Political

An Overview of the post-Coup Attempt Measures in Turkey

Following the coup attempt on July 15, during which 208 people were killed and more than
1400 were injured across Istanbul and Ankara[1], the Turkish Government declared a State of
Emergency for an initial period of three months on July 20.[2] The following day the Turkish
authorities notified the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, respectively, of Turkey’s derogation from the European Convention on
Human Rights under the Convention’s Article 15 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights under the Covenant’s Article 4.[3]The state of emergency has been extended
twice, first in October for three months, then in January for further three months.
What followed the declaration of the State of Emergency have been a massive purge of civil
servants through the enactment of 20 emergency decree-laws and the detention of persons
from various backgrounds, including security forces, politicians, civil servants, academics,
journalists, and members of the judiciary. Along with purged civil servants, civil actors such
as members of civil society organisations and businessmen were also taken into custody in
various cities in Turkey. Based on the emergency decree-laws, over 130,000 civil servants
have been dismissed from duty[4], some 18,500[5] including 9,611 teachers, 3,193 police
officers, and 276 judges later have been reinstated to their positions. Some 120 media outlets
and 1,500 civil society organisations have been shut down. The decree-laws target individuals
according to one’s membership of or connection to either terror organisations or structures,
organisations or groups that have been deemed by the National Security Council to operate
against the national security of the country. The 20 decree-laws that have been issued since
the beginning of the state of emergency aimed to take as many precautions as possible,
according to the state authorities, to prevent and stop acts that would jeopardise the current
national security condition.
What can be pointed out as a positive development in the past two months, compared to the
first three months of the state of emergency, is that more than 18,000 people have been
reinstated to their duties. However, it is believed that the level of insecurity and the fear of
losing one’s job increase every single day.
Those who have been targeted by the post-coup emergency decree-laws, laws, administrative
decisions and criminal investigations, as a rule, have a right to challenge these acts before
domestic courts, albeit with certain restrictive legal implications of the State of Emergency.
To this day, no judicial pronouncement has been made on any of the post-coup legal
developments.
On October 12, the Constitutional Court rejected two requests to annul certain provisions of
Emergency Decree-Laws No 668 and No 669 stating that it does not have a constitutional
authority to review the constitutionality of emergency decree-laws.[7] Thus, it has not
considered whether the decree-laws conform to the constitutional restrictions regarding the
temporal, spatial, and substantive scope of decree-laws. The Court recently rejected two
constitutional complaints[8] made by two dismissed judges on the grounds that they should
first seek to overturn the dismissals at the Council of State, which is a newly established
procedure solely for the dismissed judges and prosecutors by Decree-Law 685. The Council
of State had also overturned the cases brought by other public officials challenging the
emergency decree-laws on jurisdictional grounds and referred them to the first instance
administrative courts, which have also rejected cases against dismissals.[9] Individuals who
allege violations of their rights have appealed to the European Court of Human Rights as
well. Yet, the Court dismissed the complaints for failure to exhaust the domestic
remedies.[10]
On January 23, Decree-Law No 685 established the State of Emergency Acts Review
Commission, in order to review the applications of the officials dismissed and organisations
shut down by decree-laws. The Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman, and the European
Court of Human Rights now refer applications to this commission. The government,
however, still have not appointed the members of the commission, which was due to start
working by February 22 the latest according to the Decree-Law.
Below is a detailed account of the post-coup developments in certain major sectors of the
Turkish state and society.
Military officials

As military personnel carried out the coup attempt, it is not surprising that there have been an
extensive purge and major institutional reforms to the Turkish military. Decree-law No. 668,
published on July 27, dismissed 1,684 military officials on the grounds that they had a
connection to the so-called FETÖ (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü) (Fethullahist Terrorist
Organisation). Four days later, Decree-law No. 669 dismissed further 1,389 military officials
and introduced numerous drastic reforms to the structure of the military. The decree-law
subordinated the army, navy and the air force to the Ministry of National Defence, shut down
military schools and academies and established the National Defence University, transferred
the military hospitals to the Ministry of Health. It also changed the composition of the
Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura) (YAŞ), which determines the military agenda
and oversees the promotion and dismissals in the military, to include more civil members and
significantly less military officials. Subsequent Decree-laws No. 670, 672, 677, 679 and 686
dismissed further 136, 325, 338, 785 and 896 military officials respectively. In total, 5,553
people have been dismissed from the military by way of decree-laws. Moreover, 16,423
cadets have been discharged from their schools.[11]
Despite its declared aim of restoring faith in the Turkish army and strengthening it by
cleansing it from ‘infidels’[12], the far-reaching crackdown on the army, coupled with the
media reports on the treatment of the detained soldiers[13] and the coupist soldiers who have
sought refuge in other states, may have weakened both its reputation and strength.
Political Arena and Politicians
The attention of the decree-laws following the July 15 coup attempt has also been directed
towards current and former politicians. Some politicians, taking active/passive roles in
various positions, mostly within local governments, have been taken under custody with the
suspicion of having direct ties with the Gülen movement, deemed as a terrorist organisation
by the state, or to the PKK, accepted as a terrorist organisation by the state. Some of the
detentions taking place in different cities of Turkey have turned into arrests, whereas some
politicians were released. During the state of emergency, in the past 8 months, 13 MPs of
HDP (a pro-Kurdish political party and the 3rd largest party of the Parliament with 59 seats)
were arrested, among which are also the co-leaders of HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen
Yüksekdağ. Yüksekdağ’s deputyship has been cancelled on February 21st and Demirtaş has
recently been sentenced to 5 months of jail time Doğubeyazıt Penal Court of First Instance.
Following the terrorist attack on December 10 in Beşiktaş district in Istanbul, 568 people
were taken under custody among whom were also municipal or provincial level HDP and
DBP executives.[14]
The state of emergency has not only affected individuals, but political institutions- mainly
local municipalities-have also been targeted.
As an outcome of the decree-law released on September 1, a legal implementation had been
put into practice allowing the ruling system to assign trustees (kayyım-kayyum) to local
governments.[15] Thus, with the decree-law 674, the central government was given the
power to assign trustees to local governments when there is a suspicion for an alleged tie to
“terrorist organizations”. According to the this practice, in the cases where the mayor or the
vice mayor are suspended from their duties because of their association to a terrorist
organisation or because of being an accessory to a terrorist organisation, Ministry of Interior
Affairs (in metropolitan and provincial municipalities) or the governor (in other
municipalities) will be assigning newcomers (a responsible for the trustee local
government)[16]. These new assignments to local governments give the power to the new
trustees the unilateral cancellation of any contracts that were signed under the previous rule
of local governance, which in return creates a much more complicated outcome in terms of
the situation of sub-contractors.[17]
Starting from September 2016, by the end of February there were 80 local municipalities run
were assigned new trustees with their alleged ties to terrorist organizations. 3 of these
municipalities belong to Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)(AKP),
1 to Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) (MHP) and 76 to Democratic
Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi) (DBP).[18] Along with these new municipal
assignments, 2,603 people were arrested following operations directed at PKK. [19]
One of the most criticised aspects of these decree-laws has been the fact that the
democratically elected local governments became deactivated with the bringing-in of the
trustees to the local governments. Along with the trustee appointed local governments,
private businesses, universities and schools became subject to this practice as well: those
suspected to have links to Gülen movement were appointed with new trustees following the
coup attempt. This new practice is therefore criticised to be at variance with democracy, since
“it overtly interferes” with the outcomes of democratic processes.[20]
Members of the judiciary

In less than 24 hours after the coup attempt, arrest warrants were issued for 2,745 judges and
prosecutors, including two members of the Constitutional Court and many members of the
other supreme courts.[21] The number of those purged and the scope of the crackdown
gradually increased, ultimately leading to harsher sanctions such as dismissal from office and
removal of all benefits. On July 16, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve
Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu) (HSYK) suspended 2,204 judges and prosecutors, including five of
its own members.[22] Most of these members of the judiciary, followed by hundreds more,
have been detained immediately after the coup and they remain arrested, awaiting trial.
Following the declaration of the state of emergency, Article 3 of Decree-Law 667 authorised
the HSYK to dismiss judges and prosecutors, and the Constitutional Court, the Council of
State Presidential Council, and the Court of Cassation Presidential Council to dismiss the
members in these courts who are allegedly linked to terrorist organisations.
Meanwhile, President Erdogan promulgated on July 23 Law No. 6723 that dismissed all
members of the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, to be replaced by President
himself and the HSYK. The request for the annulment of the Law brought before the
Constitutional Court by the CHP has been rejected on procedural grounds.[23]
In a unanimous decision on August 4, the Constitutional Court dismissed two of its members
based upon “the social network information and the common impression of the members of
the Court” that the two members had links to the Gülenist movement.[24]The HSYK
followed suit with four decisions on August 24, August 31, October 4, and November 15, in
which it dismissed 2,847, 543, 66, and 203 judges and prosecutors respectively. The total
number is 3,659. Among the dismissed, 78 judges and prosecutors have been reinstated to
their duties by a December 8 decision of the HSYK.[25] On November 29, the requests of the
rest of the dismissed judges and prosecutors for renewed examination of their dismissals have
been summarily rejected by the HSYK in a single 41-page long decision that lacks an
individual-by-individual examination.[26]
It should be noted that all assets of the dismissed judges and prosecutors have been frozen,
they are left with no income, no rights to pension, no right to future public employment, and
their families had to evict the assigned housing within 15 days of their dismissal.
The European Association of Judges and the International Association of Judges, along with
many national unions of judges, bars, judiciaries and international organisations, have
criticised the post-coup crackdown on the Turkish judiciary.[27] Moreover, four European
judges associations established the Platform for an Independent Judiciary in Turkey in the
face of “the extraordinary situation of violation of the independence of the judiciary in
Turkey” and expressed their concerns regarding the violations of the independence of the
judiciary, the security of tenure of office, and the lack of transparency and fair procedures in
relation to the dismissal of judges and prosecutors.[28] On December 8, the European
Network of Councils for the Judiciary unanimously decided to suspend the Turkish High
Council for Judges and Prosecutors stating that the HSYK “is no longer an institution which
is independent of the executive and legislature ensuring the final responsibility for the
support of the judiciary in the independent delivery of justice”.[29]
Academics and school system

The primary crackdown took place right after the coup with the closure of 15
universities[37], which resulted in their seizure and in the termination of their academics’
employment statuses. The announcement of the Turkish Higher Education Council (Yüksek
Öğretim Kurumu) signaled the administrative case against the 6,792 academics and
administrative personnel from which 5,342 were removed from the office.[38] In YÖK’s
declaration of July 19, 1,577 deans were forced to resign from their positions (1,176 of them
from state universities and 401 from private universities) and consequently all of them
resigned from their positions[39]. The indicated reason for the shutting down of 15
universities was their alleged links to the Gülen movement. The outcome has affected more
than 60,000 university students, almost one third of whom chose either not to continue their
studies at another university or to make a lateral transfer.[40]. Another critical development
has been brought by the Decree-law No 676 announced on October 29: The rule for the
election of rectors of universities has been changed: The selection of candidates will be
evaluated and approved by the President.[41]
There have been several important criticisms indicating that these actions targeting academics
at numerous positions and universities are not only limited to sweeping those linked with the
Gülen movement but also that these actions are portrayals of an oppressive system that try to
silence and erase all those who take a critical side to the government. With 5 decree-laws
released throughout the State of Emergency that has been operating for the past 8 months,
4,811 academicians were discharged from 112 different universities. Only 58 of them were
reinstated to their position. [42]
Civil servants

There has also been a massive crackdown on public officials on a scale and in a manner
unprecedented. Immediately after July 15, thousands of public officials were suspended and
many detained and arrested mostly in provincial investigations in almost every department of
the government. Until early September, the purge amounted to the dismissal of some public
officials who did not have the status and thus the security of civil service (devlet memuru),
and only the suspension of civil servants. However, on September 1, bypassing the security
of civil service, Decree-Law No. 672 dismissed 50,875 civil servants, of which 28,163 were
teachers at the Ministry of National Education. Attachments to the decree-law enlisted all
50,785 dismissed, among which there are also 2,346 academics, 2,018 Ministry of Health
officials, 1,519 Directorate of Religious Affairs officials, 7,669 officials from the police
forces, and 323 officials from the gendarmerie.
Two other waves of massive purge came with Decree-laws No. 675 and 677, which
altogether dismissed 25,784 public officials. Among the dismissed are 403 officials from the
gendarmerie, 8,175 officials from the National Directorate of Security, 2,534 Ministry of
Justice officials, 2,338 Ministry of Education officials, 3,526 Ministry of Health officials,
2,696 Ministry of Interior Affairs officials, and 2,209 academics.
In the first three months of 2017, Decree-Laws Nos 679, 683 and 686 dismissed further
11,550 public officials, notably including 2,598 Ministry of Education officials, 3,104 police
officers, 1,024 Ministry of Health officials and 961 academics.
The Decree-laws state that the officials listed in lists attached to them are either members of
terrorist groups or structures that the National Security Council decided carries out activities
against “the national security of the State”, or affiliated to, connected to, or in contact with
them. The question how the executive reached this conclusion remains. Needless to say, these
decree-laws preceded any criminal investigation or conviction.
Business world and private sector

Decree-laws have affected the business world too. Actions towards the private sector,
especially towards the acknowledged representatives of the business world started at the end
of July, few days later the coup attempt of July 15. A holding owner, Şükrü Boydak, from
Kayseri, has been the first name pronounced in the media.[47] Detentions and arrests of big
size holding owners, of various businesspeople from different cities in Turkey have been
taking place since then. Moreover, companies and firms of various sizes have also become
subject of purges: seizures and asset freezes have also become tools to control any business
group that have an alleged tie to the Gülen movement. In mid-August, 322 companies with
alleged ties to the Gülen movement have been shut down; all financial assets of these
companies have been seized.[48]It is known that with the rule of the AKP government in
Turkey, companies in Anatolian cities (famously referred to as Anatolian Tigers) received
certain privileges and benefited from unequally distributed utilities and thus thrived under AK
Party rule.[49]
Arrests, purges and seizures towards the private sector members kept on taking place in
September too: one of the biggest construction firms, Dumankaya İnşaat’s (Dumankaya
Construction) owners’ assets have been seized due to a suspicion of their financial support to
the Gülen movement.[50] Businesspeople who are members of the TUSKON associations
started to be questioned because of their alleged ties to the Gülen movement in mid-August
and they were later on arrested in mid-September. So far, Koza-İpek Holding, Boydak
Holding, Dumankaya Holding, Kaynak Holding and Naksan Holding companies have been
seized by the state. The number of private companies seized by Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta
Fonu (the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) (TMSF) announced by Nurettin Canikli, the
Deputy Prime Minister, consisting of 46 groups and 492 companies are now long
behind.[51] Canikli’s latest announcement indicates that there are 572 companies seized by
TMSF, which resulted in the transfer of 12 billion Turkish Lira to State Treasury.[52]
Closures, detentions and arrests directed towards the private sector became questionable in
the eyes of the public opinion. This interference with the business world has been interpreted
as an attack on private ownership.

The failed coup attempt was yet another incident that revealed the fragility of the
Turkish democracy, state structure, and the political system. Dealing with it
could have been an opportunity to transition to a more transparent and
democratic governance structure based on the rule of law. The opportunity
seems to have been missed. Furthermore, the problems with the governance of
the crisis exposed Turkey to a human rights record of mass violations and a
weakened state structure and economy amid the terrorist and security threats
Turkey faces.

Improving Political Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey: Before and After the
Attempted Coup on 15th of July

Introduction: A Brief look at History of Coups in Turkey

Turkey experienced several military coups in its history. The Turkish Military Forces seized
the power twice; in 1960 and 1980 and forced the governments to resign in 1971 and 1997.
As a part of the first military coup of Republic of Turkey on 27th of May, 1960, over 200
generals, including the Chief of General Staff of the time, President and Prime Minister were
arrested by the military group that seized the power. After staying in power for 10 years, the
Democrat Party’s term ended with the military coup on 27th of May, 1960; however,
preparations for the military coup started earlier with the establishment of various juntas
within the military in the 1950’s. In various units across the country, different groups either
independent from each other or at times in communication started to get ready for the coup in
order to overthrow the Democrat Party beginning from the 1950’s. [1] The coup by the
Turkish Military Forces on 12th of September 1980 were staged within the chain of
command and following 27th of May, 1960 coup and 12th of March, 1971 memorandum, it
was the third clear intervention of military forces to a government in the history of Republic
of Turkey.
An attempted coup took place on 15-16th of July, 2016 by a group of soldiers within the
Turkish Military Forces that define themselves as “Peace at Home Council”.
Improving Political Relations

1. Azerbaijan-Turkey (1991-2016)
Azerbaijan declared its independence on 9th of October, 1991 and Turkey became the first
country to recognize its independence on 30th of August, 1991. With the protocol between
Turkey and Azerbaijan on 14th of January, 1992, the relations were formalized and the
consulate general that was working as Turkey’s representation was raised up to the level of
embassy. [2] Currently, Turkey’s Baku Embassy and Nakhichevan and Ganja Consulate
Generals are in operation, while Azerbaijan has an Embassy in Ankara and also consulate
generals in Istanbul and Kars. [3]
A positive environment in political, economic and cultural fields between Turkey and
Azerbaijan relations has been witnessed since 2014. Bilateral relations are maintained in
global, national and regional issues and also in every possible business sectors.
The Russian Federation Air Forces’ Sukhoi Su-24M type plane was taken down by the
Turkish Air Forces due to a border violation on 24th of November 2015. The plane crisis on
the 24th of November was a breaking point for the Russia-Turkey relations; however, right
after the crises Azerbaijan strongly supported Turkey when it was facing pressure. Following
the incident that took place with Russia, Moscow aimed to pressurize Turkey. To that end,
Russia ratified a bylaw with 6 articles against Turkey which had various economic sanctions
including a ban on certain Turkish products. [4] Despite these events, Azerbaijan opened its
doors for Turkey in December of 2015 and provided every opportunity in order to enable the
transportation of Turkish trucks to Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan) through Caspian Sea.
German Parliament recognized the events of 1915 related to Armenians during Ottoman era
as “genocide” on the 2nd of June, 2016. In almost every accepted draft, it is reflected that
Ottoman committed a genocide against Armenians.[5]
This decision was considered unfair and illegal by Azerbaijan. Germany was rightly
criticized by Azerbaijani President for ignoring “Khojaly Massacre.”[i] At such a difficult
time, it was once again Azerbaijan that became the first country to support Turkey. During
Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım’s visit to Azerbaijan in June, Azerbaijan President
İlham Aliyev supported Turkey and condemned German Parliament’s decision to recognize
the events of 1915 as genocide. Azerbaijani İlham Aliyev expressed his views on the issue:
“We condemn the ‘1915’ decision of Germany. Armenian issue is an excuse for Germany.
Azerbaijan stands by Turkey as always…”
Azerbaijan’s reaction was not limited to only this. For example, within the scope of the visit
to Germany in June of 2016, Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev responded harshly to the
decision of German Parliament and cancelled the meetings with the members of ‘German
Inter-parliamentary Friendship Group.’ This is only one of the examples of significant
support Azerbaijan provided for Turkey at the national level.
Baku-Ankara Friendship

Engaging Turkey’s Emigrants

Once associated with different titles, ranging from guest workers to opportunists, fugitives or
even traitors, emigrants are increasingly calling states’ attention as the extended political
communities. Home states are increasingly interested in involving in and regulating the
economic, political and social conditions of the emigrants originated from their borders. In
this context, Portes et al. (1999: 467) argued that sending governments no longer wanted their
immigrants to return, but to “achieve a secure status in the wealthy nations to which they
have moved and from which they can make sustained economic and political contributions in
the name of patriotism and home town loyalty”. Along the same line, Bauböck (2003: 710)
suggested that this change in the attitude indicated both the acceptance of permanent
emigration, but also the adoption of a strategy by the origin countries for promoting the
political integration of the immigrants in the host country.
According to the international migration literature, beginning with the 1990s origin states are
establishing new forms of relationship with the populations that they consider as members of
the society living outside of their borders. Based on Gamlen’s (2008) definition of “diasporic
membership”, home states are:

1. Aiming to maintain their relations with the emigrants through cross-border processes and
practices,
2. Attempting to create new spheres of incorporation for emigrants to integrate in the social,
economic and political areas both related to home country and host country.

As a result, home states adopt different strategies in order to keep, build, integrate and benefit
from emigrant groups. Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003: 589-590) identify a wider array of
policy choices, which are employed by the states, including:
(1) ministerial or consular reforms; (2) investment policies which seek to attract or channel
migrant remittances; extension of political rights in the form of dual citizenship or
nationality; (3) the right to vote from overseas, or the right to run for public office; (4) the
extension of state protections or services to nationals living abroad that go beyond traditional
consular services; (5) and the implementation of symbolic policies designed to reinforce
emigrants’ sense of enduring membership.
Not all states employ the same strategies for engaging with their emigrants or citizens living
abroad, and the divergences in the policy choice depend on the costliness of such policies and
the states’ capacities in implementing them (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 606). In the next
section, I focus on Turkish state’s emigrant policies, first examining its history, and then
concentrating on the recent policy changes of the Turkish state related to the issue of
emigrants and non-resident citizens. The section incorporates a discussion why the changes
took place, what were the naming practices and how was the institutional setting re-structured
in the Turkish context.
The Turkish Case

Looking at the history of emigrant policies of modern Turkey, it is possible to distinguish

four different periods that were marked by critical ruptures. The first of these periods takes
place from the foundation of the republic to the 1960s, when projects of homogenization
were at the center of policy making. During this period the policies on emigration and ethnic
kin were complementary of one another; policies on the kin determined which immigrants
who could be naturalized, while emigration policies dealt with the voluntary or involuntary
resettlement non-Turkish non-Muslims (Aksel 2014; İçduygu and Aksel 2015). This period
was marked by a concern over territoriality and the realization of projects and institutions
of “nation-building” which facilitated the process of standardization under the common title
of “Turkish citizen” (Aksel 2014). Turkish state’s involvement during the early periods after
the labor recruitment agreements was based on simple reciprocal relations of promoting the
return of economic and social capital gained by emigrants abroad (Bilgili and Siegel 2013).
The main institutional intermediary between the state and emigrants was Turkish
Employment Service, rather than Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, the Turkish state
perceived of its citizens in Europe and elsewhere not as emigrants but rather as workers
abroad or overseas until the mid-1980s (Aksel 2014).

In the post-1980 period, the post-coup mentality of securitization in state’s affairs with its
citizens as well as the opening up to the financial globalization and market economy have
shaped the emigrant policies. Emigrants started to be entitled as citizens living abroad, rather
than via concepts denoting their temporary status in the overseas, and were provided with
new rights (i.e. dual citizenship, social security rights, relaxations on military service,
customs voting) as they were considered as settled populations with transnational linkages to
the homeland. Despite the overall change, this period was a continuation of the reactive
policies of the state, in order to respond to the daily needs of emigrants, as well as create
alternatives to the rising oppositions. The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of
Education had a central position in exporting culture from Turkey to overseas (Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003). While the post-1980s were a transition period towards the new management
of emigrants, the main rupture took place in the early 2000s. As a result, over the last decade,
Turkey’s policies on emigrants have undergone a transformation, compatible with the global
trend of involving in the political, economic and social practices and conditions of members
living in other countries. For the particularity of the Turkish case, the glorification of the
market, the candidacy to the European Union, and more importantly the abrupt shifts in the
state governance under the successive single party government of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) have been effective for the changing policies related to emigrants.

The impact of social media on political change: Gezi protests in Turkey

Impact of Social Media on Politics

Recent years have witnessed many protest movements against oppressive governments.
Social media have been an important tool to organize and express anti-government protests
all around the world. However, the possibility of social media protests to turn into long
lasting oppositions have been a topic of debate. There are different theories and viewpoints
that view the impact of social media and its effectiveness. Some argue that social media is a
new tool that will organize democratic movements, however some argue that these tools are
not capable of turning protests into long lasting oppositions.
In his seminal 1973 study entitled “The Strength of Weak Ties”, Granovetter (1973) analyzed
the link between micro-level interactions and macro-level patterns in social networks. He
argued that weak ties have strong potential for diffusion, social mobility and political
organization across different networks. The advantages of weak ties over strong ties lie in
their ability to diffuse information and ideas across social groups.
The first time internet based social media sites like Twitter and Facebook were linked to a
political movement was in the spring of 2009 when activists in Moldova used Twitter to
organize large protests against the governing Communist party. Since then it has become
clear that social media can be a powerful tool for political struggle.
In December 2010, in Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire which was posted on
Youtube. On January 11th, protests reached the center of the capital city where tens of
thousands took the streets. These events resulted in Ben Ali fleeing the country on January
14th. Although the Ben Ali regime blocked Youtube during the month of unrest, it did not
entirely block internet access. During these times, internet activists played important roles,
re-posting videos and Facebook content about protests and carrying the protests from closed
loops of private networks to Twitter and online news portals. Tunisia witnessed a sudden 8
percent increase in the number of Facebook users during the first weeks of January 2011
(Safranek, 2012). The protests, nicknamed the “Jasmine revolution”, led to the installation of
a coalition government following elections. While new technology helped opposition leaders
organize protests and easily communicate with followers, experts also commented that it
would be simplistic to say social media “caused” Jasmine revolution, that the underlying
economic and political causes were decades in the making, and that it would be unlikely that
Facebook and Twitter would fill the leadership vacuum that existed in the country (Rash,
2012).
The most significant impact of social media on politics probably was seen in Egypt
Revolution which was also named by some as “Facebook Revolution”. Egypt protests that led
to the revolution started after the death of Khaled Said, a young blogger, who was brutally
beaten and killed after allegedly posting an incriminating video of police officers (Bhuiyan,
2011). In reaction to his murder, Wael Ghonim, the Middle East marketing director for
Google, set up the Facebook page, “We Are All Khaled Said”, and publicized the gruesome
photos of Said’s corpse. The page quickly attracted 500, 000 members and soon became a
platform for online discussion and dialogue of shared grievances against the Mubarak regime.
Wael Ghonim was soon after arrested by Egyptian state police.
The first large scale protest took place on 25 January 2011, when protesters gathered in
Cairo’s Tahrir Square by the thousands and Mubarak stepped down from power on 11
February 2011. According to Al Jazeera’s coverage of 18-day uprising, protest organizers
relied heavily on social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter to organize initial
protest. The Egyptian government blocked Facebook in the first act of what would eventually
become a full internet blockade. However, despite the Internet blockade, protesters were able
to continue organizing demonstrations due to the organizational infrastructure that had
already been established. A facebook event set up in advance received tens of thousands of
attendance confirmations and a Google document posted to a Facebook group collected e-
mails of the group members in case of a blockade (Chebib & Sohail, 2011).
Today, social media have become a fact of life for civil society worldwide, involving many
actors-regular citizens, activists, NGOs and even governments. However, anti-government
protests organized by social media sometimes produce unintended consequences. For
example, in Belarus in March 2006, anti-government protests resulted in even more control
on social media. Similarly, in June 2009 uprising in Iran, activists used every possible
technological coordinating tool to protest the miscount of votes for Hossein Mousavi but they
were ultimately turned off by the government (Shirky, 2011). The Red Shirt uprising in
Thailand in 2010 followed a similar path. Protesters used social media to occupy Bangkok,
but the Thai government dispersed the protesters, killing dozens.
These various cases show that social media has an important potential to contribute to
political change but at the same time, does not have a single preordinated outcome. Recently,
lines have been drawn between “cyber utopians”-those who view social media as a primary
cause of recent political, economic, and social events, and “cyber-realists” who argue that
social media is simply one in a long series of communication technologies which operate in a
subservient role to larger political forces (Swenson, 2011).
One of the optimist articles that started the debate was Andrew Sullivan’s “The Revolution
Will be Twittered” in theatlantic.com. In his article Sullivan argued that new information
technology can bypass established media and can organize as “never before”. He argued
Ahmadinejad and the old guard mullahs were caught off-guard by this technology and that
new generation with their new tools of media would wipe out the old regime. However, as a
response Morozov (2011) and other cyber-realists have argued that in most of these cases
social media had been much more successful in publicizing political events than it has been
in organizing the events. Morozov (2011) argued that social media was simply tools and
social change continued to involve many painstaking, longer-term efforts to engage with
political institutions and reform movements.
Similarly, Gladwell (2010) took a strong stand against the role of social media in recent
political events. He argued that social media could not provide what social change always
required, which is a “strong tie” between participants engaged in high risk activism which
can not be replicated in the cyber world. According to Gladwell (2010), personal ties
between participants are essential for “real” political activism and that social media can not
replace this form of direct engagement between participants. To support this claim, he cites a
sociological study of activists in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project of 1964, the result
of which showed that those who stayed after three of the volunteers were kidnapped and
killed, were those who had closer personal ties with others in the group. Gladwell (2010)
concludes that “real” political actions occur as the result of direct, face to face interactions
that are combined with emotional, interpersonal investment. While Gladwell (2010)
acknowledges that social media can be powerful and effective, “strength in weak ties” occurs
primarily in situations where access to new information is essential as in fashion, matching
up buyers and sellers, and dating world. Social media, then is capable of expanding markets,
however, when one’s life is on the line, direct material connections we have with real life
family and friends determine our level of political engagement.
However, Gladwell (2010)’s arguments were refuted in a recent empirical study by Starbird
and Palen (2012) that examined microblogging information diffusion activity during the 2011
Egyptian political uprisings. Starbird and Palen (2012) analyzed the widespread contagion of
a popular meme and found interaction between those who were “on the ground” in Cairo and
those who were not. Through both qualitative and statistical description, they showed how
the crowd expresses solidarity and does the work of information processing through
recommendation and filtering. Starbird and Palen (2012) report that 30% of the 1000 mostly
highly retweeted Twitterers who were using popular hashtags related to the protests were “on
the ground” in street protests. Tweets from these users contained information such as meeting
times, injuries and supplies needed. In the research Starbird and Palen (2012) conclude that
protesters were actually using social media services to coordinate their actions and garner
support. According to Starbird and Palen (2012), low-risk activism enabled by social media
may indeed have been a productive component of the Egyptian revolution.
In their research, Starbird and Palen (2012) theorize that the social media was effective in at
least two ways. First, interaction between real time protesters and online protesters showed
increasing solidarity with the cause. Second, online protesters did the “work” of information
processing through retweeting. According to the authors, expressions of social solidarity are
the kinds of activities that draw and sustain attention on the cause, which in turn may sustain
the cause itself.
References

Research Turkey (April, 2017), “ An Overview of the post-Coup Attempt Measures in

Turkey”, Vol. VI, Issue 4, pp.6 – 19, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey
(ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=13342)

Hassanov, F. (September, 2016), “Improving Political Relations between Azerbaijan and

Turkey: Before and After the Attempted Coup on 15th of July ”, Vol. V, Issue 8, pp.12 – 19,
Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey.
(http://researchturkey.org/?p=12838)

Aksel, D. B. (November, 2016), “Engaging Turkey’s Emigrants”, Vol. V, Issue 11, pp.6 – 14,
Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research
Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=13008)

Güner S.E. (June, 2016), “The impact of social media on political change: Gezi protests in Turkey”,
Vol. V, Issue 6, pp.88 – 99, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London,
Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=12181)
Economic

The Political Economy of Inequality, Redistribution, and the Protests in Turkey

The obvious injustice and police brutality in Gezi Park was the last drop in a long process of
accumulation of discontent against an authoritarian government, their social policies pushing
for a conservative Islamic life style threatening in particular women and the youth,
criminalization and imprisoning of oppositional groups ranging from seculars to Kurds,
socialists, and trade unionists, and last but not least neoliberal policies which increasingly
commercialized public services, created areas of rent for large corporations, destroyed the
ecological environment, and increased insecurity for a significant part of the working people.
27 May and the mobilizations that have followed will mark a historic moment for the
collective memory of the movements in Turkey. This has been the spontaneous mobilization
of a new generation, who has been brought up by the conservative neoliberal authoritarian
AKP regime for a decade. It has been a source of inspiration with the creativity and sense of
humour of the young people involved. It has been a broad movement bringing together first
time activists of all ages -young and old-, trade unions, civil society organizations, and
political groups from a wide spectrum. Despite police brutality, and systemic criminalization
of the protestors, the movement is nowhere close to disappearing. It has now spread out to
local parks, and taken the form of neighbourhood assemblies.
Despite the mass persistent ongoing protests, it is also true that Turkey is very divided in
terms of the sentiment about the AKP regime, and there is still a significant, albeit possibly
declining, support for the government. A lot has been said about the democratic aspirations of
the protestors. But less attention has been paid to the distributional dynamics in the
background of the discontent about the regime as well as the support for it. AKP has initiated
a redistribution towards the poorest of the society via both crony in kind transfers of food and
fuel, in particular in the eve of the elections, as well as some institutional pro-poor changes,
e.g. in the health services increasing access for the poor and the informal sector workers.
Share of social transfers, in particular transfers other than pensions and survivors’ benefits,
have doubled as a ratio to GDP from 0.9% in 2006 to 1.8% in 2010.[1] Relative poverty rate
(the ratio of individuals below %50 of the median value of the consumption expenditures per
equivalent individual) declined from a level of 18.5% in 2002 to 16.0% in 2011.[2] Minimum
wages have also received a significant boost in real terms, and increased from 0.61 as a ratio
to the median wage of full-time workers in 2002 to 0.71 in 2011, and minimum wages as a
ratio to average wages increased from 0.32 to 0.38 in the same period.[3]
However, the source of this redistribution was income scrapped from the organized blue
collar and white-collar/professional working people rather than taxes on corporate profits and
the rich. This redistribution helps to increase the profits of the employers without hurting the
poorest further. This may also partly explain the diverse class composition of the mass, albeit
shaky, electoral support for the party.
In the last decade insecurity has increased for all segments of the working people bare the
poorest. Share of wages in national income, which had decreased dramatically after the 1994
and 2001 crises, went on decreasing under the AKP rule until 2008. Despite some
increase since 2008, the wage share has still not recovered back to its pre-2001 crisis level
in 2000; it is still 1.4% lower in 2011 compared to 2000, and dramatically lower than the
wage share in its peak in 1991 by a rate of 9.6%.[4] Furthermore, between 2006 and 2011 the
share of the bottom 40% as well as the top 20% within the total wage income has increased,
whereas the share of the middle 40% decreased.
During a decade of AKP rule the amount of workers working for outsourced companies has
more than tripled reaching to above 1.5 million. Union density has almost halved from 9.5%
to 5.8% and is the lowest among the OECD countries –lower than in Eastern Europe or
Mexico and Korea.[5] Almost a thousand workers died in workplace accidents. Dr. Ahmet
Tellioglu, a workplace doctor at a major factory in Istanbul, who has been sacked recently
because of his objection to serious health hazards in the practices of the factory, says that
“anyone who is just above the poorest or earning just above the minimum wage, thus any
working person, who has something to loose, feels increasingly more insecure in Turkey
today”.
Interestingly, this dynamic of redistribution under a conservative neoliberal regime shows a
remarkable resemblance to the trends in Brazil. In the case of Brazil, the governing Labour
Party, a progressive party quite different from AKP, has implemented some pro-poor policies
such as child benefits to the poor families and an unprecedented increase in the minimum
wage. However, this was coupled by an unwillingness of the government to discontinue some
of the crucial neoliberal policies such as fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy, or engage
in a major land redistribution to address the origins of poverty. This has brought together an
erosion of the public services, and income and working conditions of large groups of
industrial and public sector workers, and hence alienated the original supporters of the party.
Can neoliberal speculation and finance-led growth be a role model of development, social
cohesion and regional convergence? No, this model is neither socially nor economically
stable, as the recent events as well as the recent history of Turkey, which is marked by
regular boom and bust cycles, and crises in 1994, 2001, 2009, show. In the recent global
crisis, Turkey had one of the severest recessions in 2009 –deeper than other major emerging
economies. Indeed Turkey’s growth model dependent on cheap labour and speculative
financial capital inflows and a high trade deficit, would have experienced a crisis sooner or
later even without the global recession (Onaran, 2009). The recovery since 2009 is as fragile
as before. The share of industry in Turkey’s production is decreasing and becoming
increasingly more dependent on the imports of intermediate and capital goods (Yeldan,
2013a). A genuine developmentalist industrial policy is remarkably missing in AKP’s
economic policy mix.
No wonder, this is a jobless growth process. As of 2013 March (last available data at the time
of writing by TUIK), unemployment in the urban areas (in non-agricultural sector) is as high
as 16.5% for women, and 10.2% for men. The rate of unemployment reaches to a remarkable
rate of 19.4% for young urban men, and 26.5% for young women (15-24 years old). 18.7% of
urban men and 30.2% of urban women have been unemployed for more than a year. Along
with high unemployment, the urban female participation rate is still at an extraordinary low
rate of 27.6%, which however is not surprising given the dismal supply of affordable and
public childcare services. A phenomenal indicator of the anti-women policy stance of the
government is its call for women to give birth to at least three children, and its attacks on
women’s right to abortion and birth control in an environment where urban female labour
force participation is at a level, which bears no resemblance to a developed country.
AKP has recently taken pride in having paid the last instalment of its debt to the IMF.
However, in the last decade Turkey has borrowed increasingly more in the international
financial markets, and in particular the foreign debt of the private sector has reached
unforeseen levels (Yeldan, 2013b). This is a fragile model. When the private debtors go
bankrupt, those private losses are socialized. The periphery of Europe is just one recent
example of this to add to a series of former crises in Turkey, Latin America and East Asia.
The next bust and crisis in Turkey is not a question of “if” but “when”, and the international
financial investors will make that decision. The recent foreign capital outflows from Turkey
after the rise in political instability was already a signal in this direction. But a further wave
of capital outflows came after the announcement of the Federal Reserve Board of the US that
they could consider gradually phasing out the quantitative easing programme (the injection of
money into the markets), if economic recovery is maintained. The aggressive expansionary
monetary policy of the world’s major central banks since 2008 had helped to maintain capital
inflows to emerging markets like Turkey, offering high speculative returns. The negative
effect of the announcement of the FED on international capital flows has been similar across
the world, but the effect has been particularly tougher in Turkey. In the meantime, the
government had already labelled the protests as a conspiracy of the international actors and
“interest lobby,” and the recent wave of capital outflows has been the tipping point for the
government to initiate an official inquiry about the sales of shares in the stock market,
particularly by the foreigners. Sadly, this interest in capital outflows is not about a genuine
interest in regulating capital flows, but an excuse to support a conspiracy discourse to shed
doubts on an authentic social movement.
Fortunately, it is not only the international capital flows, which has a contagion effect. The
peoples’ uprisings everywhere from Wall Street to Tunisia to Turkey and Brazil have given a
massive expression to the discontent of a silent majority across the world and turned
hopelessness into first anger and then hope. Their experiences has been followed and
received by solidarity across the world. They have created domino effects, first regionally,
but I believe now it is fair to say, also internationally. They have a lot in common. They are
all a rebellion against the lack of democracy, voice, and representation as well as rising
inequality, joblessness, insecurity, commercialization of the supply of basic needs. The young
actors of these mobilizations have been a lot more aware about the multiple dimensions of the
crisis -the energy crisis, climate change, ecological crisis and food crisis- compared to former
generations. Young men and women, who are mostly not coming from former organized
backgrounds, have been in the forefront of all these mobilizations. Not surprisingly, this is
happening at a time of record high youth unemployment and increasing precariousness. This
is a new generation, who feels insecure about the future, working, if at all, with fixed/short-
term contracts, or part time without a choice, at times in the informal sector, most often for
low pay, and usually in jobs not matching their education levels and aspirations. Turkey has a
long tradition of rebellion, but I feel the recent images of rebellion from Greece or Spain or
Egypt has been more alive in the memory of the first time demonstrators in Istanbul, Ankara
or Izmir than the history of Turkey which has been persistently erased or discredited or
demonized in the collective memory of the young people by the military coup and
generations of ruling elite to follow. To overcome fear and to rebel is today something to be
proud of. No matter what next, these mobilizations have transformed the social genes forever.

Wage Inequality in Turkey

For many, the New Year bears hopeful prospects, but not for the Confederation of
Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) in Turkey. Assuming the government would follow the
recommendations of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), the official announcement on
minimum wages for 2012 left them in disappointment. To date, the minimum wage consisted
of a monthly remuneration of 659 TL. Throughout 2012 this will be augmented by two
progressive hikes of 6 per cent. As a result, instead of the expected 1000 TL, recommended
by TUIK, the government will limit the increased minimum wage to 739 TL per
month[1] The DISK reacted furiously, stating that in this way the government denied its
citizens the possibility of living their lives in a humane way. Following the announcement,
thousands protested in front of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, where the police
used tear gas, and arrested 38 union members.
At first sight the reaction of the DISK might seem somewhat exaggerated. An overall 12 per
cent increase of the minimum wage over the course of one year seems like a very decent
improvement of labour conditions. However, a closer look is required here. Firstly, the
inflation rate – after some years of single digit successes – rose to 10.5 per cent in 2011, more
than doubling the forecasts of the Central Bank.[2] Hence, the real increase of the minimum
wage is much lower. Secondly, a significant point put forward by the trade unions is that the
increasing wealth generated by the continuously growing economy is still far from being
fairly distributed. The inadequate reform of the minimum wage is characteristic for the way
in which minimum wage earners are left without a share in the country’s rapid economic
growth. The trade unions emphasize this point by referring to the recent hike of pensions for
members of parliament, who saw their pensions rise by 25 per cent to a total of 6200 TL per
month. Initially these pensions were even set to rise with 60 per cent to a total of 8000 TL,
but public pressure limited the increase.[3]
This discrepancy between minimum wage labourers and a top layer reaping the countries
increasing wealth illustrates the structural asymmetries of the post-1979 Turkish economy.
The liberalisation of the labour market coupled with the military coup d’état of 1980
practically crushed organised labour, leaving this group in a very vulnerable position.
Economic decisions were guided by profit imperatives, at the expense of labourers. Without
an effective counterforce restraining the forces of competitive capital accumulation, labourers
saw their real wages stagnate and even decline in the economic crises of 1994 and 2000/2001.
This stood in sharp contrast with GDP growth which, except some (inter-)national crisis
years, continued its rise throughout this period.[4]
The latest quarrel over minimum wages can be interpreted in light of the uneven distributive
currents in the liberalised Turkish economy. The total size of accumulated wealth increases,
but this wealth is shared asymmetrically up to a point where large parts of society are forced
to live around subsistence level. As such, the 12 per cent hike in the minimum wage merely
obscures the continuous structural disparity in the distribution of wealth.

Weakening of the Link From Current Account Deficits to Growth

I would argue that a key distinguishing feature of the Turkish economy over this period was
that the (positive) correlation between the growth rate and foreign savings (current account
deficit) jumped to successfully higher thresholds in almost a permanent manner.
One should note that traditionally Turkey was not an economy generating high current
account deficits. Observe for instance, that during the 1990s, the growth rate of national
income was 3.6%, while the ratio of current account deficit to gross domestic product
remained below 1%. Starting from 2003, annualized current deficit increased to the 3-4%
band, and then jumped above 6% after 2006. In 2009, the growth rate, in parallel with the
global recession, was (minus) 4.8 as the current deficit went down. However, then, in 2010,
the ratio of current account deficit to national income restarted to increase. The data included
in the Table 1 below exhibits these observations. After 2006, Turkish economy has started to
operate with a considerably high-rate (above 6%) of current account deficit in order to
achieve positive growth. 2012 is the year when this observation has become clearer. In
contrast to the “mild descent” scenarios as expected by the official bureaucracy and the
international financial speculators, this period represents a new threshold in the process of
transforming Turkish economy into a foreign debt-ridden economy presenting a heaven of
cheap imports and labour surplus.
What is also alarming is the poor quality of the mode of financing of the aforementioned
deficits. The following table encapsulates this issue. It can be read from the data that 91% of
the current account deficit for the year 2012, namely USD 48.8 billion, was financed by net
inflows of portfolio investments andunrecorded capital inflows (so-called net errors and
omissions). However, in retrospect, the percentage of the said-items in the current account
deficit was around 40% in 2010 and 2011.
Being predicated on portfolio investments and unrecorded capital inflows, the hot money
flows present the most volatile form of capital, which is also the most sensitive one to abrupt
swings of foreign exchange speculation. These kinds of capital inflows, as created by hot
money flows based on speculative incentives, account for the primary reasons responsible for
excessive volatility and uncertainty in real sectors of the national economy.
Debt-DrivenAccumulation

In 2008, Turkey’s national income, the gross domestic product (GDP), was USD 742.1
billion with a total external debt stock of USD 241 billion, USD 52.5 billion of which was
composed of short term debt. Data presented in Table 3 indicate the Turkish economy’s
external borrowing and growth adventure during the process of global great recession (2008
– 2012). From 2008 to 2012, over the so-called great recession cycle, the Turkish economy
has accumulated net extra external debt amounting to USD 55.8 billion in total. Over the
course of the same period, Turkish gross domestic product has advanced to USD 786.4
billion with a cumulative increase of USD 44.3 billion. That’s to say, after 2008 the total net
increase in external indebtedness was higher than that of the national income.
Another astonishing aspect of this growth miracle, which was running the Turkish economy
into a debt trap at a dizzying speed, is that the external borrowing is mostly characterized
by short-term structure. The net increase in short-term external debt stock, USD 48.4 billion,
accounts for 87% of the overall increase.
A related question is which agents (institutions) were the dominant sources of this episode. I
know that a satisfactory answer to this question requires a more comprehensive analysis
going far beyond the scope of this column, yet I believe that we can make comments about
the overall tendency that we have derived from the official data. The official data show that
out of the net increase of USD 55.8 billion in external indebtedness, USD 18.5 billion was
generated by the public sector (including the Central Bank), while USD 37.3 billion was
contracted by the private sector. Almost all of the private sector external debt was in turn
concluded by the financial institutions. Only 1.6% (corresponding to USD 0.6 billion) of the
net increase of USD 37.3 billion in private sector external indebtedness was generated
by non-financial institutions.
An economy, whose short-term external debt is increasing more rapidly than its national
income… Rating agencies, whose recent decisions have been celebrated by the Turks as a
matter of national pride, are undoubtedly familiar with these facts. Yet, one should not be
naïve in matters of international political economy, and have a clear state of mind in that
Turkey’s position in the new international division of labour is an extension of not only
purely economical, but also political preferences of collective imperialism. The myths of
“economic successes” are now ballooned via political elements. There is now a lengthy
economic literature regarding the impact of education and the rule of law on long run
economic development. One mechanism is via trust. General trust forms in an environment
where institutions are binding and trust is vital for economic exchange. Below I summarise
the recent state of the Turkish education and justice system. I argue that institutional
instability in Turkey is forming an environment where institutions are not binding. This
environment is leading to what I call an “immoral growth” process where economy booms
but general trust falls.[1] This process is not sustainable and would eventually collapse.
In developed countries education and justice systems are mostly free from political
orientation. Regardless of political orientation politicians know the long-run value of a sound
education and justice system. Therefore necessary investments are made to sustain well-
functioning institutions. Whereas in Turkey regardless of political orientation governments
tend to own the education and justice systems which is perhaps one of the most important
reasons behind the instability. In most cases a new government means a newly designed
education and justice system. Unfortunately bad designs persist. Lets give some details.
The frequent changes in the education system in Turkey have led into a process where
students and parents do not trust in the system. The education system has changed 19 times
since 1998. Some of these changes are what people call minor “adjustments”. But some are
major (i) in 2005 high school education period increased to 4 years instead of 3, (ii) the exam
that secondary school students take to enter public high schools that teach in English has
changed 4 times. The curriculum and the content of the exam has changed numerous times,
(iii) the content and implementation of the central university entrance exam have changed so
many times that the students cannot even follow the changes, (iv) the recent major change
(4+4+4) has redesigned the whole system in such a way that primary, secondary and high
school are 4 years each now. Moreover the Higher Education Council of Turkey (YOK) has
come up with a new higher education law (what they call reform!) that would create even
further problems in the functioning of the higher education system. Last years were in one
word a disaster for the Student Selection and Placement Authority (OSYM). There were
cases of fraud in quite a number of important exams that are conducted under the authority of
OSYM. It became common to read in the newspapers that the questions of the exam were
stolen. Currently the government is planning some other major reforms in the education
system.
There are various other problems in the design of the compulsory education and higher
education system but lets cut it short. I am afraid that soon the phrase ‘educated young
population’ that we lean upon quite frequently will be a nice memory. Young yes, but
educated not! At the very least not in terms of the quality of education in basic science,
physics, mathematics and language.
Reference

Onaran, Özlem (August, 2013), “The Political Economy of Inequality,

Redistribution, and the Protests in Turkey”, Vol. II, Issue 6, pp.20-24, Centre
for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research
Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3717)

Yeldan, Erinç (May, 2013), “Turkey’s Debt-Ridden Growth”, Vol. II, Issue 3,
pp.20-22, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey),
London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=3176)
Social

Reassessing the Impact of the Europeanisation on Civil Society of Turkey

Capacity- Building
The EU intends to build the capacity of civil society by providing financial aid, training and
technical assistance, and opening up their possibilities to engage in the ongoing rule adoption
and implementation process of acceding states. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
(IPA) supports Turkey’s efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria, with special attention placed
on the political criteria and particularly strengthening institutional capacity and investment
related to the adoption of the acquis. The beneficiaries of EU‘s financial assistance not only
include the public sector or Turkish government, but also such programs addressing the needs
of non-state actors, including business interest groups, trade unions, small and medium sized
enterprises (SME), associations, foundations and non-profit organizations. To illustrate, The
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has focused on Turkey and
supported CSOs through micro and macro-projects; between 2002 and 2012, over 100 micro
and macro projects were implemented with an annual budget of over 2 million Euros [6].
The ‘Civil Society Facility’ (CSF) came into force in 2008, including civil society in
decision-making processes through their financial support. The CSF holds the clear objective
of enhancing participatory democracy in Turkey by improving civil society–state dialogue,
enhancing their capacity to contribute effectively to public sector reforms, and increasing the
access of CSOs to financial resources[7].This initiative relies on the 2008 -2009 Enlargement
Strategy, which clearly associates the success of the accession process with the involvement
of civil society in policy dialogue and consultations. It argued that the engagement of civil
society in the pre-accession process increases the quality of the accession process and
enhances public support for the ongoing reform processes. The CSF recently released 1.75
million Euros in 2013 for Turkish civil society to with an objective to contribute to the
strengthening of capacities of existing or new national, regional, local and/or thematic
platforms and networks of (CSOs) to give citizens a voice and influence public sector reform
processes through their activities. In 2013, another comprehensive project entitled
‘Strengthening Civil Society Development and Civil Society-Public Sector Cooperation in
Turkey’ has started with an aim to betterment of enabling environment of civil society and
empowerment of capacity of civil society in Turkey. As an example, on the of the sub-
projects support the establishment of a mutually accepted code of conduct regulate the civil
society organizations and public authorities. Prominent organizations work in civil society
development field including Third Sector Foundation (TÜSEV), Civil Society Development
Centre (STGM) and YADA Foundation are implementers of this project[8]. Moreover, The
EU launched a project entitled ‘Balkan Civil Society Acquis – Monitoring Enabling
Environment for Civil Society Development Project’ in 2012 to strengthen integration and
participation of CSOs of Western Balkan countries, including Turkey, in EU policy and
accession processes at European and country level[9].The project has an objective to create a
monitoring mechanism for tracking of development of civil society, to facilitate the inclusion
of related matters in the EU Progress Report and to support the participation of CSOs in the
decision making processes at the national and EU level[10].
Horizontal linkages
Third, by its nature, the EU itself is a multilevel political entity, offering multiple access
points for non-state actors. Besides the institutional arenas at the EU level, non-
state actors also find new political realms at the transnational level via memberships of
networks and platforms operating at the EU level (Sudbery 2010). In the case of the accession
states, the EU directly initiates formation of horizontal linkages among CSOs to foster
Europeanization. For instance, The EC adopted Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and
candidate countries in 2005, immediately after the accession negotiations started with
Turkey. In Turkish case, the EC highlighted that the accession process of Turkey is
challenging both for the country itself and the EU, given that Turkey’s accession would be
different than previous cases based upon ‘Turkey’s population, size, geographical location,
economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious
characteristics.’[11].
The EC proposed civil society dialogue as the third pillar of the EU[12] to address the
cultural and socio-economic gap which endangers the smooth accession of Turkey.
Sustainable dialogue between the societies of the candidate countries and in the EU member
States, as well as with the EU institutions is being supported by grant programmes to
complement the ongoing accession process. As a continuation of the previous civil society
dialogue projects, Civil Society Dialogue III grant programme have been launched in 2013
and offers funds under thematic fields of political criteria grants and media grants[13].
Political Grant of the programme acknowledges the significant role played by CSOs in
accession process in terms of minimizing the differences between national and European
legislation and implementation practices. Funding schemes target furthering contacts and
mutual exchanges of information and experiences between civil society actors in the EU
Member States and Turkey on issues related to political criterion. The priority areas are
determined as human rights, anti-discrimination, democracy and rule of law. Similarly, media
grant of the programme aims to support a sustainable dialogue between the media
organizations in Turkey and the EU member states. Grant projects to be supported will enable
collaborations between media sector in Turkey and with their European counterparts and
contribute increasing awareness about the Turkey-EU relations in the public. As one of the
three component of the Civil Society Facility, People 2 People (P2P) programme promotes
exchanges of CSOs in the candidate and potential candidate countries with their counterparts
based in EU countries and with the EU institutions to expand their knowledge in the EU and
the accession process[14]. In the tentative calendar of P2P, 21 activities were determined.
These activities include but not limited to initiatives related to “Fostering Civil Society in the
Candidate and Potential Candidate countries” and bringing “New approach in EU Accession
Negotiations” Strategies for Creating Employment Opportunities for Youth

The Turkish Statistical Institute announced the overall unemployment rate in Turkey as 9.9%
in a bulletin it published on March 6th 2015.[6] In addition to the overall unemployment level
recorded to be below 10%, it has also been stated, in the same bulletin, that the
unemployment rate concerning the age group 15-24 was 17.9%. Since youth unemployment
is above the general unemployment rate, it is especially necessary to solve the youth
unemployment problem, to develop employment opportunities oriented towards young
people.
The most widespread programs consist of the creation of new employment opportunities
aimed at youth, and the development of new fields of occupation or promoting special
training and certificate programs in different fields of occupation. In the recent years, when
recent studies conducted on this topic are investigated, local governments, universities and
various grant institutions have started different practices concerning vocational training,
entrepreneurship and trainings of intermediate staff. Prepared by the Izmir Metropolitan
Municipality with the support of Izmir Development Agency, “Kent Koleji Projesi,” (City
College Project) with its programmes and practices, aims to create employment opportunities
for young people.[7] The support towards vocational training and enabling of opportunities
for personal development with the vocational courses, which were initiated with the support
of Ege University Continuing Education Centre, are considered important steps of the City
College. In addition to the development of opportunities where youth can personally
participate and where they can develop themselves, the development of models enabling
collective participation of the youth to processes of production and service providing is
another important requirement.
Social Entrepreneurship and Youth Cooperatives

While designing entrepreneurship models intended for young people, taking ‘social
entrepreneurship’ into account, supporting voluntary participation and acting with a feeling of
responsibility developed upon certain values enables the enhancement of the gains. Spreading
cooperatives among youth is also a ‘social enterprise.’ The new cooperatives that will be
formed by young people, using the widespread cooperative business model, this can then turn
into social enterprises that produce services in different platforms. In the book entitled
“Kooperatifçilik Bilgisi” (Knowledge on Cooperatives) prepared by Zübeyir Tokgöz with the
support of the Ministry of Customs and Trade, it describes the values of cooperatives are set
as: “self-aid, responsibility, democracy, equality, honesty, solidarity, mutual trust.” [8] We
see that all these values are also covered in youth studies, based on the policy documents
published by organisations such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations.
Cooperative ventures are also remembered by their endurance during the recent economic
crises. The cooperatives in Europe were effect by the 2008 economic crisis, and were also
able to reach an advantageous position. The report published by the United Nations
International Labour Organisation (ILO) shows as an example that in situations of crisis,
cooperatives are more preferred, and that the number of cooperative partners increases and
that the turnover of consumption cooperatives upsurges.[9] The report also mentions that a
government’s unconditional inclusion of courses that cover the formation of cooperative
ventures in the curriculum of schools (so that youth can learn about cooperatives) should be
considered as a primary duty. A complete examination of the report also indicates that
cooperatives are accepted as a sustainable business model.[10]
Among the cooperatives that operate in coordination with three ministries in Turkey, all the
Cooperative types (28 types), except the agricultural and housing cooperatives, continue their
operations with the support of the Ministry of Customs and Trade. The report published in
December 2014 by the General Directorate of Cooperatives, which supports the activities of
cooperatives except the housing and agricultural cooperatives, indicates that there are 12,915
cooperatives in the country and that 8,575 of them are active.[11] Among the cooperative
types, credit guarantee, transportation and consumption cooperatives constitute 79% of the
whole. Among those that establish the remaining 21% there are cooperatives on tourism
development, production, education, supply distribution, agricultural sales, management,
women labour and others.[12] In an attempt for the formation of youth cooperatives in
Turkey and enabling the get-together of youth with the cooperative social entrepreneurship
model, there needs to be an evaluation on ‘cooperative types.’
Reference

Dereci, Sezin (November, 2013), “Reassessing the Impact of the Europeanisation on Civil
Society of Turkey”, Vol. II, Issue 9, pp.36-41, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey
(ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=4511)
Technology

Turkey’s Internet Bans and the Vicious Circle of Techno-Optimism

Turkish people has a well-known interest in social-networking. According to the latest

Internet World Stats data,[1] 86% of Internet users in the country have a Facebook account.
Twitter, mainly because of its hesitant localisation approach until 2011, had a slow start in
Turkey, however in June 2013, with the Gezi protests gathering millions of dissent Turkish
citizens in the streets, it has registered itself on the country’s social media map. According to
the Insight Radar report,[2] the number of tweets sent from Turkey skyrocketed from 6-8
million per day to 25 million on June 1, 2013, and the number of active users increased by
250%. This sudden interest in Twitter was evidently caused by the lack of media coverage on
the events, as the mainstream media in Turkey has been under direct control and/or pressure
of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) regime since the
party won its second legislative elections in 2007 by a landslide victory with 46.6% of votes,
with an increase from 35% comparing to the 2002 elections.
Under desperate conditions, Twitter turned out to be a handy way to establish communication
between the households and streets, creating a link between two different types of know-how,
street movements and online activism. The profile of protesters, the demands and the location
of protests created a seamless fusion of cultural capital between street activists and online
dissidents, to an extent which forced iron-hand Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to take
measures against this “menace against society.”[3] While the street movement was
suppressed by extreme police violence costing eight lives, Twitter has remained to be the
“agora” of anti-regime people. AKP and Erdoğan had first tried to “eradicate Twitter” by a
Constitutional Court-vetoed ban attempt, then employed a 6,000-strong army of Twitter
mouthpieces, [4] hopelessly trying to settle the score. Obviously what Erdoğan and his
consultants did not realise was, unlike Facebook, Twitter, due to its non-localised interface
and paradigm based on extensive reading-and-writing (not popular Turkish sports), appealed
mostly to the highest cultural capital owners of Turkish society, among which traditionally
the modern secularists have been in vast majority. Even before Gezi, in incidents such as
government-imposed alcohol ban and the Roboski massacre (where Turkish fighter jets killed
34 Kurdish civilians), Turkish secularists and Kurdish intellectuals led by opinion leaders
took the floor on Twitter and even forced the media and the government to respond. The New
York University Social Media Lab report on Gezi[5] also showed that the Twitter activity
during Gezi was also triggered by opinion leaders from similar layers of society. Hence,
briefly, the ‘Kulturkampf’ on Twitter was quite a lost cause for the populist AKP regime.
Twitter becoming a democratic channel for dissident views in Turkey, perceptibly created a
hype of ‘Twitter revolution.’ Explaining social movements by the emergence of new media
technologies is not new. On the contrary, it dates back to the liberal perception of glorifying
satellite television’s impact on the fall of the Eastern bloc and the CNN effect in American
wars. This approach was thoroughly dismantled by French media scholars such as
Wolton[6] and Ramonet[7] in the 1990s, however with the emergence of Web 2.0 and the
new social movements, it has –sadly– regenerated itself. Notably during the “Arab Spring”
movements of 2010-2012, the participation to these events were enthusiastically attributed
the use of social media by protesters disregarding other variables (such as local/global
political conjuncture, rising precariousness of middle classes worldwide, politicisation of
offline social networks), both in media[8] and in the academic world such Tufekci and
Wilson’s uni-dimensionally optimistic piece.[9] The unquestionable belief in technology
democratising people, mainly founded upon Daniel Bell’s theory of new technologies
creating new needs, therefore regenerating social structures, was accurately nicknamed by
scholars like Fuchs[10] and Gerbaudo[11] as “techno-optimism,” which is a form of
technological determinism claiming technology auto-magically fixes the ailments of society,
overestimating the role of technology over society due to lack of dialectics and social
perspective.
In Turkey, techno-optimism has a huge cult of followers among scholars. I will try to explain
the historical and social roots of this popularity. Turkey, the last and not-so-voluntarily
separated piece of the Ottoman Empire, has always had a problematic and two-sided
relationship with the modernity. Since the 17th century, when Ottoman Empire’s fate was
about to be sealed and the state needed to be reformed, Western modernity has been
perceived as a ‘saviour’ and a ‘threat.’ The deadlocks of Turkish society was attempted to be
resolved by modern innovations, however the traditional social structure was not let go. Even
the early Republicans, known to be avid modernists, could build the Turkish Republic upon
the traditional social networks, promoting landowner ‘ağa’s to parliamentarians. As a result,
Turkey has adopted almost any new gadget modernity has ever produced, however it has
preserved its modus operandi based on pre-modern social networks. Therefore, it has
frequently appeared, to most Westerners’ awe, as a traditionally-operated society with a
modern look.
In this context, it is easier to understand Turkish scholars’ addiction to techno-optimism.
Treating modern innovation as a magic solution to Turkey’s complicated problems is almost
automatic among Turkish modernists. Meanwhile, even the modern academic scene in
Turkey, notably in Istanbul where all the economic, social and cultural capital are
accumulated, operates under the traditional network logic, which prioritises social networks
and interpersonal relations over contractual relations. Therefore, each new phenomenon
creates its own need of social networks, which is constituted by few ‘go-to people’ and their
followers. These networks eventually establish bonds with people in private universities,
NGOs, funding agencies etc. to convert their cultural capital (of knowing this new ‘magic’
stuff) into economic and social capital. If you take a brief look into the well-funded
workshops, continuing education projects, civil society projects in Turkey, you would surely
see these networks in action.
Therefore, creating hypes and bandwagon effects with the arrival of any innovation is not
only instinctive, but also inevitable in Turkish scholar scene. Turkish academics and
intellectuals need this ‘scholar lebensraum’ in order to endure the ongoing conversion from
cultural to economic and social capital. This subject is ever changing, from blogs to Twitter,
from citizen journalism to data-driven journalism, however the modus operandi remains the
same. Obviously, creating bandwagon effects over any new phenomenon takes its toll. The
scholars in Turkey generally remain deprived of any critical approach and open-minded
debate. Every innovation becomes a revelation case for the ‘go-to guys’ so swiftly, they are
almost never debated.
That is the reason why Turkish scholars working on new media were overwhelmingly
blindsided by Twitter’s cooperation with the Turkish regime. The microblogging site
willingly contributed to AKP’s censorship attempts, on the pretext of court order given by
Turkish courts, under utter regime control and according to liberty-restraining laws, such as
Erdoğan’s personal “insult to president” law. If Turkish scholars had debated over major
Internet companies’ –such as Facebook and Twitter– business interests and their potential
partnerships with governments, perhaps they could have foreseen Twitter’s willingness to
cooperate with the Turkish regime in order to keep the site open to access, therefore
generating terrabytes of Turkey-based data, which Twitter sells through companies such as
DataSift and GNIP. Or if they had analysed how YouTube temporarily lost Turkish market to
Dailymotion along with Turkish music company deals because of the bans in 2008 and
2010,[12] they could have understood why Google kept erasing documents criminalising
Turkish government on the illegal weapon trafficking to jihadists in Syria.
New media studies need a critical approach, as the modes of production are gradually
being digitalised, if we borrow Castells’[13] terminology. Ballotised autocracies, such as
Turkey, need this approach much more than others. Major Internet companies’
business interests or despotic governments’ agendas certainly would not provide
democracy to these countries. If people would get hold of their own rights and liberties,
they will owe this to carefully-crafted strategies based on public debate and critical
thought, not on hypes and bandwagons.

Turkey - Information and Communication Technology

IT spending on hardware, software, IT services and telecommunication
services in Turkey is $23 billion. Employment has reached 113,000 jobs in
the sector and Turkey’s exports are approximately $1 billion. ICT spending
in Turkey is expected to grow faster than the world average and the sector
in the domestic market is expected to grow.

More than half of all households in Turkey have computers with internet
access, and this is expected to rise to 65.6% over the next five years. The
current percentage of internet users in Turkey is 46% and it is forecasted to
rise to above 47% in 2017. Cloud computing is gaining ground in the
Turkish market as well. Currrent social media users in Turkey are 42
million, a 5% increase over 2015.

The most heavily invested areas in ICT are:

 4.5G technology-smart phones and tablets;

 Cloud computing;
 Machine-to-machine (M2M);
 Data centers and disaster recovery areas; and
 IT services.

The Turkish technology market has significant growth potential as the

technology-driven young population continues to buy consumer electronics,
software, and products.

Traditionally, significant Personal Computer (PC) sales were confined to

Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but now PC sales have received new
momentum as the focus of demand has shifted towards the Anatolian
region. This trend is expected to continue as the rate of PC penetration
rises. PC penetration has a ripple effect on other items such as Asymetric
Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) subscription, modems, software and other
IT products and services.

Türk Telekom, a former state-owned company, is the biggest entity in the

Turkish telecommunications market. Türk Telekom was separated
from Turkish Post (PTT) in 1995. In November 2005, it was privatized
to Oger Telecom. Türk Telekom Group provides integrated
telecommunication services from Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) to broadband
Internet. With its network substructure covering the whole country, the
group's companies offer a wide range of services to personal and corporate
customers. Türk Telekom, which owns 99.9% of the shares of the
companies TTNET, Argela, Innova, Sebit A.Ş. and AssisTT, also owns
81% of the shares of Avea, one of the three GSM operators in
Turkey. Türk Telekom also supports Albania’s Albtelecom. 55% of the
shares of Turk Telekom belongs to Oger Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. and 30%
belongs to Turkey's Undersecretariat of Treasury. The remaining 15%
have been offered to the public. The value of Turk Telekom was over $15
billion in 2010. Turk Telekom’s main revenue growth came from ADSL
revenue (29%) and from mobile revenue (14%) through AVEA.

The broadband market had 62.3 million subscribers in the last quarter of
2016. Currently, fixed broadband users in Turkey is 10.5 million people.
xDSL technology is the master technology in the country with 7.8 million
subscribers. In addition, as of the last quarter of 2016, there are 1.9 million
fiber and 737,000 cable internet users. The fixed broadband penetration
rate in Turkey is 13.2% compared with a 29.8% OECD average, which
shows the potential in Turkey.

The fixed broadband market grew with fiber optic infrastructure

investments. By the last quarter of 2016, Turk Telekom led in the country
with a 228,000km long fiber optic infrastructure compared with alternative
operators, whose fiber optic length totals 63,000km. In mobile broadband,
Turk Telekom has 52 million users and holds a 64.8% countrywide
penetration rate. 50.5 million users connect to the internet via mobile
phones and 1.2 million connect via computers.

After Turkcell, Turk Telekom and Vodafone were awarded licenses for 3G
in 2008, the 3G market has rapidly evolved over recent years and will reach
a penetration ratio of 91.3% by 2017. Today, 3G plus is used by mobile
phone users. LTE licenses have been given to companies and 4.5G (LTE)
technology started to be used in the Turkish market in April 2016. The total
number of 4.5G users is 51.7 million. As a result of 4.5G deployment in
Turkey, m-commerce, mobile broadband, mobile banking services and
mobile television services increased, creating favorable business
opportunities for investors.

After the launch of the Android market in 2011, sales in Android OS

handsets greatly increased along with the general increase in the
percentage of mobile phone users. Android paved the way for the
development of applications and this is expected to grow even further with
funding and private investment for entrepreneurs in Turkey.

The three GSM cellular operators, Turkcell, Vodafone, and former AVEA,
and the fixed line operator Turk Telekom invested in equipment and
services at a total value of $4 billion to expand their services. With the
introduction of 3G, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), online services,
content and media services, E-business, personalized services, music
download, games, multi-play, video services, and other mobile
entertainment, this segment has been developing rapidly, creating new
business areas and revenues.

The BTK (Information and Communication Technologies Authority) has

registered over 75 million GSM cellular phone handsets in Turkey. The
user penetration rate is 94%. BTK estimates that Turkey imports
approximately 10 million mobile handsets every year. Many subscribers
continuously change their cell phones with new models sustaining
consistent growth in the handset market. Apple’s iPhone has been
extremely successful over the past three years. GSM cell phone sets
suitable for video downloading and TV broadcasting equipped with wide
band internet access will contribute to growth in this sector. These new
technologies will be the basis for the enhanced 3G and 4.5G (LTE)
operations.

In Turkey, Northern Telecom, Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson and NEC supply

the majority of fixed line switches, trans-multiplexers, and other telephony
equipment. U.S. companies can be competitive in software programs
required for customer databases, emergency call services, corporate
management, and intelligent network operation centers. Motorola, Nokia,
Ericsson and Siemens are the main GSM switch and base station
suppliers. U.S. companies can be competitive in new software products
required by GSM cellular operators to provide new services to their clients
and improve corporate and client management.

The GSM frequencies in Turkey start from 800 and go up to 2600 MHz. As
for frequency variation, Turkcell has the widest spectrum. The main GSM
operators buy from third parties.

This attractive consumer electronics trend has lured many international and
national electronic retail supermarkets to establish a presence in the
market. German MediaMarkt, British Electro World, Turkish Teknosa,
Vatanbilgisayar and Gold Bilgisayar have been competing for a number of
years in Turkey.

Leading Sub-Sectors
 Cybersecurity solutions;
 Cyber Forensic solutions;
 Consumer electronics;
 4.5G-related technologies and services;
 Fiber optic solutions;
 Notebook PCs;
 Audiovisual equipment;
 Wireless equipment and services;
 Internet Protocol Television (IPTV); and
 Smartphones.
Opportunities
The Turkish Government gives much importance to the e-Transformation
Turkey Project and all the other projects which are line with its information
society strategy (Registered electronic mail-KEP, e-visa, e-passport).

The young population of Turkey continues to drive sales of PCs, cell

phones, consumer electronics, and cellular voice and data services. The
audiovisual market is expected to rise further as smart buildings are
constructed with audiovisual and control room installations as well as
support entertainment consumer goods and services such as Internet
Protocol Television (IPTV). However, American ICT companies express
concern about periodic and growing restrictions on some ICT products and
services in Turkey, as well as censorship of online content.

Fiber Optic solutions are gaining market access as infrastructure

investments are made by Turk Telecom, TTNet, and other ISPs.

The cybersecurity segment is expected to grow as corporate and

government ICT security systems remain to attract significant
funding. Security of information leaving the company as well as identity
theft, network security against attackers, and viruses, are among the top
priorities with particular emphasis on providing legally sustainable evidence
used in courts of law.

The Turkish Government has increased its expenditures in hardware and

software in battling cyber threats. In order to implement these defenses,
BTK, the Department of Transportation and Communication, the
Departments of Justice and Interior, the Turkish National Police, and the
Turkish military will continue to update their cybersecurity
technologies. The Transportation, Maritime Affairs and Communication
Ministry formed SOME (Cyber Incidents Response Teams). SOME is
formed under all state organizations and institutions in order to protect
them from cyber attacks.
BTK, TUBITAK (Turkish R&D Institute) and the Ministry of Communication
& Transportation are leading the Government’s cybersecurity efforts.
 Safety and Security

*The numbers are estimates out of

interviews with the major players of the market.
The reason for that some products enter the country unrecorded or with diff
erent GTIP numbers. It is predicted that 20% of total sales is
installation and services.

The Turkish economy has serious dynamism, and a growth rate and ability
to quickly bounce back from negative events which is unique in Europe
which positively affects the sector. The past decade was marked by growth
in the Turkish economy and the sector. This growth slowed down within
Turkey in 2015 but investments in Turkic republics and in the region
provided a positive boost to the sector. However one problem was that
historic Turkish economic growth was largely dependent on a combination
of foreign capital inflows, rapid credit growth and soaring asset prices. This
left Turkey vulnerable to any changes in external financing conditions. Due
to the depreciation of TL against the € and $, the fluctuating exchange rate
in €/$ parity affected the country negatively and Turkey’s 900 km border
with Syria leaves the country vulnerable from the spillover effects of the
civil war in Syria. Moreover political unrest in the country affected the
economy adversely during the last year. A number of private and
government projects delayed or postponed their purchases, additionally
disrupting the balance of payments in the sector. On the other hand, recent
events demonstrate that Turkey needs more safety and security
technologies and there are opportunities for US firms in this sector. Many
government tendering authorities are looking to puchase new technologies.
When the economic and political stability is restored , possibly , in the last
quarter of this year, increases in the number of new construction projects
can be expected which should enliven the security sector.

For many subsectors, the health of the construction sector in country and in
the region is deeply related to growth rates. Urban revitalization, city
transformation projects, and strong housing demand reflects positively on
the market especially in big cities. Fire warning and intercom systems are
widely used in new buildings. Perimeter security and CCTV systems are
also often installed.
Some other vertical markets that will affect the sector between 2016 and
2018 are; critical infrastructure facilities and power plants, transportation
projects (primarily airport, high-speed train, metro projects and highways),
city surveillance, tunnel projects, sports halls and stadiums, border
projects, complex projects including health, hotel, shopping centers, offices
and housing. One of the decisive concepts for the sector will be green and
smart buildings which are used more often. Moreover the emphasis on
energy efficiency will increase.

MARKET ENTRY

U.S. suppliers enjoy an excellent reputation for quality, reliability, timely

delivery and after-sales service. Aggressive marketing, accompanied by
suitable financing packages, can increase the U.S. market share further.
U.S. companies should also focus on training the local distribution and
sales network. This will ensure that the end users will take full advantage of
the capabilities of the newly acquired technology.

Imports are carried out by specialized importers/distributors, local

subsidiaries of international manufacturers or domestic manufacturers with
a distribution network seeking compatible products to broaden their product
lines. Interested U.S. firms with expertise in high-tech equipment may
consider joint ventures with locally based security companies seeking
diversification.

To bid on government contracts, foreign firms must either be legally

established, or have an authorized representative in Turkey prior to
bidding, which is another reason to consider teaming with a reputable local
agent/distributor.

CURRENT MARKET TRENDS

In the IT security sector, the most widespread and popular

technologies for providing information security include
encryption (cryptography), digital signature and PKI, network segmentation
and firewalls, back up, attack detection and tracking, access control,
security depth and anti-virus. Rising user awareness with security training
will minimize the possibility of security gaps or other risk factors.
Prominent technologies regarding the gathering, storing, and distribution
of information are among the top priorities of Turkey’s private sector.
Despite the global economic crisis that led to less spending on information
technology infrastructure and upgrades, the IT security industry has
been one of the few industries to continually grow . The held true in Turkey
as well.

Corporate and government IT security systems are a particular focus in

the Turkish market. Security of information leaving the company as well
as identity theft, network security against attackers, viruses, trojans
and storage of network activities are among the top priorities with particular
emphasis on providing legally sustainable evidence used in courts of law.

MAIN COMPETITORS
Major suppliers of electronic security systems in Turkey are from the
U.S., Germany, U.K., Israel, Japan, Taiwan, China, South Korea, Italy and
Canada.

In the less sophisticated security products sector, Turkey offers 100% local
production of equipment such as protective apparel, locks
and lock subassemblies, steel doors, laminated safety glass,
portable fire extinguishers, safes, safety vaults, alarms and security panels.
For more advanced production, imported components are primarily used.

CURRENT DEMAND
Throughout the world, and including in Turkey, U.S. electronic security
products have set the standard, as most of the industry R&D
and technological innovations are realized in the U.S.

The Turkish Government has increased its expenditures in

hardware, software and education in battling cyber threats. In order
toimplement these defenses the Ministries of Justice and Interior,
the Turkish National Police and the Turkish military have all updated
their information security technologies. All governmental
and military institutions have been training their personnel
up to international standards and have been inviting expert professionals
from abroad to provide further training. Resources indicate that the Turkish
government and private sector institutions are looking at new technologies
to enhance their IT security systems. Given that there are 15 major cities in
which the national police have established crime laboratories, it is expected
that government spending on digital IT investigations will increase.

Other equipment procurements of the Turkish National Police (TNP), such

as ballistic and non-ballistic helmets, ballistic vests etc., can
beopportunities for U.S. firms. However, there is again significant
competition from European, Asian as well as domestic firms. U.S.
companies can compete on high quality and superior technology rather
than price. If the equipment offered has a high technology element that
none of the competitors can duplicate and can accommodate cost-quality
benefits, then with the prior introduction of the company and products, at
times the TNP has been willing to change the specs of the future tenders to
accomodate.

The pick-up in the construction sector accelerated

housing, hospital, shopping center and residence projects in the privat
e sector. However, the biggest consumer in coming years is the
publicsector, for projects including city surveillance,
transportationinfrastructure(airports, metros, tunnels, etc.) as well as smart
city systems.
Reference

Irak, D. (May, 2015), “Turkey’s Internet Bans and the Vicious Circle of Techno-Optimism”, Vol. IV,
Issue 5, pp.6-10, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research
Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=8766)

U.S. Commercial Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce utilizes(2017)

“Turkey - Information and Communication Technology”
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Turkey-Information-and-Communication-
Technology

U.S. Embassies abroad (2016) “safety and Security”

https://www.export.gov/article?id=Turkey-Safety-and-Security