PERCELINO DIAMANTE, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GERARDO DEYPALUBUS, respondents.
FACTS: A fishery lot, encompassing an area of 9.4 hectares and designated as Lot No.
518-A of the Cadastral Survey of Dumangas, Iloilo, was previously covered by
Fishpond Permit No. F-2021 issued in the name of Anecita Dionio. Upon Anecita's
death, her heirs, petitioner Diamante and Primitivo Dafeliz, inherited the property
which they later divided between themselves; petitioner got 4.4. hectares while Dafeliz
got 5 hectares. It is the petitioner's share that is the subject of the present controversy.
Primitivo Dafeliz later sold his share to private respondent.
On 21 May 1959, petitioner sold to private respondent his leasehold rights over the
property in question for P8,000.00 with the right to repurchase the same within three (3)
years from said date.
On 16 August 1960, private respondent filed an application with the Bureau of
Fisheries, dated 12 July 1960, for a fishpond permit and a fishpond lease agreement over
the entire lot, submitting therewith the deeds of sale executed by Dafeliz and the
petitioner.
Pressed by urgent financial needs, petitioner, on 17 October 1960, sold all his remaining
rights over the property in question to the private respondent for P4,000.00.
On 25 October 1960, private respondent, with his wife's consent, executed in favor of
the petitioner an Option to Repurchase the property in question within ten (10) years
from said date, with a ten-year grace period.
Private respondent submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries the definite deed of sale; he did
not, however, submit the Option to Repurchase.
Thereafter, on 2 August 1961, the Bureau of Fisheries issued to private respondent
Fishpond Permit
On 11 December 1963, petitioner, contending that he has a valid twenty-year option to
repurchase the subject property, requested the Bureau of Fisheries to respondent’s
permit insofar as the said property is concerned. On 18 December 1964, his letter-
complaint was dismissed. Petitioner then sought a reconsideration of the dismissal; the
same was denied on 29 April 1965. His appeal to the Secretary of the DANR was
likewise dismissed on 30 October 1968. Again, on 20 November 1968, petitioner sought
for a reconsideration; this time, however, he was successful.
Issue: Was there a valid Option? No
RULING: It is settled by this Court that "an agreement to repurchase becomes a
promise to sell when made after the sale, because when the sale is made without such
an agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely, and if he afterwards
grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the
purchaser, as absolute owner already of the object. In that case the vendor has not
reserved to himself the right to repurchase."
Hence, the Option to Repurchase executed by private respondent in the present case,
was merely a promise to sell, which must be governed by Article 1479 of the Civil Code.
A copy of the so-called Option to Repurchase is neither attached to the records nor
quoted in any of the pleadings of the parties. This Court cannot, therefore, properly rule
on whether the promise was accepted and a consideration distinct from the price,
supports the option. Undoubtedly, in the absence of either or both acceptance and
separate consideration, the promise to sell is not binding upon the promissor (private
respondent).
A unilateral promise to buy or sell is a mere offer, which is not converted into a contract
except at the moment it is accepted. Acceptance is the act that gives life to a juridical
obligation, because, before the promise is accepted, the promissor may withdraw it at
any time. Upon acceptance, however, a bilateral contract to sell and to buy is created,
and the offeree ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser; the offeror, on the other
hand, would be liable for damages if he fails to deliver the thing he had offered for sale.
The contract of option is a separate and distinct contract from the contract which the
parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option, and a consideration for an
optional contract is just as important as the consideration for any other kind of contract.
Thus, a distinction should be drawn between the consideration for the option to
repurchase, and the consideration for the contract of repurchase itself.
Even if the promise was accepted, private respondent was not bound thereby in the
absence of a distinct consideration.
G.R. No. L-51824 February 7, 1992
PERCELINO DIAMANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GERARDO DEYPALUBUS, respondents.
Hernandez, Velicaria, Vibar & Santiago for petitioner.
Amancio B. Sorongon for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated 21 March 1979 in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04866 setting aside its earlier decision therein,
promulgated on 6 December 1978, which reversed the decision of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo City. The latter nullified the Orders of the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) dated 29
August 1969, 20 November 1969 and 21 April 1970, declared binding the Fishpond Lease
Agreement (FLA) issued to private respondent and disallowed petitioner from
repurchasing from private respondent a portion of the fishery lot located at Dumangas,
Iloilo, covered by the FLA.
The pleadings of the parties and the decision of the respondent Court disclose the factual
antecedents of this case.
A fishery lot, encompassing an area of 9.4 hectares and designated as Lot No. 518-A of
the Cadastral Survey of Dumangas, Iloilo, was previously covered by Fishpond Permit
No. F-2021 issued in the name of Anecita Dionio. Upon Anecita's death, her heirs,
petitioner Diamante and Primitivo Dafeliz, inherited the property which they later
divided between themselves; petitioner got 4.4. hectares while Dafeliz got 5 hectares. It is
the petitioner's share that is the subject of the present controversy. Primitivo Dafeliz later
sold his share to private respondent.
On 21 May 1959, petitioner sold to private respondent his leasehold rights over the
property in question for P8,000.00 with the right to repurchase the same within three (3)
years from said date.
On 16 August 1960, private respondent filed an application with the Bureau of Fisheries,
dated 12 July 1960, for a fishpond permit and a fishpond lease agreement over the entire
lot, submitting therewith the deeds of sale executed by Dafeliz and the petitioner.
Pressed by urgent financial needs, petitioner, on 17 October 1960, sold all his remaining
rights over the property in question to the private respondent for P4,000.00.
On 25 October 1960, private respondent, with his wife's consent, executed in favor of the
petitioner an Option to Repurchase the property in question within ten (10) years from
said date, with a ten-year grace period.
Private respondent submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries the definite deed of sale; he did
not, however, submit the Option to Repurchase.
Thereafter, on 2 August 1961, the Bureau of Fisheries issued to private respondent
Fishpond Permit No. 4953-Q; on 17 December 1962, it approved FLA No. 1372 in the
latter's favor.
On 11 December 1963, petitioner, contending that he has a valid twenty-year option to
repurchase the subject property, requested the Bureau of Fisheries to nullify FLA No.
1372 insofar as the said property is concerned. On 18 December 1964, his letter-complaint
was dismissed. Petitioner then sought a reconsideration of the dismissal; the same was
denied on 29 April 1965. His appeal to the Secretary of the DANR was likewise dismissed
on 30 October 1968. Again, on 20 November 1968, petitioner sought for a reconsideration;
this time, however, he was successful. On 29 August 1969, the DANR Secretary granted
his motion in an Order cancelling FLA No. 1372 and stating, inter alia, that:
Evidently, the application as originally filed, could not be favorably acted
upon by reason of the existing right of a third party over a portion thereof.
It was only the submission of the deed of absolute sale which could
eliminate the stumbling block to the approval of the transfer and the
issuance of a permit or lease agreement. It was on the basis of this deed of
sale, in fact, the one entitled "option to repurchase" executed barely a week
from the execution of the deed of absolute sale, (which) reverted, in effect,
the status of the land in question to what it was after the execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase; that is, the land was again placed
under an encumbrance in favor of a third party. Circumstantially, there is a
ground (sic) to believe that the deed of absolute sale was executed merely
with the end in view of circumventing the requirements for the approval of
the transfer of leasehold rights of Diamante in favor of Deypalubos; and the
subsequent execution of the "Option to Repurchase" was made to assure the
maintenance of a vendor a retro's rights in favor of Diamante. There was,
therefore, a misrepresentation of an essential or material fact committed by
the lessee-appellee (Deypalubos) in his application for the permit and the
lease agreement, without which the same could not have been issued. 1
The Secretary based his action on Section 20 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 60,
the second paragraph of which reads:
Any and all of the statements made in the corresponding application shall
be considered as essential conditions and parts of the permit or lease
granted. Any false statements in the application of facts or any alteration,
change or modification of any or all terms and conditions made therein
shall ipso facto cause the cancellation of the permit or lease.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration of this last Order arguing that the DANR
Secretary's previous Order of 30 October 1968 dismissing petitioner's letter-complaint
had already become final on the ground that he (private respondent) was not served a
copy of petitioner's 20 November 1968 motion for reconsideration. On 20 November 1969,
private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied; a second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on 20 April 1970.
On 5 May 1970, private respondent filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City a
special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction (docketed as Civil Case No.
8209), seeking to annul the Secretary's Orders of 20 April 1970, 20 November 1969 and 29
August 1969 on the ground that the Secretary: (1) gravely abused his discretion in not
giving him the opportunity to be heard on the question of whether or not the Option to
Repurchase was forged; and (2) has no jurisdiction to set aside FLA No. 1372 as the Order
of the Bureau of Fisheries dismissing petitioner's 11 December 1963 letter-complaint had
already become final.
After issuing a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, the
lower court tried the case jointly with Criminal Case No. 520 wherein both the petitioner
and a certain Atty. Agustin Dioquino, the Notary Public who notarized the 25 October
1960 Option to Repurchase, were charged with falsification of a public document.
After due trial, the lower court acquitted the accused in the criminal case and decided in
favor of the private respondent in Civil Case No. 8209; the court ruled that: (1) the DANR
Secretary abused his discretion in issuing the questioned Orders, (2) petitioner cannot
repurchase the property in question as the Option to Repurchase is of doubtful validity,
and (3) FLA No. 1372 in the name of private respondent is valid and binding.
Petitioner appealed to the respondent Court which, on 6 December 1978, reversed the
decision of the trial court 2 on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent Secretary inasmuch as private respondent was given the
opportunity to be heard on his claim that the Option to Repurchase is spurious, and that
the trial court merely indulged in conjectures in not upholding its validity. Said the
respondent Court:
With all the foregoing arguments appellee had exhaustively adduced to
show the spuriousness of the deed of "Option to Repurchase", appellee can
hardly complain of not having been given an opportunity to be heard,
which is all that is necessary in relation to the requirement of notice and
hearing in administrative proceedings. Moreover, appellee never asked for
a formal hearing at the first opportunity that he had to do so, as when he
filed his first motion for reconsideration. He asked for a formal hearing only
in his second motion for reconsideration evidently as a mere afterthought,
upon realizing that his arguments were futile without proofs to support
them.
The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the Secretary acted with
grave abuse of discretion in giving weight to the alleged execution by
appellee of the deed of Option to Repurchase, on the basis of the xerox copy
of said deed as certified by the Notary Public, Agustin Dioquino.
With such documentary evidence duly certified by the Notary Public,
which is in effect an affirmation of the existence of the deed of "Option of
Repurchase" (sic) and its due execution, the Secretary may not be said to
have gravely abused his discretion in giving the document enough
evidentiary weight to justify his action in applying the aforequoted
provisions of Fisheries Adm. Order No. 60. This piece of evidence may be
considered substantial enough to support the conclusion reached by the
respondent Secretary, which is all that is necessary to sustain an
administrative finding of fact (Ortua vs. Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 635; Ang
Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635; Ramos vs. The Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, et al. L-29097, Jan. 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 330). Reviewing courts do
not re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case, if
originally instituted as such, nor are they authorized to receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.
For common sense dictates that the question of whether the administrative
agency abused its discretion in weighing evidence should be resolved
solely on the basis of the proof that the administrative authorities had
before them and no other (Timbancaya vs. Vicente, L-19100, Dec. 27, 1963,
9 SCRA 852). In the instant case the evidence presented for the first time
before the court a quo could be considered only for the criminal case heard
jointly with this case.
The lower court's action of acquitting the notary public, Agustin Dioquino,
and appellant Diamante in Criminal Case No. 520 for falsification of public
document is in itself a finding that the alleged forgery has not been
conclusively established. This finding is quite correct considering the
admission of the NBI handwriting expert that admission of the NBI
handwriting expert that he cannot make any finding on the question of
whether appellee's signature on the deed of "Option to Repurchase" is
forged or not, because of the lack of (sic) specimen signature of appellee for
comparative examination. The Secretary may have such signature in the
application papers of appellee on file with the former's office upon which
to satisfy himself of (sic) the genuineness of appellee's signature. It would
be strange, indeed, that appellee had not provided the NBI expert with a
specimen of his signature when his purpose was to have an expert opinion
that his signature on the questioned document is forged.
On the other hand, as to the signature of his wife, the latter herself admitted
the same to be her own. Thus —
Q There is a signature below the typewritten
words "with my marital consent" and above the
name Edelina Duyo, whose signature is this?
A That is my signature. (T.s.n., Crim. Case No.
520, April 5, 1971, p. 14).
In not finding in favor of the perfect validity of the "Option to Repurchase,"
the court a quo merely indulged in conjectures. Thus, believing the
testimony of appellee that the later (sic) could not have executed the deed
of option to repurchase after spending allegedly P12,000.00, and that if there
was really a verbal agreement upon the execution of the deed of absolute
sale, as alleged by appellant, that appellant's right to repurchase, as was
stipulated in the earlier deed of sale, shall be preserved, such agreement
should have been embodied in the deed of sale of October 17, 1960 (Exh. D),
the court doubted the genuineness of the deed of Option to Repurchase
(sic).
It is highly doubtful if appellee had spent P12,000.00 during the period from
October 17, 1960 to October 25, 1960 when the deed of option was executed.
Likewise, the right to repurchase could not have been embodied in the deed
of absolute sale since, as the Secretary of DANR found, the purpose of the
deed of absolute sale is to circumvent the law and insure the approval of
appellee's application, as with his right to 4.4 hectares appearing to be
subject to an encumbrance, his application would not have been given
favorable action.
Above all, the speculation and conjectures as indulged in by the court a
quo cannot outweigh the probative effect of the document itself, a certified
xerox copy thereof as issued by the Notary Public, the non-presentation of
the original having been explained by its loss, as was the testimony of the
same Notary Public, who justly won acquittal when charged with
falsification of public document at the instance of appellee. The fact that the
spaces for the document number, page and book numbers were not filled
up in the photostatic copy presented by the representative of the Bureau of
Records Management does not militate against the genuineness of the
document. It simply means that the copy sent to the said Bureau happens
to have those spaces unfilled up (sic). But the sending of a copy of the
document to the Bureau of Records Management attests strongly to the
existence of such document, the original of which was duly executed,
complete with the aforesaid data duly indicated thereon, as shown by the
xerox copy certified true by the Notary Public.
Indeed, in the absence of positive and convincing proof of forgery, a public
instrument executed with the intervention of a Notary Public must be held
in high respect and accorded full integrity, if only upon the presumption of
the regularity of official functions as in the nature of those upon the
presumption of the regularity of official functions as in the nature of those
of a notary public (Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin, 49 OG 179; El Hogar Filipino
vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17).
Subsequently, the respondent Court, acting on private respondent's motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on 21 March 1979 the challenged Resolution 3 setting aside
the earlier decision and affirmed, in toto, the ruling of the trial court, thus:
. . . the respondent (DANR) Secretary had gone beyond his statutory
authority and had clearly acted in abuse of discretion in giving due weight
to the alleged option to repurchase whose (sic) genuiness (sic) and due
execution had been impugned and denied by petitioner-appellee
(Deypalubos). While the certified true copy of the option to repurchase may
have been the basis of the respondent Secretary in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, the Court believes that he should have first ordered the
presentation of evidence to resolve this factual issue considering the
conflicting claims of the parties. As earlier pointed out, all that was
submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries and consequently to the respondent
Secretary, was a xerox copy of the questioned document which was
certified to by a notary public to be a copy of a deed found in his notarial
file which did not bear any specimen of the signatures of the contracting
parties. And assuming that a certification made by a notary public as to the
existence of a document should be deemed an affirmation that such
document actually exists. Nevertheless, (sic) when such claim is impugned,
the one who assails the existence of a document should be afforded the
opportunity to prove such claim, because, at most, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties is merely disputable and can
be rebutted by convincing and positive evidence to the contrary.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner filed the instant
petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied to
administrative proceedings and that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, absent
a showing of arbitrariness, should be accorded respect.
While the petition has merit, petitioner's victory is hollow and illusory for, as shall
hereafter be shown, even as We reverse the assailed resolution of the respondent Court
of Appeals, the questioned decision of the Secretary must, nevertheless, be set aside on
the basis of an erroneous conclusion of law with respect to the Option to Repurchase.
The respondent Court correctly held in its decision of 6 December 1978 that the
respondent Secretary provided the private respondent sufficient opportunity to question
the authenticity of the Option to Repurchase and committed no grave abuse of discretion
in holding that the same was in fact executed by private respondent. We thus find no
sufficient legal and factual moorings for respondent Court's sudden turnabout in its
resolution of 21 March 1979. That private respondent and his wife executed the Option
to Repurchase in favor of petitioner on 25 October 1960 is beyond dispute. As determined
by the respondent Court in its decision of 6 December 1978, private respondent's wife,
Edelina Duyo, admitted having affixed her signature to the said document. Besides, the
trial court itself in Criminal Case No. 520 which was jointly tried with the civil case,
acquitted both the petitioners and the notary public, before whom the Option to
Repurchase was acknowledged, of the crime of falsification of said document.
We hold, however, that the respondent Secretary gravely erred in holding that private
respondent's non-disclosure and suppression of the fact that 4.4 hectares of the area
subject of the application is burdened with or encumbered by the Option to Repurchase
constituted a falsehood or a misrepresentation of an essential or material fact which,
under the second paragraph of Section 29 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 60 earlier
quoted, "shall ipso facto cause the cancellation of the permit or lease." In short, the
Secretary was of the opinion that the Option to Repurchase was an encumbrance on the
property which affected the absolute and exclusive character of private respondent's
ownership over the 4.4 hectares sold to him by petitioner. This is a clear case of a
misapplication of the law on conventional redemption and a misunderstanding of the
effects of a right to repurchase granted subsequently in an instrument different from the
original document of sale.
Article 1601 of the Civil Code provides:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the
right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with the
provisions of article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been
agreed upon.
In Villarica, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 4 decided on 29 November 1968, or barely seven
(7) days before the respondent Court promulgated its decision in this case, this Court,
interpreting the above Article, held:
The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a
subsequent instrument, but is a right reserved by the vendor in the same
instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once the
instrument of absolute sale is executed, the vendor can no longer reserve
the right to repurchase, and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the
vendee in a separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but some
other right like the option to buy in the instant case. . . .
In the earlier case of Ramos, et al. vs. Icasiano, et al., 5 decided in 1927, this Court had
already ruled that "an agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when made
after the sale, because when the sale is made without such an agreement, the purchaser
acquires the thing sold absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the vendor the right to
repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the purchaser, as absolute owner already
of the object. In that case the vendor has not reserved to himself the right to repurchase."
In Vda. de Cruzo, et al. vs. Carriaga, et al., 6 this Court found another occasion to apply the
foregoing principle.
Hence, the Option to Repurchase executed by private respondent in the present case, was
merely a promise to sell, which must be governed by Article 1479 of the Civil Code which
reads as follows:
Art. 1479. — A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a
price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by
a consideration distinct from the price.
A copy of the so-called Option to Repurchase is neither attached to the records nor quoted
in any of the pleadings of the parties. This Court cannot, therefore, properly rule on
whether the promise was accepted and a consideration distinct from the price, supports
the option. Undoubtedly, in the absence of either or both acceptance and separate
consideration, the promise to sell is not binding upon the promissor (private respondent).
A unilateral promise to buy or sell is a mere offer, which is not converted
into a contract except at the moment it is accepted. Acceptance is the act
that gives life to a juridical obligation, because, before the promise is
accepted, the promissor may withdraw it at any time. Upon acceptance,
however, a bilateral contract to sell and to buy is created, and the
offeree ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser; the offeror, on the
other hand, would be liable for damages if he fails to deliver the thing he
had offered for sale.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The contract of option is a separate and distinct contract from the
contract which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the
option, and a consideration for an optional contract is just as important as
the consideration for any other kind of contract. Thus, a distinction should
be drawn between the consideration for the option to repurchase, and the
consideration for the contract of repurchase itself.7
Even if the promise was accepted, private respondent was not bound thereby in the
absence of a distinct consideration. 8
It may be true that the foregoing issues were not squarely raised by the parties. Being,
however, intertwined with the issue of the correctness of the decision of the respondent
Secretary and, considering further that the determination of said issues is essential and
indispensable for the rendition of a just decision in this case, this Court does not hesitate
to rule on them.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, 9 this Court held:
If the appellants' assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge
to the decision of the court below, we still believe that the objection takes a
narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1,
section 2) is that they "shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." In line with the modern
trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of error which
is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate
review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a number of
cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary
power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors
not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the
error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate
court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J.,
1341, footnote 77). At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in this light,
authorizes us to examine and pass upon the decision of the court below.
In Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., 10 this Court ruled:
. . . (t)he Supreme Court has ample authority to review and resolve matter
not assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if
it finds the consideration and determination of the same essential and
indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. 11 This Court,
thus, has the authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if
the unassigned errors closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if
the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the determination of the
questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend. 12
The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties. The
Supreme Court, likewise, has broad discretionary power, in the resolution
of a controversy, to take into consideration matters on record which the
parties fail to submit to the Court as specific questions for
determination. 13 Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues
not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and
close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record,
the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the
controversy as well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases wherein
questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as necessary for the
complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and such
questions fall within the issues already framed by the parties, the interests
of justice dictate that the Court consider and resolve them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals of 21 March 1979 in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04866 and the Decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 8209, insofar as they declare, for the reasons therein given, Fishpond Lease
Agreement No. 1372, valid and binding, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
challenged Orders of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of
29 August 1969, 20 November 1969 and 21 April 1970 are likewise REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1372 is ordered REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
