THIRD SECTION
CASE OF VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 10597/13)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 March 2019
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 1
In the case of Valyuzhenich v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,
Branko Lubarda,
Helen Keller,
Dmitry Dedov,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Jolien Schukking,
María Elósegui, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 5 March 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 10597/13) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Mikhail Aleksandrovich
Valyuzhenich (“the applicant”), on 5 February 2013.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr M. Valeyev, a lawyer practising
in St Petersburg. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation
to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that
office, Mr M. Galperin.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his confinement in a metal
cage during the criminal proceedings against him had amounted to
degrading treatment and rendered the proceedings unfair, and that he had
not had an effective domestic remedy in respect of the first grievance.
4. On 26 November 2014 notice of the above complaints was given to
the Government under Articles 3 and 13 and Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (b) and
(c) of the Convention and the remainder of the application was declared
inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
2 VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in
St Petersburg.
6. He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing.
7. On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending
the investigation and trial.
8. On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (“the
District Court”) received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October
2011.
9. On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years’ imprisonment.
10. During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant
was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the
cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes
during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock.
The applicant’s lawyer could only approach him with the court’s
permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the
presence of the guards.
11. On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic
upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in
the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling
metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the
Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the
judges via a video link.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Metal cages in courtrooms
12. For a summary of relevant domestic law and practice and relevant
international material and practice, see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia
([GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, §§ 53-66 and §§ 70-76, ECHR 2014
(extracts)).
B. Metal cages in remand prisons for participation in court hearings
via a video link
13. Remand prisons are equipped with videoconferencing systems
within the framework of the Federal Targeted Programme “The
Development of the Judicial System in Russia for 2013-2020”.
VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 3
14. In accordance with the Programme, on 18 April 2014 the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation, the Administrative Office of Courts at the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Federal Prison Service
concluded an agreement concerning their use of videoconferencing systems.
Annex 2 to that agreement provided for the installation of metal partitions in
remand prisons equipped with videoconferencing systems to secure the
videoconferencing equipment while inmates participated in court hearings
via a video link.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
15. The applicant complained that his confinement in a metal cage
during the criminal proceedings against him had amounted to treatment
proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
He further complained that he had not had an effective domestic remedy
in respect of his grievance under Article 3, contrary to Article 13 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
16. The Government considered that the applicant’s confinement in a
metal cage in the courtroom during the trial which had ended on 19 March
2012 and his placement behind a metal partition in the remand prison five
months later, on 10 August 2012, for the purposes of participating, via a
video link, in the appeal hearing of his criminal case did not give rise to a
“continuing situation” and that therefore the part of the complaint under
Article 3 of the Convention concerning his caging during the trial should be
rejected for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit provided for by
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
17. The applicant argued that the sixteen hearings of his case by the trial
court between 19 October 2011 and 19 March 2012 and the hearing of his
case on appeal on 10 August 2012 should be viewed as a “continuing
situation”, which had only ended on the latter date with the last instance of
4 VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
his having been confined in the metal cage during the criminal proceedings
against him.
18. The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from
the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic
remedies. Where it is clear from the outset however that no effective
remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts
or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its
effect on or prejudice to the applicant. In cases featuring a continuing
situation, the six-month period runs from the cessation of that situation. The
concept of a “continuing situation” refers to a state of affairs which operates
by continuous activities by or on the part of the State to render the applicant
a victim (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and
43441/08, § 86, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and Ananyev and Others v. Russia,
nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 72 and 75, 10 January 2012, with further
references).
19. The Court has previously found that the applicants’ repetitive
confinement in a metal cage in the courtroom during the trial amounted to a
“continuing situation” in the absence of any marked variation in the way
they appeared before the trial court (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited
above, § 86). However, in a situation where the applicant appeared before
the trial court first in a metal cage and subsequently in a glass cage, the
Court has held that the significant change in material conditions of the
applicant’s appearance before the trial court prevented it from regarding the
situation as “continuous” for the purpose of calculating the six-month
time-limit set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Yaroslav
Belousov v. Russia, nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, § 114, 4 October 2016).
20. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes
that the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom on sixteen
occasions between 19 October 2011 and 19 March 2012 when his criminal
case was being examined by the trial court and on one occasion, on
10 August 2012, in the remand prison during the examination of his case on
appeal via a video link. The Court notes the absence of any significant
change in the way the applicant appeared before the trial and appellate
courts for as long as the proceedings lasted – on each occasion he found
himself behind metal bars. The Court concludes, therefore, that regardless
of an almost five-month time gap between the end of the applicant’s trial on
19 March 2012 and the examination of his case on appeal on 10 August
2012, his confinement in a metal cage created a “continuous situation” for
the purpose of calculating the six-month time-limit set forth in
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Since the application was lodged on
5 February 2013, the applicant has thus complied with the six-month rule
and the Government’s objection should therefore be dismissed.
21. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and
13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 5
Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not
inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
22. The Government submitted that the applicant’s confinement in a
metal cage in the courtroom during the trial and behind a metal partition
during the examination of the case on appeal had been in compliance with
the domestic law and regulations in force at the material time (see
paragraphs 12-14 above). The practice of placing defendants in metal cages
in the courtroom was an ordinary security measure applied to all defendants
detained on remand. Introduced over twenty years ago, it was perceived as
customary by the parties to the criminal proceedings and third parties alike
and a priori was not aimed at humiliating those to whom it was applied. The
“feelings of humiliation, inferiority, shame and helplessness” allegedly
suffered by the applicant resulted not from his placement in a metal cage,
but rather from a natural reaction to the negative consequences of his
unlawful actions. There were no grounds for believing that the parties to the
proceedings and third parties had had a biased or hostile attitude towards the
applicant on account of his confinement in a metal cage. In any event, the
case had not been of any heightened public or media interest. Furthermore,
placement in a metal cage served the purpose of protecting a person from
any possible attack by victims while at the same time allowing him or her to
choose a comfortable posture and move behind the barriers freely. The
Government further argued that the applicant’s confinement behind a metal
partition in the remand prison during his participation in the hearing of his
case on appeal via a video link could not have caused him any negative
feelings since, in any event, the remand prison was a place of social
isolation where detainees spent most of their time on premises equipped
with various safety facilities. The Government concluded, therefore, that
there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the present
case. They made no submissions on the merits of the applicant’s complaint
under Article 13 of the Convention.
23. The applicant argued that the domestic regulations referred to by the
Government were of restricted use and therefore unavailable in any official
sources of legal information. He had had no criminal record, had been
charged with non-violent crimes and had demonstrated orderly behaviour
throughout the proceedings. His placement in the cage could not therefore
have been justified. Furthermore, the proceedings had been followed by
several journalists and several television channels had released news reports
on the trial. For example, the “KZN” television channel had released a news
6 VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
report entitled “Sentence to Drug Dealers” showing him in a metal cage.
This report had been viewed by several thousands of people even before the
conviction had become final. Showing him in a cage had created an image
of an extremely dangerous criminal, which had caused him feelings of
shame and helplessness. The applicant further submitted that, contrary to the
Government’s assertions, he had not been free to choose a comfortable
position or move around the cage: he could not stand up or have any
exchange with other participants of the proceedings unless authorised by the
presiding judge. Besides, as could be seen from the photographs provided
by the Government, the cage had been very limited in size, which had made
it impossible to get into a comfortable position. Lastly, the applicant
submitted that his confinement behind a metal barrier in the remand prison
for his participation via a video link in the examination of his case on appeal
had not been warranted by any security risks or courtroom order issues. The
applicant further maintained his complaint under Article 13 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Article 3 of the Convention
24. For a summary of the relevant general principles, see Svinarenko
and Slyadnev (cited above, §§ 113-18).
25. The Court reiterates its earlier findings, where it came to the
conclusion that holding a person in a metal cage in the courtroom
constituted in itself – having regard to its objectively degrading nature,
which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the
hallmark of a democratic society – an affront to human dignity, and
amounted to degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the
Convention. The Court’s conclusions concerned both the applicants’
confinement in metal cages in courtrooms during their personal attendance
at court hearings (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, §§ 122-39;
Urazov v. Russia, no. 42147/05, §§ 82-83, 14 June 2016; and Vorontsov and
Others v. Russia, nos. 59655/14 and 2 others, § 31, 31 January 2017), and
their confinement in metal cages at remand prisons for the purposes of their
participation in court hearings carried out via a video link (see Karachentsev
v. Russia, no. 23229/11, §§ 50-54, 17 April 2018).
26. Turning to the present case and having examined the parties’
arguments, the Court does not see any reason to depart from its findings in
the cases cited above in this regard. It follows, therefore, that the applicant’s
confinement in a metal cage in the courtroom during the trial and at the
remand prison for the purposes of his participation via a video link in the
judicial examination of his criminal case on appeal amounted to degrading
treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly
been a violation of that provision.
VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 7
(b) Article 13 of the Convention
27. The Court considers that in view of its reasoning and findings under
Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 24-26 above), there is no need
to deal separately with the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicant complained that his confinement in a metal cage
during the trial had rendered the criminal proceedings against him unfair. In
particular, he alleged that the principle of the presumption of innocence had
not been respected and that he had not been afforded an opportunity to take
notes and to confer with his lawyer in private. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1, 2
and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing ...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require ...”
A. Admissibility
29. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
available domestic remedies with regard to his complaints under
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention. They noted, in particular,
that he had not raised these issues either in the course of the trial or before
the appellate court.
30. The Court has previously held in a similar context that the appeal
instance was capable of providing an effective remedy for the alleged
violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention (see Stepan
Zimin v. Russia, no. 63686/13, 60894/14, § 62, 30 January 2018, and
Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia, nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, § 141, 4 October
2016). It notes, however, that the applicant did not include these complaints
in his points of appeal as grounds for his application to reverse the
first-instance judgment. Accordingly, he did not provide the domestic courts
with the opportunity to address the particular Convention violations alleged
against the State. These complaints must therefore be declared inadmissible,
in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
8 VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
31. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of
the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds and must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
32. The Government reiterated their argument to the effect that the
safety barrier was a common security measure introduced over twenty years
ago and applied to each and every detainee appearing before a court. The
applicant’s placement behind the metal bars could not therefore have had
any impact on the court’s position and affected the presumption of
innocence.
33. The applicant maintained his complaint.
34. The Court notes that in the present case it has examined the main
legal question raised in connection with the applicant’s confinement in a
metal cage under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 24-26 above),
which subsumed the issue of the presumption of innocence under
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Urazov, cited above, §§ 91-92, and
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05,
§§ 743-44, 25 July 2013).
35. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not necessary to examine
the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention separately.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”
A. Damage
37. The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
38. The Government considered this claim to be excessive and not
corresponding to the Court’s case-law.
39. Having regard to the violation of the Convention found and making
its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on this amount.
VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 9
B. Costs and expenses
40. The applicant did not claim costs and expenses. Accordingly, there is
no call to make an award under this head.
C. Default interest
41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the complaints under Article 3, Article 6 § 2 and Article 13 of
the Convention concerning the applicant’s confinement in a metal cage
during the criminal proceedings against him admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under
Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five
hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
10 VALYUZHENICH v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 March 2019, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stephen Phillips Vincent A. De Gaetano
Registrar President
