Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order

Benedict Spinoza

Copyright © 2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read
as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not
quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . .
indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. This version
contains some awkward repetitions of the word ‘God’. They could be avoided through the use of pronouns, but
they present us with an unattractive choice. Using ‘he’, ‘him’, ‘his’ etc. of God invites the reader, over and over
again, to think of God as a person; while using ‘it’, ‘itself’ etc. pokes the reader in the ribs, over and over again,
with reminders that God is not a person. The former choice misrepresents Spinoza’s doctrine (his other name for
God is ‘Nature’), while the latter misrepresents his style. Writing in Latin, which lacks the distinction between
personal and impersonal pronouns, he didn’t have this problem.
First launched: July 2004 Last amended: December 2004

Contents
Part I: God 1

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Ethics Benedict Spinoza

Part II: The Nature and Origin of the Mind 23

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
·Physical interlude· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
·Back to the Mind· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Concluding Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Part III: The Origin and Nature of the Affects 50

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Definitions and Postulates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Definitions of the Affects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Part IV: Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects 85

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Definitions and Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Part V: The Power of the Intellect, or Human Freedom 123

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
·Propositions about freedom· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
·Looking beyond this present life· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

Part I: God

Definitions D7: A thing is called ‘free’ if its own nature—with no input

from anything else—•makes it necessary for it to exist and
D1: In calling something ‘cause of itself’ I mean that its •causes it to act as it does. We say that a thing is ‘compelled’
essence involves existence, i.e. that its nature can’t be if something other than itself makes it exist and causes it to
conceived except as existing. act in this or that specific way.
D2: A thing is said to be ‘finite in its own kind’ if it can be D8: By ‘eternity’ I understand: existence itself when con-
limited by something else of the same nature. For example, ceived to follow necessarily from the definition of the eternal
every body counts as ‘finite in its own kind’ because we can thing. A thing is eternal only if it is absolutely (logically)
always conceive another body that is even bigger. And a necessary that the thing exists; for something to be eternal
thought can be limited by—·i.e. can count as finite because it isn’t merely a matter of its existing at all times—it must
of·—another thought ·that somehow exceeds it·. But a body necessarily exist.
can’t be limited by a thought or a thought by a body.
D3: By ‘substance’ I understand: what is in itself and is Axioms
conceived through itself, i.e. that whose concept doesn’t
have to be formed out of the concept of something else. A1: Whatever exists is either in itself or in something else.
·As we have already seen, a substance is in itself, a mode is
D4: By ‘attribute’ I understand: what the intellect perceives in something else·.
of a substance as constituting its essence.
A2: What can’t be conceived through something else must
D5: By ‘mode’ I understand: a state of a substance, i.e. be conceived through itself.
something that exists in and is conceived through something
else. A3: From a given determinate cause the effect follows neces-
sarily; and, conversely, if there is no determinate cause no
D6: By ‘God’ I understand: a thing that is absolutely infinite, effect can follow.
i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each
of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. I say A4: Knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, knowl-
‘absolutely infinite’ in contrast to ‘infinite in its own kind’. edge of its cause.
If something is infinite only in its own kind, there can be
A5: If two things have nothing in common, they can’t be
attributes that it doesn’t have; but if something is absolutely
understood through one another—that is, the concept of one
infinite its essence ·or nature· contains every positive way
doesn’t involve the concept of the other.
in which a thing can exist—·which means that it has all
possible attributes·. A6: A true idea must agree with its object.

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

A7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing then its If there were two or more distinct substances, they
essence doesn’t involve existence. would have to be distinguished from one another by a
difference either •in their attributes or •in their states
(by 4). If they are distinguished only by a difference
Propositions in their attributes, then any given attribute can be
1: A substance is prior in nature to its states. possessed by only one of them. Suppose, then, that
they are distinguished by a difference in their states.
This is evident from D3 and D5.
But a substance is prior in nature to its states (by
2: Two substances having different attributes have noth- 1), so we can set the states aside and consider the
ing in common with one another. substance in itself; and then there is nothing left
This also evident from D3. For each ·substance· must through which one substance can be conceived as
be in itself and be conceived through itself, which is distinguished from another, which by 4 amounts to
to say that the concept of the one doesn’t involve the saying that we don’t have two or more substances
concept of the other. ·with a single attribute·, but only one.

3: If things have nothing in common with one another, 6: One substance can’t be produced by another sub-
one of them can’t be the cause of the other. stance.
In Nature there can’t be two substances that share
If they have nothing in common with one another,
an attribute (by 5), that is (by 2), there can’t be two
then (by A5) they can’t be understood through one
substances that have something in common with each
another, and so (by A4) one can’t be the cause of the
other. Therefore (by 3) one substance can’t be the
other.
cause of another, or be caused by it.
4: Two or more things are made distinct from one an- Corollary: A substance can’t be produced by anything else.
other either by a difference in their attributes or by a In Nature there are only substances and their states
difference in their states. (as is evident from A1, D3, and D5). But a substance
Whatever exists is either •in itself or •in something else can’t be produced by a·nother· substance (by 6).
(by A1), which is to say (by D3 and D5) that outside Therefore, a substance can’t be produced by anything
the intellect there is nothing except •substances and else at all.
•their states. So there is nothing outside the intellect This corollary is demonstrated even more easily from the
through which things can be distinguished from one absurdity of its contradictory. If a substance could be
another except •substances (which is to say (by D4) produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have
their attributes) and •their states. to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by 4). And so (by
D3) it wouldn’t be a substance.
5: In Nature there cannot be two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute.

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. when they are also ignorant of how those traits are produced
A substance can’t be produced by anything else (by in the ·human· mind.
the corollary to 6), so it must be its own cause; and But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they
that, by D1, is to say that its essence necessarily would have no doubt of the truth of 7. Indeed, this propo-
involves existence, i.e. it pertains to its nature to exist. sition would be an axiom for everyone. . . For by ‘substance’
they would understand •what is in itself and is conceived
8: Every substance is necessarily infinite. through itself, i.e. that the knowledge of which doesn’t
[The difficult demonstration of 8 has this at its core: if require the knowledge of anything else; and by ‘quality’ they
x is finite then it is limited by something of the same would understand •what is in something else, something the
kind as itself, i.e. something that shares an attribute concept of which is formed from the concept of the thing in
with it; but no substance shares an attribute with any which it is.
other substance, so no substance can be limited in [Spinoza then has an extremely difficult paragraph, omit-
this way, so every substance is infinite.] ted here. Its premises are that substances exist and are
First note on 7 and 8: Since finiteness is partly negative, conceived through themselves, and that qualities or states
while being infinite is an unqualifiedly ·positive· affirmation exist and are conceived through something else. From these
of the existence of some nature, it follows from 7 alone that Spinoza seems to infer that we can have legitimate thoughts
every substance must be infinite; for in calling a substance of states or qualities that ‘don’t actually exist’, presumably
‘finite’ we partly, because of the negative element in finite- meaning that nothing actually has them, whereas we can’t
ness, deny existence to its nature, and according to 7 that is have the thought of a substance that doesn’t exist ‘outside
absurd. the intellect’.]
Second note on 7 and 8: I’m sure that the proof of 7 will be Hence, if someone said that he had a clear and distinct
found difficult to grasp by people who judge things confus- (i.e. true) idea of a substance, and nevertheless wondered
edly and haven’t been accustomed to understanding things whether such a substance existed, that would amount to
through their first causes. Such people don’t distinguish saying that he had a true idea and wondered whether it was
the qualities of substances from the substances themselves, false. (You’ll see that this is right if you think about it.) Or
and they don’t know how things are produced. This brings it if someone says that a substance has been created, he is
about that they fictitiously ascribe to •substances the ·sort saying that a false idea has become true! Of course nothing
of· beginning that they see •natural things to have; for those more absurd can be conceived. So it must be admitted that
who don’t know the true causes of things confuse everything, the •existence of a substance is an eternal truth, just as its
and have no difficulty supposing that both trees and men •essence is.
speak, that men are formed both from stones and from seed, This lets us infer in another way that a single nature can
and that anything can be changed into anything else! So, be possessed by only one substance—I think the inference is
also, those who confuse the divine nature with human nature worth presenting ·in the remainder of this Note·.
easily ascribe human character-traits to God, particularly

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

Four needed preliminaries to the argument: must be an external cause of its existing. Now since it
1. The true definition of each thing neither involves pertains to the nature of a substance to exist (already shown
nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing in this note), its definition must involve necessary existence,
defined. and so its existence must be inferred from its definition alone.
From which it follows that But, as we have shown in 2 and 3, the existence of a number
2. No definition involves or expresses any certain of substances can’t follow from a definition. So it follows that
number of individuals, there can exist only one substance having a given nature.
since a definition expresses only the nature of the thing
9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more
defined. For example, the definition of triangle expresses
attributes belong to it.
only the simple nature of the triangle, not any particular
This is evident from D4.
number of triangles. It should also be noted that
3. There must be, for each existing thing, a certain 10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived
cause for its existing. through itself.
Finally, it should be noted that An attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning
4. The cause on account of which a thing exists must a substance, as constituting its essence (by D4); so
either •be contained in the very nature and definition (by D3) it must be conceived through itself.
of the existing thing (which means that it pertains to Note on 10: From these propositions it is evident that
the nature of the thing to exist) or •be outside it. although two attributes can be conceived to be really distinct
From these propositions it follows that if in Nature a certain (each conceived without the aid of the other), we still can’t
number of individuals exists, there must be a cause why just infer from that that they constitute—·that is, constitute
those individuals exist and not more or fewer. the natures of, i.e. are possessed by·—two different sub-
For example, if twenty men exist in Nature—and for stances. . . . It is far from absurd to ascribe many attributes
clarity’s sake let’s assume that they are the first men to to one substance. Indeed, nothing in Nature is clearer
exist and that they all exist at the same time—how are we than that each thing must be conceived under some at-
to explain this? To show why there are exactly twenty men, tribute, and the more reality a thing has the more attributes
no more and no fewer, it doesn’t suffice to show the cause of it has—attributes that express necessity, or eternity and
human nature in general. For (by 3) there must be a cause infinity. So it is utterly clear that an absolutely infinite
why each particular man exists. But this cause (by 2 and thing must be defined (as in D6) as a thing that consists of
3) can’t be contained in human nature itself, since the true infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal
definition of man doesn’t involve the number twenty. So and infinite essence. If you want to know how we can tell
(by 4) the cause why these twenty men exist—and thus why when there are many substances, read on: in the following
each of them exists—must lie outside each of them. propositions I shall show that in Nature there exists only one
From that it follows that if something has a nature such substance, which is absolutely infinite. So there is nothing
that there can be many individuals ·of that nature·, there to ‘tell’.

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11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes It would, then, have to be in God’s nature itself. That
each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, would mean that God’s nature involved a contradiction, ·like
necessarily exists. the square circle·. But it is absurd to affirm this of a thing
If God didn’t exist, then (by A7) God’s essence would that is absolutely infinite and supremely perfect. (·That is
not involve existence; and (by 7) that is absurd. There- because •a contradiction must involve something of the form
fore God necessarily exists. ‘P and not-P—a ‘square circle’ would be something that was
A second proof: For each thing there must be assigned ‘square and not square’ because ‘not square is contained
a cause or reason for its existence (if it exists) and for its in the meaning of ‘circle’—and •a thing that is infinite and
nonexistence (if it doesn’t). . . . This reason or cause must be perfect is one whose nature involves nothing negative, so
either contained in, or lie outside of, the nature of the thing. nothing of the contradictory form·.) So there is no cause
For example, the very nature of a square circle indicates the or reason—either in God or outside God—that takes God’s
reason why it doesn’t exist, namely because it involves a existence away. Therefore God necessarily exists.
contradiction; and the very nature of a substance explains A third proof: [slightly expanded from Spinoza’s very compact
why it does exist, because that nature involves existence (see statement of it] To be unable to exist is to lack power, and
7). But the reason why [changing Spinoza’s example] a coin exists, conversely to be able to exist is to have power (this is
or why it doesn’t exist, does not follow from its nature but self-evident). Now, suppose that God doesn’t exist but some
from the order of the whole of the physical world. For from finite things do exist necessarily. In that case, these finite
this ·order· it must follow either that the coin necessarily things are more powerful than an absolutely infinite thing
exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now. (because they can exist and the absolutely infinite thing
These things are self-evident. From them it follows that can’t). But this is self-evidently absurd. So either nothing
a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that exists or an absolutely infinite thing also exists. But we
prevents it from existing. So if there is no reason or cause exist, either in ourselves as substances that necessarily exist
that prevents God from existing or takes God’s existence or as qualities of something else that necessarily exists (see
away, it certainly follows that God necessarily exists. A1 and 7). Therefore an absolutely infinite thing—that is (by
But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to D6) God—necessarily exists.
be either •in God’s very nature or •outside it and in another Note on the third proof of 11: In this last demonstration
substance of a different nature. It couldn’t be in a substance I wanted to show God’s existence a posteriori (·bringing in
of the same nature as God’s, for the supposition that there is the contingent fact that we exist·), so as to make the demon-
such a substance is, itself, the supposition that God exists. stration easier to grasp—but not because God’s existence
So it would have to be a substance of a nature different from doesn’t follow a priori from the same premises. For since
God’s; but such a substance would have nothing in common being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality
with God (by 2) and so could neither give existence to God belongs to the nature of a thing the more powers it has, of
nor take it away. So a reason or cause that takes away God’s itself, to exist. Therefore an absolutely infinite thing (God)
existence couldn’t lie outside the divine nature. has of itself an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

reason, God exists absolutely. Still, there may be many who 12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived
won’t easily see the force of this proof because they have from which it follows that the substance can be divided.
been accustomed to think only about things that flow from Suppose that a substance can be conceived as being
external causes. And of those things they see that •the ones divisible; then either its parts will also have the nature
that quickly and easily come into existence also easily perish. of the substance or they won’t. If they •do, then (by
And conversely, they judge that •complicated and intricately 8) each part will be infinite, and (by 7) will be its own
structured things are harder to produce, i.e. that they don’t cause; and (by 5) each part will have to consist of a
exist so easily. I might free them from these prejudices different attribute. And so many substances can be
by looking into •what truth there is in the proposition that formed from one, which is absurd (by 6). Furthermore,
what quickly comes to be quickly perishes, and considering the parts would have nothing in common with their
whether •all things are equally easy in respect to the whole whole (by 2), and the whole (by D4 and 10) could
of Nature (·I think they are·). But I shan’t go into any of that. exist without its parts and be conceived without them;
All I need here is to point out that I am here speaking not and no-one can doubt that that is absurd. But if on
of things that come into existence from external causes but the other hand the parts •do not retain the nature
only of substances, which (by 6) can’t be produced by any of substance, then dividing the whole substance into
external cause. For things that come to exist from external equal parts would deprive it of the nature of substance,
causes—whether they have many parts or few—owe all their meaning that it would cease to exist; and (by 7) that
perfection or reality to the power of the external cause; and is absurd.
therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of
their external cause and not from their own perfection. On 13: A substance that is absolutely infinite is indivisible.
the other hand, whatever perfection a substance has is not If it were divisible, its parts would either retain the
due to any external cause; so its existence must follow from nature of an absolutely infinite substance or they
its nature alone; so its existence is nothing but its essence. wouldn’t. If they did, then there would be a number
So perfection doesn’t take away the existence of a thing, but of substances of the same nature, which (by 5) is
on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away. So absurd. If they didn’t, then (as in 12) an absolutely
there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain infinite substance could ·be divided into such parts
than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite thing, i.e. and thereby· cease to exist, which (by 11) is also
a perfect thing, i.e. God. For since God’s essence •excludes absurd.
all imperfection and •involves absolute perfection, by that Corollary: No substance is divisible, and thus no corporeal
very fact it removes every cause of doubting God’s existence substance, insofar as it is a substance, is divisible. [This use
and gives the greatest certainty concerning it. I think this of ‘insofar as’ is explained on page 9 just above the start of section V.]
will be clear to you even if you are only moderately attentive! Note on 12–13: That substance is indivisible can be under-
stood more simply merely from this: the nature of substance
can’t be conceived other than as infinite, whereas ‘a part of

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

a substance’ can only mean a finite substance, which (by 8) and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
implies a plain contradiction. Note on 15: [This text follows Curley in numbering sections of this
note, and of the note on 17 and the Appendix, as an aid to reference.]
14: God is the only substance that can exist or be
I. Some people imagine a God who is like a man, con-
conceived.
sisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions. But
Since God is an absolutely infinite thing, of whom no
how far they wander from the true knowledge of God is
attribute expressing an essence of substance can be
shown well enough by what I have already demonstrated,
denied (by 6), and God necessarily exists (by 11), if
and I shan’t talk about them any more. Everyone who has
there were a substance other than God it would have
to any extent contemplated the divine nature denies that
to be explained through some attribute of God; ·but
God is corporeal. This is best proved from the fact that by
explanations can flow only within attributes, not from
‘a body’ we understand a quantity that has length, breadth,
one attribute to another·; and so two substances with
and depth, • by some specific shape. Nothing could be more
an attribute in common would exist, which (by 5) is
absurd than to say this about God, i.e. about a thing that is
absurd. So no substance other than God can exist;
infinite [= •’unlimited’.]
and none such can be conceived either, for if it could
In trying to demonstrate this same conclusion by different
be conceived it would have to be conceived as existing,
arguments from mine, some people clearly show that ·as
and the first part of this demonstration shows that to
well as denying that God is or has •a body· they conclude
be absurd. Therefore, God is the only substance that
that the divine nature doesn’t in any way involve corporeal
can exist or be conceived.
or •extended substance. They maintain that the corporeal
First corollary: God is unique, i.e. (by 6) in Nature there is
world, ·rather than being part of God’s nature·, has been
only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite.
created by God. But by what divine power could it be
Second corollary: An extended thing and a thinking thing
created? They have no answer to that, which shows clearly
are either attributes of God or (by A1) states of God’s at-
that they don’t understand what they are saying.
tributes.
At any rate, I have demonstrated clearly enough—in my
15: Whatever exists is in God, and nothing can exist or judgment, at least—that no substance can be produced or
be conceived without God. created by any other (see the corollary to 6 and the second
14 secures that apart from God there cannot exist (or note on 8). Next, I have shown (14) that God is the only
be conceived) any substance, i.e. (by D3) any thing substance that can exist or be conceived, and from this I
that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But have inferred in the second corollary to 14 that extended
(by D5) modes can’t exist or be conceived without a substance is one of God’s infinite attributes. To explain
substance ·that they are modes of ·. So modes can all this more fully, I shall refute my opponents’ arguments,
exist only in the divine nature, and can be conceived which all come down to these two.
only through that nature. But (by A1) substances and II. First, they think that corporeal substance, insofar
modes are all there is. Therefore, everything is in God as it is substance, consists of parts. From this they infer

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

that it cannot be infinite, and thus cannot pertain to God. 13) shown to be absurd. Anyone who wants to consider the
They explain this through many examples, of which I shall matter rightly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed
mention three. that’s what they are) from which they infer that extended
•If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let us conceive substance is finite don’t at all follow from •the supposition
it to be divided into two parts. If each part is finite, then an of an infinite quantity, but from •supposing that an infinite
infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If quantity might be measurable and composed of finite parts.
each part is infinite, then there is one infinite twice as large All they are entitled to infer from the absurdities they have
as another, which is also absurd. •Again, if an infinite quan- uncovered is that infinite quantity is not measurable and is
tity is measured by parts each equal to a foot, it will consist not composed of finite parts. This is just what I have already
of infinitely many of them, as it will also if it is measured by demonstrated above (12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at
parts each equal to an inch. So one infinite number will be me turns against themselves. . . .
twelve times as great as another, which is no less absurd. Others, imagining that a line is composed of points, know
•Finally, suppose that from one point in something of infinite how to invent many arguments showing that a line can’t be
extent two lines are extended to infinity. Although near divided to infinity. And indeed it is just as absurd to say that
the beginning they are a certain determinate distance apart, corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, as it is
the distance between them is continuously increased ·as to say that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of
they lengthen·, until finally it stops being determinate and lines, and the lines of points.
becomes indeterminable; ·which is also absurd·. Since these This must be admitted by all those who know that clear
absurdities follow—so they think—from the supposition of an reason is infallible, and especially those who deny that there
infinite quantity, they infer that corporeal substance must is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided
be finite and consequently cannot pertain to God’s essence. into parts that were really distinct, why couldn’t one part be
III. Their second argument is also drawn from God’s annihilated while the rest remained inter-related as before
supreme perfection. For, they say, God as a supremely (·thus creating a vacuum·)? Why must they all be so fitted
perfect thing cannot be acted on. But corporeal substance, together that there is no vacuum? If two things are really
since it is divisible, can be acted on; ·anything that is distinct from one another ·rather than being different modes
divisible can be pulled apart by outside forces·. So it follows or aspects of a single substance·, one of them can stay
that corporeal substance does not pertain to God’s essence. where it is whatever the other does. But there isn’t any
IV. These are the arguments that I find being used by vacuum in Nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere, ·namely
authors who want to show that corporeal substance is in my Descartes’s Principles, part 2, propositions 2 and
unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot have anything to 3·); all the parts of Nature do have to hang together so
do with it. But anyone who is properly attentive will find that that there is no vacuum; so it follows that those parts are
I have already replied to them, since these arguments are not really distinct from one another, ·i.e. that they are not
based wholly on the supposition that corporeal substance is distinct things·, which is to say that corporeal substance,
composed of parts, which I have already (12 and corollary to insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided. [Spinoza

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

means that it isn’t subject to divisions that go all the way down, so to considered as water can come into existence and go out of
speak—divisions that really split it up into separate things. He does existence, but considered as substance it can do neither.
allow that corporeal substance—i.e. the entire material world—can be ·When water considered as water goes out of existence, what
divided into (for example) wet bits and dry bits, soft bits and hard bits; happens at the level of substance is, roughly speaking, that
but none of these bits is an independent and self-sufficient thing. Its an area in the one extended substance changes from being
existence consists merely in the fact that the extended world—which is wet to being dry·.
God considered under the attribute of extension—has a certain property VI. I think this also answers the second argument—·the
at a certain location.] one in III above·—because that is based on the supposition
V. Why are we by nature so inclined to divide quantity? that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and made
The answer involves the fact that we have two ways of up of parts. Even if this reply were not sufficient, ·the
thinking about quantity: we can think of it •abstractly or argument would not succeed, because· there is no reason
superficially, which is how we depict it to ourselves in our why divisibility should be unworthy of the divine nature. For
imagination; and we can also think of it •as substance, (by 14) apart from God there can be no substance by which
which is done by the intellect alone without help from the divine nature would be acted on, ·and so God’s being
the imagination. If we attend to quantity as it is in the made up of parts would not bring with it a vulnerability to a
imagination—which we often do, finding it easy—it will be dismantling attack from the outside, so to speak·. All things,
found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we I repeat, are in God, and whatever happens does so through
attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar the laws of God’s infinite nature and follows (as I’ll show)
as it is a substance—which we don’t do often, finding it from the necessity of God’s essence. So it can’t be said in any
hard—then (as I have already sufficiently demonstrated) it way that God is acted on by something else, or that extension
will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible. is unworthy of the divine nature—even if it is supposed to
This will be clear enough to anyone who knows how to be divisible—provided that God is granted to be eternal and
distinguish the intellect from the imagination—particularly infinite.
if he bears in mind that matter is everywhere the same,
and that parts are distinguished in it only through our [In 16 and its appendages, ‘unlimited’ translates a word that often means
conceiving it to have different qualities, so that its parts ‘infinite’.]
are distinguished only modally but not really. [That is: its 16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must
parts have different qualities or modes, but are not genuinely and deeply follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways i.e.
distinct things. ‘Really’ (Latin realiter) comes from the Latin res, meaning everything that can fall under an unlimited intellect.
‘thing’.] This proposition must be plain to anyone who attends
For example, we conceive that water is divided and its to the fact that the intellect infers from a thing’s
parts separated from one another—considered as water, but definition a number of properties that really do follow
not considered as corporeal substance, for considered as necessarily from it (i.e. from the very essence of the
substance it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water thing); and that •the more reality the definition of

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

the thing expresses, i.e. •the more reality the essence the necessity of the divine nature (by 17). Therefore
of the defined thing involves, •the more properties (by D7) God alone is a free cause.
the intellect infers. But the divine nature has abso- Note on 17: I. Some people think, regarding the things that
lutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also I have said follow from God’s nature (i.e. are in God’s power),
expresses an essence that is infinite in its own kind, that God could bring it about that they don’t happen, are not
and so from its necessity there must follow infinitely produced by God; from which they infer that God is a free
many things in infinite ways (i.e. everything that can cause. But this is tantamount to saying that God can bring
fall under an unlimited intellect). it about that the nature of a triangle doesn’t require that its
First corollary to 16: God is the efficient cause of all things three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a
that can fall under an unlimited intellect. [An ‘efficient cause’ is given cause the effect would not follow—which is absurd.
just what we today call a cause. It used to be contrasted to ‘final cause’: Further, I shall show later, without help from 17, that
to assign an event a final cause was to explain it in terms of its purpose, God’s nature doesn’t involve either intellect or will. I know of
what it occurred for. See pages 18–19 below.] course that many think they can demonstrate that a supreme
Second corollary to 16: God is a cause through him- intellect and a free will pertain to God’s nature; for, they say,
self/itself and not an accidental cause. they know nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than
Third corollary to 16: God is the absolutely first cause. what is the highest perfection in us.
Moreover, while thinking of God as actually
17: God acts from the laws of the divine nature alone, •understanding things in the highest degree, they don’t
and is not compelled by anything. believe that God can bring it about that all those understood
I have just shown (16) that from •the necessity of the things •exist. For they think that would destroy God’s power.
divine nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from If God had created all the things in the divine intellect (they
•the laws of God’s nature alone, absolutely infinite say), then God couldn’t have created anything more, which
things follow; and in 15 I have demonstrated that they believe to be incompatible with God’s omnipotence. So
nothing can be or be conceived without God—that all these thinkers prefer to maintain that God has no leanings
things are in God. So there can’t be anything outside in any direction, not creating anything except what God has
God by which God could be caused or compelled to decreed to create by some fundamental free choice.
act. Therefore, God acts from the laws of the divine But I think I have shown clearly enough (see 16) that from
nature alone, and is not compelled by anything. God’s supreme power or infinite nature infinitely many things
First corollary to 17: There is no cause, either extrinsically in infinitely many ways—that is, all ·possible· things—have
or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the necessarily flowed or do always follow, with the same neces-
perfection of the divine nature. sity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle
Second corollary to 17: God alone is a free cause. it follows from eternity that its three angles equal two right
God alone exists only from the necessity of the divine angles. So God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity
nature (by 11 and first corollary to 14), and acts from and will remain actual to eternity. I think that this maintains

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

God’s omnipotence better ·than does the view that there are writers seem to have realized this—the ones who have said
things God could do but chooses not to ·. that God’s •intellect, •will and •power are one and the same.
Indeed—to be frank about it—my opponents seem to deny Therefore, since God’s intellect is the only cause of
God’s omnipotence. For they have to admit that God under- things—of their essence as well as of their existence—God
stands infinitely many creatable things which nevertheless must differ from other things both in essence and in ex-
God will never be able to create. For creating everything that istence. ·I shall explain this·. Something that is caused
God understands to be creatable would (according to them) differs from its cause precisely in what it gets from the cause.
exhaust God’s omnipotence and render God imperfect. To For example, a man may be the cause of the existence of
maintain that God is perfect, therefore, they are driven to another man, but not of his essence—·that is, not of the
maintaining that God cannot bring about everything that human nature that he has, not of the-possibility-of-being-
lies within the scope of the divine power. I don’t see how human·—for the latter is an eternal truth. So they can
anything more absurd than this, or more contrary to God’s agree entirely in their essence, ·having the very same human
omnipotence, could be dreamed up! nature·. But they must differ in their existences: if one
II. I shall add a point about the intellect and will that of the men goes out of existence, that need not destroy
are commonly attributed to God. If ‘will’ and ‘intellect’ do the other’s existence. But if the essence of one could be
pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must understand by destroyed and become false—·that is, if it could become the
each of these something different from what men commonly case that there was no such thing as human nature, no
understand by them. For the ‘intellect’ and ‘will’ that would possibility-of-being-human·—then the essence of the other
constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from would also be destroyed.
our intellect and will, not agreeing with them in anything So if something causes both the essence and the existence
but the name. They wouldn’t match one another any more of some effect, it must differ in essence and existence from
than Sirius the ‘dog-star’ matches the dog that is a barking the effect. But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence
animal. I shall demonstrate this. and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore God’s intellect,
We have intellect, and what we understand through it conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our
is either •earlier than the act of understanding (as most intellect both in essence and in existence and can’t agree
people think) or •simultaneous with it; but if the divine with it in anything but in name—which is what I said. It is
nature includes intellect, it can’t be like ours in this respect, easy to see that there is a similar proof regarding God’s will
because God is •prior in causality to all things (by the first and our will.
corollary to 16). ·So far from its being the case that God’s
intellect represents something because the thing exists·, 18: God is the in-dwelling and not the going-across
the fundamental nature of things is what it is because cause of all things.
God’s intellect represents it in that way. So God’s intellect, In-dwelling because: everything that exists is in God
conceived as constituting the divine essence, is really the and must be conceived through God (by 15), and so
cause of the essence and of the existence of things. Some (by the first corollary to 16) God is the cause of all

11
Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

things that are in God. Not going-across because: explain God’s eternal existence, which is to say that
by 14 there can’t be anything outside God ·for God what constitutes God’s essence also constitutes God’s
to act on·. So God is the in-dwelling and not the existence. So God’s existence and God’s essence are
going-across cause of all things. one and the same.
[The expressions ‘in-dwelling- and ‘going-across’ render technical terms First corollary to 20: God’s existence, like God’s essence,
of Spinoza’s that are usually translated by ‘immanent’ and ‘transeunt’ is an eternal truth.
respectively. The distinction itself is plain: I am the in-dwelling cause of Second corollary to 20: God is unchangeable, or all of
my hand’s moving when I move it, and the going-across cause of the fall God’s attributes are unchangeable.
of the tumbler that I knock off the table.] If they changed as to their existence, they would also
(by 20) change as to their essence,. . . which is absurd.
19: God is eternal, and all God’s attributes are eternal.
God (by D6) is a substance which (by 11) necessarily 21: All the things that follow from the absolute nature
exists, that is (by 7) to whose nature it pertains to of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and
exist. . . and therefore (by D8) God is eternal. be infinite, and are through the same attribute eternal
Next point: God’s •attributes are to be understood and infinite.
(by D4) as •what expresses an essence of the Divine [The lengthy and extremely difficult demonstration
substance. So the attributes partake of the nature of of this is constructed in the form ‘Suppose this is
substance, and I have already shown (7) that eternity false. . . ’ and then trying to deduce an absurdity from
pertains to the nature of substance. Therefore each of the supposition. For the first part of the proposition
the attributes must involve eternity, and so they are it takes an example of what the ‘something that is
all eternal. finite and has a limited existence or duration’ might
Note on 19: This proposition is also utterly clear from be supposed to be, and makes the first part of the
my way of demonstrating God’s existence (11), for that proposition stand or fall with that example. For the
demonstration established that God’s existence is an eternal second part of the proposition, it again lets everything
truth just as God’s essence is. I have also demonstrated rest on an example, indeed the same example, of
God’s eternity in another way in my Descartes’s Principles, something that might be supposed not to be eternal
Part I, proposition 19, and there is no need to repeat that and infinite. The demonstration also gives trouble by
here. allowing heavy overlap between the first and second
parts of the proposition.]
20: God’s existence and God’s essence are one and the
same.
God is eternal and so are all of God’s attributes ((by
19), that is (by D8) each of God’s attributes expresses
existence. Therefore, the attributes of God that (by
D4) explain God’s eternal essence at the same time

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

22: Anything that follows from some attribute of God 24: The essence of things produced by God does not
when it is modified ·or enriched or added to· by a quality involve existence.
which that same attribute causes to exist necessarily This is evident from D1. For if something’s nature
and to be infinite must itself also exist necessarily and involves existence, is its own cause, existing only from
be infinite. the necessity of its own nature, ·and so cannot be
The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the caused by God·.
same way as the demonstration of 21. [21 concerns Corollary to 24: God is the cause not only of things’ begin-
the likes of: what follows from God’s being extended. ning to exist, but also of their continuing to exist.
22 concerns the likes of: what follows from God’s in- If we attend to the essence of any caused thing—
volving motion and rest; this is not extension as such, not considering whether the thing actually exists or
extension considered ‘absolutely’, but it necessarily not—we shall find that this essence involves neither
follows from extension.] existence nor duration. So such an essence can’t be
the cause either of the thing’s coming into existence
23: Every mode that exists necessarily and is infinite or of its staying in existence; and the only cause of
must have followed either from •the absolute nature of both is God (by the first corollary to 14).
some attribute of God—·that is, some attribute taken all
by itself·—or from •some attribute that is modified, ·i.e. 25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
enriched or added to·, by a quality that exists necessar- of things but also of their essence.
ily and is infinite. Suppose this is wrong. Then God is not the cause
of the essence of things, and so (by A4) the essence
A mode is in something other than itself, through
of things can be conceived without God. But (by 15)
which it must be conceived (by D5), that is (by 15) it is
this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the
in God alone and can be conceived only through God.
essence of things.
So if a mode is thought of as existing necessarily and
being infinite, it must be inferred from or perceived Note on 25: This proposition follows more clearly from 16,
through some attribute of God that is conceived to which implies that from the given divine nature both the
express infinity and necessity of existence. It may essence of things and their existence must necessarily be
follow from •the absolute nature of the attribute—·the inferred; and, in brief, God must be called the cause of
unadorned attribute, so to speak·—or from •the at- all things in the same sense in which God is said to be
tribute modified or enriched or added to by some me- self -caused. This will be established still more clearly from
diating quality which itself follows from the attribute’s the following corollary.
absolute nature and is therefore (by 22) necessarily Corollary to 25: Particular things are nothing but states of
existent and infinite. God’s attributes, or modes by which [= ‘ways in which’] God’s
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.
The demonstration is evident from 15 and D5.

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

26: A thing that has been caused to produce an effect mediation of these first things. From this it follows:
has necessarily been caused in this way by God; and one I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things
that has not been caused by God cannot cause itself to produced immediately by God, and not ·a proximate cause·
produce an effect. in God’s own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither
[The demonstration of this is omitted.] be nor be conceived without their cause (by 15 and 24C).
27: A thing that has been caused by God to produce an II. That God cannot properly be called the ‘remote’ cause
effect cannot make itself be uncaused. of singular things (except perhaps to distinguish them from
This proposition is evident from A3. things that God has produced immediately, i.e. that follow
from God’s absolute nature). A ‘remote’ cause is one that
28: A particular thing (that is, a thing that is finite isn’t conjoined in any way with its effect; but every existing
and has a limited existence) can’t exist or be caused thing is in God, and depends on God in such a way that it
to produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and can’t exist or be conceived without God.
produce an effect by another cause that is also finite
and has a limited existence; and the latter can’t exist 29: In Nature there is nothing contingent; all things
or be caused to produce an effect unless it is caused to have been caused by the necessity of the divine nature
exist and produce an effect by yet another. . . and so on, to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
to infinity. Whatever exists is in God (by 15); and (by 11) God
[Somewhat simplified version of the demonstration:] Anything exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes
that follows necessarily from something infinite and of the divine nature—·the ways in which God exists·—
eternal must itself be infinite and eternal; so some- have also followed from that nature necessarily (by
thing that is finite and has a limited existence—that 16)—either •following from the divine nature just in
is, a finite item that comes into existence, lasts for itself (by 21) or •following from it considered as caused
a while, and then goes out of existence—can’t be an to act in a certain way (by 28). Further, God is the
upshot or effect of something infinite and eternal. So cause not only of the existence of these modes (by
its source must be of the other sort, that is, must be corollary to 24) but also of their having such-and-such
finite and non-eternal. And that line of thought re- causal powers. For if they hadn’t been caused by
applies to the latter item, and then to its source, and God, then (by 26) they could not possibly have caused
so on ad infinitum. Each finite and temporally limited themselves. And conversely (by 27) if they have been
item is to be thought of not as •something entirely caused by God, it is impossible that they should
other than God, but rather as •God-considered-as- render themselves uncaused. So all things have been
having-such-and-such-attributes-and-modes. caused from the necessity of the divine nature not only
Note on 28: Certain things had to be produced by God to exist but to exist in a certain way, and to produce
immediately, namely those that follow necessarily from God’s effects in a certain way; and all of this is necessary,
nature alone, and others. . . had to be produced through the not contingent. There is nothing contingent.

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

[At this point Spinoza inserts a note explaining in terms of Second corollary to 32: Will and intellect are related to
his philosophy a pair of mediaeval technical terms, the Latin God’s nature as motion and rest are, and as are absolutely
of which can be translated as ‘naturing Nature’ (Nature as a all natural things, which (by 29) must be caused by God to
cause) and ‘natured Nature’ (Nature as an effect) respectively. exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
The distinction has attracted much attention from scholars, The will, like everything else, requires a cause by
but in itself it is fairly trivial, and it has no structural role in which it is caused to exist and produce an effect in a
the Ethics. Spinoza uses the terms only in 31, to which he certain way. And although from a given will or intellect
makes no further reference anywhere in the work. The note infinitely many things may follow, God still can’t be
and that proposition are omitted from the present version, said on that account to act from freedom of the will,
and along with them 30, which has almost no role except in any more than God can be said to act from ‘freedom
31.] of motion and rest’ on account of the things that
follow from motion and rest! So will doesn’t pertain to
32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a God’s nature any more than do other natural things;
necessary one. it is related to God in the same way as motion and
rest. . . ·In short: acts of the will, such as human
The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode ·or choices and decisions, are natural events with natural
way· of thinking. And so (by 28) each volition—·each causes, just as are (for example) collisions of billiard
act of the will·—can exist and be fit to produce an balls. And to attribute will to God, saying that because
effect only if it is caused by another cause, and this the cause of each volition is God (= Nature) therefore
cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. So the God has choices and makes decisions, is as absurd as
will requires a cause by which it is caused to exist and to suppose that God is rattling around on the billiard
produce an effect; and so (by D7) it cannot be called a table·.
‘free’ cause but only a necessary or compelled one.
That was based on the will’s being a finite entity to 33: Things could not have been produced by God in any
which 28 applies. Suppose it is infinite, making 28 way or in any order other than that in which they have
irrelevant to it. Then it falls under 23, which means been produced.
that it has to be caused to exist and produce an All things have necessarily followed from God’s given
effect by God—this time by God-as-having-the-infinite- nature (by 16), and have been caused from the neces-
and-eternal-essence-of-thought rather than God-as- sity of God’s nature to exist and produce an effect in a
having-this-or-that-temporary-and-local-quality. So certain way (by 29). To think of them as possibly being
on this supposition also the will is not a free cause different in some way is, therefore, to think of God as
but a compelled one. possibly being different; that is to think that there is
Corollary to 32: God doesn’t produce any effect through some other nature that God could have—some other
freedom of the will. divine nature—and if such a nature is possible then

15
Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

it is actually instantiated, which means that there will! because they have been accustomed to credit God
are two Gods. But it is absurd to suppose that there with having an absolute will—·that is, with just non-causally
could have been two Gods. So things could not have deciding what to do·—which attributes to God a ‘freedom’
been produced in any other way or in any other order quite different from what I have taught (D7). But I am also
than they have been produced. sure that if they would consent to reflect on the matter, and
Note on 33: Since by these propositions I have made it as pay proper attention to my chain of our demonstrations,
clear as day that there is absolutely nothing in things on the they would end up utterly rejecting the ‘freedom’ they now
basis of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to attribute to God, not only as futile but as a great obstacle to
explain briefly what we should understand by ‘contingent’— science. I needn’t repeat here what I said in the note on 17.
but first, what we should understand by ‘necessary’ and Still, to please them ·or at least meet them half-way·, I
‘impossible’. A thing is called ‘necessary’ either •by reason of shall argue on the basis that God’s essence does involve will,
its essence or •by reason of its cause. For a thing’s existence and shall still prove that it follows from God’s perfection that
follows necessarily either from its essence and definition things could not have been created by God in any other way
or from a given efficient cause. And a thing is also called or any other order. It will be easy to show this if we consider
‘impossible’ for these same reasons—namely, either because ·two things·. First, as my opponents concede, it depends on
its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because God’s decree and will alone that each thing is what it is; for
no external cause has been caused to produce such a thing otherwise God wouldn’t be the cause of all things. Secondly,
·in which case the external causes that do exist will have all God’s decrees have been established by God from eternity;
been enough to prevent the thing from existing·. for otherwise God would be convicted of imperfection and
A thing is called ‘contingent’ only because of a lack of inconstancy. But since in eternity there is neither when,
our knowledge. If we don’t know that the thing’s essence nor before, nor after, it follows purely from God’s perfection
involves a contradiction, or if we know quite well that its that God could never have decreed anything different. It is a
essence doesn’t involve a contradiction, but we can’t say mistake to think of God as having existed for a while without
anything for sure about its existence because the order of making any decrees and then making some.
causes is hidden from us, it can’t seem to us either necessary The opponents will say that in supposing God to have
or impossible. So we call it ‘contingent’ or ‘·merely· possible’. made another nature of things, or supposing that from eter-
Second note on 33: From this it clearly follows that things nity God had decreed something else concerning Nature and
have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since its order, one is not implicitly supposing any imperfection in
they have followed necessarily from a most perfect nature. God.
God’s producing everything there is doesn’t mean that God Still, if they say this, they will ·have to· concede also
is in any way imperfect. The suggestion that God could have that God’s decrees can be changed by their maker. Their
acted differently is, as I have shown, absurd. . . . supposition that God could have decreed Nature and its
I’m sure that many people will reject my view as absurd, order to be different from how they actually are involves
without even being willing to examine it. Of course they supposing that God could have had a different intellect

16
Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

and will from those that God actually has; and they—·the something not depending on God, to which God in acting
opponents·—hold that this could have been the case without attends as a model and at which God aims as at a goal. This
any change of God’s essence or of God’s perfection. But is simply to subject God to fate [Latin fatum, here = ‘something
if that is right, why can’t God now change God’s decrees independently fixed and given’]. Nothing more absurd can be
concerning created things while remaining just as perfect? maintained about God—shown by me to be the first and only
·It is absurd to suppose that God can do this—e.g. that from free cause of the essence of all things and of their existence.
now on the laws of physics will be slightly different every I shan’t waste any more time refuting this absurdity.
second Tuesday—but my opponents have left themselves
34: God’s power is God’s essence itself.
with no basis for ruling this out as the absurdity that it
It follows purely from the necessity of God’s essence
really is·. . . .
that God is the cause of God (by 11) and (by 16 and
Therefore, since things could not have been produced its corollary) the cause of all things. So God’s power,
by God in any other way or any other order, and since the by which God and all things exist and act, is God’s
truth of this follows from God’s supreme perfection, we have essence itself.
to accept that God willed to create all the things that are
in God’s intellect, with the same perfection with which God 35: Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power, neces-
understands them. sarily exists.
The opponents will say that there is no perfection or Whatever is in God’s power must (by 34) be so related
imperfection in things: what is to count in things as making to God’s essence that it necessarily follows from it,
them perfect or imperfect, and thus called ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and therefore necessarily exists.
depends only on God’s will. So God could have brought it 36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does
about, simply by willing it, that what is now perfection would not follow.
have been the greatest imperfection, and conversely that Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of
what is now an imperfection in things would have been the God in a certain and determinate way (by the corollary
most perfect. ·Thus the opponents·. But God necessarily to 25), that is, whatever exists expresses in a certain
understands what God wills; so what the opponents say here and determinate way the power of God, which is the
is tantamount to saying outright that God could bring it cause of all things. So (by 16) from everything that
about through an act of will that God understands things in exists some effect must follow.
a different way from how God does understand them. And
this, as I have just shown, is a great absurdity. . . .
I confess that •this opinion that subjects all things to a
certain unguided will of God and makes everything depend
on God’s whim is nearer the truth than •the view of those
who maintain that God does all things for the sake of the
good. For the latter seem to suppose something outside God,

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Appendix and other things of this kind. [Spinoza uses the word malum
equivalently to our adjective ‘bad’ and the noun-phrases ‘thing that is
With these demonstrations I have explained God’s nature bad’. We don’t have one word for both roles, except ‘evil’—‘That was an
and properties: evil act’—‘He did a great evil’—but in our senses of it ‘evil’ is really too
•God exists necessarily; strong in many of Spinoza’s contexts. In this text, as a compromise, ‘evil’
•God is unique; is used for the noun and ‘bad’ for the adjective.]
•God exists and acts solely from the necessity of the I. Of course this is not the place to derive my explanations
divine nature; from the nature of the human mind. It will suffice here to
•God is the free cause of all things (and I have shown build on two things that everyone must admit to be true: that
how); •all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that
•all things are in God and depend on God in such a •all men want to seek their own advantage and are conscious
way that without God they can’t exist or be conceived; of wanting this.
•all things have been precaused by God, not from free- From these premises it follows that men think themselves
dom of the will or absolute ·whim or· good pleasure, free, because they are conscious of their choices and their
but from God’s absolute nature or infinite power. desires, are ignorant of the causes that incline them to want
Further, I have taken care, whenever the occasion arose, to and to choose, and thus never give the faintest thought—even
remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations in their dreams!—to those causes. It follows also that men
from being grasped. But because many prejudices remain act always on account of a goal, specifically on account
that could—that can—be a great obstacle to men’s under- of their advantage, which they seek. ·Putting these two
standing my way of explaining how things hang together, I together, men are in a frame of mind from which •efficient
have thought it worthwhile to consider those prejudices here, causes—that is, real causes—are almost totally absent, and
subjecting them to the scrutiny of reason. All the prejudices I which is saturated by thought about •final causes, goals
here undertake to expose depend on the common supposition or ends or purposes·. So the only explanations they look
that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end. for are ones in terms of final causes—·in asking ‘Why did
Indeed, people maintain as a certainty that God directs all that happen?’ they are asking ‘For what purpose did that
things to some definite end, this being implicit in their view happen?’·—and when they have heard that they are satisfied,
that God has made all things for man and has made man to having nothing more to ask. But if they can’t get such
worship God. explanations from others they have to turn to themselves,
So I shall begin by considering this one prejudice, asking and to reflect on the ends by which they are usually led to
first •why most people are satisfied that it is true and so do such things; so they necessarily judge the temperament
inclined by nature to embrace it. Then I shall show •its of other men from their own temperament.
falsity, and finally show •how from this prejudices have Furthermore, they find—both in themselves and outside
arisen concerning good and evil, merit and wrong-doing, themselves—many means that are very helpful in seeking
praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, their own advantage: eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing,

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plants and animals for food, the sun for light, the sea for examples showed that conveniences and inconveniences
supporting fish, and similarly with almost everything else happen indiscriminately to the pious and the impious alike,
whose natural causes—·that is, whose efficient causes·— that didn’t lead them to give up their longstanding prejudice.
they are not curious about. This leads them to consider It was easier for them to •put ·the Gods’ reasons for· this
all natural things as means to their own advantage. And among the other unknown things whose uses they were
knowing that they had found these means, not provided ignorant of, thus remaining in the state of ignorance in which
them for themselves, they had reason to think there was they had been born, than to •destroy that whole construction
someone else who had prepared these means for human and think up a new one.
use. . . . So they inferred that one or more rulers of Nature, So they maintained it as certain that the Gods’ judgments
endowed with human freedom, had taken care of all things far surpass man’s grasp. This alone would have caused the
for them, and made all things for their (·human·) use. truth to be hidden from the human race for ever, if mathemat-
And since they had never heard anything about the ics hadn’t shown them another standard of truth. ·It could
character of these rulers, they had to judge it from their do this because it isn’t involved in the final-causes muddle,
own characters; so they maintained that the Gods direct because· it is concerned not with •ends but only with •the
everything for the use of men in order to bind men to essential properties of figures. In addition to mathematics
them and be held by men in the highest honour! So it there have also been a few other things (I needn’t list them
has come about that each man has thought up—on the here) which have enabled a few men to notice these common
basis of his own character—his own way of worshipping prejudices and be led to the true knowledge of things.
God, so that God might love him above all the rest, and II. That is enough on what I promised in the first place,
direct the whole of Nature according to the needs of his blind ·namely, to explain why men are so inclined to believe that
desire and insatiable greed. Thus this prejudice changed into all things act for an end·. I don’t need many words to show
superstition, and struck deep roots in men’s minds. This is that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes
why everyone tried so hard to understand and explain the are nothing but human fictions. I think I have already
final causes—·the purposes·—of all things. sufficiently established it, both by my explanation of the
But while trying to show that •Nature does nothing in origins of this prejudice and also by 16, the corollaries to
vain (meaning: nothing that isn’t useful to men), they seem 32, and all the propositions by which I have shown that
to have shown only that •Nature and the Gods are as mad everything happens by a certain eternal necessity of Nature
as men are! Look at how they ended up! Along with many and with the greatest perfection.
conveniences in Nature they couldn’t avoid finding many Still, I shall add this: this doctrine about ends turns
inconveniences—storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc. They Nature completely upside down. •For what is really a cause
hold that these happen because the Gods—whom they judge it considers as an effect, and conversely what is an effect it
on the basis of themselves—are angry with men for wronging considers as a cause. •What by Nature comes first it makes
them or making mistakes in their worship. And though their follow. And finally, •what is supreme and most perfect it
daily experience contradicted this, and though countless makes imperfect.

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Ethics Benedict Spinoza I: God

The first two points are self-evident. [Spinoza then offers was the wind blowing hard just then? Why was the
an obscure explanation of the third; omitted.] man walking by just then? If you answer that the
Again, this doctrine takes away God’s perfection. For if wind arose then because on the preceding day, while
God acts for the sake of an end, it must be that God •wants the weather was still calm, the sea began to toss, and
something and therefore •lacks something. And though the that the man had been invited somewhere by a friend,
theologians and metaphysicians distinguish different kinds then we will ask: Why was the sea tossing? Why was
of ends, ·that doesn’t help them with the present difficulty·. the man invited at just that time?
They say that God did everything for God’s own sake and not And on it goes! They won’t stop asking for the causes of
for the sake of the things God was going to create. For before causes until you take refuge in the will of God, which is the
the creation ·that they believe in· they can’t find anything haven of ·unacknowledged· ignorance.
for the sake of which God could act—except God! And so Similarly, when they see the structure of the human body,
they have to admit that God willed to make things happen these people are struck by a foolish wonder; and because
as means to things that God wanted and lacked. This is they don’t know the causes of this elaborate structure they
self-evident. conclude that it is constructed not by mechanical processes
I should also mention that the followers of this doctrine but by divine or supernatural skill, and constituted as it is
·about ends·, wanting to show off their cleverness in saying so that the parts won’t injure another.
what things are for, have called to their aid a new form of So it comes about that someone who seeks the true
argument: instead of reducing things to the impossible, they causes of ‘miracles’ and is eager (like an educated man)
reduce them to ignorance! [This is a joke. One traditional kind to •understand natural things, not (like a fool) to •wonder at
of argument takes the form: ‘If P were false, Q would be the case; Q is them, is denounced as an impious heretic by those whom
absurd or impossible; so P is true.’ Spinoza is crediting his opponents the people honour as interpreters of Nature and of the Gods.
with an argument of the form: ‘If P were false, we would be wholly For the denouncers know that if ignorance is taken away
ignorant of the answers to a large range of questions; so P is true’, ·and replaced by real knowledge of mechanical processes·,
perhaps with the added premise ‘It would be intolerable to admit that then foolish wonder is also taken away, depriving them of
much ignorance’.] Their resorting to this shows that no other their only means for arguing and defending their authority.
way of defending their doctrine was open to them. Enough of this; I now pass on to what I decided to treat
For example, if a slate falls from a roof onto someone’s here in the third place.
head and kills him, they will argue that the slate fell in order III. After men convinced themselves that whatever hap-
to kill the man. Here is how their argument goes: pens does so on their account, they had to judge as most
If it didn’t fall for that purpose because God wanted important in each thing whatever is most useful to them, and
the man to be killed, how could so many circum- to rate as most excellent all the things by which they were
stances have come together by chance? You may most pleased. So they had to develop the notions:
answer that it happened because the wind was blow- good, bad, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty,
ing hard and the man was walking that way. But why ugliness,

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in terms of which they ‘explained’ natural things. I shall their sake, and call the nature of a thing ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
briefly discuss these here. (Because men think themselves ‘sound’ or ‘rotten’ and ‘corrupt’, according to how it affects
free, they have also formed the notion of praise and blame them. For example, if the motion the nerves receive from
and sin and merit. I’ll explain these after I have treated objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health,
human nature.) the objects that cause it are called ‘beautiful’; those that
Whatever contributes to health and to the worship of God cause a contrary motion are called ‘ugly’. Those that move
they have called ‘good’, and what is contrary to these they the sensory apparatus through the nose they call ‘pleasant-
call ‘bad’. smelling’ or ‘stinking’; through the tongue, ‘sweet’ or ‘bitter’,
Those who don’t understand the real nature of things, ‘tasty’ or ‘tasteless’; through touch, ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, ‘rough’ or
and have only a pictorial grasp of them, mistake their own ‘smooth’, etc.; and finally those that affect us through the
imaginings for intellectual thought; they really have nothing ears are said to produce ‘noise’, ‘sound’ or ‘harmony’. Some
to say about things, but in their ignorance of things and men have been mad enough to believe that God is pleased
of their own natures they firmly believe that there is an by harmony!. . . .
order in things. When a number of items are set out in All these things show well enough that each person has
such a way that when they’re presented to us through the judged things according to the disposition of his own brain;
senses we can easily imagine them—·can easily depict them or rather, has accepted •states of the imagination as •things.
to ourselves·—and so can easily remember them, we say that So it is no wonder (I note in passing) that we find so many
they are ‘orderly’; but if the opposite is true we say that they controversies to have arisen among men, and that they have
are ‘disorderly’ or ‘confused’. finally given rise to scepticism. For although human bodies
And since the things we can easily imagine are especially are alike in many ways, they still differ in very many. And for
pleasing to us, men prefer ‘order’ to ‘confusion’, as if or- that reason what seems good to one seems bad to another;
der were something in Nature more than a relation to our what seems ordered to one seems confused to another; what
imagination! They also say that God has created all things seems pleasing to one seems displeasing to another, and so
to be orderly (thus unknowingly attributing imagination to on.
God, unless they mean that God has disposed things so I pass over the other notions here, both because this is
that men can easily imagine them). Perhaps they won’t be not the place to treat them at length and because everyone
deterred—·though they should be·—by the fact that we find has experienced this variability sufficiently for himself. That
infinitely many things that far surpass our imagination, and is why we have such sayings as ‘So many heads, so many
many that confuse it on account of its weakness. But enough attitudes’, ‘Everyone is well pleased with his own opinion’,
of this. and ‘Brains differ as much as palates do’. These proverbs
The other notions are also nothing but various •states show well enough that men judge things according to the
of the imagination; yet ignorant people consider them to disposition of their brain, and •imagine things rather than
be chief •attributes of things. This is because, as I have •understanding them. For if men had understood natural
already said, they believe that all things were made for things they would at least have been convinced ·of the truth

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about them·, even if they weren’t all attracted by it. The their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect
example of mathematics shows this. because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they
So we see that all the notions by which ordinary people are useful or harmful to human nature.
are accustomed to explain Nature are only states of the But to those who ask ‘Why didn’t God create all men so
imagination, and don’t indicate the nature of anything except that they would be governed by the command of reason?’
the imagination. . . . I answer only: ‘Because God had the material to create all
Many people are accustomed to arguing in this way: things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest’;
If all things have followed from the necessity of God’s or, to put it more accurately, ‘Because the laws of God’s
most perfect nature, why are there so many imperfec- nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing
tions in Nature? why are things so rotten that they all things that can be conceived by an unlimited intellect’ (as
stink? so ugly that they make us sick? why is there I demonstrated in 16)—·that is, producing everything that is
confusion, evil, and wrong-doing? conceivable or possible·. . . .
I repeat that those who argue like this are easily answered.
For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from

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