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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit
of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that
sphere of executive authority;

2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never
be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.

3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question
may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period
given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .

4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks
at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of
its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction;
and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal
Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated
January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing
to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction
over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents
are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as
important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court
is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds
of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of
Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in
this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed
statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned,
which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable
to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby
enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid
Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas,
filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality
of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice
Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even
after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is
a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the
purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For
after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible.5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on
the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in
cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars
of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital
sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of
the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in
absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case
to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding
the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . .
and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is
an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question
arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It
bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which,
among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption
that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of
their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs
judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance
of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it
is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on
the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12
The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all

courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it
the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no
jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less
than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein

respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that
the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern,
and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital

information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of
seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day
of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant
to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of
such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and
defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at
execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to

herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section
28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of

which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access
to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature
are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right
and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by
his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's
right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on
the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted
the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December
15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final
and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the
TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite
as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed
in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of
law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts
and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to
grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective
as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1)
that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had
either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment
be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator
Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and
thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours
to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law
are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was
also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly
a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment
but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The
extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was
at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it
needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and
equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives
to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter
and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that
extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with
minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25
expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition,
the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence
of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has
served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been
the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our
clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of
capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-
death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse
of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to
assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the
very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the
courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by
the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the
mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of
law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who
hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress
would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after
deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused
or recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further
done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The
rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing
before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches
that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court
may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice or when supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man,
whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on
the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or
review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the
execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital
sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of
the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in
absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case
to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding
the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to
delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement . . ..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to
grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could
benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and
may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court
would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure
that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with
the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification
of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet
expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the
majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People
vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty
law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-
making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself
has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death
penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental
law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses theretofore already
provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons'
would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has
prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the
circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally
offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of
each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the
Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and
excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even
brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction,
not too unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in
undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to
hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is
fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however,
must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain
my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current
session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment,
the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death
penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons"
prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various
death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For
easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law
(or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally
nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both
RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means
of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law
reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his
previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its
Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even
in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to
reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a
retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to
reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while
the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and
thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-
claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-
imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of
the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and
made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a
constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes
but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition
that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is
emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly
limited:

1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and

2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons"
and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death
penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes;
and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing
said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1)
by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in
general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2)
the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit,
is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous"
crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659
itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph
in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its
bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective
juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not
arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the
authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty
once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes
were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of
Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws
which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to
the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the
Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and
subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by
Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez
agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not
just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were
admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I
also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:

1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or
level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or

2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is
added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or

3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or
magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the
same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier
penalty is prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never
be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization
of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the
future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation
(during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the
return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve
as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace
and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent
this particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on
that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening
circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized
society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be
commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the
compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own
concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of
the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate
penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice".
With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed
deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police
show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact
declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder
in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.