People vs. Fernandez GR No.

218130 Feb 14, 2018

Issue: Is Fernandez’ extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence?

Ruling: For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence against the accused, the same must
be a) voluntary; b) made w/ the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; d) in
writing. Sec.2 of RA7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained, or under custiodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.”

In this case, Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at all times during his custodial investigation. He
was assisted by Atty. Francisco only during the time he executed his extrajudicial confession. No lawyer
assisted him at the time he was arrested and brought to the police station to answer questions about
the robbery with homicide. Furthermore, Atty Francisco was not an independent counsel. He even
testified that he was a legal consultant of the Mayor, the latter’s duty being to execute the laws and
ordinances and maintain peace and order in the municipality. To the mind of the SC, Atty. Francisco
cannot be considered as an independent counsel since protecting the rights of Fernandez as a suspect is
in direct conflict w/ his duty to the Mayor. The SC has held that a lawyer who assists a suspect during
custodial investigation should, as much as possible, be the choice of the suspect. It is also important
that the lawyer who will assist the accused should be competent, independent and prepared to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be
giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. Given
these circumstances, Fernandez’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible.

Quimvel vs. People GR No. 214497 April 18, 2017

Issue: For having been convicted under RA 7610 and not under the RPC, was Quimvel denied of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him?

Ruling: No. He was properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In criminal
prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information before an
accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime
charged. An investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the
offense by its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or
preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being
conclusions of law. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a
child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under
Section 5 of RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited
in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b)
of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from
the act complained of. It refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a
violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the
child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.

Callo vs. Morente, GR 230324 Sept 19,2017

Issue: Is parker entitled to the writ of amparo?

Ruling: No. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations
of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On
the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. Further, elements
constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court,:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; ·

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is also no
threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State
through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker
because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had
produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously
initiated by Parker herself. There is no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case
against her in Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the
country.
De la Cruz vs. People GR 200748 July 23, 2014

Issue: Can the urine drug test of the petitioner arrested for extortion be used against him without
violating violating his right against self-incrimination?

Ruling: No. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being made. In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could
be material to the charge of extortion. (take note pwde ang urine drug test if accused was arrested for
any offenses falling under RA9165)

PCDS Inc. vs. Carndang GR 206958 Nov. 8, 2017

Issue: Will an appeal on the withdrawal of an information for lack of probable cause violate the right of
the accused against being placed in double jeopardy?

Ruling: No. An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is
final, and the remedy to question this final order is an appeal. The records of the cases show, however,
that the motion to withdraw the information was granted by the MeTC before respondents were
arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a, criminal case is dismissed as the accused would
be placed in double jeopardy does not apply

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice GR 203335 Feb. 18, 2014

Issue: Is Sec. 20 of the Cybercrime Law a bill of attainder?

Ruling: No. Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the
orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law
enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere
failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-
compliance would be reasonable or valid. But since the non-compliance would be punished as a
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the
offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in
and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.

P.D. 1829 states:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts: x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully."
There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes,
defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it
applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.