − γ1 = W −1 15
γ . Next take the limit of this utility
function as γ → 0. Note that the numerator and denominator both go to zero,
so that the limit is not obvious. However, we can re-write the numerator in
terms of an exponential and natural log function and apply L’Hôpital’s rule to
obtain:

Wγ − 1 eγ ln(W ) − 1 ln(W )W γ
lim = lim = lim = ln(W ) (1.31)
γ→0 γ γ→0 γ γ→0 1

Thus, logarithmic utility is equivalent to power utility with γ = 0, or a coefficient

of relative risk aversion of unity:
−2
R(W ) = − W
W −1 =
1
W and Rr (W ) = 1.
Quadratic utility takes the form

U (W ) = W − 2b W 2 , b > 0 (1.32)

Note that the marginal utility of wealth is U 0 (W ) = 1 − bW and is positive only

1
when b < W . Thus, this utility function makes sense (in that more wealth is
preferred to less) only when W < 1b . The point of maximum utility, 1b , is known
b bW
as the “bliss point.” We have R(W ) = 1−bW and Rr (W ) = 1−bW .
Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility is a generalization of all of
the aforementioned utility functions. It can be written as

µ ¶γ
1−γ αW
U (W ) = +β (1.33)
γ 1−γ
15 Recall that we can do this because utility functions are unique up to a linear transforma-

tion.
1.2. RISK AVERSION AND RISK PREMIA 23

αW
subject to the restrictions γ 6= 1, α > 0, 1−γ + β > 0, and β = 1 if γ = −∞.
³ ´−1
W β
Thus, R(W ) = 1−γ +α . Since R(W ) must be > 0, it implies β > 0 when
³ ´−1
W β
γ > 1. Rr (W ) = W 1−γ +α . HARA utility nests constant absolute risk
aversion (γ = −∞, β = 1), constant relative risk aversion (γ < 1, β = 0), and
quadratic (γ = 2) utility functions. Thus, depending on the parameters, it is
able to display constant absolute risk aversion or relative risk aversion that is
increasing, decreasing, or constant. We will re-visit HARA utility in future
chapters as it can be an analytically convenient assumption for utility when
deriving an individual’s intertemporal consumption and portfolio choices.

Pratt’s definition of a risk premium in (1.17) is commonly used in the insur-

ance literature because it can be interpreted as the payment that an individual
is willing to make to insure against a particular risk. However, in the field of
financial economics, a somewhat different definition is often employed. Finan-
cial economists seek to understand how the risk of an asset’s payoff determines
the asset’s rate of return. In this context, an asset’s risk premium is defined as
its expected rate of return in excess of the risk-free rate of return. This alterna-
tive concept of a risk premium was used by Kenneth Arrow (Arrow 1971) who
independently derived a coefficient of risk aversion that is identical to Pratt’s
measure. Let us now outline Arrow’s approach. Suppose that an asset (lot-
tery), e
ε, has the following payoffs and probabilities (this could be generalized to
other types of fair payoffs):

⎧
⎪
⎨ + with probability 1
2
e
ε= (1.34)
⎪
⎩ − with probability 1
2

where ≥ 0. Note that, as before, E [e

ε] = 0. Now consider the following
question. By how much should we change the expected value (return) of the
asset, by changing the probability of winning, in order to make the individual
24 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

indifferent between taking and not taking the risk? If p is the probability of
winning, we can define the risk premium as

θ = prob (e
ε = + ) − prob (e
ε = − ) = p − (1 − p) = 2p − 1 (1.35)

Therefore, from (1.35) we have

ε = + ) ≡ p = 12 (1 + θ)
prob (e
(1.36)
ε = − ) ≡ 1 − p = 12 (1 − θ)
prob (e

These new probabilities of winning and losing are equal to the old probabilities,
1
2, plus half of the increment, θ. Thus, the premium, θ, that makes the individual
indifferent between accepting and refusing the asset is

1 1
U (W ) = (1 + θ)U (W + ) + (1 − θ)U(W − ) (1.37)
2 2

Taking a Taylor series approximation around = 0, gives

1 £ ¤
U (W ) = (1 + θ) U (W ) + U 0 (W ) + 12 2 U 00 (W ) (1.38)
2
1 £ ¤
+ (1 − θ) U (W ) − U 0 (W ) + 12 2 U 00 (W )
2
= U (W ) + θU 0 (W ) + 1 2 00
2 U (W )

Re-arranging (1.38) implies

1
θ= 2 R(W ) (1.39)

which, as before, is a function of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Note

that the Arrow premium, θ, is in terms of a probability, while the Pratt measure,
π, is in units of a monetary payment. If we multiply θ by the monetary payment
1.3. RISK AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 25

received, , then equation (1.39) becomes

1 2
θ= 2 R(W ) (1.40)

2
Since is the variance of the random payoff, e
ε, equation (1.40) shows that the
Pratt and Arrow measures of risk premia are equivalent. Both were obtained
as a linearization of the true function around e
ε = 0.

The results of this section showed how risk aversion depends on the shape of
an individual’s utility function. Moreover, it demonstrated that a risk premium,
equal to either the payment an individual would make to avoid a risk or the
individual’s required excess rate of return on a risky asset, is proportional to
the individual’s Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

1.3 Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice

Having developed the concepts of risk aversion and risk premiums, we now
consider the relation between risk aversion and an individual’s portfolio choice
in a single period context. While the portfolio choice problem that we analyze
is very simple, many of its insights extend to the more complex environments
that will be covered in later chapters of this book. We shall demonstrate that
absolute and relative risk aversion play important roles in determining how
portfolio choices vary with an individual’s level of wealth. Moreover, we show
that when given a choice between a risk-free asset and a risky asset, a risk-averse
individual always chooses at least some positive investment in the risky asset if
it pays a positive risk premium.

The model’s assumptions are as follows. Assume there is a riskless security

that pays a rate of return equal to rf . In addition, for simplicity suppose there
is just one risky security that pays a stochastic rate of return equal to re. Also,
26 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

let W0 be the individual’s initial wealth, and let A be the dollar amount that
the individual invests in the risky asset at the beginning of the period. Thus,
W0 −A is the initial investment in the riskless security. Denoting the individual’s
end-of-period wealth as W̃ , it satisfies:

W̃ = (W0 − A)(1 + rf ) + A(1 + r̃) (1.41)

= W0 (1 + rf ) + A(r̃ − rf )

Note that in the second line of equation (1.41), the first term is the individual’s
return on wealth when the entire portfolio is invested in the risk-free asset, while
the second term is the difference in return gained by investing A dollars in the
risky asset.

We assume that the individual cares only about consumption at the end of
this single period. Therefore, maximizing end-of-period consumption is equiva-
lent to maximizing end-of-period wealth. Assuming that the individual is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer, she chooses her portfolio by
maximizing the expected utility of end-of-period wealth:

maxE[U (W̃ )] = maxE [U (W0 (1 + rf ) + A(r̃ − rf ))] (1.42)

A A

The solution to the individual’s problem in (1.42) must satisfy the following
first order condition with respect to A:

h ³ ´ i
E U 0 W̃ (r̃ − rf ) = 0 (1.43)

This condition determines the amount, A, that the individual invests in the
1.3. RISK AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 27

risky asset.16 Consider the special case in which the expected rate of re-
turn on the risky asset equals the risk-free rate. In that case A = 0 sat-
isfies the first order condition. To see this, note that when A = 0, then
³ ´
W̃ = W0 (1 + rf ) and, therefore, U 0 W̃ = U 0 (W0 (1 + rf )) are non-stochastic.
h ³ ´ i
Hence, E U 0 W̃ (r̃ − rf ) = U 0 (W0 (1 + rf )) E[r̃ − rf ] = 0. This result is
reminiscent of our earlier finding that a risk-averse individual would not choose
to accept a fair lottery. Here, the fair lottery is interpreted as a risky asset that
has an expected rate of return just equal to the risk-free rate.

Next, consider the case in which E[r̃]−rf > 0. Clearly, A = 0 would not sat-
h ³ ´ i
isfy the first order condition because E U 0 W̃ (r̃ − rf ) = U 0 (W0 (1 + rf )) E[r̃−
rf ] > 0 when A = 0. Rather, when E[r̃] − rf > 0 condition (1.43) is satisfied
only when A > 0. To see this, let rh denote a realization of r̃ such that it exceeds
rf , and let W h be the corresponding level of W̃ . Also let rl denote a realization
of r̃ such that it is lower than rf , and let W l be the corresponding level of W̃ .
³ ´
Obviously, U 0 (W h )(rh − rf ) > 0 and U 0 (W l )(rl − rf ) < 0. For U 0 W̃ (r̃ − rf )
to average to zero for all realizations of r̃, it must be the case that W h > W l
¡ ¢ ¡ ¢
so that U 0 W h < U 0 W l due to the concavity of the utility function. This is
because since E[r̃]−rf > 0, the average realization of rh is farther above rf than
³ ´
the average realization of rl is below rf . Therefore, to make U 0 W̃ (r̃ − rf )
¡ ¢
average to zero, the positive (rh − rf ) terms need to be given weights, U 0 W h ,
that are smaller than the weights, U 0 (W l ), that multiply the negative (rl − rf )
realizations. This can occur only if A > 0 so that W h > W l . The implication
is that an individual will always hold at least some positive amount of the risky
asset if its expected rate of return exceeds the risk-free rate.17
k   2 l
16 The second order condition for a maximum, E U 00 W̃ r̃ − rf ≤ 0, is satisfied be-
 
cause U 00 W̃ ≤ 0 due to the assumed concavity of the utility function.
17 Related to this is the notion that a risk-averse expected utility maximizer should accept

a small lottery with a positive expected return. In other words, such an individual should
be close to risk-neutral for small-scale bets. However, Matthew Rabin and Richard Thaler
(Rabin and Thaler 2001) claim that individuals frequently reject lotteries (gambles) that are
28 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

Now, we can go further and explore the relationship between A and the
individual’s initial wealth, W0 . Using the envelope theorem, we can differentiate
the first order condition to obtain18

h i h i
E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )(1 + rf ) dW0 + E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2 dA = 0 (1.44)

or

h i
dA (1 + rf )E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )
= h i (1.45)
dW0 −E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2

The denominator of (1.45) is positive because concavity of the utility function

ensures that U 00 (W̃ ) is negative. Therefore, the sign of the expression depends
on the numerator, which can be of either sign because realizations of (r̃ − rf )
can turn out to be both positive and negative.

To characterize situations in which the sign of (1.45) can be determined, let

us first consider the case where the individual has absolute risk aversion that
is decreasing in wealth. As before, let rh denote a realization of r̃ such that it
exceeds rf , and let W h be the corresponding level of W̃ . Then for A > 0, we
have W h > W0 (1 + rf ). If absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, this

modest in size yet have positive expected returns. From this they argue that concave expected
utility is not a plausible model for predicting an individual’s choice of small-scale risks.
18 The envelope theorem is used to analyze how the maximized value of the objective function

and the control variable

k  change
l when one of the model’s parameters changes. In our context,
define f (A, W0 ) ≡ E U W i so that v (W0 ) = maxf (A, W0 ) is the maximized value of the
A
objective function when the control variable, A, is optimally chosen. Also define A (W0 ) as
the value of A that maximizes f for a given value of W0 . Then applying the chain rule, we
dv(W ) ∂f (A,W0 ) dA(W0 ) ∂f (A(W0 ),W0 ) ∂f(A,W0 )
have dW 0 = ∂A dW
+ ∂W
. But since ∂A
= 0, from the first
0 0 0
dv(W0 )
order condition, this simplifies to just dW0
= ∂f(A(W
∂W0
0 ),W0 )
. Again applying the chain rule
∂(∂f(A(W0 ),W0 )/∂A) ∂ 2 f (A(W0 ),W0 ) dA(W0 )
to the first order condition, one obtains ∂W0
=0= ∂A2 dW0
+
∂ 2 f (A(W0 ),W0 ) dA(W0 ) ∂ 2 f (A(W0 ),W0 ) ∂ 2 f(A(W0 ),W0 )
∂A∂W0
. Re-arranging gives us dW =− ∂A∂W0
/ ∂A2
, which is
0
equation (1.45).
1.3. RISK AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 29

implies

¡ ¢
R W h 6 R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.46)

where, as before, R(W ) = −U 00 (W )/U 0 (W ). Multiplying both terms of (1.46)

by −U 0 (W h )(rh − rf ), which is a negative quantity, the inequality sign changes:

U 00 (W h )(rh − rf ) > −U 0 (W h )(rh − rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.47)

Next, we again let rl denote a realization of r̃ that is lower than rf and define W l
to be the corresponding level of W̃ . Then for A > 0, we have W l 6 W0 (1 + rf ).
If absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, this implies

R(W l ) > R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.48)

Multiplying (1.48) by −U 0 (W l )(rl − rf ), which is positive, so that the sign

of (1.48) remains the same, we obtain

U 00 (W l )(rl − rf ) > −U 0 (W l )(rl − rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.49)

Notice that inequalities (1.47) and (1.49) are of the same form. The inequality
holds whether the realization is r̃ = rh or r̃ = rl . Therefore, if we take expecta-
tions over all realizations, where r̃ can be either higher than or lower than rf ,
we obtain

h i h i
E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) > −E U 0 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.50)

Since the first term on the right-hand-side is just the first order condition,

inequality (1.50) reduces to

30 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

h i
E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) > 0 (1.51)

Thus, the first conclusion that can be drawn is that declining absolute risk aver-

sion implies dA/dW0 > 0, that is, the individual invests an increasing amount of
wealth in the risky asset for larger amounts of initial wealth. For two individuals
with the same utility function but different initial wealths, the more wealthy one
invests a greater dollar amount in the risky asset if utility is characterized by
decreasing absolute risk aversion. While not shown here, the opposite is true,
namely, that the more wealthy individual invests a smaller dollar amount in the
risky asset if utility is characterized by increasing absolute risk aversion.
Thus far, we have not said anything about the proportion of initial wealth
invested in the risky asset. To analyze this issue, we need the concept of relative
risk aversion. Define

dA W0
η≡ (1.52)
dW0 A

which is the elasticity measuring the proportional increase in the risky asset for

an increase in initial wealth. Adding 1 − A

A to the right hand side of (1.52) gives

(dA/dW0 )W0 − A
η =1+ (1.53)
A

Substituting the expression dA/dW0 from equation (1.45), we have

h i h i
W0 (1 + rf )E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) + AE U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2
η =1+ h i (1.54)
−AE U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2

Collecting terms in U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ), this can be re-written as

1.3. RISK AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 31
h i
E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ){W0 (1 + rf ) + A(r̃ − rf )}
η = 1+ h i (1.55)
−AE U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2
h i
E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )W̃
= 1+ h i
−AE U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )2

The denominator is always positive. Therefore, we see that the elasticity, η, is

greater than one, so that the individual invests proportionally more in the risky
h i
asset with an increase in wealth, if E U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf )W̃ > 0. Can we relate
this to the individual’s risk aversion? The answer is yes and the derivation is
almost exactly the same as that just given.

Consider the case where the individual has relative risk aversion that is
decreasing in wealth. Let rh denote a realization of r̃ such that it exceeds
rf , and let W h be the corresponding level of W̃ . Then for A > 0, we have
W h > W0 (1 + rf ). If relative risk aversion, Rr (W ) ≡ W R(W ), is decreasing in
wealth, this implies

W h R(W h ) 6 W0 (1 + rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.56)

Multiplying both terms of (1.56) by −U 0 (W h )(rh − rf ), which is a negative

quantity, the inequality sign changes:

W h U 00 (W h )(rh − rf ) > −U 0 (W h )(rh − rf )W0 (1 + rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.57)

Next, let rl denote a realization of r̃ such that it is lower than rf , and let W l
be the corresponding level of W̃ . Then for A > 0, we have W l 6 W0 (1 + rf ). If
relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, this implies
32 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

W l R(W l ) > W0 (1 + rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.58)

Multiplying (1.58) by −U 0 (W l )(rl − rf ), which is positive, so that the sign of

(1.58) remains the same, we obtain

W l U 00 (W l )(rl − rf ) > −U 0 (W l )(rl − rf )W0 (1 + rf )R (W0 (1 + rf )) (1.59)

Notice that inequalities (1.57) and (1.59) are of the same form. The inequality
holds whether the realization is r̃ = rh or r̃ = rl . Therefore, if we take expecta-
tions over all realizations, where r̃ can be either higher than or lower than rf ,
we obtain

h i h i
E W̃ U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) > −E U 0 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) W0 (1+rf )R(W0 (1+rf )) (1.60)

Since the first term on the right-hand-side is just the first order condition,
inequality (1.60) reduces to

h i
E W̃ U 00 (W̃ )(r̃ − rf ) > 0 (1.61)

Thus, we see that an individual with decreasing relative risk aversion has η > 1
and invests proportionally more in the risky asset as wealth increases. The
opposite is true for increasing relative risk aversion: η < 1 so that this individual
invests proportionally less in the risky asset as wealth increases. The following
table provides another way of writing this section’s main results.
1.4. SUMMARY 33

Risk Aversion Investment Behavior

∂A
Decreasing Absolute ∂W0 >0
∂A
Constant Absolute ∂W0 =0
∂A
Increasing Absolute ∂W0 <0
∂A A
Decreasing Relative ∂W0 > W0
∂A A
Constant Relative ∂W0 = W0
∂A A
Increasing Relative ∂W0 < W0

A point worth emphasizing is that absolute risk aversion indicates how the
investor’s dollar amount in the risky asset changes with changes in initial wealth
while relative risk aversion indicates how the investor’s portfolio proportion
(or portfolio weight) in the risky asset, A/W0 , changes with changes in initial
wealth.

1.4 Summary

This chapter is a first step toward understanding how an individual’s preferences

toward risk affects his portfolio behavior. It was shown that if an individual’s
risk preferences satisfied specific plausible conditions, then her behavior could
be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. In
turn, the shape of the individual’s utility function determines a measure of risk
aversion that is linked to two concepts of a risk premium. The first one is
the monetary payment that the individual is willing to pay to avoid a risk, an
example being a premium paid to insure against a property/casualty loss. The
second is the rate of return in excess of a riskless rate that the individual requires
to hold a risky asset, which is the common definition of a security risk premium
used in the finance literature. Finally, it was shown how an individual’s absolute
and relative risk aversion affects his choice between a risky and risk-free asset. In
34 CHAPTER 1. EXPECTED UTILITY AND RISK AVERSION

particular, individuals with decreasing (increasing) relative risk aversion invest

proportionally more (less) in the risky asset as their wealth increases. Though
based on a simple single-period, two asset portfolio choice model, this insight
generalizes to the more complex portfolio choice problems that will be studied
in later chapters.

1.5 Exercises

1. Suppose there are two lotteries P = {p1 , ..., pn } and P ∗ = {p∗1 , ..., p∗n }. Let
P
n
V (p1 , ..., pn ) = pi Ui be an individual’s expected utility function defined
i=1
P
n
over these lotteries. Let W (p1 , ..., pn ) = pi Qi where Qi = a + bUi and
i=1
a and b are constants. If P ∗ Â P , so that V (p∗1 , ..., p∗n ) > V (p1 , ..., pn ),
must it be the case that W (p∗1 , ..., p∗n ) > W (p1 , ..., pn )? In other words, is
W also a valid expected utility function for the individual? Are there any
restrictions needed on a and b for this to be the case?

2. (Allais Paradox) Asset A pays $1,500 with certainty, while asset B pays
$2,000 with probability 0.8 or $100 with probability 0.2. If offered the
choice between asset A or B, a particular individual would choose asset
A. Suppose, instead, the individual is offered the choice between asset
C and asset D. Asset C pays $1,500 with probability 0.25 or $100 with
probability 0.75 while asset D pays $2,000 with probability 0.2 or $100
with probability 0.8. If asset D is chosen, show that the individual’s
preferences violate the independence axiom.

3. Verify that the HARA utility function in 1.33 becomes the constant ab-
solute risk aversion utility function when β = 1 and γ = −∞. Hint: recall
¡ ¢x
that ea = lim 1 + xa .
x−→∞

4. Consider the individual’s portfolio choice problem given in 1.42. As-