1st Batch of Cases:

1. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER OF

QUEZON CITY VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO)
G.R. No. L-15334 January 31, 1964

Prepared by: Marife S. Zamora

FACTS:

On October 1902, Philippine Commission enacted Act. No. 484 authorizing the Municipal
Board of Manila to grant a franchise to operate an electric street railway and electric light in Manila to
the most favorable bid. Swift was awarded the franchise on March 1903. Then, they transferred to
MERALCO. Meralco’s electric power is transmitted by means of electric transmission wires which are
fastened to insulators on steel towers.

November 1955, city assessor of QC declared the steel towers (Espana, Kamuning & Kamias
towers) for real property tax. After the denial of Meralco’s petition to cancel the declarations, an appeal
was taken to the Board of Assessment Appeals of QC, which required Meralco to pay real property tax
for year 1952-1956. Meralco paid the amount under the protest, and filed for review in CTA which
rendered a decision to cancel the tax declarations and refund Meralco. The motion for reconsideration
was denied too, an instant petition for review was filed.

CTA held that: (1) The steel towers come within the term “poles” which are declared exempt
from taxes under Part II Paragraph 9 of respondent’s franchise; (2) The steel towers are personal
properties and are not subject to real property tax; and (3) The City Treasurer of Quezon City is held
responsible for the refund of the amount paid.

The tax exemption privilege of the petitioner is quoted hereunder:

Paragraph 9: The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate,
buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and
personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter required by law to pay…

It is evident, that the word “poles”, as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner’s
franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for
which the franchise was granted. The poles as contemplated thereon, should be understood and taken
as a part of the electric power system of the respondent Meralco, for the conveyance of electric current
from the source thereof to its consumers.

ISSUE: Whether the steel towers constitute real properties, so that they can be subject to real property
tax.

RULING:

No, they are not. Thus, they are not subject to real property tax. Article 415 of the Civil Code
the following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
 (3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot
be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

The steel towers or supports in question do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph
1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not
construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower
court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.

They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in
a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration
upon the object to which they are attached. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under
paragraph 5, for they are not machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if
they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an
industry or works in the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed. CTA erred.

2 and 14. SIBAL VS. VALDEZ

G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927

Prepared by: Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

FACTS:

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of
Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and
sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven
parcels of land. Said sugar cane was entered into a chattel mortgage. Plaintiff offered to redeem said
sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the
latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the
purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to
return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Plaintiff upon the other hand claimed the sugar cane was real
property for same could be considered as growing fruits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sugar cane is a real property

RULING:

No. The sugar cane is a personal property. Although the sugar cane is considered as growing
fruits and therefore ordinarily a real property but must be regarded as personal property for the purposes
of the chattel mortgage law, and also for the purposes of attachment, he right of the growing crops
mobilizes the crops by anticipation. More specifically, it is said that the existence of a right on the
growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop
movable.
3. GAVINO A. TUMALAD and GENEROSA R. TUMALAD VS. ALBERTA VICENCIO and
EMILIANO SIMEON
G.R. No. L-30173 September 30, 1971

Prepared by: Cielo Bonachita

FACTS:

Defendants-appellants executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over their

house of strong materials. The mortgage was executed to guarantee a loan received from plaintiffs-
appellees. When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed. As highest bidder, plaintiffs-appellees were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
Thereafter, plaintiffs-appellant filed a case before the municipal court of Manila prayingthat the house
be vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for defendants-appellants to pay rent of P200.00
monthly from March 27,1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered. The municipal court
rendered its decision ordering the defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants-appellants, in their
answers in both the municipal court and court a quo impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject house is immovable or personal property.

RULING:

PERSONAL PROPERTY. The house on rented land is not only expressly designated as Chattel
Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and
TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot
on which it is constructed and participation ..." Although there is no specific statement referring to the
subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel
mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand
by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-appellants
merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although this cannot in itself alone determine the status of
the property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties,
particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty.

4. SECRETARY OF DENR VS. MAYOR JOSE YAP

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

Prepared by: Jason Ampong

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Regional Trial Court, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and
marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass
of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a)
of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

RULING:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

5. LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL VS. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
G.R. No. 155076 January 13, 2009

Prepared by: Mary Jean A. Olaso

FACTS:

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a complaint for theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Laurel for stealing and using the international long
distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively
stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended
Information do not constitute the felony of theft. On the other hand, PLDT alleges that the international
calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable
of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal
property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

Any property which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code
and capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. The only
requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying
away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require
transportation or carrying away.

The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property

which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be
appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. It is
the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of
theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business. Therefore, the business of
providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said
article.

6. VALLEY GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. VS. ROSA O. VDA. DE CARAM
G.R. No. 158805 April 16, 2009

Prepared by: Rene M. Cabahug, Jr.

FACTS:

The petitioner is a duly constituted non-stock, non-profit corporation which operates a golf
course. Cong. Fermin Z. Caram Jr., respondent’s husband, subscribed and paid in full 1 Golf Share of
the petitioner and was subsequently issued with a stock certificate which indicated a par value. It was
alleged by the petitioner that Caram stopped paying his monthly dues and became deliquent. The Golf
Share was subsequently sold at public auction after the BOD had authorized the sale. Caram thereafter
died and his wife initiated intestate proceedings before the RTC of Iloilo. Unaware of the pending
controversy over the Golf Share, the Caram family and the RTC included there Golf Share as part of
Caram’s estate. The RTC approved a project of partition of Caram’s estate and the Golf Share was
adjudicated to the wife, who paid the corresponding estate tax due, including that on the golf share.

It was only through a letter that the heirs of Caram learned of the sale of the Golf Share
following their inquiry with Valley Golf about the Golf Share. After a series of correspondence, the
Caram heirs were subsequently informed in a letter that they were entitled to the refund of the proceeds
of the sale of the Golf Share, which amount had been in the custody of the petitioner.

Caram’s wife filed an action for reconveyance of the Golf Share with damages before the SEC
against Valley Golf. The SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision in favor of the wife, ordering Valley
Golf to convey ownership of the Golf Share, or in the alternative to issue one fully paid share of stock
of Valley Golf of the same class as the Golf Share to the wife. Damages were also awarded to the wife.
 The SEC hearing officer ruled that under Section67, paragraph 2 of the Corporation Code, a
share stock could only be deemed delinquent and sold in an extrejudicial sale at public auction only
upon the failure of the stockholder to pay the unpaid subscription or balance for the share. However,
the section could not have applied in Caram’s case since he had fully paid for the Golf Share and he
had been assessed not the share itself but for his delinquent club dues.

Proceeding from the foregoing premises, the SEC hearing officer concluded that the auction
sale had no basis in law and was thus a nullity. The SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
hearing officer’s decision, and so the petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the membership shares are considered as movable or personal property, and
that they can be constituted as security to secure a principal obligation.

RULING:

Yes. The arrangement provided for in the by-laws of Valley Golf whereby a lien is constituted
on the membership share to answer for subsequent obligations to the corporation finds applicable
parallels under the Civil Code. Membership shares are considered as movable or personal property, and
they can be constituted as security to secure a principal obligation, such as the dues and fees.

There are at least two contractual modes under the Civil Code by which personal property can
be used to secure a principal obligation. The first is through a contract of pledge, while the second is
through a chattel mortgage. A pledge would require the pledgor to surrender possession of the thing
pledged, i.e., the membership share, to the pledge in order that the contract of pledge may be constituted.

Is delivery of the share cannot be effected, the suitable security transaction is the chattel
mortgage. Under Article 2124 of the Civil Code, movables may be the object of a chattel mortgage. The
Chattel mortgage is governed by Act No. 1508, otherwise known The Chattel Mortgage Law, and the
Civil Code. Therefore, the membership shares can be constituted as movable or personal property to
answer for the obligations incurred by the defendant’s husband.

7. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. CARIDAD CAPISTRANO

G.R. No. L-11075. June 30, 1960

Prepared by: Phillip Lojo

FACTS:

On March 31, 1955, Caridad Capistrano was booked as an outgoing passenger of a plane bound for
Hongkong. When she was subjected to the customary search by a woman agent of the Bureau of
Customs immediately before the plane she was to board took off, there were found in her person one
hundred and fifty six (156) pieces of Philippine 50-peso bills, seventeen (17) pieces of U.S. 20-dollar
bills and one (1) piece of U.S. 10-dollar bill, although her license from the Central Bank allowed her to
carry only $200, broken down into $50.00 in cash and $150.00 in traveler's check. Consequently, the
bills were seized for alleged violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 42 and 55, in relation to Section
1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Collector of Customs rendered on May 5, 1955, a decision ordering the forfeiture in favor of the
Government of the bills in question. This decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on
July 29, 1955.

 Ruling of the COURT OF TAX APPEALS:

Court of Tax Appeals ruled that while Circulars Nos. 37, 20, 42 and 55 were promulgated by
the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 265, said circulars did not,
however, authorize the seizure and forfeiture of the Philippine peso bills carried by herein
petitioner in excess of that allowed by the Central Bank regulations.

Taking judicial notice of the fact that the United States dollar has already ceased to be legal
tender in the Philippines and that it could be bought and sold in the country, the Tax Court held that
the U. S. dollar falls within the term "merchandise". However, the same thing was not said of the
Philippine peso. Hence, the decision of the Commissioner of Customs, insofar as the one hundred
and fifty six (156) pieces of Philippine 50-peso bills were concerned, was reversed, and said bills
were ordered to be returned to petitioner Caridad Capistrano. From that portion of the decision, the
Commissioner of Customs has appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: Is money a merchandise?

RULING:

There can scarcely be any doubt that Philippine money may be exported or brought out of the
country. Indeed, the Court of Tax Appeals recognized this fact in the decision appealed from. That such
exportation ultimately affects the stability of the peso cannot be denied. As clearly explained by the Tax
Court, it was in the light of compelling economic reasons and necessities that Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 37 and 42, prohibiting the exportation of Philippine. Bills and coins, subject to certain exceptions,
were conceived and promulgated.

We believe that Philippine peso bills come within the concept of "merchandise," as this term is
understood in Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code. As defined by the same Code,
merchandise, when used with reference to importations or exportations, includes goods, wares, and in
general anything that may be the subject of importation or exportation. (Sec. 1419.) It cannot be gainsaid
that money may be a commodity—an object of trade.

“In the same manner that in the Philippines the United States dollar bills which have ceased to be
legal tender, are considered merchandise, the Philippine peso bills when attempted to be exported, as in
the present case, may be deemed to have been taken out of domestic circulation as legal tender and
treated as commodity. Hence, they may be forfeited pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 37 in relation
to Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
reversed. So ordered.

Relevance Of The Case On Personal Property

1. Applying the three tests to determine if it is movable or immovable property as mentioned by

Manresa.
2. First, money can be carried from place to place
3. Second, it does not cause injury to the real property of which it may be temorarily attached
 4. Finally, it is not one of those enumerated by art. 415

Nota Bene: Only when money is attempted to be exported or smuggled thus taken out of domestic
circulation; then it may be subject to forfeiture. However, money, whether legal tender or not,
merchandise or not, by its very nature, is still personal property.

8. PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge of Branch

III, Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City; FERNANDO MAGCALE &
TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE
G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987

Prepared by: Charlton Lee

FACTS:

On November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula Baluyut Magcale
secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendant Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this
loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
a 2-storey, semi-concrete residential building including the right of occupancy on the land. Such
mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deeds on November 23, 1971.

When the spouses Magcale executed this mortgage, the land still belonged to the government
as the Sales Patent over the lot applied for by the spouses Magcale was not yet issued. On April 24,
1973, the Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 over the parcel of land,
possessory rights over which were mortgaged to defendant Prudential Bank, in favor of plaintiffs.

On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs secured an additional loan from defendant Prudential Bank in the
sum of P20,000.00. To secure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of the said
defendant another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged. For
failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank after it became due, and upon application
of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. Consequent to the
foreclosure was the sale of the properties therein mortgaged to defendant as the highest bidder in a
public auction sale conducted by the defendant City Sheriff on April 12, 1978.

The lower court, in a Decision dated November 3, 1978 declared the deeds of Real Estate
Mortgage as null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
land belonging to another?

RULING:

YES. In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land,
in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property."

Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land
on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would
still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.
 In the same manner, this Court has also established that possessory rights over said properties
before title is vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage.

In the case at bar, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a
valid mortgage.

9. BENITO MANALANSAN VS. LUIS MANALANG, JULIO CUBA and JOSE SY

G.R. No. L-13646 July 26, 1960

Prepared by: Ruelan Ruben Lacre

FACTS:

The spouses Augusto Manalang and Victoria Dabu were the original owners of the two-story
building located at 2268-2270 España Street. They entered into a loan agreement with Benito
Manalansan. On August 14, 1951, they executed a deed of chattel mortgage over this property in favor
of Benito Manalansan to secure the payment of the loan. Because of their failure to pay the loan on the
date of maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed.

On May 14, 1956, the sheriff of Manila sold the building at public auction to the mortgagee
Manalansan as the highest bidder. Thereafter, Manalansan went to the premises in question to take
possession thereof. There he found Jose Sy and Julio Cuba occupying the building. Jose Sy and Julio
Cuba disclosed that they are occupying the building as tenants/lessee of Luis Manalang, lessor. Benito
Manalansan asked his lawyer to formally notify Luis Manalang and his tenants to vacate the premises,
and eventually filed this case against them for the recovery of possession thereof.

At the trial, defendant Luis Manalang established that the building in question was sold to him
on September 24, 1949, by spouses Augusto Manalang and Victoria Dabu with the right to repurchase
within one year; that the vendors failed to redeem the property within the period stipulated; that the
property had been assessed for taxation purposes in his name for the years 1950-57, and he had paid the
corresponding taxes thereon for that period; that on January 25, 1955, he obtained a judgment from the
Municipal Court in Civil Case No. 34346 against Augusto Manalang, et al., ordering the latter to vacate
the building in question; and that since the finality of the aforesaid judgment, he has been in the
possession of said building, which he leased to his co-defendants Jose Sy and Julio Cuba.

Convinced that defendant Luis Manalang had acquired full ownership of the building in
question before the execution of the deed of chattel mortgage relied upon by plaintiff for his cause of
action, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with costs. Unable to obtain
reconsideration of this judgment, plaintiff Manalansan appealed directly to this Court. It is urged by
appellant that a building, although standing on the land belonging to another, is an immovable property,
as held by us in Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., 103 Phil., 401; 55 Off. Gaz. (20)
3672; Lopez vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., 103 Phil., 98; 56 Off. Gaz. (13) 2820; and other cases; and that
as the expiration of the period of redemption under appellee's contract of sale over the building in
question with the former owners Manalang and Dabu occurred after the New Civil Code had already
come into effect, the consolidation of this title over said building should be governed by, and follow the
procedure laid down in Art. 1607 thereof, a new provision not found in the Old Code, to wit:
 ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of
the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1676 shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.

ISSUES:

Whether the building is separate from the Land on which it has been built.

Whether the sale with right to repurchase of the house in question and appellee's consolidation
of ownership thereof should be registered.

RULING:

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS

In the enumeration of properties under Article 415, the inclusion of “building” separate and
distinct from the land, in said provision of law, can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable
property.

Registry of Building, Non-Existence Of.

Appellant contends that inasmuch as the sale with right to repurchase of the house in question
and appellee's consolidation of ownership thereof, were not registered as notice to third persons, he is
not bound thereby. Unfortunately, there is no registry of building in this jurisdiction apart from the lands
on which they stand, so that there is no legal compulsion to register, as notice to third persons,
transactions over or dealings on buildings that do not belong to the owners of the lands on which they
stand.

10. MINDANAO BUS COMPANY VS. THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER AND THE
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962

Prepared by: Menerva B. Calapan

FACTS:

Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargoes by
motor vehicles, in Mindanao with main office and shop in Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner likewise
owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops. With these
machineries which are placed therein, its trucks are made; body constructed, and the same are repaired
in a condition to be serviceable in the land transportation business it operates.
 The machineries have never been or were never been used as industrial equipments to produce
finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general public
indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which petitioner has never engaged in.

The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair
equipments.

The machineries sought to be assessed as real properties are:

a. Hobart Electric Welder Machine
b. Storm Boring Machine
c. Lathe Machine
d. Black And Decker Grinder
e. PEMCO Hydraulic Press
f. Battery Charger
g. D-engine Waukesha-M-Fuel

Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision,
while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and thus subject
to a realty tax.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipments are not subject to the assessment
of real estate tax.

The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is as follows:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
XXX XXX XXX

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the

tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Aside from the element of essentiality, the quoted provision also requires that industry or
works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land.

In the case at bar, the tools and equipments in question are by their nature, not essential and
principle municipal elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentals – acquired as movables and used only in the expediency to
facilitate/improve its service. Even without such, its business may be carried on, if its rolling equipment
is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. The equipments in question are not
absolutely essential to the petitioner’s transportation business, and petitioner’s business is not carried
on in a building, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipments may not be considered real property
within the meaning of Art 415 of the Civil Code.

11. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

Preprared by: Abdul Rahman Aguam

FACTS:

The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, entered into a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines(CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The reclaimed lands were later transferred, under PD no. 1085, to
the Public Estate Authority(PEA). On April 25, 1995 PEA entered into a joint venture agreement(JVA)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA was entered into without
a public bidding but was still approved by President Ramos. However the JVA was denounced by then
Senate President Maceda concluding the: (1) The reclaimed lands being transferred to AMARI were
lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate, (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom islands are thus void, and (3) The
JVA itself is illegal. Under an order issued by President Ramos the respondents entered into
renegotiation therefore amending the JVA. Petitioner as a taxpayer filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition praying that the amended JVA be declared null and void. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 constitution.

RULING:

Yes. The ownership of lands reclaimed from offshore and submerged areas by the state is rooted
in the Regalian doctrine. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land
ownership that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. The doctrine is adopted under sections 2 and 3 article XII of the 1987
Constitution and also incorporated under article 420 of the Civil Code. The transferring of ownership
of the lands of the public domain to private corporations violate sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.
These lands can only be leased, and not sold and transferred ownership, to private corporations provided
it be declared alienable by the government. Therefore stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer
to AMARI certain reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands do violate the Constitution.

12. FAUSTINO IGNACIO VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO
G.R. No. 12958

Prepared by: Renato F. Tolinero, Jr.

FACTS:

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing
his application for the registration of a parcel of land. On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application
for the registration of a parcel of land 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by
alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. The Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel
applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his
predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition
title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely under
a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894.

Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees,
and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years
until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano. On the other hand, the Director of Lands
sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore,
formed part of the public domain.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion to the land of applicant-appellant forms part of public domain.

RULING:

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property
of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

In the instant case, the subject property is a parcel of land having been formed by gradual
deposit by action of the Manila Bay. Therefore, the accretion on the land of applicant-appellant is clearly
forms part of the public domain, citing the Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard
service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.

13. ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY, INC. VS. ISABEL IYA,
ADRIANO VALINO AND LUCIA VALINO
G.R. Nos. L-10837-38 May 30, 1958

Prepared by: Faye Danielle C. Porras

FACTS:

Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino, husband and wife, were the owners and possessors of a
house of a strong materials, which they purchased on installment basis from Philippine Realty
Corporation. On November 6, 1951, to enable Lucia to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, Lucia A.
Valino filed a surety bond subscribed by the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., and as counter-
guaranty therefor, the spouses executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the aforementioned house in
favor of the surety company, which encumbrance was duly registered with the Chattel Mortgage
Register of Rizal.

It is admitted that at the time said undertaking took place, the parcel of land on which the house
is erected was still registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation. Having completed
payment in the purchase price of the lot, the Valinos were able to secure a certificate of title in their
name. Subsequently however, the Valinos, to secure payment on an indebtedness, they executed a real
estate mortgage over the house and lot in favor of Isabel Iya, which was duly registered and annotated.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC. In return, the surety company was
compelled to pay. The spouses were not able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the
company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. The surety company later then learned of the real estate
mortgage over the house and lot by the spouses in favor of Iya.

This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another action
against the spouses, asserting that she has the better right over the property.

The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred
right over the building since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land was not owned yet by the
spouses making the building then a chattel and lot a real property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chattel mortgage covering the said building is null and void.

RULING:

Yes. The chattel mortgage executed covering said building is null and void. A building certainly
cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs
to another. It is obvious that the inclusion of building, separate and distinct from the land, in Art. 415,
can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property.

In the case at bar, as personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage (Sec.1,
Act 3952) and the structure in question is not one. The execution of the chattel mortgage covering said
building is clearly invalid and a nullity while the document corresponds the registration in the Chattel
Mortgage Register of Rizal produces no effect whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in the
nature of a real property.

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG
AMBROSE ROASA, as herein represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M.
NICOLAS, JR. and ALVIN B. ACAYEN
G.R. No. 176022 February 2, 2015

Prepared by: Rena May A. Gabinete

FACTS:

Cecilia Roasa applied for the registration of title over a parcel of land. The application was filed
on December 15, 2000. She alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject lot, having acquired
the same by purchase as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994; that the said
property is an agricultural land; that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim
of ownership since the 1930's and that they have declared the land for taxation purposes.

The Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application and one its argument was that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation. The records show that the
subject land is not classified as forest land prior to March 15, 1982. The evidence adduced by the
applicant particularly shows that the subject land applied for registration was declared as not part of the
forest land of the government before March 15, 1982, or short of more or less seven (7) years of the
required adverse possession of thirty (30) years.

ISSUE: Whether or not subject land can already be subject for ownership.

RULING:

Yes. What is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of
this requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of adverse possession prior to
the declaration that land is alienable and disposable. Hence, the 30 years requirement of adverse
possession has been met.

There is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared alienable and disposable on March 15,
1982. This is more than eighteen (18) years before respondent's application for registration, which was
filed on December 15, 2000.

16. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN (Represented By Sally A. Malabanan) VS. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

Prepared by: April Rose F. Flores

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay
City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title. To support his petition, Malabanan presented a certification from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that the property has been classified
as alienable or disposable since March 15, 1982. The RTC granted the petition.

The Solicitor General appealed, arguing that Malabanan had not proven that the land was
alienable or disposable, or that Malabanan and his predecessors had possessed the land long enough for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

The CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. The CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982. Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not therefore be tacked to Malabanan’s period of possession.

Pending appeal before the CA, Malabanan passed away. His heirs then filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The SC ruled that the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree were applicable, and pegged the date for the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable at June 12, 1945. Malabanan failed to prove that
he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the property since on or before June 12,
1945. Petition for certiorari was denied.

In the motion for reconsideration, Malabanan’s heirs argued that mere classification of the land
as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State, and that this opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code. Thus, the ten-year period
should apply in their favor. The Solicitor General, in their motion for partial reconsideration, sought
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, upon which the
Malabanan heirs relied on.

ISSUE: Whether Malabanan could acquire the property by acquisitive prescription.

RULING:

Motion for reconsideration is denied, and CA’s decision is upheld.

The Court, in dismissing the motions for reconsideration, discussed the various classifications
of property under the 1987 Constitution. Particularly, the legal concept of Regalian Doctrine, public
land classification according to alienability, and stated that only agricultural lands can be alienated.
As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. This means that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of the land, and is charged with the conservation such
patrimony. Lands that are not clearly under the private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. In particular, Sec. 11 (4b) provides that acquisition by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is done by administrative legalization. The Court read
this together with Sec. 48 (b), which provided that registration may be done by citizens of the
Philippines who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In sum, the Court provided the following must be satisfied for an application for registration to
be granted:
The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in- interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application:

 The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
  The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
 The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
 The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.

The Court further interpreted Sec. 48(b) to mean that the character of the property subject of
the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Ownership and title were determined
by possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The argument of Malabanan’s heirs was
rejected by the Court. The Court ruled that the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only
to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable. It does not operate to make acquisitive
prescription apply in favor of Malabanan or his heirs. Acquisitive prescription, as well as other modes
of acquisition under the Civil Code, would only apply to lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth.

2nd Batch of Cases:

1.

2.

3.

4. VIEGELY SAMELO VS. MANOTOK SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 170509 June 27, 2012

Prepared by: Gerardo James L. Sabal IV

FACTS:

Manotok Services, Inc., alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land. On January
31, 1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of subject premises.
The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year, with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the
expiration of the lease contract on Dec. 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the subject
premises without paying the rent. On Aug. 5, 1998, the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok,
sent a letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for
its use and occupancy. The petitioner, however, refused to heed this demands.

On November 18, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
petitioner before the MeTC. In her answer, petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to
Collect rentals because such land is located inside the property of the Philippine National
Railways(PNR). She also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the subject premises
and further claimed that her signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondents
misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises as she
had been in possession since 1944.

ISSUE: Whether the action for unlawful detainer will prosper.

RULING:

An action for unlawful detainer exist when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any
land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, after the termination or
expiration of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The only issue
to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical possession of the property involved independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved. Thus, when the relationship of lessor and
lessee is established in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of
ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw a light on the right of possession.

The juridical relationship between a lessor and a lessee carries with it the recognition of the
lessors title or to assert a better title not only in herself, but also in some third person while she remains
in possession of the subject premises and until she surrenders possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of the lessor and lessee was created
and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.

5. GERMAN MANAGEMET AND SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Prepared by: Riczen O. Baculio

FACTS:

Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. The land was originally registered
pursuant to a Homestead Patent . They executed a special power of attorney authorizing German
Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision.Petitioner obtained
Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development.
However, part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons. Petitioner
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.Private respondents filed an action
for forcible entry against petitioner alleging that they are mountainside farmers and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association.

That they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27. Petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due
process of law by means of force, violence, threat and intimidation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner.

Ruling:
 Yes, Private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever
in possession of the subject property.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
6. PSUPT FELIXBERTO CASTILLO VS. DR. AMANDA & NIXON CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009

Prepared by: Edziel Jo D. Maluya

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which
intended to utilize it for local projects. The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn
decided against the spouses. RTC affirmed the decision. The spouses didn’t vacate and continued to file
cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended the demolition against the property, a determination of
the property bounds, and a remanding of the case by means of a writ of injunction. The respondents
filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another demolition order. In order to
stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property. Superintendent Castillo
was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession. Respondents refused. The y
filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC. The same people claimed that
the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy equipment and arrested them. RTC ruled in
their favor.

ISSUE: Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?

HELD:

No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on Oct. 24, 2007 and the Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power
was inherent in the Constitutional grant to the courts to promulgate rules for human rights.

Definitions of the Writs:

a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity”
 b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the “right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person”.

The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Secretary of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There
must be a connection between the acts and effects of the aforementioned rights. Tapuz v Del Rosario-
“What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.” The same case states that the court will only
issue the writ after determining the facts ‘existence from the supporting affidavits of the Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security
of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.” There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners
use of force. They were only protecting property rights. Their affidavit said: “Wala kaming nagawa
ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN POSSESSION.” Regarding habeas
data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement. The writs can’t be used to stall the
execution of a property dispute decision. The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was
due to the institution of criminal proceedings running first. They may avail of the reliefs as a motion.

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory
decision in a property dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.

7. BEJAR VS. CALUAG

G.R. No. 171277 February 15, 2007

Prepared by: Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

FACTS:

On August 2, 2002, the late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a complaint for unlawful detainer that
Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light materials consisting of wood and galvanized
iron roof built on government-owned land located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila. On December
21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the said residential house with an area of twenty-two
feet in length and fifteen feet in width to Fernando Mijares in the amount of Eleven Thousand
(₱11,000.00).

Subsequently, plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government land where his
residential house was built including the one-half portion he sold to Fernando Mijares, located at 777
Coral Street, Tondo, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 156220 registered and
entered in the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 30, 1983. On September 2, 1991, Fernando
Mijares, sold his residential house to Maricel Caluag with residence address at 1391 R.A. Reyes St.,
Tondo, Manila to be used as a warehouse for her business.

Plaintiff badly needs the portion of his land occupied by the defendant to build a residential
house for use of his family. On April 9, 2002, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to
defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the property situated at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila
within ten (10) days from receipt of the demand letter. Despite formal demand from the plaintiff on
April 19, 2002, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate said portion of the
property owned by the plaintiff located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiff.

On October 15, 2002, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MeTC has
no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue of ownership. On February 10, 2003, respondent
filed a supplement to her motion to dismiss alleging that pursuant to the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Bahay," Almario Bejar sold to Fernando Mijares both his house and the entire lot on which it was
constructed, citing paragraph 4 of the "Kasulatan" which reads:

Na alang alang sa halagang LABING ISANG LIBO PISO (₱11,000.00) kuartang Filipino na
kasasalukuyang gastahin na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahang loob kay FERNANDO MIJARES x
x x ay aking ipinagbili, ibinigay, isinulit at inilipat ng buo kong pagaari na kalahating harapan ng
bahay ko naipaliwanag sa itaas at ang pagbibili kong ito ay kasama ang lahat kong karapatan sa lupa
kung may karapatan ako na kinatitirikan ng bahay.

On June 16, 2003, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 173262-CV for want
of jurisdiction, holding that the actual issue between the parties is the enforceability of the subsequent
sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the subject property; and that, therefore, jurisdiction properly
lies with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

On appeal, the RTC, Branch 47, Manila, on January 5, 2004, rendered its Decision reversing
the Order of dismissal of the MeTC. The RTC held that the issue in Civil Case No. 173262-CV is who
has better possession of the disputed property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to hear the case on the
merits.

ISSUES:

Whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case; and

Whether the defendant is liable for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

RULING:

Yes, MeTC has jurisdiction over the case.

First Issue: In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who
between the contending parties has better possession of the contested property.3 Pursuant to Section 33
(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts that exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases. The proceedings are governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, as amended.
 We are guided by the elementary principle that what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.

The defendant is liable for unlawful detainer.

Second Issue: To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the complaint must
contain two mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff; and
(2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth.8 This latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed property by the intruder has
been unlawful from the very start. Then, the action must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry to the property or, in cases where stealth was employed, from the date the plaintiff learned
about it.

An examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV does not show
that Almario Bejar was deprived of his possession of the property by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth.

Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly alleges that Almario Bejar sold
one-half portion of his house to Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in turn, sold the same portion of the
house to respondent; that eventually, Almario Bejar became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot
where his house was built; that he needs the portion of the lot occupied by respondent for the
construction of a house for the use of his family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still
fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that Almario Bejar filed his complaint within
one year from the date of his last demand upon respondent to vacate the contested portion of the land.

A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint sufficiently alleges that there is a
withholding of possession or refusal to vacate the property by a defendant.10 The cause of action arises
from the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right to continue possession which is upon
plaintiff’s demand to vacate the premises. The complaint for unlawful detainer must then be instituted
within one year from the date of the last demand.11 All these incidents are present in the instant case.

Considering that the allegations in Almario Bejar’s complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV
show that it is one for illegal detainer, hence, it is the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila which has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 173262-CV.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The RTC Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the MeTC,
Branch 12, Manila, for further proceedings with dispatch.

8. SPOUSES PEDRO ONG AND VERONICA ONG VS. SOCCORO PAREL AND HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 143173, March 28, 2001

Prepared by: Michael Bryan S. Lauron

FACTS:

Sps. Ong is a registered owners of Lot No. 18, block 2 of the subdivision plan II of Rizal Park
subdivision, situated in Sta Cruz, Manila. On May 25, 1995, the Ong Sps. Filed an action for forcible
entry against defendant Parel before the MTC of Manila, alleging among other things that defendant
Parel through strategy and stealth constructed an overhang hollow block wall along the common
boundary of the parties adjoining Lot no. 17 owned by Parel and inside Lot No. 18 owned by plaintiffs
Sps. Ong.

On April 12, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
spouses Ong. Respondent on appeal with the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the Ong spouses to
prove prior possession of the subject lot. Then spouses moved for reconsideration which was also
denied.

Spouses elevated the matter to the CA which denied the petition on their findings that alleged
encroachments were made by the late Visitacion Beltran at the time when she still owned both lots or
when she had all the right and the power to introduce the improvements; thus the introduction of the
said construction could not be equated with strategy and stealth giving rise to forcible entry.

ISSUE: Whether or not forcible entry is the right action for the recovery of the said property.

RULING:

No. The petition has no merit. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courts requires that in actions
for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time within one year from the
time of such unlawful deprivation of possession.

On the other hand, respondents claim that the said structures were already existing on the lot at
the time petitioners brought the same from the Magbag spouses in 1994, was sustained by the lower
court, and since petitioners admitted in their petition that they discovered such encroachment only after
a relocation survey on their lot on august 23, 1994.

The court find no reason to disturb the respondent courts factual conclusion that the alleged
encroachments were made by the late Visitacion Beltran at a time when she still owned both lots nos.
17 and 18 or when she had all the right and power to do so.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either an Accion
Publiciana or an Accion Reinvindicatoria in the proper RTC.

9. ILDEFENSO TOLENTINO VS. TOMAS PARAISO

G.R. No. L-11405 July 28, 1916

Prepared by: Reina Joyce A. Oropilla

FACTS:

Plaintiff Tolentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance alleging that he is the owner
in fee simple of a parcel of land located in Sitio of Macabaclay, Bongabong, Nueva Ecija by reason of
having inherited from his late father, Simeon Tolentino, by virtue of extrajudicial partition between him
and his brothers. He also alleged that in 1910, Defendant Paraiso, without the plaintiff’s consent,
illegally appropriated said land and refused to return despite the various demands made upon him. On
September 22, 1913, defendant answered denying the allegations in the complaint and contending that
the land in question is a part of a larger tract owned by the defendant which adjoins the same and that
he acquired it by purchase which is evidenced with a deed of sale executed in his favor by its former
owner Miguela Tolentino, plaintiff’s aunt.

Moreover, Miguela previously acquired the property, by reason of an “Estate” partition among
the surviving children (Simeon, Remigio, Francisco and Miguela, a child of a second marriage) and
wife of Canuto Tolentino. On trial, Miguela claims that she only sold to the Defendant Paraiso of a land
which had a capacity of 6 cavanes and denies that she had sold 12 hectares of land. She further added
that she did not know the contents of the document she has signed because she was unable to read and
write in Spanish, it was the defendant who has drawn said document. Plaintiff further testified that he
had inherited the land in question from his Father Simeon who, since the time of the former Spanish
sovereignty up to his death, had possessed and tilled it. And that the land of the plaintiff, in the
extrajudicial partition, is not the same as the land belonging to Miguela Tolentino which she sold to
the defendant, although both land adjoin each other on the south of that of Ildefonso and the north of
that Miguela,( which only contains 6 hectares, 3 ares and 72 centares).

ISSUE: Whether or not Paraiso is the owner of the 12-hectare land as appeared on the deed of sale.

RULING:

NO. Miguela Tolentino, not being the owner of the Land in question, could not have disposed
of the property and transferred it to the defendant, because she possessed no right therein.

“Ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate
on intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.”(Art. 609, Civil Code)

If the dominion of the owner over the property consists the right to enjoy and dispose of the
same without further limitations than those established by the law, Miguela Tolentino, not being the
owner or proprietor of the land in litigation could not transfer the same to Paraiso, and as the latter
detains the land without right or title which transferred to him the dominion, thus, the owner has the
right to recover it. Furthermore, the validity and efficacy of the said deed of sale cannot produce any
effect except on the land really sold; it cannot affect the plaintiff’s land which, although it is adjoining,
is separate and does not belong to the vendor. Therefore, Paraiso is only the owner of 6 hectares of land
sold to him by Miguela Tolentino excluding adjoining 6-hectare land of Ildefenso Tolentino.

9.

10.

11. SPOUSES AGUSTIN FLORES and PURITA M. FLORES VS. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SALVADOR, MILAGROS and CONRADA,
ALL SURNAME NICO
178 SCRA 717

Prepared by: Faridah L. Asum

FACTS:
 Private respondent Nico owns Assessors Lot No. 71, located at Miag-ao, Iloilo. They claim that
the area of their lot is 689 square meters as shown by Tax Declarations and the sketch plans duly
certified by the Office of the Provincial Assessor; and that they have been in possession of that property
since 1936.

On the other hand, petitioner Flores owns the adjoining Assessors Lot No. 72. Their allegation
is that this lot has an area of 3,173 square meters pursuant to the Deed of Sale in their favor dated 11
January 1967 and as shown by Tax Declarations. A sketch plan however, also indicates that the area is
3,083 square meters. Both lots are unregistered properties.

Sometime in 1975, petitioners constructed a bamboo fence, and in 1978, a hollow-block fence
to separate the two adjoining properties, over the strong protest of Nico who alleged that the
construction encroached upon a portion of their property. As they refused to heed the protest, Nico filed
an action for “Recovery of Real Property with Damages”.

Lower courts ruled that the disputed area of 199 square meters (Lot A of 55 square meters being
claimed by Flores, Lot B of 144 square meters by Nico) belong to Nico and that Flores should demolish
the fence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ownership of disputed area belongs to Flores or to Nico.

RULING:

SC deemed it best to divide the disputed area between the parties equally, or 99.5 square meters
for each of them. Neither party has proven its entitlement to the entire disputed portion, much less has
either party convincingly shown the dividing line between their two properties. All contrary to the basic
rule that in an action to recover, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must
prove both ownership and identity.

While Nico may have been in possession of their lot since 1936 in the concept of owners and
planted trees thereon, these are insufficient to delineate boundaries. The bamboo fences respectively
built by the parties do not conclusively appear either as clear dividing lines. Also, Flores will necessarily
have to demolish their concrete fence and move it towards the resulting boundary, but they have only
themselves to blame since they proceeded with its construction despite the verbal and written protests
of Nico.

12. DOUGLAS B. ALVIR VS. HON. RIZALINA B. VERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXIII, BERNARDO MOLLAT AND TERESA
MOLLAT
G.R. No. L-39338 July 16, 1984

Prepared by: Sittie Ayna Dimaporo Dia

FACTS:

Douglas B. Alvir, herein petitioner, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against private
respondents Bernardo Mollat and Teresa Mollat, before the then Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal.
The basis of the complaint is that petitioner is the registered owner of a residential lot, together with the
improvements thereon and after said property had been adjudicated to him as its new owner, petitioner
wrote private respondents to vacate the premises as he and his family is in need of a place to live which
the respondent ignored.

Private respondent contended that In November 196, the late Dr. Antonio B. Alvir, petitioner’s
father, entered into a contract of sale with Mr. Howard J. Weber which the latter was given the right to
pay the full purchase price of the property within two (2) years from the date of the contract of sale and
the private respondents were allowed by Mr. Weber to occupy the premises before the he left for United
States. The respondents also averred that they have been occupying the property as tenants of Mr.
Weber.

However petitioner claims that as an owner, he is entitled to the possession of the premises
against private respondents with whom he has no contract and notwithstanding, refused to vacate the
same.

The inferior court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.

On appeal, the CFI set aside the decision of the then Municipal Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint.

From the evidences presented before him, the Court of First Instance found out that as early as
1966, the Alvirs and Weber seemed not to agree as to the amount still due to Alvirs from Weber which
prompted Weber to deposit the amount which he believed was the maximum amount still due to the
Alvirs with the Associated Banking Corporation. Thus, it appears that defendants are claiming the right
to possess the property by virtue of the authority of Weber who claims to be the owner of the property
as per deed of sale executed by the Alvirs in his favor.

That since the question of possession cannot be properly determined without settling that of
ownership, then the jurisdiction of the court is lost and the action should be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the ejectment suit

RULING:

No, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. In ejectment cases, the main
issue is only possession de facto. The mere fact that defendant raises issue of ownership is not sufficient
to divest the municipal court of jurisdiction thereon. But if, if it appears during the trial that the
principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession
which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, the
jurisdiction of the municipal or city court is lost and the action should be dismissed

The case is remanded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for that court to proceed with the
trial in the exercise of its original jurisdiction

13. ATTY. PATERNO CANLAS V. CA AND FRANCISCO HERRERA

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8, 1988

Prepared by: Donna Ginn G. Pacheco

FACTS:
 Respondent Herrera was the registered owner of 8 parcels of land in QC. He obtained several
loans from the L&R Corp. (financing institution) equal to P420,000. As security, he executed deeds of
mortgage in favor of the corp. over the parcels of land. Upon failure to pay, L&R extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage, causing the parcels of land to be sold at public auction, with L&R as highest
bidder. Pending redemption, the respondent through petitioner counsel filed a complaint for injunction
against L & R, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. Two years later, parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby
respondent was allowed another year to redeem the property and that Atty. Canlas shall be entitled to
P100,000 as attorney’s fees. The court approved the compromise.

Respondent remained in financial straits, failing to acquire the funds to repay the loans and the
attorney’s fees. Petitioner moved for execution as to his fees, which was granted but not collected.
Petitioner and respondent came to an agreement that Atty. Canlas would redeem the property in favor
of the latter, executing a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and /or to redeem,” which
enabled petitioner to redeem and register the same in his name. Respondent alleged that the deed was
falsified and filed an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, disbarment proceedings,
and various criminal complaints, but the court ruled otherwise, stating that it did not change the meaning
of the contract. He then filed a suit for Annulment of Judgment in the CA. Petitioner argues that the
petition for annulment was actually a petition for certiorari and should be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.

RULING:

YES. The Court observed that the “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem” was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract—not one in pursuance of what had been agreed
upon on compromise—in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over
the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties, which are “the object of any litigation.”

It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation
similar to that vested upon redemptioners. To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a
result of execution in satisfaction of judgment.

In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much
less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided.

At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil
Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. For this reason we
invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the
respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for
annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to
third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno
Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties. To hold Atty.
Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties
must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by
one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the
petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, in addition to
the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent
Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, such that he shall, after
proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sumof P326,000.00 as and for damages.

14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) VS. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 192100 March 12, 2014

Prepared by: Jaya Rhys Ybaňez

FACTS:

Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation is the registered owner of a 17,175-square meter
property situated in Pampanga. The Republic through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted
expropriation proceedings against the respondent over a portion of their property to be used for the
NLEX project.

The parties agreed on TRB’s authority to expropriate the subject property but disagreed as to
the amount of just compensation. Petitioner offered to pay P607,200.00 for the portion taken but
respondent made a counter-offer of P1,821,600.00. The parties eventually agreed to submit the issue of
just compensation to three Commissioners composed of the Municipal Assessor of San Simon as
Chairman, and the RTC Branch Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga
as Members.

The Assessor’s Office being aware of the actual conditions of subject property decided to use
opinion values stated by real estate brokers and banks in the determination of the current and fair market
value for the purpose of payment of just compensation. The amount of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 was
arrived at by the commissioners due to the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to
industrial use.

Although there was no documentary evidence attached to substantiate the opinions of the banks
and the realtors indicated in the Commissioners’ Report, the Court finds the commissioners’
recommendation of the valuation of industrial lands at P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 to be fair, and the
Republic’s offer of P300 per square meter to be very low.

ISSUE: Whether or not determination of the fair market value of the subject property is valid.

RULING:

No. The Court held that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of
the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax
declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence.

Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of expropriated land
taken for national government infrastructure projects, thus:
 SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation
Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. – In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation,
the court may consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevant standards:

(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;

(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;

(c) The value declared by the owners;

(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;

(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain
improvements on the land and for the value of the improvements thereon;

(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;

(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary
evidence presented; and

(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to
acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the
government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.

In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the classification of the subject
property which is located in an area with mixed land use (commercial, residential and industrial) and
the property’s conversion from agricultural to industrial land, and (2) the current selling price of similar
lands in the vicinity – the only factors which the commissioners included in their Report. It also found
the commissioners’ recommended valuation of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square to be fair and just
despite the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices were based merely on the opinions
of bankers and realtors.

Nonetheless, the Court did not subscribe to petitioner’s argument that just compensation for the
subject property should not exceed the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter). Zonal valuation is
just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis
of “just compensation” in expropriation cases.

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION VS. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 165354 January 12, 2015

Prepared by: Enricco Albert P. Ballares

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government-owned and controlled

corporation vested with authority under Republic Act No. 6395, to undertake the development of
electric generation, transportation and maintenance facilities. In 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property
owned by Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon, in Batangas City in order to construct and
maintain transmission lines. In 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC,
seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property, alleging that it
had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach any
agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of P 9,790.00 representing the
assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated.

In their answer, the respondents maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent in the process, destroying
some fruit trees without payment, and installing five transmission line posts and five wood poles for its
project. Respondents also content that while the area being expropriated only covered the portion
directly affected by the transmission lines, the remaining portion of the property was also affected
because the transmission line passed through the center of the land, dividing the land into three lots and
rendering the entire property inutile for any future use and capabilities due to the presence of the
transmission lines. Respondents also contend that they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR's entry
provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the
entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project • On 2014,
NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings by reason that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the
intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents' property, thus the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return
the property to its owners • Furthermore, they contend that the compensation to be awarded the
respondents be reduced by the equivalent of the benefit they received from the land during the time of
its occupation, and not the entirety, for there was never any actual taking of the land considering the
expropriation proceeding was never completed.

ISSUES:

Whether an ongoing expropriation proceeding be susceptible to dismissal once the subject land
no longer serves its intended public purpose or not ?

Whether there was any taking of land under Eminent Domain, for reasons of compensation,
considering the expropriation proceeding was completed?

RULING:

The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but,
conformably with the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon
such terms as the court deems just and equitable.

In the context of Eminent Domain, where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial
use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
Constitutional sense.

Expropriation:

The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not
only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public
purpose." • But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government's exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: • (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; • (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
 These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no
longer necessary for public use • The retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. • To continue with the expropriation
proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the
rendition of an invalid judgment in favour of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element
of public use.

Cornpensation:

The taking of private property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose
for which it was taken. Thus, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and
is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received • Furthermore, there is no
need to pay "just compensation" to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR.
Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents
for the entire period of the disturbance of their property rights

There is a sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and took possession of the
respondents' property as early as in March 1993 without the benefit of first filing a petition for eminent
domain • This Court has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking,
not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. Thus, the compensation must be based on
what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR's construction of the
transmission lines, from the time of entry in 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession.

16. NELSON LAGAZO VS. GERALD B. SORIANO AND GALILEO B. SORIANO

G.R. NO. 170864 February 16, 2010

Prepared by: Narodhen E. Yusop

FACTS:

On January 16, 2001, respondents file with MTC of Tabuk, Kalinga, a complaint for forcible
entry with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
claim they were the owners of the of the parcel of land. They allegedly acquired the same by purchase
from their grandfather, Arsenio Baac. They were allowed by Baac to cultivate the land. They paid
property taxes for the said property from 1990 to 1998 and had been in actual possession from that time.

On January 6, 2001, petitioner allegedly entered the property by means of FORCE, STEALTH,
and STRATEGY and began cultivating the land for himself. Petitioner insisted that they were the lawful
owner of the land in question, being the legal heirs of Alfredo Lagazo, the registered owner thereof.
They alleged that the agreement between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac was merely one of
mortgage.They allegedly tried several times to redeem the property, this prompted to bring the matter
before the Barangay Lupon of Balong, Tabung, Kalinga, but no agreement was reached.

The MTC dismissed the complaint of Forcible Entry filed against defendant Nelson Lagazo. The
RTC reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint. Respondents failed to prove prior physical
possession. Respondents then filed with the CA a Petition for Review is granted. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was dismissed. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding that the respondents have better right of
possession over the lot in controversy.

RULING:

The court found the petition unmeritorious. Prior physical possession is an indispensable element
in forcible entry cases. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him. Petitioner never established the fact of his physical possession over the
disputed land. Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

17. JOVEN DE GRANO VS. GREGORIO LACABA

GR NO. 158877 JUNE 16, 2009

Prepared by: Narodhen E. Yusop

FACTS:

Respondent claims that he is the owner of two adjacent parcel of land, located in Barangay
Niugan, Laurel, Batangas. The said parcel of land is covered by a separate tax declaration in the name
of the respondent. Respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against petitioner. According to respondent, he has been
in physical possession of the two parcel of land for more than 30 years and has paying real property
taxes. Respondent alleged that petitioner, by means of force intimidation, strategy and threats, and with
the help of his men, destroyed the perimeter fence built by the respondent.

Petitioner averred that the real owners and possessors of the property were the family of Ernesto
Malabanan, as evidence by TCT. Petitioner alleged that the Office of the Building Official approved
the application of the Mabanans for the construction of the fence on a portion of their property, which
caused the clearing of the said property.

The MCTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC affirmed the MCTC
decision. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the lower courts. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not forcible entry will prosper.

RULING:

Yes. For forcible entry suit to prosper, the complainant must allege and prove that he was
in prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of such possession by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. A party who can prove prior possession in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with better right lawfully
ejects him. Respondent’s evidence fails to make out a prima facie case of forcible entry as it does not
satisfactorily establish that respondent has been in physical possession of the subject property prior to
petitioner’s occupation thereof. Tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof
of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the
presumption that no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession. When the law speaks of possession, the reference is to prior
physical possession or possession de facto, as contra-distinguished from possession de jure. Only
prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.

Petition was granted, judgment and resolution of the CA was reversed and set aside.

Note: Prior possession is relevant in forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer.