A AATAT ATT
ieIsvarapratyabhijiia-Vimarging, rpy in
short, Critique of the Doctrine of Divine
Recognition, is the most important work
of the Pratyabhijfia School of Kashmir
Saivism. Thisis a commentary by the great
Abhinavagupta on the Isvarapratyabhijtia-
Satra (or -Karika) of Utpala, expounded
by acommentary Bhaskar of Bhaskara-
kantha. The original text with Vimarsini
and the Bhdskari thereon was edited and
published by Dr. K.c, Pandey and Profes-
sor K.A. Subramania yer, along with
English Translation of the py by Dr.
Pandey, in three volumes under the title,
Bhaskari, as the Princess of Wales Saras-
wati Bhawan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in
the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively.
These works were out of print for long and
are now being re-issued under the general
title of Isvara-Pratyabnijiia-Vimarsini of
Abhinavagupta, in three yolumes.
The Isvarapratyabhijfia of Utapalacarya
has four Adhikaras: Jfiana-, Kriya-,
Agama- and Tattvasangraha-. The first
volume contains the Janadhikara which
has eight Ahnikas or chapters along with
the Vimaréini of Abhinavagupta and the
Bhaskari of Bhaskarakantha. The second
volume completes the text and the com-
mentaries in the Temaining three Adhikaras,
This also carries an Introduction giving
in brief the History and Literature and
philosophy of the Pratyabhijiia system
along with various appendixes for Vol. I
and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English transla-
tion of the Isvarapratyabhijaa and the
VimarSini.
ISBN: 81-208-0019-2 (for set) j Re,
‘@ |
ee/ 33
KS-56EylISVARA-PRATYABHIJNA-VIMARSINI
OF ABHINAVAGUPTA
aferaancitat gracnafaafaataatISVARA-PRATYABHIJNA-VIMARSINI
OF ABHINAVAGUPTA
Doctrine of Divine Recognition
Volume II
Sanskrit Text with the Commentary Bhaskari
Adhikara 2, 3, 4
Edited by
Prof. K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER
and
Dr. K. C. PANDEY
General Editor
Professor Dr. R. C. DWIVEDI
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras
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wreattdafaat
faded art:
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sito Glo Mo AAT Azar:
sto aiftaraex qwea:
TATA:
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Hawa @tacaiaa
feet areomit gear mare© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110007
Branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221001 \
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore,
Madras 600 004
First published : The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana
Text No. 83, 1950
Reprint : Delhi, 1986
ISBN: 81-208-0021—-4
Printed in India by Narendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press,
‘A-45 Naraina, Phase I, New Delhi 110 028 and published by
Shantilal Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110 007.GENERAL EDITOR’S NOTE
Isvarapratyabhijid-Vimarsini, IPV in short, (Critique of the
Doctrine of Divine Recognition) is the most important work of
the Pratyabhijaia school of Kashmir Saivism. This is a commen-
tary by the great Abhinavagupta on the Jvarapratyabhijiia-Sitra
(or -Karika) of Utpala, expounded by a commentary Bhaskari
of Bhaskarakantha. The original text with Vimarsini and the
Bhaskar! thereon was edited and published by my teachers, Dr.
K. C. Pandey and Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, along with
English translation of the JPV by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes
under the title, Bhdskari, as the Princess of Wales Saraswati
Bhavan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954
respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now
being re-issued under the general title of [vara-Pratyabhijna-
Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, in three yolumes. An Outline of
History of Saiva Philosophy given by Dr. Pandey in Vol. ILI of the
Bhaskari will be issued separately for the sake of general readers
and the scholars interested in the history of religions. Reprint of
the rare and fundamental works of Kashmir Saivism will be wel-
comed by the scholars concerned with the idealistic systems of
Indian Philosophy.
It was in the mid-9th century A.D., when the whole of India
was fired with the Advaita Vedanta of Acarya Sankara that the
beautiful land of Goddess Sarada, the Kashmir valley, produced
a great acarya, who systematized the philosophical postulates of
the Saiva non-dualism on the basis of the monistic Saiva scriptures.
His name is Somadeva, better known as Somananda. He was an
older contemporary of another great Saiva acdrya, Bhatta Kallata
who wrote his Vtti on the Spanda Siitras revealed to Vasugupta.
The spanda system hardly differs in its philosophical thought from
Somananda? Their real difference lies in prescribing different
means of realizing the philosophical goal. Sivadrsti or Vision from
Siva by Somananda is the first systematic formulation of the
of what is later on conveniently described as the
4 school of Kashmir Saivism, following the term
occurring in the [svarapratyabhijiia of Utpala, Somananda invi
his foundational work, the Sivadrsti, consisting of seven chapters
of 700 verses, declared (I. 2) that Lord Siva is the essence and
identity of all the beings, He shines in all the beings. He is bliss
and consciousness whose free will nothing can impede and who
manifests himself through his powers of knowledge and action.
This concept of the highest reality is basically different from the
Buddhistic idea of momentary vijfidna, from the nirguna (hence
passive) Brahman of Sankara, from the dualistic conception of
Purusa and Prakyti of the Sankhya and from the later schools of
Vaisnava Vedanta. Somananda not merely propounded his theory
of the ultimate reality, he refuted the grammarians’ theory of
Sabda Brahman, the views of the Saktas, the dualistic Saivas,
and the followers of the Yoga and demonstrated the lack of logic
and consistency in their view of reality. Utpaladeva, Utpalacarya,
or simply Utpala, built the great edifice of the Pratyabhijid on the
foundations laid by his teacher Somananda. He wrote his famous
ISvarapratyabhijaa Sutra or Karika by working out at great
length the germinal ideas of the founder of the system (Utpala
treats his Karika as the reflection of the Sivadrsti) and by provid-
ing a suitable fencing against the onslaughts of the counter
systems of Indian philosophy.
Utpala advocates the permanence and universality of the self
and criticises the Vijiianavadin’s theory of momentariness and
individuality, He asserts that freedom of will, thought and action
is basic essence of being. Being must have innate power to become
at will. He vehemently opposes the passive Brahman of Vedanta
and lack of integrality between Purusa and Prakrti of the Sarhkhya,
Vasugupta had recognized three ways of final freedom of human
beings: Sambhava, Sakta and Anava. These ways required an
ascetic life of complete detachment and austere practice of Yoga.
Somananda and Utpala show anew way to freedom and beatitude.
The realization in the Pratyabhijaia system, to quote from the
Introduction of Vol. II (pp. v-vi) by Dr. K. C. Pandey, “consists,
not in the actualisation of the potential, nor in the attainment
of something new, but in penetrating through the veil that makes
the Mahesvara appear as the individual of which everyone is
immediately aware and in recognising the MaheSvara in the
individual.” The followers of this system daily recite the follow-
ing verse which sums up the attitude of a Saiva:vii
fara eran fret vitae, fara: wafied soa 1
feat aafa ava, a: fra: aise fe
The following prayer for universal peace and happiness occur-
ring at the end of the manuscript B of the Vivytivimarsint of
Abhinavagupta quoted by its editor in his Preface to Volume I
explains the Saiva’s feelings for the world around him and for
his fellow human beings :
qaaeg aasrat releafrea wag TTT: |
aot: sarg wid ada gdtasg sar 1
Utpala holds that the human being is essentially free; freedom
is the very nature of the individual. However, the veil of ignorance
covers this freedom of man and thus keeps him away from the
God within him. Man must remove this ignorance; he must
penetrate through the veil to recognize his real self, eternally free,
omniscient and omnipotent. Recognition is the way to regain the
lost freedom. Incidentally, it is significant to note that the
philosophy of Utpala has intimate parallels in the Daksinamiir-
tistotra of Acatya Sankara, as interpreted by his great disciple,
SureSvara (See Abhinavagupta, pp. 151-52) and the lyrics of the
Saundaryalahari.
According to the tradition, Utpala lived near Vicharnaga to
the north of Srinagar and belonged to the end of the 9th and
first half of the 10th century A.D. Many of his works are lost,
those surviving include Ajadapramatrsiddhi, Isvarasiddhi, Sam-
bandhasiddhi and the commentaries on the latter two works. His
commentary on the Sivadysfi is available only in part. His devo-
tional lyrics are collected under the title Sivastotrdvali and quot-
ations from his unknown works are found in the JPY. But heis
justly famous for his Isvarapratyabhijfia Siitra or Karika. This
reveals sharpness of his intellect, original thinking and masterly
exposition, intimate knowledge of the monistic tradition of the
Saiva Agamas and the recognitive Sadhana to realize the Lord
Mahe$vara.
He wrote two auto-commentaries on his Karika: Vrtti and
Vivrti or Tika. No complete MS of either of these two commen-
taries by Utpala has so far been discovered. The available portion
of the Vrtti upto the 20th karikd of the third adhikara was
published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series and the fragment of theviii
Vivrti is in the personal collection of Dr. K. C. Pandey, which
remains unpublished. The fragment of the Vivrti begins with the
6th Karikd of the Jaanadhikara, Ahnika 3 and ends abruptly with
the 3rd Karika of the fifth Anika, Utpala imparted his new doct-
tine to Laksmanagupta who transmitted itto his worthiest disciple,
Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedic writer on Indian aesthetics and
Kashmir Saivism. Abhinava wrote acommentary on the Vivrti
of Utpala, known as the Vivytivimarsinf. This was published in
the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. LX (1938 A.D.),
LXIH (1941 A.D.) and LXV (1943 A.D.) in three volumes.
Abhinava’s direct commentary on the text of Utpala’s Karika is”
also known as Vimarsini and described as Laghu VimarSini, being
shorter in length than the Vivrti-Vimarsini, which is described as
the Brhativimarsint. They are also known as Catussahasri and
Astadasasahasri respectively in accordance with the old method of
calculation. The Siitras or Karikas of Utpala remain unintelligible
without a commentary, like the Sitras of Panini or Badarayana.
Utpala’s own commentaries are more in the nature of independent
exposition of the Pratyabhijiia system than actual explanation of
the text. Abhinavagupta’s Vimarsini offers explanation of the
Karika@ and also reads like an independent work. It is available in
full and it represents the systems comprehensively and correctly.
Abhinavagupta’s Vimarsint is thus the most authentic commentary
of the Pratyabhijaia system, which enjoys the reputation of an
original work. However, in spite of its clarity and lucidy and
comprehensive treatment of the system, it does require a guide to
understand the full implications of the words and the ideas of the
Vimarsint. The commentary does not solve the problem fully
particularly when the oral tradition of teaching the Sastras is lost
and when we know that the original thinker like Abhinava will
naturally make fresh points in promoting the tradition and in
defending it against newly formulated counter-points in the
philosophical circles of India in the 10th century A.D.
It was to obviate this difficulty that Dr. K. C. Pandey set on the
search for a commentary on Abhinava’s VimarSini. He struck
gold in 1931 when he discovered a commentary Bhaskari by
Bhaskarakantha, He belonged to the later half of the 18th
century A.D. According to the Bhaskari he was of the Dhaumya-
yona Gotra and the names of his grand-father and father were
Vaidiryakantha and Avatarakantha respectively. It was to teachix
his son Jagannatha (‘svasutadibodhanartham’) that Bhaskara
wrote his learned commentary giving traditional interpretation of
the Vimargini or the Pratyabhijfia school of Kashmir Saivism for
that matter, which was handed down to him through unbroken
chain of acaryas. Besides this commentary, he translated the
mystic sayings of Lallesvari, Lalla Vak, into Sanskrit, wrote a
commentary, available in fragment, on the Yogavdsistha and
composed a poem, named Harsesvarastava, in singing the glory
of the Lord on the occasion of his visit to the temple in Kashmir.
Another anonymous commentary on the VimarSint, Isvarapra-
tyabhijiid-Vimarsini-Vyakhya procured by the late Dr. K. C.
Pandey from the Government Manuscript Library, Madras and
edited by him before his sad demise is under print and will be
published before long by Messrs Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
According to Madhava (15th century A.D.), the author of the
Sarvadarsana-Samgraha, (i) Sittrai.e. I§varapratyabhij a of
Utpala and his two commentaries thereon, (ii) Vytei and (iii) Vivrti
and short and long commentaries of Abhinavagupta, namely,
(iv) Vimarsini and VivrtivimarSini constitute the Pratyabhijiiasastra
which in essence is the exposition of the Sivadrsti (spoken of as a
prakarana of the Saivaéastra) of Somananda:
aa afafagfactedt gait fanfait
sacrfarorrssafafa med safer: 1
(This verse also occurs in the Sastraparamarga of Madhuraja
where the last word reads as ‘pratyabhijiakhyam’.)
The ISvarapratyabhijfid of Utpalacarya has four Adhikaras:
Jiiana-, Kriya-, Agama- and the Tattvasarigraha-. The first volume
contains the Jfdnadhikara which has eight Ahnikas or chapters
along with the Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta and the Bhdskari of
Bhaskarakantha. The second volume completes the text and the
commentaries in the remaining three Adhikaras. This also carries
an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and
Philosophy of the Pratyabhijfia system along with various
appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English translation
of the [svarapratyabhijfid and the VimarSini. As these volumes are
essentially photo-prints; the original edition has not been disturbed
except in the formal matters where the change of title, publisher
etc. is involved. In some cases it might create apparent difficulties,
For example, the volumes, although now differently titled willx
still be found under the old title of the Bhdskart in the contents,
Introduction etc. of Dr. K. C. Pandey. In our desire to place
these volumes in the hands of readers at the earliest, we did not
think it proper to make changes warranted by new circumstances
of the publication. I crave the indulgence of the scholars .in this
matter and hope the reprint of the classic texts of the /fvarapratya-
bhijfia system of Kashmir, for which real credit should go to
Shri J. P. Jain, the publisher, will help in further promoting
the growing interest of Indologists in this branch of Indian
Philosophy.
Department of Sanskrit, R. C. DWIVEDI
University of Rajasthan, JaipurCONTENTS
General Editor’s Note
v
Preface a @
Introduction Gi)
Preliminary ie (iii)
@ History and Literature
Soménanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijfia System (iii)
Somananda and the tradition of the Monistic Saivagamas (iv)
His rationalistic approach a (iv)
His discovery of Pratyabhijaia Re (v)
The Isvara Pratyabhijia Karika of Utpaldcarya (vi)
Importance of the VimarSini of Abhinavagupta (vii)
The Bhaskari of Bhaskara Kantha ase (viii)
Another Commentary on the Vimarsini < (ix)
(ID Philosophy
The Philosophical Background of Kriyasakti ... (ix)
The Mahesvara i («)
The Influence of Religion (xi)
Mahesvara, the Absolute Mind (xiii)
Svatantryavada (xvii)
The point of view of the Iévara Pratyabhi (xix)
The Bauddha theory of action ‘ 2 (xx)
The Bauddha criticism of the Saiva view of action (xxiii)
Bauddha refutation of the Mahesvara i” (xxiv)
Objections against the Svatantryavada (xxvi)
The Saiva reply (xxvii)
Agreement with the Monistic Vedanta Re (xxx)
The Saiva answer to Buddhistic objections ,
against kriya boo (xxxii)
List of Abbreviations se (xxxvi)Sanskrit Text
AN arfear qooq
frantirere: a
sanatend—Prarakae rT, RARE
fara:
FTA, g
atatenfiatertisas aranfaaa: g ©
aarernaras: R go
PUTTS, Ry RR
wom TA TAT: a Re
uaala carreras: Rw
factamitea—' earttien Ro-gy
frareraaadtt 7g: g RR
wa STREaTL RR
frarare epetyi ar Re
uarnerearaa fram: wove
ferent aT & we
warns pranratt: v as
aetremnfaert- arcacreta ea GXROE
SAUTE CTET co
seqaaaraea Urge RRR ER
frorrraera RR RRA
siafefetaarantarad Re -RRo
STAR SATTETITT TET: Ea Gu ea
TERA ERS TAT 20 kee
ag aati aeecTae see BXo-RoR
was Ua BAST:
FSC FROTTT AT
g RAR
Reet RISxiii
faa: aqitet = IS
Saqeta scare STAT wee HERO RHE
sraare frafearhecaearsitear see BRR VOM
ahidte: aaron Taras
feeata are we RRR 85S
BTA HAH TAT HTATARTATT AIT FONE, RE
Sareareribacara AIO A TT se RO“RR ROR
STATA:
seen STL, RPo-Q¥R
Rarer, 20s RR
aaa: SETA, eS
aierareaaTy Re RR
wean: wehrans STTTA: nest
safraTTeMTE TATRA SATE weet Ae, Hw RRO
wat Ae Balt RRR
saoraatiied gehen, & Re
FTAA STA, ee RR
RTT a 5 RRR
mace ee RUT CTT
FOI eTAKeT ETT ay BRR
ROTA TOT, me RO URS
ifaafatatrerr, {he WE. RR YS
fedrteny—mraeratrerny «as R-Rvs
FORA, oe CANS,
aeraTTH eter Sap ER
ATTRA STRAT ve We RS
rarer gore fre: ae Roxiv
fraat:
Rardlai Aird Fe,
ASST FRAT SST THREAT
SANTA: ATA
arama: *
anlar tad qtaadiatedtaaa,
Wiasmaraaere smeatate:
ee
ono SR—8 A
«RRR
- 8R-80
ao
TAMA AHA -ABATEA AAT ICT TAIT ALATA Yok-FO
wise AVAL Ut STAT
TST,
FR
FATA SETA
waa WaT
sagan:
af safe saafeafa:
wy af saateaia:
Sree eta eT
fragitetenmastt ata:
aaa: st ole Fa:
aera sae Tara:
abrarcaaeanaea nor
omer
seratarecarasatiar seater
firar 4 waters cera:
SISETT
Roo
RR
Row
Ro
RoR
RoE
Nett
Rey
Zoo
RoR
ow
R08
R05
Rok
RRR
RYee a ee ee ee
xv
aa:
Sacrafaararicarat gat
Taare Serra pacrea aT RTARTA wt
davretrertaficgrrenat Fara at mss
Saumatartakegraeat sere at
iquatereakrgrae ward at...
Saraftanfrafieqreaai Tara eat Gat...
Sacatartaiirtentortiaacaci et
BRERA TATTATEATAT A
348 ]
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avo |PREFACE.
The Bhaskari Vol. II, which is being presented to the
reader after the gap of twelve years, completes the work.
It covers the last three Adhikaras: (I) Kriya, (11) Agama and
(III) Tattva Saigraha,
The war and its after-effects have been primarily
responsible for the long delay in bringing out this part. Soon
aftef the publication of the First Volume in 1988, the com-
positors at the Government Press, Allahabad, had taken the
work of the present Volume in hand and had made good
progress, when the war broke out and the types had to be
broken up as an emergency measwre, even before the com-
posed and approved portion could be printed off, ‘The press
copy of the Manuscript was-neglected so much that it could
be traced out with very great difficulty. It was found in a
mutilated condition and in spite of long and careful search,
the last two pages of it could not be recovered. A fresh
press copy had to be prepared. The matter of the missing
pages of the press copy could not be reconstructed with
the available material. In its place, therefore, another
commentary, which has been utilised for filling up the long
gap in the original Manuscript of the Bbaskari, had to be put.
‘There is nothing to add to what has been said in the intro-
duction to the Bhaskari Vol. I, about the big and the small
gaps in the MS,, fidelity to the manuscript, different readings
of the Vimargini, Sandhiand the use of different types in
the- Bhaskari, The same principles and methods have been
followed in this volume also,( ii)
Prof. K, A. S. Iyer had no time to collaborate for the last
six years, though he wished to doso, The entire editorial
work from preparing a Press copy to seeing the final proofs
had to be done by Dr. Pandey. Surely, if Prof. Iyer had
collaborated, the defects of the book, whatever they may be,
would have been fewer.
After the completion of the work, it is our sacred duty
to acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude to Mahamahopa-
dhyaya Narayana Shastri Khiste, Principal, Government
Sanskrit College, Banaras, and to Mr, M, G, Shome, Superin-
tendent, Printing and Stationery, Allahabud, for their keen
and sustained interest in this Work and for all the help that
they have so promptly given, We are also deeply indebted
to Pandit Soma Datta Pandey, Vyakaranacharya, the elder
brother of Dr, Pandey, for the much needed help in reading
the proofs and in preparing the Indices ; and to Mr. Baikunth
Nath Bhargava, Managing Proprietor of the Anand Sagar
Press, Banaras, for giving priority to this work, But for their
help it would not have been possible to bring this volume out.
soci inareimasinie tie aise ae aINTRODUCTION.
( Dr, K. ©. Panpey. )
Preliminary.
The Monistic system of thought, that arose in Kashmir
in the 9th Century A.D., isa synthesis: of the idealistic,
realistic, voluntaristic, absolutistic and mystic tendencies of
the thinkers of that land of beauty. It is called the
Pratyabhijiia Dars‘ana qn the basis of the title “Iévara
Pratyabhijiia” which Utpalacarya gave to his Karikas. But
before Madhavacarya gave this name to the system in his
Sarva Daréana Sangraha, it was known as Svatantryavada,
a name by which it is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his
Vivti Vimargini (I. P. V. V., Vol. I, P.9). To our contem-
poraries it is known as “Kashmir Saivaism’. Mr. J. C.
Chatterji gave this name to the system, because all the
writers on ib belonged to Kashmir.
(1) HISTORY AND LITERATURE.
Somananda, the founder of the Pratyabhijna System,
The Pratyabhijfié system was founded in Kashmir by
Sominanda ( Circa 850 A. D. ), the author of the Siva Drsti.
It is in this work that we find the Pratyabhijiia, the Recogni-
tion, as a means to the Realisation of the Ultimate Reality,
pointed out for the first time the philosophical literature
of Kashmir. He himself calls his work ‘Prakarana’, probably
meaning thereby that it is a. treatise, which does not simply
state the principles aphoristically, as was done by Vasugupta,
but puts them on a rational basis, The five works: (I ) Sutra,G tie)
(AL) Vetti and ( IIL) Viveti of Utpalacarya; and (IV ) Laghvi
Vimars‘ini and (V) Brhati Vimaréini or Vivgti Vimaréini of
Abhinavagupta, which are recognised to be the authoritative
books on the Pratyabhijis System by Madhava in his Sarva
Dars‘ana Safgraha, simply reflect and elaborate the views
of Sominanda, presented in the Siva Drsti. Somananda,
theresore, was the founder of the Pratyabhijiié system.
Somananda and the tradition of the Monistic Saivagamas.
According to his own statement in the concluding verses
of his work, the Agamic traditon, to which he has given a
philosophic form, goes back to the hoary past, But much of
what is stated thore would sound mythical to modern histori-
ans. We, therefore, ignore it here. The part that is of his-
torical value from the modern point of view is the account of
his own descent from Tryambakaditya, the propagator of the
monistic Saivagamas in Kaliyuga.
Somananda represents himself to be the 19th descendant
of Tryambake, He wasa great-grand-teacher of Abhinava-
gtipta and, therefore, in all probability a contemporary of
Bhatta Kallata, who, as we know from the Rajataraigini, was
acontemporary of King Avanti Varman of Kashmir ( 855-883
A.D.). Therefore, if we follow the traditional method of allowing
twenty-five years for each generation, we will have’ to udmit
that a period of four hundred and fifty years intervened
between ‘Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic
jaivagamas, and Somananda, The philosophic tradition,
therefore, which Somananda systematises, goes back to about
the end of the 4th Century A. D,
His rationalistic approach.
In the history of the monistic Saiva literature of Kashmir,
Somananda is the first to make a definitely rationalistic(ys)
approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality. He
distinctly refers to the various prevailing schools of thought
and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories. His
attacks are primarily directed against the Sabdabrahmavada
of the Grammarians and the Saktyadvayavada, of a section
of Kashmir Ssivas themselves, But other systems, such as
the various schools of Buddhism, the monistic Vedanta, the
Jainism, the Safkhya, the Nyaya and the Vais‘esika, he
criticises summarily only. He clearly brings out» the
distinction of the Ultimate, as maintained by the mouistic
Saivas, from similar conceptions of other systems, through
comparison.
His discovery of Pratyabhijna.
He discovered, through deep study of the monistic
Saivagamas, a means to final emancipation, which was
unknown even to Vasugupta, the first writer of a treatise on
Kashmir Saivaism. It is this means to the realisation of the
Ultimate, the Pratyabhijna, which has given the system the
name, under which it is Summarised by Madhava in his Sarva
Dargana Safgraba.
Vasugupta had recognised only three means or ways to
liberation: (1) Sambhava ( II ) Sakta and (111) Anava. All
these meant an ascetic life of detachment from the world and
long practice of Yoga, both extremely dificult in the prac-
tical world. Somananda represents an advance on Vasugupta.
He shows a new way to the Realisation of the Ultimate
metaphysical Reality, che Mahevara. ‘The realisation
consists, not in the actualisation of the potential; nor in the
attainment of something new; nor in knowing what was
unknown before; but in penetrating through the veil, that
makes the Mahe$vara appear as the individual, of which every
one is immediately aware, and in recognising the Maheévara( vi)
in the individual. He holds that the individual is essentially
free ; freedom is the inner being of the individual. But it is
hidden by the veil of ignorance. The ignorance has to be
removed to recognise it, to realise it as identical with the
Reality.
Somananda asserts that his doctrine that the entire
universe is essentially identical with Siva or Rudra, is upheld
even in the Vedas and Puranas and refers to the Vedic
passages, such as “Ekorudrovatasthe” “Puruga evedati sarvain”
“Sorodidyadasya rudrasya rudratvam” and the Puranic
conception of eight forms of Siva,
The Ivara Pratyabhijna Karika of Utpalacarya
Utpalacarya was a pupil of Somananda. His Iévara
Pratyabhijid Karika, according to his own statement in the
concluding verse of his work, reflects the views of SomAnanda,
as presented in the Siva Drsti.
Somananda had summarily criticised different schools of
Buddhism and some other schools of thought. Buddhism was
fully alive in Kashmir at that time. And, therefore, uvery
probably there was a counter-criticism of the monistic Saiva
Philosophy that had just arisen, Utpalacarya, undertook to
reply to this counter-criticism and wrote his Tévara Pratyabhi-
Jha Karika and two commentaries thereon, which are nothing
more than a reply to the Bauddha objections against the funda-
mentals of the monistie Saivaism. Only the last two small
Adhik@ras are devoted to the exposition and the presentation
of the summary view of the system respectively,
He wrote some minor works also. But in all his works his
efforts are concentrated on establishing permanence as opposed
to momentariness, universality as opposed to individuality
and freedom of thought and action as opposed to passivity( Santatva ) of the Mind. The permanence and universality
are asserted against the Vijiia@navadin Bauddhas, who are
true subjectivists and hold the subject to be momentary and
jndividual and the object to be a mere projection of such a
subject. And freedom of the Universal Self he emphasises
against the monistic Vedanta, which holds the Brahman to be
Santa, without Vimaréa, Spanda or Sphuratta, Thus, he
shows in detail the distinction of his school from the Bauddha
on the one hand and from the Vedauta and the Saakhya on
the other.
Importance of the Virnars'int of Abhinavagupta,
Utpalacarya in his Vgtti bas not given any detailed oxpla-
nation of the words, employed in the Karika. His object was
simply to state the substance of the Katikas clearly, In fact,
he himself, according to Abhinava’s quotation in the Vimars‘ini,
(Bb, Vol.1,P.39)) said that Vetti was intended to put
clearly what had rather been obscurely stated in the Sutras,
because of the limitations of the Sitra style. Utpalacarya in
his Vrtti, never refers to any word of the Siitra for explaining
itssmeaning. He seems to write an independent work, presen-
ting summarily but clearly the fundamentals of his system.
In his Vivyti or Tik&, he is not concerned with the explanation
of the Siitrasso much as with the elaboration of the ideas,
presented in the Vytti. He has, therefore, nob attempted a
full exposition of the aphorisms anywhere,
Abhinava in his Vimargini tried to bring out the fall
import of the Siitras so as to show that all the details of the
system are implied by the words of the Sutras, He was a
very great grammarian. He, therefore, tried to bring out the
implications of the words on the basis of the rules of grammar,
to which there are frequent references in the work,( viii)
Utpalacarya wrote two commentaries, (I) Vetti and { II)
Vivrti or Tika, as has already been stated. No complete MS.
of the Vrtti has so far been discovered. ‘The Kashmir edition
contains Vrtti up to the 20th Karika of the third Adhikara,
Bub unfortunately, in spite of all search for it, no trace
ofthe Vivrti has so far been found. It was an important
work, Herein the author elaborated the ideas, aphoristically
presented in the Karika. But even this needed further eluci-
dation. Abhicavagnpla, therefore, wrote a commentary on
this commentary, called Vivrti Vimaréini, This also has been
published withont the original text. Thus, we find that most
of the available material for a proper understanding of the
Pratyabhijia system is from the pen of Abhinavagupla. His
Vivyti Vimargini, though a very voluminous and important
work on the Pratyabhijiia system, is not of much help in gett-
ing a connected and detailed idea of the system; because the
original commentary, the Vivgti of Utpalacarya, is not avail-
able. In his Vivrti Vimaréini, howevor, Abhivavagupta enters
into independent and lengthy discussions on various problems.
But they can be understood only after the fundamentals
of the system have been thoroughly grasped in detail,
Thus we find that the only recognised text on the Praty-
abhijita system, that is available in full and in which the
system is fairly well and accurately presented, is the Vimaréini
of Abhinavagupta. It is, therefore, the most important
available work, which, though a commentary on the Karika,
yet presents the system in such a way that one can geta
fairly clear idea of the whole system, without having recourse
to other texts, not excluding even the Karika
The Bhaskart of Bhaskara Kantha,
But the Vimargini of Abhinavagupta is extremely difficult,
The writer of these pages, struggled with it for years, without( ix )
much appreciable success. Even the discussions with old
Pandits of Kashmir, who were in touch with the system, could
not remove the doubts about the correctness of the interpreta-
tion. For, the continuity of the tradition having been broken.
their own minds were not free from donbts, A commen-
tary, presenting the traditional interpretation, was greatly
needed. It was, therefore, a moment of great joy, te discover
the Bhaskari in Srinagar in 1931. The necessary informa-
tion about this commentary and its author has been given in
“Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study” and
in the Introduction to the first Volume of the Bhaskari itself.
Another commentary on the Vimarsini.
In the course of search for Mss on various aspects of
Saivaism, another commentary on the Vimargini- was found
in the Government Manuscript Library, Madras. It is named
“Iévara Pratyabhijiia Vimargini Vyakhya, No information
even about the name of its author is available. In the present
volume, this commentary has been used to fill up two gaps,
(1) Kriyadhikara, Abnika II, Karikas 2-6, and (II) the last
two Rarikas of the Tattva Sangrahadhikara, i.e, the concluding
verses of the work, The portion on the Kriyalhikara is
missing not only in the MS,, on which the present edition is
based, but also in the original. This information was very
kindly given by the living descendants of Bhaskara Kantha
in Srinagar, But the portion of the Bhaskari on the
concluding two verses was lost in the Press.
(IL) PHILOSOPHY
Lhe Philosophical Background of “Kriyas'akti”
The present volume is mainly occupied with the presenta-
tion of ‘Kriyagakti’, Its porper understanding presupposes a(x)
clear idea of the Mahegvara; of the Svatantryavada, and of
the Bauddhs objections against the view of the MaheSvara as
Karta’, In order, therefore, to facilitate the reader's task,
these points are discussed in the following pages,
The Mahesvara.
The MaheSvara, in the context of metaphysics, is the Free
Will. As such He has two powers, (I) the power to act, that
is, to manifest the phenomena, which are the basis of the
temporal and spatial orders and ( II ) the power to know, that
is, to manifest the limited subjects and objects and all the
rest that is involved in cognition. The former is technically
called ‘Kriyagakti’ and the latter ‘Jfianagakti’, He is called
Mahe§vara, bevause of His omnipotence and omniscience, not
in the sense, in which these words are understood in the
system of Nyaya, but in the sense that He has two powers as
presented above,
_ In this connection it is necessary to keep in mind that the
Shiva differs from the Naiyayika in his conception. of the
‘Power’ ( Sakti), According to the latter, it is a quality which
cannot exist without a substratum and, therefore, presupposes
& possessor, distinet from itself. The talk of power necessarily
means dualism. The knower is different from the power to
Know and so is the doer from the power to act. But the
former holds that the power is non-different frotn the possessor.
(Saktigaktimatorabhedah ), It is the very being of the
possessor : the distinction between the power and its possessor
is as imaginary as between vhe fire and its power to burn
( Na s‘ivah saktirahito na saktih sivavanyite
Tadatmyamanayornityam vahnidahacayoriva. )
Similar is the case with the difference of one power from
another, It is assumed because of the variety of the effects.(xi)
It iy of the same kind as is imagined between the fire’s power
of burning and that of baking.
The Influence of Religion.
It is a recognised fact that philosophy very often is an
outgrowth of religion, It is particularly true of some of the
prominent systems of Indian thought, such as Buddhism,
Jainism, Vaisnavism, Saktism aod Saivaism. Saivaism, as the
very word indicates, is an outgrowth of the Religioz, which
recognised Siva to be the highest God, This God is referred
to in the Vedic passages by various names such as Sambhava,
Mayobhava, Saikara, Mayaskara, Siva and Rudra etc. This
God, Siva, has been discovered to be the object of worship in
the hoary past in India in the finds of Harappa and Mohenjo-
daro, which are recognised to be the earliest archaeological
finds of this country, Saivaism is even now one of the great
living religions. Some of the biggest religious monuments are
dedicated to Siva.
Religion leads to philosophy; and philosophy that grows
out of religion may still employ the words, commonly used in
the religious literature, giving them new meauings and
interpreting the religious myths and beliefs philosophically,
as has been done by the two eminent systems of thought,
Saivaism and Vaisnavism; or it may completely cut itself off
from religion and become purely speculative, as has been done
by rationalism in the West.
Saivaism has not cut itself off from religion. In the
Agamic literature, on which the Saiva Philosophy is based,
there are generally four sections in each Agama, (I ) Vidya
(ID) Kriya (IIL) Yoga and (IV) Carya. The first deals with
the categories and other purely philosophical matters. The
second is occupied with various forms of spiritual initiation( xii)
and the accompanying rituals. And because the self-realisation
is not possible without Yoga, therefore, the third discusses
different types of Yoga. But the practice of Yoga is not
possible without maintaining the highest ethical standard
The fourth, therefore, gives the rules of conduct. S'aivaism is,
thus, not concerned with pure speculative thought. It is «
synthesis of religion, philosophy and ethics,
If we take for instance, the Vimargini of Abbinavagupta
and the Bhaskari of Bhaskara Kantha, we find that they ass-
ert the view that religion presents the same Ultimate Reality
mythically as philosophy establishes rationally and Yoga reve-
als immediately, Asa concrete instance we may take the
benedictory verse at the beginning of the Kriyadhikara, with
which the present volume begins, Here Abhinavagupta gives
a popular and figurative presentation of the abstruse Saiva
Philosophical doctrine of Kriyaéakti, Here he uses the
word Gauripati, which in the context of religon is used for
the mythical God, S'iva, as the husband of Gauri, and gives it
philosophical meaning, This fact is clearly pointed ont by
Bhaskara in his commentary. It may be stated here by the
way that the benedictory verse or verses, which Abhinava puts
ab the beginning of each chapter of his Vimaréint, are of great
importance inasmuch as therein he states the subject-matter
of the chapter briefly, clearly and poetically. This practice
is followed by Bhaskara also in his commentary. These
are popular and figurative presentations of the abstruse
philosophical doctrines.
In fact, if we study the Iévara Pratyabhijiia caretully, we
find. that it is concerned with nothing more than the philoso-
phical presentation of the general religious conception of the
God, as omniscient and omnipotent,in the light of the monistie
philosophy. For, the Maheévara, with the exposition of the( xii)
Saiva conception of which the work is concerned, is repie-
sented to be such in the very first verse of the work, ‘Kartari
jfiatari’ etc. The Saiva conception of omniscience and
omnipotence of the MaheSvara is different from a verbally similar
conception of the God of the Naiyayika. In the latter case
the Ivara is not free ( Svatantra ); because He depends upon
the atoms for the creation of the world. Further, the Nyaya
conception is based upon the pluralistic philosophy. But in
the former case He is free and the eonception is based upon
the monistic philosophy.
Mahes'vara, the Absolute Mind.
In the Saiva metaphysics of Kashmir, the Ultimate Meta-
physical Principle is technically called Mahegvara. And in
contrasc to the Brahman of the Vedantin, which is referred to
in the neuter gender, the Saivas refer to the MaheSvara in the
masculine, ‘He’ is not orly Self-luminous ( Prakagamaya )
like the Brahman of the Vedantin, and, therefore, S’anta
( passive ) (?) but also self-conscious and free ( Vimargamaya ),
The implication of the affix ‘maya’ in the present context is
similar to that of the Vedantin, when he talks of the Brahman
as ‘Anandamaya’.
Prakééa and Vimarga are inseparable. There is no self—
luminosity without self-consciousness and vice versa, The
two expressions simply present an analytical view of the same
Ultimate Reality. This Reality, because it is self-luminous
and self-conscious, is spoken of as the Universal Mind or Self,
The Reality, in the words of the Saiva, is “Prakaéa-vimarga-
maya”. In the context of metaphysios, to put the idea meta-
phorically, the Reality is like a mirror, capable of producing
the multiplicity of itsown affections. Just asa mirror remains
really unaffected by the reflections which are casb in it by(aaa)
external objects, so the Reality remains really unaffected
by the appearances, the Abhasas, which ib pene
which proceed from it as do the thoughts, ideas, Gs mental
images from an individual mind: But the distinction
between the Reality, the Universal Mirror, and an ordinary
looking-glass is that (I) while the latter is not aware of its
‘being’, does not know: that it is, is not self-conscious, the
former is; and ( I ) while the latter depends for its affections
on the external, the former is perfectly independent of every-
thing external. Its affections spring from it 4s do fhe ideas
from the individual mind, It means that the Reality is the
Mind and the universe is nothing but the thought of the
Universal Mind. The universe is a reflection on the Universal
Mirror. The Prakaéa is the mirror and the power of aware-
ness of the ‘Being’ is.the Vimarga.
In the context of epistemology, ib means that the Reality
is self-shining and self-conscious, It means that the Reality is
the Universal Self-consciousness; that itis the presupposition
of every experience und assertion and denial.
It is admitted that every determinate experience, that an
individual subject has, is due to an affection of the individual
mind by an external object through senses and to the determi-
native reaction of the mind on the data, supplied through the
senses. The Saiva admits that the aspect of the individual
that receives the affections of the external object, whereon the
external objects are reflected, is the ‘Praka§a’ and is identical
with the ‘Universal Prakaéa’; and that the aspect of the indi-
vidual, that determinately reacts on what is reflected on it, is
the ‘Vimarga’ and. is identical with the ‘Universal Vimaréga’,
“The Universal and-the individual are essentially identical”,
isan assertion that the Saiva makes in common with the
Vedantin. And because it is an acknowledged fact that the
aii. teak( xv)
individual mind is the presupposition of all experiences, a fact
that has been admitted even in the West by such an eminent
thinker as Descartes; and because the individual is identical
with the Universal; the Saiva, therefore, holds that the
Universal Mind as ‘Prakaéa’ and ‘Vimarga’ is the presupposition
of all experiences,
Epistemically ‘Prakaéa’ also means that the object of
experience is essentially ‘Praka$a’ i. e. of the nature of ‘idea’.
For, if the object be admitted to be different from ‘Prakaga’,
essentially opposite to ‘Prakaga’ i.e, ‘Aprakaéa’; if it be not
the essential nature of the object to shine; if ‘not to shite’
were the essential nature of the object; it would never shine in
experience; because the essential nature of a thing does not
change and if it changes, it cannot be admitted to be its
essential nature.
The Saiva rejects the view of the dualists and the pluralists,
who hold that though it is not the essential nature of the
object to shine, yet it is made to shino by the means of right
knowledge, ‘Pramana’, For, he asserts that that the essential
nature of which is ‘not to shine’, can never be made to shine,
Thus he asserts that everything is essentially ‘Prakaéa’ and
claims to be a Mahadvaitavadin,
From the mystical point of view also the Reality is the same.
It is self-shining and self-conscious. The Saiva admits that
in the perfect emancipation (Pirnamokga) there is no negation
of self-consciousness. For, that would mean reduction to the
state of the insentience jédyapatti ). In fact, this is the
chief point of differenge between the Saiva and the Vedantin,
For while the Vedantin admits the Brahman to be self-shining
only (Cinmatra) and without self-consciousness (Nirvimaréa)
and accordingly he holds the Brahman to be Santa and the( xvi)
liberation to be the identity with the Brahman and, therefore,
a state of negation of self-conseiousness : the Saiva admits
self-consciousness to persist even in the final emancipation ;
because he holds the Reality, into which the appearance
merges, to be not only self-shining but also self-conscious,
He, however, asserts the Reality and the final emancipation
to be immediacy ( Nirvipkalpa ), His assertion is_ made on
the basis of the conception of mediacy (Vikalpa), which may be
stated as follows :—
Determinacy consists (I) in unifying a multiplicity into
aunity, as when a person combines a number of simple
percepts into a complex whole; ( IL) in contra-distinguishing
the ebject of cognition “this” from “not this”; (IIL) in
interpreting a stimulus in a variety of ways and in accepting
one interpretation to be correct and rejecting others as
incorrect, Thus, determinacy in all cases is dependent on the
consciousness of multiplicity either for unification or for
consciousness of distinction. Therefore, in the absence of
consciousness of multiplicity, determinacy is not possible,
Since in the transcendental Self-consciousness, there is
nothing to be contra-distinguished from the Self, as there is
no ‘not-being’ from which ‘being’ is to be distinguished, it
cannot be spoken of as determinate consciousness.
The ’Saivas admit, like the Vedantin, that the individual
mind is identical with the Universal. Their conception of the
macrocosm is based on a very careful study of the microcosm.
They hold thab what is true in the case of the individual
self is equally so in that of the Universal. Accordingly
they maintain that the entire universe is a manifestation
of the Universal Mind exactly as the world of imagination is
that of the individual and thot the universe is related to the
Universal Mind exactly ag ideas are related to the individual,ii ( xvii )
Thus, the conception of the Ultimate Reality as Prakaga-
. is not only what
vimargamaya, self-luminous and self-consciot
the metaphysical reasoning leads to, but als) what the mystic
experience in tho indeterminate (nirvikalpa ) Samadhi, from
which a yogin rises either automatically ( Svatovyuttisthate )
or is awakened by another (parabodhitah ). reveals. It is
also the presupposition of all volitional, cognitive and
conscious-physical acts at the empirical level. The distinctive
conception of the Ultimate Reality m the metaphysical
context, according to Kashmir Saivas, is, therefore, “The Free
Will” ( Svatantra Iecha ).
Svdtantryavada.
‘This Saiva conception of the metaphysical Reality is very
similar to what the German Voluntarists, like Schopenhauer,
admit. The Saiva voluntarism, Svatantryavada, agrees with the
German Voluntarism (I) that what is known at the empirical
level is only a phenomenon; because, like Kant, it admits that
the knowing subject can know the given, not as it is in itself.
but as it appears through the limiting conditions, time (Kala)
tc. : ( IL) that the thing-in-itself is the Will, of which we are
immediately aware in voluntary action and intense emotion;
because it admits that the principle of Freedom ( Svatautrya )
is immediately present to us in states of intense temotion, in
which all external affections of mind disappear : ( IIL ) that
the physical act and the entire physical body are immediate
objectifications of the Will; because it holds that action is
nothing but the 2will externalised and accepts that the will of a
great Yogin manifests physical things independently of matter:
(IV ) that the Will is the inner nature of everything and
the ‘one’ of every phenomenon: ( V ) that the philosophical
J. 8. Dr. 11, and 8. K, 39 2 IP. V., Vol, I, 183,( xviii)
wisdom is nothing but bringing the trath “The world is
my idea” into reflective and abstract consciousness ; because
the jivanmukti of the Saiva consists in nothing but in the
reelisation that the entire universe is my manifestation
Bat it differs from the Voluntarism of Schopenhauer,
inasmuch as he holds the Will to be unconscious; he abstracts
the Will from the ‘intelligence’, which he :regards as a mere
function of the brain, and identifies it with ‘Nature’, which,
according to him, works independently of the ‘intelligence’
He was led to such an abstraction; because he wanted to
identify the presuppositions of different sciences with some-
thing of which he was immediately aware at the empirical
level; because he accepted the Kantian view that conscious-
ness of the pure subject, in total isolation from the object, is
impossible ; and because his system grew in antagonism to
that of Hegel.
The Kashmir Saivaism, which developed in the hands of
Yogins, to whom self-consciousness in isolation from the object
was the most indubitable experience, did not feel compelled to
abstract the Will from self-consciousness. It admits the Will
to be an aspect of the Mind. This view is in consonance with
the experience of will, as even Schopenhauer admits. This
ie the aspect of the Mind which constitutes the metaphysical
substratum of the whole phenomenal world. This Free
Will is essentially nothing but what we have already pointed
out to be ‘Vimarga’, It is the starting point of the concretisa-
tion of the universal Mind as self-luminous and self-conscious
Reality. It differs from Vimarga in so faras while Vimaréa
is free from objective reference, does not involve the
antithesis of the subject and the object, the Free Will has
1. LP. V., Vol. Il, 266.(@ 21x»)
objective reference, it involves the antithesis of the subject
and the object. The object, however, to which the Will is
related, is the Universal “this” which lacks all determinacy,
exactly as does the mental picture in the mind of a great
artist, when the desire to produce a masterpiece first arises in
him. It is like an imperceptible stir in calm water before the
rise of waves. It is like the internal stir that precedes the
perceptible movement of a physical organ. It is that aspect
of the universal Mind, which is responsible for the objectifica-
tion of what is identical with it, It logically precedes the
universal powers of knowledge and action ( jiianagakti and
Kriyaéakti ) exactly as individual intentional knowledge and
action are preceded by intention.
Kashmir Saivas admit that the individual mind is essen-
tially identical with the Univereal, as has already been pointed
out. They also admit that while everything can be thought
as false (Mithyz) or appearance (Abbaea), the subject, the “I”,
which assumes or thinks of the falsity of everything, cannot
be so thought; and, therefore, they, very much like Descartes,
assert that the trath “I think, therefore, I am” is so certain and
so assured that no amount of sceptical reasoning can uproot
it, For, it is the presupposition of all doubts and negations,
And because the individual is eseentially identical with the
Universal, neither of them can be proved or disproved.
The point of view of the Is'vura Pratyabhijna Karika.
The Iévara Pratyabhijiia Karika states the Saiva view of the
MaheSvara very briefly in four verses in the very beginning. But
it does not proceed immediately to attempt a rational justifica-
tion, elucidation and elaboration of the assertions, Its author,
according to Abhinava’s interpretation, held that a view, that
is primarily intended to be presented, becomes quite clear, if( xx)
the adverse criticism, that is levelled against it, is clearly
stated first and then refuted. Accordingly, the Bauddha
objections against the Saiva conception of the MaheSvara, as
the Free Universal Mind, are stated and the rest of the
work is mainly an answer to this criticistm, For a proper
understanding of the contents of this volume, it is necessary to
bave a clear idea of the nature of objections against the Saiva
view of the Mahegvara as ‘Karta’, the omnipotent doer,
The Bauddha theory of action.
The characteristic doctrine of the Bauddha is the momen-
tariness, not only of the object but also of the subject. Acco-
rdingly he denies not only a permanent subject ( jiiata ) as
the ‘substratum’ ( Aégraya ) of all determinate cognitions, but
also a persisting doer ( Karta ), as the ‘substratum’ of action
?
( Kriya ), to whom the action belongs. He rejects the Saiva
view of action as a unity in multiplicity, as something that is
one and is yet characterised by succession and belongs to one
agent ¢ Kriya naikasya sakrama caika.Bh., Vol. II, P. 7. ).
According to the Bauddha, action ( Kriya) involves
change. It may be spatial, temporal or formal, Wor instance,
in the case of the perceptible action, which is referred to as
“He goes” “He moves” or “He falls”, we perceive nothing more
than a body, such as that ofa man, connected with various
spatial points in temporal succession. And when we assert
“He sits for the whole day”, our assertion has no other basis
than the perception of a body at a fixed spatial point in
temporal succession. Similarly when we say “milk changes” we
mean “that which was experienced as liquid and sweet, is
experienced as hard and sour”, The aforesaid three instances
are the instances of action, involving spatial, temporal and
formal changes respectively( xxi)
One point has to be clarified here. The experience of a
body as connected with various spatial points in temporal
succession, on which the idea of action is based, involves the
experience of the body, that is perceived in successive mome-
nts at.successive points of space, as the same. But the idea
of sameness of the body is in conflict with the Bauddha theory
of momentariness, For according to the Bauddha, nothing
can remain the same for two successive moments. It has,
therefore, to be remembered in this connection that the
Bauddha holds that the idea of sameness is not due to the
persistence of a thing: for successive momeuts, but to the
extreme similaricy of the thing that comes into being in the
sueceeding moment with that which existed in the preceding.
For instance, we experience the flame of a lamp to persist as
the same for a duration of time. ‘The question that arises is “Is
the flame the same in reality” ? The Bauddba would reply
‘No’; the flame that is experienced as the same is not the same,
does not persist for two moments. It is successively being
replaced in successive moments by otlier flames, into which
the oil, that is drawn by the wick to the spatial point
of the going out flame, is converted, A layman, however,
experiences the same flame to persist. The recognition of
the flame as the same is due to the extreme similarity of the
flame that comes into being at the next moment with the one
of the preceding moment. Similar is the case with all things
which are experienced as the same for a duration of time.
Another point, that has to be elucidated, is that the
Bauddha holds that when the spatial and formal differences
are there the temporal difference is bound to be. And when
there are spatial and tempora! differences, the formal difference
is invariably there. Similarly spatial difference is invariably
concomitant with the formal and the temporal.
It is on the basis of this view that the Bauddha asserts(ex 9)
that in the case of the judgement “Devadatta goes” the reco-
gnition of Devadatta as the same, when he is found related to
different spatial points, is due to similarity; because being an
exponent of the theory of momentariness, he has to admit .
the formal difference of the body of Devadatta in the succes-
sive moments. Further, though temporal and spatial differe-
noes necessarily mean the formal difference and, therefore, are
included in the formal difference, yet the Bauddha talks of
them as different from one angther from the popular point of
view. ( Bh, Vol. I, 112-13, )
Thus, the Bauddha analyses ‘action’ from the empirical
point of view and asserts that such an analysis does not reveal
any perceptible fact to be called ‘action’,apart from momentary
existences of a succession of bodily forms, which are related to
successive spatial and temporal points and which, though
different, are yet recognised to be identical, because of extreme
similarity of one with another. And because there is no distinct
Perceptible fact, which may be called ‘action’, its inference
also is not possible; because inference presupposes a direct
perception of the inferable,
The Mimauisakas hold the ‘action’ to be inferable from its
effect. For instance, a person reaches a distant place. This
relation with a distant place is an effect, which musb have a
eause. And this cause they hold to be ‘action’. The Bauddha,
however, does not accept this argument. Being an exponent+
of the theory of momentariness, he asserts that the so called
effect, ‘the reaching of a distant place by a particular body’ is
a distinct momentary existence of a body at a particular spatial
and temporal point; and that iv is not the same body, that
was at one spatial point, which reaches a distant place in the
Process of time. This explanation is based upon a peculiar
conception of causality, held by the Bauddha.(xxiii)
The Bauddha criticism of the S'aiva view of action
The Bauddha attacks the Saiva theory ofaction from two
points of view. He shows tbat there is no reason in support
of the ‘action’ as something distinct from the momentary
existences of aseries of bodily forms, which are recognised to be
identical, in spatial and temporal order. This view has been
presented above. He also asserts that the Saiva view of
‘action’ is inconsistent with reason, as follows :—
According to the Saiva, the chief characteristic of action
is the succession, which involves priority and posteriority; it
is a unity in multiplicity and it belongs to one body such as
that of a particular individual. The Bauddha attacks the
Saiva view at all the three points, ‘This attack is based upon
three assumptions. (1) Whatever is determinately grasped
is not real. (II) The real is momentary. ( III ) Priority and
posteriority do not belong to moments ( Ksanas ) in them-
selves: the order of priority and posteriority shines in the
determinate grasp of a number of Ksanas together in an order.
Accordingly (I ) he refutes the Saiva view of action ( Kriya )
as real ( Satya ); because it is made up of a series, the members
of which are held up together by the determinative activity of
mind in the order of priority and posteriority. And as the
priority and posteriority do not belong to the moments
( Kgamas ) in themselves, they are rather due to the deter-
minative activity of the miad; and as the series, which is the
chief characteristic of action, involves priority and posteriority
of its members, ‘action’, therefore, is merely a mental construct,
such as the determinative activity of mind produces, and is
not real; because the moments alone are real and whatever is
grasped in determinacy lacks true reality. (II) He also
refutes oneness ( Ekatva ) of action; because it is made up of
a series of moments, which do not interpenetrate one another(GeEXIV 7)
(Na avyonyariipavistah. Bh. Vol. I, 115). And as the series
js characterised by difference of its members from one another,
the assertion of oneness of action, therefore, is in conflict with
the assertion of its serial nature. (IIL) He also refutes the
view that action is one, because of oveness of its ‘substratum’ :
firstly, because such a substratum, as distinct from the
various Ksanas, is not experienced and, therefore, cannot
be admitted: and secondly, because even if for the
sake of argument the substratum be admitted,
the assertion of its oneness is unreasonable. For, how
can the substratum, being affected by various moments,
be spoken of as one ?
Bauddha refutation of the Mahes'vara.
The Bauddha attacks the very basic principle, the Absolute
in the metaphysical context, the MaheSvara. His criticism
of cognition and action, jiiana and Kriya, is preparatory to
the attack on the most fundamental doctrine. ‘The Saiva,
as stated in the vary first verse of the Igvara Pratyabhij
admits that the Absolute is perfectly free and that this
freedom manifests itself in the metaphysical context as the
power, which expresses itself as the phenomena of cognition and
action, The Saivas of Kashmir have been great adherents to
and exponents of the philosophy of Grammar, They have been
strict followers of the school of Panini. Accordingly, following
Panini’s aphorism ‘Svatantrah Karta’, they call the Mabegvara
Karta and jiiata in so far as the Absolute is free in the
manifestation of phenomena of cognition and action.
Tho Bauddha, however, taking the word Karta in
the popular sense of the word as signifying a subject that
is related to action, denies the being of all the three ( I ) the
action (Kriya) (II) the subject to whom the action is
related and ( III ) the relation itself.(xxv)
The Bauddba asserts on the basis of empirical observation
that thert is nothing like an action as an observed fact, apart
from the momentary existences of a number of bodies in
temporal and spatial order. ‘he so called Kriya is simply a
mental construct that the mind builds up when it holds all the
obzerved facts together in an order. And nothing that figures
in a determinate cognition is real (Arthasamsparéino vikalpah.)
‘The same he asserts about the relation ( Sambandha ). Tf, for
instance, we analyse the causal relation, do we find in the
observed momentary facts anything apart from two momentary
beings, coming into being one after another invariably’? And
similar is the case with all other relations. Thus, in the
case of the relation of the container and the contained, what
distinct observed fact is there, apart from the momentary
being of the contained and the container at two distinct points
of space, without any point of space between them lying empty
or occupied by any other momentary being ?
The Bauddha, in the course of his criticism of relation,
points out that not only there is no evidence in support of
the being of relation, but also there are reasons against its
acceptance as follows :—
‘The generally accepted definition of relation is that it isa
unity that has its being in two, which exist at two distinct
spatial points, without any point of space in between them
being occupied by something else or even being empty. But
such a definition is impossible, For, how can that, which is
present at one particular point of space in its entirity, be, ab
the same time, present at another also ? The reason is obvious,
The Bauddha is a momentarist, He, therefore, admits that
one and the same thing cannot be at two points of space; that
the thing, which is cognised at a. different point of space, is
in itself different formally ; and that the occupation by it of a(| xxvi )
spatial point sakes place at a different point of time. This is
the argument that he advances not only against the relations
of conjunction and inherence but also against all other
relations, which are based on them.
The Bauddha, therefore, asserts that the two terms
“Knower” and “deer” ( jfiaté and Karta), employed by the
Saivas to present their view of the Absolute in the metaphysical
context, stand for mental constructs only ( Kalpanématram )
and not for the real ( Vastu ).
Objections against the Svatantryavada.
The Syatantryavada ( Voluntarism ) of Kashmir admits
that the Free Will manifests all kinds of subject and object
and their relations, such as the causality etc., as distinct from
one another, from itself, in itself and by itself; and that it is the
essential nature of everything. One may, therefore ask :—
“Ts it not self-contradictory to assert(I) that the Free
Will by itself manifests all kinds of subject and object, which
lie in a state of identity with itself, as external to and
different from itself; (II ) that all the subjects and the objects,
while they are manifested as external to it, are yet in it
and (IIL) that it constitutes the essential nature of the
manifested ?” This may be elaborated as follows :—
(1) What is the basis of the assertion that the entire
phenomenal world has its being in the Free Will, which is
au aspect of the Universal Mind? Does it not involve self
contradiction to assert that this Free Will manifests the pheno-
menal world as external to itself and yet the manifested have
their being in it as indentical with it? For, being manifested
as external to the Will, is the opposite of being in a state cf
identity with it or being in it. A thing that shines in something
else cannot be said to shine as external to thatin which it shines.(xxvii)
For instance, a jar, which is,in a house at a particular time,
cannot at the same time be said to be outside it,
(II) It does not stand to reason to assert that the Free
Will is the essential nature of the manifested, For, the manifested
is characterised by multiplicity, But the Will is characterised by
unity, which is the opposite of the multiplicity. How can any
body accept the view that the manifested, though perceived as
multiplicity, have unity as their essential nature ?
(TIL) Why does the Will manifest the multiplicity of
objects, which are identical with it, as external to itself ? If
the manifestation be udmitted to have no cause, it should
either always take place or never,
)
The Saiva reply.
These objections are answered as follows:—
The difference between the Saiva Voluntarism and the
German Voluntarism is that the latter admits the Free
Will to be unconscious: but the former definitely asserts
it to be consciousness, It represents the Will to be the
immediate expression of the Universal Self-consciousness
or Mind, In fact, the Universal Self-consciousness is nothing but
a sate of the Universal Mind, in which the world of the limited
subjects ard objects is in perfect identity with the Self-
consciousness. At the empiricai level we know it on the basis
of our personal experience that self-consciousness is the
undeniable presupposition of the individual will. ‘The Saiva,
therefore, admitting the essential identity of macrocosm
and microcosm, the universal and the individual, holds
that the Free Will is the immediate expression of the
Universal Self-consciousness, And because Saivaism admits,
like the German Voluntarism, that all that is within anybody’s
experience and even that which i beyond the limitedexperience is a manifestation of the Free will, therefore, it
répresents the Free Will to be an aspect of Siva, the Self, the
Prakia, who is in inseparable union or in relation of identity
with the consciousness, the Freedom, the VimarSa, and calls
the Free Will in the context of metaphysics “the Mahegvara”.
The Saiva replies to the objection No. (1) from the
idealistic point of view. He admits that everything is
essentially of the nature of thought or idea and as such has
no being independently of the mind. Accordingly he asserts
that the entire universe has its being in and rests on the
Universal Mind as follow:
The determinate cognition of the objects as distinct from
one another, whether it involves assertion or denial of their
existence, is not possible, unless they rest on the Mind
(Sathvidvigranta ). For, the objects shine only when they
rest on the Mind, And shining of the objects consists in
shining as essentially identical with the Mind; because the
Mind is nothing but the light of consciousness ( Prakaéa ).
Therefore, to say that they are different from the light of
cousciousness and yet shine, is to assume most unreasonable
position. Hence it follows that the objects rest on, have
their being in the Mind and are essentially identical with it.
The Mind is essentially a unity, because it is essentially
the light of consciousness. ‘The admission of diversity aud
essential distinction in the case of the Mind, would mean that
what is essentially distinct from the Mind, as the light of
consciousness, is not-mind,
Nor can the diversity be attributed to the Mind, because
of the diversity of objects. For, they also are essentially
identical with the Mind. If they could have diversity
independently of the Mind, they could produce diversity in the((EZxiX a)
Mind. But they themselves have no diversity independently
of it. Their diversity is a product of the Mind itself. ‘To say
that the objects, which owe their diversity to the Mind,
produce diversity in it, is to argue in a circle, to get involved
in the fallacy, called “Avyonyagraya”.
The time and the space also cannot introduce differentia-
tion in the Universal Self-consciousuess. For, they are also
the manifestations and, therefore, are identical with the light
of consciousness.
It is a fact of experience that all the objects shine only
as resting on the light of consciousness. And because they
shine, they, therefore, have to be admitted to be identical
with the light of consciousness, And Prakafa, the light of
consciousness, is never without Vimarga, the Freedom. And
Freedom is the Will. As the Will manifests all the limited
sudjects and objects: as the entire variety, even when
manifested, shines ouly as resting on the light of consciousness,
therefore, it is on the basis of the fact of experience that the
assertion, referred to in the objection No. I, is made,
(II) Self-contradiction is no self-contradiction if it refers
to facts, For instavee, if ‘the blue’ could shine as ‘iot-
blue’ without giving up shining as ‘the blue’, who would
have the hardihood of saying that the person who says
“the blue shines as uot-blue, without giving up shining
as the blue”, asserts what is self-contradictory, And it
is a fact of experience that “the blue” ete, while they
shine as such, are essentially identical with the light of
consciousness, (Prakagabhedamayah), Thus, the Freedom of the
Will consists just in this much that while it retains its essential
nature as the light of consciousness (Sathvidatmaka eva bhavan)
it shines as diversity of limited subject and object, which,
though essentially non-different from the light of consciousness,~( xxx)
appears as different from it ( Samvidrapanadhikenapi
samvidripadhikataya prakagamanavapusa bhasate I. P. V. V.,
Vol. L, 6 ). An instance, which illustrates the point in hand,
we find at the empirical level in the case of a mirror, We know
that the numerous reflections ina mirror are
non-different from it, though they appear to be different. The
difference, however, between a mirror and the Sarivid as Free
Will, is that in the case of the former the reflections are caused
by external objects, which have their being independently of it.
and that it is not self-aware: in the case of the latter the
phenomena, which shine in it, are the manifestations of the
Sarhvid itself as the Free Will, and it is aware of itself.
essentially
(TIL) The third objection is meaningless. For, the Free
Will is notin temporal order. The time series is a manifestation
and, therefore, cannot be spoken of as a delimitation of
the Free Will.
Agreement with the Monistic Vedanta.
All the objects are like the body of the self-shining Uni-
versal 1Self. Just as the body of an individual subject, though
an object, is yet directly pervaded by consciousness ( cit ),
because of the identification of the self with the body, so is the
objective world, because of the identification of the Universal
Self with it. The consciousness, thus, is all-pervading and,
therefore, omnipresent, The multiplicity of the objects also is
similarly all-pervading and omuipresent, Each object is
identical with the consciousness. The consciousness and the
object are not essentially distinct from each other.
This is the view held not only by the Saivas but the
Vedautins also, as asserted by them in “Pradegopi Brahmanah
1 LP. V. V., Vol I, 43.(i xxxipe)
siriipyamanatikrantascavikalpyagca.” This may be elaborated
as follows :—
The two implications of the word ‘Brahman’ are that the
Brahman is all-pervasive ( Brhat ) and that it is the creator
and sustainer of the, universe ( Brmhaka ). On the basis of
these implications the following assertion is made :-—
It is generally acknowledged that even a part of the Akaga,
which the determinative mind imagines, because of the relation
of the Akasa with external objects, such as jar ete., and which
is distinctly called “Ghatakaéa”, is non-different from the Akaéa
as such and has the essential nature of the Akaga, the freedom
from limitations, the all-pervasiveness. Similarly, even a part of
the Brahman, which the determinative mind imagines to be limi-
ted, because of the limiting conditions, such as ‘the blue’ etc,
(which are the limited objective appearances of the Brahman
itself, because it is the creator of the Phenomenal world by
itsown Power) and which is distinctly called “Nilaprakaga”
ete. is non-different from the Brahman and has the essential
nature of the Brahman such as omnipresence, identity with all
powers ( Sarvagaktyavibhagavrttitva ) and indeterminacy or
immediacy,
For, the Brahman is indeterminacy inasmuch as it is self-
shining ( Prakaéam@natamatraripa ) only, and, therefore, deter-
minacy cannot be attributed to it, because there is nothing
from which it can be contradistinguished.
This view is corroborated by the following famous assertions
of the Vedantin:—
(1) ‘Sarvati khalu idam Brahma’ It means that the
limited subjects and objects, on the scrutiny of their most
essential nature, are found to be nothing more than the
Brahman,( xxxii_)
(II) “Neha nai i kificana”. It denies the independent
being to all that is referred to by the word ‘Sarva’ in the
preceding quotation. Jt asserts that there is uothing which
is not identical with ‘Prakaga’, For, to admit anything to be
different from Prakaga is to admit something that is not a
tact of experience.
The S'aiva Answer to Buddhistic objections
against Kriya.
The Kriyadhikara is an answer to the objections, raised.
by the Bauddha, against the Saiva conception of Kriya or
Action. The Bauddha objection was: how can action, which
consists of a series, be spoken of as ‘one’ and how can the
‘substratum’ of action ¢ Karta), being connected with the
series, be represented to be one ?
The reply of the Saiva is that the MaheSvara is like a
mirror. And just as the unity of a mirror remains unaffected
by the multiplicity of retlections, which are cast in it by
external objects, so the unity of the Mahegvara remains in
tact in spite of the series, which consitutes action and which
is nothing but a manifestation of the Mahegvara himself,
being reflected on him, He is spoken of as Karta, because he
is the ‘substratum’ of the series. In the case of the individual
action also a
milar explanation can be giver. Action is
undoubtedly a series, made up of the multiplicity of relations of
a body, such as that of a particular individual, Devadatta,
with a number of spatial points, say, from one to hundred. So
far action is a multiplicity. But it isa unity, because the
‘substratum’ of the series, the body of Devadatta, is recognised
to be the same and this recognition remaius uncontradicted,
The objection of the Bau@dha was based on his theory of
momentariness of both, the subject and the object. The(. xxxili_)
Saiva’s answer is based upon the refutation of the Bauddha
theory of momenteriness of the subject. Thus, even though
it may be asserted that the body, the relations of which with
a number of spatial points constitute the series, which
is called action, is not the same, but different at each
successive moment and yet is recognised to be the
same, because of the similarity in forms: yet that would not
affect the Saiva position. For, the Sava finally asserts that
the ‘substratum’ of action is nob the body, but the conscious
subject, who is conscious of himself us the same through all
the Arelations of the body with various spatial points.
In the Saiva literature the word “Kriya” is used in two
different meanings —
(1) ‘he power of the Universal Mind to manifest the
limited subjects and objects, which are the presuppositions
of the empirical knowledge and on which all the worldly
transactions depend, is the 1managakti’. And the Kriya is
nothing but the power to unite and separate these limited
manifestations with and from one another, When the word
“Kriy&” refers to this aspect of the Universal Mind, it is
nothing but ‘Vimaréa’ and is called Kriyaéakti, This Kriya
has no temporal limitations and, therefore, is not of the
serial.nature ; because the Universal Mind, of which it is an
aspect, is free from such limitations. Thus, the ‘Kriya’, as an ~
aspect of the Universal Mind, in reality, is not of the serial
nature. But it appears to be such, when it is viewed in
relation with the manifestation of succession, to the limited
subjects. For, according to the Siva, the manifested variety
in succession is related to the Universal Mind as the
reflectiove are to a mirror. Therefore, from the point of
1. 1. POV, Vol, IIT, 3.(Gaxxxiv’;)
view of the limited subject the ‘Kriya’ appears to. be
‘successive’ (Kramika). But in yeality from the true philosoph-
ical point of view it is nov so; because the temporal order
is from the point of view of the individual mind and not from
that of the Universal Mind.
(IL) The Naiyayikas admit action to be simply an
empirical fact, e. g. the motion of the hand when it is lifted up.
Such a Kriya is undoubtedly serial in nature ; because it
consists of the successive relations of the hand with a number
of spatial points from the one, from which it is raised, to the
other, which it reaches. ¢
The Mimanisakas, however, assert that ‘Kriya’ is a certain
power in the hand, which is responsible for the successive
relations of the hand with successive points of space, As such,
they hold, it is a matter of inference only,
The Bauddha view of action is that it is nothing but a
mental construct, produced by the determinative activity of
the mind, which unifies the various moments ( Ksanas ), “the
hand at one point of space” and “the hand at another point of
space” and so on, into one whole; and that there is nothing
apart from the aforesaid Kganas which is perceptible. Kriya,
therefore, the Bauddha holds, is simply a mental construct, and
as such is not real. For, whatever figures in the determinate
coguition is not real. (Arthosuinspars'ino Vikalpah )
The Saiva admits that ‘Kriya’ is serial in nature ( Kramika ),
but asserts that this holds good of the Kriy& at the empirical
level, where things are necessarily in the temporal torder, But
the Kriya at the transcendental level, ‘the Kriyagakti’, is vot of
1 LP. V.V., Vol, UII, 3.(Geax aye)
such a nature ; because transcendency consists in freedom from
the temporal order. The Suivi holds that the serial appearance
of the objects is due to the Kalagakti, an aspect of the
Kriyagakti, which manifests each object as cut off from every
other, and each state of an object as distinct from every other
to the individual only.
The reader is requested to keep the following points in
mind, while going through the Bhaskari :—
(1) Some types, particularly those of the Matras and
Repha, have got broken in the course of printing. They will,
therefore, be found occasionally missing,
(IL) @and # at some places look like @ and W, because
the ink has got spread.LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.
Bh. = Bhaskari,
C.=Codex,
TP. Y.=Iévara Pratyabhijiia Vimaréini.
1, P. V. V.=Iévara Pratyabhijfia Vivgti Vimaréini.
K. S'S. =Kashmir Sanskrit Series.
8. Dr. =Siva Drsti.
8. K.=Spanda Karika.
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