US. Department of Justice ‘Attomey Werle Prout “ Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election Volume I of II Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, IIL Submited Pursuant 028 CER. §600.8(e) Washington, D.C March 2019)US, Department of Justice Attomey- Work Brdet My- Centar Materiel roteeted tinder Fed Crim Pte}US, Department of Justice Attorney orl Prot // May Conia Material Protected Under Fed R- Ctn-B6fe) ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME T IIRODUCTION TO VOLUME Tn | Execuvive Susatany To VoLuMe rene I. The SpeciaL. COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION : seve ML 1, RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN vss EA ‘A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency " 1S 1B, Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin 16 C. The IRA Targets US. Elton ns : 9 1 The IRA Ramps Up U.S, Operations As Eacly As 2014 9 2. US. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts 2 3. USS. Operations Through Facebook, — 4 4. US. Operations Through Twitter o 26 a. Individualized Accounts, b. IRA Botnet Activities USS. Operations Involving Politial Rallis ..srnnsnsnnnnnnnnnn 2 ‘Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons. 31 Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign, 33 ‘8, Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials es b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies ruvnon 38 TI, RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS. _ sci 6 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign. ns 36 |. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign. 2. Inusions into the DCCC and DNC Newwotks on 8 Iii AceeS$ smn sets 38 Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Network ness 38 «©. Theft of Documents ftom DNC and DECC NetWotks nnnnnnnnn A 18. Dissemination ofthe Hacked Materials 1. DCLeaks Gucciter 20. a 3. Use OF WiKTLe@KS nnn “4 1, WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign 44 b, WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guesfer 2.0 and DCLOAKS soso ASUS, Department of Justice te en Sse vires Se tt 1. Summeran F216 Opts Teng Dowie Vin nn 2. ines Taint iit oS eons 0 Bek : 31 '. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks, LL 44. WikiLoaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails. 38 Donald Trump Jr, Interaction with WiKiLe@kS on 39 2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials su 6 4 Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) 6 . Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails 2 IV, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN one 6 ‘A. Campaign Period (September 2015 November 8, 2016). 66 1, Trump Tower Moscow Project. o 4, Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) .n.na: 67 5. Communications with LC. Expat lavenment Company and Go Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)... sn 69 Lote of nia and Contacts Rosin Goverament (Octaber2015- Tanuary 2016) 70 5. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf ofthe Trump Organization ..70 ii, Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia, n 4. Discussions about Russa Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016) 16 i, Sater’s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russa. secs ii, Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia vie 7 2. George Papadopoulos 7 8, Origins of Campaign Work... 81 b. Initial Russa-Related Contacts ns se «, March 31 Foreign Policy Team Mectng 85US. Department of Justice Sevan Woe Brae | ay omeqnr latent Rin Bt «4. George Papadopoulos Leaens That Russia Has “Diet” in the Form of Clinton Emails «Rus Related Communications With The Campsign £, Trump Campaign Knowledge of £2. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact. 3. Carter Page. Buchysound b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work «Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow 4, Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign 4, Dimitri Simes and the Center forthe Nationa Interest ‘a. CNLand Dimitri Simes Connest withthe Trump Campaign. 5. Nation Inert Hons Foreign Policy Specht th Mayflower Hoe! «Jef Sessions Pst Speech Ineratons wit CN 4, Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes. 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower, 4. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting. i, Outreach to Donald Trump Je fi, Awareness ofthe Meeting Within the Campaign b, The Events of Fune 9, 2016... i. Arrangements forthe Mesting li, Conduct ofthe Mesting, «, PostJune 9 Events 6 Events tthe Republican Natal Convention. 8, Ambassador Kislyak’s Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D, Gordon the Weck ofthe RNC 'b, Change to Republican Party Platform. 171. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislya. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence. 2. Senator Sesionss September 2016 Meeting with Ambasador Kis. 8, Paul Manafort. 1, Paul Manafort’s Ties to Russia and Ukraine. 86 eessese 102 03 103 os 07 108 0 10 110 us 116 116 n7 120 123 123 128 oa a 7 129 31US. Department of Justice at ii, Political Consulting Work. i Konstantin Kili n senna ID $6. Contacts rng Pl Manafows Te withthe Tramp Campaign i §, Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign Be fi, Paul Manafort's Campsign-Period Contct.. soc 1S i, Paul Manafo's Two Campsige-Paiod Mertngs with Konan Kilimnik in the United States 138 «. Post-Resignation Activ a B, Post-Election and Transition-Period Comte nn ut 1. Immediate Post-Election Activity seuss rn 14 4. Outreach from the Russian Government. sone 5 ', High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels... 146 2, Kirill Dmiteev's Transition-Era Outreach tothe Incoming Adminstration... 147 4. Background, ur '. Kisll Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming. ‘Administration, vnnen 9 «, Brik Prine and Kirill Dmitviev Meet inthe Seychelles 151 i Gorge Nader and Erik Princ Anange Seshles Mesing with Dmitiev, = a 151 li, The Seychelles Meetngs..nn 153 i, Erk Prince's Mesting wih Steve Bannon afer he Seyeles Tp 158 44 it Dit’ Pose ston Contact wth Rick Gerson Reping US Russia Relations : 156 3. Ambassador Kislyak’s Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in “Trump Tower Following the Ele os 159 4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey GoIkOV essen 161 5. Pete Aven’s Outreach Efforts tothe Transition Team sn soo 1B (6. Carter Fage Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady DvorKOVIER ncn. 168 7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn... er ‘. United Nations Vote on Israeli Setlements. sosnsnnn OT b, US, Sanctions Against Russa svn 168 \V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS : 174 A. Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign rane 14US, Department of Justice Attomey- Work Bret May-Comtain Materiel Protected Linder Fed-R-Ctim Pie} B, Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations os 175 1. Section 1030 Computer-Inrusion Conspiracy soon IS 2, Background : 178 '. Charging Decision As to EIREXCTEMPUEIO ie 2. Potential Section 1030 Violson 7 I 19 . Russian Government Outreach and Contacts 180 |. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and ColUsi ns 180 2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (PARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951). 181 a. Governing Law, = 11 ». Application. : os ie 3, Campaign Finance 183 1. Overview OF Governing Lawson 84 ', Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting. son BBS J, Thing-of-Value Element o 186 i, Willftness . 187 il, Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information 188 «6. Application to WikiL sks 188 i. Questions Over 189 1. Wiss 10 i Consol Considers 180 iv. Ana sis sue 190 4. Patton Dat areal is & Ovevew Of Governing Law is Applian Corunna isa 1 ergs Ppp. i recor | 194 i. Misha Fyn i iy MihaelCaben cs ’ 196 Wet Sens i vil, Others Interviewed Du the Investigation, 198US. Department of Justice Attomey-Worke Product May-Centet Materiel Protected: Under Fed-Rt-Geim- Pe}US, Department of Justice Attorney Werke Broduet ay Comba barrie Protected Linder edo 8m Hey yrRopucTioN 10 VouuME ‘This report is submitted tothe Attorney General pursuant to 28 CFR. § 600.80), which stats that, “af the conclusion of the Special Counse's work, he... shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special Counsel] reached.” ‘The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidental election in sweeping and systematic fashion, Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016, In Jie, the Democratic National Committe and its eyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network, Releases of hacked materals—hacks that publie reporting soon atrbuted to the Russian government—began that same month ‘Adaitinal leases followed in July though te organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in ‘October and Novernber In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's fist release of stolen documents, a foreign ‘government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested toa representative of that foreign ‘govemment thatthe Trump Campaign hid received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging tw Democratic presidental candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated withthe Trump Campaign ‘were coordinating withthe Russian government in its interference activites. “That fll, two federal agencies jointly announced thatthe Russian government “rected recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, ineluding US political “organizations,” and, “these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US elect process.” After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. By carly 2017, several congressional committees were ‘examining Russia's interference inthe election. Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ukimatey led to the May 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, Ill. The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate “the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,” including any links of coordination between the Russian government and ‘individuals associated with the Trump Campaign ‘As set forth in detail inthis report, the Special Counsel’s investigation established that Russia inverfered in the 2016 presidental elecsion prineipaly tough two opeations. Fis Russian entity carted out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. ‘Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computeriniusion operations against entities, employees, and. volunteers ‘Working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also ‘denied numerous Finks between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established thatthe Russian goversment perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and thatthe Campaign expected it would benefit 1US. Depactment of Justice Scores Woe bsesey Slyeconsae titantron te eo Ing Matter See, eg, Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigoohin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by US, Js Krown ‘a “Putin's Cook" New York Ties (Feb. 16, 2018) > OEE > IE » Ero see also SM: 2230634, seat RM "7US, Department of Justice Attomey-Worke Pret May- Conia Materiel Protected: Under ederim P62} oy Ps OME EO (ELITE * The erm “vol” refers to internet users—in his context, pid operatives —who post inflammatory orosberise disruptive content on socal media or ater websites. 18US. Department of Justice ‘May-Gontair Mattie Preieeted Linder ed-R- Crim P-6(e) Set Person TIA employecs were aware that Pigochin was involved in the IRA's US. of Barrera ccs recruited U'S, persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read “Happy Ssth Birthday Dear Boss.” as an homage to Prigorhin (whose SSth birthday was on June 12016)" mero The IRA Targets U.S. Elections 1, The JRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Barly As 2014 ‘The IRA's US. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a si seneral_ department, known internally as the “Translator” (Tlepesosuin) Soa forums. i © Translator Department ino diferent responsibties, ranging fom operations on different social media platforms to analytics to "EE see 8M.2030604, serials 131 @ 208 » See SM-2230654, sera 156 % Iugrnet Research Agency Inditmest § 1479936895656787 (United Muslims of Ameria) &| 120 see al S26/16 Facebok Messages, 1DUS. Department of Justice Atcorney Work: Prduet/) May-Gontsin-Meterat Protected Under Fad R-Crim-PrOfe) sraphios and IT Pe) Crone See SM0634 See SM-2250604, svat 204 EU XDRETPIETIE 20US. Department of Justice ee IRA employees also traveled to the United States on ineligeneo-gathering missions. In June 2014, four IRA employees applied tothe U.S, Department of Stat to enter the United States, ‘while lying about the purpose of their tp and claiming tobe four fiends who had met at party." Ukimately, two IRA employees—Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova—received visas and entered the United States on June 4, 2014 Prioro traveling, Krylova and Bogacheva compiled itineraries ad instructions for thet vee » ER > BESTEL Farm to Ongoing Matter Sue SM 2730654, sve 150 & 172 GENIN TET > oRS, Deparment of lustce 2, US. Operations Through IRA-Contolled Social Media Accounts, Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on Afferent U.S. social media platforms. The TRA refered to emplayees assigned to operate the oval iin accouuts as “specialiss."? Starting as carly ax 2014, the IRAs U.S. operations included socal media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twiter"® The IRA later faded specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts. Initially, the TRA ereated social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts of US. persons ® By eatly 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots ‘organizations, In certain cases the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. Fer example, one IRA-contolled Twitter acount, @TEN_GOP, purported tobe connected tothe Tennessee Republican Party. More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of fittious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these aecounts tO pose as ant- immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Mater protestors, and other U.S. social and political activi, The IRA closely monitored the activity ofits social media accounts ‘leas EliFiarmto Ongoing Matter, siiealiai “ Se, Facebook 1D 1000159046680 (Alex Anderson; Facebook ID 100009626173204 (Andrea Hansen: Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Wiliams); Facebook ID 100013640043337 (Cakisha Richardson, mo. TOUTE © The acount climed tobe the “Uno Twiter of Tennessee Republicans that appeared to be endorsements of the sate poical par. See, 0, (Tennessee GOP backs GrelDonaldTrump period #nakeA mercagrestagain wed made posts TEN. GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet, gop tennessee #09") 2US, Department of Justice Attomey-WorkeProdet / May-Contair Material Protected tinder Fed-Rt-Crite P60} farm to Ongoing Matter Pec nay By February 2016, internal TRA documents relered 1 su and opposition to candidate Clinton. Fo for the Trump Campaign Go Ee LE dirctions to IRA fra feu Use any opportunity were Hilary rand the rest (except SEHarm to Ongoing Matter “The focus on the U.S. presidental campaign continued throug eho i 20 reviewing the IRA-controled Facebook group “Secured Bowes” the ea “Se eg,5M220064 srl 1 ©The TRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially enmounced her ential campaign IRA-controled social media secount State and promoted various rtigus of her caniac ined Clinton's record as Secretary of The (RA also used ote echaigucs ee SMezzs003, seal 7 ORI 2B