PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Concept of Paternity, Maternity, and Filiation

Janie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua

G.R. No. 183965
September 18, 2009

Facts:

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18

February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and
filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and
her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would
pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to
future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending
before RTC-Branch 24.

Ruling:

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem
causa.
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.

It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch

9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions
for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence,
there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases.
However, the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.

The court rules in the negative.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid

a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic,the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.

It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement
must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of
the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void,
and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.
 Kinds/Status of Children

De Asis v. CA
GR No. 127578
February 15, 1999

Facts:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel pull out the complaint for the reason
that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal
of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. Years after,
Vircel filed again a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He
countered that paternity was not proven and his alleged son is not entitled for his support.

Issue:

Is the minor barred from action for support?

Held:

No. The Court held that existence of lack of any filial relationship between parties was
not a matter which the parties must decide by themselves but should be decided by the Court
itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown
between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declared
by the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. The mere agreement of
both parties does not constitute non-filiation. Thus, the first dismissal of the first case cannot
forbid the filing of another action asking for the same relief. Furthermore, the defense of res
judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver. The court dismissed the petition and ordered Manuel De Asis to give
support over his son.
 Fernandez v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 143256
August 28, 2001

Facts:

Spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia were the registered owners of a
parcel of land located at Dagupan City and a two-storey building constructed thereon covered by
Tax Declaration. Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only
twelve (12) years old as paralytic. According to a certain Romeo Fernandez, the spouses, being
childless due to the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1)
month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the
appellant in this case. Rodolfo was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and
became a dental technician. He also lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.

Eventually, Jose died leaving his wife Generosa, Rodolfo, and an estate consisting of the
aforesaid parcel of land and two-storey building. Rodolfo and Generosa then executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the assets left by Jose. On the same
day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, Rodolfo’s son.
After learning about this transaction, the nephews and nieces of Jose, their father Genaro being a
brother of Jose, filed an action to declare the Extrajudicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale
void ab initio.

The complaint claimed that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated

greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees)
of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or
inheritance, taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of Generosa aggravated
by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake,
simulated grossly inauthentic contracts causing the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly signed by Generosa covering the same property described in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land
titles in their favor. Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of
Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the beginning.

The trial court found that Rodolfo was neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Jose and Generosa, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. The court also
found that the Extrajudicial Partition and the Deed of Absolute Sale were prepared and executed
under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and
void. Rodolfo thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. Rodolfo then filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Is Rodolfo a child by nature of spouses Jose and Generosa and is therefore a legal heir of
Jose?

Ruling:

No, Rodolfo is not a child by nature of spouses Jose and Generosa and is therefore not a
legal heir of Jose. Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the
enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate
child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as
legitimate, constant attendance to the child’s support and education, and giving the child the
reputation of being a child of his parents. Although Rodolfo claims that he enjoyed and
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they
died, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.

Further, Rodolfo presented a Baptismal Certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St.
John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate
child. Such certificate stated that Rodolfo is a child of Jose and Generosa, having been born on
November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934. However, while Baptismal Certificates
may be considered public documents, they are pieces of evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.

It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in the case at hand, the authenticity of the
Baptismal Certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist
Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting
that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. Also, the family
portrait offered in evidence did not establish a sufficient proof of filiation, as pictures do not
constitute proof of such. In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire evidentiary
weight to prove his filiation. Consequently, the Extrajudicial Partition dated August 31, 1989
executed by Rodolfo and Generosa is null and void insofar as the former is concerned pursuant
to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code which states that “a partition which includes a person
believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.”
 Legitimate Children: Presumption of Legitimacy

Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169
January 28, 2015

Facts:

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in
their estate are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title and of the Registries
of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTCa civil case for mandatory
injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The alleged that petitioner is the
only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the
subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have
stolen the same.respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity
and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that
since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the
conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and
sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but
entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

Petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To
prove filiation, he presented the following documents:

1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;

2. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS)Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;

3. His Individual Income Tax Return

4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employmentindicating that petitioner is his

son;

5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan, where it is declared that the

Aguilar spouses are his parents; and Letter of the BMMC Secretary introducing
petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
 Respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher; that she does not know
petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is
not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner. Respondent likewise offered the testimony
of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera) that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar;
that she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo"
whose nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses.

Ruling of the RTC, is that no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is
either a biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of
live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the
deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of
Candelaria S. Aguilars he expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue
and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is concrete proof that plaintiff herein was
never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria Aguilar.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals, in the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that
he has a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. "Student record or other writing not
signed by alleged father do not constitute evidence of filiation. That a baptismal certificate, a
private document is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income
tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount that the Highest
Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not
competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.

Issue:

Whether or not SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code (3) in conjunction with Section 19 and Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
 In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

It must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths –
has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. Pursuant to Art. 54.
"Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate."
 Action to impugn legitimacy: Grounds

Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123450
August 31, 2005
Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts:

Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
During their marriage, Jose Gerardo was conceived and born. Subsequently, Gerardo filed a
petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that Theresa has been
previously married to Mario Gopiao. The second marriage was contracted without the first
marriage being annulled or declared void. While Theresa did not deny her first marriage, she
claims that her marriage with Gopiao was a fake one. The trial court nonetheless ruled that
Theresa’s marriage with Mario is a valid marriage. Thus, the marriage between Theresa and
Gerardo was annulled and Jose Gerardo was declared as an illegitimate child. His custody was
awarded to his mother while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa raised the issue to the
Court of Appeals which rendered the decision finding Jose Gerardo not the son of Ma. Theresa
with Gerardo but with Mario as he was conceived and born during the subsistence of the valid
marriage of Theresa and Mario. Gerardo filed a motion to impugn the legitimacy of Jose
Gerardo.

Issue:

Is the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of
Mario instead of Gerardo?

Ruling:

Yes. Provided under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is considered to be a legitimate child of the spouses of
such valid marriage. In the present case, the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
declared to be void ab initio since the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was valid and
subsisting when they contracted such second marriage. Jose Gerardo was conceived during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage; thus, the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate
child of Theresa and Mario. Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo because such
right is strictly personal to Mario, being the legitimate husband of Theresa. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. According to Article 167 of
the Family Code, “it is the right of a child to be presumed legitimate even if his mother declared
against his legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”. Therefore, the Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring Jose Gerardo as the legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.
 Angeles v. Maglaya
G.R. No. 153798
September 2, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made
the administratrix of Franciscos estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being
the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving
spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his
estate.

Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf. Respondent also offered in
evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon
the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question “Legitimate?”.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.

Ruling:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents
and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. For, save for respondents
gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the
decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. In all, no evidence whatsoever
was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract;
when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the
persons present, and like significant details.

Petitioner, however, contends, that [respondents] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes

that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married. The Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted.
Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who
certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record
of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the
fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth
certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition,
must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Also
respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her
student and government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is
her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or
the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.
 Jao v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49162
July28, 1987

Padilla, J.:

Facts:

Janice Marie Jao, represented by her mother, Arlene Salgado filed a case for recognition
and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico
Jao. Perico denied paternity so, upon the order of the trial court, the parties agreed to a blood
grouping test conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The tests showed that
Janice Marie could not have been the possible offspring of Arlene and Perico. The trial court
initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s)
second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was
declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support. Perico appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Is the result of the blood grouping test admissible and conclusive of non-paternity?

Held:

Yes. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are
conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the
blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are
crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
 Babiera v. Catotal

G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

Facts:

Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
TeofistaBabiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted
that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and HermogenaCariosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw
with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their
house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries. The natural
father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent TeofistaBarbiera's birth certificate is
void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically
impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a)
HermogenaCariosaBabiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the
year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and
simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who
inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after
publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring the certificate of birth of
respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent
local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City.

Issue:

Does the respondent have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal?

Ruling:

Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of
respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former. Moreover, a close reading ofArticle 171 of the Family Code shows that it
applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. Verily, the present action
does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there
is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify
the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of
respondents parents.
 Action to impugn legitimacy: Who may file and within what period, Art. 170-171, FC

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao

G.R. No. 138961
March 7, 2002

Facts:

On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filedan action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita
Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.

The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.

The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams’s untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children
from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

Ruling:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an
insult to his memory.

It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled
that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate
of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,
the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed
to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon
Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the
initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through
his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.
 De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon
G.R. No. 142877
October 2, 2001

Facts:

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement
that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting"
of the Dizon estate.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does
not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in
Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
Juan G. Dizon.

Ruling:

The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only
the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
 The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an
action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B.
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
 Action to claim legitimacy: Proof of Legitimacy, Art. 172, FC

Geronimo vs. Santos

G.R. No. 197099
September 28, 2015

Facts:

Karen Santos, claims that she is the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against
the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged
that with the death of her parents the parcel of land belonging to her parents was passed on to her
by the law on intestacy.

Defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took
in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.

Issue:

Whether or not proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,
should only be raised in a direct and separate action

Ruling:

Yes. Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only
be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. When the
period expires, as provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no
longer be brought. The husband is the only one who can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Although there are exceptions where the can contest the legitimacy.

In the case at bar, the filiation of a child is not an issue. The heirs do not Karen is not the
legitimate child deceased Rufino and his wife Caridad. The claim is that Karen is not the child of
the deceased spouses. Thus, the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary
evidence of respondent even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove one's
filiation.
 Action to claim legitimacy: Who may file and when to file, Art. 173, FC

Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenido A. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001

Facts:

Petitioners are husband and wife who have 6 children, the youngest of them is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. Edgardo was born on April 27, 1989. Bienvenida served as a laundry woman of
private respondent, Angelita Diamante. In August 1989, Angelita fetched Bienvenida to do some
laundry. However, the latter was on her way to the market so she asked Angelita to look after her
baby, who was then four months old, until she returns. Angelita would oftentimes look after the
baby while Bienvenida is doing laundry. When she returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr. were gone. She went to Angelita’s house hoping that the two were there but they
were nowhere to be found. After three days, she found out that Angelita had moved to another
place. She told the punong barangay and the police about her sentiments.

Four years later, Bienvenida saw in a tabloid that Angelita’s common-law partner passed
away. She immediately went to Hagonoy, Bulacan where the remains were in state. She was
hoping that she would see there her son. Indeed, her son was there but now with a different
name, John Thomas Lopez. She tried to take her son back but Angelita refused.

The spouses, then, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. Their petition was supported by two witnesses: Lourdes Vasquez, who testified
Bienvenida’s clinical records during her delivery and Benjamin Lopez, brother of the deceased
common-law partner of Angelita saying that his brother could not possibly father John Thomas
because the former was sterile.

Because of the circumstances and the strong resemblance between Bienvenida and John
Thomas, the trial court granted the petition. Said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Is the petition for the writ of habeas corpus a proper remedy for the parents to regain
custody of their child?

Ruling:

Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his
own free will. In custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint
of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed
too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person. It was duly proven, through
competent, that indeed, John Thomas and Edgardo Jr. are one and the same. Aside from the
resemblance between Bienvenida and the child, other evidence were also adduced. First is the
testimony of Angelita that she undergone the process of ligation after giving birth to her second
child. Second, the sterility of Tomas Lopez and his admission to Benjamin Lopez that John
Thomas was adopted. Third, the unusual filing of the birth certificate of the child which was
done by Tomas instead of the midwife which was done four months after the child’s birth.
Fourth is the strong similarities of Bienvenida and the child in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Fifth is the testimony of Lourdes Vasquez, the midwife who assisted Bienvenida in
giving birth to the child. Considering all these, the Court ruled that the child is indeed the son of
petitioner. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of their child.
 Illegitimate Children: Kinds of Recognition

Cabatania v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124814
October 21, 2004

Facts:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. During the trial,
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9,
1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her
in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on
January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexu. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife
sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her towhere he rented a house for her. On
September 9, 1982,, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner
Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return
to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for
another job. According to petitioner, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told
him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application of article 283 of the civil code
on the compulsory recognition and award of support in favor of respondent-appellee Camelo
Regodos.
Ruling:

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition. We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and
the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the
rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy. The petition is hereby granted.

Eceta v. Eceta
G.R. No. 157037
May 20, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926.
During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several
properties, among which is the disputed property.Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired
Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were
his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a
casefor “Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her
father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and coowner of the Cubao property. Rosalina
alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.
Issue:

a. Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is
competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter"
of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

b. Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her granddaughter is

enough to prove respondent’s filiation with Vicente Eceta, the only son of petitioner.

Ruling:

Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one
for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by
Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed
and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s
granddaughter.

Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The Court find no necessity to discuss the other
issues submitted.
 Compulsory Recognition

Rivero v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141273
May 17, 2005

Facts:

On 27 July 1995, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. died intestate.On August 27, 1996, Benedick
Arevalo, represented by his mother Shirley Arevalo, filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy
Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao for “compulsory recognition as
the illegitimate child of their father, and for the administration and partition of his estate as he
had.” The complaint alleged that Shirley Arevalo had an amorous relationship with Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr., and that Benedick Arevalo is the latter’s son.

Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman and Bendick Arevalo, assisted by their respective

counsels, submitted to the court a Compromise Agreement. The said agreement states that
Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman recognizes Benedick Arevalo as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. and that in behalf of herself and of her brothers, she agrees
and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the
estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.

The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, file a petition for
the cancellation of the compromise agreement. They claim that they did not authorize their sister
Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement for and in their behalf. The Dy Chiao brothers,
likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the administrator of their parents estate. On
May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was served on
Benedick, several lots in the name of Benito, Sr. had already been sold by Benedick at public
auction. The vendees are petitioners JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO.

Issue:

Whether or not the recogition of Benedick as the illegitimate child of Benito Sr. and the
subsequent sale of the lots is valid.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the recognition of Benedick as the illegitimate child of
Benito Sr. and the subsequent sale of the lots is invalid.

According to the court, “A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal

concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Like any other contract, it
must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a)
consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public
policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party.”

The compromise agreement between Mary Jane and Benedick recognizing the latter as
the illegitimate child of Benito Sr., is ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must be
made personally by the presumed parent, and not by any brother, sister or relative.
 People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894
October 3, 1996

Facts:

The complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed in
thefollowing manner: That on or about the 28th day of June, 1992, in the City of Laoag,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moreno
Bayani, by means of force and intimidation with the point of a gun, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against
her will. The accused not only admitted having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the
28th day of June 1992; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his mistress and that
the further acts of sexual intercourse after the said date were with her consent. As to the
complainant's motive to falsely testify against him, the accused claimed that she harbored hatred
against him because he did not stand up for her pregnancy and that she lost a boyfriend;
moreover, the accused was not able to give the amount of P5,000,00 in December 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be made to support his illegitimate child with the
complainant

Ruling:

The Court addresses the Solicitor General's recommendation that the accused should be
made to support his illegitimate child with the complainant, in conformity with Article 345(3) of
the Revised Penal Code. While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be
ordered in the absence of evidence, in this instance, however, before both the trial court and this
Court, the accused expressly admitted paternity of the complainant's child thus giving rise to the
obligation to provide support, i.e., "But this ploy of hers boomeranged because she not only lost
her boyfriend but also Bayani who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love, if she
would not see anymore her boyfriend." With this judicial admission twice recited, the accused
has indisputably admitted his paternity of the complainant's child. Article 176 of the Family
Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides
for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further
need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married
which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim
and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be
ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena Nieto, but in
light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by the
trial court only after due notice and hearing.
 People v. Manahan
G.R. No. 128157
September 29, 1999

Facts:

Teresita Tibigar, 16 y/o was a stay-in waitress at Espiritu Canteen. Teresita was raped by
Manuel Manahan, brother-in-law of the owner, who was temporarily residing in the same
canteen. Within the same month the raped occurred, Teresita returned to Pangasinan and
thereafter became pregnant. When her parents discovered it and learned of her story, they
brought her to the hospital where she was examined and proceeded to the police to give her
statement. With the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing
Manuel of rape. Teresita gave birth to Melanie Tibigar. Court found Manuel guilty and sentenced
him to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim 50k as moral damages, pay the costs,
and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Case went to SC on automatic
review.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court committed error in acknowledging Melanie as a child of

Manuel and ordering him to support the offspring of his indiscretion.

Ruling:

The matter of acknowledgement and support for the child, a correction of the view of the
court a quo is in order. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides the persons guilty of rape
also be sentenced to “acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so”, and “in every case to support the offspring”. In the case at bar, compulsory
acknowledgement of the child Melanie Tigibar is not proper there being a legal impedimemt in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronpunced by this Court in People
v. Guerrero, “the rule is that the accuse is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate”.
Consequently, that portion of the judgement under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

The portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a married man, to
acknowledge the child Melanie Tigibar is DELETED being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
 Proof of Illegitimacy

Alberto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86639
June 2, 1994

Facts:

A child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to a certain Aurora Reniva
with Juan Alberto as the alleged father. Ma. Theresa used "Alberto" as her surname. Eventually,
Juan Alberto died intestate. Yolanda Alberto, his widow, then filed a petition for the
administration of Juan’s estate. She was appointed as the administratrix of the estate after the
publication of notices. Later, Ma. Theresa filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and
to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have the status of a natural child and
for her to be entitled to a share in Juan’s estate. The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision.

Issue:

May the estate and heirs of Juan Alberto be ordered to recognize Ma. Theresa as Juan’s
natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her claim that
she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?

Held:

Yes, for the following had been established in the probate court: 1) that before Juan’s
marriage to Yolanda, he and Aurora, Ma. Theresa’s mother, were sweethearts; 2) that Aurora
conceived and gave birth to Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953; 3) that Ma. Theresa
used the surname, “Alberto”, in all her school records and Juan was known to be her father; 4)
that through Fr. Arcilla, Juan’s first cousin, money was given to Aurora; 5) that when Ma.
Theresa was about nine years old, Aurita Solidum, Juan’s youngest sister, arranged the first
meeting between Ma. Theresa and Juan at the MOPC and during said meeting, they talked about
petitioner, and Juan gave her P500.00 and two telephone numbers; 6) that Juan would have
visited Ma. Theresa on her birthday at her school, International School, if it weren’t for his
unfortunate death on September 18, 1967; 7) that when Ma. Theresa and Aurora went to the
PGH on the occasion of Juan’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to
make way for her as she was Juan’s daughter; 8) that after Juan’s wake, his stepmother,
Saturnina Alberto introduced Ma. Theresa to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister; 9) that Juan’s
siblings regarded Ma. Theresa as their niece and introduced her to their children as Juan’s eldest
daughter; 10) that the children of Juan’s siblings considered her as their cousin; 11) that Ma.
Theresa was known by Juan’s friends as his daughter; 12) that Juan showed Jose Tablizo the
grades of Ma. Theresa and told him that such grades were those of his daughter. Considering all
these, the Supreme Court held that Ma. Theresa had been in continuous possession of the status
of a natural child of Juan, pursuant to Article 283 of the Civil Code.
 Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Arhbencel Ann Lopez
G.R. No.181258
March 18, 2010

Facts:

Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She

therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth
certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do
so. Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month.

Issue:

Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.

Ruling:

No.Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such
is to be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the
adduced evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement
whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.

Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note
cannot be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not
even notarized. Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
 Cruz v. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422
August 7, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. On 18 June
1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land. Sometime in the year 1930,
Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners learned that
private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred
its title to their names.

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them
and private responfor Annulment of Title and Damages was filed by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer,
they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents.

To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa,Anselmo,and the late Socorrowere presented. In the case of Mercedes who
was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to
1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

The trial court rendered a judgment dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to
prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth
certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioner’s inaction for a long period
of time amounts to laches. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to
recover their share of the subject property because of laches.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Ruling:

The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

In the present case, the were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable
documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification. Issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and
1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of
Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to
prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child.

In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof
to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal. The
foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
 Perla v. Baring
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively
respondents), filed for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and
Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation,
Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he
abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio
be ordered to support Randy.

Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy.
Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his
commonlaw wife nor was she treated as such.

On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy. She presented Randy’s Certificate
of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child.
Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. Next to
take the witness stand was Randy who at that time was just 15 years old. Randy claimed that he
knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his father. When Randy asked him for
support, Antonio promised that he would support him.

The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio
himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy
testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals is
that the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy.

Ruling:

Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate
filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal
certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and
nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature.

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."

"To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child
as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously."

Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good
proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of
the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity.

Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support
him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To
emphasize, "the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
ground to exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other
acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
 Probative value of DNA tests in paternity cases

Tijing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001

Facts:

Petitioners are husband and wife who have 6 children, the youngest of them is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. Edgardo was born on April 27, 1989. Bienvenida served as a laundry woman of
private respondent, Angelita Diamante. In August 1989, Angelita fetched Bienvenida to do some
laundry. However, the latter was on her way to the market so she asked Angelita to look after her
baby, who was then four months old, until she returns. Angelita would oftentimes look after the
baby while Bienvenida is doing laundry. When she returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr. were gone. She went to Angelita’s house hoping that the two were there but they
were nowhere to be found. After three days, she found out that Angelita had moved to another
place. She told the punong barangay and the police about her sentiments.

Four years later, Bienvenida saw in a tabloid that Angelita’s common-law partner passed
away. She immediately went to Hagonoy, Bulacan where the remains were in state. She was
hoping that she would see there her son. Indeed, her son was there but now with a different
name, John Thomas Lopez. She tried to take her son back but Angelita refused.

The spouses, then, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. Their petition was supported by two witnesses: Lourdes Vasquez, who testified
Bienvenida’s clinical records during her delivery and Benjamin Lopez, brother of the deceased
common-law partner of Angelita saying that his brother could not possibly father John Thomas
because the former was sterile.

Because of the circumstances and the strong resemblance between Bienvenida and John
Thomas, the trial court granted the petition. Said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
 Is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of petitioners?

Held:

Yes. Aside from the physical and factual evidence presented, parentage will still be
resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary
in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
 Agustin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 162571
June 15, 2005

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered
into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite
Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The
baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-
natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite
his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg.
This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia
and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
thus this petition.

Issue:

Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support withoutviolating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
 No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, it said: “In no
uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.”

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
 Herrera vs. Alba
G.R. No. 148220
June 15, 2005

Facts:

Respondent Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner
filed his answer where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Respondent, then
filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D., wherein
she described the process for DNA paternity testing ans asserted that the test had an accuracy
rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability.

Issue:

Can the results of a DNA Analysis be considered as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation?

Ruling:

Yes, subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.The Court
stated in the case of Vallejo that “in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.”

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father
does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted
in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine
population database, is required to compute for W.
 People of the Philippines v. Gerrico Vallejo
G.R. No. 144656
May 9, 2002

Facts:

On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in
an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment.
At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to
Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next
morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and
thereafter strangled to death. In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to
question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some
neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of
July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared.
Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing. The person who processed the
clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal,
he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA
testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar
to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab
from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn
statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement
was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible
because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence
contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic
substance found in Persons and Family Relation 422 a person’s cells which contains his or her
genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.When
a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body
for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with
the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to
ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
 Estate of Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007

Facts:

Joanne Rodjin Diaz filed a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz against Rogelio G.
Ong before the (RTC) of Tarlac City. From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio
cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
Joanne Rodjin Diaz was born. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky,
and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. CA
directed the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of
the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the
illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she
reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The
Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot
be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."

Issue:

Can DNA analysis still be done despite the death of Rogelio?

Ruling:

Yes. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample
obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA
profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. The death of Rogelio does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. The new rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by
using biological samples such as organic material originating from the person's body like blood,
saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, and even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to
DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to.
 Jesse Lucas v. Jesus Lucas
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011

Facts:

The petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The petitioner,
relying on his mother’s admission that she and respondent had intimate relationship resulting to
petitioner’s birth, avers that the respondent is his illegitimate father. The petitioner also claims
that the respondent extended support to him and his mother for two years from his birth until his
mother refused to accept any more support in lieu of her separation with the respondent. The
RTC initially dismissed the decision for failure to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child. The RTC found that a prima facie case was not established because
petitioner’s mother did not declare that she had sexual intercourse with the respondent, that
petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him was mere hearsay and that although the
petitioner used the respondent’s surname, there was no allegation that he was treated as a child
by the respondent or the latter’s family. The RTC however reversed its initial decision upon
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration finding that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance and that deciding based on the petitioner’s ground for filing the petition was premature
considering that there was no trial yet. The Court of Appeals however reversed the RTC’s second
decision mainly because the petitioner failed to comply with the four procedural aspects of
traditional paternity especially the establishment of a prima facie case warranting the need for
DNA testing.

Issue:

Is a prima facie case necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?

Held:

Yes. In Herrera v. Alba, establishment of the four procedural aspects of traditional

paternity comes after the parties’ presentation of their respective pieces of evidence during trial.
The establishment of a prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence during a trial and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Moreover, the court order for blood testing is
considered a search and thus there is a need first to establish probable cause for the order to be
valid. The petitioner must first present prima facie evidence or establish the reasonable
possibility of paternity. This is also for the protection of putative parents from harassment and
extortion from opportunists.Nonetheless, the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court so that when there is already preponderance of evidence establishing
paternity, it may rule that a DNA testing is no longer necessary.
 Who may file and when to file action for compulsory recognition, Art. 175, FC

Guy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006

Facts:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represemted by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before
the RTC of Makati City. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei,w ho died intestate on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties.

Issue:

Are the private respondents barred by prescription from proving their filiation?

Ruling:

No. Under the family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action
for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
 Marquino v Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72078
June 27, 1994

Facts:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of

Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly
of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of
an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate
children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana,
allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel
recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be
continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issue:

Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the
heirs

Ruling:

The Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never
be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in
an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
 Tayag vs Tayag-Gallor
G.R. No. 174680
March 24, 2008

Facts:

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties
both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10
October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised
to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00 each as a share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. In a Motion dated 31
August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer
certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that
respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There
being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the courts time,
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

Issue:

Whether respondents petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently

states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter.

Held:

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag the Court defined
an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and
direct, not merely indirect or contingent. Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or
worse, can no longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested
party. Here lies the complication in the case which the appellate court had not discussed,
although its disposition of the case is correct. Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters
of administration is a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of
respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights
as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition. Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth
appearing in the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by
his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that
the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent. Judicial or
compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his
parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
 Rights of Illegitimate Children

Grande v. Antonio
G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period
of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by
respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval
of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/
Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

Issue:

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the
application of Art. 176 of the Family Code

Ruling:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
 Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non- filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child
shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or
her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children.
But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.
 Jenie San Juan dela Cruz v. Ronald Paul S. Gracia
G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009

Facts:

In 2005, the 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz and then 19-year old
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. Jenie gave birth to her co-petitioner minor
child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino.

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs
Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father[3] (AUSF) which she
had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father
Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY
which Dominique, during his lifetime. However , the applicaction was denied due to insufficient
evidence submitted by Jenie. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the
author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.

Issue:

Can the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian be
considered as a recognition of paternity?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Also the provision does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in
the private handwritten instrument.
 The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of
a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2)Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
 Briones v. Miguel
G.R. No.156343
October 18, 2004

Facts:

Joey Briones, petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
Miguel and Francisca Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child, Michael Kevin Pineda.
Afterwards, Joey filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta Miguel, the mother of the minor,
as one of the respondents. Consequently, a Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by the Court of
Appeals, ordering the respondents to produce before such Court the living body of Michael on
March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Joey alleged that Michael is his illegitimate son with Loreta. Additionally, he claimed
that he caused Michael to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and
send him to school. Joey also stated that his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child. One day, Maricel and Francisca came to Joey’s
house on the pretext that they were visiting Michael and requested that they be allowed to bring
the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised Joey that they will bring
Michael back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, Maricel and Francisca
did not fulfill their promise and did not bring Michael back. Joey went several times to Maricel
at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that Michael is with his mother at Batal Heights,
Santiago City. When he went there, Francisca told him that Michael is with her daughter at
Tuguegarao City.

He later on sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to
locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile. Hence, he was
constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Joey was praying that the custody of his son
Michael be given to him as his biological father and as he has demonstrated his capability to
support and educate him.

Loreta, on the other hand, denied the allegation of Joey that he was the one who brought
their child to the Philippines and stated that she, instead, was the one who brought him here
pursuant to their agreement. She likewise denied Joey’s allegation that respondents Maricel and
Francisca were the ones who took the child from petitioner. She averred that she was the one
who took Michael from petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily
agreed and consented. Further, Loreta stated that the custody of Michael was entrusted to Joey’s
parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of the
child was given to the petitioner’s parents, she has already been living separately from the
petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another
woman until his deportation. Loreta then also prayed that the custody of her minor child be given
to her and invoked Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

Issue:

Is Loreta entitled to have custody of Michael?

Held:

Yes, Loreta is entitled to have custody of Michael. Having been born outside a valid
marriage, Michael is deemed an illegitimate child of Joey and Loreta. Article 176 of the Family
Code clearly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.”
This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Additionally, under the same
provision, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any
distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of natural child is important only for
purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both parties acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained
and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Loreta, regardless
of his father’s recognition of him.

Further, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the recognition of an
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not
custody of, the child. The law explicitly grants to the mother sole parental authority over an
illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority
over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a
case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over Michael, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it
except in the cases authorized by law.
 Republic v. Abadilla
G.R. No. 133054
January 28, 1999

Facts:

Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname ―Abadillaǁ and the name of their father was entered as ―Hersonǁ Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor
children, Emerson and Rafael, filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates. The petition
was granted. The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office
of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it
allowed the deletion of the ―date and place of marriage of parentsǁ from the birth certificates of
minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors
‘surname from ―Abadilla to ―Celestino.

Issue:

Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.

Ruling:

Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.
 Verceles vs. Posada
G.R. No. 159785
April 27, 2007

Facts:

The petitioner is the mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes who offered the respondent to work
in his office. The respondent accepted said offer and started working in the mayor’s office.
During a seminar, the petitioner fetched the respondent at the venue of the convention attended
by the latter. He offered her a dinner to which the latter conceded when she was informed that
the dinner will be with some of the other employees who attended the seminar. However, when
the respondent arrived at the place where the dinner was set, her officemates where nowhere to
be found and it was only the petitioner who was at the venue. The petitioner thus started to
performed lascivious acts causing Clarissa to be troubled but she kept that incident to herself.
Subsequently, while the respondent was in one of the hotel rooms in the place where the
respondent was supposed to do work-related activities, the petitioner embraced her and offered
her a higher position as municipal development coordinator. She thus succumbed to his advances
and accepted the offer of the higher position. Thereafter, she became pregnant and gave birth to
their illegitimate child, Verna Aiza Posadas. The petitioner however failed to continuously
provide support for the respondent and her child prompting the latter to file a complaint for
damages with support pendente lite. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent
ordering the petitioner to pay monthly support to the respondent and their child with damages.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that he was not supposed to provide for
the support of the child because said child was illegitimate and he was not sure of that he was
actually the father but the appellate court only affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modifications on the damages awarded.

Issue:

Are illegitimate children entitled to support and such other rights granted to legitimate
children?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court found that Verna Aiza Posadas was the illegitimate child of the
petitioner as proved by evidence presented by the respondent. Illegitimate children are conferred
rights that somehow come at par with those of legitimate children. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and with the same evidence as those of the
legitimate children. In the present case, the respondent relied on Article 172 of the Family Code,
which provides the limitation as to when the the right to establish filiation be raised which is
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Under Republic Act No. 9225, "Illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child”.
This amendment broadens the rights of an illegitimate child; it provides rights similarly equal to
those of a legitimate child so long as the illegitimate party could prove such. Therefore, as the
respondent has proved the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada with petitioner and the petitioner failed
to rebut such, their child was granted the ability to exercise her rights as an illegitimate child.
Verna is therefore entitled to support from his father.
 People v Glabo
G.R. No. 129248
December 7, 2001

Facts:

One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and
her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away
from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where
she was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie
down. He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made
push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She
shouted for help, but there were no neighbors nearby. Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith
had to run back to the house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3
feet above the ground. While underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor
above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder
sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he
stood up and raised his briefs.

The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However,
the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was
her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila
to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.

Ruling:

Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the child‘s status.ǁ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.
 Tonog v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002

Facts:

Gardin Faith Tonog is the illegitimate child of Dinah Tonog and Edgar Daguimol. One
year after giving birth to Gardin, Dinah went to the United States to work as a nurse. Gardin
Faith was left to the care of her father and her paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992,
private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and on March 9, 1992, the
trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor,
Gardin Faith. On October 4, 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin
Faith to her. The trial court granted her petition. The private respondent, Edgar, filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari questioning the actuations of the trial court. The
CA originally affirmed the decision of the trial court, however, it modified its decision upon
reviewing the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private respondent, thus granting him
physical custody of Gardin Faith.

Issue:

Did the CA err in allowing the father to have temporary custody of Gardin Faith?

Held:

No. In cases of custody of illegitimate children, the welfare of the child must be given the
utmost consideration. The general rule, as provided by law, is that if the child is below seven
years old, he or she should be put in the custody of the mother unless there are compelling
reasons to order otherwise. This is because the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian
of her children. Bearing in mind that the welfare of Gardin Faith, a minor, as the controlling
factor, the Supreme Court finds that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father, Edgar,
to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
 Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111455
December 23, 1998

Facts:

On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, gave birth to a baby
boy. The presumed father, one EleazarSiribanCalasan, lawyer, married, signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child's name as Jonathan
MossesgeldCalasan. Both the presumed father and the mother, accomplished a statement that the
information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, Calasan executed an affidavit
admitting paternity of the child.

Due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the presumed father's
surname as the child's surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner himself submitted the
certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration.

On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge,

rejected the registration on the basis that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their
mother.

On October 9, 1990, Eleazar S. Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the
Civil Registrar General denying registration of the certificate of live birth of petitioner's
illegitimate child using the father's surname, for it is contrary to law.

On November 7, 1990, Eleazar S. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition
for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his
alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The said petition was denied by the Regional Trial
Court.

On November 21, 1991, petitioner Calasan filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, on December 9, 1991, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit
amended petition, substituting the child's mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The
lower court granted the motion for leave to amend petition. However, on June 3, 1992, the lower
court denied the motion for reconsideration.On July 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision affirming the judgment appealed from.

Issue:
 Will mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live
birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the latter admitted
paternity.

Ruling:

Art. 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that "illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner's illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latter's consent.

The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate,thereby
eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction.
Consequently, we rule that mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register
the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father's surname, even with the
consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by
law.
 Silva v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114742
July 17, 1997

Facts:

Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and
Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends.
The legal conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation
rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights
to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no
case should Silva take the children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an
appeal from the RTC‘s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten
married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC.
The CA, stated that as alleged by Suzanne, Silva‘s womanizing would have a negative influence
on the children.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.

2. Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.

Ruling:

The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon
City RTC‘s decision favoring Silva‘s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne‘s written
permission. The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his
illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. The Court clarified: ―Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither
the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to
the well-being of the child. The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate
child (Art. 176 of the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate
children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their
right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his
visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise
of her parental authority from immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to
visitation and the duty to pay child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father
of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there will be
no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking the court to
settle the terms and conditions.
 David v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David was the secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children. The relationship between Daisie and Ramon developed into an intimate one which bore
them a son, Christopher J. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely
Christine, and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when
Daisie introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought
by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of
1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Daisie filed a
petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

Issue:

Is Daisie entitled to the custody of the child?

Ruling:

Yes. Under rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides, "The writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." Tthe Court of Appeals observed that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. The court cited their decision in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, that the writ of habeas
corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even
though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will. In the case, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child
since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married
to another woman other than the child's mother. Under Article 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that private
respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact
that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. Under Article 204
of the Family Code, “A person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless” in the case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case
was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child.
 Legitimated Children: Rights of Legitimated Children

De Santos vs. Angeles

G.R. No. 105619
December 12, 1995

Facts:

Dr. Antonio de Santos got married to Sofia Bona. Their marriage resulted to daughter
named Maria Rosario de Santos. However, their relationship did not last long. Antonio fell in
love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag. Antonio obtained a divorce decree from Nevada.

Antonio married Conchita in Tokyo, Japan. Their marriage produced eleven children. Later,
Sofia died and a month later Antonio and Conchita marriage in Tagaytay City. Subsequently,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties.

Conchita went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in
connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that
the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and Maria Rosario. However, the latter claims that Conchita’s children with her father
were illegitimate.

Issue:

Whether or not Maria has the same rights with his half brothers and sisters?

Ruling:

No. There are three rights that can be enjoyed by children, depending on their filiation: use of
surname, succession, and support.

Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. Thus, they "shall principally
use the surname of the father, and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants
and descendants, as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both
parents, and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation." These rights as
effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced.

It is thus improper to conclude, that Maria's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being
legitimized because they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that
they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269. As a rule only natural children may
be legitimated.

Article 269 of the Civil Code provides that a child can only be considered a natural child if the
parents are not disqualified to marry each other at the time of his conception. In the case at bar,
all the children born to Conchita and Antonio were conceived and born while Antonio’s marriage
to Sofia was subsisting. The divorce obtained cannot qualify in the Philippine laws because we
do not recognize the same.
 Abadilla v. Tabiliran
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716
October 25, 1995

Facts:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the
charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children
with Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he
knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years
had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence
the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the
record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.

Issue:

Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Ruling:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.
 Adopted Children: Who may adopt

Republic v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100835
October 26, 1993

Facts:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married
Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the
petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. On 29 November
1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.

Issue:

Can the spouses adopt the minors?

Ruling:

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91,
Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt
when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now
expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When
one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife
jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall
be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
 Republic v. Toledano
G.R. No. 94147
June 8, 1994

Facts:

Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from
November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care
and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and
educate her son. The RTC granted the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.

Ruling:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The
Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209
expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not
included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
intercountry adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the
other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She
was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must
jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 18.
 Republic v. Alarcon Vergara
G.R. No. 95551
March 20, 1997

Facts:

Samuel R. Dye, Jr., an American citizen, resides at the Clark Air Base. His wife Rosalina
is a former Filipino who later became a naturalized American. They have two children.On June
25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition to adopt the
latter’s younger siblings, Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively.

The RTC granted the petition on its decision dated September 10, 1990. The Regional
Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only
fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due. The
RTC claimed that that “a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy
behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child” finding that the petitioning
spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient
financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.

Issue:

Whether or not the Dye spouses may adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due.

Ruling:

As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article
184 of the Family Code, except: a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
byconsanguinity; one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; and
one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.Samuel Robert
Dye is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall
under any of the three aforequoted exceptions. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although
he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino
citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American, excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen
seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the
general rule that aliens may not adopt.

On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife. Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; (2)When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.Unfortunately, none of
the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the
latter's child but her brother and sister.
 In Re: Petitions for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93
May 21, 2009

Facts:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as If they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
 Requirements for Adoption

In Re: Petitions for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93
May 21, 2009

Facts:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as If
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle
and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
 Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948
June 27, 2006

Facts:

Diwata Landingin, a citizen of the USA, filed a petition for the adoption of Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos, who were all minors at that time. The
aforementioned minors were the natural children of Manuel Ramos, Diwata’s brother, with
Amelia Ramos. Diwata claimed in her petition that when Manuel died, the children were left to
the custody of their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos, because Amelia, their biological
mother, went to Italy, re-married there, and had two children. Additionally, Amelia had stopped
communicating with the minors or with her in-laws from the time she left up to the initiation of
the adoption. Diwata also alleged that when Maria eventually passed away, the minors were
financially supported by her, her children and relatives abroad.

Diwata went home to the Philippines to spend time with the minors, and that her children
gave their written consent to the minors’ adoption. Also, Diwata’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who
was earning substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in Diwata’s custody. A Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD submitted a Report
recommending the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother, was consulted with
the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption of her children, she voluntarily
consented to such.

The Regional Trial Court granted the adoption. Upon appeal, however, of the OSG to the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the RTC decision on the ground that Diwata failed
to provide evidence of Amelia’s voluntary consent. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of
Diwata’s children could not be admitted in evidence as such was not executed in Guam, USA
and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a consular office, and although Diwata had a
job, she was not stable enough to support the minors.

Issue:
 Should the petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of Amelia, the
minors’ biological mother?

Held:

No. Section 9, Paragraph b of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, provides that consent of the biological parent/s of the child, if known, is
necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

Such general requisite of consent and notice to the natural parents is aimed to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted intrusion by interlopers, and to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Hence, the written consent of the
biological parents is necessary and is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. The
natural right of a parent to his child entails that his consent must be obtained prior to the
termination of his parental rights and duties and re-establishment of such in the adoptive parents.
In the case at hand, Diwata was not able to submit the written consent of Amelia to adopt.

Finally, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform or to do the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely allowing the child to remain undisturbed for a period of
time in the care of others is not to be considered abandonment. To dispense with the requisite of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to already exist at the time of the adoption.
 Cang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105308
September 25, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the
Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned
of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.

Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then
left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places” to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the
petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were “too meager” compared to
theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.”

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished
custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

Issue:
 Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them?

Ruling:

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary. In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
 Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362
July 18, 1997

Facts:

Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.

Issue:

May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social
welfare officer of the court?

Ruling:

No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts
hearing adoption cases: (1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those
cases already filed; (2) To strictly comply with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid
decree.

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall
coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the
preparation and submittal of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and
social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that
respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have
been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was
observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in

jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption,
after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal
terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself
a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in
the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to actaccordingly, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this
Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen,
Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and
Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is reprimanded for
violating Circular No. 12.
 Nature and Effects of Adoption

Republic v. Hernandez
GR No. 117209
February 9, 1996

Facts:

The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to
his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition
for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and
rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform to that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of
the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name,
and since this would involve a substantial change of one‘s legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective
requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly
filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule
2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and
in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there
is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded
as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or
proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption

Ruling:
 Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable
in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103695
March 15, 1996

Facts:

The respondents, Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, filed a petition for
the adoption of Michael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who was then living with Jaime B.
Caranto since he was seven years old. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered that
the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name
which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it required the correction of the
name of the child from Midael to Michael. He contended that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and harmless error, it could not be granted because the petition was
merely for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) then ruled in favor of Caranto spouses, declaring
MICHAEL C. Mazon as the son by adoption of the spouses, and changing his name to
MICHAEL. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

Does RTC have a jurisdiction over the said petition for adoption?

Ruling:

Yes. The RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon
and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. There is an
obvious clerical error in the name of the child wanted to be adopted. The correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters for the letter D, so that what appears as a Midael as given
name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is plainly clerical one.
Changing the name from Midael to Michael cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both
names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. However, as to the process of
the correction of the name of the minor, the proper procedure was not observed. There was no
notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108. While there was
notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in
compliance with Rule 99. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated.
Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also
being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the
opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the decision of the RTC insofar as it ordered the correction of
the name of the minor is void and without force and effect.
 In re Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

Facts:

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994 and her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mother’s
middle name and surname. Now that he is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name,Astorga, be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and
that her surname, Garcia, be changed to Catindig, his surname. On March 23, 2001, the trial
court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption. The decision stated that the minor
child shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

May an illegitimate child use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father?

Ruling:

Yes. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. However, as correctly pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use
the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Therefore, this petition is granted allowing Stephanie is allowed to use her
mother’s surname “Garcia” as her middle name.
 Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965

Facts:

Maria Mortera died in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left
a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence. Among the many legacies and
devises made in the will are the following: 1) P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the
testatrix’s niece named Josefina Mortera; 2) to said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building; 3) the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her
grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses; and 4) Josefina Mortera as her
sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will.

Issues:

1. Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in the proceeding?

2. Does she have any interest in any of the provisions of the will?

Ruling:

1. No. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene
in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, on in the property to
be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate.

2. No. An interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

Ana del Val Chan cannot derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
 Bartolome v. Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531
November 12, 2014

Facts:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an
accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to
the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.

2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives
by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minoradopted child if the adopter passed
away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.
 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at
such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising
from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in
the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

2. Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already
died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
 Geronimo v. Santos
G.R. No. 197099
September 28, 2015

Facts:

In 2001, when plaintiff Karen Santos discovered that Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo
executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the
only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad; adjudicating to themselves the property in question
and they took possession; and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to
their names claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo, filed a
complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants who are
the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting
of one half of the parcel of land and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on
intestacy that lately. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration
of the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.
Defendants disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in
as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. On appeal, petitioner
raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and the offered evidence
of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself.

Issue:

May the secondary evidence be admitted only in a direct action?

Ruling:

No.The Supreme Court cited its decision in Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa
Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, she
then submitted documents such as a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax
returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government Service Insurance System of
the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had
been reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter. By testimonial evidence alone, to the
effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of
Benitez- Badua rebutted all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that
was counted against Benitez- Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to
bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to
her at the age of 36 of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of
birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence
of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of
Benitez, respondent Angelina and her codefendants should have presented evidence of her
adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any
such evidence.
 Rescission of Adoption

Lahom v. Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989
July 14, 2003

Facts:

On May 5, 1972, an order granting the petition for adoption of the respondent by the
petitioner and her husband was granted. The respondent however refused to change his surname
from Sibulo to Lahom despite his adopters’ pleadings. This caused frustration to the petitioner
and her husband so that before the latter died, he manifested his desire to revoke the respondent’s
adoption. Nonetheless, the respondent continued to use Sibulo in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession. His records with the Professional Regulation
Commission also show his use of the surname Sibulo instead of Lahom. Moreover, the
respondent only went home to the petitioner once in a year and did not show care and support
expected of a son to the latter in her ailing condition. The respondent’s only interest with the
petitioner was the alleged rights the former has over the latter’s properties.

The respondent’s show of insensible attitude towards the petitioner causing the latter
wounded feelings prompted the latter to file a petition of rescission of the former’s adoption. The
petition however was filed after Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) took effect. Said act removed
the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption. Moreover, even if the petitioner has acquired the
right to rescind the adoption, such right has already prescribed because the petition was filed
beyond five years from the discovery of the ground for rescission of the adoption. The trial court
thus dismissed the petition.

Issue:

May an adopter, whose right to rescind an adoption was vested by the Civil Code and
Family Code, barred to revoke or rescind an adoption after the effectivity of RA 8552?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court has previously ruled that controversies should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In the case, the petition was filed after RA
8552 took effect. Therefore, RA 8552 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Thus, the petition,
having been initiated after the effectivity of RA 8552, may no long be pursued. Also, there are no
vested rights in statutory privileges so that any right of action given by a statute may be taken
away at any time before it has been exercised. Moreover, even assuming that petitioner still has
the right to rescind the adoption, such right has already prescribed because she filed the petition
beyond the five-year period, allowed by the Rules of Court, from the date of discovery of the
ground of rescission and the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner may still have other
recourse in order to exclude the private respondent from inheriting from the former.