Attorney's Role in Admission Requests
Uploaded by
Vance CeballosAttorney's Role in Admission Requests
Uploaded by
Vance CeballosPSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION), vs.
CA;
G.R. No. 106094 December 28, 1992
RULE 26 Sec. 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues have been joined, a party
may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request
or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
FACTS:
At issue in this petition for review is whether a request for admission directed to an adverse
party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered only by his counsel.
Petitioner PSCFC alleges that as land developer it availed itself of the Home Financing Plan of
Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690.00 as "developer loan."
As security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which properties
were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan,
the "developer loan" would mature only after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved
and then sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the
loan value of the lots and houses bought by them. However, on 25 September 1987, without the
loan having matured as none of the lots have been conveyed to buyers, such that the latter
could now take the place of petitioner as mortgagors, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of private respondent Banco Filipino.
On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission
signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's
mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans.
However, respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan, including
the agreement that the maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the mortgaged
subdivision lots.
On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent Banco
Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who
was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February
1968 and therefore did not have personal knowledge of the financing scheme. The second
request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did not send a formal notice of its intention to
foreclose the mortgage and that there was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made
by the party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent
Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn
statement would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it
must be the part itself who must respond to the request for admission and that a mere reply
made and verified by its counsel alone is insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent
behind recourse to modes of discovery.
PRINCIPLE:
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not
be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make
the response in his behalf.
DECISION:
The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ... 3
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as
found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of
attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and
their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel
to appear at the pre-trail in behalf of the client, he must clothe the former with an adequate
authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case
by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure ..."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not
be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make
the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously;
otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule
138, of the Rule of Court.
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority,
it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and
not petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response
made by its counsel in its behalf.
