Four Ciso Tribes and Where To Find Them: Gary Mcgraw, Ph.D. Sammy Migues Brian Chess, PH.D
Four Ciso Tribes and Where To Find Them: Gary Mcgraw, Ph.D. Sammy Migues Brian Chess, PH.D
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
18 discriminators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
• Eight Workforce discriminators 7
• Five Governance discriminators 9
• Five Controls discriminators 10
Now what? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Data matter, especially in computer security. As scientists, we like to gather data and then describe the data we’ve gathered in a
coherent model. This is the approach we took in the BSIMM Project, and it is the same approach we take in this project.
We gathered data in a series of extended in-person interviews with 25 CISOs. The firms we chose to study include ADP, Aetna,
Allergan, Bank of America, Cisco, Citizens Bank, Eli Lilly, Facebook, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Human Longevity, JPMorgan
Chase, LifeLock, Morningstar, Starbucks, and U.S. Bank. Collectively, our population represents just under 150 years of experience in
the CISO role.
Though we knew when we started this project that our results would be data-driven, we had no idea what kinds of things we would
uncover. As it turns out, we set ourselves up for some hard work. CISOs are all individuals with modes of operation that have been
influenced by long and distinguished careers. We produced an initial version of this report in 2016 based on analysis of data from
12 CISOs. With double the population size (25 CISOs), the current version of the report validates and refines our model.
We identify four distinct approaches to the CISO role, each with unique characteristics and discriminators. We describe the four
“tribes” below, with an emphasis on what separates one from another (as opposed to what makes them all the same). Dividing
CISOs into tribes leads to some insight with regard to career development and progression. We believe that when CISOs
understand their own approaches with reference to others, they will be better informed about their own ways forward.
Though we did end up with lists of controls and reams of technical security information in our data, we focus our discussion on
other aspects of the CISO role. In particular, we’re interested in how the four tribes we have identified differ in executing a security
plan, and what the tribes may be able to learn from one another.
In the real world, two major factors are more important than any others when it comes to success in the CISO role: the person
and the organization—that is, the personality and experience of the leader, and the culture, security willingness, and resources of
the company. The tricky question is whether either of these factors can be changed or evolved in any given situation. Can a zebra
change its stripes if it is trapped in the zoo?
Before we set out on our in-person interviews, our approach was to devise a framework for use in guiding the conversations. Of
course, in cases like this, the framework itself needs to be based on actual data! As step zero, we conducted a series of phone
conversations to gain a basic understanding of main topics, key words, and other ways to divide up the CISO problem space.
We identified three domains that every firm had in common. They are Workforce, Governance, and Controls (or in slightly more
hackneyed terms, People, Process, and Technology). These three domains help to organize our results in a meaningful pattern.
The Workforce domain covers people and includes organizational structure, Board interaction, goals/MBOs, and staff development.
The Governance domain covers process and includes metrics, reporting rhythm, budgets, Line of Business interaction, and project
management.
Finally, the Controls domain covers technology and includes cyber security frameworks, risk management, network operations,
incident response, security features, assessment and vulnerability management, threat intelligence, software security, and vendor
control. Of the three domains, the Controls domain ran the largest risk of becoming a laundry list, which, as we mentioned above,
was something we set out to avoid.
We also discussed peer groups, role consistency, and evolution of the CISO role with each of our participants.
Using this three-domain CISO framework, our 25 in-person interviews generated lots of real-world data.
In our model, membership in one tribe is mutually exclusive with membership in other tribes. Each of the 25 CISOs fits into one of
these four tribes.
Our working theory is that any CISO will fall into one of these four tribes. Further, knowing what tribe you are in can help you plan to
evolve and improve in the most efficient manner.
We will describe each of the four tribes in detail below, but before we do that, we introduce a set of discriminators that can be used
to differentiate the tribes.
18 discriminators
What sets apart our four tribes of CISOs? Are there particular aspects of the four tribes that differ from one another in important
ways? Can these differences be meaningfully organized? The answer to all three of these questions can be found in what we call
discriminators.
Simply put, discriminators can be used to tease apart CISOs from different tribes. And, not surprisingly, discriminators help clarify
what makes any particular tribe tick. Finally, discriminators can be used to influence strategy directly and efficiently.
To cohere with our CISO framework, we chunk discriminators into our three domains of Workforce, Governance, and Controls.
Each of the 18 discriminators is given a number in Roman numerals (I through XVIII). The Workforce domain encompasses eight
discriminators (I–VIII). The Governance domain encompasses five discriminators (IX–XIII). The Controls domain encompasses
five discriminators (XIV–XVIII).
XII. Budget
Each of the 18 discriminators can have up to four subentries describing how that particular discriminator is mapped into each tribe.
For example, discriminator I is called “CISO executive stance.” This discriminator has four subentries, one for each of the four tribes.
Each of these subentries is labeled with its associated tribe as follows: T1 = Enabler, T2 = Technology, T3 = Compliance, T4 = Cost
Center. For example, I.T1 is the subentry for discriminator I, Tribe 1. Take a quick look at discriminator I, below, and our scheme will
become clear.
In some cases, a discriminator does not have a subentry for each of the four tribes. That’s because there is no difference between
two particular tribes in the case of that discriminator. For example, discriminator II, “CISO-Board relations,” has one subentry shared
between T1 and T2. When there is no change in a subentry with respect to tribes, that subentry is labeled with all relevant tribes (in
some cases, up to three tribes share one subentry).
No individual discriminator alone can be used to categorize a tribe. Tribes are associated with sets of discriminators. In addition,
discriminator subentries associated with the four tribes do not always have contiguous boundaries. That is, they may not perfectly
describe any individual CISO. For example, the subentries for discriminator II describe just three of all possible types of CISO-Board
relationships.
I.T1 The CISO is a seasoned senior executive. While often having a deep technical past, the CISO focuses much more
attention on the business and less on technology.
I.T2 The CISO has a deep technical past and in many cases may still be known primarily for technical work. The CISO
has solid business skills, which may still be developing.
I.T3 The CISO is a seasoned senior executive without a deeply technical past. The CISO is often an excellent
administrator.
I.T4 The security leader, whose title is likely not CISO but who remains at the top of the security heap, is a technology
person.
II.T1-T2 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with and influence on both the CEO and the Board.
II.T3 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with the CEO. Board interaction likely includes attendance but not direct
education about security.
II.T4 The security leader lacks a collegial relationship with either the CEO or the Board. While the CEO and Board might
know the security leader by sight, the security message is filtered through other layers of senior management before it
gets to the top.
III.T1-T2 The CISO curates Board understanding of security, which is well past a compliance-only view.
III.T3 The CISO does not curate a well-mapped Board understanding of security. Though the Board may understand
that compliance alone is insufficient, they remain hazy about security goals.
III.T4 The Board has limited understanding of cyber security, is not being educated, and may be driven by popular press.
In many cases, the Board is made aware of security activity without any grounding in actual risk to the firm.
IV.T1 The CISO has moved the firm from compliance to commitment.
IV.T2 The CISO has moved the firm past compliance as the goal, but work remains to be done to integrate security into
the business.
IV.T3 The firm is finishing up or actively working compliance requirements and has identified the next set of security
goals but is not executing against them.
IV.T4 The security program is limited to compliance and is seriously resource constrained.
V.T1 Security organization structure reflects the firm’s business focus and is not only technology driven. In the case of
global firms, geography often plays a role in organization structure.
V.T2 Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not reflect the business
focus of the firm, but understaffing is not a problem.
V.T3 Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not reflect the business
focus of the firm. In addition, understaffing can be a problem.
VI.T1 A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct executive mentorship. Roles
among direct CISO reports are often non-technical.
VI.T2 A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct executive mentorship.
However, career advancement tends to overemphasize technical security prowess even though there are some direct
efforts to teach about the business.
VI.T3 A career path in security is murky and is probably non-technical even though responsibilities are technical.
VI.T4 Security work is tactical in nature, is often only technical, and does not align with obvious career progression.
VII.T1 Employee development in security is aligned with the business and includes leadership finishing school (just like
the opportunities found outside security).
VII.T2 Employee development in security is not clearly aligned with the business and tends to overemphasize the
technical.
VII.T4 While there are promotions and title changes, security purview is limited to the technical weeds. Without two-way
understanding of and by the business, security staff goals are constrained to the now and do not help prepare them or
the firm for the future.
VIII.T1-T2 Company culture aligns with security and is partially defined by security.
VIII.T3 Company culture is beginning to align with security at senior executive levels. However, harmonized vision is not
yet driven down, sometimes even in the security organization itself.
VIII.T4 Company culture is not conducive to security. Compliance is the one and only currency.
IX.T1-T2-T3 Together with direct reports, the CISO determines which Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Risk
Indicators (KRIs) to collect, track, and report.
IX.T4 Metrics tend to be counts of effort. There is little or no evidence of transforming raw data into KPIs/KRIs important
to the business.
X.T2 Security is not yet business as usual, though there may be a plan and unity of purpose. A crisis may have been the
catalyst for renewed security effort and a change in philosophy.
X.T3 Security is not yet business as usual, and compliance requirements may not be fully accounted for. A crisis may
have caused a change in security leadership and the smoke has not yet cleared.
X.T4 Budget may include a pot of money for an anticipated crisis (one allowed per year).
XI.T4 No PMO exists for project management, which is instead handled directly by staff.
XII. Budget
XII.T1 Budget is never an issue, because the Board and senior executives are aligned with the security mission. Funding
within the agreed-on security mission is always possible.
XII.T2 Budget is not really an issue, because the Board and senior executives are aligned with the security mission.
However, uptake in Lines of Business can be problematic when the firm is not completely aligned with security.
XII.T3 Resources are tight and underinvestment is common. Investment is limited to compliance efforts.
XII.T4 Security is managed like a cost center and is not provided adequate resources. Security apparatus is often paid
for by taxing Lines of Business directly.
XIII.T1-T2 Security is treated as risk management. Technical debt is understood and accounted for in the risk
management paradigm.
XIII.T3 Security is treated as risk management. However, technical debt is not accounted for in the risk management
paradigm.
XIII.T4 Security is limited to a compliance exercise. Security has little or no handle on technical debt.
XIV.T1-T2 A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the security story forward.
XIV.T3 A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the security story forward. Use
of the framework may not be creatively tailored to the business.
XV.T1-T2 Top security controls include Identity and Access Management (IAM), use of cryptography, and logging and
analysis.
XV.T3 Top security controls, including IAM, use of cryptography, and logging, are still lagging. Projects to improve all
three are underway.
XV.T4 Top security controls are in a state of flux at best. IAM may be completely ignored, use of cryptography is
haphazard, and logging is weak.
XVI.T1 The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past penetrate and patch and is
driven by risk.
XVI.T2 The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past penetrate and patch but is
driven by threat instead of risk.
XVI.T3 Vulnerability management is behind the curve, but plans are in the works to address the problem. Threat
intelligence and other similar exercises are limited to what is purchased without customization.
XVI.T4 Patch management is the tail that wags the defect management dog. Network security basics may not be in
place (think network segmentation).
XVII.T1 Lines of Business go along with security requests and do the right thing. This happens even though the requests
may not be in their best short-term interest, because they are aligned with the security mission and the security mission
is aligned with them.
XVII.T2 Security provides Lines of Business a set of services that may not in all cases be aligned with the business.
Because of this, uptake in Lines of Business may vary.
XVII.T3 A past security crisis is being used as a lever to force security into Lines of Business.
XVII.T4 Security is provided as a service to Lines of Business, which may choose to ignore the services entirely. Security
advises but probably cannot enforce.
Think of discriminators as vectors defining a space. To move from one shape (or tribe) to another, changes in the associated set of
discriminators are required (and can be observed and measured). Thus, knowing your discriminators (and your tribe) is the first step
in moving forward.
The Enabler tribe has a number of salient characteristics. Firms in this tribe have long since evolved the security mission from
compliance to commitment. This means a firm’s culture prioritizes security and gets compliance as a planned side effect. Even the
Board of Directors has moved past compliance and uses a risk management approach to provide oversight. Security is not just a
technical problem, and the business-focused approach gets Lines of Business to participate in the security mission. Staff balance
between technologists and executives is carefully constructed. Speaking of executives, regardless of whether CISOs in the Enabler
tribe have a deep technical past, today they look like their senior executive peers from a business standpoint. Like good senior
executives, CISOs in this tribe proactively get in front of the problem both internally and externally by intentionally influencing the
standards by which they will be judged.
Workforce discriminators
I.T1 The CISO is a seasoned senior executive. While often having a deep technical past, the CISO focuses much more
attention on the business and less on technology.
II.T1-T2 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with and influence on both the CEO and the Board.
III.T1-T2 The CISO curates Board understanding of security, which is well past a compliance-only view.
IV.T1 The CISO has moved the firm from compliance to commitment.
V.T1 Security organization structure reflects the firm’s business focus and is not only technology driven. In the case of
global firms, geography often plays a role in organization structure.
VI.T1 A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct executive mentorship. Roles
among direct CISO reports are often non-technical.
VII.T1 Employee development in security is aligned with the business and includes leadership finishing school (just like
the opportunities found outside security).
VIII.T1-T2 Company culture aligns with security and is partially defined by security.
IX.T1-T2-T3 Together with direct reports, the CISO determines which KPIs and KRIs to collect, track, and report.
XII.T1 Budget is never an issue, because the Board and senior executives are aligned with the security mission. Funding
within the agreed-on security mission is always possible.
XIII.T1-T2 Security is treated as risk management. Technical debt is understood and accounted for in the risk
management paradigm.
Controls discriminators
XIV.T1-T2 A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the security story forward.
XV.T1-T2 Top security controls include IAM, use of cryptography, and logging and analysis.
XVI.T1 The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past penetrate and patch and is
driven by risk.
XVII.T1 Lines of Business go along with security requests and do the right thing. This happens even though the requests
may not be in their best short-term interest, because they are aligned with the security mission and the security mission
is aligned with them.
TRIBE 2: SECURITY AS TECHNOLOGY
One salient characteristic of the Technology tribe is an approach to security not bounded by compliance. Because CISOs in the
Technology group started their careers as alpha geeks, their world view tends to overemphasize the technical aspects of security
challenges. They bring the technology hammer to bear on every problem first. All that aside, a Technology CISO sets out to be a
good business person but has not attained the senior executive gravitas of the Enabler tribe. Learning the business ropes the hard
way (that is, through trial and error and raw experience) is an ongoing challenge. Because technologists like to solve hard problems,
one common trap for Technology CISOs is to take on the stickiest business challenges themselves. An undersupply of business
acumen leads to what we call the “superman syndrome,” in which the Technology CISO often gets down in the weeds on a particular
problem instead of delegating—for example, weeding through the morning’s catch of threat intelligence at 5 a.m. or believing that
contributing a tiny bit of revenue to the firm is the best use of time.
Workforce discriminators
I.T2 The CISO has a deep technical past and in many cases may still be known primarily for technical work. The CISO
has solid business skills, which may still be developing.
II.T1-T2 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with and influence on both the CEO and the Board.
IV.T2 The CISO has moved the firm past compliance as the goal, but work remains to be done to integrate security into
the business.
V.T2 Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not reflect the business
focus of the firm, but understaffing is not a problem.
VI.T2 A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct executive mentorship.
However, career advancement tends to overemphasize technical security prowess even though there are some direct
efforts to teach about the business.
VII.T2 Employee development in security is not clearly aligned with the business and tends to overemphasize the
technical.
VIII.T1-T2 Company culture aligns with security and is partially defined by security.
Governance discriminators
IX.T1-T2-T3 Together with direct reports, the CISO determines which KPIs and KRIs to collect, track, and report.
X.T2 Security is not yet business as usual, though there may be a plan and unity of purpose. A crisis may have been
the catalyst for renewed security effort and a change in philosophy.
XII.T2 Budget is not really an issue, because the Board and senior executives are aligned with the security mission.
However, uptake in Lines of Business can be problematic when the firm is not completely aligned with security.
XIII.T1-T2 Security is treated as risk management. Technical debt is understood and accounted for in the risk
management paradigm.
Controls discriminators
XIV.T1-T2 A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the security story forward.
XV.T1-T2 Top security controls include IAM, use of cryptography, and logging and analysis.
XVI.T2 The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past penetrate and patch but is
driven by threat instead of risk.
XVII.T2 Security provides Lines of Business a set of services that may not in all cases be aligned with the business.
Because of this, uptake in Lines of Business may vary.
Compliance is both a boon and bane for security. The Compliance tribe intentionally leverages compliance requirements to make
real security progress. But compliance alone has never kept a bad guy out. That means compliance is both a bare minimum
standard that must be reached and a bar that some firms are struggling to get over. In many cases, previous security leadership
was replaced at the same time that a compliance regime was imposed from outside (possibly in the wake of a crisis). Historical
underinvestment in security, which may have reached crisis proportions, leads these firms to continue to underinvest in security
even in the face of compliance requirements. That’s because the compliance spending of today is in many cases more than the
pre-crisis spending of yesterday. Simply put, they were spending a dime instead of a dollar in the past and are now sanguine in
spending a quarter when a dollar is still what’s required. CISOs in the Compliance tribe tend not to be deep technologists, but at
the same time they tend to have strong managerial and leadership skills. This can lead to a situation in which limited resources are
being properly allocated and clear progress is being made, even while technical debt is accumulating.
Workforce discriminators
I.T3 The CISO is a seasoned senior executive without a deeply technical past. The CISO is often an excellent
administrator.
II.T3 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with the CEO. Board interaction likely includes attendance but not direct
education about security.
III.T3 The CISO does not curate a well-mapped Board understanding of security. Though the Board may understand
that compliance alone is insufficient, they remain hazy about security goals.
IV.T3 The firm is finishing up or actively working compliance requirements and has identified the next set of security
goals but is not executing against them.
V.T3 Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not reflect the business
focus of the firm. In addition, understaffing can be a problem.
VI.T3 A career path in security is murky and is probably non-technical even though responsibilities are technical.
VIII.T3 Company culture is beginning to align with security at senior executive levels. However, harmonized vision is not
yet driven down, sometimes even in the security organization itself.
Governance discriminators
IX.T1-T2-T3 Together with direct reports, the CISO determines which KPIs and KRIs to collect, track, and report.
X.T3 Security is not yet business as usual, and compliance requirements may not be fully accounted for. A crisis may
have caused a change in security leadership and the smoke has not yet cleared.
XII.T3 Resources are tight and underinvestment is common. Investment is limited to compliance efforts.
XIII.T3 Security is treated as risk management. However, technical debt is not accounted for in the risk management
paradigm.
XIV.T3 A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the security story forward. Use
of the framework may not be creatively tailored to the business.
XV.T3 Top security controls, including IAM, use of cryptography, and logging, are still lagging. Projects to improve all
three are underway.
XVI.T3 Vulnerability management is behind the curve, but plans are in the works to address the problem. Threat
intelligence and other similar exercises are limited to what is purchased without customization.
XVII.T3 A past security crisis is being used as a lever to force security into Lines of Business.
TRIBE 4: SECURITY AS A COST CENTER
The Cost Center tribe is overwhelmed and underresourced. In most cases, security leadership exists under several levels of
executive leadership (and sometimes even middle management) that treat security as a cost center. Security consumes budget but
never drives budget creation and in some sense has a thick glass ceiling imposed on it. Without a real executive seat at the table,
security is relegated to plumbing, much like the help desk.
Workforce discriminators
I.T4 The security leader, whose title is likely not CISO but who remains at the top of the security heap, is a technology
person.
II.T4 The security leader lacks a collegial relationship with either the CEO or the Board. While the CEO and Board might
know the security leader by sight, the security message is filtered through other layers of senior management before it
gets to the top.
III.T4 The Board has limited understanding of cyber security, is not being educated, and may be driven by popular
press. In many cases, the Board is made aware of security activity without any grounding in actual risk to the firm.
IV.T4 The security program is limited to compliance and is seriously resource constrained.
VI.T4 Security work is tactical in nature, is often only technical, and does not align with obvious career progression.
VII.T4 While there are promotions and title changes, security purview is limited to the technical weeds. Without two-way
understanding of and by the business, security staff goals are constrained to the now and do not help prepare them or
the firm for the future.
VIII.T4 Company culture is not conducive to security. Compliance is the one and only currency.
X.T4 Budget may include a pot of money for an anticipated crisis (one per year).
XI.T4 No PMO exists for project management, which is instead handled directly by staff.
XII.T4 Security is managed like a cost center and is not provided adequate resources. Security apparatus is often paid
for by taxing Lines of Business directly.
XIII.T4 Security is limited to a compliance exercise. Security has little or no handle on technical debt.
Controls discriminators
XIV.T4 There is no underlying cyber security framework.
XV.T4 Top security controls are in a state of flux at best. IAM may be completely ignored, use of cryptography is
haphazard, and logging is weak.
XVI.T4 Patch management is the tail that wags the defect management dog. Network security basics may not be in
place (think network segmentation).
XVII.T4 Security is provided as a service to Lines of Business, which may choose to ignore the services entirely. Security
advises but probably cannot enforce.
The conceptual distance between tribes varies. Tribe 1 and Tribe 2 share many characteristics and are conceptually close, as
demonstrated by discriminator overlap. We have observed that CISOs in both Tribes 1 and 2 can be very effective in their respective
organizations.
The discriminators associated with Tribe 3 have little overlap with the discriminators of Tribes 1 and 2. In our view, Tribes 1 and
2 are much closer conceptually than Tribe 3 is to either of them. We have observed in many cases that organizational focus on
compliance becomes a habit that’s hard to kick. There may not be willingness to go past compliance even after it’s attained. The
goal becomes the limit.
Tribe 4 discriminators are a unique set. There is no overlap with the discriminators of Tribe 1, 2, or 3. Conceptually, Tribe 4 is way off
by itself, further from Tribe 3 than Tribe 3 is from Tribes 1 and 2. We fear that Tribe 4 may be very large, meaning there’s plenty of
room for security improvement in the world.
Moving between tribes is certainly possible. Moving from Tribe 4 to Tribe 3 may require a crisis, something we see plenty of
evidence for in our data. Fortunately, not all firms have to start in Tribe 4. On the other hand, compliance is a common theme in all
Tribes 1 and 2 are both fine situations to find yourself in as a CISO. Though these two tribes are very similar in appearance, moving
from Tribe 2 to Tribe 1 requires earning a seat at the senior executive table.
That said, each of our 18 discriminators and its subentries can be used as a roadmap for moving from one tribe to another.
Consider discriminator I (reproduced here):
I.T2 The CISO has a deep technical past and in many cases may still be known primarily for technical work. The CISO
has solid business skills, which may still be developing.
I.T3 The CISO is a seasoned senior executive without a deeply technical past. The CISO is often an excellent
administrator.
I.T4 The security leader, whose title is likely not CISO but who remains at the top of the security heap, is a technology
person.
A Tribe 4 CISO can set out to move into Tribe 2 by moving up the executive food chain. An explicit exercise in leadership
development will be required. Indeed, a Tribe 2 CISO may still have work to do to move into Tribe 1 from a business acumen
perspective.
Each of the discriminators helps to define a story of possible improvement and tribe evolution.
Middle management
Lots of security organizations are suffering from a lack of middle management. Incidentally, this is also commonly observed
in other technical fields. Senior executive leadership is often strong and present, as are collections of qualified technologists.
What’s missing is the glue that goes between. If the ranks of senior leadership are to grow, there must be a defined career
path from the technical weeds to the executive suite. In addition, execution is hampered by the lack of middle management.
There’s plenty to learn from CISOs who focus on succession planning and job rotation.
Programs
Security is not just a collection of projects. Strategic vision aligned with the business is easy to sketch on paper, but it
remains a real challenge. If your strategic vision is limited to compliance, you need a more appropriate vision.
Talent
There are not enough security people. Acquiring, developing, and retaining a well-oiled security machine requires attention
to personnel. Even the top CISOs in the world have a talent problem and invest heavy resources into nurturing their staff.
Leadership development is just as important as compensation when it comes to retention. Smart CISOs can kill two birds
with one stone, filling the middle management gap and producing highly qualified security executives that want to stick
around.
Scale
An approach that works for a team of 10 is unlikely to scale to an army of 10,000. The best CISOs think about scale from
day one, just like their counterparts in development and operations. Security processes must evolve at the same pace as the
business or risk being left behind.
Fraud
Most CISOs don’t own fraud control. Among the 25 CISOs we observed, only 2 of them had anything to do with fraud control.
Simply put, fraud is beyond the scope of the security organization even when there is an active fraud control approach at the
firm.
SOCs
Almost all the CISOs in our study have a security operations center (SOC). Though the trend seems to be that many SOC
duties are outsourced, many firms are bringing them in-house. Sometimes SOC duties are split between a vendor and staff.
Even within the Enabler tribe, SOC execution is not carried out the same way by all firms.
Vendor control
No organization, no matter what tribe it is in, has solved the vendor control problem. Interestingly, vendor control is on
everybody’s radar.
Now what?
We’ve learned a bunch about CISOs, and we hope you have too. Everywhere we’ve been so far, we’ve seen great interest in what
CISOs actually do, why they do it, and how they can do it better. Occasionally, groups of like-minded CISOs get together, especially if
they all are from the same vertical or geography. This is an encouraging trend that we support. In the best of all possible worlds, the
model we describe can provide not only a common vocabulary but also a basis for further discussion and professionalization.
Please share this work with all the CISOs you know. If you’re a CISO yourself and you want to be involved in our science project, get
in touch. Everyone is welcome.
T1 T2 T3 T4 LABEL DISCRIMINATOR
WORKFORCE
The CISO is a seasoned senior executive. While often having a deep technical past, the
I.T1
CISO focuses much more attention on the business and less on technology.
The CISO has a deep technical past and in many cases may still be known primarily for
I.T2
technical work. The CISO has solid business skills, which may still be developing.
The CISO is a seasoned senior executive without a deeply technical past. The CISO is
I.T3
often an excellent administrator.
The security leader, whose title is likely not CISO but who remains at the top of the
I.T4
security heap, is a technology person.
CISO-Board relations
II.T1-T2 The CISO enjoys direct interaction with and influence on both the CEO and the Board.
The CISO enjoys direct interaction with the CEO. Board interaction likely includes
II.T3
attendance but not direct education about security.
The security leader lacks a collegial relationship with either the CEO or the Board. While
II.T4 the CEO and Board might know the security leader by sight, the security message is
filtered through other layers of senior management before it gets to the top.
The CISO curates Board understanding of security, which is well past a compliance-only
III.T1-T2
view.
The CISO does not curate a well-mapped Board understanding of security. Though the
III.T3 Board may understand that compliance alone is insufficient, they remain hazy about
security goals.
IV.T1 The CISO has moved the firm from compliance to commitment.
The CISO has moved the firm past compliance as the goal, but work remains to be done
IV.T2
to integrate security into the business.
The firm is finishing up or actively working compliance requirements and has identified
IV.T3
the next set of security goals but is not executing against them.
IV.T4 The security program is limited to compliance and is seriously resource constrained.
Security organization structure reflects the firm’s business focus and is not only
V.T1 technology driven. In the case of global firms, geography often plays a role in
organization structure.
Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not
V.T2
reflect the business focus of the firm, but understaffing is not a problem.
Security organization structure is built around technical goals and objectives and may not
V.T3
reflect the business focus of the firm. In addition, understaffing can be a problem.
A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct
VI.T1
executive mentorship. Roles among direct CISO reports are often non-technical.
A career path in security is well-defined and includes succession planning and direct
VI.T2 executive mentorship. However, career advancement tends to overemphasize technical
security prowess even though there are some direct efforts to teach about the business.
Security work is tactical in nature, is often only technical, and does not align with obvious
VI.T4
career progression.
Employee development in security is aligned with the business and includes leadership
VII.T1
finishing school (just like the opportunities found outside security).
Employee development in security is not clearly aligned with the business and tends to
VII.T2
overemphasize the technical.
While there are promotions and title changes, security purview is limited to the technical
VII.T4 weeds. Without two-way understanding of and by the business, security staff goals are
constrained to the now and do not help prepare them or the firm for the future.
VIII.T1-T2 Company culture aligns with security and is partially defined by security.
Company culture is beginning to align with security at senior executive levels. However,
VIII.T3 harmonized vision is not yet driven down, sometimes even in the security organization
itself.
VIII.T4 Company culture is not conducive to security. Compliance is the one and only currency.
GOVERNANCE
Together with direct reports, the CISO determines which Key Performance Indicators
IX.T1-T2-T3
(KPIs) and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) to collect, track, and report.
Metrics tend to be counts of effort. There is little or no evidence of transforming raw data
IX.T4
into KPIs/KRIs important to the business.
Security is not yet business as usual, though there may be a plan and unity of purpose. A
X.T2
crisis may have been the catalyst for renewed security effort and a change in philosophy.
Security is not yet business as usual, and compliance requirements may not be fully
X.T3 accounted for. A crisis may have caused a change in security leadership and the smoke
has not yet cleared.
X.T4 Budget may include a pot of money for an anticipated crisis (one allowed per year).
Program management
XI.T4 No PMO exists for project management, which is instead handled directly by staff.
Budget
Budget is never an issue, because the Board and senior executives are aligned with the
XII.T1
security mission. Funding within the agreed-on security mission is always possible.
Security is managed like a cost center and is not provided adequate resources. Security
XII.T4
apparatus is often paid for by taxing Lines of Business directly.
Security is treated as risk management. Technical debt is understood and accounted for
XIII.T1-T2
in the risk management paradigm.
Security is treated as risk management. However, technical debt is not accounted for in
XIII.T3
the risk management paradigm.
CONTROLS
A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive the
XIV.T1-T2
security story forward.
A cyber security framework (e.g., the NIST framework) is used proactively to drive
XIV.T3 the security story forward. Use of the framework may not be creatively tailored to the
business.
Security controls
Top security controls include Identity and Access Management (IAM), use of
XV.T1-T2
cryptography, and logging and analysis.
Top security controls, including IAM, use of cryptography, and logging, are still lagging.
XV.T3
Projects to improve all three are underway.
Top security controls are in a state of flux at best. IAM may be completely ignored, use of
XV.T4
cryptography is haphazard, and logging is weak.
The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past
XVI.T1
penetrate and patch and is driven by risk.
The security organization has moved the vulnerability management exercise well past
XVI.T2
penetrate and patch but is driven by threat instead of risk.
Vulnerability management is behind the curve, but plans are in the works to address the
XVI.T3 problem. Threat intelligence and other similar exercises are limited to what is purchased
without customization.
Lines of Business go along with security requests and do the right thing. This happens
XVII.T1 even though the requests may not be in their best short-term interest, because they are
aligned with the security mission and the security mission is aligned with them.
Security provides Lines of Business a set of services that may not in all cases be aligned
XVII.T2
with the business. Because of this, uptake in Lines of Business may vary.
XVII.T3 A past security crisis is being used as lever to force security into Lines of Business.
Security is provided as a service to Lines of Business, which may choose to ignore the
XVII.T4
services entirely. Security advises but probably cannot enforce.
SSI measurement