G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent.

His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA in her name cannot be considered compliance of
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA would have had a reasonable opportunity to
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents. contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
F A C T S: The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter's children if they are 10 years old or
Atty. Jose adopted Jen and Regina. Atty. Jose is the estranged older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
husband of Rosario and the father of Joanne. Rosario alleged 8552, the consent of the adopter's other children
that she and Jose were married but left Jose after a couple of is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
months because of the incompatibilities between them. They prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the
however, briefly reconciled and Rosario gave birth to Joanne. other children on notice that they will have to
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario share their parent's love and care, as well as their
alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. future legitimes, with another person. It is
undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's
Jose, who was then 70 years old, filed a petition for adoption legitimate child and that she was over 10 years
and alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her
with Lilibeth whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
housekeeper. adoption to be valid.
A Home Study Report was conducted and at the time of the 2) No. Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina Rosario were childless, thereby preventing
temporarily and that the children have allegedly been in his Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
custody since Lilibeth's death. her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.
The trial court approved the adoption. However, Rosario filed a
complaint for disbarment against Jose. She alleged that Jose
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent
had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal
Joanne, for the past 36 years and that Jose had been
service of summons should have been effected
showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry, and even
on the spouse and all legitimate children to
went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and
ensure that their substantive rights are protected.
Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.
It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as
in this case. Since the trial court failed to
Thereafter, Jose died. Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
annulment of judgment of the decision of the trial court
the proceedings, it never validly acquired
approving Jed and Regina's adoption. They allege that
jurisdiction.
Rosario's affidavit of consent was fraudulent and that Jed and
Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

I S S U E:
1) W/N Rosario and Joanne should have been given
notice as adoption laws require their consent as a
requisite in the proceedings.

2) W/N the adoption is valid

H E L D:
1) Yes. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8552, the husband must first obtain the consent
of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children
born out of wedlock. The provision is mandatory.
As a general rule, the husband and wife must file
a joint petition for adoption. In the absence of any
decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite
their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible
to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 H E L D:

1) No. The written consent of the natural parent is

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, indispensable for the validity of the decree of
vs. adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO written consent can be dispensed with if the
and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents. parent has abandoned the child or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The
F A C T S: court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even,
without the written consent of the parents or one
of the parents provided that the petition for
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
and begot three children. Anna Marie however learned of her exemption from compliance therewith.
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family
friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of
illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation the natural mother was attached to the petition for
which was granted. They agreed that the children of the parties adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural
shall be entitled to a monthly support of 1,000 and that the father is lacking.
Anna Marie shall be entitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical 2) No. In reference to abandonment of a child by his
without the written consent of Herbert Cang. parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a purpose to forego all parental duties and
divorce from Anna Marie where the court issued the divorce relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
decree and also granted sole custody of the three minor means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all and legal obligations of care and support which
reasonable times and places" to petitioner. parents owe their children."

Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria In the instant case, records disclose that
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang purpose to forego all parental duties and
children. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent relinquish all parental claims over his children as
alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to to, constitute abandonment. Physical
support" his children and that her husband had "long forfeited estrangement alone, without financial and
his parental rights" over the children. moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition obligations of love, care and support for his
thereto. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, children. He maintained regular communication
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging with his wife and children through letters and
that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby telephone. He used to send packages by mail
leaving custody of their children to private respondents. and catered to their whims.

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a decree of

adoption.

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that the

petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest
him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written
consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written
consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as
witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development who made the case study report required by
law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption.

I S S U E:

1) W/N minor children can be legally adopted

without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them
2) W/N Herbert Cang abandoned his minor children
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial
court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.
Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner, It was clear that Judge Moya could not recall having
vs. ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER when shown the signature over his name, he
OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN positively declared that it was not his.
F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.
The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
F A C T S: court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya
declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption
cases. The only decisions he made in open court
Tomasa claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a where he was assigned was always indicated in his
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did
deceased. Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
presented an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In
Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob
had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the
deceased Alfredo, Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no
and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
father Alfredo. inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Pedro’s intervention.

I S S U E:

1) W/N the marriage between the Tomasa Vda. De

Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid
2) W/N defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted
son of Alfredo E. Jacob

H E L D:

1) Yes. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and

petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not
require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.

With regards to the loss of the marriage certificate,

due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own
declaration in court. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

2) No. Central to the present question is the authenticity

of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned Order of
Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter,
two expert witnesses were presented, one for
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996 because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, correction of the name of the minor, is void and
vs. without force or effect. The trial court was clearly
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents. to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons.
F A C T S:
The local civil registrar is thus required to be
made a party to the proceeding. He is an
Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed for the indispensable party, without whom no final
adoption of Midael C. Mazon. After their marriage, minor determination of the case can be had. As he was
Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and not impleaded in this case much less given notice
custody. The spouses prayed for the declaration of the child of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
Michael C. Mazon as their child for all intents and purposes; insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction
dissolution of the authority vested in the natural parents of the of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable
child; and that the surname of the child be legally changed to party in a case renders ineffectual all the
that of the petitioners and that the first name which was proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to complaint including the judgment.
"MICHAEL."
While there was notice given by publication in this
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that
"Michael." He argued that although the correction sought notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the addition the correction of his name in the civil
correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the registry was also being sought. The local civil
Rules of Court. registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on
the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies only to The necessary consequence of the failure to
the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
I S S U E: correction of entry was concerned, null and void
for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to
the subject matter.
1) W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for adoption despite the fact that the
notice by publication did not state the true name
of the minor child.
2) W/N the prayer for the correction of the name of
the child in the civil registry should be granted

H E L D:

1) Yes. In this case the correction involves merely

the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d,"
so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from "Midael C.
Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names "can
be read and pronounced with the same rhyme
(tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give
notice so that those who have any objection to
the adoption can make their objection known.
That purpose has been served by publication of
notice in this case.

2) No. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule

108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010 leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo
to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the
REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal
REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners, incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.
vs.
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. The Court of Appeals issued a resolution regarding the status
MAURICIO, Respondents. of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case and
F A C T S: affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.

Eugenio was the registered owner of a parcel of land which I S S U E:

was first registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes,
siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to 1) W/N there exist a tenancy relationship between
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the Eugenio and the respondents
heirs following the death of his parents. 2) W/N Eugenio can question the legal standing of
Leonida as a party on the ground that she was a
A complaint was filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
by respondents Librada, now deceased, and her alleged legal heir
daughter Leonida for annulment of contract denominated as
Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. H E L D:

Respondents alleged, among others, that they are the legal 1) Yes. A tenancy relationship cannot be
heirs of the late Godofredo who was the lawful and registered extinguished by mere expiration of term or period
tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation
subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other or the transfer of legal possession of the
unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a landholding according to Section 9 of Republic
document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
from the subject property; and that Eugenio had been Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Code of
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.
subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to
maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation
of the subject property. During trial, respondents presented a
leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo 2) No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be
to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement. collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child
cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between purpose. The same rule is applied to adoption
him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation such that it cannot also be made subject to a
of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere collateral attack. Against these jurisprudential
tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a backdrops, we have to leave out the status of
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an Leonida from the case for annulment of the
agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and cause.
that she was fully aware of the contents of the document.
Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also
questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract,
over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio
also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the
present suit.

The Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the

tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject
land.

On the other hand, the DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are
former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses
Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among
others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of
their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the
farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB
banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE the surname of her father and her mother.
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3)
F A C T S: of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
Petitioner Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
alleged therein, among others, that her mother is Gemma hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s mother are living together in the house built by
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs.
"Catindig," his surname. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and
father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
The trial court granted the petition. The petitioner filed a motion they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother name will not only sustain her continued loving
(GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied. The Republic, relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), stigma of her illegitimacy.
agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to
use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother

I S S U E:

1) W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her

mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

H E L D:

1) Yes. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate

child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009 (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. provision means that joint adoption by the husband
LIM, and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner. which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
F A C T S: natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

Petitioner Monina is married to Primo Lim. They were childless.

Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
to them by a certain Ayuban. Monina and Lim registered the Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions
children to make it appear that they were the children’s for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
parents. petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were on this ground.
their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. However, Lim died. Thereafter, Monina married 2) No. It is true that when the child reaches the age of
Olario, an American citizen. emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental
simulated the birth of a child. She then filed separate petitions authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. Michelle and her adoption.
husband gave their consent to the adoption as well as Michael
and Olario.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
The trial court dismissed the petitions. It ruled that since adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
petition jointly with her new husband. legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising
I S S U E: from the relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
1) W/N the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs
adopt
of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation
2) W/N joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
since the children have been emancipated upon
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
reaching the age of majority
the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
H E L D: support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
1) No. The rule provides that husband and the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents
cases: are entitled such as support and successional rights.

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the

legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014 case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, He even kept the money given him, in violation of the
vs. Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent. demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
F A C T S: violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and
of the public confidence in the legal profession.
Nery filed a complaint alleging that she engaged the services
of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana.
As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter.
Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in installment. Sampana,
thereafter, sent a text message informing Nery that he already
filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the
court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer
necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional.

Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the

status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there
was no such petition filed in the court. Thus Nery met
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00
she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct
the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was
never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the
reimbursement but the demands were left unheeded.

Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the

petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have
mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana
committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.

Sampana was found guilty of malpractice for making Nery

believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.

I S S U E:

1) W/N a certification must first be obtained before filing

the petition for adoption

H E L D:

1) No. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the

certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be
married to her close relative, the intended adoption
could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt is waived.

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for

adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of
the petition. He then conceded that the annulment
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
vs. the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME employee do not form part of the estate of the
SERVICES, INC., Respondents. adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
F A C T S: vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
John was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. As such, certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
he was enrolled under the government's Employees' exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
which led to his untimely death the following day. minor child whose second chance at a better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological adopted child’s quality of life might have been better
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim off not being adopted at all if he would only find
for death benefits under PD 626 with the SSS. However, SSS himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
denied the claim because she was no longer considered as the Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority
parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental
CORNELIO COLCOL. authority over the adopted child.

The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
the ruling of the SSS. deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
I S S U E: minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees'
1) W/N the biological parents of the covered, but legally Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
adopted, employee considered secondary petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases,
to receive the benefits under the ECP
2) W/N petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John’s work-related demise.

H E L D:

1) Yes. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears

that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987, or only less than three (3) years since the
decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to
have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the
legitimate parents is contrary to law.

2) Yes. Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then
about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority
over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside
from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive
parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four
(4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a

significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents.