IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT PAR ES SALAAM

(CORAM: LUANDA, J.A., MUSSA, J.A., MMILLA, 3.A. MUGASHA, J.A., And
MWAMBEGELE, J.AT

CIVIL APPEAL NO 65 OF 2016

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL................................................. APPELLANT

VERSUS

JEREMIA MTOBESYA................................................... RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the Ruling of the High Court of Tanzania

(Lila, 3., Kihivo, J. And Ruhanqisa, 3.)

dated 22nd day of December, 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

23rd June, 2017 & 2nd February, 2018

MUSSA, J-A,:

This is an appeal by the Attorney General, the appellant

herein, against the decision of the High Court [Lila J.K. (as he then

was), Kihiyo, J. and Ruhangisa, J.] comprised in Miscellaneous Civil

Application No. 29 of 2015. The factual setting giving rise to the

impugned decision may briefly be recapitulated as follows:-

1
 On the 1st day of July, 2015 the respondent who held himself

up as a resident of Dar es Salaam, lodged a petition in the High

Court challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of section

148 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Chapter 20 of the Revised

Laws of Tanzania (hereinafter referred by the acronym "CPA".). It

is, perhaps, noteworthy that the referred provision forbids a court

or police officer from granting bail if the Director of Public

Prosecutions (the DPP) certifies in writing that it is likely that the

safety or interests of the Republic would thereby be prejudiced. We

shall, at a later stage, extract the referred provisions in full. For the

moment, it will suffice to observe that the petition was filed by way

of an originating summons which was expressly taken out under

the provisions of Article 26 (2) of the Constitution of the United

Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (the Constitution) as well as sections 4

and 5 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, Chapter 5 of

the Revised Laws of Tanzania (the Act). The respondent also

expressly predicated the petition under Rule 4 of the Basic Rights

and Duties Enforcement (Practice and Procedure Rules, 2014 (the

practice and procedure Rules). It is, perhaps, pertinent to also

2
observe at this stage that, in the body of originating summons, the

respondent referred to Article 13 (6) (b) of the Constitution as a

ground in support of the petition. To accompany the petition, was

an affidavit duly sworn by the respondent on the 30th June, 2015.

From the other side, the petition was resisted by the

appellant through a counter affidavit which was duly affirmed by a

certain Aida Alfred Kisumo, who happens to be a learned Senior

State Attorney.

Thus, against the foregoing contending pleadings, the trial

court ordered the parties to argue the petition by way of written

submissions and scheduled a timetable to that effect. As it turned

out, the parties were heedful and, in that regard, in his written

submissions, the respondent inter alia, advanced a plea to the

effect that, in the originating summons, he inadvertently referred

to Article 13 (6) (b) in lieu of Article 13 (b) (a). In the upshot, he

sought the indulgence of the trial court to rectify the so-called

clerical error to avert an impending misconception. In reply, the

appellant vehemently resisted the attempt which he dubbed

"strange and unprocedurai'. Apparently befuddled by the rival

3
arguments, the presiding Judges took the assumption that the

impugned reference to Article 13 (6) (b) instead of 13 (6) (a) was,

in fact, a wrong citation of the enabling provisions of the law. In

their own words:-

"We need to satisfy ourselves on the aspect

whether the court has been properly moved

now that the petitioner adm its to have cited

the wrong provisions o f the law ."

The court of the first instance then painstakingly discussed

the consequences of the so- called wrong citation of the enabling

provision and, at the height of its deliberations, it was,

nevertheless, satisfied that the petition was properly before it. We

need not venture into a consideration of the merits or demerits of

this finding much as, if we may digress a bit and observe en

passant In the originating summons, the respondent did not quite

cite Article 13(6)(b) as an enabling provision to ground his petition.

On the contrary and, as already intimated, the cited provisions

were Article 26(2) of the Constitution, sections 4 and 5 of the Act

and Rule 4 of the practice and procedure Rules. As we have hinted

4
upon, Article 13 (6) (b) was only referred by the respondent in the

body of the originating summons as a ground in support of the

petition. To say the least, it was, in the first place, unnecessary for

the trial court to initiate the issue of wrong citation with respect to

an Article which was not even cited as an enabling provision. With

this remark, so much for our digression.

To resume our recapitulation of the factual setting, having

found that it was properly seized of the petition, the court of first

instance dispassionately considered and weighed the learned rival

submissions from either side on the constitutionality or otherwise

of the impugned provisions of section 148 (4) of the CPA. In the

final result, it was observed

"The im pugned section 148 (4) o f the CPA is a

potential ground fo r breeding arbitrary

detentions as it denies the accused person the

right to be heard on m atters o f bail and

prem aturely treats the accused person as a

convict. This kind o f restriction to b ail puts the

liberty o f the citizen a t stake and infringes his

5
 right to liberty. It is in conflict with the

presumption o f innocence which is guaranteed

under Article 13(6) (b) o f the Constitution".

The petition was, accordingly, allowed and, consequently, the

court handed down the following verdict:-

"The provisions o f section 148(4) o f the

Crim inal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 (R.E.2002)

are hereby declared unconstitutional fo r

offending the provisions o f Article 13 (6) (a) o f

the Constitution o f the United Republic o f

Tanzania o f 1977as amended".

The appellant is presently aggrieved and, in an effort to

impugn the verdict of the High Court, he filed a memorandum of

appeal which is comprised of five points of grievance, namely:-

(/) That, the High Court erred in law in holding

that in human rights cases, wrong citation

o f the enabling provisions o f the law by the

petitioner is not fatal i f the parties were

aware o f the issues under consideration

6
 and an error can be corrected without

prejudicing anybody nor can it occasion

any injustice to the other party.

(ii) That, the High Court erred in law in holding

that section 148(4) of the Criminal

Procedure A ct [Cap 20 R.E. 2002j

Contravenes Article 13(6) of the

Constitution o f the United Republic o f

Tanzania and that the said Provisions

neither pass the proportionally test nor can

be saved by the derogation clause in Article

30(2) o f the Constitution o f the United

Republic o f Tanzania.

(Hi) That, the High Court erred in law in holding

that the accused has no platform to stand

on and challenge the certificate objecting

the grant o f bail by the Director o f Public

Prosecution in Court.
 (iv) That, the High Court erred in law in

disregarding Article 30(5) of the

Constitution o f the United Republic o f

Tanzania.

( v) That the High Court erred in law in venturing

into areas which have already been settled

and decided by the Court o f Appeal o f

Tanzania vide the case o f The Director o f

Public Prosecutions Vs Daudi Pete TLR

[1993] 22".

When the appeal was placed before us for hearing, the

appellant was represented by a consortium of four learned Law

Officers, namely, Ms. Alesia Mbuya (Principal State Attorney), Mr.

Timon Vitalis (Principal State Attorney), Mr. Abubakari Mrisha

(Senior State Attorney) and Ms. Aida Kisumo (Senior State

Attorney). On the adversary side, the respondent was represented

by two learned Advocates, namely, Mr. Mpale Mpoki and Dr.

Lugemeleza Nshala. In addition, the Court had the services of two

8
learned am ici curiae, namely, Professor Gamaliel Mgongo Fimbo

and Professor Chris Maina Peter.

From the very outset, we are obliged to express our profound

appreciation in the manner the learned counsel on either side and

the two learned Professors addressed the issues of contention in

detail and thoroughly well. We wish to commend them all for the

industry and brilliance that went into the preparation and

presentation of their respective arguments. But, as we do so, we

should hasten a confession that it will not be possible for us to go

so far as to recite each and every detail comprised in counsel's

submissions. Rather, we propose to be choosy and only relate, in a

nutshell, so much of their respective contentions which are

conveniently relevant and sufficient for the disposal of the matter

at hand. It is, perhaps, also pertinent to observe beforehand that

in the course of our deliberations, where required, the relevant

provisions of the Constitution will be extracted from the latest

2008 Official Revised English Version of the Constitution which

was published on the 31st December, 2010. We would, however

make requisite observations just in case we find a material

9
deviation in any of the provisions from the controlling Kiswahili

Edition of the Constitution.

That said, at the commencement of the hearing, we raised a

preliminary matter, suo motu, to satisfy our curiosity on the

manner in which the respondent's petition was presented before

the High Court and, for that matter, we invited all counsel to

address us on whether or not the petition was properly before the

court of first instance. Our curiosity was partly prompted by a

reflection on section 6 (e) of the Act which requires a petition for

enforcement of basic rights and duties to set out the specific

sections in Part III of Chapter one of the Constitution which are the

basis of the cause. Thus, our enquiry was as to whether or not

there was need to additionally cite Article 13(6) (a) as an enabling

provision to come to terms with the referred section 6 (e) of the

Act.

To this enquiry, Mr. Vitalis expressed at once that Article 13

(6) (a) is, after all, not an enabling provision for the purposes of

predicating the petition at hand. Rather, as he put it, the same is a

ground upon which the constitutionality or otherwise of the

10
impugned provision was to be gauged. Thus, to him, it was

sufficient for the petitioner to only cite, as he did, the provisions of

Article 26 (2) of the constitution. Nonetheless, upon a reflection,

Ms. Mbuya refurbished her colleague's stance and urged that it was

necessary for the petition to cite Article 13 (6) (a) in addition to

Article 26 (2) of the constitution.

On his part, while accepting the formulation by Mr. Vitalis to

the effect that Article 13 (6) (a) is not an enabling provision, Mr.

Mpoki advised that the right to institute a constitutional petition is

both constitutional and statutory depending on the nature of the

petition as well as the particulars of the petitioner. Counsel further

submitted that, on the one hand, where, for instance, the

petitioner alleges a basic right contravention, in relation to him

personally, he may predicate the petition under the provisions of

Article 30 (3) of the constitution, just as he may as well ground it

under the provisions of section 4 of the Act.

On the other hand, counsel added, where the petition is in

the nature of an action for the protection of the Constitution and

legality on behalf of the general public, that is, as distinguished

li
from personal interest, the petition ought to be instituted under the

provisions of Article 26 (2) of the Constitution. Mr. Mpoki concluded

that the latter type of a petition for the enforcement of basic rights

and duties constitutes an action brought to protect or enforce the

rights and duties enjoyed by members of the public at large which

has, nowadays, assumed the title: " Public interest litigation" The

learned counsel for the respondent finally urged that the petition

giving rise to the appeal under our consideration was filed under

the referred Article 26(2) and, to that end, the same was properly

before the High Court.

When we invited the learned am ici curiae to comment on

the issue which we raised, Professor Fimbo was of the view that

given the fact that the petition before the High Court was a public

interest litigation, the enabling provision was Article 26 (2) of the

constitution which was duly cited in the originating summons. In

that regard, he said, both Article 30 (3) of the Constitution and

section 4 of the Act were inapplicable. Thus to him, with the

citation of Article 26(2), the petition was properly before the High

12
Court. Professor Peter went along with the submission to which he

had nothing useful to add.

Addressing the issue we raised on the competency of the

petition before the High Court, we are inclined to straightaway

accept the position taken by both Mr. Vitalis and Mr. Mpoki to the

effect that Article 13 (b) (a) is not quite an enabling provision to

ground a petition for the enforcement of basic rights and duties. As

correctly formulated by Mr. Vitalis, the referred Article is, rather, a

ground upon which the constitutionality of an impugned enactment

is to be gauged. Again, we accept Mr. Mpoki's submission to the

effect that one's standing to institute a petition for the enforcement

of basic rights and duties is conferred by both the constitutional

and statutory provisions depending on the nature of the petition

or, as the case may be, the particulars of a given petitioner. In

that regard, where, for instance, the petitioner seeks to enforce a

basic right or duty in relation to his personal interest, he may

predicate the petition under Article 30 (3) of the Constitution which

provides

13
 ''Where any person alleges that any

provision o f this Part o f this Chapter or any

law involving a basic right or duty has been;

is being or is likely to be contravened in

re la tio n to h im in any part o f the United

Republic, he may institute proceedings for

re lie f in the High Court."

[Emphasis supplied.]

We have bolded the expression "in re la tio n to h im " to

underscore the need for the petitioner proceeding under this Article

to show sufficient personal interest in the action complained of.

But, similarly and, under the same circumstances, such a petitioner

may, just as well, predicate his petition under section 4 of the Act

which stipulates:-

"If any person alleges that any o f the

provisions o f sections 12 to 29 o f the

Constitution has been, is being o r is likely to

be contravened in relation to him, he may,

w ith o u t p re ju d ic e to a n y o th e r a ctio n

14
 with respect to the same m atter that is

iaw fuiiy available, app/y to the High Court

fo r redress."

[Emphasis supplied.]

Apparently, in the foregoing provision of the Act, the

legislature was minded to replicate the referred provisions of Article

30 (3), save for the introduction of the bolded expression which is

not contained in the Article. We find it unnecessary to speculate as

to whatever was the legislator's intention in introducing the

expression.

Contra wise, where the contravention of a basic right or duty

has no bearing on one's personal interests, the petitioner may,

nevertheless, shoulder the burden for the public at large by

instituting the petition under Article 26 (2) of the Constitution

which stipulates:-

"Every person has the right, in accordance

with the procedure provided by law, to take

legal action to ensure protection o f this

Constitution and the laws o f the /and"

15
 In the High Court decision of Rev. Christopher Mtikila Vs.

Attorney General [1995] TLR 31, this Article was held to be the

bedrock of the so -called public interest litigation. In the words of

the late Lugakingira, J. (as he then was):-

"It occurs to me, therefore, that Article 26 (2)

enacts into our constitution the doctrine o f

public interest litigation. It is then not in logic

or foreign precedent that we have to go fo r

this doctrine; it is already with us in our own

constitution."

We fully subscribe to and adopt the foregoing statement of

principle. We may only add that by commencing with the

expression "Everyperson.. as distinguished from "an aggrieved

o r interested persorf, the Article confers standing on a desirous

petitioner to seek to protect the rights of another or the general

public at large despite having no sufficient interest on the

impugned contravention. The Article is, in itself, a departure from

the doctrine of locus standi as we know it in the Common Law

tradition.

16
 All said, our curiosity was satisfactorily quenched and we fully

subscribe to counsel submission that, with the citation of Article 26

(2) of the constitution, the petition was properly before the High

Court. We note that the respondent additionally cited sections 4

and 5 of the Act as well as Rule 4 of the practice procedure Rules

which are inapplicable to the situation at hand. Nonetheless, as

correctly urged by both Mr. Mpoki and Dr. Nshala, reference to

those provisions were an unnecessary surplusage which did not

affect the competency of the petition so long as the enabling

Article 26 (2) of the Constitution was cited. We should note that

this is not the first time we are making this observation, much as

we have previously consistently stated that where a provision that

confers jurisdiction in the Court is cited alongside inapplicable or

superfluous provisions, the matter is deemed to to have sufficient

legs to stand in Court (see, for instance, the unreported Civil

Appeal No. 22 of 2007 - Abdallah Hassan vs. Juma Haamis

Sekiboko; and Civil Appeal No. 60 of 2012 - Bitan Inernational

Enterpprises Ltd. Vs. Mished Kotalu)

17
 Coming now to the appeal, Mr. Vitalis commenced his

address by abandoning the first, third and fifth grounds of appeal.

The learned Principal State Attorney then prefaced his substantive

arguments with a brief background of the impugned section 148

(4) of the CPA. The provisions, he said, were imported into our

legislation from section 123 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code of

the Republic of Zambia. To fortify his contention, Mr. Vitalis

referred us to the Report of the Judicial System Review

Commission which recommended the importation of the provision

from the Criminal Procedure Code of Zambia. Thus, he concluded,

the Zambian provision was introduced into the CPA with

modifications that were to follow upon numerous amendments.

On the second ground of appeal which he, apparently,

approached generally, Mr. Vitalis reminded us that, in the petition,

the respondent's complaint was not on liberty, rather, it was on the

right to be heard. The learned Principal State Attorney then

contended that whilst section 148 (4) takes away the court's

discretion to admit the intended person to bail, the same does not,

however, bar the hearing of such person. In that regard, Mr.

18
Vitalis referred us to our unreported Criminal Appeal No. 508 of

2015 - The Director of Public Prosecutions Vs. Li Ling Ling.

In the referred case, he said, the High Court afforded the

respondent a hearing despite there being a corresponding

certificate under the provisions of section 36 (2) of the Economic

and Organized Crime Control Act, Chapter 200 of the Revised Laws

of Tanzania (the Economic Crimes Act). Elaborating further on the

availability of the right to a hearing on the person affected by the

DPP's certificate, the learned Principal State Attorney submitted

that the right to a hearing is securely guaranteed under the

provisions of section 161 of the CPA which stipulates that all orders

issued under sections 148 to 160, that is, including the impugned

provisions, are appealable just as they are subject to judicial

review.

On the test to determine the constitutionality or otherwise of

an impugned provision, Mr. Vitalis contended that regard must be

in the provisions themselves and not the resultant outcome of the

operation of the provision. To bolster his contention, the learned

Principal State Attorney referred us to Rev. Mtikila (supra) and,

19
we should suppose, Mr. Vital is had in mind the observation made

by the High Court at pg. 55:-

"... it m ust be realized that the

constitutionality o f a provision or statute is not

found in what could happen in its operation

but in what it actually provides for. Where a

provision is reasonable and valid, the mere

possibility o f its being abused in actual

operation w ill not make it invalid."

Still on the second ground of appeal, the learned Principal

State Attorney finally submitted that for an impugned provision to

be declared unconstitutional, the alleged breach of the Constitution

must be express as opposed to one which has to be arrived at by

mere inference. To fortify this position, Mr. Vitalis, again, paid

homage to Rev. Mtikila (supra). It is noteworthy that at pages

70 - 71 of the High Court decision there is this remark:-

"A breach o f the Constitution, however, is

such a grave and serious affair that cannot be

arrived a t by mere inferences, however

20
 attractive and I apprehend that this would

require p ro o f beyond reasonable d o u b t"

As to what extent the foregoing statement of principle related

to the impugned provision under our consideration, Mr. Vitalis was

not quite forthcoming. A remark is, however, well worth that the

learned Principal State Attorney hardly addressed us on the gist of

the complaint in the second ground to the effect that the High

Court erred in holding that the impugned provisions neither passed

the proportionality test nor can be saved by the derogation clause

in Article 30(2) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, in the written

submissions in support of the appeal, the appellant submits, in

effect, that on a proper and true construction of the provisions of

sub-section (4) of section 148 of the CPA, a meaning can be

ascertained which fits into the provisions of Article 30(2)(b) of the

Constitution. Thus, it is part of the appellant's case that the

impugned provisions fall within the scope of Article 30(2)(b) of the

Constitution and are therefore constitutionally valid.

Addressing us on the fourth ground of appeal, the learned

Principal State Attorney criticized the court below for disregarding

21
and, as a result, not invoking the provisions of Article 30 (5) which

provides

"Where in any proceedings it is alleged that

any law enacted or any action taken by the

Government or any other authority abrogates

or abridges any o f the basic rights, freedoms

and duties set out in Article 12 to 29 o f this

Constitution, and the High Court is satisfied

that the law or action concerned, to extent

that it conflicts with this Constitution is void

is inconsistent with this Constitution, then

the High Court i f it deems fit, or i f the

circumstances or public interest so requires,

instead o f declaring that such law or action is

void, or shall have pow er to decide to afford

the Government or other authority

concerned an opportunity to rectify the

defect found in the law or action concerned

within such a period in such m anner as the

22
 High Court shall determine, and such law or

action shall be deem ed to be valid until such

time the defect is rectified or the period

determ ined by the High Court /apses,

whichever is the earlier."

Mr. Vitalis contended that the High Court did not accord

reasons, as one would have expected, for not invoking its

discretion conferred under the Article. To buttress his contention,

the learned Principal State Attorney referred us to the case of

Tanesco Vs. IPTL [2000] TLR 327. Nonetheless, Mr. Vitalis

candidly conceded that in his written submissions below, the

appellant did not prompt the High Court to exercise its discretion

under the Article.

In sum, the learned Principal State Attorney urged us to allow

the appeal and quash the decision of the High Court upon a

declaration that the provisions of section 148 (4) of the CPA were

enacted intra vires the Constitution. Although he did not

forthrightly express so in his prayers, on the strength of the fourth

23
ground of appeal, the appellant would seemingly impress upon us

to step into the shoes of the High Court and invoke the provisions

of Article 30 (5), that is, if we are minded to uphold the decision of

the High Court on the unconstitutionally of the impugned provision.

In reply, Mr. Mpoki commenced his argument with a

reference to Article 13 (6) (a) which we shall later extract in full.

The learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that the

impugned section 148 (4) does not prescribe any procedure, let

alone one which is reasonable, fair and appropriate to govern the

issuance of the DPP's certificate. To that extent, he said, an

accused person is not afforded any meaningful opportunity of

being heard before he is denied bail by operation of the DDP's

certificate. Thus, to him, the impugned provision violated the

particular Article of the Constitution.

Mr. Mpoki further submitted that the onus of proving that a

breach of a basic right was limited or saved by the derogation

provisions rests upon the party seeking to uphold the saving or

limitation. In that regard, the learned counsel for the respondent

24
criticized the appellant for not venturing, in the least, to seek the

invocation of the derogation provisions. In any event, Mr. Mpoki

urged, the impugned provision would not pass the proportionality

test referring us to the case of Kukutia Ole Pumbun and

Another Vs. The Attorney General [1993] TLR 159.

On his part, Professor Fimbo formulated his advice along the

lines of the mandate given to him by the Court which was to

address the following issues namely;-

(i) Whether the provisions o f section 148 (4) o f

the Crim inal Procedure A ct contravene

Article 13(6) o f the Constitution.

(ii) Whether the provisions o f section 148(4) o f

the Crim inal procedure A ct are covered by

the perm issible lim itation o f Article 30 (2) o f

the constitution o f the United Republic o f

Tanzania, Cap. 2 (R.E.2002) the clawback

clause.

(Hi) Whether DPP V. Daudi Pete's case [1993]

TLR 22 is applicable to the circumstances o f

25
 the present case or is distinguishable and to

what extent

(iv) Whether the constitutional Court was

ju stified to declare section 148 (4) o f the

Criminal Procedure Act, unconstitutional."

We shall henceforth refer the extracted issues as,

respectively, the first to fourth instructions. Addressing us on the

first instruction, the learned Professor reminded us that to him, the

same is broader than the issue addressed by the respondent in his

originating summons which was limited to Article 13(6) (a) of the

Constitution. Accordingly, in his submissions Professor Fimbo

examined the provisions of the Article, which relates to the right to

be heard, in the light of the other fundamental rights such as, one,

the right to bail, two, access to courts, three, presumption of

innocence and; four equality before the law. More particularly,

Professor Fimbo submitted that the right to be heard is enshrined

under Article 13(b) (a) of the Constitution. Of recent, he said, the

jurisprudence of the Court was developed and expanded in the

case of Mbeya - Rukwa Auto parts and Transport Ltd vs

26
Jestina George Mwakyoma [2003] TLR 251 where it was held

that a decision reached without regard to principles of natural

justice and/or in contravention of the Constitution is void and of no

effect.

Coming to the right to bail, Professor Fimbo submitted that

the same is similarly enshrined under Article 15(2) of the

Constitution, save for certain prescriptions. In this respect, he

referred to the leading case of DPP vs Daudi Pete [1993] TLR 22

which read the right to bail in Article 15(2) as one of the species of

the right to personal freedom.

As regards the access to courts, the learned Professor

referred us to a portion of the judgment of Court in Julius

Francis Ishengoma Dyanabo v. The Attorney General [2004]

TLR 14 where the concept was underlined in the following words:-

"Access to courts is undoubtedly, a cardinal

safeguard against violations o f ones rights

whether those rights are fundam ental or

not Without that right, there can be no

27
 rule o f law and therefore; no democracy. A

court o f law is the "last resort o f the

oppressed and the b e w ild e re d A n y o n e

seeking a legal remedy should be able to

knock on the door o f justice and be heard."

On the presumption of innocence and equality before the

law, Professor Fimbo referred us to a decision of the High Court of

Kenya in Juma and Others vs The Attorney General (2003)

AHRLR. 179 (Ke HC 2003 where the court held in part:-

"Subject to the right o f every person

entrenched in the Constitution o f Kenya and

including the presumption o f innocence until

proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the

fundamental right to a fa ir hearing by its

nature requires that there be equality

between contestants in litigation. There

can be no true equality i f the legal process

allow s one party to withhold m aterial

inform ation from his adversary without ju s t

28
 cause or peculiar circumstances o f the

case.

Having discussed the first instruction, the learned Professor

concluded thus:-

"It is hereby advised that a provision which

denies an accused person to present and be

heard on his application fo r b ail or to

challenge the certificate of the DPP

constitutes unfair hearing and thereby

contravenes Article 13 (6) (a) o f the

Constitution"

Dealing with the second instruction, Professor Fimbo was

very brief: The impugned provisions, he said, could only be

validated if they are, on the terms of Article 30 (2) of the

Constitution, construed as being wholly for ensuring the defence,

public safety public peace and any other interests for the purposes

of enhancing public benefit Adopting the construction formulae

29
from DPP vs Daudi Pete (supra), the learned Professor advised

that the impugned provisions are so broadly drafted as they may

encompass all accused person irrespective of the seriousness of

the offence they are faced with as well as the circumstances of the

commission of the offence charged.

Addressing the third instruction, Professor Fimbo was

similarly brief: To the extent that in the matter at hand, the High

Court did not address itself on Article 15(2) of the Constitution and,

further, inasmuch as the Court in Daudi Pete (supra) did not

specifically address the impugned provisions, the latter decision is

distinguishable.

Finally, on the fourth instruction, the learned professor

advised that in terms of Article 30(5) of the Constitution, two

alternatives avail upon a determination that an impugned

legislation abrogates the Constitution: First the court may declare

such legislation or part of it null and avoid or second, it may grant

the relevant authority time and opportunity to take remedial action.

Whereas, he said, the first option is immediately effective, in the

30
second option remedial action may take effect in future. Professor

Fimbo did not go so far as to prescribe the appropriate option for

the matter at hand although he cautioned that, if anything the

second option cannot be supervised by the court. With this detail,

so much for the submissions of Professor Fimbo.

We now turn to the written submissions of Professor Peter

who, just as well, predicated his arguments along the lines of the

four instructions which we have already extracted. Addressing us

on the first instruction, the learned Professor commenced his

argument with an outright proposition that the impugned

legislative provision does, indeed, contravene Article 13 (6) (a) of

the Constitution. To him, the basic constitutional principle is

equality before the law and, in this regard, he said on account of

the impugned legislative provision, the DPP and the person

accused are not on the same level. He submitted that by giving the

DPP an option to block bail to an accused person, the fair battle

envisaged by the Constitution is thereby, curtailed.

31
 As regards the second instruction, Professor Peter argument

was no more than that the wide powers given to the DPP under

the impugned legislative provision cannot, in any way, fit into and

be associated with the provisions of Article 30(2) of the

Constitution. To him, section 148(4) of the CPA cannot be

synchronised with any of the permissible derogations comprised in

Article 30 (2) of the Constitution.

Addressing the third instruction, the learned Professor was of

the view that the case of DPP vs Daudi Pete (supra) is clearly

distinguishable from the situation at hand. Whilst, he said, on the

one hand, the former case addressed the question of bail for a

person charged with an offence constituting specific serious

assaults, on the other hand, central to the matter under

consideration, is the DPP's certificate blocking bail, as it is, the

offence charged being completely irrelevant.

Finally, on the fourth instruction, Professor Peter reiterated

the stance he had taken with respect to the first instruction to the

effect that the impugned legislative provision offends Article 13

32
(6)(a) of the Constitution and that, in the premises, the High Court

was fully justified to declare it unconstitutional. More particularly,

he submitted that under Article 15 of the Constitution, every

person has the right to freedom and to live as a free person. That

right, he added, cannot be arbitrarily taken away by any person

unless a due process is followed including a fair hearing. On fair

hearing, the learned Professor authoritatively referred us to the

unreported decision of the Court in Criminal Case No. 132 of 2004 -

Dishon John Mtaita vs The DPP where it was observed:-

"...The right to be heard when one's rights

are being determ ined by any authority,

leave alone a court o f justice, is both

elementary and fundam ent Its flagrant

violation will, o f necessity, lead to the

nullification o f the decision arrived a t in

breach o f i t "

Thus, in sum, Professor Peter concluded that to the extent,

that the impugned legislative provision a p riori abrogates the right

to a fair hearing and completely dismisses the courts of law that

33
might have otherwise provided relief to an accused person; the

same is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

That concludes the respective submissions from the parties

as well as the two learned am ici curiae, either in support or in

opposition to the appeal. We should now be in a position to

carefully address and weigh the contending issues and determine

the appeal.

For a start, we think it is now opportune to fully extract

section 148 of the CPA which goes thus:-

"148.-(1) When any person is arrested or detained

without warrant by an officer in charge o f a

police station or appears or is brought before

a court and is prepared a t any time while in

the custody o f that officer o r a t any stage o f

the proceedings before that court to give b ail

the officer or the court, as the case m ay be,

may, subject to the follow ing provisions o f this

section, adm it that person to bail; save that

34
 the officer or the court may, instead o f taking

bail from that person, release him on his

executing a bond with or without sureties fo r

his appearance as provided in this section.

(2) The am ount o f a b ail shall be fixed with due

regard to the gravity and other circumstances

o f the case, but shall not be excessive.

(3) The High Court may, subject to subsections (4)

and (5) o f this section, in any case direct that

any person be adm itted to b ail o r that the bail

required by a subordinate court o r a police

officer be reduced.

(4) Notw ithstanding anything in this section

contained, no police officer o r court

shall, after a person is arrested and

while he is aw aiting trial o r appeal,

adm it that person to b a il i f the Director

of Public Prosecutions, certifies in

writing that it is likely that the safety or

be prejudiced; and a certificate issued

b y the Director o f Public Prosecutions

under this section sh all take effect from

the date it is filed in court or notified to

the officer in charge o f a police station

and shall remain in effect until the

proceedings concerned are concluded or

the Director of Public Prosecutions

withdraws i t

(5) A police officer in charge o f a police station o r a

court before whom an accused person is

brought o r appears; shall not adm it that

person to b ail if-

(a) that person is charged w ith-

(i) murder, treason, arm ed robbery, or

defilement;

(ii) illicit trafficking in drugs against the

Drugs and Prevention o f Illicit

include a person charged fo r an

offence o f being in possession o f

drugs which taking into account a il

circumstances in which the offence

was committed, was not m eant fo r

conveyance or comm ercial purpose;

an offence involving heroin, cocaine,

prepared opium, opium poppy

(papaver setigerum), poppy straw,

coca plant, coca leaves, cannabis

sativa o r cannabis resin (Indian

hemp), methaquaione (mandrax),

catha edulis (khat) o r any other

narcotic drug or psychotropic

substance specified in the Schedule

to this A ct which has an established

value certified by the Commissioner

fo r National Coordination o f Drugs

ten m illion shillings;

(iv) terrorism against the Prevention o f

Terrorism Act, 2002;

(v) money laundering contrary to Anti­

money Laundering Act, 2006;

b) it appears that the accused person has

previously been sentenced to imprisonment

fo r a term exceeding three years;

(c) it appears that the accused person has

previously been granted bail by a court and

failed to comply with the conditions o f the

b ail or absconded;

(d) it appears to the court that it is necessary

that the accused person be kept in custody

fo r his own protection o r safety;

(e) the offence with which the person is charged

involves actual money or property whose

value exceeds ten m illion shillings unless

equivalent to h a lf the am ount or value o f

actual money or property involved and the

rest is secured by execution o f a bond:-

Provided that where the property to be

deposited is immovable, it shall be sufficient to

deposit the title deed, or i f the title deed is not

available such other evidence as is satisfactory

to the court in p ro o f o f existence o f the

property; save that this provision shall not

apply in the case o f police bail.

(6) Where a court decides to adm it an accused

person to bail, it shall impose the following

conditions on the bail, nam eiy-

(a) surrender by the accused person to the

police o f his passport or any other travel

document; and
 (b) restriction o f the movement o f the accused

to the area o f the town, village or other area

o f his residence.

(7) A court may, in addition to the mandatory

conditions prescribed in subsection (6), impose

any one or more o f the following conditions

which appear to the court to be likely to result

in the appearance o f the accused fo r the trial or

resumption o f the trial a t the time and place

required or as m ay be necessary in the interests

o f justice o r fo r the prevention o f crime,

nam eiy-

(a) requiring the accused to report a t specified

intervals to a police station or other

authority within the area o f his residence;

(b) requiring the accused to abstain from

visiting a particular locality or premises, or

associating with certain specified persons;

deem proper and ju s t to impose in addition

to the preceding conditions."

From the foregoing extract, it is noteworthy that we have

bolded subsection 4 of the provision which is the subject of the

present appeal. True, as hinted upon by Mr. Vitalis, the impugned

subsection 4 was imported into the CPA from section 123 (4) of the

Criminal Procedure Code of Zambia (the Zambian Code). As it

were, the recommendation for the importation of the provision was

comprised in report of the Judicial System Review Commission (the

Commission) which was presented to the Government on the 12th

August, 1977. At the time of the recommendation, section 123 (4)

of the Zambian Code, as referred by the commission in its report,

read as follows:-

"Notwithstanding anything in this section

contained, no person shaii be adm itted to

bail, either pending trial o r pending appeal,

if the Director of Public Prosecutions

41
 certifies that it is likely that the safety or

interests o f the Republic would thereby be

prejudiced"

[See page 205 of the Report of the Judicial System Review

Commission, 1977.]

It is noticeable that the Zambian Code provision, as it then

stood, was more or less in p ari materia with our section 148 (4)

which is under our consideration. We shall, at a later stage, reflect

on how the Zambian section 123 (4) presently stands. For the

moment, we deem it instructive to explore, albeit briefly, the

reasons behind the commission's recommendation.

In its report, the Commission noted that the law, as it then

stood, only prohibited the grant of bail where the person was

charged with either murder or treason. The Commission, however,

noted that there was in existence of a school of thought amongst

the members of the public which advocated the view that offences

involving violence and economic sabotage should be included in

the statutory list of unbailable offences. Nonetheless, the

42
Commission felt reluctant to accommodate the school of thought in

the following words:-

"We appreciate the anxiety generated

among the members o f the public regarding

the present rate at which crime seems to be

increasing and the fact that it is being

perpetrated with violence and with

motivation subversive of the national

economy. But, with great respect, it is

our considered view that the solution

to the crim e problem does n o t depend

on an increasing denial o f liberty to

persons who are n ot ye t convicted. On

the other hand, to increase the

num ber o f non-baiiabie offences, and

to do so in the m anner advocated,

w ould be to jum p from the present

rig id position o f the law on bait into

another legal straight jacket.

43
 Furthermore, once it is accepted that more

offences be added into the present list o f

non-baiiabie offences, it would be difficult

to foretell where the process would stop.

Public opinion does not always reflect the

interests o f justice. For these reasons we

think and recommend that the present law

in relation to offences in respect o f which

b ail may not be granted be le ft as it is ."

[Emphasis supplied].

Nevertheless, despite the foregoing recommendation, the

Commission was concerned that there are certain circumstances

where the safety of the accused person and the gravity or other

circumstances surrounding the offence with which a person is

charged, would necessitate the limitation of his liberty, albeit

temporarily. The commission felt that the law as it then stood did

not address such a situation, hence the recommendation to import

the provision of the Zambian Code. Speaking of it, the Commission

observed

44
 "We believe that, i f enacted, a provision o f

this nature, even i f used sparingly and

conscientiously, as it naturally should,

would go a long way to take care o f cases

where b ail is presently granted to the

consternation o f ju stice."

All said with respect to the rationale behind the enactment of

the impugned provision, it is common ground that under it, the

DPP is empowered to file a certificate against the release on bail of

an accused person if it is likely that the safety or interests of the

Republic would be prejudiced by the grating of bail.

The provision does not require the DPP to specify or disclose

the nature of the safety or public interest concerned. As was stated

in the case of DPP Vs Ally Nur Dirie and Another [1988] TLR

252, once the DPP's certificate has met a validity test, a court of

law will have no other option than not to grant bail, such validity

test, it was said, is to be governed by the following conditions:-

"(ij That the D PP m ust certify in writing;

45
(ii) The certificate m ust be to the effect that the safety

or interests o f the United Republic are likely to be

prejudiced by granting b ail in the case; and

(iii) The certificate m ust relate to a crim inal case

either pending trial or pending appeal."

[Emphasis supplied].

We have supplied emphasis as a reminder that the

expression "either pending trial o r pending appeal"which was

then subsisting under the impugned provision at Dirie's time, was

replaced by the expression "awaiting trial o r appeal" by a

subsequent amendment. Incidentally, the DPP's certificate in

Dirie's case was adjudged pre-mature on account that the trial

had not commenced and the amendment was seemingly brought

to cure the apparent mischief.

Having restated the effect of the DPP's certificate on bail, let

us now turn to the nitty-gritty of the matter which is whether or

not the High Court correctly adjudged the impugned provision to

be unconstitutional. But, before embarking on an analysis and

determination of this issue, it is useful to clearly express the duty

46
of the Court as well as the principles that should guide the court in

making its determination. As regards the duty of the Court, we

need to do no more than to borrow and adopt the persuasive

wisdom of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in

U.S vs Butler, 297 U.S. 1 [1936] where it was expressed:-

"When an A ct o f Congress is appropriately

chalienged in the courts as not conform ing to the

constitutional mandate, the ju d icia l branch o f the

governm ent has only one duty; to la y the

article o f the Constitution which is invoked

beside the statute which is challenged and

to decide whether the latter squares with

the form er. AH the Court does, or can do, is to

announce its considered judgm ent upon the

question. The only pow er it has, i f such it may be

called, is the pow er o f judgm ent This Court

neither approves nor condem ns any

legislative policy . Its delicate and difficult

office is to ascertain and declare whether

47
 the legislation is in accordance with, or in

contravention of, the provisions o f the

Constitution; and, having done that, its

duty ends,"

[Emphasis added.]

As to what should guide us in our determination, we are

minded to allude to the principles governing constitutional

interpretation which were meticulously laid down by the Court in

Julius Francis Ishengoma Dyanabo v. The Attorney General

(supra), thus:-

First, the Constitution of the United

Republic o f Tanzania is a living instrument,

having a soul and consciousness o f its own

as reflected in the Preamble and

Fundam ental Objectives and Directive

Principles o f State Policy. Courts must,

therefore, endeavour to avoid crippling it by

construing it technically or in a narrow

sp irit It m ust be construed in tune with the

48
lofty purposes fo r which its makers fram ed

it So construed, the instrum ent becomes a

solid foundation o f democracy and rule o f

law.... Secondly, the provisions touching

fundam ental rights have to be interpreted in

a broad and liberal manner, thereby

jealously protecting and developing the

dim ensions o f those rights and ensuring

that our people enjoy their rights, our

young democracy not only functions but

also grows, and the w ill and dom inant

aspirations of the people prevail.

Restrictions on fundam ental rights m ust be

strictly construed. Thirdly, until the contrary

is proved, a legislation is presum ed to be

constitutional. I t is a sound principle o f

constitutional construction that, i f possible,

legislation should receive such a

construction as w ill make it operative and

short while ago, there is a presumption o f

constitutionality o f a legislation, save where

a c/aw back or exclusion clause is relied

upon as a basis fo r constitutionality o f the

legislation, the onus is upon those who

challenge the constitutionality of the

legislation; they have to rebut the

presumption. Fifthly, where those

supporting a restriction on a fundamental

right rely on a daw back or exclusion c/ause

in doing so, the onus is on them; they have

to ju stify the restriction.

From other jurisdictions, it has also been persuasively held

that in determining the constitutionality of a statute, a court must

be guided by the object and purpose of the impugned statute,

which object and purpose can be discerned from the legislation

itself. The Supreme Court of Canada, for instance, in R vs Big M

50
Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 enunciated this principle

as follows:-

"Both purpose and effect are relevant in

determ ining constitutionality; either an

unconstitutional purpose or an

unconstitutional effect can invalidate

legislation. AH legislation is anim ated by an

object the legislature intends to achieve.

This object is realized through im pact

produced by the operation and application

o f the legislation. Purpose and effect

respectively, in the sense o f the legislation's

object and its ultimate impact, are clearly

linked, i f not indivisible. Intended and

achieved effects have been looked to fo r

guidance in assessing the legislation's

object and thus the validity."

Mindful of the foregoing guidelines from the extracted

judicial pronouncements, we now turn to consider the turn of

51
legislative developments which have evolved subsequent to the

enactment of section 148(4). If we, for a start, first reflect on the

inspiring section 123 across the border, after several amendments

which were comprised in Acts Nos. 36 <9^1969, 59 o f 1970, 6 o f

1972 and 35 o f 1993, the Zambian provision presently reads as

follows:-

"123(4) Notwithstanding anything in this

section contained, no person charged

with an offence under the State

Security A ct shall be adm itted to bail,

either pending trial or pending appeal, i f the

Director o f Public Prosecutions certifies that

it is likely that the safety o r interests o f the

Republic would thereby be prejudiced."

[Emphasis added].

We have supplied emphasis on the extracted provision to

demonstrate that, unlike here, in Zambia, the scope of the

operation of the DPP's certificate was subsequently qualified and

limited to offences under the State Security Act which is the

52
equivalent of our National Security Act, Chapter 47 of the Revised

Laws.

Back home, it should be recalled that, at the enactment of

section 148(4) of the CPA, the law, as it then stood, only prohibited

the grant of bail where the offence involved was either murder or

treason. But, in the wake of numerous amendments, as one may

discern from the body of the provisions of the section, the list of

unbailable offences was extended well beyond the offences

carrying a possible or mandatory capital penalty to include armed

robbery; defilement/ illicit trafficking in or conveyance of drugs for

commercial purpose as well as offences involving certain narcotic

drugs; terrorism; and money laundering.

Quite apart from the CPA, the list of unbailable offences is

presently additionally embodied in such other legislation as the

Economic and Organised Crimes Control Act, Chapter 200 of the

Revised Laws (the Economic Crimes Act), as well as the Drugs

Control and Enforcement Act No. 5 of 2015 (the DCA). Speaking of

the Economic Crimes Act, the same contains a provision akin to

section 148(4) of the CPA through which the DPP is similarly

53
empowered to issue a certificate denying bail to an accused person

upon grounds that the safety or interests of the United Republic

are likely to be prejudiced by granting bail. As regards the DCA, the

provisions of the CPA with respect to the unbailable drugs offences

have been replicated therein with a rider to the effect that the

same would apply m utatis mutandis to the DCA.

With the foregoing legislative developments, the so-called

"legalstraightjacket"\Nh\ch the Commission conscientiously sought

to avoid, has been overtaken and is, presently, fully fledged with a

sizable number of unbailable offences. That being the obtaining

position, a question begs: If it is, as such, as plain as pike - staff

that the reasons for which the Commission justified the

promulgation of section 148(4) have been pre-empted and

completely overridden; what is the utility, if at all, of having the

DPP's certificate? As we pose the question lest we be

misunderstood to suggest that we are bent towards determining

the constitutionality of the impugned provision on account of its

usefulness or otherwise: Far from it! As we have already remarked,

it is not part of our mandate to approve or condemn the legislative

54
wisdom but, we should caution though and, with respect to Mr.

Vitalis, as was observed in the Canadian case of Big M Drug M art

Ltd., (supra), "... an unconstitutional effect can invalidate

le g is la tio n That takes us to a consideration of the impugned

provision in the light of the relevant articles of the Constitution.

The specific provision of the Constitution which is claimed to

be infringed by the impugned section 148(4) of the CPA is Article

13(6) (a) which relates to equality before the law by providing

thus:-

"To ensure equality before the law, the

state authority shall make procedures which

are appropriate o r which take into account

the following principles, namely:

(a) when the rights and duties o f any

person are being determ ined b y the

court o r any other agencyf that

person shall be entitled to a fair

hearing and to the right o f appeal or

other legal remedy against the

55
 decision o f the court or o f the other

agency concerned;

[Emphasis supplied].

But, whist we are alive to Mr. Vitalises reminder to the effect

that, in the petition, the respondent's complaint was not on liberty,

rather, it was on the right to be heard; we, nonetheless, with

respect, take the position that, since the challenge hinges on denial

of bail which is basically the negation of personal liberty, the

foregoing Article cannot be considered in isolation to Article 15

which makes provision for the right to personal freedom as

follows:-

"15.-(1) Every person has the right to

freedom and to live as a free person.

(2) For the purposes of preserving

individual freedom and the right to live as a

free person, no person shall be arrested,

imprisoned, confined, detained, deported or

otherwise be deprived o f his freedom save

only-

56
 (a) under circumstances and in accordance

with procedures prescribed by law; or

(b) in the execution o f a judgm ent, order or

a sentence given o r passed by the court

follow ing a decision in a legal proceeding or

a conviction fo r a crim inal offence."

As we have already hinted, the appellant argued the appeal

on the premise that the impugned provision are intra vires the

Constitution, much as the right to a hearing is securely guaranteed

under the provisions of section 161 of the CPA which stipulates

that all orders issued under sections 148 to 160, that is, including

the impugned provisions, are appealable just as they are subject to

judicial review. Thus, whilst he somewhat conceded that section

148 (4) takes away the court's discretion to admit the intended

person to bail, the learned Principal State Attorney contended that

the same does not, however, bar the hearing of such person. On

the other hand, the respondents and the two invitees of the Court

were upbeat in the contention that the impugned provision actually

denies an accused person to present and be heard on his

57
application for bail or to challenge the certificate of the DPP which

constitutes unfair hearing and thereby contravenes Article 13 (6)

(a) of the Constitution.

It is in the context of these submissions that we propose to

start with a consideration of the impugned provisions of Section

148 (4) of the CPA in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution

which we have reproduced. If we may express at once, the basic

right to personal liberty is not absolute as it may be derogated

from or restricted within the scope of the exceptions stated by the

Article itself under paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Article itself. As to

what constitutes "circumstances and in accordance with procedures

prescribed by faw " within the meaning of Article 15(2)(a), the

Court had the occasion to discuss the expression at length in DPP

V. Daudi Pete (supra) in the course of its deliberations on the

validity of section 148(5)(e) which, incidentally, related to denial of

bail.

Speaking of paragraph (a) of the Article, the Court observed

that the same sanctions the deprivation or denial of liberty under

"certain circumstances" and "subject to a procedure", both of

58
which must be "prescribed by law". As it were, the Court was in no

difficulty finding the "certain circumstances" for deprivation or

denial of personal liberty much as such circumstances are clearly

enumerated under section 148(5)(a) to (e) of the CPA. The real

problem, it was further observed, was in finding the requisite

"prescribed procedure" for denying bail to the accused and, in that

regard, the Court held:-

"From a close examination o f sub-article (2)

o f Article 15, it is apparent that its wording

is so em phatically protective o f the right to

persona! liberty that the procedure

envisaged under paragraph (a) cannot be

anything but a procedure o f safeguards by

which one may be deprived o r denied o f

persona! liberty."

To fortify its stance, the Court sought reliance in the words of

the Supreme Court of India which considered a similar provision

the in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)2 SCR

p.621:-

59
 "...is the prescription o f some sort o f

procedure enough or m ust the procedure

comply with any particular requirements?

Obviously procedure cannot be arbitrary,

unfair o r unreasonable

In the upshot, the Court was drawn into the conclusion

"We are unable to find under section 148 or

elsewhere any prescription fo r the requisite

procedure fo r denial o f b ail in terms o f

paragraph (a) o f Article 15(2) o f the

Constitution o f this country. It follow s

therefore that sections 148(5)(e) o f the A ct

is violative of Article 15(2) of the

Constitutions and we so fin d ."

We venture to say that the foregoing statement of principle

applies, in similar vein, to the situation at hand. We say so because

we have already indicated the extent to which the impugned

provision does not require the DPP to specify or disclose the nature

of the safety or public interest concerned. Once the certificate

60
meets the validity test, which we have, again, extracted from the

case of DPP Vs Ally Nur Dirie and Another (supra), a court of

law as well as a police officer, in terms of section 148(4) of the

CPA will have no other option than not to grant bail. Thus, in terms

of the impugned provision, a court or a police officer is, so to

speak, not only compelled to accede to the DPP's ex parte

statement of fact, not supported by any evidence, but the statute

also tells the court what order to give: To refuse bail. To us, such

a provision which completely eliminates the judicial process in

matters of personal liberty cannot qualify to "prescribed procedure"

or, by any standards, a due process, within the meaning of Article

15(2)(a). With respect, the obtaining procedure appears to us to

be meaningless, much as it does not go so far as to affect the

outcome, in that the accused is bound to be denied bail

irrespective of what he may say in that regard. But we say no more

much as this particular Article was not the subject of the complaint

in the court below.

Addressing now Article 13 (6) (a), we entirely share Mr.

Mpoki's sentiments to the effect that the impugned section 148

61
(4) does not prescribe any procedure, let alone one which is

reasonable, fair and appropriate to govern the issuance of the

DPP's certificate. To that extent, we, again, agree with his

submission that an accused person is not afforded any meaningful

opportunity of being heard before he is denied bail by operation of

the DDP's certificate. Despite the numerous statutory powers

accorded to the DPP, it should be appreciated that, in a criminal

proceeding, she is no more than a party who, along with the

accused person, deserves equal treatment and protection before

the law. In this regard, we should clearly express that it is utterly

repugnant to the notion of fair hearing for the legislature to allot so

much power to one of the parties to a proceeding so that he is able

to deprive the other party of his liberty merely by her say-so and;

much worse, to the extent that the victimized party as well as the

court or, as the case may be, a police officer, are rendered

powerless. The right to a fair hearing, by its very nature, requires

there be equality between the contestants in the proceeding. There

can be no true equality if the legislature, as we have said, allows

one party to deprive the other of his personal liberty merely by her

62
say - so. All said, we just as well find that the impugned provisions

infringe Article 13 (6) (a) of the Constitution.

Our finding to the effect that the impugned provisions

infringe the provisions of Articles 13 (6) (a) and 15 of the

Constitution does not automatically mean the same is "ex facie

ultra vires the Constitution, On the contrary, we bear in mind that

the Constitution itself permits the derogation from basic rights in

certain circumstances as provided in Articles 30 or 31. Thus, in

each case where the court finds a statutory provision to have

infringed one or several fundamental rights, it must further venture

into a determination as to whether or not the impugned provision

is saved by articles 30 or 31 of the Constitution which, as we have

just remarked, permit derogation from basic human rights in

certain circumstances. Article 31 which relates to measures taken

during the period of emergency is obviously inapplicable to the

situation at hand and, as far as article 30 is concerned, only sub­

article (2) is relevant and the same goes thus:-

"It is hereby declared that the provisions

contained in this Part o f this Constitution

63
 which set out the principles o f rights,

freedom and duties, does not render

unlawful any existing law or prohibit the

enactment o f any law or the doing o f any

law ful act in accordance with such law for

the purposes of-

(a) ensuring that the rights and freedoms o f

other people or o f the interests o f the public

are not prejudiced by the wrongful exercise

o f the freedoms and rights o f individuals;

(b) ensuring the defence, public safety, public

peace, public morality, public health, rural

and urban development planning, the

exploitation and utilization o f m inerals or

the increase and development o f property

o f any other interests fo r the purposes o f

enhancing the public benefit;

order o f a court given o r made in any civil

o r crim inal matter;

(d) protecting the reputation, rights and

freedoms o f others or the privacy of

persons involved in any court proceedings,

prohibiting the disclosure o f confidential

information, or safeguarding the dignity,

authority and independence o f the courts;

(e) imposing restrictions, supervising and

controlling the formation, management and

activities of private societies and

organizations in the country; or

(f) enabling any other thing to be done which

promotes, o r preserves the national interest

in general.

The question is thus whether or not section 148(4) of the

CPA is saved by any of the extracted derogation provisions. This

Court had occasion to deal with a corresponding question, again, in

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the case of DPP v Daudi Pete (supra) where it was recognised

that because of the coexistence between the basic rights of the

individual and the collective rights of the society, it is common

nowadays to find in practically every society limitations to the basic

rights of the individual. So, it was further observed, the real

concern today is how the legal system harmonizes the two sets of

rights. Thus, consistent with that approach, the Court, in the

subsequent case of Kukutia and Another Vs. The AG (supra),

laid down the statement of principle as follows:-

"... a law which seeks to lim it o r derogate

from the basic right o f the individual on

grounds o f public interest w ill have special

requirements; first, such a law m ust be

law ful in the sense that it is not arbitrary. It

should make adequate safeguards against

arbitrary decisions, and provide effective

controls against abuse by those in authority

when using the law. Secondly, the lim itation

im posed by such law m ust not be more

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 than is reasonably necessary to achieve the

legitim ate object This is what is also known

as the principal o f proportionality. The

principle requires that such law m ust not be

drafted too widely so as to m eet everyone

including even the untargeted members o f

the society. I f the law which infringes a

basic right does not m eet both

requirements, such law is not saved by

article 30(2) o f the Constitution, it is null

and void."

It was further held that any law that seeks to limit

fundamental rights of the individual must be construed strictly to

make sure that it conforms to the foregoing requirements,

otherwise the guaranteed rights under the Constitution may easily

be rendered meaningless by the use of the derogative or clawback

clauses of that very same Constitution.

We shall now apply the two tests to section 148(4) of the

CPA to see if it is saved by Article 30(2) of the Constitution. If we

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may express at once, it is most apparent that the impugned

provision is, indeed, arbitrary. We have already indicated the

extent to which the provision does not prescribe any procedure, let

alone one which is reasonable, fair and appropriate to govern the

issuance of the DPP's certificate. In the result, an accused person

is not afforded any meaningful opportunity of being heard before

he is denied bail by operation of the DDP's certificate.

Turning now to the requirement that the law must not be

drafted too widely, it is obvious, once again, that the impugned

provision does not pass that test either. The provision is too

broadly drafted and overbroad, much as it applies to all offences

irrespective of their seriousness. As such, it may easily give way to

an abuse of the powers conferred by it as the exercise of that

power wholly depends on the DPP's whims. In this regard, we are

reminded of a treatise by Chaskalson, Woolman and Bishop in

Constitutional Law of South Africa, Juta, 2nd ed. 2014, at

page 49 where the learned authors stated that:

"Laws m ay n ot grant officials largely

unfettered discretion to use their

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 pow er as they wish, nor m ay law s be

so vaguely worded as to lead

reasonable people to differ

fundam entally over their extension„"

To say the least and, in sum, upon our deliberations, we find

the impugned section 148(4) of the CPA does not as well fit into

any of the provisions of Article 30(2) of the Constitution. That

concludes our deliberations on the second ground of appeal which

is, accordingly, answered in the negative.

The fourth ground of appeal need not detain us a bit. Before

us, Mr. Vitalis candidly conceded that in the proceedings below, the

High Court was not prompted to exercise its discretion under

Article 30(5). That being the position the court had no material

whatsoever with which to exercise that discretion and, indeed, the

appellant had no cause to criticize the court below for not doing

what was, after all, not sought. We would be loath to have to

venture upon a request which was, in the first place, not sought in

the proceedings below. To This end, we, accordingly, similarly

69
dismiss the fourth ground of appeal which we find to be wholly

bereft of merit.

In the final event, we are minded to dismiss the appeal with

costs and uphold the decision of the High Court to the effect that

impugned section 148(4) of the CPA is, indeed, unconstitutional as

well as null and void on account of its derogation from the

provision of Aticlel3(6)(a) of the Constitution.

DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 31st day of January, 2018.

B.M. LUANDA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

K. M. MUSSA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

B. M. K. MMILLA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

S. E. MUGASHA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

J. C. M. MWAMBEGELE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is Hthe original

J. R. Kahyoza
REGISTRAR
COURT OF APPEAL

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