NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
AY 18-19
ATTY. POLICARPIO
PAL, INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. 49188 | January 30 1990 |181 SCRA 557
SYLLABI:
Civil Procedure; Execution; A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by the unreasonable
application of a strict rule of procedure. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to
other writs of execution.—Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a
judgment for execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law
(Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8 SCRA 59 [1963]; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by
the unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended to rest on
the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform the court and the parties, of any and
all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such information can be established in some other
manner, the absence of an executing officer’s return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as
discharged or being executed through an alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the
case at bar. Where the return cannot be expected to be forthcoming, to require the same would be to
compel the enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on an impossibility, thereby allowing the
total avoidance of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to other
writs of execution (Government of the Philippines v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318). It is a well
known legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect, sues his case vainly.
Civil Law; Payment; The payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not operate
as satisfaction of the judgment debt.—Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to
the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Same; Same; A payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation must be made to the
proper person.—In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be
made to the proper person. Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having
authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment (Ulen v. Knecttle, 50 Wyo. 94, 58 [2d]
446, 11 ALR 65). Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be
treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one
who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a discharge (Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609,
20 SO 800, 34 LRA 283). The receipt of money due on a judgment by an officer authorized by law to
accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt.
Same; Same; Same; Ordinarily, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff
should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt.—The theory is where payment is made to a
person authorized and recognized by the creditor, the payment to such a person so authorized is
deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in
the case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
AY 18-19
ATTY. POLICARPIO
Same; Same; Unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public officer has
no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment
being executed.—In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the
discharge of a debt or obligation in money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US] 641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the
parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash
as medium of payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md. 312, 29 A 527, 25 LRA 200, 47 Am. St. Rep.
402). Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public officer has
no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being
executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in the case at bar,
does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.
Commercial Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; A check whether manager’s check or ordinary
check is not a legal tender and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of
payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.—Since a negotiable instrument is only
a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment (Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7
Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61) A check, whether a manager’s check or
ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of
payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not
discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended
until the payment by commercial document is actually realized.
FACTS:
- Amelia Tan filed a complaint for damages before the CFI Manila. Petitioner then appealed the
decision with the CA who affirmed the lower court’s decision with modifications. Motions for
reconsideration were then dismissed.
- The case was remanded to the trial court for execution which Tan filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution if the judgement rendered by the CA. The trial court upon the motion of
Amelia Tan issued an order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of the respondent.
Said writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Reyes for enforcement.
- Four months later, Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating that
the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the CA, remained
unsatisfied. PAL opposed the motion, stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to
plaintiff through the issuance of checks payable to the deputy sheriff who later did not appear
with his return and instead absconded.
- The CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature. After two months the CA
granted her an alias writ of execution for the full satisfaction of the judgment rendered, when
she filed another motion. Deputy Sheriff del Rosario is appointed special sheriff for enforcement
thereof.
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ATTY. POLICARPIO
- Petitioner then filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return
of the writ had been made by the Deputy Sheriff Reyes and that the judgement debt had
already been fulfilled which were signed and received by the Deputy Sheriff
- Respondent Rosario served a notice of garnishment of the depository bank of petiioner
ISSUE:
1. WON an alias writ of execution can be issued without prior return of the original writ by the
implementing officer. YES
2. WON payment of judgment to the implementing officer as directed in the writ of execution
constitutes satisfaction of judgment. NO
3. WON payment made in checks to the sheriff and under his name is a valid payment to
extinguish judgment of debt. NO
HELD:
1. YES. technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is
the fruit and end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law (Ipekdjian Merchandising
Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8 SCRA 59 [1963]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan
Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by the
unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended to rest
on the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform the court and the parties,
of any and all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such information can be
established in some other manner, the absence of an executing officer’s return will not preclude
a judgment from being treated as discharged or being executed through an alias writ of execution
as the case may be.
2. NO. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by
check in his name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt. Through absolutely no
fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid from
the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all because
PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name. The theory is where payment is made
to a person authorized and recognized by the creditor, the payment to such a person so
authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the
judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the
judgment debt.
3. NO. In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of
a debt or obligation in money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US] 641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the
parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of
cash as medium of payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md. 312, 29 A 527, 25 LRA 200, 47
Am. St. Rep. 402). Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee,
a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an
obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
AY 18-19
ATTY. POLICARPIO
the petitioner’s checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment
debt.
In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in checks. And second, payment in cash always
carries with it certain cautions.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the trial court’s issuance of the alias writ of execution
against the petitioner is upheld without prejudice to any action it should take against the errant sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes. The Court Administrator is ordered to follow up the actions taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.
SO ORDERED. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 49188 January 30, 1990
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