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~upreme Qeourt
;!Manila
SECOND DIVISION

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 196596

REVENUE,
Petitioner,

-versus-

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.,

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY INC., G.R. No. 198841
Petitioner,

-versus-

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 198941
REVENUE,
Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
-versus-
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA,* and
LEONEN,JJ.

DE LA SALLE UNIVE
RSITY INC.
, Responden~---------~-~-~+
Promulgated: 2016

x------------------------------------------------------

* On Official Leave.

~
 ..
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari: 1

1. G.R. No. 196596 filed by the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (Commissioner) to assail the December 10, 2010
decision and March 29, 2011 resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals ( CTA) in En Banc Case No. 622; 2

2. G.R. No. 198841 filed by De La Salle University, Inc. (DLSU)

to assail the June 8, 2011 decision and October 4, 2011
resolution in CTA En Banc Case No. 671 ;3 and

3. G.R. No. 198941 filed by the Commissioner to assail the June

8, 2011 decision and October 4, 2011 resolution in CTA En
Banc Case No. 671. 4

G.R. Nos. 196596, 198841 and 198941 all originated from CTA
Special First Division (CTA Division) Case No. 7303. G.R. No. 196596
stemmed from CTA En Banc Case No. 622 filed by the Commissioner to
challenge CTA Case No. 7303. G.R. No. 198841 and 198941 both stemmed
from CTA En Banc Case No. 671 filed by DLSU to also challenge CTA
Case No. 7303.

The Factual Antecedents

Sometime in 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued to

DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA) No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers
to examine the latter's books of accounts and other accounting records for
all internal revenue taxes for the period Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and
Unverified Prior Years. 5

On May 19, 2004, BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice to

DLSU. 6

Subsequently on August 18, 2004, the BIR through a Formal Letter of

Demand assessed DLSU the following deficiency taxes: (1) income tax on
rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within

The petitions are filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Cowt in relation to Rule 16 of the Revised
CTA Rules (AM. No. 05-11-07). On November 28, 2011, the Court resolved to consolidate the petitions
to avoid conflicting decisions. Rollo, p. 78 (G.R. No. 198941).
2
Id. at 34-70 (G.R. No. 196596).
3
Id. at 14-53 (G.R. No. 198841).
4
Id. at 9-43 (G.R. No. 198941).
Id. at 85. The date of the issuance of the LOA is not on record.
6
Id. at 4 (G.K No. 196596). The PAN was issued by the BIR's Special Large Taxpayers Task
Force on educational institutions.

fr
 Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAI) on business income; and (3)
documentary stamp tax (DSI) on loans and lease contracts. The BIR
demanded the payment of Pl 7,303,001.12, inclusive of surcharge, interest
and penalty for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. 7

DLSU protested the assessment. The Commissioner failed to act on

the protest; thus, DLSU filed on August 3, 2005 a petition for review with
the CTA Division. 8

DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, principally

anchored its petition on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution,
which reads:

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. xxx.

On January 5, 2010, the CTA Division partially granted DLSU's

petition for review. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The DST assessment on the loan transactions of [DLSU] in
the amount of P.1,1681,774.00 is hereby CANCELLED. However,
[DLSU] is ORDERED TO PAY deficiency income tax, VAT and DST
on its lease contracts, plus 25% surcharge for the fiscal years 2001, 2002
and 2003 in the total amount of ¥18,421,363.53 ... xxx.

In addition, [DLSU] is hereby held liable to pay 20% delinquency

interest on the total amount due computed from September 30, 2004 until
full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249(C)(3) of the [National
Internal Revenue Code]. Further, the compromise penalties imposed by
[the Commissioner] were excluded, there being no compromise agreement
between the parties.

SO ORDERED. 9

Both the Commissioner and DLSU moved for the reconsideration of

the January 5, 2010 decision.1° On April 6, 2010, the CTA Division denied
the Commissioner's motion for reconsideration while it held in abeyance the
resolution on DLSU's motion for reconsideration. 11

On May 13, 2010, the Commissioner appealed to the CTA En Banc

(CTA En Banc Case No. 622) arguing that DLSU's use of its revenues and
assets for non-educational or commercial purposes removed these items
from the exemption coverage under the Constitution. 12

Id. at 151-154.
Id. at 38 and 268.
9
Id. at 97-128.
IO
Id. at 39 and 268-269.
II
Id. at 129-137.

\t
12
Id. at 185-194.
 Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

On May 18, 2010, DLSU formally offered to the CTA Division

supplemental pieces of documentary evidence to prove that its rental income
was used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 13 The
Commissioner did not promptly object to the formal offer of supplemental
evz"dence despzte
. notice.
. 14

On July 29, 2010, the CTA Division, in view of the supplemental

evidence submitted, reduced the amount of DLSU's tax deficiencies. The
dispositive portion of the amended decision reads:

WHEREFORE, [DLSU]'s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is

hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. [DLSU] is hereby ORDERED TO
PAY for deficiency income tax, VAT and DST plus 25% surcharge for the
fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003 in the total adjusted amount of
¥5,506,456. 71 ... xxx.

In addition, [DLSU] is hereby held liable to pay 20% per annum

deficiency interest on the ... basic deficiency taxes ... until full payment
thereof pursuant to Section 249(B) of the [National Internal Revenue
Code] ... xxx.

Further, [DLSU] is hereby held liable to pay 20% per annum

delinquency interest on the deficiency taxes, surcharge and deficiency
interest which have accrued ... from September 30, 2004 until fully paid. 15

Consequently, the Commissioner supplemented its petition with the

CTA En Banc and argued that the CTA Division erred in admitting DLSU's
. . 1ev1"dence. 16
add1tiona

Dissatisfied with the partial reduction of its tax liabilities, DLSU filed
a separate petition for review with the CTA En Banc (CTA En Banc Case
No. 671) on the following grounds: (1) the entire assessment should have
been cancelled because it was based on an invalid LOA; (2) assuming the
LOA was valid, the CTA Division should still have cancelled the entire
assessment because DLSU submitted evidence similar to those submitted by
Ateneo De Manila University (Ateneo) in a separate case where the CTA
cancelled Ateneo 's tax assessment; 17 and (3) the CTA Division erred in
finding that a portion of DLSU's rental income was not proved to have been
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 18

13
Id. at 155-159, filed on May 18, 2010.
14
Id. at 302. DLSU quoted the June 9, 2010 resolution of the CTA Division, viz.:
"For resolution is [DLSU's] 'Supplemental Formal Offer of Evidence in Relation to the
[CTA Division's] Resolution Dated 06 April 2010' filed on April 23, 2010, sans any
Comment/Opposition from the !Commissioner) despite notice." [emphasis and
underscoring ours]
15
Id. at 149-150.
16
Id. at 40.
17
Ateneo de Manila University v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case Nos. 7246 and
7293.
18
Rollo, p. 73 (G.R. No. 198841).

it
 Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

The CTA En Banc Rulings

CTA En Banc Case No. 622

The CTA En Banc dismissed the Commissioner's petition for review

and sustained the findings of the CTA Division. 19

Tax on rental income

Relying on the findings of the court-commissioned Independent

Certified Public Accountant (Independent CPA), the CTA En Banc found
that DLSU was able to prove that a portion of the assessed rental income
was used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes; hence,
exempt from tax. 20 The CTA En Banc was satisfied with DLSU's supporting
evidence confirming that part of its rental income had indeed been used to
pay the loan it obtained to build the university's Physical Education - Sports
Comp l ex. 21

Parenthetically, DLSU's unsubstantiated claim for exemption, i.e., the

part of its income that was not shown by supporting documents to have been
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, must be
subjected to income tax and VAT. 22

DST on loan and mortgage transactions

Contrary to the Commissioner's contention, DLSU froved its

remittance of the DST due on its loan and mortgage documents. 2 The CTA
En Banc found that DLSU's DST payments had been remitted to the BIR,
evidenced by the stamp on the documents made by a DST imprinting
machine, which is allowed under Section 200 (D) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (Tax Code) 24 and Section 2 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No.
15-2001. 25

19
Id. at 77-96 (G.R. No. 196596), decision dated December 10, 2010.
20
Id. at 82-88.
21
Id. at 86.
22
Id. at 86-87.
23
Id. at 88-90.
24
Section 200 (D) of the Tax Code provides:
(D) Exception. - In lieu of the foregoing provisions of this Section, the tax may be paid either
through purchase and actual affixture; or by imprinting the stamps through a documentary stamp
metering machine, on the taxable document, in the manner as may be prescribed by rules and regulations
to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner. [emphasis
ours]
25
Section 2.2 of RR No. 15-2001 provides that:· "In lieu of constructive stamping, Section 200 (D)
of the [Tax Code], however, allows the payment of DST ... or by imprinting of stamps through a
:~;sjmenta.-y stamp metedng machine (...oc on line eledmnic DST imp•inting machine)." [emphasis~
 \

Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Admissibility ofDLSU's supplemental evidence

The CTA En Banc held that the supplemental pieces of documentary

evidence were admissible even if DLSU formally offered them only when it
moved for reconsideration of the CTA Division's original decision.
Notably, the law creating the CTA provides that proceedings before it shall
not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence. 26

The Commissioner moved but failed to obtain a reconsideration of the

CTA En Banc 's December 10, 2010 decision. 27 Thus, she came to this court
for relief through a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 196596).

CTA En Banc Case No. 671

The CTA En Banc partially granted DLSU's petition for review and
further reduced its tax liabilities to P2,554,825.47 inclusive of surcharge. 28

On the validity of the Letter ofAuthority

The issue of the LOA' s validity was raised during trial; 29 hence, the
issue was deemed properly submitted for decision and reviewable on appeal.

Citing jurisprudence, the CTA En Banc held that a LOA should

cover only one taxable period and that the practice of issuing a LOA
covering audit of unverified prior years is prohibited. 30 The prohibition is
consistent with Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 43-90, which
provides that if the audit includes more than one taxable period, the other
periods or years shall be specifically indicated in the LOA. 31

In the present case, the LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years. Hence, the assessments for
deficiency income tax, VAT and DST for taxable years 2001 and 2002 are
void, but the assessment for taxable year 2003 is valid. 32

On the applicability of the Ateneo case

The CTA En Banc held that the Ateneo case is not a valid precedent
because it involved different parties, factual settings, bases of assessments,
sets of evidence, and defenses. 33

26
Rollo, pp. 91-94 (G.R. No. 196596).
27
Id. at 72-76.
28
Id. at 88-90 (G.R. No. 198841).
29
Id. at 75-79.
30
Id. at 80, citing Commissioner of Internal v. Sony Philippines, Inc., 649 Phil. 519 (2010).
31
Id. at 80.
32
Id.at SI.

~
33
Id. at 82.
 Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

On the CTA Division's appreciation of the evidence

The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Division's appreciation of

DLSU' s evidence. It held that while DLSU successfully proved that a
portion of its rental income was transmitted and used to pay the loan
obtained to fund the construction of the Sports Complex, the rental income
from other sources were not shown to have been actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes. 34

Not pleased with the CTA En Bane's ruling, both DLSU (G.R. No.
198841) and the Commissioner (G.R. No. 198941) came to this Court for
relief.
The Consolidated Petitions

G.R. No. 196596

The Commissioner submits the following arguments:

First, DLSU's rental income is taxable regardless of how such income

is derived, used or disposed of. 35 DLSU's operations of canteens and
bookstores within its campus even though exclusively serving the university
community do not negate income tax liability. 36

The Commissioner contends that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the

Constitution must be harmonized with Section 30 (H) of the Tax Code,
which states among others, that the income of whatever kind and character
of [a non-stock and non-profit educational institution] from any of [its]
properties, real or personal, or from any of [its] activities conducted for
profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to
tax imposed by this Code. 37

The Commissioner argues that the CTA En Banc misread and

misapplied the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. YMCA 38 to
support its conclusion that revenues however generated are covered by the
constitutional exemption, provided that, the revenues will be used for
educational purposes or will be held in reserve for such purposes. 39

On the contrary, the Commissioner posits that a tax-exempt

organization like DLSU is exempt only from property tax but not from
income tax on the rentals earned from property. 40 Thus, DLSU's income

34
These pertain to rental income from Alerey Inc., Zaide Food Corp., Capri International and MTO
Bookstore. Id. at 85.
35
Id. at 43-55 (G.R. No. 196596).
36
Id. at 48.
37
Id. at 50.
38
358 Phil. 562 (1998).
39

r
Rollo, p. 46 (G.R. No. 196596).
40
Id. at 51-55.
 Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

from the leases of its real properties is not exempt from taxation even if the
income would be used for educational purposes. 41

Second, the Commissioner insists that DLSU did not prove the fact of
DST payment42 and that it is not qualified to use the On-Line Electronic DST
Imprinting Machine, which is available only to certain classes of taxpayers
under RR No. 9-2000. 43

Finally, the Commissioner objects to the admission of DLSU's

supplemental offer of evidence. The belated submission of supplemental
evidence reopened the case for trial, and worse, DLSU offered the
supplemental evidence only after it received the unfavorable CTA Division's
original decision. 44 In any case, DLSU's submission of supplemental
documentary evidence was unnecessary since its rental income was taxable
regardless of its disposition. 45

G.R. No. 198841

DLSU argues as that:

First, RMO No. 43-90 prohibits the practice of issuing a LOA with
any indication of unverified prior years. A LOA issued contrary to RMO
No. 43-90 is void, thus, an assessment issued based on such defective LOA
must also be void. 46

DLSU points out that the LOA issued to it covered the Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years. On the basis of this defective
LOA, the Commissioner assessed DLSU for deficiency income tax, VAT
and DST for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. 47 DLSU objects to the
CTA En Bane's conclusion that the LOA is valid for taxable year 2003.
According to DLSU, when RMO No. 43-90 provides that:

The practice of issuing [LOAs] covering audit of 'unverified prior

years' is hereby prohibited.

41
Id. at 50.
42
Id. at 55-56.
43
The Commissioner cites Section 4 of RR No. 9-2000 which states that the "on-line electronic
DST imprinting machine," unless expressly exempted by the Commissioner, will be used in the payment
and remittance of the DST by the following class of taxpayers: a) bank, quasi-bank or non-bank financial
intermediary, finance company, insurance, surety, fidelity, or annuity company; b) the Philippine Stock
Exchange (in the case of shares of stock and other securities traded in the local stock exchange); c)
shipping and airline companies; d) pre-need company (on sale of pre-need plans); and e) other industries as
may be required by the Commissioner.
44
Rollo, pp. 57-65 (G.R. No. 196596).
45
Id. at 65-66.
46
Id. at 14-16 (G.R. No. 198841).

~
47
Id. at 24, 30.
 Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

it refers to the LOA which has the format "Base Year + Unverified Prior
Years." Since the LOA issued to DLSU follows this format, then any
assessment arising from it must be entirely voided. 48

Second, DLSU invokes the principle of uniformity in taxation, which

mandates that for similarly situated parties, the same set of evidence should
be appreciated and weighed in the same manner. 49 The CTA En Banc erred
when it did not similarly appreciate DLSU' s evidence as it did to the pieces
of evidence submitted by Ateneo, also a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution. 50

G.R. No. 198941

The issues and arguments raised by the Commissioner in G.R. No.

198941 petition are exactly the same as those she raised in her: ( 1) petition
docketed as G.R. No. 196596 and (2) comment on DLSU's petition
docketed as G.R. No. 198841. 51

Counter-arguments

DLSU's Comment on G.R. No. 196596

First, DLSU questions the defective verification attached to the

• • 52
petlt10n.

Second, DLSU stresses that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the

Constitution is clear that all assets and revenues of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes are exempt from taxes and duties. 53

On this point, DLSU explains that: (1) the tax exemption of non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions is novel to the 1987 Constitution
and that Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code cannot amend the 1987
Constitution; 54 (2) Section 30 of the 1997 Tax Code is almost an exact
replica of Section 26 of the 1977 Tax Code -with the addition of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions to the list of tax-exempt entities; and (3)
that the 1977 Tax Code was promulgated when the 1973 Constitution was
still in place.

48
Id. at 25-26.
49
Id. at 41-48.
50
Id. at 34-48.
51
Id. at 9-43 (G.R. No. 198941).
52
Id. at 272-276 (G.R. No. 196596). DLSU claims that the Commissioner failed to state that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic record. The
CIR also allegedly failed to state that she caused the preparation of the petition and that she has read and
understood all the allegations. DLSU notes that a pleading required to be verified but lacks proper
verification is treated as an unsigned pleading.
53
Id. at 276-279.

~
54
Id. at 279-285.
 Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

DLSU elaborates that the tax exemption granted to a private

educational institution under the 1973 Constitution was only for real
property tax. Back then, the special tax treatment on income of private
educational institutions only emanates from statute, i.e., the 1977 Tax Code.
Only under the 1987 Constitution that exemption from tax of all the assets
and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes, was expressly and
categorically enshrined. 55

DLSU thus invokes the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, which

renders any subsequent law that is contrary to the Constitution void and
without any force and effect. 56 Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code insofar
as it subjects to tax the income of whatever kind and character of a non-
stock and non-profit educational institution from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any of its activities conducted for profit regardless of the
disposition made ofsuch income, should be declared without force and effect
in view of the constitutionally granted tax exemption on "all revenues and
assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes." 57

DLSU further submits that it complies with the requirements

enunciated in the YMCA case, that for an exemption to be granted under
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, the taxpayer must prove that:
( 1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational
institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 58 Unlike
YMCA, which is not an educational institution, DLSU is undisputedly a
non-stock, non-profit educational institution. It had also submitted evidence
to prove that it actually, directly and exclusively used its income for
educational purposes. 59

DLSU also cites the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission where they recognized that the tax exemption was granted "to
incentivize private educational institutions to share with the State the
responsibility of educating the youth." 60

Third, DLSU highlights that both the CTA En Banc and Division
found that the bank that handled DLSU' s loan and mortgage transactions
had remitted to the BIR the DST through an imprinting machine, a method
allowed under RR No. 15-2001. 61 In any case, DLSU argues that it cannot

55
Id. at 282.
56
Id. at 286-289.
57
Id. at 287.
58
Id. at 290.
59
Id. at 291.

~
60
Id. at 283.
61
Id. at 296-30 I.
 Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

be held liable for DST owing to the exemption granted under the
Constitution. 62

Finally, DLSU underscores that the Commissioner, despite notice, did

not oppose the formal offer of supplemental evidence. Because of the
Commissioner's failure to timely object, she became bound by the results of
the submission of such supplemental evidence. 63

The CIR's Comment on G.R. No. 198841

The Commissioner submits that DLSU is estopped from questioning

the LOA's validity because it failed to raise this issue in both the
administrative and judicial proceedings. 64 That it was asked on cross-
examination during the trial does not make it an issue that the CTA could
resolve. 65 The Commissioner also maintains that DLSU's rental income is
not tax-exempt because an educational institution is only exempt from
property tax but not from tax on the income earned from the property. 66

DLSU's Comment on G.R. No. 198941

DLSU puts forward the same counter-arguments discussed above. 67

In addition, DLSU prays that the Court award attorney's fees in its favor
because it was constrained to unnecessarily retain the services of counsel in
this separate petition. 68

Issues

Although the parties raised a number of issues, the Court shall decide
only the pivotal issues, which we summarize as follows:

I. Whether DLSU' s income and revenues proved to have been

used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes
are exempt from duties and taxes;

II. Whether the entire assessment should be voided because of the

defective LOA;

III. Whether the CTA correctly admitted DLSU's supplemental

pieces of evidence; and

IV. Whether the CTA's appreciation of the sufficiency ofDLSU's

evidence may be disturbed by the Court.

62
Id. at 297-298.
63
Id. at 301-302.
64
Id. at 192-197 (G.R. No. 198841 ).
65
Id. at 192-193.
66
Id. at 197-207.
67
Id. at 82-93 (G.R. No. 198941).
68
Id. at 89-90.

~
Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Our Ruling

As we explain in full below, we rule that:

I. The income, revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions proved to have been used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt
from duties and taxes.

II. The LOA issued to DLSU is not entirely void. The assessment
for taxable year 2003 is valid.

III. The CTA correctly admitted DLSU's formal offer of

supplemental evidence; and

IV. The CTA's appreciation of evidence is conclusive unless the

CTA is shown to have manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The parties failed to convince the Court that the CTA

overlooked or failed to consider relevant facts. We thus sustain
the CTA En Bane's findings that:

a. DLSU proved that a portion of its rental income was

used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes; and

b. DLSU proved the payment of the DST through its

bank's on-line imprinting machine.

I. The revenues and assets of non-stock,

non-profit educational institutions
proved to have been used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes are exempt from duties and
taxes.

DLSU rests it case on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the 1987

Constitution, which reads:

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided
by law.

r
 Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively

owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the
limitations provided !!Y law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment. [underscoring and emphasis supplied]

Before fully discussing the merits of the case, we observe that:

First, the constitutional provision refers to two kinds of educational
institutions: ( 1) non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2)
proprietary educational institutions. 69

Second, DLSU falls under the first category. Even the Commissioner
admits the status of DLSU as a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution. 70

Third, while DLSU's claim for tax exemption arises from and is based
on the Constitution, the Constitution, in the same provision, also imposes
certain conditions to avail of the exemption. We discuss below the import of
the constitutional text vis-a-vis the Commissioner's counter-arguments.

Fourth, there is a marked distinction between the treatment of non-

stock, non-profit educational institutions and proprietary educational
institutions. The tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions is conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of
their revenues and assets for educational purposes. While tax exemptions
may also be granted to proprietary educational institutions, these exemptions
may be subject to limitations imposed by Congress.

As we explain below, the marked distinction between a non-stock,

non-profit and a proprietary educational institution is crucial in determining
the nature and extent of the tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions.

The Commissioner opposes DLSU's claim for tax exemption on the

basis of Section 30 (H) of the Tax Code. The relevant text reads:

The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title [Tax on
Income] in respect to income received by them as such:

xx xx

(H) A non-stock and non-profit educational institution

xx xx

69
In Commissioner v. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc., 695 Phil. 867, 885 (2012), the Court quoted
Section 27 (8) of the Tax Code and defined proprietary educational institution as "any private school
maintained and administered by private individuals or groups" with a government permit. ~
m Rollo, p. 37 (G.R. No. 196596). \"
 Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of

whatever kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of
their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities
conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income
shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code. [underscoring and
emphasis supplied]

The Commissioner posits that the 1997 Tax Code qualified the tax
exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions such that
the revenues and income they derived from their assets, or from any of their
activities conducted for profit, are taxable even if these revenues and income
are used for educational purposes.

Did the 1997 Tax Code qualify the tax exemption constitutionally-
granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions?

We answer in the negative.

While the present petition appears to be a case of first impression, 71

the Court in the YMCA case had in fact already analyzed and explained
the meaning of Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution. The Court in
that case made doctrinal pronouncements that are relevant to the present
case.

The issue in YMCA was whether the income derived from rentals of
real property owned by the YMCA, established as a "welfare, educational
and charitable non-profit corporation," was subject to income tax under the
Tax Code and the Constitution. 72

The Court denied YMCA's claim for exemption on the ground

that as a charitable institution falling under Article VI, Section 28
(3) of the Constitution, 73 the YMCA is not tax-exempt per se; " what
is exempted is not the institution itself. .. those exempted from real
estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes." 74

The Court held that the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly
disallowed by the last paragraph of then Section 27 (now Section 30) of the
71
Previous cases construing the nature of the exemption of tax-exempt entities under Section 30
(then Section 27) of the Tax Code vis-a-vis the exemption granted under the Constitution pertain to non-
profit foundations, churches, charitable hospitals or social welfare institutions. Some cases involved
educational institutions but they tackled local or real property taxation. See: YMCA, supra note 37, St.
Luke's, supra note 68; Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, 689 Phil. 623 (2012); and Abra
Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino, infra note 90.
72
Supra note 38.
73
Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution, provides: "Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxation."
74

~
Supra note 38, at 579-580.
 Decision 15 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Tax Code, which mandates that the income of exempt organizations from
any of their properties, real or personal, are subject to the same tax imposed
by the Tax Code, regardless of how that income is used. The Court ruled
that the last paragraph of Section 27 unequivocally subjects to tax the rent
income of the YMCA from its property. 75

In short, the YMCA is exempt only from property tax but not from
income tax.

As a last ditch effort to avoid paying the taxes on its rental income,
the YMCA invoked the tax privilege granted under Article XIV, Section 4
(3) of the Constitution.

The Court denied YMCA's claim that it falls under Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) of the Constitution holding that the term educational
institution, when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to the school
system (synonymous with formal education); it includes a college or an
educational establishment; it refers to the hierarchically structured and
chronologically graded learnings organized and provided by the formal
school system. 76

The Court then significantly laid down the requisites for availing the
tax exemption under Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1) the taxpayer
falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution;
and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 77

We now adopt YMCA as precedent and hold that:

1. The last paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code is without

force and effect with respect to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions, provided, that the non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions prove that its assets and revenues
are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes.

2. The tax-exemption constitutionally-granted to non-stock, non-

profit educational institutions, is not subject to limitations imposed
by law.

75
Id. at 575-578.
76

tr
Id. at 581-582.
77
Id. at 580-581.
 ,•

Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

The tax exemption granted by the

Constitution to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions is conditioned only
on the actual, direct and exclusive use of
their assets, revenues and income 78 for
educational purposes.

We find that unlike Article VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution

(pertaining to charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries), which exempts from tax only the
assets, i.e., "all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes ... ,"
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) categorically states that "[a]ll revenues and
assets ... used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxes and duties."

The addition and express use of the word revenues in Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) of the Constitution is not without significance.

We find that the text demonstrates the policy of the 1987 Constitution,
discernible from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission79 to
provide broader tax privilege to non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions as recognition of their role in assisting the State provide a public
good. The tax exemption was seen as beneficial to students who may
otherwise be charged unreasonable tuition fees if not for the tax exemption
extended to all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
. • . 80
ms ti tuti ons.

Further, a plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article

XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income must have
also been sourced from educational activities or activities related to the
purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all revenues is
unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues. Thus, so long as the

78
For purposes of construing Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, we treat income and
revenues as synonyms. Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition, 1979) defines revenues as "return or yield;
profit as that which returns or comes back from investment; the annual or periodical rents, profits, interest
or issues of any species of property or personal. .. " (p.1185) and income as "the return in money from one's
business, labor, or capital invested; gains, profits, salary, wages, etc ... " (p. 687).
79
See Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 69, Volume IV, August 29, 1986.
80
See IV Record 401, 402, as cited by DLSU, Rollo, p. 283 (G.R. No. 196596). The following
comments of the Constitutional Commission members are illuminating:
MR. GASCON: ... There are many schools which are genuinely non-profit and non-stock but
which may have been taxed at the expense of students. In the long run, these schools oftentimes have to
increase tuition fees, which is detrimental to the interest of the students. So when we encourage non-stock,
non-profit institutions be assuring them of tax exemption, we also assure the students of lower tuition fees.
That is the intent.
xx xx

COMM. NOLLEDO: ... So I think, what is important here is the philosophy behind the duty on
the part of the State to educate the Filipino people that duty is being shouldered by private institutions. In
order to provide incentive to private institutions to share with the State the responsibility of educating th~
youth, I think we •hould grant tax exemption. ~
 Decision 17 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from
taxes and duties. 81

We find it helpful to discuss at this point the taxation of revenues

versus the taxation of assets.

Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the

conduct of business operations. 82 It may refer to the sale of goods, rendition
of services, or the return of an investment. Revenue is a component of the
tax base in income tax, 83 VAT, 84 and local business tax (LBT). 85

Assets, on the other hand, are the tangible and intangible properties
owned by a person or entity. 86 It may refer to real estate, cash deposit in a
bank, investment in the stocks of a corporation, inventory of goods, or any
property from which the person or entity may derive income or use to
generate the same. In Philippine taxation, the fair market value of real
property is a component of the tax base in real property tax (RPT). 87 Also,
the landed cost of imported goods is a component of the tax base in VAT on
• •
1mportat10n 88 an d tan"ff d ut1es.
. 89

Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution proves that

it uses its revenues actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax, VAT, and LBT. On the
other hand, when it also shows that it uses its assets in the form of real
property for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from RPT.

To be clear, proving the actual use of the taxable item will result in an
exemption, but the specific tax from which the entity shall be exempted from
shall depend on whether the item is an item of revenue or asset.

To illustrate, if a university leases a portion of its school building to a

bookstore or cafeteria, the leased portion is not actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes, even if the bookstore or canteen
caters only to university students, faculty and staff.

81
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its language should be understood in the
sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. See: People v. Deri/o, 338 Phil. 350, 383 (1997).
82
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "Revenues" as, "Return or yield, as of land; profit
as that which returns or comes back from an investment; the annual or periodical rents, profits, interest or
issues of any species of property, real or personal; income of individual, corporation, government, etc."
(citing Willoughby v. Willoughby, 66 R.I. 430, 19 A.2d 857, 860)
83
Section 32, Tax Code
84
Sections 106 and 108, Tax Code.
85
Section 143 cf. Section 13 l(n), Local Government Code.
86
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "Assets" as, "Property of all kinds, real and
personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter a/ia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action
which belong to any person including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. The entire property of a
rerson, association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his or his debts."
7
Section 208 cf Sections 233 and 235, Local Government Code.
88
Section 107, Tax Code
89

~
Section 104, PD 1464, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
 Decision 18 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

The leased portion of the building may be subject to real property tax,
as held in Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino. 90 We ruled in that case that
the test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution. We also held that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes.

In concrete terms, the lease of a portion of a school building for

commercial purposes, removes such asset from the property tax exemption
granted under the Constitution. 91 There is no exemption because the asset is
not used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. The
commercial use of the property is also not incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose of a university, which
is to educate its students.

However, if the university actually, directly and exclusively uses for

educational purposes the revenues earned from the lease of its school
building, such revenues shall be exempt from taxes and duties. The tax
exemption no longer hinges on the use of the asset from which the revenues
were earned, but on the actual, direct and exclusive use of the revenues for
educational purposes.

Parenthetically, income and revenues of non-stock, non-profit

educational institution not used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes are not exempt from duties and taxes. To avail of the
exemption, the taxpayer must factually prove that it used actually, directly
and exclusively for educational purposes the revenues or income sought to
be exempted.

The crucial point of inquiry then is on the use of the assets or on the
use of the revenues. These are two things that must be viewed and treated
separately. But so long as the assets or revenues are used actually, directly
and exclusively for educational purposes, they are exempt from duties and
taxes.

The tax exemption granted by the

Constitution to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions, unlike the exemption
that may be availed of by proprietary
educational institutions, is not subject to
limitations imposed by law.

That the Constitution treats non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions differently from proprietary educational institutions cannot be
doubted. As discussed, the privilege granted to the former is conditioned

90
245 Phil. 83 (1988).

~
91
Id. at 91-92.
 Decision 19 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their revenues and assets for
educational purposes. In clear contrast, the tax privilege granted to the latter
may be subject to limitations imposed by law.

We spell out below the difference in treatment if only to highlight the

privileged status of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions compared
with their proprietary counterparts.

While a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is classified as a

tax-exempt entity under Section 30 (Exemptions from Tax on Corporations)
of the Tax Code, a proprietary educational institution is covered by Section
27 (Rates ofIncome Tax on Domestic Corporations).

To be specific, Section 30 provides that exempt organizations like

non-stock, non-profit educational institutions shall not be taxed on income
received by them as such.

Section 27 (B), on the other hand, states that "[p]roprietary

educational institutions ... which are nonprofit shall pay a tax of ten percent
(10%) on their taxable income .. .Provided, that if the gross income from
unrelated trade, business or other activity exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the
total gross income derived by such educational institutions ... [the regular
corporate income tax of 30%] shall be imposed on the entire taxable
income ... " 92

By the Tax Code's clear terms, a proprietary educational institution is

entitled only to the reduced rate of 10% corporate income tax. The reduced
rate is applicable only if: (1) the proprietary educational institution is non-
profit and (2) its gross income from unrelated trade, business or activity does
not exceed 50% of its total gross income.

Consistent with Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, these

limitations do not apply to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions.

Thus, we declare the last paragraph of Section 30 of the Tax Code

without force and effect for being contrary to the Constitution insofar as it
subjects to tax the income and revenues of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly and exclusively tor educational purpose.
We make this declaration in the exercise of and consistent with our duty93 to
uphold the primacy of the Constitution. 94

92
Section 27 (B) further provides that the term unrelated trade, business or other activity means any
trade, business or activity, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the exercise or performance
by such educational institution ... ofits primary purpose of functions.
93
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5 (2).
94
In Kida, et al. v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., 675 Phil. 316, 365-366(2011), we held that the
primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be respected
until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitution~

P'°°'"· ~
 ) ..
Decision 20 G .R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Finally, we stress that our holding here pertains only to non-stock,

non-profit educational institutions and does not cover the other exempt
organizations under Section 30 of the Tax Code.

For all these reasons, we hold that the income and revenues of DLSU
proven to have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes are exempt from duties and taxes.

II. The LOA issued to DLSU is

not entirely void. The
assessment for taxable year
2003 is valid.

DLSU objects to the CTA En Banc 's conclusion that the LOA is valid
for taxable year 2003 and insists that the entire LOA should be voided for
being contrary to RMO No. 43-90, which provides that if tax audit includes
more than one taxable period, the other periods or years shall be specifically
indicated in the LOA.

A LOA is the authority given to the appropriate revenue officer to

examine the books of account and other accounting records of the taxpayer
in order to determine the taxpayer's correct internal revenue liabilities 95 and
for the purpose of collecting the correct amount of tax, 96 in accordance with
Section 5 of the Tax Code, which gives the CIR the power to obtain
information, to summon/examine, and take testimony of persons. The LOA
commences the audit process 97 and informs the taxpayer that it is under audit
for possible deficiency tax assessment.

Given the purposes of a LOA, is there basis to completely nullify the

LOA issued to DLSU, and consequently, disregard the BIR and the CTA's
findings of tax deficiency for taxable year 2003?

We answer in the negative.

The relevant provision is Section C of RMO No. 43-90, the pertinent

portion of which reads:

3. A Letter of Authority [LOA] should cover a taxable period not

exceeding one taxable year. The practice of issuing [LO As] covering
audit of unverified prior years is hereby prohibited. If the audit of a
taxpayer shall include more than one taxable period, the other periods
or years shall be specifically indicated in the [LOA]. 98

What this provision clearly prohibits is the practice of issuing LOAs

covering audit of unverified prior years. RMO 43-90 does not say that a
95
Revenue Audit Memorandum Order No. 2-95.
96
Rollo, p. 79 (G.R. No. 198841). See Section 13 of the tax Code.
97
See the Taxpayers Bill of Rights at http://www.bir.gov.ph/index.P/taxpayer-bill-of-rights.html last
accessed on June I, 2016.
98

~
Cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sony Philippines, Inc., supra note 30, at 531.
 Decision 21 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

LOA which contains unverified prior years is void. It merely prescribes that
if the audit includes more than one taxable period, the other periods or years
must be specified. The provision read as a whole requires that if a taxpayer
is audited for more than one taxable year, the BIR must specify each taxable
year or taxable period on separate LOAs.

Read in this light, the requirement to specify the taxable period

covered by the LOA is simply to inform the taxpayer of the extent of the
audit and the scope of the revenue officer's authority. Without this rule, a
revenue officer can unduly burden the taxpayer by demanding random
accounting records from random unverified years, which may include
documents from as far back as ten years in cases offraud audit. 99

In the present case, the LOA issued to DLSU is for Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years. The LOA does not strictly
comply with RMO 43-90 because it includes unverified prior years. This
does not mean, however, that the entire LOA is void.

As the CTA correctly held, the assessment for taxable year 2003 is
valid because this taxable period is specified in the LOA. DLSU was fully
apprised that it was being audited for taxable year 2003. Corollarily, the
assessments for taxable years 2001 and 2002 are void for having been
unspecified on separate LOAs as required under RMO No. 43-90.

Lastly, the Commissioner's claim that DLSU failed to raise the issue
of the LOA' s validity at the CTA Division, and thus, should not have been
entertained on appeal, is not accurate.

On the contrary, the CTA En Banc found that the issue of the LOA's
validity came up during the trial. 100 DLSU then raised the issue in its
memorandum and motion for partial reconsideration with the CTA
Division. DLSU raised it again on appeal to the CTA En Banc. Thus, the
CTA En Banc could, as it did, pass upon the validity of the LOA. 101
Besides, the Commissioner had the opportunity to argue for the validity of
the LOA at the CTA En Banc but she chose not to file her comment and
memorandum despite notice. 102

III. The CTA correctly admitted

the supplemental evidence
formally offered by DLSU.

The Commissioner objects to the CTA Division's admission of

DLSU's supplemental pieces of documentary evidence.

99
Section 222, Tax Code.
100
Rollo, p. 78 (G.R. No. 198841).
IOI
Id. at 75-79.
102
Id. at 73-74.
 . ..
Decision 22 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

To recall, DLSU formally offered its supplemental evidence upon

filing its motion for reconsideration with the CTA Division. 103 The CTA
Division admitted the supplemental evidence, which proved that a portion of
DLSU's rental income was used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes. Consequently, the CTA Division reduced DLSU's tax
liabilities.

We uphold the CTA Division's admission of the supplemental

evidence on distinct but mutually reinforcing grounds, to wit: (1) the
Commissioner failed to timely object to the formal offer of supplemental
evidence; and (2) the CTA is not governed strictly by the technical rules of
evidence.

First, the failure to object to the offered evidence renders it

admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. 104

The Court has held that if a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it
cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. 105
Because of a party's failure to timely object, the evidence offered becomes
part of the evidence in the case. As a consequence, all the parties are
considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence
properly presented. 106

As disclosed by DLSU, the Commissioner did not oppose the

supplemental formal offer of evidence despite notice. 107 The Commissioner
objected to the admission of the supplemental evidence only when the case
was on appeal to the CTA En Banc. By the time the Commissioner raised
her objection, it was too late; the formal offer, admission and evaluation of
the supplemental evidence were allfait accompli.

We clarify that while the Commissioner's failure to promptly object

had no bearing on the materiality or sufficiency of the supplemental
evidence admitted, she was bound by the outcome of the CTA Division's
assessment ofthe evidence. 108

Second, the CTA is not governed strictly by the technical rules of

evidence. The CTA Division's admission of the formal offer of
supplemental evidence, without prompt objection from the Commissioner,
was thus justified.

103
Id. at 155-159 (G.R. No. 196596).
104
Asian Construction and Development Corp. v. COMFAC Corp., 535 Phil. 513, 517-518 (2006)
citing Tison v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 582, 596-597.
105
Id. citing Arwood Industries, Inc. v. D.M Consunji, Inc., G.R. No. 142277, December 11, 2002,
394 SCRA 11. 18.
106
Id.at518.
107
Rollo, p. 302 (G.R. No. 196596), CTA Division Resolution dated June 9, 2010, quoted by DLSU.
108
Supra note 103.

\Y
 Decision 23 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Notably, this Court had in the past admitted and considered evidence
attached to the taxpayers' motion for reconsideration.

In the case of BPI-Family Savings Bank v. Court ofAppeals, 109 the tax
refund claimant attached to its motion for reconsideration with the CTA its
Final Adjustment Return. The Commissioner, as in the present case, did not
oppose the taxpayer's motion for reconsideration and the admission of the
Final Adjustment Return. 110 We thus admitted and gave weight to the Final
Adjustment Return although it was only submitted upon motion for
reconsideration.

We held that while it is true that strict procedural rules generally

frown upon the submission of documents after the trial, the law creating the
CTA specifically provides that proceedings before it shall not be governed
strictly by the technical rules of evidence 111 and that the paramount
consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. We ruled that procedural
rules should not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a
.
Just . . o f a controversy. 112
determmat10n

We applied the same reasoning in the subsequent cases of Fi/invest

Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 113 and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. PERF Realty Corporation, 114 where
the taxpayers also submitted the supplemental supporting document only
upon filing their motions for reconsideration.

Although the cited cases involved claims for tax refunds, we also
dispense with the strict application of the technical rules of evidence in the
present tax assessment case. If anything, the liberal application of the rules
assumes greater force and significance in the case of a taxpayer who claims
a constitutionally granted tax exemption. While the taxpayers in the cited
cases claimed refund of excess tax payments based on the Tax Code, 115
DLSU is claiming tax exemption based on the Constitution. If liberality is
afforded to taxpayers who paid more than they should have under a statute,
then with more reason that we should allow a taxpayer to prove its
exemption from tax based on the Constitution.

Hence, we sustain the CTA's admission of DLSU's supplemental

offer of evidence not only because the Commissioner failed to promptly
object, but more so because the strict application of the technical rules of
evidence may defeat the intent of the Constitution.

109
386 Phil. 719 (2000).
110
Id. at 726.
111
See Section 8, Republic Act No. 1125, published in Official Gazette, S. No. 17 5 I 50 OG No. 8,
3458 (August, 1954).
112
Supra note 91, at 726.
13
I 556 Phil. 439 (2007).

~
114
579 Phil. 442 (2008).
115
Section 76 in relation to Section 229 of the Tax Code.
 Ji ,••

Decision 24 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

IV. The CTA's appreciation of

evidence is generally binding on
the Court unless compelling
reasons justify otherwise.

It is doctrinal that the Court will not lightly set aside the conclusions
reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its function of being
dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax problems, has developed an
expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of authority. 116 We thus accord the findings of fact by the CTA
with the highest respect. These findings of facts can only be disturbed on
appeal if they are not supported by substantial evidence or there is a showing
of gross error or abuse on the part of the CTA. In the absence of any clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court must presume that the CTA
rendered a decision which is valid in every respect. 117

We sustain the factual findings of the CTA.

The parties failed to raise credible basis for us to disturb the CTA's
findings that DLSU had used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes a portion of its assessed income and that it had
remitted the DST payments though an online imprinting machine.

a. DLSU used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational

purposes a portion of its assessed income.

To see how the CTA arrived at its factual findings, we review the
process undertaken, from which it deduced that DLSU successfully proved
that it used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes a
portion of its rental income.

The CTA reduced DLSU' s deficiency income tax and VAT liabilities
in view of the submission of the supplemental evidence, which consisted of
statement of receipts, statement of disbursement and fund balance and
statement offund changes .118

These documents showed that DLSU borrowed P93.86 Million, 119

which was used to build the university's Sports Complex. Based on these
pieces of evidence, the CTA found that DLSU' s rental income from its
concessionaires were indeed transmitted and used for the payment of this
loan. The CTA held that the degree of preponderance of evidence was
sufficiently met to prove actual, direct and exclusive use for educational
purposes.
116
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asian Transmission Corporation, 655 Phil. 186, 196 (2011 ).
117
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power, Inc. G.R. No. 183880, January 20, 2014, 714
SCRA 276, 292, citing Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 529 Phil. 785
(2006).

~
118
Rollo, p. 143-144 (G.R. No. 196596).
119
Id. at 144 (G.R. No. 196596), the amount is rounded-off from P93,860,675.40.
 Decision 25 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

The CTA also found that DLSU's rental income from other
concessionaires, which were allegedly deposited to a fund (CF-CPA
Account), 120 intended for the university's capital projects, was not proved to
have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
The CTA observed that "[DLSU] ... failed to fully account for and
substantiate all the disbursements from the [fund]." Thus, the CTA "cannot
ascertain whether rental income from the [other] concessionaires was indeed
used for educational purposes." 121

To stress, the CTA's factual findings were based on and supported by

the report of the Independent CPA who reviewed, audited and examined the
voluminous documents submitted by DLSU.

Under the CTA Revised Rules, an Independent CPA's functions

include: (a) examination and verification of receipts, invoices, vouchers
and other long accounts; (b) reproduction of, and comparison of such
reproduction with, and certification that the same are faithful copies of
original documents, and pre-marking of documentary exhibits consisting
of voluminous documents; (c) preparation of schedules or summaries
containing a chronological listing of the numbers, dates and amounts
covered by receipts or invoices or other relevant documents and the
amount(s) of taxes paid; (d) making findings as to compliance with
substantiation requirements under pertinent tax laws, regulations and
jurisprudence; (e) submission of a formal report with certification of
authenticity and veracity of findings and conclusions in the performance of
the audit; (f) testifying on such formal report; and (g) performing such other
functions as the CTA may direct. 122

Based on the Independent CPA's report and on its own appreciation

of the evidence, the CTA held that only the portion of the rental income
pertaining to the substantiated disbursements (i.e., proved by receipts,
vouchers, etc.) from the CF-CPA Account was considered as used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes. Consequently, the
unaccounted and unsubstantiated disbursements must be subjected to income
tax and VAT. 123

The CTA then further reduced DLSU's tax liabilities by cancelling

the assessments for taxable years 2001 and 2002 due to the defective
LOA.124

The Court finds that the above fact-finding process undertaken by the
CTA shows that it based its ruling on the evidence on record, which we
reiterate, were examined and verified by the Independent CPA. Thus, we
see no persuasive reason to deviate from these factual findings.
120
121
122
123
124
Id. at 143 (G.R. No. 196596). Capital Fund - Capital Projects Account.
Id. at 144 (G.R. No. 196596).
Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, November 22, 2005.
Rollo, pp. 86, 145 (G.R. No. 196596).
Id. at 81 (G.R. No. 198841).
(t
 .. •'

Decision 26 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

However, while we generally respect the factual findings of the CTA,

it does not mean that we are bound by its conclusions. In the present case,
we do not agree with the method used by the CT A to arrive at DLSU' s
unsubstantiated rental income (i.e., income not proved to have been actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes).

To recall, the CTA found that DLSU earned a rental income of

Pl0,610,379.00 in taxable year 2003. 125 DLSU earned this income from
leasing a portion of its premises to: 1) MTG-Sports Complex, 2) La Casita,
3) Alarey, Inc., 4) Zaide Food Corp., 5) Capri International, and 6) MTO
Bookstore. 126

To prove that its rental income was used for educational purposes,
DLSU identified the transactions where the rental income was expended,
viz.: 1) P4,007,724.00 127 used to pay the loan obtained by DLSU to build the
Sports Complex; and 2) P6,602,655.00 transferred to the CF-CPA
Account. 128

DLSU also submitted documents to the Independent CPA to prove

that the P6,602,655.00 transferred to the CF-CPA Account was used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. According to the
Independent CPA' findings, DLSU was able to substantiate disbursements
from the CF-CPA Account amounting to P6,259,078.30.

Contradicting the findings of the Independent CPA, the CTA

concluded that out of the Pl0,610,379.00 rental income, P4,841,066.65 was
unsubstantiated, and thus, subject to income tax and VAT. 129

The CTA then concluded that the ratio of substantiated disbursements

to the total disbursements from the CF-CPA Account for taxable year 2003
is only 26.68%. 130 The CTA held as follows:

However, as regards petitioner's rental income from Alarey, Inc., Zaide

Food Corp., Capri International and MTO Bookstore, which were
transmitted to the CF-CPA Account, petitioner again failed to fully
account for and substantiate all the disbursements from the CF-CPA
Account; thus failing to prove that the rental income derived therein were
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. Likewise,
the findings of the Court-Commissioned Independent CPA show that the
disbursements from the CF-CPA Account for fiscal year 2003 amounts to
P.6,259,078.30 only. Hence, this portion of the rental income, being the

125
Id. at 101, page 9 of CT A Division Amended Decision.
126
Id. at 98 (G.R. No. 198841).
127
Id. at 87. According to the CTA, the income earned from the lease of premises to MTO-Sports
Complex and La Casita amounted to F2,090,880.00 and Fl,916,844.00, respectively (Total of
F4,007,724.00). These amounts were specifically identified as part of the proceeds used by DLSU to pay an
outstanding loan obligation that was previously obtained for the purpose of constructing the Sports
Complex.
Id.

~
12s
129 Id.
130
Id. at 86.
 Decision 27 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

substantiated disbursements of the CF-CPA Account, was considered by

the Special First Division as used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes. Since for fiscal year 2003, the total disbursements
per voucher is P6,259,078.3 (Exhibit "LL-25-C"), and the total
disbursements per subsidiary ledger amounts to P23,463,543.02 (Exhibit
"LL-29-C"), the ratio of substantiated disbursements for fiscal year 2003
is 26.68% (P6,259,078.30/P23,463,543.02). Thus, the substantiated
portion of CF-CPA Disbursements for fiscal year 2003, arrived at by
multiplying the ratio of 26.68% with the total rent income added to and
used in the CF-CPA Account in the amount of P6.602,655.00 is
Pl,761,588.35. 131 (emphasis supplied)

For better understanding, we summarize the CTA's computation as

follows:

1. The CTA subtracted the rent income used in the construction of

the Sports Complex (P4,007,724.00) from the rental income
(Pl0,610,379.00) earned from the abovementioned
concessionaries. The difference (P6,602,655.00) was the
portion claimed to have been deposited to the CF-CPA
Account.

2. The CTA then subtracted the supposed substantiated portion of

CF-CPA disbursements (Pl,761,308.37) from the
P6,602,655.00 to arrive at the supposed unsubstantiated portion
of the rental income (P4,841,066.65). 132

3. The substantiated portion of CF-CPA disbursements

(Pl,761,308.37) 133 was derived by multiplying the rental
income claimed to have been added to the CF-CPA Account
(P6,602,655.00) by 26.68% or the ratio of substantiated
disbursements to total disbursements (P 23,463,543.02).

4. The 26.68% ratio 134 was the result of dividing the substantiated
disbursements from the CF-CPA Account as found by the

131
Id. at 85-86.
132
The tax base of P4,841,066.65 was computed as follows:
Rental income 10,610,379.00
Less: Rent income used in construction of Sports Complex 4,007,724.00
Rental income allegedly added and used in the CF-CPA Account 6,602,655.00
Less: Substantiated portion of CF-CPA disbursements 1,761,588.35
Tax base for deficiency income tax and VAT 4,841,066.65
133
The substantiated portion of CF-CPA disbursements amounting to Pl,761,308.37 was computed
as follows:
Rental income allegedly added and used in the CF-CPA Account 6,602,655.00
Multiply by: Ratio of substantiated disbursements (See note 134) 26.68%
Substantiated portion of CF-CPA disbursements 1,761,588.35
134
The ratio of26.68% was computed as follows:
Substantiated disbursements of the CF-CPA Account, per Independent CPA 6,259,078.30
Divide by: Total disbursements made out of the CF-CPA Account 23,463,543.02
Ratio 26.68%

~
 ' .•• "

Decision 28 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Independent CPA (P6,259,078.30) by the total disbursements

(P 23,463,543.02) from the same account.

We find that this system of calculation is incorrect and does not truly
give effect to the constitutional grant of tax exemption to non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions. The CTA's reasoning is flawed because it
required DLSU to substantiate an amount that is greater than the rental
income deposited in the CF-CPA Account in 2003.

To reiterate, to be exempt from tax, DLSU has the burden of proving

that the proceeds of its rental income (which amounted to a total of Pl0.61
million) 135 were used for educational purposes. This amount was divided
into two parts: (a) the P4.0l million, which was used to pay the loan
obtained for the construction of the Sports Complex; and (b) the P6.60
million, 136 which was transferred to the CF-CPA account.

For year 2003, the total disbursement from the CF-CPA account
amounted to P23 .46 million. 137 These figures, read in light of the
constitutional exemption, raises the question: does DLSU claim that the
whole total CF-CPA disbursement of ¥23.46 million is tax-exempt so
that it is required to prove that all these disbursements had been made
for educational purposes?

We answer in the negative.

The records show that DLSU never claimed that the total CF-CPA
disbursements of P23 .46 million had been for educational purposes and
should thus be tax-exempt; DLSU only claimed P 10.61 million for tax-
exemption and should thus be required to prove that this amount had been
used as claimed.

Of this amount, P4.01 had been proven to have been used for
educational purposes, as confirmed by the Independent CPA. The amount in
issue is therefore the balance of P6.60 million which was transferred to the
CF-CPA which in turn made disbursements of P23.46 million for various
general purposes, among them the P6.60 million transferred by DLSU.

Significantly, the Independent CPA confirmed that the CF-CPA made

disbursements for educational purposes in year 2003 in the amount P6.26
million. Based on these given figures, the CTA concluded that the expenses
for educational purposes that had been coursed through the CF-CPA should
be prorated so that only the portion that P6.26 million bears to the total CF-
CPA disbursements should be credited to DLSU for tax exemption.

135
For brevity, the exact amount of PI0,610,379.00 shall hereinafter be expressed as PI 0.61 million.
136
For brevity, the exact amount of P6,602,655.00 shall hereinafter be expressed as P6.60 miliion.
137
For brevity, the exact amount of P23,463,543.02 shall hereinafter be expressed as P23.46 million.
 Decision 29 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

This approach, in our view, is flawed given the constitutional

requirement that revenues actually and directly used for educational
purposes should be tax-exempt. As already mentioned above, DLSU is not
claiming that the whole P23.46 million CF-CPA disbursement had been
used for educational purposes; it only claims that P6.60 million transferred
to CF-CPA had been used for educational purposes. This was what DLSU
needed to prove to have actually and directly used for educational purposes.

That this fund had been first deposited into a separate fund (the CF -
CPA established to fund capital projects) lends peculiarity to the facts of this
case, but does not detract from the fact that the deposited funds were DLSU
revenue funds that had been confirmed and proven to have been actually and
directly used for educational purposes via the CF-CPA. That the CF-CPA
might have had other sources of funding is irrelevant because the assessment
in the present case pertains only to the rental income which DLSU
indisputably earned as revenue in 2003. That the proven CF-CPA funds
used for educational purposes should not be prorated as part of its total CF-
CP A disbursements for purposes of crediting to DLSU is also logical
because no claim whatsoever had been made that the totality of the CF-CPA
disbursements had been for educational purposes. No prorating is necessary;
to state the obvious, exemption is based on actual and direct use and this
DLSU has indisputably proven.

Based on these considerations, DLSU should therefore be liable only

for the difference between what it claimed and what it has proven. In more
concrete terms, DLSU only had to prove that its rental income for taxable
year 2003 (Pl0,610,379.00) was used for educational purposes. Hence,
while the total disbursements from the CF-CPA Account amounted to
P23,463,543.02, DLSU only had to substantiate its Pl0.6 million rental
income, part of which was the P6,602,655.00 transferred to the CF-CPA
account. Of this latter amount, P6.259 million was substantiated to have
been used for educational purposes.

To summarize, we thus revise the tax base for deficiency income tax
and VAT for taxable year 2003 as follows:
CTA
Decision 138 Revised

Rental income 10,610,379.00 10,610,379.00

Less: Rent income used in construction of the Sports
Complex 4,007,724.00 4,007,724.00

Rental income deposited to the CF-CPA Account 6,602,655.00 6,602,655.00

Less: Substantiated portion of CF-CPA disbursements 1,761,588.35 6,259,078.30

Tax base for deficiency income tax and VAT 4,841,066.65 343.576.70

138
Supra note 130.

(\V'
 ' ·'. .
Decision 30 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

On DLSU' s argument that the CTA should have appreciated its

evidence in the same way as it did with the evidence submitted by Ateneo in
another separate case, the CTA explained that the issue in the Ateneo case
was not the same as the issue in the present case.

The issue in the Ateneo case was whether or not Ateneo could be held
liable to pay income taxes and VAT under certain BIR and Department of
Finance issuances 139 that required the educational institution to own and
operate the canteens, or other commercial enterprises within its campus, as
condition for tax exemption. The CTA held that the Constitution does not
require the educational institution to own or operate these commercial
establishments to avail of the exemption. 140

Given the lack of complete identity of the issues involved, the CTA
held that it had to evaluate the separate sets of evidence differently. The
CTA likewise stressed that DLSU and Ateneo gave distinct defenses and
that its wisdom "cannot be equated on its decision on two different cases
with two different issues." 141

DLSU disagrees with the CTA and argues that the entire assessment
must be cancelled because it submitted similar, if not stronger sets of
evidence, as Ateneo. We reject DLSU's argument for being non sequitur.
Its reliance on the concept of uniformity of taxation is also incorrect.

First, even granting that Ateneo and DLSU submitted similar

evidence, the sufficiency and materiality of the evidence supporting their
respective claims for tax exemption would necessarily differ because their
attendant issues and facts differ.

To state the obvious, the amount of income received by DLSU and by

Ateneo during the taxable years they were assessed varied. The amount of
tax assessment also varied. The amount of income proven to have been used
for educational purposes also varied because the amount substantiated
varied. 142 Thus, the amount of tax assessment cancelled by the CTA varied.

On the one hand, the BIR assessed DLSU a total tax deficiency of
P17,303,001.12 for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. On the other hand,
the BIR assessed Ateneo a total deficiency tax of PB,864,042.35 for the
same period. Notably, DLSU was assessed deficiency DST, while Ateneo
was not. 143

139
Rollo, pp. 82-83 (G.R. No. 198841). Ateneo was assessed deficiency income tax and VAT under
Section 2.2 ofDOF Circular137-87 and BIR Ruling No. 173-88.
140
Id. at 83 (G.R. No. 198841).
141
Id. at 83 (G.R. No. 198841 ).
142
See Ateneo case (CTA Case Nos. 7246 & 7293, March 11, 2010), Id. at 140-154 (G.R. No.
198841).

~
143
Id. at 145 (G.R. No. 198841 ).
 Decision 31 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

Thus, although both Ateneo and DLSU claimed that they used their
rental income actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes by
submitting similar evidence, e.g., the testimony of their employees on the
use of university revenues, the report of the Independent CPA, their income
summaries, financial statements, vouchers, etc., the fact remains that DLSU
failed to prove that a portion of its income and revenues had indeed been
used for educational purposes.

The CTA significantly found that some documents that could have
fully supported DLSU's claim were not produced in court. Indeed, the
Independent CPA testified that some disbursements had not been proven to
have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
144
purposes.

The final nail on the question of evidence is DLSU's own admission

that the original of these documents had not in fact been produced before the
CTA although it claimed that there was no bad faith on its part. 145 To our
mind, this admission is a good indicator of how the Ateneo and the DLSU
cases varied, resulting in DLSU's failure to substantiate a portion of its
claimed exemption.

Further, DLSU's invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised

Rules on Evidence, that the contents of the missing supporting documents
were proven by its . rec1ta
. 1m . documents on record, 146
. some oth er auth ent1c
can no longer be entertained at this late stage of the proceeding. The CTA
did not rule on this particular claim. The CTA also made no finding on
DLSU' s assertion of lack of bad faith. Besides, it is not our duty to go over
these documents to test the truthfulness of their contents, this Court not
being a trier of facts.

Second, DLSU misunderstands the concept of uniformity of taxation.

Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or

kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. 147 A tax
is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place
where the subject of it is found. 148 The concept requires that all subjects of
taxation similarly situated should be treated alike and placed in equal
. 149
fiootmg.
In our view, the CTA placed Ateneo and DLSU in equal footing. The
CTA treated them alike because their income proved to have been used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes were exempted

144
Id. at 85-90 (G.R. No. 198841 ).
145
ld. at47 (G.R. No. 198841).
146
Id.
147
Churchill v. Concepcion, 34 Phil. 969. 976 (1916); Eastern Theatrical Co. vs. Alfonso, 83 Phil.
852, 862 (1949); Abakada Gura Party List v. Ermita, 506 Phil. 1, 130-13 J (2005).
148
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 603 Phil. 38, 48-49 (2009).

t
149
Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Court ofAppeals, 329 Phil. 987, l 0 IO (1996).
 ' .•' "

Decision 32 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

from taxes. The CTA equally applied the requirements in the YMCA case to
test if they indeed used their revenues for educational purposes.

DLSU can only assert that the CTA violated the rule on uniformity if
it can show that, despite proving that it used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes its income and revenues, the CTA still
affirmed the imposition of taxes. That the DLSU secured a different result
happened because it failed to fully prove that it used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes its revenues and income.

On this point, we remind DLSU that the rule on uniformity of taxation

does not mean that subjects of taxation similarly situated are treated in
literally the same way in all and every occasion. The fact that the Ateneo
and DLSU are both non-stock, non-profit educational institutions, does not
mean that the CTA or this Court would similarly decide every case for (or
against) both universities. Success in tax litigation, like in any other
litigation, depends to a large extent on the sufficiency of evidence. DLSU's
evidence was wanting, thus, the CTA was correct in not fully cancelling its
tax liabilities.

b. DLSU proved its payment of the DST

The CTA affirmed DLSU's claim that the DST due on its mortgage
and loan transactions were paid and remitted through its bank's On-Line
Electronic DST Imprinting Machine. The Commissioner argues that DLSU
is not allowed to use this method of payment because an educational
institution is excluded from the class of taxpayers who can use the On-Line
Electronic DST Imprinting Machine.

We sustain the findings of the CTA. The Commissioner's argument

lacks basis in both the Tax Code and the relevant revenue regulations.

DST on documents, loan agreements, and papers shall be levied,

collected and paid for by the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or
transferring the same. 150 The Tax Code provides that whenever one party to
the document enjoys exemption from DST, the other party not exempt from
DST shall be directly liable for the tax. Thus, it is clear that DST shall be
payable by any party to the document, such that the payment and compliance
by one shall mean the full settlement of the DST due on the document.

In the present case, DLSU entered into mortgage and loan agreements
with banks. These agreements are subject to DST. 151 For the purpose of
showing that the DST on the loan agreement has been paid, DLSU presented
its agreements bearing the imprint showing that DST on the document has
been paid by the bank, its counterparty. The imprint should be sufficient

150
Section 173, Tax Code.

~
151
Sections 179 and 195, Tax Code.
 Decision 33 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

proof that DST has been paid. Thus, DLSU cannot be further assessed for
deficiency DST on the said documents.

Finally, it is true that educational institutions are not included in the

class of taxpayers who can pay and remit DST through the On-Line
Electronic DST Imprinting Machine under RR No. 9-2000. As correctly
held by the CTA, this is irrelevant because it was not DLSU who used the
On-Line Electronic DST Imprinting Machine but the bank that handled its
mortgage and loan transactions. RR No. 9-2000 expressly includes banks in
the class of taxpayers that can use the On-Line Electronic DST Imprinting
Machine.

Thus, the Court sustains the finding of the CTA that DLSU proved the
payment of the assessed DST deficiency, except for the unpaid balance of
P13,265.48. 152

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition of the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue in G.R. No. 196596 and AFFIRM the
December 10, 2010 decision and March 29, 2011 resolution of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA En Banc Case No. 622, except for the total
amount of deficiency tax liabilities of De La Salle University, Inc., which
had been reduced.

We also DENY both the petition of De La Salle University, Inc. in

G.R. No. 198841 and the petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in G.R. No. 198941 and thus AFFIRM the June 8, 2011 decision and
October 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA En
Banc Case No. 671, with the MODIFICATION that the base for the
deficiency income tax and VAT for taxable year 2003 is P343,576.70.

SO ORDERED.

<AWiJ) ij~
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Wz:r
Associate Justice
Chairperson

152
Rollo, p. 89 (G.R. No. 198841).
 ' ,'I ...

Decision 34 G.R. Nos. 196596, et al.

~-
MARIANO C. DEL CASTri:LO
(On Official Leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

~
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case \Vas
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice