EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,

JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO
X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY

POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state

believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as
an inestimable acquisition, that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either
[1]

by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court
with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and
American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence
that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as

Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe,
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits
- 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case
for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record
in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella
M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No.
20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of
the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include
G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio,
Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52

of the Omnibus Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
"any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
[2] [3]

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution
also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
 Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to
be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take
on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision
cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the

1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge
of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as not (being) justiciable controversies or
[4]

disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the

President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic
Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
 Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal
of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on
18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
[5]

election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al.,
vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
 Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a
man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the
[6]

"State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be

adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. The concept grew
[7]

to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications
like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen
to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life
[8]

and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In
the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship,
which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th
[9]

century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to

participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century saw the next
[10]

stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right
of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of
[11]

citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so

developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.
[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime
but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives
[13]

were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the
19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees. [14]
 Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law
was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts; however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
[15]

applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14

August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
[16]

political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, and finally, the Ley
[17]

Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable

to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine

Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws. [19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the
state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony
in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect
on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain
and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political
[21]

status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance;
in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects.Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States
on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from

11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant
in the Philippines.Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential
writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period. More about this later.
[25]
 In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In
1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was

deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men,
the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973

Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are

citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
[28]

qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus

soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
[29]

adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
[30]

become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy
of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried,
and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried,
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit
"3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was
submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents
were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly
in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage
certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley
and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September
1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public
office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:

Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries
made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11

September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when
the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo
Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.
 Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or
civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code
of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation
or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only
be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to the
[32]

new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. In Mendoza [33]

vs. Mella, the Court ruled -

[34]

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is
whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event
the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a
case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his
or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,

nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being
no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained
to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, this Court defined[35]

what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one
of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment
could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last
during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the
child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary
public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173,
and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of
the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled:
[36]

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the

acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private
and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in
the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, the Court has held:

[38]

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband
and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing
property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the
civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified

in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the

Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on [39]

successional rights and family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted

[40]

child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the
same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to
define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
[41]

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This

discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the
Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue,
(c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question,
(d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister
of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx
 7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila
in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children
after Ronald Allan Poe.

xxxxxxxxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe,
Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily

establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue
of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has [42]

acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child.According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie
Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita
Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at
best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate
of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father
and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand
on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citing Chiongbian vs. de
[43]

Leon and Serra vs. Republic.

[44] [45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.

Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.

First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was
about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese
father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing
about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office
before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No
one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra
was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one
who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is
nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of
Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio,
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that
he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded
that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple,
simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs.
Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children
rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What

possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child
of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of
this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom,
have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging
solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
 Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and
had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing
neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed
for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ
has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship
of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
[48]

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents,"
and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-
003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this
grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same
may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?

In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent
organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of
its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members
of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part
of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned
to the ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a
16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.

The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the
opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover
those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17,
1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations
and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-
born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who
have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I
right Mr. Presiding Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book,
he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto
Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling
him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the
body to approve that provision of section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that
the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen
or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

 Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between
1av vphi1

1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but
alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien
fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if
they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also
be retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to
be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase
Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid
which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts
since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How
can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to
the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of
his father which he could possibly have chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4
of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will
not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.

If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant
has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a
place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed
to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule.

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28,
1972 cannot be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by
Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect
that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when
he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election
protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention,
states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the
election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present.
Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-
born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility
of the evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member
of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications
of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile,
to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly
are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof,
that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.

Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment
was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose
Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon
the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession,
became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the
names of his parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would
be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that
the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang,
Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always
had the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans,
Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which
one must forever cherish.

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more
indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R. The RTC granted the petition2 filed by
respondent Nora Fe Sagun entitled "In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship,
Nora Fe Sagun v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City."

The facts follow:

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance4 to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document
was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that
she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered
to annotate the same on her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog
fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint
Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of
herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas
in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification5 issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and
such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.

On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for
the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the
above mentioned case.6 However, no comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting
the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby
DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to
annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.7

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the
instant recourse viaa petition for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is

procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible; and,

II

Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching
the age of majority, is considered to have been made "within a reasonable time" as
interpreted by jurisprudence.8

Petitioner argues that respondent’s petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one,
law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of
Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the
local civil registry and its annotation on respondent’s birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the
registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondent’s petition before the
trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a
determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed
under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondent’s intention in filing the petition is
ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her
birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondent’s action is sanctioned, the trial court
erred in finding respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election
was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a "reasonable
time." Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary
public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of
allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was
already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made
beyond the period allowed by law.

In her Comment,9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship
by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims
that she had voted and participated in all local and national elections from the time she was of legal
age. She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her "election" of Philippine
citizenship was delayed and unregistered.
In reply,10 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her
choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as American citizens, and her being a
registered voter, cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondent’s petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether
respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final
resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.11

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring
respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of
Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for judicial declaration of election
of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has
raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given
the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of
Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her
birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioner’s election of
Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the
choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China,
however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this country, and has
learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that
many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby
DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.12

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the
Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.13 There is no specific legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our
citizenry.14 This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic15 citing the early case of Tan v. Republic
of the Philippines,16 where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of
an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given
right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the
rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative
to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine

citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make
an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of
Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.19

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.20 An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the case of respondent, for her to be
considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
registry.23

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No.
625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an
alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his
alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said
Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election.25 Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final
determination and review.26 1âwphi1

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special
proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or
correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the
relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent
had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the
nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert
that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of
election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before
the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007

EDISON SO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate court’s
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision.

Antecedents

On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization3 under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged the following in his petition:

He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak
and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as
amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the
Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good
moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications
provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as
amended; he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of men’s ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable
contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with
the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time
of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition
was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.

Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and
petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence.7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any,
why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were
ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the
petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition and its
annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper
of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.

No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified
that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s
business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He
knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all
the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully
employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been
practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been socially
active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family
observed Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness,
petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to
organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist and has not been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or
any incurable disease.12
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University
of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school
organizations and mingled well with friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a
week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to petitioner’s house. He has
known petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good
moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful
occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.

At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the following documents:
(1) Certificate of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of
Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupil’s17 and High School Student’s18 Permanent Record issued by
Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;19 (6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and
Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a
depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General
Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in evidence.

The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring that petitioner
EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen
and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance,
as soon as this decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law,
and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his
petition with evidence.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed
the decision to the CA on the following grounds:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR.
AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.

II.

PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. 27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch
for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving
specific details about his character and moral conduct.28 The witnesses did not even reside in the
same place as petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he
is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific answers
to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general
statements in answer to his counsel’s questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino
citizen.30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a medical student at the UST
Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as
amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after
the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China; the
requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into
law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from
these offices came forward to oppose the petition before the lower court.32 Petitioner insisted that he
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly
established by his witnesses.

In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any opposition,
a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.

In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the
petition for naturalization without prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioner’s two (2) witnesses
were not credible because they failed to mention specific details of petitioner’s life or character to
show how well they knew him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without
clearly explaining their applicability to petitioner’s case.35The appellate court likewise ruled that
petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of
the requirement.36 The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to
any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would
make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.37

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration38 was denied in a Resolution39 dated November 24, 2005;
hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the Brief filed before the
CA.

In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on
August 8, 2001 and where the applicant’s age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old),
refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does
not apply to judicial naturalization before the court, as in the present case.42 Respondent, through the
OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before the court a quo does not preclude it from
appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to question an already final
decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument
that petitioner’s character witnesses are not qualified to prove the former’s qualifications.

In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it
is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for
naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are
"credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No.
473.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to
an alien.45

Petitioner’s contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those
provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139
provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative
act.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.50 It likewise
addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot
practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These however, do not
justify petitioner’s contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for
naturalization by judicial act.

First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing
of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.

Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens
who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born
in the Philippines and have been residing here.

Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of
the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set
forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been
residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for
more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if
we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under
R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the
qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for
his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be
stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s
conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the
inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law.53

Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not
elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know
petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the
CA, the witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading
questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty.
Adasa’s testimony follows:

q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?

a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and adviser of their
family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their place way back in 1991 to
1992.

q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner more or less
contin[u]ous?

a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family some social
function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioner’s birthday?

a On several occasions I attend the birthday.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?

a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.

q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?

a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.

q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression of his conduct?

a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working individual and ah (sic)
he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report concerning the character
of the petitioner.

q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a] citizen of the
Philippines?

a Yes.

q Can you tell us why do you say so?

a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated by law and
presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in the Philippines particularly in the City of
Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good
moral character and I have observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah
(sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and meddle (sic)
some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and learn the customs and
ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in
proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our country and he has a
gainful occupation.

q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?

a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah observed (sic) the usual
Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and some occasions such as fiestas.

q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act to become
Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?

a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of coming (sic) the
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government.
His family and himself does not believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah
(sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted in
any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental alienation or any
incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?

a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously having ah (sic)
the usual contact with his family.54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner’s family, but not specifically to petitioner.
Atty. Adasa’s statements refer to his observations on the family’s practices and not to petitioner in
particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well
enough to vouch for his qualifications.

Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:

q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Are you personally acquainted with him?

a Yes, Sir.

q How long have you known the petitioner?

a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.

q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you come to know the
petitioner?

a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.

q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?

a Yes, Sir.

q How often did you see the petitioner?

a I see him twice a week, Sir.

q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?

a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).

q Do you go to church together?

a Yes, Sir.

q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?

a Yes, Sir.

q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also go during fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.

q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?

a Yes, Sir.

q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?

a Twice a week, sir.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?

a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.

q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?

a Since birth, Sir.

q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us your impression of
his conduct?

a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the Philippines (sic)
Constitution.

q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of the Philippines
(sic) Constitution?

a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the people and
the government authority emanate from within; and the other one is the civilian government is not
supreme over the military.

q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir.

q What are these qualifications?

a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in the Philippines
since birth.

q What else?

a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and appraochable (sic) manner
during the period of his residence in the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?

a Yes, Sir.

q What is the occupation of the petitioner?

a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.

q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?

a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.

q Is the petitioner still a student?

a Yes, Sir.

q Where is he studying?

a In UST, Sir.

q Is he your classmate?

a Yes, Sir.

q What was his course?

a Pharmacy, Sir.

q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?

a Yes, Sir.

q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with?

a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.

q Who else?

a Elmer Ramos, Sir.

q Who else?

a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.

q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?

a Yes, Sir.

q Why do you know that?

a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah better
approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well with friends.

q So during school days you see him everyday?

a Yes, Sir.

q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a week?

a Yes, Sir.

q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become the citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.

q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?

a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus and he is not
convicted of any crime, Sir.

q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable disease illnesses?

a No, Sir.

q Why do you know?

a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very
intelligent person, Sir.

q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?

a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?

a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.

q What does starget means?

a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.

q How about the other one which you mentioned?

a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate, Sir.55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioner’s qualifications.

In sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do
not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual
who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must
be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must
have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty
of the applicant’s worthiness.57

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good
standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however,
this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence
tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good
moral character of his witnesses.58

We do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more
reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to
oppose the petition before the lower court.

Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization
law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without
prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of
the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon
persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAG
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO