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Kashmir Shaivism - (Abhinavagupta) Isvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini Bhaskari (Doctrine of Divine Recognition) Iyer Kanti Charan Pandey Vol 2 PDF

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Kashmir Shaivism - (Abhinavagupta) Isvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini Bhaskari (Doctrine of Divine Recognition) Iyer Kanti Charan Pandey Vol 2 PDF

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A AATAT ATT ie Isvarapratyabhijiia-Vimarging, rpy in short, Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition, is the most important work of the Pratyabhijfia School of Kashmir Saivism. Thisis a commentary by the great Abhinavagupta on the Isvarapratyabhijtia- Satra (or -Karika) of Utpala, expounded by acommentary Bhaskar of Bhaskara- kantha. The original text with Vimarsini and the Bhdskari thereon was edited and published by Dr. K.c, Pandey and Profes- sor K.A. Subramania yer, along with English Translation of the py by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, Bhaskari, as the Princess of Wales Saras- wati Bhawan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of Isvara-Pratyabnijiia-Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, in three yolumes. The Isvarapratyabhijfia of Utapalacarya has four Adhikaras: Jfiana-, Kriya-, Agama- and Tattvasangraha-. The first volume contains the Janadhikara which has eight Ahnikas or chapters along with the Vimaréini of Abhinavagupta and the Bhaskari of Bhaskarakantha. The second volume completes the text and the com- mentaries in the Temaining three Adhikaras, This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and philosophy of the Pratyabhijiia system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English transla- tion of the Isvarapratyabhijaa and the VimarSini. ISBN: 81-208-0019-2 (for set) j Re, ‘@ | ee / 33 KS-56 Eyl ISVARA-PRATYABHIJNA-VIMARSINI OF ABHINAVAGUPTA aferaancitat gracnafaafaataat ISVARA-PRATYABHIJNA-VIMARSINI OF ABHINAVAGUPTA Doctrine of Divine Recognition Volume II Sanskrit Text with the Commentary Bhaskari Adhikara 2, 3, 4 Edited by Prof. K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER and Dr. K. C. PANDEY General Editor Professor Dr. R. C. DWIVEDI MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras | afaraqcasnanet seazncafuatiaataat wreattdafaat faded art: feats —aradang—aferere: arareet sito Glo Mo AAT Azar: sto aiftaraex qwea: TATA: Sito sto Hag Fae Hawa @tacaiaa feet areomit gear mare © MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110007 Branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221001 \ Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600 004 First published : The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Text No. 83, 1950 Reprint : Delhi, 1986 ISBN: 81-208-0021—-4 Printed in India by Narendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, ‘A-45 Naraina, Phase I, New Delhi 110 028 and published by Shantilal Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110 007. GENERAL EDITOR’S NOTE Isvarapratyabhijid-Vimarsini, IPV in short, (Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition) is the most important work of the Pratyabhijaia school of Kashmir Saivism. This is a commen- tary by the great Abhinavagupta on the Jvarapratyabhijiia-Sitra (or -Karika) of Utpala, expounded by a commentary Bhaskari of Bhaskarakantha. The original text with Vimarsini and the Bhaskar! thereon was edited and published by my teachers, Dr. K. C. Pandey and Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, along with English translation of the JPV by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, Bhdskari, as the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of [vara-Pratyabhijna- Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, in three yolumes. An Outline of History of Saiva Philosophy given by Dr. Pandey in Vol. ILI of the Bhaskari will be issued separately for the sake of general readers and the scholars interested in the history of religions. Reprint of the rare and fundamental works of Kashmir Saivism will be wel- comed by the scholars concerned with the idealistic systems of Indian Philosophy. It was in the mid-9th century A.D., when the whole of India was fired with the Advaita Vedanta of Acarya Sankara that the beautiful land of Goddess Sarada, the Kashmir valley, produced a great acarya, who systematized the philosophical postulates of the Saiva non-dualism on the basis of the monistic Saiva scriptures. His name is Somadeva, better known as Somananda. He was an older contemporary of another great Saiva acdrya, Bhatta Kallata who wrote his Vtti on the Spanda Siitras revealed to Vasugupta. The spanda system hardly differs in its philosophical thought from Somananda? Their real difference lies in prescribing different means of realizing the philosophical goal. Sivadrsti or Vision from Siva by Somananda is the first systematic formulation of the of what is later on conveniently described as the 4 school of Kashmir Saivism, following the term occurring in the [svarapratyabhijiia of Utpala, Somananda in vi his foundational work, the Sivadrsti, consisting of seven chapters of 700 verses, declared (I. 2) that Lord Siva is the essence and identity of all the beings, He shines in all the beings. He is bliss and consciousness whose free will nothing can impede and who manifests himself through his powers of knowledge and action. This concept of the highest reality is basically different from the Buddhistic idea of momentary vijfidna, from the nirguna (hence passive) Brahman of Sankara, from the dualistic conception of Purusa and Prakyti of the Sankhya and from the later schools of Vaisnava Vedanta. Somananda not merely propounded his theory of the ultimate reality, he refuted the grammarians’ theory of Sabda Brahman, the views of the Saktas, the dualistic Saivas, and the followers of the Yoga and demonstrated the lack of logic and consistency in their view of reality. Utpaladeva, Utpalacarya, or simply Utpala, built the great edifice of the Pratyabhijid on the foundations laid by his teacher Somananda. He wrote his famous ISvarapratyabhijaa Sutra or Karika by working out at great length the germinal ideas of the founder of the system (Utpala treats his Karika as the reflection of the Sivadrsti) and by provid- ing a suitable fencing against the onslaughts of the counter systems of Indian philosophy. Utpala advocates the permanence and universality of the self and criticises the Vijiianavadin’s theory of momentariness and individuality, He asserts that freedom of will, thought and action is basic essence of being. Being must have innate power to become at will. He vehemently opposes the passive Brahman of Vedanta and lack of integrality between Purusa and Prakrti of the Sarhkhya, Vasugupta had recognized three ways of final freedom of human beings: Sambhava, Sakta and Anava. These ways required an ascetic life of complete detachment and austere practice of Yoga. Somananda and Utpala show anew way to freedom and beatitude. The realization in the Pratyabhijaia system, to quote from the Introduction of Vol. II (pp. v-vi) by Dr. K. C. Pandey, “consists, not in the actualisation of the potential, nor in the attainment of something new, but in penetrating through the veil that makes the Mahesvara appear as the individual of which everyone is immediately aware and in recognising the MaheSvara in the individual.” The followers of this system daily recite the follow- ing verse which sums up the attitude of a Saiva: vii fara eran fret vitae, fara: wafied soa 1 feat aafa ava, a: fra: aise fe The following prayer for universal peace and happiness occur- ring at the end of the manuscript B of the Vivytivimarsint of Abhinavagupta quoted by its editor in his Preface to Volume I explains the Saiva’s feelings for the world around him and for his fellow human beings : qaaeg aasrat releafrea wag TTT: | aot: sarg wid ada gdtasg sar 1 Utpala holds that the human being is essentially free; freedom is the very nature of the individual. However, the veil of ignorance covers this freedom of man and thus keeps him away from the God within him. Man must remove this ignorance; he must penetrate through the veil to recognize his real self, eternally free, omniscient and omnipotent. Recognition is the way to regain the lost freedom. Incidentally, it is significant to note that the philosophy of Utpala has intimate parallels in the Daksinamiir- tistotra of Acatya Sankara, as interpreted by his great disciple, SureSvara (See Abhinavagupta, pp. 151-52) and the lyrics of the Saundaryalahari. According to the tradition, Utpala lived near Vicharnaga to the north of Srinagar and belonged to the end of the 9th and first half of the 10th century A.D. Many of his works are lost, those surviving include Ajadapramatrsiddhi, Isvarasiddhi, Sam- bandhasiddhi and the commentaries on the latter two works. His commentary on the Sivadysfi is available only in part. His devo- tional lyrics are collected under the title Sivastotrdvali and quot- ations from his unknown works are found in the JPY. But heis justly famous for his Isvarapratyabhijfia Siitra or Karika. This reveals sharpness of his intellect, original thinking and masterly exposition, intimate knowledge of the monistic tradition of the Saiva Agamas and the recognitive Sadhana to realize the Lord Mahe$vara. He wrote two auto-commentaries on his Karika: Vrtti and Vivrti or Tika. No complete MS of either of these two commen- taries by Utpala has so far been discovered. The available portion of the Vrtti upto the 20th karikd of the third adhikara was published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series and the fragment of the viii Vivrti is in the personal collection of Dr. K. C. Pandey, which remains unpublished. The fragment of the Vivrti begins with the 6th Karikd of the Jaanadhikara, Ahnika 3 and ends abruptly with the 3rd Karika of the fifth Anika, Utpala imparted his new doct- tine to Laksmanagupta who transmitted itto his worthiest disciple, Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedic writer on Indian aesthetics and Kashmir Saivism. Abhinava wrote acommentary on the Vivrti of Utpala, known as the Vivytivimarsinf. This was published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. LX (1938 A.D.), LXIH (1941 A.D.) and LXV (1943 A.D.) in three volumes. Abhinava’s direct commentary on the text of Utpala’s Karika is” also known as Vimarsini and described as Laghu VimarSini, being shorter in length than the Vivrti-Vimarsini, which is described as the Brhativimarsint. They are also known as Catussahasri and Astadasasahasri respectively in accordance with the old method of calculation. The Siitras or Karikas of Utpala remain unintelligible without a commentary, like the Sitras of Panini or Badarayana. Utpala’s own commentaries are more in the nature of independent exposition of the Pratyabhijiia system than actual explanation of the text. Abhinavagupta’s Vimarsini offers explanation of the Karika@ and also reads like an independent work. It is available in full and it represents the systems comprehensively and correctly. Abhinavagupta’s Vimarsint is thus the most authentic commentary of the Pratyabhijaia system, which enjoys the reputation of an original work. However, in spite of its clarity and lucidy and comprehensive treatment of the system, it does require a guide to understand the full implications of the words and the ideas of the Vimarsint. The commentary does not solve the problem fully particularly when the oral tradition of teaching the Sastras is lost and when we know that the original thinker like Abhinava will naturally make fresh points in promoting the tradition and in defending it against newly formulated counter-points in the philosophical circles of India in the 10th century A.D. It was to obviate this difficulty that Dr. K. C. Pandey set on the search for a commentary on Abhinava’s VimarSini. He struck gold in 1931 when he discovered a commentary Bhaskari by Bhaskarakantha, He belonged to the later half of the 18th century A.D. According to the Bhaskari he was of the Dhaumya- yona Gotra and the names of his grand-father and father were Vaidiryakantha and Avatarakantha respectively. It was to teach ix his son Jagannatha (‘svasutadibodhanartham’) that Bhaskara wrote his learned commentary giving traditional interpretation of the Vimargini or the Pratyabhijfia school of Kashmir Saivism for that matter, which was handed down to him through unbroken chain of acaryas. Besides this commentary, he translated the mystic sayings of Lallesvari, Lalla Vak, into Sanskrit, wrote a commentary, available in fragment, on the Yogavdsistha and composed a poem, named Harsesvarastava, in singing the glory of the Lord on the occasion of his visit to the temple in Kashmir. Another anonymous commentary on the VimarSint, Isvarapra- tyabhijiid-Vimarsini-Vyakhya procured by the late Dr. K. C. Pandey from the Government Manuscript Library, Madras and edited by him before his sad demise is under print and will be published before long by Messrs Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. According to Madhava (15th century A.D.), the author of the Sarvadarsana-Samgraha, (i) Sittrai.e. I§varapratyabhij a of Utpala and his two commentaries thereon, (ii) Vytei and (iii) Vivrti and short and long commentaries of Abhinavagupta, namely, (iv) Vimarsini and VivrtivimarSini constitute the Pratyabhijiiasastra which in essence is the exposition of the Sivadrsti (spoken of as a prakarana of the Saivaéastra) of Somananda: aa afafagfactedt gait fanfait sacrfarorrssafafa med safer: 1 (This verse also occurs in the Sastraparamarga of Madhuraja where the last word reads as ‘pratyabhijiakhyam’.) The ISvarapratyabhijfid of Utpalacarya has four Adhikaras: Jiiana-, Kriya-, Agama- and the Tattvasarigraha-. The first volume contains the Jfdnadhikara which has eight Ahnikas or chapters along with the Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta and the Bhdskari of Bhaskarakantha. The second volume completes the text and the commentaries in the remaining three Adhikaras. This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and Philosophy of the Pratyabhijfia system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English translation of the [svarapratyabhijfid and the VimarSini. As these volumes are essentially photo-prints; the original edition has not been disturbed except in the formal matters where the change of title, publisher etc. is involved. In some cases it might create apparent difficulties, For example, the volumes, although now differently titled will x still be found under the old title of the Bhdskart in the contents, Introduction etc. of Dr. K. C. Pandey. In our desire to place these volumes in the hands of readers at the earliest, we did not think it proper to make changes warranted by new circumstances of the publication. I crave the indulgence of the scholars .in this matter and hope the reprint of the classic texts of the /fvarapratya- bhijfia system of Kashmir, for which real credit should go to Shri J. P. Jain, the publisher, will help in further promoting the growing interest of Indologists in this branch of Indian Philosophy. Department of Sanskrit, R. C. DWIVEDI University of Rajasthan, Jaipur CONTENTS General Editor’s Note v Preface a @ Introduction Gi) Preliminary ie (iii) @ History and Literature Soménanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijfia System (iii) Somananda and the tradition of the Monistic Saivagamas (iv) His rationalistic approach a (iv) His discovery of Pratyabhijaia Re (v) The Isvara Pratyabhijia Karika of Utpaldcarya (vi) Importance of the VimarSini of Abhinavagupta (vii) The Bhaskari of Bhaskara Kantha ase (viii) Another Commentary on the Vimarsini < (ix) (ID Philosophy The Philosophical Background of Kriyasakti ... (ix) The Mahesvara i («) The Influence of Religion (xi) Mahesvara, the Absolute Mind (xiii) Svatantryavada (xvii) The point of view of the Iévara Pratyabhi (xix) The Bauddha theory of action ‘ 2 (xx) The Bauddha criticism of the Saiva view of action (xxiii) Bauddha refutation of the Mahesvara i” (xxiv) Objections against the Svatantryavada (xxvi) The Saiva reply (xxvii) Agreement with the Monistic Vedanta Re (xxx) The Saiva answer to Buddhistic objections , against kriya boo (xxxii) List of Abbreviations se (xxxvi) Sanskrit Text AN arfear qooq frantirere: a sanatend—Prarakae rT, RARE fara: FTA, g atatenfiatertisas aranfaaa: g © aarernaras: R go PUTTS, Ry RR wom TA TAT: a Re uaala carreras: Rw factamitea—' earttien Ro-gy frareraaadtt 7g: g RR wa STREaTL RR frarare epetyi ar Re uarnerearaa fram: wove ferent aT & we warns pranratt: v as aetremnfaert- arcacreta ea GXROE SAUTE CTET co seqaaaraea Urge RRR ER frorrraera RR RRA siafefetaarantarad Re -RRo STAR SATTETITT TET: Ea Gu ea TERA ERS TAT 20 kee ag aati aeecTae see BXo-RoR was Ua BAST: FSC FROTTT AT g RAR Reet RIS xiii faa: aqitet = IS Saqeta scare STAT wee HERO RHE sraare frafearhecaearsitear see BRR VOM ahidte: aaron Taras feeata are we RRR 85S BTA HAH TAT HTATARTATT AIT FONE, RE Sareareribacara AIO A TT se RO“RR ROR STATA: seen STL, RPo-Q¥R Rarer, 20s RR aaa: SETA, eS aierareaaTy Re RR wean: wehrans STTTA: nest safraTTeMTE TATRA SATE weet Ae, Hw RRO wat Ae Balt RRR saoraatiied gehen, & Re FTAA STA, ee RR RTT a 5 RRR mace ee RUT CTT FOI eTAKeT ETT ay BRR ROTA TOT, me RO URS ifaafatatrerr, {he WE. RR YS fedrteny—mraeratrerny «as R-Rvs FORA, oe CANS, aeraTTH eter Sap ER ATTRA STRAT ve We RS rarer gore fre: ae Ro xiv fraat: Rardlai Aird Fe, ASST FRAT SST THREAT SANTA: ATA arama: * anlar tad qtaadiatedtaaa, Wiasmaraaere smeatate: ee ono SR—8 A «RRR - 8R-80 ao TAMA AHA -ABATEA AAT ICT TAIT ALATA Yok-FO wise AVAL Ut STAT TST, FR FATA SETA waa WaT sagan: af safe saafeafa: wy af saateaia: Sree eta eT fragitetenmastt ata: aaa: st ole Fa: aera sae Tara: abrarcaaeanaea nor omer seratarecarasatiar seater firar 4 waters cera: SISETT Roo RR Row Ro RoR RoE Nett Rey Zoo RoR ow R08 R05 Rok RRR RY ee a ee ee ee xv aa: Sacrafaararicarat gat Taare Serra pacrea aT RTARTA wt davretrertaficgrrenat Fara at mss Saumatartakegraeat sere at iquatereakrgrae ward at... Saraftanfrafieqreaai Tara eat Gat... Sacatartaiirtentortiaacaci et BRERA TATTATEATAT A 348 ] ara] ara] RRR] aR 1 aR] RY ] avo | PREFACE. The Bhaskari Vol. II, which is being presented to the reader after the gap of twelve years, completes the work. It covers the last three Adhikaras: (I) Kriya, (11) Agama and (III) Tattva Saigraha, The war and its after-effects have been primarily responsible for the long delay in bringing out this part. Soon aftef the publication of the First Volume in 1988, the com- positors at the Government Press, Allahabad, had taken the work of the present Volume in hand and had made good progress, when the war broke out and the types had to be broken up as an emergency measwre, even before the com- posed and approved portion could be printed off, ‘The press copy of the Manuscript was-neglected so much that it could be traced out with very great difficulty. It was found in a mutilated condition and in spite of long and careful search, the last two pages of it could not be recovered. A fresh press copy had to be prepared. The matter of the missing pages of the press copy could not be reconstructed with the available material. In its place, therefore, another commentary, which has been utilised for filling up the long gap in the original Manuscript of the Bbaskari, had to be put. ‘There is nothing to add to what has been said in the intro- duction to the Bhaskari Vol. I, about the big and the small gaps in the MS,, fidelity to the manuscript, different readings of the Vimargini, Sandhiand the use of different types in the- Bhaskari, The same principles and methods have been followed in this volume also, ( ii) Prof. K, A. S. Iyer had no time to collaborate for the last six years, though he wished to doso, The entire editorial work from preparing a Press copy to seeing the final proofs had to be done by Dr. Pandey. Surely, if Prof. Iyer had collaborated, the defects of the book, whatever they may be, would have been fewer. After the completion of the work, it is our sacred duty to acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude to Mahamahopa- dhyaya Narayana Shastri Khiste, Principal, Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, and to Mr, M, G, Shome, Superin- tendent, Printing and Stationery, Allahabud, for their keen and sustained interest in this Work and for all the help that they have so promptly given, We are also deeply indebted to Pandit Soma Datta Pandey, Vyakaranacharya, the elder brother of Dr, Pandey, for the much needed help in reading the proofs and in preparing the Indices ; and to Mr. Baikunth Nath Bhargava, Managing Proprietor of the Anand Sagar Press, Banaras, for giving priority to this work, But for their help it would not have been possible to bring this volume out. soci inareimasinie tie aise ae a INTRODUCTION. ( Dr, K. ©. Panpey. ) Preliminary. The Monistic system of thought, that arose in Kashmir in the 9th Century A.D., isa synthesis: of the idealistic, realistic, voluntaristic, absolutistic and mystic tendencies of the thinkers of that land of beauty. It is called the Pratyabhijiia Dars‘ana qn the basis of the title “Iévara Pratyabhijiia” which Utpalacarya gave to his Karikas. But before Madhavacarya gave this name to the system in his Sarva Daréana Sangraha, it was known as Svatantryavada, a name by which it is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his Vivti Vimargini (I. P. V. V., Vol. I, P.9). To our contem- poraries it is known as “Kashmir Saivaism’. Mr. J. C. Chatterji gave this name to the system, because all the writers on ib belonged to Kashmir. (1) HISTORY AND LITERATURE. Somananda, the founder of the Pratyabhijna System, The Pratyabhijfié system was founded in Kashmir by Sominanda ( Circa 850 A. D. ), the author of the Siva Drsti. It is in this work that we find the Pratyabhijiia, the Recogni- tion, as a means to the Realisation of the Ultimate Reality, pointed out for the first time the philosophical literature of Kashmir. He himself calls his work ‘Prakarana’, probably meaning thereby that it is a. treatise, which does not simply state the principles aphoristically, as was done by Vasugupta, but puts them on a rational basis, The five works: (I ) Sutra, G tie) (AL) Vetti and ( IIL) Viveti of Utpalacarya; and (IV ) Laghvi Vimars‘ini and (V) Brhati Vimaréini or Vivgti Vimaréini of Abhinavagupta, which are recognised to be the authoritative books on the Pratyabhijis System by Madhava in his Sarva Dars‘ana Safgraha, simply reflect and elaborate the views of Sominanda, presented in the Siva Drsti. Somananda, theresore, was the founder of the Pratyabhijiié system. Somananda and the tradition of the Monistic Saivagamas. According to his own statement in the concluding verses of his work, the Agamic traditon, to which he has given a philosophic form, goes back to the hoary past, But much of what is stated thore would sound mythical to modern histori- ans. We, therefore, ignore it here. The part that is of his- torical value from the modern point of view is the account of his own descent from Tryambakaditya, the propagator of the monistic Saivagamas in Kaliyuga. Somananda represents himself to be the 19th descendant of Tryambake, He wasa great-grand-teacher of Abhinava- gtipta and, therefore, in all probability a contemporary of Bhatta Kallata, who, as we know from the Rajataraigini, was acontemporary of King Avanti Varman of Kashmir ( 855-883 A.D.). Therefore, if we follow the traditional method of allowing twenty-five years for each generation, we will have’ to udmit that a period of four hundred and fifty years intervened between ‘Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic jaivagamas, and Somananda, The philosophic tradition, therefore, which Somananda systematises, goes back to about the end of the 4th Century A. D, His rationalistic approach. In the history of the monistic Saiva literature of Kashmir, Somananda is the first to make a definitely rationalistic (ys) approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality. He distinctly refers to the various prevailing schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories. His attacks are primarily directed against the Sabdabrahmavada of the Grammarians and the Saktyadvayavada, of a section of Kashmir Ssivas themselves, But other systems, such as the various schools of Buddhism, the monistic Vedanta, the Jainism, the Safkhya, the Nyaya and the Vais‘esika, he criticises summarily only. He clearly brings out» the distinction of the Ultimate, as maintained by the mouistic Saivas, from similar conceptions of other systems, through comparison. His discovery of Pratyabhijna. He discovered, through deep study of the monistic Saivagamas, a means to final emancipation, which was unknown even to Vasugupta, the first writer of a treatise on Kashmir Saivaism. It is this means to the realisation of the Ultimate, the Pratyabhijna, which has given the system the name, under which it is Summarised by Madhava in his Sarva Dargana Safgraba. Vasugupta had recognised only three means or ways to liberation: (1) Sambhava ( II ) Sakta and (111) Anava. All these meant an ascetic life of detachment from the world and long practice of Yoga, both extremely dificult in the prac- tical world. Somananda represents an advance on Vasugupta. He shows a new way to the Realisation of the Ultimate metaphysical Reality, che Mahevara. ‘The realisation consists, not in the actualisation of the potential; nor in the attainment of something new; nor in knowing what was unknown before; but in penetrating through the veil, that makes the Mahe$vara appear as the individual, of which every one is immediately aware, and in recognising the Maheévara ( vi) in the individual. He holds that the individual is essentially free ; freedom is the inner being of the individual. But it is hidden by the veil of ignorance. The ignorance has to be removed to recognise it, to realise it as identical with the Reality. Somananda asserts that his doctrine that the entire universe is essentially identical with Siva or Rudra, is upheld even in the Vedas and Puranas and refers to the Vedic passages, such as “Ekorudrovatasthe” “Puruga evedati sarvain” “Sorodidyadasya rudrasya rudratvam” and the Puranic conception of eight forms of Siva, The Ivara Pratyabhijna Karika of Utpalacarya Utpalacarya was a pupil of Somananda. His Iévara Pratyabhijid Karika, according to his own statement in the concluding verse of his work, reflects the views of SomAnanda, as presented in the Siva Drsti. Somananda had summarily criticised different schools of Buddhism and some other schools of thought. Buddhism was fully alive in Kashmir at that time. And, therefore, uvery probably there was a counter-criticism of the monistic Saiva Philosophy that had just arisen, Utpalacarya, undertook to reply to this counter-criticism and wrote his Tévara Pratyabhi- Jha Karika and two commentaries thereon, which are nothing more than a reply to the Bauddha objections against the funda- mentals of the monistie Saivaism. Only the last two small Adhik@ras are devoted to the exposition and the presentation of the summary view of the system respectively, He wrote some minor works also. But in all his works his efforts are concentrated on establishing permanence as opposed to momentariness, universality as opposed to individuality and freedom of thought and action as opposed to passivity ( Santatva ) of the Mind. The permanence and universality are asserted against the Vijiia@navadin Bauddhas, who are true subjectivists and hold the subject to be momentary and jndividual and the object to be a mere projection of such a subject. And freedom of the Universal Self he emphasises against the monistic Vedanta, which holds the Brahman to be Santa, without Vimaréa, Spanda or Sphuratta, Thus, he shows in detail the distinction of his school from the Bauddha on the one hand and from the Vedauta and the Saakhya on the other. Importance of the Virnars'int of Abhinavagupta, Utpalacarya in his Vgtti bas not given any detailed oxpla- nation of the words, employed in the Karika. His object was simply to state the substance of the Katikas clearly, In fact, he himself, according to Abhinava’s quotation in the Vimars‘ini, (Bb, Vol.1,P.39)) said that Vetti was intended to put clearly what had rather been obscurely stated in the Sutras, because of the limitations of the Sitra style. Utpalacarya in his Vrtti, never refers to any word of the Siitra for explaining itssmeaning. He seems to write an independent work, presen- ting summarily but clearly the fundamentals of his system. In his Vivyti or Tik&, he is not concerned with the explanation of the Siitrasso much as with the elaboration of the ideas, presented in the Vytti. He has, therefore, nob attempted a full exposition of the aphorisms anywhere, Abhinava in his Vimargini tried to bring out the fall import of the Siitras so as to show that all the details of the system are implied by the words of the Sutras, He was a very great grammarian. He, therefore, tried to bring out the implications of the words on the basis of the rules of grammar, to which there are frequent references in the work, ( viii) Utpalacarya wrote two commentaries, (I) Vetti and { II) Vivrti or Tika, as has already been stated. No complete MS. of the Vrtti has so far been discovered. ‘The Kashmir edition contains Vrtti up to the 20th Karika of the third Adhikara, Bub unfortunately, in spite of all search for it, no trace ofthe Vivrti has so far been found. It was an important work, Herein the author elaborated the ideas, aphoristically presented in the Karika. But even this needed further eluci- dation. Abhicavagnpla, therefore, wrote a commentary on this commentary, called Vivrti Vimaréini, This also has been published withont the original text. Thus, we find that most of the available material for a proper understanding of the Pratyabhijia system is from the pen of Abhinavagupla. His Vivyti Vimargini, though a very voluminous and important work on the Pratyabhijiia system, is not of much help in gett- ing a connected and detailed idea of the system; because the original commentary, the Vivgti of Utpalacarya, is not avail- able. In his Vivrti Vimaréini, howevor, Abhivavagupta enters into independent and lengthy discussions on various problems. But they can be understood only after the fundamentals of the system have been thoroughly grasped in detail, Thus we find that the only recognised text on the Praty- abhijita system, that is available in full and in which the system is fairly well and accurately presented, is the Vimaréini of Abhinavagupta. It is, therefore, the most important available work, which, though a commentary on the Karika, yet presents the system in such a way that one can geta fairly clear idea of the whole system, without having recourse to other texts, not excluding even the Karika The Bhaskart of Bhaskara Kantha, But the Vimargini of Abhinavagupta is extremely difficult, The writer of these pages, struggled with it for years, without ( ix ) much appreciable success. Even the discussions with old Pandits of Kashmir, who were in touch with the system, could not remove the doubts about the correctness of the interpreta- tion. For, the continuity of the tradition having been broken. their own minds were not free from donbts, A commen- tary, presenting the traditional interpretation, was greatly needed. It was, therefore, a moment of great joy, te discover the Bhaskari in Srinagar in 1931. The necessary informa- tion about this commentary and its author has been given in “Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study” and in the Introduction to the first Volume of the Bhaskari itself. Another commentary on the Vimarsini. In the course of search for Mss on various aspects of Saivaism, another commentary on the Vimargini- was found in the Government Manuscript Library, Madras. It is named “Iévara Pratyabhijiia Vimargini Vyakhya, No information even about the name of its author is available. In the present volume, this commentary has been used to fill up two gaps, (1) Kriyadhikara, Abnika II, Karikas 2-6, and (II) the last two Rarikas of the Tattva Sangrahadhikara, i.e, the concluding verses of the work, The portion on the Kriyalhikara is missing not only in the MS,, on which the present edition is based, but also in the original. This information was very kindly given by the living descendants of Bhaskara Kantha in Srinagar, But the portion of the Bhaskari on the concluding two verses was lost in the Press. (IL) PHILOSOPHY Lhe Philosophical Background of “Kriyas'akti” The present volume is mainly occupied with the presenta- tion of ‘Kriyagakti’, Its porper understanding presupposes a (x) clear idea of the Mahegvara; of the Svatantryavada, and of the Bauddhs objections against the view of the MaheSvara as Karta’, In order, therefore, to facilitate the reader's task, these points are discussed in the following pages, The Mahesvara. The MaheSvara, in the context of metaphysics, is the Free Will. As such He has two powers, (I) the power to act, that is, to manifest the phenomena, which are the basis of the temporal and spatial orders and ( II ) the power to know, that is, to manifest the limited subjects and objects and all the rest that is involved in cognition. The former is technically called ‘Kriyagakti’ and the latter ‘Jfianagakti’, He is called Mahe§vara, bevause of His omnipotence and omniscience, not in the sense, in which these words are understood in the system of Nyaya, but in the sense that He has two powers as presented above, _ In this connection it is necessary to keep in mind that the Shiva differs from the Naiyayika in his conception. of the ‘Power’ ( Sakti), According to the latter, it is a quality which cannot exist without a substratum and, therefore, presupposes & possessor, distinet from itself. The talk of power necessarily means dualism. The knower is different from the power to Know and so is the doer from the power to act. But the former holds that the power is non-different frotn the possessor. (Saktigaktimatorabhedah ), It is the very being of the possessor : the distinction between the power and its possessor is as imaginary as between vhe fire and its power to burn ( Na s‘ivah saktirahito na saktih sivavanyite Tadatmyamanayornityam vahnidahacayoriva. ) Similar is the case with the difference of one power from another, It is assumed because of the variety of the effects. (xi) It iy of the same kind as is imagined between the fire’s power of burning and that of baking. The Influence of Religion. It is a recognised fact that philosophy very often is an outgrowth of religion, It is particularly true of some of the prominent systems of Indian thought, such as Buddhism, Jainism, Vaisnavism, Saktism aod Saivaism. Saivaism, as the very word indicates, is an outgrowth of the Religioz, which recognised Siva to be the highest God, This God is referred to in the Vedic passages by various names such as Sambhava, Mayobhava, Saikara, Mayaskara, Siva and Rudra etc. This God, Siva, has been discovered to be the object of worship in the hoary past in India in the finds of Harappa and Mohenjo- daro, which are recognised to be the earliest archaeological finds of this country, Saivaism is even now one of the great living religions. Some of the biggest religious monuments are dedicated to Siva. Religion leads to philosophy; and philosophy that grows out of religion may still employ the words, commonly used in the religious literature, giving them new meauings and interpreting the religious myths and beliefs philosophically, as has been done by the two eminent systems of thought, Saivaism and Vaisnavism; or it may completely cut itself off from religion and become purely speculative, as has been done by rationalism in the West. Saivaism has not cut itself off from religion. In the Agamic literature, on which the Saiva Philosophy is based, there are generally four sections in each Agama, (I ) Vidya (ID) Kriya (IIL) Yoga and (IV) Carya. The first deals with the categories and other purely philosophical matters. The second is occupied with various forms of spiritual initiation ( xii) and the accompanying rituals. And because the self-realisation is not possible without Yoga, therefore, the third discusses different types of Yoga. But the practice of Yoga is not possible without maintaining the highest ethical standard The fourth, therefore, gives the rules of conduct. S'aivaism is, thus, not concerned with pure speculative thought. It is « synthesis of religion, philosophy and ethics, If we take for instance, the Vimargini of Abbinavagupta and the Bhaskari of Bhaskara Kantha, we find that they ass- ert the view that religion presents the same Ultimate Reality mythically as philosophy establishes rationally and Yoga reve- als immediately, Asa concrete instance we may take the benedictory verse at the beginning of the Kriyadhikara, with which the present volume begins, Here Abhinavagupta gives a popular and figurative presentation of the abstruse Saiva Philosophical doctrine of Kriyaéakti, Here he uses the word Gauripati, which in the context of religon is used for the mythical God, S'iva, as the husband of Gauri, and gives it philosophical meaning, This fact is clearly pointed ont by Bhaskara in his commentary. It may be stated here by the way that the benedictory verse or verses, which Abhinava puts ab the beginning of each chapter of his Vimaréint, are of great importance inasmuch as therein he states the subject-matter of the chapter briefly, clearly and poetically. This practice is followed by Bhaskara also in his commentary. These are popular and figurative presentations of the abstruse philosophical doctrines. In fact, if we study the Iévara Pratyabhijiia caretully, we find. that it is concerned with nothing more than the philoso- phical presentation of the general religious conception of the God, as omniscient and omnipotent,in the light of the monistie philosophy. For, the Maheévara, with the exposition of the ( xii) Saiva conception of which the work is concerned, is repie- sented to be such in the very first verse of the work, ‘Kartari jfiatari’ etc. The Saiva conception of omniscience and omnipotence of the MaheSvara is different from a verbally similar conception of the God of the Naiyayika. In the latter case the Ivara is not free ( Svatantra ); because He depends upon the atoms for the creation of the world. Further, the Nyaya conception is based upon the pluralistic philosophy. But in the former case He is free and the eonception is based upon the monistic philosophy. Mahes'vara, the Absolute Mind. In the Saiva metaphysics of Kashmir, the Ultimate Meta- physical Principle is technically called Mahegvara. And in contrasc to the Brahman of the Vedantin, which is referred to in the neuter gender, the Saivas refer to the MaheSvara in the masculine, ‘He’ is not orly Self-luminous ( Prakagamaya ) like the Brahman of the Vedantin, and, therefore, S’anta ( passive ) (?) but also self-conscious and free ( Vimargamaya ), The implication of the affix ‘maya’ in the present context is similar to that of the Vedantin, when he talks of the Brahman as ‘Anandamaya’. Prakééa and Vimarga are inseparable. There is no self— luminosity without self-consciousness and vice versa, The two expressions simply present an analytical view of the same Ultimate Reality. This Reality, because it is self-luminous and self-conscious, is spoken of as the Universal Mind or Self, The Reality, in the words of the Saiva, is “Prakaéa-vimarga- maya”. In the context of metaphysios, to put the idea meta- phorically, the Reality is like a mirror, capable of producing the multiplicity of itsown affections. Just asa mirror remains really unaffected by the reflections which are casb in it by (aaa) external objects, so the Reality remains really unaffected by the appearances, the Abhasas, which ib pene which proceed from it as do the thoughts, ideas, Gs mental images from an individual mind: But the distinction between the Reality, the Universal Mirror, and an ordinary looking-glass is that (I) while the latter is not aware of its ‘being’, does not know: that it is, is not self-conscious, the former is; and ( I ) while the latter depends for its affections on the external, the former is perfectly independent of every- thing external. Its affections spring from it 4s do fhe ideas from the individual mind, It means that the Reality is the Mind and the universe is nothing but the thought of the Universal Mind. The universe is a reflection on the Universal Mirror. The Prakaéa is the mirror and the power of aware- ness of the ‘Being’ is.the Vimarga. In the context of epistemology, ib means that the Reality is self-shining and self-conscious, It means that the Reality is the Universal Self-consciousness; that itis the presupposition of every experience und assertion and denial. It is admitted that every determinate experience, that an individual subject has, is due to an affection of the individual mind by an external object through senses and to the determi- native reaction of the mind on the data, supplied through the senses. The Saiva admits that the aspect of the individual that receives the affections of the external object, whereon the external objects are reflected, is the ‘Praka§a’ and is identical with the ‘Universal Prakaéa’; and that the aspect of the indi- vidual, that determinately reacts on what is reflected on it, is the ‘Vimarga’ and. is identical with the ‘Universal Vimaréga’, “The Universal and-the individual are essentially identical”, isan assertion that the Saiva makes in common with the Vedantin. And because it is an acknowledged fact that the aii. teak ( xv) individual mind is the presupposition of all experiences, a fact that has been admitted even in the West by such an eminent thinker as Descartes; and because the individual is identical with the Universal; the Saiva, therefore, holds that the Universal Mind as ‘Prakaéa’ and ‘Vimarga’ is the presupposition of all experiences, Epistemically ‘Prakaéa’ also means that the object of experience is essentially ‘Praka$a’ i. e. of the nature of ‘idea’. For, if the object be admitted to be different from ‘Prakaga’, essentially opposite to ‘Prakaga’ i.e, ‘Aprakaéa’; if it be not the essential nature of the object to shine; if ‘not to shite’ were the essential nature of the object; it would never shine in experience; because the essential nature of a thing does not change and if it changes, it cannot be admitted to be its essential nature. The Saiva rejects the view of the dualists and the pluralists, who hold that though it is not the essential nature of the object to shine, yet it is made to shino by the means of right knowledge, ‘Pramana’, For, he asserts that that the essential nature of which is ‘not to shine’, can never be made to shine, Thus he asserts that everything is essentially ‘Prakaéa’ and claims to be a Mahadvaitavadin, From the mystical point of view also the Reality is the same. It is self-shining and self-conscious. The Saiva admits that in the perfect emancipation (Pirnamokga) there is no negation of self-consciousness. For, that would mean reduction to the state of the insentience jédyapatti ). In fact, this is the chief point of differenge between the Saiva and the Vedantin, For while the Vedantin admits the Brahman to be self-shining only (Cinmatra) and without self-consciousness (Nirvimaréa) and accordingly he holds the Brahman to be Santa and the ( xvi) liberation to be the identity with the Brahman and, therefore, a state of negation of self-conseiousness : the Saiva admits self-consciousness to persist even in the final emancipation ; because he holds the Reality, into which the appearance merges, to be not only self-shining but also self-conscious, He, however, asserts the Reality and the final emancipation to be immediacy ( Nirvipkalpa ), His assertion is_ made on the basis of the conception of mediacy (Vikalpa), which may be stated as follows :— Determinacy consists (I) in unifying a multiplicity into aunity, as when a person combines a number of simple percepts into a complex whole; ( IL) in contra-distinguishing the ebject of cognition “this” from “not this”; (IIL) in interpreting a stimulus in a variety of ways and in accepting one interpretation to be correct and rejecting others as incorrect, Thus, determinacy in all cases is dependent on the consciousness of multiplicity either for unification or for consciousness of distinction. Therefore, in the absence of consciousness of multiplicity, determinacy is not possible, Since in the transcendental Self-consciousness, there is nothing to be contra-distinguished from the Self, as there is no ‘not-being’ from which ‘being’ is to be distinguished, it cannot be spoken of as determinate consciousness. The ’Saivas admit, like the Vedantin, that the individual mind is identical with the Universal. Their conception of the macrocosm is based on a very careful study of the microcosm. They hold thab what is true in the case of the individual self is equally so in that of the Universal. Accordingly they maintain that the entire universe is a manifestation of the Universal Mind exactly as the world of imagination is that of the individual and thot the universe is related to the Universal Mind exactly ag ideas are related to the individual, ii ( xvii ) Thus, the conception of the Ultimate Reality as Prakaga- . is not only what vimargamaya, self-luminous and self-consciot the metaphysical reasoning leads to, but als) what the mystic experience in tho indeterminate (nirvikalpa ) Samadhi, from which a yogin rises either automatically ( Svatovyuttisthate ) or is awakened by another (parabodhitah ). reveals. It is also the presupposition of all volitional, cognitive and conscious-physical acts at the empirical level. The distinctive conception of the Ultimate Reality m the metaphysical context, according to Kashmir Saivas, is, therefore, “The Free Will” ( Svatantra Iecha ). Svdtantryavada. ‘This Saiva conception of the metaphysical Reality is very similar to what the German Voluntarists, like Schopenhauer, admit. The Saiva voluntarism, Svatantryavada, agrees with the German Voluntarism (I) that what is known at the empirical level is only a phenomenon; because, like Kant, it admits that the knowing subject can know the given, not as it is in itself. but as it appears through the limiting conditions, time (Kala) tc. : ( IL) that the thing-in-itself is the Will, of which we are immediately aware in voluntary action and intense emotion; because it admits that the principle of Freedom ( Svatautrya ) is immediately present to us in states of intense temotion, in which all external affections of mind disappear : ( IIL ) that the physical act and the entire physical body are immediate objectifications of the Will; because it holds that action is nothing but the 2will externalised and accepts that the will of a great Yogin manifests physical things independently of matter: (IV ) that the Will is the inner nature of everything and the ‘one’ of every phenomenon: ( V ) that the philosophical J. 8. Dr. 11, and 8. K, 39 2 IP. V., Vol, I, 183, ( xviii) wisdom is nothing but bringing the trath “The world is my idea” into reflective and abstract consciousness ; because the jivanmukti of the Saiva consists in nothing but in the reelisation that the entire universe is my manifestation Bat it differs from the Voluntarism of Schopenhauer, inasmuch as he holds the Will to be unconscious; he abstracts the Will from the ‘intelligence’, which he :regards as a mere function of the brain, and identifies it with ‘Nature’, which, according to him, works independently of the ‘intelligence’ He was led to such an abstraction; because he wanted to identify the presuppositions of different sciences with some- thing of which he was immediately aware at the empirical level; because he accepted the Kantian view that conscious- ness of the pure subject, in total isolation from the object, is impossible ; and because his system grew in antagonism to that of Hegel. The Kashmir Saivaism, which developed in the hands of Yogins, to whom self-consciousness in isolation from the object was the most indubitable experience, did not feel compelled to abstract the Will from self-consciousness. It admits the Will to be an aspect of the Mind. This view is in consonance with the experience of will, as even Schopenhauer admits. This ie the aspect of the Mind which constitutes the metaphysical substratum of the whole phenomenal world. This Free Will is essentially nothing but what we have already pointed out to be ‘Vimarga’, It is the starting point of the concretisa- tion of the universal Mind as self-luminous and self-conscious Reality. It differs from Vimarga in so faras while Vimaréa is free from objective reference, does not involve the antithesis of the subject and the object, the Free Will has 1. LP. V., Vol. Il, 266. (@ 21x») objective reference, it involves the antithesis of the subject and the object. The object, however, to which the Will is related, is the Universal “this” which lacks all determinacy, exactly as does the mental picture in the mind of a great artist, when the desire to produce a masterpiece first arises in him. It is like an imperceptible stir in calm water before the rise of waves. It is like the internal stir that precedes the perceptible movement of a physical organ. It is that aspect of the universal Mind, which is responsible for the objectifica- tion of what is identical with it, It logically precedes the universal powers of knowledge and action ( jiianagakti and Kriyaéakti ) exactly as individual intentional knowledge and action are preceded by intention. Kashmir Saivas admit that the individual mind is essen- tially identical with the Univereal, as has already been pointed out. They also admit that while everything can be thought as false (Mithyz) or appearance (Abbaea), the subject, the “I”, which assumes or thinks of the falsity of everything, cannot be so thought; and, therefore, they, very much like Descartes, assert that the trath “I think, therefore, I am” is so certain and so assured that no amount of sceptical reasoning can uproot it, For, it is the presupposition of all doubts and negations, And because the individual is eseentially identical with the Universal, neither of them can be proved or disproved. The point of view of the Is'vura Pratyabhijna Karika. The Iévara Pratyabhijiia Karika states the Saiva view of the MaheSvara very briefly in four verses in the very beginning. But it does not proceed immediately to attempt a rational justifica- tion, elucidation and elaboration of the assertions, Its author, according to Abhinava’s interpretation, held that a view, that is primarily intended to be presented, becomes quite clear, if ( xx) the adverse criticism, that is levelled against it, is clearly stated first and then refuted. Accordingly, the Bauddha objections against the Saiva conception of the MaheSvara, as the Free Universal Mind, are stated and the rest of the work is mainly an answer to this criticistm, For a proper understanding of the contents of this volume, it is necessary to bave a clear idea of the nature of objections against the Saiva view of the Mahegvara as ‘Karta’, the omnipotent doer, The Bauddha theory of action. The characteristic doctrine of the Bauddha is the momen- tariness, not only of the object but also of the subject. Acco- rdingly he denies not only a permanent subject ( jiiata ) as the ‘substratum’ ( Aégraya ) of all determinate cognitions, but also a persisting doer ( Karta ), as the ‘substratum’ of action ? ( Kriya ), to whom the action belongs. He rejects the Saiva view of action as a unity in multiplicity, as something that is one and is yet characterised by succession and belongs to one agent ¢ Kriya naikasya sakrama caika.Bh., Vol. II, P. 7. ). According to the Bauddha, action ( Kriya) involves change. It may be spatial, temporal or formal, Wor instance, in the case of the perceptible action, which is referred to as “He goes” “He moves” or “He falls”, we perceive nothing more than a body, such as that ofa man, connected with various spatial points in temporal succession. And when we assert “He sits for the whole day”, our assertion has no other basis than the perception of a body at a fixed spatial point in temporal succession. Similarly when we say “milk changes” we mean “that which was experienced as liquid and sweet, is experienced as hard and sour”, The aforesaid three instances are the instances of action, involving spatial, temporal and formal changes respectively ( xxi) One point has to be clarified here. The experience of a body as connected with various spatial points in temporal succession, on which the idea of action is based, involves the experience of the body, that is perceived in successive mome- nts at.successive points of space, as the same. But the idea of sameness of the body is in conflict with the Bauddha theory of momentariness, For according to the Bauddha, nothing can remain the same for two successive moments. It has, therefore, to be remembered in this connection that the Bauddha holds that the idea of sameness is not due to the persistence of a thing: for successive momeuts, but to the extreme similaricy of the thing that comes into being in the sueceeding moment with that which existed in the preceding. For instance, we experience the flame of a lamp to persist as the same for a duration of time. ‘The question that arises is “Is the flame the same in reality” ? The Bauddba would reply ‘No’; the flame that is experienced as the same is not the same, does not persist for two moments. It is successively being replaced in successive moments by otlier flames, into which the oil, that is drawn by the wick to the spatial point of the going out flame, is converted, A layman, however, experiences the same flame to persist. The recognition of the flame as the same is due to the extreme similarity of the flame that comes into being at the next moment with the one of the preceding moment. Similar is the case with all things which are experienced as the same for a duration of time. Another point, that has to be elucidated, is that the Bauddha holds that when the spatial and formal differences are there the temporal difference is bound to be. And when there are spatial and tempora! differences, the formal difference is invariably there. Similarly spatial difference is invariably concomitant with the formal and the temporal. It is on the basis of this view that the Bauddha asserts (ex 9) that in the case of the judgement “Devadatta goes” the reco- gnition of Devadatta as the same, when he is found related to different spatial points, is due to similarity; because being an exponent of the theory of momentariness, he has to admit . the formal difference of the body of Devadatta in the succes- sive moments. Further, though temporal and spatial differe- noes necessarily mean the formal difference and, therefore, are included in the formal difference, yet the Bauddha talks of them as different from one angther from the popular point of view. ( Bh, Vol. I, 112-13, ) Thus, the Bauddha analyses ‘action’ from the empirical point of view and asserts that such an analysis does not reveal any perceptible fact to be called ‘action’,apart from momentary existences of a succession of bodily forms, which are related to successive spatial and temporal points and which, though different, are yet recognised to be identical, because of extreme similarity of one with another. And because there is no distinct Perceptible fact, which may be called ‘action’, its inference also is not possible; because inference presupposes a direct perception of the inferable, The Mimauisakas hold the ‘action’ to be inferable from its effect. For instance, a person reaches a distant place. This relation with a distant place is an effect, which musb have a eause. And this cause they hold to be ‘action’. The Bauddha, however, does not accept this argument. Being an exponent+ of the theory of momentariness, he asserts that the so called effect, ‘the reaching of a distant place by a particular body’ is a distinct momentary existence of a body at a particular spatial and temporal point; and that iv is not the same body, that was at one spatial point, which reaches a distant place in the Process of time. This explanation is based upon a peculiar conception of causality, held by the Bauddha. (xxiii) The Bauddha criticism of the S'aiva view of action The Bauddha attacks the Saiva theory ofaction from two points of view. He shows tbat there is no reason in support of the ‘action’ as something distinct from the momentary existences of aseries of bodily forms, which are recognised to be identical, in spatial and temporal order. This view has been presented above. He also asserts that the Saiva view of ‘action’ is inconsistent with reason, as follows :— According to the Saiva, the chief characteristic of action is the succession, which involves priority and posteriority; it is a unity in multiplicity and it belongs to one body such as that of a particular individual. The Bauddha attacks the Saiva view at all the three points, ‘This attack is based upon three assumptions. (1) Whatever is determinately grasped is not real. (II) The real is momentary. ( III ) Priority and posteriority do not belong to moments ( Ksanas ) in them- selves: the order of priority and posteriority shines in the determinate grasp of a number of Ksanas together in an order. Accordingly (I ) he refutes the Saiva view of action ( Kriya ) as real ( Satya ); because it is made up of a series, the members of which are held up together by the determinative activity of mind in the order of priority and posteriority. And as the priority and posteriority do not belong to the moments ( Kgamas ) in themselves, they are rather due to the deter- minative activity of the miad; and as the series, which is the chief characteristic of action, involves priority and posteriority of its members, ‘action’, therefore, is merely a mental construct, such as the determinative activity of mind produces, and is not real; because the moments alone are real and whatever is grasped in determinacy lacks true reality. (II) He also refutes oneness ( Ekatva ) of action; because it is made up of a series of moments, which do not interpenetrate one another (GeEXIV 7) (Na avyonyariipavistah. Bh. Vol. I, 115). And as the series js characterised by difference of its members from one another, the assertion of oneness of action, therefore, is in conflict with the assertion of its serial nature. (IIL) He also refutes the view that action is one, because of oveness of its ‘substratum’ : firstly, because such a substratum, as distinct from the various Ksanas, is not experienced and, therefore, cannot be admitted: and secondly, because even if for the sake of argument the substratum be admitted, the assertion of its oneness is unreasonable. For, how can the substratum, being affected by various moments, be spoken of as one ? Bauddha refutation of the Mahes'vara. The Bauddha attacks the very basic principle, the Absolute in the metaphysical context, the MaheSvara. His criticism of cognition and action, jiiana and Kriya, is preparatory to the attack on the most fundamental doctrine. ‘The Saiva, as stated in the vary first verse of the Igvara Pratyabhij admits that the Absolute is perfectly free and that this freedom manifests itself in the metaphysical context as the power, which expresses itself as the phenomena of cognition and action, The Saivas of Kashmir have been great adherents to and exponents of the philosophy of Grammar, They have been strict followers of the school of Panini. Accordingly, following Panini’s aphorism ‘Svatantrah Karta’, they call the Mabegvara Karta and jiiata in so far as the Absolute is free in the manifestation of phenomena of cognition and action. Tho Bauddha, however, taking the word Karta in the popular sense of the word as signifying a subject that is related to action, denies the being of all the three ( I ) the action (Kriya) (II) the subject to whom the action is related and ( III ) the relation itself. (xxv) The Bauddba asserts on the basis of empirical observation that thert is nothing like an action as an observed fact, apart from the momentary existences of a number of bodies in temporal and spatial order. ‘he so called Kriya is simply a mental construct that the mind builds up when it holds all the obzerved facts together in an order. And nothing that figures in a determinate cognition is real (Arthasamsparéino vikalpah.) ‘The same he asserts about the relation ( Sambandha ). Tf, for instance, we analyse the causal relation, do we find in the observed momentary facts anything apart from two momentary beings, coming into being one after another invariably’? And similar is the case with all other relations. Thus, in the case of the relation of the container and the contained, what distinct observed fact is there, apart from the momentary being of the contained and the container at two distinct points of space, without any point of space between them lying empty or occupied by any other momentary being ? The Bauddha, in the course of his criticism of relation, points out that not only there is no evidence in support of the being of relation, but also there are reasons against its acceptance as follows :— ‘The generally accepted definition of relation is that it isa unity that has its being in two, which exist at two distinct spatial points, without any point of space in between them being occupied by something else or even being empty. But such a definition is impossible, For, how can that, which is present at one particular point of space in its entirity, be, ab the same time, present at another also ? The reason is obvious, The Bauddha is a momentarist, He, therefore, admits that one and the same thing cannot be at two points of space; that the thing, which is cognised at a. different point of space, is in itself different formally ; and that the occupation by it of a (| xxvi ) spatial point sakes place at a different point of time. This is the argument that he advances not only against the relations of conjunction and inherence but also against all other relations, which are based on them. The Bauddha, therefore, asserts that the two terms “Knower” and “deer” ( jfiaté and Karta), employed by the Saivas to present their view of the Absolute in the metaphysical context, stand for mental constructs only ( Kalpanématram ) and not for the real ( Vastu ). Objections against the Svatantryavada. The Syatantryavada ( Voluntarism ) of Kashmir admits that the Free Will manifests all kinds of subject and object and their relations, such as the causality etc., as distinct from one another, from itself, in itself and by itself; and that it is the essential nature of everything. One may, therefore ask :— “Ts it not self-contradictory to assert(I) that the Free Will by itself manifests all kinds of subject and object, which lie in a state of identity with itself, as external to and different from itself; (II ) that all the subjects and the objects, while they are manifested as external to it, are yet in it and (IIL) that it constitutes the essential nature of the manifested ?” This may be elaborated as follows :— (1) What is the basis of the assertion that the entire phenomenal world has its being in the Free Will, which is au aspect of the Universal Mind? Does it not involve self contradiction to assert that this Free Will manifests the pheno- menal world as external to itself and yet the manifested have their being in it as indentical with it? For, being manifested as external to the Will, is the opposite of being in a state cf identity with it or being in it. A thing that shines in something else cannot be said to shine as external to thatin which it shines. (xxvii) For instance, a jar, which is,in a house at a particular time, cannot at the same time be said to be outside it, (II) It does not stand to reason to assert that the Free Will is the essential nature of the manifested, For, the manifested is characterised by multiplicity, But the Will is characterised by unity, which is the opposite of the multiplicity. How can any body accept the view that the manifested, though perceived as multiplicity, have unity as their essential nature ? (TIL) Why does the Will manifest the multiplicity of objects, which are identical with it, as external to itself ? If the manifestation be udmitted to have no cause, it should either always take place or never, ) The Saiva reply. These objections are answered as follows:— The difference between the Saiva Voluntarism and the German Voluntarism is that the latter admits the Free Will to be unconscious: but the former definitely asserts it to be consciousness, It represents the Will to be the immediate expression of the Universal Self-consciousness or Mind, In fact, the Universal Self-consciousness is nothing but a sate of the Universal Mind, in which the world of the limited subjects ard objects is in perfect identity with the Self- consciousness. At the empiricai level we know it on the basis of our personal experience that self-consciousness is the undeniable presupposition of the individual will. ‘The Saiva, therefore, admitting the essential identity of macrocosm and microcosm, the universal and the individual, holds that the Free Will is the immediate expression of the Universal Self-consciousness, And because Saivaism admits, like the German Voluntarism, that all that is within anybody’s experience and even that which i beyond the limited experience is a manifestation of the Free will, therefore, it répresents the Free Will to be an aspect of Siva, the Self, the Prakia, who is in inseparable union or in relation of identity with the consciousness, the Freedom, the VimarSa, and calls the Free Will in the context of metaphysics “the Mahegvara”. The Saiva replies to the objection No. (1) from the idealistic point of view. He admits that everything is essentially of the nature of thought or idea and as such has no being independently of the mind. Accordingly he asserts that the entire universe has its being in and rests on the Universal Mind as follow: The determinate cognition of the objects as distinct from one another, whether it involves assertion or denial of their existence, is not possible, unless they rest on the Mind (Sathvidvigranta ). For, the objects shine only when they rest on the Mind, And shining of the objects consists in shining as essentially identical with the Mind; because the Mind is nothing but the light of consciousness ( Prakaéa ). Therefore, to say that they are different from the light of cousciousness and yet shine, is to assume most unreasonable position. Hence it follows that the objects rest on, have their being in the Mind and are essentially identical with it. The Mind is essentially a unity, because it is essentially the light of consciousness. ‘The admission of diversity aud essential distinction in the case of the Mind, would mean that what is essentially distinct from the Mind, as the light of consciousness, is not-mind, Nor can the diversity be attributed to the Mind, because of the diversity of objects. For, they also are essentially identical with the Mind. If they could have diversity independently of the Mind, they could produce diversity in the ((EZxiX a) Mind. But they themselves have no diversity independently of it. Their diversity is a product of the Mind itself. ‘To say that the objects, which owe their diversity to the Mind, produce diversity in it, is to argue in a circle, to get involved in the fallacy, called “Avyonyagraya”. The time and the space also cannot introduce differentia- tion in the Universal Self-consciousuess. For, they are also the manifestations and, therefore, are identical with the light of consciousness. It is a fact of experience that all the objects shine only as resting on the light of consciousness. And because they shine, they, therefore, have to be admitted to be identical with the light of consciousness, And Prakafa, the light of consciousness, is never without Vimarga, the Freedom. And Freedom is the Will. As the Will manifests all the limited sudjects and objects: as the entire variety, even when manifested, shines ouly as resting on the light of consciousness, therefore, it is on the basis of the fact of experience that the assertion, referred to in the objection No. I, is made, (II) Self-contradiction is no self-contradiction if it refers to facts, For instavee, if ‘the blue’ could shine as ‘iot- blue’ without giving up shining as ‘the blue’, who would have the hardihood of saying that the person who says “the blue shines as uot-blue, without giving up shining as the blue”, asserts what is self-contradictory, And it is a fact of experience that “the blue” ete, while they shine as such, are essentially identical with the light of consciousness, (Prakagabhedamayah), Thus, the Freedom of the Will consists just in this much that while it retains its essential nature as the light of consciousness (Sathvidatmaka eva bhavan) it shines as diversity of limited subject and object, which, though essentially non-different from the light of consciousness, ~( xxx) appears as different from it ( Samvidrapanadhikenapi samvidripadhikataya prakagamanavapusa bhasate I. P. V. V., Vol. L, 6 ). An instance, which illustrates the point in hand, we find at the empirical level in the case of a mirror, We know that the numerous reflections ina mirror are non-different from it, though they appear to be different. The difference, however, between a mirror and the Sarivid as Free Will, is that in the case of the former the reflections are caused by external objects, which have their being independently of it. and that it is not self-aware: in the case of the latter the phenomena, which shine in it, are the manifestations of the Sarhvid itself as the Free Will, and it is aware of itself. essentially (TIL) The third objection is meaningless. For, the Free Will is notin temporal order. The time series is a manifestation and, therefore, cannot be spoken of as a delimitation of the Free Will. Agreement with the Monistic Vedanta. All the objects are like the body of the self-shining Uni- versal 1Self. Just as the body of an individual subject, though an object, is yet directly pervaded by consciousness ( cit ), because of the identification of the self with the body, so is the objective world, because of the identification of the Universal Self with it. The consciousness, thus, is all-pervading and, therefore, omnipresent, The multiplicity of the objects also is similarly all-pervading and omuipresent, Each object is identical with the consciousness. The consciousness and the object are not essentially distinct from each other. This is the view held not only by the Saivas but the Vedautins also, as asserted by them in “Pradegopi Brahmanah 1 LP. V. V., Vol I, 43. (i xxxipe) siriipyamanatikrantascavikalpyagca.” This may be elaborated as follows :— The two implications of the word ‘Brahman’ are that the Brahman is all-pervasive ( Brhat ) and that it is the creator and sustainer of the, universe ( Brmhaka ). On the basis of these implications the following assertion is made :-— It is generally acknowledged that even a part of the Akaga, which the determinative mind imagines, because of the relation of the Akasa with external objects, such as jar ete., and which is distinctly called “Ghatakaéa”, is non-different from the Akaéa as such and has the essential nature of the Akaga, the freedom from limitations, the all-pervasiveness. Similarly, even a part of the Brahman, which the determinative mind imagines to be limi- ted, because of the limiting conditions, such as ‘the blue’ etc, (which are the limited objective appearances of the Brahman itself, because it is the creator of the Phenomenal world by itsown Power) and which is distinctly called “Nilaprakaga” ete. is non-different from the Brahman and has the essential nature of the Brahman such as omnipresence, identity with all powers ( Sarvagaktyavibhagavrttitva ) and indeterminacy or immediacy, For, the Brahman is indeterminacy inasmuch as it is self- shining ( Prakaéam@natamatraripa ) only, and, therefore, deter- minacy cannot be attributed to it, because there is nothing from which it can be contradistinguished. This view is corroborated by the following famous assertions of the Vedantin:— (1) ‘Sarvati khalu idam Brahma’ It means that the limited subjects and objects, on the scrutiny of their most essential nature, are found to be nothing more than the Brahman, ( xxxii_) (II) “Neha nai i kificana”. It denies the independent being to all that is referred to by the word ‘Sarva’ in the preceding quotation. Jt asserts that there is uothing which is not identical with ‘Prakaga’, For, to admit anything to be different from Prakaga is to admit something that is not a tact of experience. The S'aiva Answer to Buddhistic objections against Kriya. The Kriyadhikara is an answer to the objections, raised. by the Bauddha, against the Saiva conception of Kriya or Action. The Bauddha objection was: how can action, which consists of a series, be spoken of as ‘one’ and how can the ‘substratum’ of action ¢ Karta), being connected with the series, be represented to be one ? The reply of the Saiva is that the MaheSvara is like a mirror. And just as the unity of a mirror remains unaffected by the multiplicity of retlections, which are cast in it by external objects, so the unity of the Mahegvara remains in tact in spite of the series, which consitutes action and which is nothing but a manifestation of the Mahegvara himself, being reflected on him, He is spoken of as Karta, because he is the ‘substratum’ of the series. In the case of the individual action also a milar explanation can be giver. Action is undoubtedly a series, made up of the multiplicity of relations of a body, such as that of a particular individual, Devadatta, with a number of spatial points, say, from one to hundred. So far action is a multiplicity. But it isa unity, because the ‘substratum’ of the series, the body of Devadatta, is recognised to be the same and this recognition remaius uncontradicted, The objection of the Bau@dha was based on his theory of momentariness of both, the subject and the object. The (. xxxili_) Saiva’s answer is based upon the refutation of the Bauddha theory of momenteriness of the subject. Thus, even though it may be asserted that the body, the relations of which with a number of spatial points constitute the series, which is called action, is not the same, but different at each successive moment and yet is recognised to be the same, because of the similarity in forms: yet that would not affect the Saiva position. For, the Sava finally asserts that the ‘substratum’ of action is nob the body, but the conscious subject, who is conscious of himself us the same through all the Arelations of the body with various spatial points. In the Saiva literature the word “Kriya” is used in two different meanings — (1) ‘he power of the Universal Mind to manifest the limited subjects and objects, which are the presuppositions of the empirical knowledge and on which all the worldly transactions depend, is the 1managakti’. And the Kriya is nothing but the power to unite and separate these limited manifestations with and from one another, When the word “Kriy&” refers to this aspect of the Universal Mind, it is nothing but ‘Vimaréa’ and is called Kriyaéakti, This Kriya has no temporal limitations and, therefore, is not of the serial.nature ; because the Universal Mind, of which it is an aspect, is free from such limitations. Thus, the ‘Kriya’, as an ~ aspect of the Universal Mind, in reality, is not of the serial nature. But it appears to be such, when it is viewed in relation with the manifestation of succession, to the limited subjects. For, according to the Siva, the manifested variety in succession is related to the Universal Mind as the reflectiove are to a mirror. Therefore, from the point of 1. 1. POV, Vol, IIT, 3. (Gaxxxiv’;) view of the limited subject the ‘Kriya’ appears to. be ‘successive’ (Kramika). But in yeality from the true philosoph- ical point of view it is nov so; because the temporal order is from the point of view of the individual mind and not from that of the Universal Mind. (IL) The Naiyayikas admit action to be simply an empirical fact, e. g. the motion of the hand when it is lifted up. Such a Kriya is undoubtedly serial in nature ; because it consists of the successive relations of the hand with a number of spatial points from the one, from which it is raised, to the other, which it reaches. ¢ The Mimanisakas, however, assert that ‘Kriya’ is a certain power in the hand, which is responsible for the successive relations of the hand with successive points of space, As such, they hold, it is a matter of inference only, The Bauddha view of action is that it is nothing but a mental construct, produced by the determinative activity of the mind, which unifies the various moments ( Ksanas ), “the hand at one point of space” and “the hand at another point of space” and so on, into one whole; and that there is nothing apart from the aforesaid Kganas which is perceptible. Kriya, therefore, the Bauddha holds, is simply a mental construct, and as such is not real. For, whatever figures in the determinate coguition is not real. (Arthosuinspars'ino Vikalpah ) The Saiva admits that ‘Kriya’ is serial in nature ( Kramika ), but asserts that this holds good of the Kriy& at the empirical level, where things are necessarily in the temporal torder, But the Kriya at the transcendental level, ‘the Kriyagakti’, is vot of 1 LP. V.V., Vol, UII, 3. (Geax aye) such a nature ; because transcendency consists in freedom from the temporal order. The Suivi holds that the serial appearance of the objects is due to the Kalagakti, an aspect of the Kriyagakti, which manifests each object as cut off from every other, and each state of an object as distinct from every other to the individual only. The reader is requested to keep the following points in mind, while going through the Bhaskari :— (1) Some types, particularly those of the Matras and Repha, have got broken in the course of printing. They will, therefore, be found occasionally missing, (IL) @and # at some places look like @ and W, because the ink has got spread. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. Bh. = Bhaskari, C.=Codex, TP. Y.=Iévara Pratyabhijiia Vimaréini. 1, P. V. V.=Iévara Pratyabhijfia Vivgti Vimaréini. K. S'S. =Kashmir Sanskrit Series. 8. Dr. =Siva Drsti. 8. K.=Spanda Karika. a ITAA: frartranrea: feeftatisRrare: ferarfgreit faaafrageatana watacatssrat aeeate at Hrgelastadesd | agiiraquaiyit fearaftd aa sazag at ofarentdiofa: @ at FTL 8 Al arene Soar Farerraghela orate: aferar sramfafeaaeaasiiga ear | seracararat fife gafrar Aaafeet frardlager afe fe 8% aeftraa | ad mrarftarred saa fama’ crear trarfierrerer fealaer fraser ffgaaftena® saanaaa a aadse: wangiantt afe: fasafirat ceergeaed daearaldkar ameniteras: asta waar “faa” ce! a-wdotaraaa afea:, sftara-aeaatermerenarrerareragaa:, sa wa aitgh—afa- Friera wer cr at, af-afeaacta faaarg aden, fariteksars cf aad 1 was gol ai aa, Aenea oftrareaeai sarge, THerg—Rerhe- vaqerr faseqeqaa eats stg, It J ered aTd ataiga ward aa | ae: f a aig: Prana ariearat — Raga-dmremagaRaiaaeirer “a R dearorafrarfratitttcaren 1 [8 ao 8 ae SIMT-TSETA fT sre, a ua Taha, aT Tq-etiwaa oo yoig, fearaftaq—araahegutraedt suai adq, secali—sfaternaa afe: cealsi wale, BAM MIATA | Sd sew? AR—aEeaT: 3 aioe, oeaasma et aaa, Fa Tatler a— ae mass 3, eta ceqa-aaaeet aga, 7, aeaet ofa Tad | aafeta-fsimlersea, swaeT-waATT, aramiata araq | fradafsta araafisrara frarakeaaa waft t ‘até sari ‘ad aadfir eat fe saandaaaa: sane aaa aaa, aa: soars eala, azar fuerte seTaaIT, yea amet senagsaeay | ga seal? agauy ware a veq-aeizem tag, areal yf aarqerati earn | afta erat wed nara gata a ale: eHeagya- arat eaters umuehanatia daria, wea g TEVA AarAayR ca, Fsrsanigreer aasnrlerariReareeka SeTeTST AT Balch | ASAT ad fearfast afe: fuser agate arate eaarien star fagearafear it aft) aur waraceataateata oat wT eaTarakis- aereriaser cat qeaeraaTUlengiaera igaaiaeTeeH nae daettraaarart ward Nagase ahaa TI aT TT qaqraats eramareamier ciara | aga 1, fansiagata—C. 2. aagerarg—C. 3, wasafiara—C, 4, gai'—C. 5. qarayza—C, g wo } ATER t a wequaqaet afaater arqara aerfgatnral wa: SL IZ: Va: Il xf) saga | gfisd: a: era gerHeraae MHS qtarsaaa afte: | earatnlitaseataera: searereet: ae: MT | TY SST IAAT, AT WT W WUgal HAARTSNAIT- tarrasrersqeratt fua:, Ter selfs Be, get fe sara ara crater RaaagaaitaMeleaesegETaTE A Tse aaa, ag “aU Nas? TeTeAaIsaREMTTIST Ta- fac’ gagaeaia “ad? gRiceened eaatelaaemanea WERT |S SET: TL? WUT —earaamMaig AaTleeaed- GeqKIATTTTa Sasha dese, afssateq—quesaeraTE- TIARAS ART, AAT AGRA, Hraaarfals aaa, Ta aa, afeareareag & aaiear aft antaa aaitadar eacta, aa qaigtaienst aot qalataaada! gal aaa ve gatenai tant aera “ser? fi serfr-gfreaeas ad frac aRten Aaah, fecd faua:aecquiea- afieataaa’ qeq area, Carehfaararmraash ardarargaararas, SPOUT aes aTgeTETa aaa SEAT ATA: | aa a cise: a:-qungTaet eaaly adqadededa feas: fractare: ware:, TUAseTeA: Wa! TEI THIS

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