Todd A. Diacon - Stringing Together A Nation - Cândido Mariano Da Silva Rondon and The Construction of A Modern Brazil, 1906-1930-Duke University Press Books (2004)
Todd A. Diacon - Stringing Together A Nation - Cândido Mariano Da Silva Rondon and The Construction of A Modern Brazil, 1906-1930-Duke University Press Books (2004)
c â n d i d o m a r i a n o da s i lva ro n d o n
and the c o n st ru c t i o n of a
todd a. diacon
contents
Illustrations vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
Notes 163
Bibliography 207
Index 225
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i l lu st r at i o n s
Maps
1909 expedition 28
Figures
Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon 2
Telegraph right-of-way 24
Commission workers 60
Reveille 60
Positivist-Indian shrine 88
ac k n ow l e d g m e n t s
x * ac k n ow l e d g m e n t s
ac k n ow l e d g m e n t s * xi
i n t ro d u c t i o n
i n t ro d u c t i o n * 3
4 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
i n t ro d u c t i o n * 5
6 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
i n t ro d u c t i o n * 7
Rondon graduated from normal school at the age of sixteen. Like many
Brazilians, Rondon’s only affordable option for further schooling was to
join the army. Transferred to Rio de Janeiro, he studied at the Military
Academy and at the Superior War College, graduating as a military engi-
neer in 1890.4
Rondon played a small role in the events leading to the declaration
of the Republic in 1889. Sent as a young officer back to his native Mato
Grosso, he spent thirty years constructing telegraph lines. In 1927, at the
age of sixty-two, he began the arduous task of inspecting and surveying
all of Brazil’s international borders, much of which he did on foot and
via canoe, crossing some 25,000 miles of territory. Retired from the army
in 1930, he led a very active life as president of the National Council for
the Protection of Indians. In that capacity he lobbied successfully for the
creation of the Day of the Indian national holiday, even while he devoted
himself to the cause of Positivism. He died in 1958.
* * *
This study grew out of my lengthy engagement with the literature on
Rondon, the Brazilian Old Republic, and the related themes of nation
building and state consolidation. Nevertheless, my goal is to keep this
book accessible to a larger audience. Undergraduate students and those
in the general public who are interested in history will, I believe, find
the story of the commission interesting and even entertaining. To insure
this I have kept my dialogue with the literature to a minimum in the text,
although it does appear often in the notes. The one glaring exception is
the chapter on Rondon’s policies toward Indians, for given the amount
and nature of work on this subject I found it impossible to construct my
telling of this topic without wading into debates in the larger scholarly
literature. I hope I have presented this discussion in a fashion that non-
specialists also will find interesting.
Chapter 1 places the Rondon Commission in its broad historical and
historiographical context. Chapter 2 narrates the construction of the
line, while chapter 3 focuses on the lives of the soldiers sent to work on
this project in the Amazon. Chapter 4 urges a renewed appreciation for
the role Positivism played in Rondon’s life and work. Chapter 5 discusses
Rondon’s and the Rondon Commission’s interactions with indigenous
peoples in northwest Brazil. Chapter 6 analyzes the commission’s im-
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8 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
Chapter One: st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r
a p e o p l e a n d a p l ac e
10 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
nicely turned phrase. On this route one sailed down the Atlantic coast
from Rio de Janeiro, then up the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers, such that
when traveling from one Brazilian state to another the visitor was forced
to pass through three foreign countries: Argentina, Uruguay, and Para-
guay. The journey lasted thirty days if connections with steamships were
good, compared with the forty-five days immigrants spent traveling from
Japan to Brazil in the 1920s. Once in Mato Grosso, travelers often faced
equally lengthy trips just to move about within the state. In 1900 Mato
Grosso comprised nearly 15 percent of the total land area of Brazil. Cover-
ing 1.4 million square miles, Mato Grosso was roughly the size of Alaska,
although it has since been split into two states: Mato Grosso and Mato
Grosso do Sul.3
In a land the size of Brazil, time and space could conspire to create
baffling situations for federal officials at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. Such was the case in 1914 in the southern state of Santa Catarina,
where the Brazilian army was fighting a bloody war against millenarian
rebels. Seeking to enlist local residents in the fight against the rebels,
an army commander invited Francisco Pires, a local landowner of some
means, to visit army headquarters. Soldiers raised the Brazilian flag and
played the national anthem on the parade grounds while Pires was in the
commander’s office. The landowner reportedly raced to the window and
expressed great puzzlement over what was happening before his eyes.
Incredibly, he had never seen the Brazilian flag nor heard the national
anthem, even though both had been adopted decades earlier! 4
These episodes suggest that in 1900 Brazil was a country but perhaps
not a unified country, if by that one means ‘‘the land . . . to which a per-
son owes allegiance.’’ 5 For federal officials stationed and living in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil’s vast interior could seem like a foreign country, separated
by enormous distances and varied beliefs and allegiances. Of course, the
opposite was also true, with the lives of interior residents having about as
much to do with Rio de Janeiro as they did with Paris, Berlin, or Tokyo.
Connecting these two Brazils would be Cândido Mariano da Silva Ron-
don’s lifelong challenge. Via a single, lonely telegraph line he hoped to
incorporate the faraway lands and peoples of the interior into the urban,
coastal nation governed from Rio de Janeiro.6
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a p e o p l e a n d a p l ac e * 11
12 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
tity was to replace the panoply of customs, cultures, beliefs, and back-
grounds. As the Brazilian philosopher Marilena de Souza Chaui notes,
the nation would have to include ‘‘an empirical reference (territory), and
imaginary reference (a cultural community and a political unity via the
State), and a symbolic reference (a field of cultural signifiers . . . ).’’ Urban
intellectuals and political leaders asserted their right to create that iden-
tity.9
Julyan Peard observes that ‘‘imitation was a strategy that many Latin
Americans adopted for resolving anxieties central to new nations.’’ 10 In
Latin America this meant that intellectuals looked to Europe for clues
and ideas on how to construct a supposedly modern nation. Prominent
nineteenth-century European thinkers argued that one race (one people)
comprised the nation, and they believed that ‘‘intermediary groups or
minorities destroyed [it].’’ 11 In Brazil, nation building in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries thus became primarily an elite-led
attempt to create one ‘‘people’’ (povo), or one race or national ‘‘type.’’ Yet,
Brazilian intellectuals faced a dilemma, for to be ‘‘modern was to be white
and European, but most Brazilians were neither.’’ 12
An initial solution to this seeming dilemma was to promote the mas-
sive immigration of European, and hence, white, settlers. Brazilian scien-
tists accepted the racial hierarchies of social Darwinism and hoped that
European immigrants would help ‘‘whiten’’ Brazil’s population, thus pro-
ducing a ‘‘modern’’ nation. The problem for Brazilian intellectuals, how-
ever, was that European racist theories argued that any mixture of whites
and nonwhites would produce inferior people. Given Brazil’s sizable
nonwhite population and long history of miscegenation, this seemingly
doomed the country to perpetual inferiority. Ingeniously, Brazilian intel-
lectuals rejected the Europeans’ condemnation of miscegenation (but
maintained their emphasis on racial hierarchies) by employing a version
of Lamarckian eugenics to assert instead that over the course of genera-
tions the ‘‘superior’’ white genes would ‘‘triumph’’ in Brazil.13
According to Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, race has always been a compo-
nent of nation formation in Brazil. Gradually, however, Brazilian cultural
thinkers moved away from defining whiteness as the goal of any mod-
ern nation toward a celebration precisely of the mestiço as the symbol of
Brazil. Brazilians formed a strong, unified nation, this school of thought
argued, precisely because of the union of three great races: blacks, whites,
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a p e o p l e a n d a p l ac e * 13
and Indians. And with the inclusion of the latter, Doris Sommer notes,
Brazilians truly could proclaim their independence from Portugal, for
what could be more ‘‘Brazilian’’ than to be Indian? 14
Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon subscribed wholeheartedly to the
latter attempt to create a Brazilian people and, hence, a Brazilian nation.
To be sure, he spent much of his time directing the construction of tele-
graph lines, roads, bridges, and other projects, yet he also spent much
time, perhaps even more time, energy, and thought, on implementing
plans to incorporate peoples of different ethnic and racial backgrounds
(especially Indians) into one shared nation. Building such a nation, how-
ever, first required that the isolation of vast regions of the country be
overcome. As an officer in the Brazilian army, Rondon felt he was well
placed to do this, because the army, along with the Catholic Church, was
the only truly national institution in Brazil at that time. In other words,
to build a particular kind of nation, leaders would have to extend the
reach of the Brazilian government over those who, like the perplexed
landowner in Santa Catarina, recognized none of the symbols of the na-
tion or its government.15
14 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
a p e o p l e a n d a p l ac e * 15
That the effort to construct a unified Brazilian nation required the ex-
pansion of the central state’s power can also be seen in the recruitment
activities of the Brazilian army. Early twentieth-century supporters of a
universal conscription law, such as Federal Deputy Alcindo Guanabara,
argued that an army of invigorated conscripts would help the central
government establish effective control over Brazil’s interior and would
thus serve as ‘‘an engine of national integration,’’ as Peter Beattie put it.20
Mandatory military service would also become an extended civics les-
son, in essence, by distilling ‘‘an ennobling and unifying sense of patriotic
identity to be carried throughout Brazil’s vast territorial extremities by
reservists.’’ 21 Mandatory military service, it was argued, would incorpo-
rate different groups and produce a shared, national identity. Further-
more, it would improve the health of poor Brazilians, thereby strength-
ening the nation.22
That interior peoples and lands remained far removed from urban,
coastal Brazilians, and vice-versa, can be seen from two examples from
the state of Mato Grosso. Paraguay initiated the Paraguayan War by in-
vading southern Mato Grosso in 1865. Incredibly, officials in Rio de Ja-
neiro only learned of the invasion six weeks after the fact, and throughout
the war news from the front took weeks to reach the national capital.
Twenty-four years later, on 15 November 1889, officers and soldiers in Rio
de Janeiro overthrew the Brazilian monarchy and declared the republic.
Yet, given the difficulties of communication with the far west, residents
of Cuiabá, the capital of Mato Grosso, did not learn of these events until
a month later.23
More than anything, the Paraguayan War demonstrated that the na-
tional government needed to establish a system of rapid communication
with the far west. The telegraph, a relatively new technology, promised
to do just that. It promised to conquer long distances with relative ease. It
alone, Laura Maciel notes, ‘‘was capable of lassoing the states, for it could
sew them together, thereby avoiding the disintegration [of Brasil].’’ In-
deed, she continues, the telegraph promised to serve as a kind of ‘‘metal-
lic highway’’ between the coast and the interior. Only after such infra-
structure development, Brazilian President Afonso Pena noted in 1906,
would the vast hinterlands of the country open to the circulation of agri-
cultural and industrial products. As Rondon himself put it, the expansion
of central state authority via telegraph construction was necessary for
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16 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
the progress of the Brazilian nation, for ‘‘wherever the telegraph goes,
there people will experience the benefits of civilization. With the estab-
lishment of order . . . the development of man and industry will follow
inevitably, for commerce will connect continuously the societies [of the
coast and the interior].’’ 24
a p e o p l e a n d a p l ac e * 17
Conclusion
In his official reports Rondon wrote surprisingly little about the details
of telegraph construction during his seventy-month stay in Mato Grosso.
Instead, he emphasized his other activities, such as explorations and
mapmaking, for they promised to extend the power of the federal gov-
ernment over these lands as much as the telegraph line itself did. But
what occupied Rondon the most during those years, it seems, were his
encounters with the Bororo people living in southern and central Mato
Grosso.29
By 1906, in part because of his experiences with the Bororo, Rondon
was beginning to see the nation building implications of his telegraph
work. That is, he began to feel that the telegraph could be something far
greater than a military instrument to secure border lands. His work, he
felt, could spark the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the Brazil-
ian nation as well as the migration of coastal Brazilians to Mato Grosso’s
fertile lands—it could spark, in other words, the physical, but also emo-
tional and affective, unification of his country and his nation.
Rondon’s dream of telegraph-led development for the Brazilian north-
west soon received official sanction. In February 1907, while directing
line construction between Cuiabá and the town of Cáceres in nothern
Mato Grosso, Rondon received word of a fantastic plan to extend his
activities. President Afonso Pena, impressed by Rondon’s accomplish-
ments, created a dramatically expanded telegraph commission to build a
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18 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
telegraph line north and west into the Amazon basin. The new line would
extend nearly a thousand miles from Cuiabá to the banks of the Madeira
River, and then on to Brazil’s rubber-rich territory of Acre.30
The task seemed herculean. Southern Mato Grosso was sparsely popu-
lated, but it was a veritable megalopolis when compared to the lands to
the northwest. To be sure, a few Brazilians of European descent lived
along the numerous tributaries of the Amazon River, as did groups of in-
digenous peoples. But for the most part the proposed line would cross
lands rarely seen or mapped. It would cross the Amazon basin by land,
thus breaking the riverine grip on the settlement of that vast region.
President Pena’s edict established the Rondon Commission’s duties
with a nod to the dual goals of state and nation building. In addition
to building the line, Rondon was to study the region, to explore it and
map it so as to promote the effective occupation and incorporation of
the area. He was to survey lands and open them to the flood of migrants
he hoped would follow his lead. Using methods he had developed in the
previous years, he was to contact indigenous peoples and turn them into
Brazilians. Thus, with great spirit and energy, Rondon announced that
his goal was to develop the Amazon, ‘‘to make it productive by submit-
ting it to our actions, to bring it nearer to us [coastal Brazilians]. It is to
extend to the farthest ends of this enormous country the civilizing effort
of mankind. This is the elevated directive of our great statesman [Presi-
dent Afonso Pena], for he understands the primordial necessity of the
development of this Patria.’’ 31
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20 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 21
22 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 23
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 25
the cities. The fluttering Brazilian flag, hoisted atop a long pole planted
in the middle of the jungle, reinforced the nation-building lessons taking
place below.
At 7:00 a.m. Rondon officially established the Juruena camp, then
exhorted his troops to fulfill their duties and destinies. ‘‘The crashing
sounds of dynamite’’ then ‘‘echoed up and down the Juruena Valley,’’
as joyous soldiers celebrated the holiday. That night Rondon concluded
with a final assertion of nation and state as fireworks filled the sky while
against the jungle backdrop a commission projectionist showed slides of
the president of the republic, the minister of transportation, and other
figures.15
In a little less than a month Rondon and his crew of some seventy sol-
diers managed to open a trail to a point fifty-five miles west of the Juruena
base camp. During that time an expedition scout got lost in the dense
forest and was rescued a day later, but only after Rondon had ordered his
men to scale trees, fire their rifles, and explode sticks of dynamite to draw
the wayward soldier’s attention. In the meantime almost all of the pack
animals had faltered, leading Rondon to order his men to carry their own
supplies. This order, he noted later, along with the constant fear of at-
tack from the Nambikwara people, caused four men to desert with their
supplies and weapons and led Rondon to collect all of the rifles of the
soldiers not on guard duty ‘‘so that more desertions would be avoided.’’ 16
Similar problems with desertions from the crew constructing the tele-
graph line forced Rondon to abandon this cherished expedition in early
October 1908. Twenty-eight soldiers had gone awol, and those who re-
mained staged work stoppages because of food shortages. Informed of
the problems on the line by two tired messengers sent from Juruena,
Rondon called off the expedition and returned to Diamantino. There
he addressed the matter (although how he does not say), then turned
immediately to organizing yet another expedition from Juruena to the
Madeira River.17
Rondon’s 1909 plan to cross more than 800 miles of territory on foot
and thus to conquer this great unknown region rested on a flawed supply
plan. From the previous expedition Rondon knew that oxen could not
survive the entire journey, as there simply was not enough pasture to
support the beasts. The sandy soils of the Parecis Plateau did not pro-
vide enough fodder for pack animals. West of Juruena the Amazon forest
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26 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
Rondon and officers on the Juruena River. Courtesy of Comissão Rondon, Serviço
de Registro Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 27
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1909 expedition. Inset map revised from original in Bakewell, History of Latin
America, xxiii.
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 29
gust and the crew was well beyond the range of commission pack ani-
mals from that camp. In early September soldiers abandoned the last of
the expedition’s exhausted oxen, thus forcing Rondon to jettison most of
the botanical and zoological specimens, heavy photographic plates, and
most of the remaining gear. The men now hauled equipment on their
backs. Furthermore, a sense of dread washed over them, as the expedi-
tion failed to encounter the resupply crew Rondon had sent up the Jaci-
paraná River. Due to an error in the existing maps, Rondon had believed
he would cross this river on the journey to the Madeira River. Instead,
they passed hundreds of miles to the north.22
For the final months of the expedition Rondon and his men hunted,
gathered, and fished for their food. Monkeys, insects, honey, and fish
provided sustenance, if not satisfaction, and the hard work of hunting
simply added to the difficulties of blazing a trail. Fishing consisted of
throwing sticks of dynamite into pools and streams, then collecting the
fish that rose to the surface. On one occasion in late October, Lieuten-
ant Antonio Pirineus de Souza collected a piranha amongst the bevy of
stunned fish gathered in his arms. As told later by Rondon, the piranha
regained consciousness and bit off a part of the lieutenant’s tongue. The
massive bleeding that followed nearly suffocated him.23
In November 1909 malaria weakened Dr. Joaquim Augusto Tanajura,
the expedition’s physician, and several other officers and soldiers. At
the headwaters of the Pimenta Bueno River, a tributary of the Jiparaná
River, Rondon ordered the ailing Tanajura, First Lieutenant Alencarli-
ense Fernandes da Costa, commission zoologist Dr. Alípio de Miranda
Ribeiro, and eleven other mostly ill men into the dugout canoes soldiers
had fashioned on the spot. From there they descended the rivers to the
point where the Jiparaná empties into the Madeira River, where, after
five weeks of difficult portages, the sick and hungry men finally obtained
aid and comfort in the town of Calama.24
Rondon and his remaining men trudged on under the thick forests of
what is today the state of Rondônia. They crossed the Urupá River. They
reached the headwaters of the Jaru River on 7 December 1909. At that
point Rondon instructed his men to fashion more dugout canoes and
ordered two ill lieutenants and twelve sick men to float that river to the
Jaciparaná River, then on to the Madeira River at Calama, where they ar-
rived on 29 December.25 At this point ‘‘six soldiers, six civilian workers,
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30 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
and Lieutenants Lyra and Amarante remained with me; our backpacks
contained nothing more than a change of clothes.’’ The crew continued
on, although most of them were ill, including Rondon, who suffered the
high fevers of his chronic form of malaria. All the while they continued
to chart the path of the future telegraph line.26
In the sixth month of his expedition Rondon and his skeleton crew ap-
proached the headwaters of the Jamari River on 13 December 1909. There
they surprised a husband-and-wife team who were collecting latex, for
no one imagined that men would appear out of the jungle, by land,
in a region that was limited to riverine settlements of latex gatherers.
The couple explained to the exhausted and sick men that this was the
Jamari River, not the Jaciparaná, leading Rondon to realize that he would
never encounter his resupply crew. Armed with this information, Ron-
don opted not to cross the remaining territory between the Jamari and
Madeira Rivers. Instead, he and his men prepared dugout canoes and de-
scended the Jamari. After having spent several days passing through areas
occupied by latex gatherers, on 25 December 1909, the crew approached
the town of Primor—after six months and nearly 900 miles, an emo-
tional event for the men. Rondon characteristically stressed the nation-
and state-building implications of their arrival: ‘‘What a shock it was for
residents of the Jamari [River] to witness our Expedition, because we ar-
rived flying the Republican [national] banner which for three straight
years had guided us on our journeys across northwest Mato Grosso; and
because they heard, probably for the first time, who knows, the victori-
ous melody of the anthem of the Fifth Battalion of Engineers.’’ 27
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 31
32 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
do Madeira in November 1911. The main crew, now named the Southern
Section, continued construction northwest out of Juruena.30
Throughout 1911, 1912, and 1913, soldiers made steady progress while
Rondon traveled back and forth between the two sections, sometimes
surveying the line northwest out of Juruena, sometimes directing the
placement of the line southeast out of Santo Antonio do Madeira. On
the Southern Section he inaugurated the Nambikwara, Vilhena, and José
Bonifácio stations in 1911 and 1912. By June 1912, soldiers of the North-
ern Section had inaugurated stations at the terminus of Santo Antonio
do Madeira, at Jamari, and at Caritianas, the latter two of which were
located on the Jamari River.31
A year later workers inaugurated the Barão de Melgaço station. At
that station, in early October 1913, a very busy Rondon received an un-
usual telegram from Lauro Muller, an old Army Academy classmate who
was now Brazil’s minister of foreign relations. In the telegram Muller
ordered Rondon to proceed immediately to Rio de Janeiro. Former U.S.
President Theodore Roosevelt was set to give a series of speeches in the
countries of southern South America. As part of his tour, Roosevelt had
requested that Muller arrange a December safari through the Brazilian
northwest as a sort of grand finale of his South American journey. He
asked Muller to contract a guide to accompany the expedition. Rondon
was to be that guide.32
The timing of Roosevelt’s request and Muller’s order could not have
been worse. Construction had begun to bog down in the thick rainforest
of the Amazon basin. Illnesses sapped the strength of the construction
crew and strained Rondon’s administrative abilities. A November 1914
inauguration date for the telegraph line loomed large. And now Rondon
would have to drop everything and head for Rio de Janeiro. To make mat-
ters worse, there was no quick and efficient way to travel from the tele-
graph line to the coast. Thus it took him five weeks to make the trek, first
down the Jiparaná River in a canoe and a small, motorized boat to the
Madeira River, then on a steamer down the Amazon River to the Atlantic
Ocean and on to Rio.33
Rondon clearly recognized the public-relations benefit of Roosevelt’s
proposed journey for the country and for his telegraph project, but he
lamented that Muller had informed him of the mission just as Roosevelt
set sail for Brazil. This meant that an encounter between the two would
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 33
have to wait until the expedition began in late December, for Roosevelt
had already toured and left Rio de Janeiro for Argentina by the time Ron-
don arrived in the city. ‘‘What a pity it is that they only called me just as
Roosevelt was leaving New York,’’ he noted in a telegram to one of his
lieutenants while on route, ‘‘for I do not own a dirigible with which to
fly over the vast territory of our country.’’ 34
Roosevelt’s traveling partner, the American priest Father John Augus-
tine Zahm, described their reception in Rio de Janeiro as akin to ‘‘all
the wild enthusiasm of a national holiday.’’ Large crowds met Roose-
velt when he arrived on 22 October 1913. The ex-president and his wife
toured the city, met with Brazilian officials, and attended state dinners.
Roosevelt lectured at the ymca and at a reception in his honor at the
Jockey Club. The Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro named Roose-
velt an honorary member. Newspapers covered the events with banner
headlines and front-page photographs of the festivities. ‘‘Mr Roosevelt,’’
a Jornal do Comércio reporter gushed, ‘‘is a true friend of Brazil.’’ 35
Other authors, however, just as quickly condemned Roosevelt’s im-
perialism. They denounced his participation in the war with Spain and
in the U.S. manipulation of the events leading to the creation of Panama.
Roosevelt’s speeches in Rio defending the Monroe Doctrine offended
them, although one journalist argued that this visit convinced Roosevelt
of the impossibility of imperial rule over large, prosperous countries such
as Brazil. An Imparcial reporter noted Roosevelt’s assertion that together
the United States and Brazil, as allies, could bring peace and civilization
to South America. That, the journalist concluded, was the kind of lie a
parent tells a child.36
Commentators sensitive to the construction of a modern Brazil seized
on Roosevelt’s planned expedition across the wilds of Brazil to criticize
the refusal of Americans to see Brazil as anything but a nation of jungles
and wild animals. Indeed, they sought to teach Roosevelt the foreigner
about the real, modern Brazilian nation as they saw it. Roosevelt wasn’t
interested in the Brazilian people, an Imparcial reporter argued, nor was
he interested in the Brazilian society and government. Instead, he cared
‘‘only about our animals and how to hunt and kill them.’’ In a mocking
editorial, ‘‘C.L.’’ satirized the decision of Brazilian officials to tour the
city of Rio de Janeiro with Roosevelt. The former president did not want
to see buildings, C.L. bellowed. Nor did he wish to see signs of civiliza-
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34 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
tion such as railroads and skyscrapers, because the U.S. was already full
of such things. No, he charged, Roosevelt lusted only for the wild, sav-
age jungle. Thus, if C.L. had been organizing things, he would have met
Roosevelt’s ship with schoolgirls dressed as Indians, with snakes piled
high and wide on the docks, and with monkeys running wild through the
crowds in order to create an ‘‘authentic’’ Brazilian experience for Roose-
velt’s enjoyment. Thank God, C.L. sneered, that Roosevelt had protected
such an uncivilized people from European invasion! And on a more seri-
ous note he suggested one small addition to Roosevelt’s precious Monroe
Doctrine: that it also protect American nations from conquests and ter-
ritorial expansion by one particular American nation, for ‘‘then, yes, we
could support the Monroe Doctrine!’’ 37
As Roosevelt continued his South American tour, Rondon, in tran-
sit to Rio, proposed to the former president an exploration of the Rio
da Dúvida instead of a simple hunting trip across the Brazilian north-
west, a suggestion that Roosevelt accepted enthusiastically. Rondon was
fairly certain that this river emptied into the Madeira River, but its upper
course had never been mapped or explored (hence its name). To reach
this river, the expedition would first travel from the commission ware-
house at Tapirapuã to the telegraph line at Utiariti. Then they would
march under the telegraph line for roughly 150 miles to the headwaters of
the Dúvida. This new and decidedly more onerous itinerary concerned
Foreign Minister Muller, and he warned Roosevelt of its dangers. After
all, Roosevelt would turn fifty-five while on the expedition.38
Roosevelt was finishing his months-long South American tour when
he and Rondon met on ships moored in the Paraguay River in Decem-
ber 1913. Among those accompanying Roosevelt were his son Kermit (an
engineer who had been employed in railroad and bridge construction
in Brazil for the past year), as well as Father Zahm and two naturalists,
George Cherrie and Leo Miller, from the American Museum of Natural
History. The diminutive Rondon and rotund Roosevelt communicated
in halting French, sometimes employing Kermit as a translator. After
several hunting trips in central Mato Grosso, they made their way to
the Tapirapuã camp of the Rondon Commission, where they arrived on
16 January 1914.39
The scope of preparations in Tapirapuã impressed Roosevelt, and he
attributed them to the importance Brazilian officials placed on the expe-
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Roosevelt and Rondon, probably near Cáceres, Mato Grosso. Courtesy of Comissão
Rondon, Serviço de Registro Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
Rondon and officers with supply wagon. Courtesy of Comissão Rondon, Serviço de
Registro Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
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36 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
dition, noting that the government wanted ‘‘not merely a success, but a
success of note.’’ What he could not have realized was that this was busi-
ness as usual for the Rondon Commission and that the scope of prepara-
tions paled in comparison with the explorations that had departed from
Tapirapuã in 1907 and 1908. Roosevelt also did not understand or ap-
preciate the new round of problems he created for Rondon, for he had
arrived with far more baggage and many more crates than Rondon was
prepared to transport.40
In fact, Rondon searched frantically for more pack animals while his
men labored to divide the contents of the largest crates into units ap-
propriate for mules, horses, and oxen. Indeed, Rondon himself created
a crisis within the commission when he appropriated the pack animals
that had been reserved for commission biologist Frederico Hoehne, who
was along to collect specimens for the National Museum of Brazil. An
outraged Hoehne resigned from the expedition, raising the nationalist
complaint that he had been deprived of transport ‘‘while at the same time
the foreigners were allowed to continue with bountiful resources and
pack animals.’’ 41
Hoehne’s nationalist quip highlighted ongoing tensions, for Rondon
and Foreign Minister Lauro Muller (whose ministry financed the expe-
dition) clearly hoped that Roosevelt, a famous foreigner from a modern,
industrialized nation, would trumpet Brazil’s progress and potential to
foreign audiences. Yet, this meant treating the Americans lavishly to gain
their favor, which only emphasized Brazil’s subservient status among the
nations of the world. By that point expenses far exceeded the ministry’s
budget for Roosevelt’s visit and expedition, and Muller began to balk at
Rondon’s requests for funds to purchase more animals and other items.
Rondon dared not offend the Americans by asking them to reduce their
own baggage, so he began to abandon commission supplies. In despera-
tion he insisted on overloading his pack animals, and his men struggled
to place the giant loads on new, unbroken animals. This prompted the
Americans to attribute the growing chaos to Rondon’s and the Brazilians’
incompetence, and led a furious Kermit Roosevelt to write that at that
point he was ‘‘ready to kill the whole lot [of pack animals] and all the
members of the expedition.’’ 42
Two separate units, which together included some 250 pack animals,
departed Tapirapuã on 21 January 1914. The route, which by then was
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 39
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 41
miles. Sickness, hunger, and exhaustion hovered over the camp, yet the
expedition, properly speaking, had not yet even begun, as nary a canoe
had entered the River of Doubt’s waters. In dramatic fashion Roosevelt
recalled the uncertainty that awaited them. If the River of Doubt emptied
into the Jiparaná River, then the trek would end within a week. If it
emptied into the Madeira River, it might take several weeks. If it did not
connect with either river, then their final destination and their fates were
unknown. Rondon, by contrast, was confident that the river emptied into
the Madeira, so much so that he had arranged earlier for a commission
relief crew to travel up the Aripuanã River, a tributary of the Madeira, to
await the expedition.49
The nagging discontent over supplies quickly reappeared. In Juruena,
Rondon insisted that the Americans abandon the canvas canoes they
had brought with them, for their weight was too much for the Brazilian
porters to bear during the rain-soaked trek to the River of Doubt. Roose-
velt then discovered that Rondon ‘‘had somehow allowed several mule
loads of provisions for his men to be left behind when their pack train
was reorganized,’’ which, we now know, Rondon had ordered so as to not
threaten the foodstuffs of the Americans. Roosevelt now felt it necessary
to share the Americans’ food with the Brazilians because of Rondon’s
‘‘rather absurd lack of forethought,’’ as Roosevelt put it.50
Rondon had hired, at considerable cost, thirteen of Mato Grosso’s
best canoeists to guide, along with three soldiers, the expedition’s dug-
out canoes down the River of Doubt. Rondon, Dr. Cajazeira, and Lieu-
tenant Salustiano Lyra rounded out the Brazilian contingent. Theodore
Roosevelt, his son Kermit, and the naturalist George Cherrie completed
the crew. They prepared to descend the river in the heavy dugout canoes
that, because of the weight of supplies, barely rode above the surface of
the waters. ‘‘Now entirely on their own,’’ as Joseph Ornig describes it,
‘‘Roosevelt’s party found themselves descending a wild, timber-choked
mountain stream that had overflowed its banks after weeks of torren-
tial rains. The surrounding forest stood drowned in a network of lagoons
and channels extending far inland. Scores of palm trees, uprooted by the
souring current, lay strewn like matchsticks along the shoreline. In some
places, a dead tree sagged far enough across the narrow river to force the
boatmen to make a frantic detour around the huge trunk. It was then, T.R.
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42 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
wrote, that ‘the muscles stood out on the backs and arms of the paddlers
as stroke on stroke they urged us away from and past the obstacle.’ ’’ 51
On the River of Doubt the dispute over the nature and goals of the
expedition quickly surfaced once again. Roosevelt’s primary goal was
to experience an adventure and to help his American colleagues gather
specimens for the American Museum of Natural History. He desired a
speedy descent of the River of Doubt, especially because of his height-
ened fears concerning the expedition’s food supplies and because his son
continued to suffer from high fevers. Rondon, by contrast, envisioned a
much slower descent, for he sought to explore and survey not only the
River of Doubt but also its major tributaries. Unlike Roosevelt, the dwin-
dling supplies did not concern him. He had, after all, recently survived
significantly more strenuous treks on foot across northwest Mato Grosso
and had done so with far fewer provisions.
Surveying the river did indeed consume much time and energy. Ker-
mit Roosevelt would go ashore with a sighting rod while Rondon would
read the angle and distance from his canoe in order to establish coordi-
nates. According to Ornig, this meant that in a six-mile stretch Kermit
Roosevelt landed 114 times to plant the survey rod. To make matters
worse, four days into the descent they encountered their first set of falls
on the river.52
The expedition’s massive dugout canoes could shoot precious few of
the river’s rapids; some of them were as long as twenty-five feet and
weighed well over a thousand pounds when empty. On the third of
March, crewmembers began the first of what would become many por-
tages, this time around the Navaité Falls. First the men unloaded the
cargo, then employed a block and tackle to hoist the waterlogged canoes
up the steep banks of the river. Ahead of them some of the men struggled
to clear a path through the forest. Yet others fashioned small logs to serve
as rollers, across which everyone strained to push and pull the canoes
overland. Finally, the men carried the cargo on their backs along the
newly hewn trail. Two-and-a-half exhausting days later the canoes were
back in the water.53
Another series of grinding portages strained bodies, emotions, and re-
lations among expedition members after just two days of calm waters.
Between March seventh and ninth the men cut a quarter-mile portage
path through the jungle to avoid the next set of falls. On 15 March a
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third major portage turned into disaster when Kermit Roosevelt ignored
Rondon’s orders and, along with a canoeist, explored a possible route
through the rapids. The craft overturned, and while Kermit was able to
swim to shore, the commission employee drowned. An outraged Ron-
don lamented the loss of his crewmember and the disregard of his orders.
Theodore Roosevelt, by contrast, was seemingly more worried about the
possible delay the accident might cause. ‘‘On an expedition such as ours,’’
he noted, ‘‘death is one of the accidents that may at any time occur. . . .
One mourns sincerely, but mourning cannot interfere with labor.’’ 54
In separate incidents the rushing waters of the River of Doubt carried
away canoes and the precious block and tackle. By mid-March the lack
of canoes forced most of the men to struggle over river boulders and
through the forest on foot, while Theodore Roosevelt and Dr. Cajazeira
guided the remaining canoes, now lashed together to form a raft, on the
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44 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
river. Roosevelt was by now in a near panic over the dwindling supplies,
but Rondon seemed to view the events as business as usual and appeared
satisfied by efforts to hunt and gather food. The former U.S. president
despaired over the slowness of the journey, complaining that in eighteen
days they had traveled just seventy-five miles. ‘‘We had lost four canoes
and one man,’’ the ex-president noted. ‘‘We were in the country of wild
Indians, who shot well with their bows [the expedition never encoun-
tered Indians, nor were they ever attacked, save Rondon’s dog]. It be-
hooved us to go warily, but also to make all speed possible, if we were to
avoid serious trouble.’’ 55
The roiling dispute over the speed of the trek came to a head in mid-
March when Rondon, over Roosevelt’s objection, ordered a halt of sev-
eral days to build new canoes. In personal correspondence uncovered by
Joseph Ornig, we know that an infuriated George Cherrie and Kermit
Roosevelt accused Rondon of ordering his canoe builders to go slowly
so that Lieutenant Lyra would have time to survey the area. A perturbed
Theodore Roosevelt pulled Rondon into his tent for a conversation, ex-
pressing concern for Kermit’s health, the dangers of Indian attack, and
the lack of supplies, and insisting that all formal surveying of the river
cease immediately.56
A disappointed Rondon agreed to Roosevelt’s demand. This was a
hard pill to swallow, for surveying the River of Doubt had been his pri-
mary goal for the expedition. Rondon indeed had justified the delay the
expedition would cause in the construction of the telegraph by point-
ing out precisely the benefits of such a survey. Thus, while Rondon’s on-
going task was to display the authority of the central state and explain
the power of his vision of the Brazilian nation to those in the interior,
at this point he faced his own and his country’s subservience to a more
powerful nation, the United States of America, as well as to the powerful
personality of Theodore Roosevelt. In public Rondon never articulated
any dismay over this situation. Whether or not he did so privately is un-
known. Curiously, all of his diary entries for the Roosevelt-Rondon ex-
pedition are missing, as is his unpublished account of the trip. Likewise,
the official ‘‘Orders of the Day’’ for the expedition are missing for the
days of the descent of the River of Doubt.57
Roosevelt was the titular commander of the expedition, and Rondon
had little choice but to accept the American’s wishes. ‘‘I replied that we
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 45
were there to accompany him and to take him across the wilderness,’’
Rondon later recalled, ‘‘and that therefore we would execute the services
in accordance with his wishes.’’ ‘‘For this reason,’’ he concluded, the ‘‘sur-
vey proceeded without our being able to obtain all the benefit of the tech-
nical resources which we had at our disposal and with which we had
carried out a sufficiently exact and correct work.’’ 58
A late-March encounter with an even longer and much more difficult
series of rapids mocked the strain of the journey thus far and threat-
ened to break the expedition members. Furthermore, the rapids cut a
deep gorge through the surrounding terrain, so that portaging the canoes
over land was impossible. Instead, men tied long ropes to the canoes and
scampered across shoreline boulders while guiding the vessels through
the rapids. Others hauled the supplies up the river’s bank, cleared a two-
mile path over the steep hills above the gorge, and began carrying the
cargo to an area below the rapids.
This canyon portage consumed a week of time and the last of Roose-
velt’s patience. Constant hunger haunted everyone, he noted, and many
of the men were too ill to work effectively. Prompted by the memories
of this particularly difficult time, Roosevelt observed later that Rondon
and the Brazilians ‘‘did an extraordinary amount of work; but they would
leave out certain essential things. This was characteristic of everything
they did. Their short-comings in preparation were astonishing.’’ 59
In contrast, Rondon, who was still smarting from Roosevelt’s recent
refusal to allow him to explore a major river (the Taunay) where it
emptied into the River of Doubt, still described the journey as business
as usual. ‘‘The sanitary conditions of the expedition were good,’’ he noted
about the days of this portage, ‘‘and the quantity of provisions were . . .
sufficient to assure . . . the termination of the voyage.’’ Indeed, under
normal circumstances (that is, without Roosevelt), Rondon argued, this
would have been ‘‘a good occasion to extend, with greater leisure, our
exploration into the interior of these lands.’’ 60
Rondon’s hope for greater leisure and normal circumstances evapo-
rated as Theodore Roosevelt’s health worsened in late March and early
April. On 27 March Roosevelt cut his leg while helping to right a cap-
sized canoe. On the next day he began to exhibit signs of malaria, and his
fever topped 105 degrees. He steadily worsened, and Dr. Cajazeira estab-
lished a night watch for the patient and began to inject quinine every six
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46 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 47
Conclusion
Rondon realized that construction of the telegraph line would likely
grind to a halt during his seven-and-a-half-month involvement with the
Roosevelt-Rondon expedition. He justified his decision in part on the
publicity his participation in Roosevelt’s activities would bring to his
project. That assumption proved to be correct, for newspapers in Rio
de Janeiro trumpeted the expedition and Rondon’s telegraph work for
months on end. Furthermore, the press covered at length Theodore
Roosevelt’s June 1914 lectures in England about the trip, as well as the
publication of Roosevelt’s account of it (Through the Brazilian Wilder-
ness).65
Publicity alone, however, would not finish the construction of the line.
For that, Rondon returned directly to northwest Mato Grosso in order to
lead the final construction push. Since October 1913, Rondon had trav-
eled to Rio de Janeiro, returned to Mato Grosso, and led the Roosevelt
expedition down the River of Doubt. He now returned to finish construc-
tion as the inauguration date (which had been pushed back to 1 January
1915) dominated his thoughts. While Theodore Roosevelt rested in the
stateroom of his transatlantic steamship and later at his home in Oyster
Bay, New York, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon headed back into the
Amazon basin to begin the most difficult and crucial phase of telegraph
construction.
The disarray of the construction camps up and down the proposed line
confirmed Rondon’s earlier fears. Great waves of malarial infections had
shut down construction for the entire time Rondon had been attending
to Roosevelt. During Rondon’s absence, eight different officers had as-
sumed command of construction, but each one of them quickly retreated
to Rio de Janeiro in various stages of ill health. To make matters worse,
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Cuiabá–Santo Antonio telegraph line. Inset map revised from original in Bake-
well, History of Latin America, xxiii.
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 49
construction was now passing through the most difficult terrain of the re-
gion, from the headwaters of the Jiparaná River west to the Jamari River.
Thick forests, sharp peaks, and rushing rivers strained workers’ abilities,
even as the constant presence of malaria weakened their resolve.66
After reorganizing work on the Southern Section along the headwaters
of the Jiparaná River (at the Barão de Melgaço and Pimento Bueno tele-
graph stations), Rondon returned to the Northern Section and began sur-
veying the right-of-way east from the Arikêmes station to the left bank of
the Jaru River. Leaving the construction of this section to subordinates,
Rondon then led the difficult right-of-way survey of the forest between
the Jaru River and the Jiparaná River, finishing in September 1914.67
In the months after the Roosevelt-Rondon expedition (May–
December 1914), Rondon and his men inaugurated five telegraph sta-
tions (Pimenta Bueno, Presidente Hermes, Presidente Pena, Jaru, and
Arikêmes) and 230 miles of telegraph line. Between 1907 and 1915 they
had strung the main telegraph line across 800 miles of mostly difficult
terrain and constructed some twenty telegraph stations. They built an-
other 300 miles of connecting telegraph lines, along with a dozen more
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b u i l d i n g t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 51
telegraph stations. They built bridges, corrals, and rafts to serve as fer-
ries. They explored rivers and valleys. They fought illnesses, torrential
rainstorms, insects, and animals, and faced severe shortages of food and
supplies.68
After the expenditure of so much time and energy and after so many
years of danger and adventure, the inauguration of the entire line on
1 January 1915 took place with surprisingly little fanfare. This seems odd
because during the eight years of construction Rondon celebrated every
station inauguration, every national holiday, and even minor events such
as Columbus Day with speeches, fireworks, and music. Perhaps Rondon
and his men were too tired and ill to plan and participate in such festivi-
ties. He had not seen his family for any extended period in more than
sixteen months, and perhaps he wished simply to go home to Rio de
Janeiro.69
‘‘An electric buzz of progress’’ now connected Cuiabá with the Ama-
zon basin. And yet, on 1 January 1915 very little changed, which might
have been the real reason for the lack of inaugural festivities. To begin
with, few people wished to use the services of the telegraph line. Second,
those precious-few souls who did attempt to send a telegram could not,
for the line had been inaugurated in name only. Constant service inter-
ruptions caused by rushed jobs and shoddy workmanship meant that the
line, a commission officer later admitted, basically did not work.70
Rondon traveled to Rio de Janeiro in early 1915, where he enjoyed
great acclaim for his efforts and gave stirring speeches to packed audi-
ences about the commission’s heroic accomplishments. Meanwhile, in
the Amazon basin officers, soldiers, and civilian workers trudged back
down the telegraph line’s right-of-way to continue with what they had
been doing for eight years. There they labored for another full year to fin-
ish construction and to inaugurate telegraph communications in more
than name only. These were the men (and women) who truly built the
telegraph line.
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Chapter Three: wo r k i n g a n d l i v i n g
o n t h e l o n e ly l i n e
54 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
Reluctant ‘‘Recruits’’
National leaders spoke of, analyzed, and increasingly worried about the
quality of Brazilian soldiers during the years of the Rondon Commission.
A modern nation required a modern army staffed with healthy and prop-
erly educated soldiers. Ongoing attempts to create a national draft lottery
focused on ‘‘civilizing’’ the Brazilian poor through national military ser-
vice and training. Alarmingly, these soldiers, ideally to become agents of
the state and nation themselves, were often illiterate, mostly sick, and
troublesome.2
They were also fearful. In his 1913 report to Rondon, Captain Luiz C.
Franco Ferreira repeated a familiar complaint. Soldiers in Rio de Janeiro
who had been assigned to the Rondon Commission simply did every-
thing they could to avoid service in the Amazon. Ferreira’s colleague Cap-
tain João Florentino Meira de Faria noted in his own report that a soldier
chosen for service with the Rondon Commission ‘‘is the target of the sin-
cerest and saddest expressions of sympathy.’’ Fears of dreaded and deadly
diseases terrified soldiers, and most of them treated their assignments
to the Amazon as death sentences. Given such fears, Captain Ferreira
noted, armed guards accompanied commission soldiers as they marched
through the streets of Rio de Janeiro, lest they escape before boarding
ships bound for the dreaded region.3
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l i v i n g o n t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 55
Legislation called for a minimum of 350 soldiers to serve with the Ron-
don Commission. As many as 600 soldiers were assigned to the commis-
sion for much of the construction era (especially 1910–1914). Most of the
soldiers came from the Fifth Engineering Battalion in Rio de Janeiro, al-
though at times Rondon was allowed to request additional troops from
garrisons in the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso. If one follows Peter
Beattie’s estimate of roughly 12,000 to 16,000 soldiers in Brazil during
peacetime in this era, then perhaps as many as 5 percent of all soldiers
in Brazil were serving with the Rondon Commission at any given time.4
Officers complained about the quality of the soldiers assigned for duty
on the telegraph line. Most of them, the officers noted, had been forced
into military service, were illiterate, very poor, and often criminals. Army
commanders ordered to cede soldiers to the Rondon Commission did so
by sending their worst workers, biggest troublemakers, and most insub-
ordinate soldiers. Soldiers weak from chronic illnesses such as tubercu-
losis and malaria reported for Rondon Commission service. If they were
prisoners from barracks revolts, they arrived broken by corporal punish-
ment and from having eaten nothing but bread and water for days.5
In this sense the Rondon Commission mirrored the situation of the
Brazilian army at large. The impressment of soldiers was the norm, so
much so that Beattie noted that ‘‘the army functioned as a national labor
regime and quasi-penal institution in different regions of Brazil.’’ He in-
dicates further that perhaps as many as half of all soldiers served against
their will. Most soldiers were obtained from the ranks of the so-called
unprotected poor, meaning that they did not have the financial resources
or political connections to avoid military service. Furthermore, as with
the Rondon Commission, commanders in other regions commonly un-
loaded their sickest and most troublesome soldiers when authorities in
Rio de Janeiro requested troops.6
In one infamous case, the Brazilian government forced rebellious
sailors to labor for the Rondon Commission. In 1910 sailors in Rio de
Janeiro mutinied in protest of corporal punishment, among other things.
The Chibata Revolt, so-called because the chibata was a type of whip
used in naval corporal punishment, ended with the imprisonment of the
mutineers and the decision to send 100 prisoners to Santo Antonio do
Madeira in the Amazon, where they would work on telegraph construc-
tion under Rondon’s command.7
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gularly unhealthy, full of shallow pools and standing water where, ac-
cording to one commission physician, ‘‘malaria washe[d] over the place.’’
Officers organized units and often began the one- or two-week march
to the site of telegraph construction on the very day of arrival in Tapi-
rapuã.12
In June 1908, 274 soldiers arrived in Tapirapuã after the long journey
from Rio de Janeiro. Forty-five of them were too ill to make what at that
time was the subsequent nine-day march to the construction zone. In
1913 an indignant commission officer witnessed not the arrival of sick
men but rather the arrival of what clearly were insubordinate troops de-
termined to resist their fate. With horror he noted that as they marched
‘‘the soldiers began to dance the samba’’ while they shouted ‘‘Death to
the [Rondon] Commission.’’ A commission officer in Santo Antonio do
Madeira devised a novel approach to guarantee the morale of troops
arriving from Rio de Janeiro via Manaus. Fearful that his own troops
looked frightfully unhealthy, he ordered them to leave the city so as to not
startle the new recruits who, after all, arrived ‘‘with the expectation, even
certainty, that they would encounter [in the Amazon] a habitat which
is incompatible with the most rudimentary conditions of human exis-
tence.’’ 13
Routinely Ill
Newly arrived soldiers quickly learned camp and work routines. Reveille
sounded at 4 a.m., at which time men jumped into nearby rivers or
streams for a quick bath. Such washings were enjoyable and relaxing dur-
ing a lazy afternoon of rest, but in the morning darkness soldiers gashed
feet on submerged sticks, twisted ankles on slippery rocks, and dreaded
encounters with snakes. Soldiers queued for a breakfast of tea, coffee, and
farofa, a type of fried flour mixed with bits of beef. At 5 a.m. they began
the march from their camp to the construction site, which, depending
on the location of construction, might take an hour, or even two. At the
same time an advance team of surveyors would be waking up at their
isolated bivouac far beyond the construction site.14
Some of the men did not wake up alone, as women routinely accompa-
nied their partners. Sometimes they helped carry their husbands’ tools
and other equipment on the marches to and from the point of construc-
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the night where he was, hoping that his colleagues would find him the
next day. Once in camp the men ate a quick dinner at eight or nine
o’clock, then retired to their tents, which were arranged by rank. To pro-
tect against attacks by wild animals, the norm was to camp in the form of
a square, with three sides composed of tents and the fourth of the bank
of a river or stream. Around the perimeter the men stacked yokes and
supply boxes against the walls of their tents. Soldiers serving two-hour
watches stood guard through the night. Commission dogs, sometimes
more than twenty of them, provided another layer of security.18
Sundays and holidays provided the only rest days for soldiers. They
washed clothes, bathed, swam, and at times listened to mandatory health
lectures from commission physicians. Rondon filled holidays with events
that probably seemed like work to his men. Flags were raised, anthems
played, and sometimes the men marched in formation. Ever interested in
building his version of a strong Brazilian nation and strong Brazilian citi-
zens, Rondon used such events to deliver long civics lessons to assembled
troops. Rondon would often speak for an hour, or maybe two, about Bra-
zilian history and national heroes. In addition, as a fervent believer in the
Positivist religion he also lectured his troops on the Positivist worldview,
emphasizing in particular key Positivist holidays such as Columbus Day
and New Year’s Day. In camp at night he held informal Positivist study
sessions so that his men might learn about the faith that guided his life.19
In reality, life on the line was not nearly as routine as the preceding de-
scription suggests. Endless hours of hard labor under difficult conditions
were the norm and thus became routine, but this should not obscure the
myriad difficulties soldiers faced every hour of every day: a tree might
fall, as it did on one soldier, forcing the amputation of his leg; another
soldier died when the mule he was riding fell on top of him.20
The Brazilian army issued inferior boots to recruits in Rio de Janeiro.
The boots injured the men’s feet as they marched in the Amazon and
usually fell apart within the first weeks of service. Most soldiers went
barefoot, which created another set of health problems. Men bruised and
cut their feet on rocks, sticks, and thorns. Dangerous gashes on the legs
and feet, which quickly became infected in the jungle, resulted from the
clearing of the right-of-way with machetes.
Going barefoot further exposed soldiers to two chronic conditions.
One was the so-called bicho de pé (literally, ‘‘foot animal’’), caused by
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the burrowing of a tiny, female flea into the skin around toenails. The
fleas deposited eggs, which grew into larvae and caused chronic itching.
Another, more serious condition, ancylostomiasis (hookworm disease),
began with parasites that bore through the bottom of the foot. These
parasites produced larvae that fed off of the host’s large intestine, causing
lethargy and severe anemia. It was known for this reason as the ‘‘lazi-
ness disease’’ (doença de preguiça) and was thought to infect as much as
70 percent of Brazil’s rural population at the time.21
Seemingly endless swarms of insects, of the kind that molested Theo-
dore Roosevelt during his journey through the region, also awaited the
soldiers. Tiny sweat bees tortured commission personnel with their con-
stant buzzing around the eyes. Ticks, horseflies, snakes, and scorpions
made life miserable. Fungal infections, especially around the crotch, arm-
pits, and feet, were a constant woe. And on top of all of this there was
the black ant tocandeiro, ‘‘whose bite is so supernaturally painful that the
Amerindians use it for initiation rites.’’ 22
Torrential rains during the wet season (October–March) added to the
soldiers’ woes. The men continued to work, of course, but did so in
clothes that never seemed to dry completely. Moisture seeped into the
small tents, which were made from inferior cloth. Wild thunderstorms
flooded them at night. Soldiers fashioned wooden platforms for their
canvas huts, but even these would sink in the mud during the rainy
season. Some accepted these conditions stoically, a commission officer
noted, but many others did not.23
The list of life’s daily difficulties continues. On the Southern Section
a soldier stripped down to swim across a river. Unfortunately, he failed
to notice the fresh cuts on his buttocks, which resulted from brushing
against a thorn bush, and his desperate screams soon pierced the air as
piranhas attacked. He survived by making it to a small island but lost con-
siderable flesh nonetheless. In 1910 Nambikwara archers shot another
soldier in the buttock. His companions struggled to remove the barbed
arrowhead, but it broke off at skin level. Fortunately a commission physi-
cian was nearby. Many times, however, no physician was present, forcing
nervous officers to administer questionable medical care, such as when
a colonel burned a patient’s chest by leaving a mustard plaster on for
too long.24
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self was recuperating in Rio de Janeiro from his own bout with malaria.
The sickness struck officers and soldiers alike, and several died. Malaria
then grounded construction activities from October 1913 to April 1914,
just as the 1915 inauguration deadline was fast approaching. Commission
reports of this period describe a scene of growing desperation, as sick
soldiers struggled to labor and healthy officers replaced their stricken
comrades, only to succumb to the illness themselves in what became an
unbroken cycle of arrival, sickness, and departure.29
This deadly period began in 1913 when Captain Cândido Cardoso, re-
cently nominated commander of the Southern Section, died of malaria
en route to replacing Lieutenants Marones and Vasconcellos, both of
whom were incapacitated by the illness. In rapid succession a series of
commanders took over construction, which was now operating deep in
the jungle northwest of the Pimenta Bueno telegraph station. Malaria
struck Lieutenant Nicolau Bueno Horta Barbosa. He was replaced by a
Lieutenant Bellaruino. Malaria felled him as well and then his replace-
ment, Captain Tinoco. Two more replacements, Lieutenants Cuitinho
and Carneiro Pinto, took ill shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Horta Barbosa
sought treatment in Bahia, and after recovering requested to be removed
from the commission ‘‘because of the impossibility of continuing with-
out sacrificing his very existence.’’ 30
The command situation stabilized with the arrival of Lieutenant Cân-
dido Sobrinho in April 1914. Although work resumed, the lieutenant
found that all but six of the soldiers under his command were suffering
the high fevers and fatigue of malaria. He ordered the immediate transfer
of the construction camp to a drier, and thus healthier, locale. Neverthe-
less, between April and December 1914, as the final push for completion
of the line proceeded, malaria forced the lieutenant to send fifty-one men
to commission infirmaries for treatment. Tragically, in this same period
thirty-two of his men died of malaria.31
Desperate soldiers and officers sought out local cures when visiting
towns like Cáceres and Cuiabá. A popular treatment in the town of Mato
Grosso involved fashioning suppositories out of leaves and cotton, and
filling them with a mixture of gunpowder, pepper, pig fat, and pulver-
ized tobacco (snuff). In other locales soap was added to the mix. Early in
his telegraph construction career in Mato Grosso Rondon himself sought
the services of a local medicine woman who prescribed a purgative made
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odes when he discussed one of his favorite topics: his dogs. Rondon loved
his dogs, which he used to hunt game and protect camp. A beloved set
of three or four dogs constantly accompanied the commander, with as
many as twenty of them living in camp at any one time. At night Rondon
would share his food with them, and he was always quite affectionate
toward them. He once halted a day’s march during the 1908 expedition
from Juruena to the Madeira River so that his dogs could rest. His diary
entry for that day lamented that the brutal sun was so hard on the dogs,
though he never mentions its effect on his men. In 1905, while construct-
ing a line in southern Mato Grosso, Rondon delayed a march because his
dogs were tired. Indeed, the day before he had carried one of the dogs ‘‘so
he would not die of exhaustion.’’ A week later he grew concerned when
two of his dogs, Santusa and Fortuna, did not make it to camp. The next
day Rondon walked back down the line until he found them and brought
them back.43
Unlike the death of a soldier, the death of his dogs sparked touch-
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l i v i n g o n t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 71
ing eulogies in Rondon’s diary. On the day Vulcão died while hunting in
southern Mato Grosso, Rondon wrote, ‘‘Travel companion who guarded
my tent. . . . Poor companion! How I feel your death. . . . You who served
me so well, without my being able to pay you back for half of your dedica-
tion.’’ In September 1908 Nambikwara Indians wounded Rondon’s dog
Turco with two arrows. In his diary Rondon noted what a fine dog he was
and that he had immediately ordered the commission physician to treat
the dog’s injuries ‘‘with all due care and kindness.’’ That month must have
been especially difficult for Rondon, as he also lamented the death of his
favorite mule, Lontra. ‘‘Poor Lontra,’’ he wrote, ‘‘so good and so strong,
you performed wonderfully throughout the [construction] campaigns of
Mato Grosso until today.’’ 44
Rondon’s dogs and mules did not desert. Rondon’s men did, and they
did so often. In this they were like Brazilian soldiers in general. Peter
Beattie estimates that between 300 and 400 Brazilian soldiers deserted
every year in the early twentieth century. At times desertion levels forced
army leaders to deny discharges to soldiers who had fulfilled their tours
of duty, in order to maintain required troop levels. Soldiers on the fron-
tier deserted more frequently because officials reserved service in such
undesirable locations for incorrigible soldiers who were more prone to
desert in the first place. Also, supplies and housing were more meager
there. Furthermore, soldiers feared diseases and danger in frontier lands
such as the Amazon.45
Beattie’s discussion reads like a roll call of the reasons for desertions
from the Rondon Commission. According to one commission officer, sol-
diers, many of whom were from coastal cities, dreaded life deep in the
forest. Actually, he said, it terrified them. What especially frightened sol-
diers and encouraged desertions were Indian attacks and the threat of
such. This was especially true for the two- or three-man crews manning
telegraph stations who, as construction moved ahead, were left largely
alone in the jungle. Periodic breakdowns in supply trains caused further
unrest among the soldiers, and food shortages led many hungry men to
desert.46
Rondon estimated a desertion rate of 10 percent of his soldiers for
the year 1912. Specific cases of desertion suggest that at times the rate
was far higher. Between June and December 1907, fifty-seven of 154
soldiers building the commission road out of Tapirapuã deserted. The
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most famous case occurred in 1908, when desertions and work stoppages
shut down construction and forced Rondon to abandon his trek to the
Madeira River. Troops under the command of Major Custódio de Senna
Braga first fled en masse in December 1907, when a third of his soldiers
simply disappeared. Then, on 1 September 1908, eighteen more soldiers
deserted Braga’s unit, presumably because of hunger, as pack trains were
having trouble reaching the construction site and a merchant in Cuiabá
was refusing to sell more supplies to Rondon due to the commission’s
already sizable debt to him. Major Braga feared more desertions, and
indeed ten more did leave eventually, for ‘‘the discontent of the men is
plainly visible, as they live in terror of being left without food in this
wasteland.’’ 47
Desertions robbed Rondon of vital personnel. That much is obvious.
They also caused construction delays because of Rondon’s insistence that
his officers capture the wayward soldiers, ‘‘so that,’’ one officer put it, ‘‘we
can prevent additional desertions from occurring, which would cause
further damage to [army] discipline.’’ This officer, Second Lieutenant
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that thirteen men had deserted and were most certainly heading down
the line’s right-of-way toward him. The officer planned to have his men
fan out through the forest to await the deserters. Botelho de Magalhães’s
problem, however, was that he did not trust his soldiers to make arrests
if they did encounter the fleeing soldiers, as a certain amount of soldierly
solidarity often meant collusion between soldiers and deserters. He thus
asked the one soldier he trusted and a group of civilian contract workers
stationed in the camp to help him. The men spread out around the sta-
tion. Mounted on his horse, Botelho de Magalhães surprised the thirteen
deserters and trained his pistol on them. He yelled through the woods
to the nearby trusted soldier to come and help him make the arrest. The
soldier did not respond to his calls, however, and the deserters broke
and ran further into the woods. A chagrined Botelho de Magalhães cap-
tured only one of the men. The others, he noted feebly, ‘‘fled into the
jungle, where my lack of experience as a backwoodsman prevented me
from pursuing them.’’ 50
It was clearly important for deserting soldiers to find a friendly third
party if they were to escape successfully. Such abetment outraged Ron-
don, frustrated attempts to capture escapees, and demonstrated the very
real limits of the commission’s authority. In August 1906 Rondon and his
soldiers were exploring possible paths for the proposed auxiliary tele-
graph line between Cáceres and the town of Mato Grosso. They passed
near the fazenda (landed estate) known as the Fazenda Baia de Fumaça,
which Rondon described as a ‘‘hangout for assassins and thieves, . . .
and which is a quilombo [literally, a runaway slave community] for de-
serters from the Army.’’ The estate owner, Rondon noted, was a thief
who ‘‘attracts and protects all the criminals in the region, including de-
serters from the Army.’’ Oddly, at one point Rondon even accused the
commander of troops stationed in Cuiabá of fomenting the desertions of
commission soldiers and of protecting those men who did desert.51
Depending on the location, a final option for deserters was to seek aid
from other employers. Mostly this meant working as a latex gatherer,
and while commission officers sometimes successfully tracked down
deserters-turned-rubber tappers, often they did not. Near the town of
Santo Antonio do Madeira, the other option was to flee commission ser-
vice for a job constructing the infamous Madeira-Mamoré Railroad. Of
this latter option, a frustrated commission official wondered if it would
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two labor contractors in Manaus. The commission agreed to pay the con-
tractors for each kilometer of right-of-way cleared and widened, with the
contractors then responsible for paying their workers. The first contrac-
tor, Mr. Francisco Trocoly, managed to clear only fifteen miles of right-
of-way, while the other contractor, Pedro Leão, cleared less than a mile.
Malaria stopped both men and almost all of their workers. This, Fer-
nandes da Costa explained, was because the workers were Portuguese
immigrants who ‘‘not being from this region were not adapted to the
unhealthiness of these lands, and thus they succumbed entirely.’’ 56
Desperately seeking to salvage the situation, Fernandes da Costa or-
dered commission physician Dr. Pedro de Aguiar to travel from Manaus
to the construction site. There he was to establish a field hospital in
order to treat the workers so that they might resume their labors. In-
stead, Dr. de Aguiar refused to visit the sick men, preferring instead to
hole up in a comfortable house on the Jiparanã River that was owned by
the Asensi Rubber Company. Then, ‘‘when his services were most desper-
ately needed [the physician] suddenly withdrew from the Commission’’
and the workers were abandoned, presumably to find their own ways
back to Manaus.57
Indeed, the personnel situation never really improved for Captain Fer-
nandes da Costa. In 1916 he ‘‘sent five units to clear the right of way,
and five units fell victim to malaria.’’ In that same year he authorized the
contracting of 300 workers in faraway Belém, on the Atlantic coast, ‘‘but
only 90 men enlisted, and they were no good’’—most of them deserted.
Finally, in 1922 Rondon ordered Captain Boanerges Lopes de Souza to
contract 120 civilians in Manaus to once again tackle the clearing of the
right-of-way. A flu epidemic ravaged the men en route, seven of them
dying before even reaching the telegraph line. The survivors did succeed
in clearing seventy-five miles of right-of-way before Captain Lopes de
Souza contracted malaria. He fled the region and the campaign was aban-
doned.58
Conclusion
Force alone motivated many of the soldiers of the Rondon Commission.
Judging from the figures from the Brazilian army as a whole, it is clear
that up to one-half of the commission’s soldiers were involuntary recruits
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Chapter Four: t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m
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t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 81
82 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 83
84 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 85
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t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 87
is, scholars argue that Rondon’s primary goal was to define areas and
peoples as ‘‘Brazilian.’’ His goal was to incorporate peoples and regions
in an elite-led project aimed at producing a single, republican Brazil. At
the same time, this incorporation was to be carried out by the central
state, so that both nation and state building informed Rondon’s actions
in the interior. ‘‘These rituals and their daily repetition,’’ Laura Maciel
concludes, ‘‘can be thought of explicitly as a national power under con-
struction.’’ 21
A greater appreciation of the force of Positivism in Rondon’s life and
work, however, demonstrates that what was under construction in the
interior was as much a Positivist message as a nationalist one. Indeed,
the importance of civic ritual is a hallmark of Positivism, because for
Comte such ritual socialized the proletariat, making them aware ulti-
mately of the universal, or Humanity. Stated another way, Comte viewed
civic rituals as the best mechanism for connecting individuals (Family)
with society (Humanity), for in the middle was the nation (Patria).22
So the nation, or in this case the Patria, could carry a Positivist as well
as Brazilian connotation. The Brazilian flag flying above camp symbol-
ized a certain kind of Brazil, but it was also a Positivist flag. It was de-
signed by a Positivist, proposed by the Positivist leader Teixeira Mendes,
and included the Positivist motto ‘‘Order and Progress.’’ Furthermore,
commission photographs housed in the Museum of the Indian in Rio de
Janeiro show the particular care taken to insure that this Positivist motto
appeared prominently in photographs.
According to Carvalho, another symbol carried this kind of dual mean-
ing for Brazilian Positivists. The idealized female form represented both
the republic and the Positivist concept of Humanity. Brazilian Positivist
artists, he continues, promoted just such a double meaning in the paint-
ings and statues they created in the 1890s. Flag and female figure, na-
tion and Positivism again came together most dramatically in the photo-
graphs Rondon staged in the field. In one such photograph an indigenous
woman stands in front of a national flag that is clearly draped to highlight
the Positivist slogan.23
Even seemingly more straightforward examples of nation building in-
cluded a Positivist message for Rondon, demonstrating clearly that for
him the two were the same. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima asserts that
the renaming of local, indigenous places demonstrated powerfully the
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Positivist-Indian shrine,
probably in the central office
of the Rondon Commission.
Courtesy of Comissão Rondon,
Serviço de Registro Audio-
Visual, Museu do Índio.
t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 89
90 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
from other officers and increased hostility toward his projects in north-
west Brazil. It also led to fights with members of the Catholic clergy and
their political supporters in Brazil.
t h e p ow e r o f p o s i t i v i s m * 91
dissipate the passions, prejudices, and war-like habits of their [army] col-
leagues and the general public.’’ 30
Following the teachings of Auguste Comte, Positivists predicted that
pacifism would lead to the decline of nationalism and even of the nation.
These outworn political loyalties and forms would be replaced by univer-
sal brotherhood and a unified Humanity. Comte argued that in the future
the largest nations would be no larger than Portugal and would possess
populations not in excess of three million inhabitants. Teixeira Mendes
predicted that as a very large nation Brazil ‘‘would disappear in the near
future.’’ 31
This incendiary position among countrymen proud of Brazil’s colossal
size was matched by Teixeira Mendes’s and the Positivists’ public con-
demnations of the Brazilian military victories that were so celebrated
by officers and nationalists. According to José Murilo de Carvalho, Bra-
zilian Positivists ‘‘denounced military heroics and considered the Para-
guayan War a disaster.’’ Teixeira Mendes referred to Brazil’s conduct in
this war as the ‘‘most monstrous attack against the Family, the Patria, and
Humanity yet perpetrated in South America.’’ He then ridiculed a 1906
proposal to build a monument in honor of the famous Brazilian victory at
Riachuelo in the Paraguayan War because it would be nothing more than
a monument to Brazilian backwardness. Likewise, Rondon Commission
Lieutenant Severo dos Santos was quoted in 1916 in a Rio newspaper as
saying that ‘‘this work [of the Rondon Commission] certainly honors the
Brazilian Army more than all of the battles of the Paraguayan War, and
in part makes up for the errors and crimes of the Canudos, Rio Grande,
and Contestado [rebellions].’’ 32
In contrast to such Positivist partisanship, the historian Frank D.
McCann asserts that increasingly the army could not ‘‘tolerate its offi-
cers being philosophers who knew Auguste Comte’s Positivism but not
how to shoot, ride, or function in the field.’’ In 1908 one young officer de-
nounced in public the Positivist Military Academy professors ‘‘who have
dedicated themselves almost exclusively to science with prejudice to the
military part of training.’’ An officer who attended the Military Academy
during the height of Positivist influence later noted that his lessons pre-
pared him for nothing but the life of a dilettante.33
Opponents labeled Positivists as religious fanatics. Within the army
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special venom was reserved for the Positivists’ critique of militarism and
their call for the end of national militaries. Writing in 1914, General Tito
Escobar denounced the tendency of the Positivist military professors
to produce ‘‘entrenched bureaucrats, literary figures, philosophers, . . .
[and] mathematicians’’ who were ‘‘friends of universal peace, of general
disarmament, [and were] enemies of war, and permanent armies.’’ Posi-
tivist military officers preferred to be called ‘‘Dr. General’’ or ‘‘Dr. Lieu-
tenant,’’ another officer sneered. Even General Tasso Fragosso, a Positiv-
ist sympathizer and friend of Rondon, noted the depth of anger toward
and distrust of the Positivists’ and, in particular, Constant’s pacifism.34
Critics often turned their general dislike of Positivism into an attack
against Rondon and the Rondon Commission. Sometimes the tone was
sarcastic, as when the editorialist ‘‘C.L.’’ spoke of Rondon’s ‘‘Positivist
trumpet of proselytism,’’ or when another newspaper reporter spoke of
Rondon as ‘‘the illustrious Colonel and Positivist—that is to say, much
more Positivist than Colonel.’’ This latter remark was the crux of the mat-
ter, for some in the military argued that Rondon’s work was not related
directly to the army’s mission. According to one newspaper, Minister of
War Caetano Faria disliked the commission and had been heard to refer
to Rondon and his men as mere ‘‘missionaries to the Indians.’’ Rondon, it
is worth remembering, was appointed commander of the telegraph com-
mission by a civilian minister of transportation and public works, and
that bureaucracy, and not the army, paid his salary.35
The press regularly condemned Rondon’s pacifism and the Positiv-
ists’ stated goal of turning the army into a Brazilian civilian conservation
corps. Rondon and his men were engaged in civil engineering, his crit-
ics claimed, instead of doing what they were trained to do, which was
to defend the country. In one particularly strong attack in the Jornal do
Brasil, longtime Rondon critic Antonio Pimentel began by presenting a
pamphlet by Teixeira Mendes that he said ordered all Positivists in the
military to avoid displays of militarism. This proved, Pimentel argued,
that the Positivists within the army were working for its very destruc-
tion. Such Positivist harangues, he continued, were weakening the mili-
tary and thus the country. Furthermore, Teixeira Mendes had called for
soldiers to engage not in military activities but in ‘‘pacific-industrial’’ pur-
suits. This was exactly what Rondon and his men were doing in the in-
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terior, Pimentel charged, and as such they should retire from the mili-
tary.36
‘‘It is time,’’ one commentator wrote in 1911 concerning the Rondon
Commission, ‘‘to insist that the Army recall to the barracks the officers
who have abandoned their duties, for they prefer to wander in the middle
of the jungle fishing for the souls of savages and country bumpkins.’’ This
‘‘fishing for souls’’ remark refers to the standard criticism that the Ron-
don Commission was little more than a Positivist missionary society. Al-
most without exception Rondon’s officers were Positivists. Almost all of
them belonged to the Positivist Church in Rio de Janeiro. Researching
Positivist Church archives, Robert Nachman uncovered letters from Tei-
xeira Mendes to Rondon requesting jobs for Positivists. From one promi-
nent Positivist family alone, the Horta Barbosa family, Rondon hired four
brothers as officers in the commission. His most trusted officer, Amilcar
Botelho de Magalhães, was Benjamin Constant’s nephew.37
In a 1911 exposé the Jornal do Comércio presented the case of an un-
named lieutenant who it claimed was well known within the army but
was not a Positivist. Assigned to the Rondon Commission, he was sent
to a commission camp on the Madeira River. The officer returned to Rio
de Janeiro ‘‘poisoned by malaria’’ and reported for duty in the commis-
sion’s central office. The Positivists shunned him, the article claimed, and
Rondon eventually placed the unnamed lieutenant on unpaid leave until
his appointment with the commission expired. The reporter claimed
to know of several other non-Positivist officers who had been similarly
shunned.38
Rondon and his officers were well aware of these opinions and attacks,
and believed that they robbed the commission of the credit and praise it
deserved for its hard work and accomplishments in the interior. Amil-
car Botelho de Magalhães made this point most forcefully in a special
article he wrote for Correio do Povo in 1925. His goal, he explained at the
outset, was to attack ongoing official hostility toward the Rondon Com-
mission. It pained him to say that government officials had shown little
interest in publishing and publicizing commission reports. What reports
did appear ‘‘robbed the Commission of its heroic vitality’’ by listing only
construction numbers without explaining the dreadful conditions under
which such construction had taken place.
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‘‘The moral and heroic side of the Commission, which would allow
the public to understand the difficulties overcome and the sacrifices
made,’’ he continued, was ignored and even ridiculed by ‘‘pencil pushers
[homens de gabinete] incapable of surviving even one month in the in-
terior.’’ Botelho de Magalhães singled out the ministry of war in particu-
lar for failing to report adequately the commission’s accomplishments in
the ministry’s annual reports. The 1909 annual report, he noted specifi-
cally, included just two pages on the commission, as if that were enough
to ‘‘capture the grandiose Amazon’’ and the commission’s equally grandi-
ose accomplishments. Some sort of official conspiracy against the com-
mission, he claimed ominously, was underway.39
More plainly hostile than some vague conspiracy was the army’s
policy on promotions for those serving in the Rondon Commission. Ron-
don himself was most concerned about the slow pace of promotion for
his officers, which he interpreted as a sign of official hostility toward his
‘‘pacific-industrial’’ project. In a candid letter to his colleague Francisco
Jaguaribe Gomes de Mattos, Rondon condemned the army’s decision to
‘‘remove from consideration for merit promotion officials who serve in
commissions.’’ He then confided that an important general once told a
Rondon Commission officer seeking a merit promotion that ‘‘the record
of an officer in the Rondon Commission is a blank record!’’ Many weaker
officers had been promoted, Rondon charged, while commission officers
languished in their respective ranks. At best, his officers received pro-
motions for time served, but such promotions, he concluded, ‘‘always
represent an injustice and even a punishment for those who deserve a
merit promotion.’’ In 1919 Botelho de Magalhães confided in a private
note that there were those in the military who wished to prevent Ron-
don’s promotion to general ‘‘because his duties are not exercised with
troops stationed in the cities.’’ Earlier, Rondon had archly observed in an
official government report that his 1908 promotion to lieutenant colonel
‘‘must have disappointed many of my colleagues.’’ 40
Moreover, the government repeatedly refused Rondon’s requests to
grant hazardous duty (combat) pay to the soldiers and officers in the
Rondon Commission. In 1911, and perhaps one other time, army leaders
mounted opposition to the Rondon Commission because they did not
consider it to be a military endeavor. In the 1911 case they pressed for
the removal of all military personnel from the telegraph project, which
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these men practice in the service of Priests.’’ Later he celebrated the de-
feat of what he termed an ‘‘attempt to transform [the spi] into a false reli-
gious Mission, as was so desired by national and foreign clergymen.’’ 46
Catholic supporters in the media and in government fought back. An
article published in the Jornal do Comércio condemned ‘‘the morbid ori-
entation [of Rondon and the Positivists], which is the result of their
philosophical and religious stereotypes.’’ Catholic officials and support-
ers denounced what they saw as Positivist attempts to take over the Bra-
zilian interior via the (Positivist) Rondon Commission. Rondon’s con-
gressional detractors defended the Salesian missions, and government
subsidies to the Catholic missions were maintained even as Congress
slashed the budget of the Rondon Commission.47
During these unsettled times Rondon went out of his way to provoke
Catholic officials and their supporters. One such provocation, which
took place in 1917, began when Rondon enrolled an orphaned Nambi-
kwara child in the Baptist School of Rio de Janeiro. His decision ignited
a firestorm of protest and several months of debate in the press. An un-
named reporter discovered the boy’s case and quickly denounced Ron-
don’s brazen decision to enroll the child in a Protestant school. ‘‘Alert
the Judge and Supervisor of Orphans,’’ the reporter wrote, ‘‘for everyone
knows that the Baptist School is an unabashed and tenacious institution
of religious propaganda.’’ He questioned why the child was not enrolled
in a public school. ‘‘Mr. Rondon does not have the right,’’ the article con-
tinued, ‘‘to kidnap our Indians and pervert their spirit by subjecting them
to false doctrines.’’ ‘‘It is necessary for Mr. Rondon to know,’’ the reporter
concluded, ‘‘that he will not be allowed to do anything he wants.’’ 48
Reading between the lines, it is clear that Rondon’s Positivist dislike
of Catholicism outraged the writer, as did the deliberate act of doctri-
nal provocation. Certainly Rondon Commission Central Office Director
Captain Botelho de Magalhães read the attack as such, for he quickly con-
demned the journalist’s attempt ‘‘to transform into religious propaganda
a Positivist’s decision to enroll an Indian into a Protestant school.’’ Cer-
tainly no protest would have occurred, the captain continued, if the boy
had been enrolled in a Catholic school.49
Subsequent barbs demonstrate that this affair emerged out of the
larger issues of religion and religious affiliation in Brazil. For his part
Botelho de Magalhães used the immediate events to hammer home Posi-
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Conclusion
Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon spent his entire adult life promoting
the Positivist religion of Humanity. The religion shaped his daily life and
activities, as well as his ideas about progress, Indian affairs, and, thus, the
future of the nation. It led him to expend precious time and energy clash-
ing with Catholic officials, their supporters in government, and army
leaders precisely when he was most deeply involved with the demand-
ing tasks of telegraph construction in the interior. Positivism inspired
Rondon and strengthened his resolve, but it also led him into myriad dis-
putes that distracted his focus and damaged the political fortunes of his
telegraph project.51
Rondon’s diary and other personal correspondence confirm the cen-
trality of Positivism in his life. In his diary Rondon took pains to note his
attendance at Positivist services, dinners, and celebrations while in Rio
de Janeiro. Copies of telegrams to his wife and children, which Rondon
included in the diary, are full of Positivist exhortations. Mostly these are
stern but agreeable appeals, as when he honored his son Benjamin on
his birthday by noting that ‘‘if you lead your life in accordance with your
Faith you will one day become a dignified Son of Humanity.’’ At times,
however, they seem obsessive and out of place, such as in a tragic 1925
telegraph to his wife after Rondon was informed of the death of their
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Rondon and his wife, Francisca Xavier da Silva Rondon. Courtesy of Comissão Ron-
don, Serviço de Registro Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
daughter. In it he expressed his love for the departed child and for his wife
and other children, but also focused at some length on the overarching
need for a Positivist, rather than Catholic, burial service.52
There can be no doubt that scholars are correct to discuss Rondon’s
work and vision in terms of nation building and the expansion of cen-
tral state power in Brazil. Especially later in life, Rondon emphasized
more and more the need for the government to assert its authority over
Catholic missionaries in Mato Grosso, and in true nationalist fashion he
condemned the mostly foreign-born Salesian priests as a potential fifth
column in Brazil. And yet, in far more cases Rondon stressed the ap-
propriateness and infallibility of Comte’s teachings when defending his
work and attacking his opponents. Rondon’s unshakable vision of a mod-
ern Brazil included the incorporation of distant lands and peoples into
that nation, but this was primarily a Positivist vision, one shaped as much
by the writings of a thinker in France as by the realities of Brazil.
Perhaps some scholars have ignored the obvious—Rondon’s Posi-
tivism—because that religion quickly became anachronistic in early-
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Chapter Five: l i v i n g w i t h ot h e r s
o n t h e l o n e ly l i n e
102 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
l i v i n g w i t h ot h e r s * 103
sions onto their lands and noted wryly that the armed defense of these
lands could hardly be considered a crime, for ‘‘no one considers the Span-
ish and Portuguese as being criminals for having expelled the Arabs from
the Iberian peninsula.’’ 6
Protection would then allow for the implementation of the second
part of the Positivist policy: assimilation (or ‘‘the civilizing process,’’
as Positivists sometimes called it). This ‘‘civilizing’’ of indigenes would
consist of ‘‘elevating’’ them from the fetishistic stage to the scientific-
industrial stage of Positivism. Teixeira Mendes felt strongly that with
Positivist tutelage indigenes could bypass the theological stage of social
evolution which, he said, was anarchic and in the process of extinction.7
Assimilation, which in Positivist lingo would lead to the evolution of
indigenous society, was to be gradual, nonviolent, noncoercive, and en-
couraged via demonstration and example rather than by force. Teixeira
Mendes wrote that the fruits of science and industry ‘‘would demon-
strate to the savages the grandiose power of the West. . . . It will amaze
them and convince them of the benefits Humanity possesses.’’ 8 Positiv-
ists trumpeted social evolution because Comte wrote of the impossibility
of revolutionary change (as this would violate natural laws). Thus, what
Positivists believed to be the highest form of civilization, Positivism, had
to be adopted by the free will of indigenes (livre aceitação), otherwise one
would not know if the evolutionary process had truly transpired or if
force had merely created the illusion of change.9
Given these beliefs, Teixeira Mendes and other Brazilian Positivists
firmly opposed past and current efforts to convert indigenes forcibly to
Christianity, for such force again violated the evolutionary laws of nature.
Rondon’s friend and colleague Armando Amilcar Botelho de Magalhães
argued that forced conversions ‘‘represente[ed] jumps that Nature does
not accept,’’ for Positivism demonstrated that ‘‘one should not intervene
in, nor abolish tribal rituals, but should instead allow Indians to evolve
gradually via regular contact with civilized people.’’ As one Positivist put
it as late as 1966 in a letter to then Brazilian President Castelo Branco,
Christian missionaries ‘‘seek to break with the normal course of evolu-
tion, forcing [on indigenes] a monotheism and sedentary lifestyle that is
inconsistent with their cultural development.’’ This abrupt transforma-
tion, he continued, degraded Indians.10
Rondon and other Positivists opposed Christian, and especially
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order for this social evolution to take place. Hence, even in a mundane
commission document that seemingly had nothing to do with Indians
or his Indian policy, Rondon nevertheless stressed this policy. In 1910
Rondon issued instructions creating a new personnel section to maintain
the road from the commission warehouse at Tapirapuã to the Utiariti
telegraph station. Filled with numerous articles mandating construction
types and procedures, the instructions also included, in article 9, orders
to protect Indian holdings and to convince latex gatherers operating in
the region to do the same. Likewise, in a letter to the minister of agri-
culture that had nothing to do with Indian landholdings, Rondon argued
that ‘‘Indian holdings must be respected, especially given that ‘civiliza-
dos’ have violently invaded them for years.’’ 20
But it was in the initial instructions Rondon sent to spi personnel one
month after the inauguration of the Indian Protection Service that he
most forcefully pressed for the defense of Indian landholdings. These ini-
tial instructions dealt first and foremost with precisely the issue of pro-
tecting Indian lands, which suggests that Rondon saw this as the first
priority of his Indian policy. In the instructions he demanded that each
employee conduct a tour of his assigned region ‘‘in order to describe in
detail the current situation Indians find themselves in with regards to
their landholdings.’’ He then ordered each agent to submit a detailed re-
port on these lands ‘‘so that later we can call for a proper survey and
titling of these lands.’’ Rondon also stressed the need to survey lands
usurped by whites so that both the lands currently occupied by Indians
and lands usurped by whites could be ‘‘legalized for Indian occupation.’’ 21
A draft of the enabling legislation that accompanied the creation of
the spi also emphasized the primary need to protect Indian holdings.
The first article of the first chapter directed Rodolfo Miranda to enter
into contact with state governors in order to ‘‘legalize the holdings actu-
ally occupied by Indians.’’ Where such lands were found to be public
lands the minister was to encourage governors to donate them to their
indigenous occupants. In the second chapter of the draft there is an-
other call for efforts to ‘‘guarantee the effective control of lands already
occupied by Indians.’’ In addition, spi personnel were instructed to ‘‘op-
pose energetically the invasion of Indian lands by whites.’’ Similarly, in
his annual report Miranda noted that the first order of business was
to secure Indian land rights, saying that ‘‘it will be necessary to estab-
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108 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
lish as the foundation [of spi policy] the defense of lands they [Indi-
ans] already occupy, surveying them [and] preventing the intrusions of
whites.’’ 22
An interesting complaint from Miranda’s successor as minister of agri-
culture suggests that Rondon and his men did indeed spend their initial
energy defending indigenous land holdings. Pedro de Toledo was much
less supportive of Rondon’s Indian protection efforts. In 1911 he observed
that Rondon was spending too much time defending Indian land rights
and too little time establishing agricultural centers for white settlers.
Indians, he noted, were left on the lands they occupied ‘‘out of respect for
their natural wants.’’ Yet these settlements were far removed from mar-
ket centers, he complained, and thus made it difficult for the government
to profit from the sale of foodstuffs produced on Indian lands, which ap-
parently was more important to the new minister than was the defense
of holdings.23
Rondon’s emphasis on land rights often combined with a second
theme of protection: protection of indigenes from invasions, attacks, and
local landowner attempts to force Indians to labor against their will on
area properties. Given that Rondon operated in northwest Brazil at the
turn of the twentieth century, this meant in particular the need to inter-
vene against the owners of rubber estates and against latex gatherers.
Typical was this 1909 telegram, reprinted in the Journal do Comércio, in
which he blasted ‘‘the inhumane rubber gatherers who burn Indian vil-
lages and assassinate the legitimate owners of the land [Indians], robbing
them of their tranquility and destroying their legitimate traditions.’’ 24
Rondon denounced the abuse of Indians throughout his career in
Mato Grosso. In a series of unsuccessful interventions he condemned the
seizure of indigenous lands and pleaded with local and state officials to do
something about it. For example, in October 1904 Rondon was supervis-
ing the construction of telegraph lines in what is today the state of Mato
Grosso do Sul. Angered by the massacre of Ofaié Indians, Rondon spoke
with José Alves Ribeiro, owner of the Fazenda Tobôco, the landowner
who allegedly had ordered the attack. Ribeiro responded with what Ron-
don termed an ‘‘evasive’’ letter, more attacks followed, and so Rondon
sent an angry telegram to the governor of Mato Grosso requesting that
state troops be sent to protect the Ofaié. Little was accomplished, how-
ever, for Rondon’s report on the incident ends with the comment that
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l i v i n g w i t h ot h e r s * 109
‘‘in spite of the Governor’s favorable attitude, more killings occurred six
months later, and were done by the same individuals.’’ 25
Fifteen years later an officer with the Rondon Commission once again
condemned landowner José Alves Ribeiro’s treatment of these same
Ofaié people. Referring first to the events of 1904, Captain Botelho de
Magalhães noted that ‘‘in certain far-off regions it is nearly impossible [to
bring people to justice] . . . especially when the accused is a local poten-
tate.’’ Turning to the case pending in 1919, he told of the ‘‘Indian José’’
who had fled Ribeiro’s fazenda because of mistreatment, only to be re-
turned by local authorities. José fled yet again, this time seeking protec-
tion at an spi post. Ribeiro’s son ‘‘violently removed him from the post,’’
but José escaped again and was again recaptured. Botelho de Magalhães
admitted that Ribeiro was able to retake the boy ‘‘against the wishes of
the Indian Protection Service,’’ and he was reduced to observing that at
least Ribeiro would now suffer the censure of the public for his acts: ‘‘At
least he [Ribeiro] will now be known as an executioner of Indians [algoz
dos índios], and this at least satisfies our secondary wish, given that we
were unable to liberate the victim.’’ 26
Rondon’s desire to protect Indians and his general inability to enforce
his policy highlight a case from 1910. Near Rosário, in northern Mato
Grosso, Kayabi men attacked and killed the labor contractor known as
Manoel Velho. Explaining the attack to the minister of agriculture, Ron-
don noted that rubber-tappers under Velho’s employ had been attacking
the Kayabi for some time and that Velho’s death was an act of retaliation.
‘‘I can assure you,’’ Rondon wrote, ‘‘that Indians never attack without a
reason; they attack for no other reason than to defend themselves against
treason and falsehoods.’’ 27
The murder of Manoel Velho generated calls for an armed expedition
against the Kayabi. Rondon telegraphed Minister Miranda, asking him
to intercede on the Indians’ behalf with the governor of Mato Grosso.
Miranda telegraphed the governor as well, but the result was not the de-
sired one: the governor already had authorized local landowners to con-
tract hired gunmen (jagunços) at the state’s expense. Two months later
a telegram from another commission officer confirmed the result: Alex-
andre Adder, the owner of a rubber estate near Rosário, hired twenty-
six men who then attacked Indians along the Arinos River. They de-
stroyed villages, killed ‘‘many people,’’ and kidnapped several children.
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ans and of the need to make amends. He condemned the bandeirantes, the
colonial-era explorers and slavers, for their barbaric campaigns against
indigenes. ‘‘Now,’’ he continued, ‘‘it is we who are the invaders, but this
time we are inspired by the principles of Justice that a new civilization
[Positivism] has inculcated in us. We feel profoundly the weight of our
historic errors, understanding that the time has arrived to atone for our
past sins.’’ 34
Rondon warned his troops of possible attacks by the Nambikwara
people on the eve of the historic expedition across northwest Mato
Grosso in 1908. ‘‘Even if we are wounded by the warriors of the Juruena’’
he told them, ‘‘absolutely no reprisal against our attackers will be al-
lowed.’’ 35 Later, in his report on the expedition Rondon noted that his
troops had found it hard to accept his orders. ‘‘This theory contrasted
with the bellicose sentiments of our soldiers . . . for whom Indians were
but ferocious animals that should be attacked.’’ 36
Notice the orders Rondon issued to his officers before leaving the
construction zone in 1912. On them he conferred ‘‘the protection of the
Tribal Families that periodically visit us along the [telegraph] line.’’ Then,
in the same orders, he warned against improper behavior vis-à-vis indi-
genes, and especially women, saying that ‘‘from each functionary I expect
the purest sentiments of patriotism and chivalry, and that each soldier
will defend Indian women, and their pure innocence, from the gross mas-
culinity and brutality [of men].’’ 37
Rondon often described Indian attacks against telegraph station per-
sonnel as legitimate reprisals against those who had violated commission
rules by engaging in improper behavior. Over the years the Nambikwara
launched several lethal strikes against stations built in what is today
the border region between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. In
April 1919 one such raid at the Juruena station killed two telegraph em-
ployees. As Rondon later explained it, the Nambikwara men attacked
in response to the earlier actions of one of the commission employees.
Antonio Pereira was crossing the Juruena River in a canoe with two
Nambikwara passengers when one of the passengers demanded a piece of
Pereira’s plug tobacco. He refused, and the men argued, causing Pereira
to push them out of the canoe and into the river. Days later Pereira and
his colleague were dead.38
Less than two years later members of the Nambikwara nation killed
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Rondon with Pareci men and women in front of Utiariti Falls. Courtesy of Comissão
Rondon, Serviço de Registro Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
118 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
Lima forcefully asserts that Rondon’s policies were not any more pro-
gressive than, or even fundamentally different from, the days of armed
conquest. ‘‘During the first two decades [of the twentieth century],’’ he
suggests, ‘‘they [Rondon et al.] not only desired, but also acted to dissolve
and destroy, at even the most basic level, the socioeconomic and political
forms of native organization.’’ 56 Rondon and his men thus ‘‘mounted a
war of conquest by imagining a mono-national political community.’’ 57
Or, as Laura Maciel puts it in even more dramatic fashion, ‘‘To explore
and tame the wilderness and all that was in it, including Indians, was
similar to what one does to domesticate wild animals. . . . These were po-
litical decisions of conquest and the occupation of space, translated into
acts of force, with an eye towards subjugation and domination.’’ 58
Rondon distributing presents and clothes to Parecis men, women, and children at
the Utiariti telegraph station. Courtesy of Comissão Rondon, Serviço de Registro
Audio-Visual, Museu do Índio.
120 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
rapacious whites. By asserting the sole right to define the future of these
people, the central state, Lima notes, claimed total power over Indians.
Tutela, Seth Garfield observes, promised aid and protection, but ‘‘on the
flip-side . . . lurked the specter of government heavy-handedness.’’ Its
biggest flaw, he continues, was that the state decided what was best for
Indians but did so based on its ‘‘own narrow-minded views about Indians
and their future.’’ ‘‘Tutela was, above all,’’ Nádia Farage and Manuela Car-
neiro da Cunha assert, ‘‘an instrument for the defense of Indian lands by
the state, but [it] eventually came to emphasize more the infantile nature
of Indians and their societies.’’ 61
The contradictions of tutela point to the key contribution of the re-
visionist literature. As Alcida Ramos notes, ‘‘Brazilians—that is, adults—
know what is best for the infantile Indians, and for Indians to reach
adulthood they must relinquish their Indianness.’’ Certainly Rondon’s
oft-stated goal was the transformation of indigenes into Brazilians (‘‘na-
tionalization,’’ as he put it), and the residential posts were indeed to be
the primary site for this transformation. Commission photographs and
reports document the schoolwork, the teaching of trades, the Western-
ization of dress that, as Lima eloquently puts it, altered native rhythms
and limits.62
Indeed, it is tempting to accept Lima’s assertions that the logical con-
clusion of assimilation would be extermination. Even the anthropologist
Darcy Ribeiro, Rondon’s friend and admirer and the favorite target of
revisionist venom, criticized this aspect of Rondon’s policy. The Positiv-
ist model, Garfield notes, did indeed dictate a solution or a specific end
point to Indian evolution. As such, he concludes, it lacked the cultural
relativity practiced by today’s ethnographers.63
There also is no denying that Rondon was much engaged in the at-
tempt to expand state power. His telegraph commission and the spi were
long-lived, nationwide bureaucracies. Commission and spi personnel
did indeed intervene in the hinterland. They certainly attempted to place
a ‘‘great wall’’ of state authority between indigenes and local society. They
also used the power of the state to redefine identities or, as Lima writes,
to redefine the other.
That having been said, however, there is for the historian a gnawing
incompleteness, or perhaps one-sidedness, especially to Lima’s revision-
ist portrait. This is the result of the refusal to assign any credibility to or
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find any complexity in the language, intentions, acts, and rhetoric of Ron-
don and his associates. Lima deftly employs his Foucauldian sword to
skewer those who consider it at least possible that protection and assimi-
lation could carry with them positive, if contradictory, meanings, lead-
ing to both positive and negative actions, not to mention the possibility
of Indian resistance (a topic Lima ignores completely, thus portraying
indigenes as powerless victims).64 No doubt power is repressive, as Lima
asserts, again borrowing from Foucault. Yet power can also be contradic-
tory, can it not? Is one not allowed to consider at least the possibility of
a dialectic?
For example, Lima’s assertion of state building grossly exaggerates
the de facto power exercised by the Rondon Commission in the Brazil-
ian interior. On paper, in federal documents (which are the only sources
Lima examines), commission officers certainly asserted their expertise
and power. But more thorough research reveals a far different reality—
that of a federal agency that never, in any real sense, succeeded in im-
plementing state authority over local landowners. What on paper might
seem like a ‘‘great wall of state power’’ to Lima looks, on a deeper exami-
nation, more like a leaky net of little more than federal discourse.65
It is certainly fair to note that the ultimate goal of assimilation was the
disappearance of Indians. But one also should acknowledge the ambigu-
ous nature of Rondon’s thoughts on this matter. While calling for assimi-
lation he nevertheless urged his personnel to respect indigenous social
and religious practices until they were ‘‘ready’’ for Positivism. Further-
more, Egon Schaden claims, based on a 1949 interview with Rondon,
that late in his life Rondon abandoned the idea of assimilation altogether.
And while the idea of assimilation is objectionable today, Rondon’s for-
mulation of it prepared him to wait for generations, for a century, for it
to occur.66
It is the job of the historian to provide evidence of the complexities of
this situation. Lima writes that Rondon and spi personnel forced indi-
genes to abandon their languages. Certainly in myriad speeches, letters,
and reports Rondon argued just the opposite. But what about in deed?
In 1920 Captain Alencarliense Fernandes da Costa began his inspec-
tion of the telegraph line in northwest Brazil. At the Ponte de Pedra sta-
tion he also visited the school attended by Pareci children, which by that
point was operated by the ministry of education of the state of Mato
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124 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
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River (in other words, precisely where the Rondon Commission oper-
ated), the piece began by noting that coastal Brazilians held a romanti-
cized view of indigenes because they never came into contact with such
people. Rondon’s actions, no matter how impressive and altruistic, re-
inforced this naïve attitude, giving the public ‘‘the erroneous notion that
the Indian problem could be solved by constructing an idyllic peace and
fraternity with the Indians.’’ However, the editorial continued, a rubber
estate could not serve ‘‘simultaneously as hunting ground for the savages
and the source of precious latex.’’ Conflict was inevitable, for ‘‘to order
the civilized man to respect the land of the Indians is the same as ask-
ing that civilization cease.’’ And because the author could not conceive
of this he ended his editorial by noting that ‘‘here, as in other countries,
the victory of the civilized is certain.’’ 87
At least at the time, then, a number of prominent Brazilians recog-
nized the qualitatively different nature of Rondon’s policies, and they
opposed them. Thus, while the revisionist deconstruction of Rondon’s
language does provide new insight into Indian policy and the attempts
to expand state power, it fails to consider fully the context of that lan-
guage and to consider just what was possible in that era. Indeed, there
is an anachronistic tone to the revisionist argument. The very real abuse
and exploitation of Indians by spi personnel in the 1950s and later seems
to be one source of the revisionist condemnation of acts committed and
policies pursued decades earlier.88
Significantly, a recent comparative history of state policies toward in-
digenous peoples in Mexico, Canada, the United States, and Australia
confirms this. Rondon’s policies at the turn of the twentieth century used
less force, were less violent, and were less abusive of indigenous prac-
tices than those of other national governments.89 The revisionists are cor-
rect to point out the contradictions, ramifications, problems, and deeper
meanings of Rondon’s indigenist policies. They fail, however, to ade-
quately place such policies in their historical context.
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128 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
ments and lands ‘‘in a flagrant show of disrespect for both the principles
of humanity and the laws that insure the right to own land.’’ 96
In an impressive display of the contradictions of development, Fiuza
then turned his attention to describing the natural riches to be exploited
in the region. He noted the quality of the forests that, he thought, could
easily be exploited commercially. He commented on the fertility of the
soil and its appropriateness for commercial agriculture. He even reported
with satisfaction that his arrival had encouraged rubber-tappers to re-
sume their activities, which they had abandoned after the attacks. Like
those in the Rondon Commission before him, Fiuza also relied on the
owner of the rubber estate to provide the motorized canoes for his inves-
tigation.97 Perhaps sensing the weight of this contradiction, Fiuza ended
his report by recognizing a growing impasse: ‘‘If on the one hand the spi
has as its number one priority the protection of these Indians, on the
other hand there is no less a desire on the part of the government to . . .
exploit forest and mineral reserves. The two [goals] are in conflict, and
they call for our urgent attention.’’ 98
Conclusion
Two images nicely capture the complexities of Rondon’s indigenist poli-
cies. The first is a black-and-white photograph taken in the 1940s. A
smiling, bare-chested man poses for the camera. A leather headband
keeps his black, shoulder-length hair in place, and he wears what ap-
pear to be army pants. On the reverse side the subject of the photograph
thanks Rondon for providing protection, friendship, and an education
for him and his people.99
The other image is a map of the state of Rondônia. A thick, red, diago-
nal line cuts across the map. Running from the southeast to the north-
west, this represents highway br364. This red line (and the very real high-
way it represents) conjures the annual forest fires, the ecological damage,
and the costs of the ‘‘development’’ of the Amazon given that land-hungry
migrants invaded the region shortly after the paving of this road in the
early 1980s.100
The photograph of the unnamed individual, a man with indigenous
features but clothed in western pants, reflects Rondon’s problematic as-
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similation policy. It indicates that, as Lima has argued, the ultimate goal
of this policy was the elimination of ‘‘Indians’’ by turning them into
‘‘Brazilians.’’ Darcy Ribeiro has likewise acknowledged that ‘‘integration’’
ultimately meant ‘‘disappearance.’’ The policy was, he says, the one glar-
ing flaw in Rondon’s work, and it was later abandoned in practice by
the spi. This policy was, David Price asserts, immoral, for it dictated to
indigenes the terms of their incorporation into Western society. It was
ethnocentric, Seth Garfield notes, because ‘‘Indians could only be con-
ceptualized and valued in so far as they served white goals and embodied
white ideals—never on their own merit.’’ 101
The revisionists have supplied a helpful, alternative reading of Ron-
don’s policies. And yet, Rondon’s ideas were more complex than re-
visionist analysis indicates. While his policies were often ambiguous,
they were, given the context of the times, surprisingly respectful of in-
digenous practices. Yes, his ideas may have been misguided, and his
ethnocentricity did misrepresent indigenes and their histories. Never-
theless, this Brazilian general defended indigenous land rights publicly
and energetically. He and his Positivist colleagues openly called for the
recognition of the sovereignty of indigenous groups. They condemned
the racial determinism of the era. Despite the now objectionable goal of
assimilation, Rondon conceived of this as a long, slow process, and he
ordered his men to respect indigenous religious practices in the mean-
time. Clearly, this was paternalism, and it was ethnocentric, but there
were worse alternatives proposed at the time.
The map provides further commentary on the policies of Rondon.
br364 cuts through towns such as Vilhena, Pimenta Bueno, and Ari-
quemes. Ninety years ago these towns did not exist. In each case they
began, between 1910 and 1915, as telegraph stations. They represented the
Rondon Commission’s entrance into a region that at the time contained
virtually no residents of European descent. Today, br364 highway follows
the route of the telegraph line. Just as building that line first suggested
the possibilities of developing the region, the paving of br364 opened the
region to the ill effects of the latest round of development.102
It was Rondon’s mistaken belief that migration, mineral extraction,
and commercial agriculture could be managed in such a way as not
to threaten indigenous holdings and lives. He and his officers pressed
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did so by meeting with public officials, especially when pressing for in-
creases in the commission’s budget. He did so by mounting exhibitions
and by arranging and giving speeches about the commission’s activities.
Largely because of Botelho de Magalhães’s efforts, if you were edu-
cated and lived in a major Brazilian city, you were probably quite aware of
what Rondon was doing in the interior.2 In this sense the public-relations
activities of the central office were a rousing success, due in large measure
to two central arguments developed to promote the project’s activities.
First, officers justified the project’s existence by doggedly stressing their
efforts to develop the lands crossed by the telegraph lines. Second, in the
media, in published reports, in speeches and publications, and in face-to-
face conversations with leaders, Rondon and others stressed their heroic
sacrifices and their seemingly superhuman successes in the hinterlands.
And yet, each argument contained an inherent contradiction or weakness
that threatened, or at least limited, crucial support for the project.
Developing Brazil
The first telegraph construction campaigns in the west followed the logic
of military strategy. The oft-stated goal was to connect key settlements
and forts in Mato Grosso in order to facilitate troop movements in the
event of war. A further goal was to secure Brazil’s borders. Rondon him-
self stressed this strategic necessity when in early 1904 he celebrated
the inauguration of a telegraph line to the Bolivian border. He touted
the ‘‘connection of the Bolivian border with the Federal Capital [Rio de
Janeiro]’’ and crowed that ‘‘this tour de force will make it possible to . . .
maintain communications in a theater of war.’’ 3
Nevertheless, Rondon quickly moved beyond a purely strategic ratio-
nale for telegraph construction. For him the key was to develop the re-
gion, to populate it with small farmers, and to build thriving towns where
none currently existed. He noted of telegraph construction that ‘‘more
than the military defense of the Nation that every government seeks to
secure, . . . we have come to promote the principal necessities of popu-
lating and civilizing our Brazil.’’ 4
Just as it was Rondon’s goal to develop northwest Brazil by blanket-
ing it with migrants who would settle and prosper, it was the commis-
sion’s goal to blanket urban Brazilians with publicity celebrating this
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forded by its healthy and mild climate, by its fertile lands, . . . by its means
of river communications . . . and by using the almost unlimited hydrau-
lic power capable of moving innumerous factories and operating elec-
tric railways which can be laid out with almost no trouble whatever . . .
towards Cuiabá and the other centers of commerce or interchange with
the rest of the world.’’ 10
The 1915 lectures sparked a media frenzy in Rio and were a publicity
coup for the commission. The Correio da Manhã’s coverage began with
the banner headline ‘‘The Unknown Brazil’’ and included a front-page
photograph of Rondon. The Jornal do Comércio reprinted Rondon’s lec-
tures in their entirety. One Comércio da Tarde headline read ‘‘Rondon: The
New Apostle of the Jungle.’’ For its part the O País newspaper gave exten-
sive coverage of Rondon’s immediate departure from Rio de Janeiro after
his last lecture, and noted that an enthusiastic crowd of more than a hun-
dred supporters said goodbye to him as he boarded a steamer for Mato
Grosso. The crowd, which included Antonio Azeredo, the vice-president
of the Senate, as well as General Thaumaturgo de Azevedo, was reported
to have ‘‘given him a rousing send-off, shouting ‘long live Rondon’ while
waving handkerchiefs and hats.’’ 11
These and other newspaper stories reported on commission activities
in Mato Grosso. To be sure, they reported at length on the Roosevelt-
Rondon expedition, but the stories also emphasized the commission’s
efforts to develop northwest Brazil. Articles celebrated commission road-
building efforts in addition to its telegraph activities. One article noted
that the commission had built ‘‘thousands of kilometers of roads that
are so smooth that rubber-tappers now prefer them instead of rivers.’’
Another series of talks by Rondon in 1924 brought a similar round of
coverage. In that year the Jornal do Comércio reprinted in full one of his
speeches, and several newspapers used the speeches as a reason to update
readers on Rondon’s activities.12 The commission’s central office did not
wait passively, however, for journalists to report on its activities. Employ-
ees actively promoted the commission through press releases and aggres-
sive responses via letters to the editor any time a criticism of the commis-
sion appeared in print. In July 1916, for example, Botelho de Magalhães,
‘‘by order of Colonel Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, Head of this
Commission,’’ sent copies of the just-published collection of Rondon’s
1915 speeches to all of Rio’s major newspapers.13
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The line’s revenue figures likewise contradicted the assertion that its
construction was leading to the development of the region. At the very
least, people in the area were not telegraph users. The Diamantino sta-
tion, which was the second station north of Cuiabá, witnessed virtually
no growth in its revenues between 1909 (the first full year after the sta-
tion’s inauguration) and 1914. Two full years after the line’s inauguration
the Presidente Hermes station generated no revenues for the first three
months of 1917, while the Pimenta Bueno station failed to generate reve-
nues during the month of February. The nearby Barão de Melgaço station
was closed during these months. All three stations were in the zone the
commission most sought to develop.21
In fact, revenues for the line between Cuiabá and the Madeira River
did nothing but decline after its inauguration. In 1917 revenues reached
nearly U.S.$10,000, but by 1927 they had plummeted to U.S.$6,840. In
1930, the last year of the commission’s existence, revenues dropped fur-
ther still, to just U.S.$3,520. The disastrous decline in the region’s rubber
trade, one officer noted, explained this dismal performance.22
Historian Laura Maciel argues that the commission continued to oper-
ate in spite of such paltry performance figures precisely because of the
public-relations activities of the central office. At no time were the public-
relations talents of the officers more in demand than during yearly bud-
get hearings. Especially intense budget battles erupted in 1911–1912, 1914–
1915, and 1916–1917. At several points politicians sought to close down
the commission. It did survive, but budget cuts and a series of flat bud-
gets essentially thwarted the commission’s dream of developing the in-
terior via a network of commission-sponsored agricultural colonies and
indigenous posts.
Budget deliberations began late in each calendar year and continued
into the early part of the next. Invariably these months sparked a flurry
of pro- and anticommission comments in the press. For its part the com-
mission scheduled Rondon’s appearances and speeches to coincide with
these deliberations.
In late 1911 a campaign to reduce the commission’s budget, or to even
eliminate it, reverberated through Rio de Janeiro. In one of a series of
articles critical of the project, a journalist with Jornal do Comércio bel-
lowed, ‘‘The Government is too ashamed to release the exact amount of
funds wasted on this craziness.’’ Given the size of its budget, at roughly
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of the hunger, and all the other sorts of privations, that tormented us
during our journey.’’ Passages describing the expedition are filled with ac-
counts of desperate times when Rondon and his men ate insects, rats, and
monkeys to survive. Life and work in northwest Mato Grosso, Rondon
noted, ‘‘require[d] a notable physical resistance, a tenacious character,
and a love of the Patria.’’ 30
Rondon issued his strongest heroic pronouncements in public ad-
dresses. In 1910 he lectured in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo about his re-
cently concluded expeditions to the Madeira River. In the introduction to
one lecture he noted that he would speak on his ‘‘incessant battles against
privations and danger,’’ but then claimed that he would omit many of
the details ‘‘for fear of being accused of exaggeration.’’ 31 When reading
these speeches it is hard to believe that he omitted any details. He dra-
matized the trek through the forest northwest of Juruena by telling his
audience, ‘‘Upon seeing the colossal trees we now realized the enormous
effort it had taken to march the 51 kilometers we had done so far. What
was worse was the realization that there was no end in sight. It [the for-
est] probably extended all the way to the Madeira [River].’’ 32 In effect,
he noted, ‘‘we had to brave the interior by land, crossing forests, moun-
tains, plateaus, and rivers.’’ Moreover, this had to be done ‘‘both under
a piercing and debilitating sun, and during horrendous thunderstorms.’’
He and his men had to ‘‘descend into deep canyons only to be faced next
with the scaling of a steep cliff or the crossing of a raging river.’’ 33
The quintessential heroic commission tale was one Rondon told about
himself. In the speeches he gave in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1910,
Rondon offered a dramatic reading of events during the second of the
Madeira River expeditions. Returning from the Juruena River, Rondon
and his men were exhausted, ill, and famished. Their supplies had given
out weeks earlier. In this desperate state the crew arrived at the banks of
the Papagaio River, where, during the first leg of the exploration, Ron-
don had left several canoes to cross the fast-moving waters. The canoes
were now gone. ‘‘My brave men were devastated by this turn of events,’’
Rondon told his audience. Most of his men could not swim! 34
Thinking quickly, before his men lost all hope, Rondon fashioned a
crude raft out of a large piece of stiff leather that floated. Then, ‘‘throw-
ing myself into the water I began to pull the raft back and forth across
the river. On each trip it was loaded with even more bags and equip-
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ment . . . and in the same fashion I also carried all of our sick men to
the other side.’’ 35 By his own account Rondon swam the Papagaio for
five straight hours. Exhausted and nearly broken, his spirits nonetheless
soared as troop morale improved. Inspired by his example, Rondon told
his audience, the men ‘‘revived their spirits . . . and thus I was able to
save the expedition.’’ 36 Years later this story became a staple of Rondon
hagiographies.37
Rondon’s supporters in the press and in Congress proclaimed their
hero’s exploits when defending the commission during yearly budget
talks. No other human being, they asserted, could have done so much
with so little, and in such a short time. Senator Alcindo Guanabara
asserted shortly after the inauguration of the Cuiabá-Madeira River
telegraph line that ‘‘in less than one year Rondon . . . accomplished
something [the completion of the line] that normally would take two.’’
Another O País article noted that not only had Rondon completed the
line in record time, but that he had done so for less money than had ever
been imaginable.38
This very emphasis on Rondon the hero, however, furnished his crit-
ics with ample opportunity to criticize him and his work. It gave them
the opportunity to poke fun at the exaggerations emanating from the
commission’s public-relations department and from Rondon himself.
Rondon’s supporters even admitted as much. Army officers ridiculed
Rondon’s claims and activities. In Congress there were those who op-
posed the commission because, as one journalist sympathetic to the com-
mission noted, they simply couldn’t believe that Rondon was capable
of doing, and was actually accomplishing, all that he and his officers
claimed they were doing. Rondon, one newspaper noted in 1924, chroni-
cally exaggerated his exploits and simply could not be trusted.39
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double-edged sword that brought not only positive publicity but contro-
versy as well.59
Recent Brazilian studies have examined the commission’s filmmaking
unit. All of them focus on the meanings of commission films. They ana-
lyze in great detail the messages of the films, their techniques, their goals,
and their authenticity, and those readers interested in these issues and
the authors’ conclusions are encouraged to consult this literature. But
the public’s reaction to the films was just as important as their content,
as was evident with the commission’s documentary film ‘‘Os sertões de
Mato-Grosso,’’ which toured Brazil in 1915 and 1916.60
The Central Office’s advance publicity generated a media frenzy
around the exhibition of the film. Articles about and advertisements for
the film filled local newspapers before showings in towns and cities. A
prominent article about the film in A Notícia in São Paulo included a large
photograph of an indigenous women breastfeeding a child. An advertise-
ment for the film read,
Os Sertões de Matto Grosso: a marvelous national, feature-length
film made during the work on the telegraph lines of Matto Grosso
and Amazonas by the illustrious and intrepid colonel Rondon and
his dignified officers. . . .
Sensational revelation of the strength and tenacity of our [Bra-
zilian] race. The immense and uncharted jungles crossed by the
telegraph line. The discovery of eleven important rivers. Paci-
fication of many savage Indian tribes.61
In Rio de Janeiro the public fought to gain access to the film’s show-
ings. It played for several days in some eight theaters, and as many as
20,000 people viewed it. Four thousand people viewed the film in one
theater alone in São Paulo. There the commission exhibited the film
again in 1916 because so many patrons had been turned away during the
initial showings.62
One wonders, however, how many people decided to view the film
not because of their interest in commission activities but because of a
much-publicized controversy that was unanticipated and unwanted by
the central office: naked Nambikwara men, women, and children ap-
peared in the film’s final two reels. Numerous schools and museums also
had been scheduled to screen the documentary, but the nudity caused
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fused on principle, and once again the commission’s tightly crafted plans
for positive publicity ran aground.67
Conclusion
The central office, it should now be clear, struggled to create a particular
image of the commission and its work. But emphasizing the long-term
development goals of the commission allowed its critics to focus on the
ongoing cost of the project. Emphasizing the healthiness of the region led
others to reaffirm the myriad stories of disease and death in northwest
Brazil. Capturing the heroic actions and accomplishments of the com-
mission on film offended the morals of many of Brazil’s urban residents.
Thus, the results of the central office’s and the commission’s public-
relations campaigns were mixed at best. Still, the publicity, along with a
slew of later hagiographies of Rondon, seem to have fixed a heroic image
of Rondon in the minds of many, if not most, Brazilians born and raised
during the early to mid-twentieth century. In the 1980s the Brazilian gov-
ernment celebrated Rondon the hero, the brave man of the sertão who
famously claimed in the face of Indian attacks that he would ‘‘die if nec-
essary; but kill, never,’’ with a 1,000 cruzeiro note bearing his likeness on
one side and those of Indians on the other. However, and perhaps this is
fitting, inflation quickly eroded its value, and the government withdrew
the note from circulation.68
Rondon always had his critics. Furthermore, a recent generation of
Brazilian scholars has reacted against the positive portrayals and hagiog-
raphy by presenting a far darker picture of the man and his commission.
Instead of Indian protection, these scholars speak of conquest and de-
struction. Instead of development, these scholars write about exploita-
tion. They speak of Rondon’s efforts not in terms of self-sacrifice but in
terms of self-aggrandizement.69 But all of these revisionist studies view
the Rondon Commission as a juggernaut, speaking of the entirely effi-
cacious activities of commission personnel. Rondon’s Indian policy was
really one of conquest as state building, Lima forcefully asserts, and it
was, he says, dreadfully successful. If Rondon’s project was first and fore-
most a military assault, as Laura Maciel argues, it was, she says, depress-
ingly effective. Films and photographs, she and others argue, asserted
‘‘modern’’ man’s technological and cultural superiority over indigenes.
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And in this, the revisionists argue, Rondon and his men unfortunately
were all too successful.70
The failures and contradictions of the commission’s public-relations
work, however, belie the revisionist image of an all-powerful Rondon. He
indeed may have wanted to do certain things, and his actions may have
been designed primarily to assert his power, his commission’s power, and
the federal government’s authority. But reality was much more contra-
dictory than that, and the Rondon Commission never came close to being
the juggernaut of the Old Republic. The commission’s assertions of its
goals and accomplishments were one thing, but how the public accepted
these assertions and evaluated these accomplishments was quite another.
Herein, then, rests the ironic legacy of the commission’s public-
relations campaigns. They promoted Rondon and created an image that
grew throughout the twentieth century, until they sparked the recent re-
visionist attempts to discredit the man and his work. Yet both the hagi-
ographers and the revisionists share the assumption that Rondon and
his work powerfully and completely altered Brazil, be it for the better or
for the worse. For both sides Rondon continues to be a larger-than-life
figure, whether it be in glory or in infamy. Perhaps, then, the commis-
sion’s public-relations work was a success after all, for its assumptions
continue to shape our understanding and evaluations of the man and his
work to this day.
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Chapter Seven: t h e l e g ac y
o f t h e l o n e ly l i n e
156 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
l e g ac y o f t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 157
l e g ac y o f t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 159
160 * st r i n g i n g to g e t h e r a nat i o n
l e g ac y o f t h e l o n e ly l i n e * 161
n ot e s
Introduction
1 This correspondence, conducted by Rondon between June and September
1956, is contained in an unmarked file in the ar.
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.
3 Viveiros, Rondon conta a sua vida, 621.
4 The best source for information on Rondon’s life is Viveiros, Rondon conta a
sua vida. See also Macaulay, The Prestes Column, chap. 3.
164 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 1
‘‘Elite Families and Oligarchic Politics,’’ 55, 61–70. Barman, Citizen Emperor,
243–45, 247, 250.
8 Skidmore, Brazil, 64. Calvalcante and Rodrigues, Mato Grosso e sua história,
47–54. Beattie, ‘‘Conscription Versus Penal Servitude,’’ 848, 856. For an inter-
esting study of the recruitment and experiences of Afro-Brazilian soldiers
during the war see Kraay, ‘‘Soldiers, Officers, and Society’’; see also his recent
book, Race, State, and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil.
9 Skidmore, Brazil, 62. Marilena de Souza Chaui quoted in Maciel, ‘‘A nação
por um fio,’’ 19. Helpful sources on nation building in Brazil include Antonio
Carlos de Souza Lima, Um grande cerco de paz; Seyferth, ‘‘Construindo a
nação,’’ 41–59; Lesser, Negotiating National Identity; Chasteen, Heroes on Horse-
back; Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine; Motta, A nação faz 100 anos, esp. 11–40.
For a suggestive examination of the relationship between nation building
and sexuality in the works of a generation of Brazilian intellectuals see Rago,
‘‘Sexualidade e identidade.’’ For Latin America and elsewhere, useful start-
ing points for research are Sommer, Foundational Fictions; Mallon, Peasant
and Nation; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Hobsbawm, Nations
and Nationalism; Anthony D. Smith, ‘‘The Myth of the ‘Modern Nation’ ’’ and
‘‘The Problem of National Identity.’’
10 Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine, 3.
11 Seyfirth, ‘‘Construindo a nação,’’ 41.
12 Eakin, Brazil, 120. For two studies that examine these issues for Rio de Janeiro
see Meade, ‘‘Civilizing’’ Rio; and Holloway, Policing Rio de Janeiro.
13 Seyfirth, ‘‘Construindo a nação,’’ 41–51; Lesser, Negotiating National Identity,
2–5; Skidmore, Brazil, 77–78; Eakin, Brazil, 114–22, 157–58; Schwarcz, O espetá-
culo das raças, 18–19, 240–50; Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine, 6–7. Two foun-
dational texts on this subject are Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics, and Skidmore,
Black into White. João Batista de Lacerda, of the National Museum of Rio de
Janeiro, was one of the most famous proponents of the ‘‘whitening’’ thesis.
14 Schwartz, O espetáculo, 244, 249. This book appears in English as The Spec-
tacle of the Races: Scientists, Institutions, and the Race Question in Brazil, 1870–
1930, trans. Leyland Guyer (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999). The works of
Thomas E. Skidmore and Nancy Leys Stepan (see n.13) are useful starting
points for the study of race and nation in Brazil. See also Eakin, Brazil, 117,
158; Maio and Santos, ‘‘Apresentação,’’ 9; Monteiro, ‘‘As ‘raças’ indígenas,’’
16; Sommer, Foundational Fictions, 147, 151. For a useful discussion of recent
works on race and race relations in Brazil see Dávila, ‘‘Expanding Perspec-
tives.’’
15 Fausto, ‘‘Brazil,’’ 797–800. For an example of how Brazilian army officers re-
flected on their role in nation building see Diacon, ‘‘Bringing the Countryside
Back In.’’
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 1 * 165
16 Eakin, Brazil, 38–39, 171–73; Skidmore, Brazil, 75; Foweraker, Struggle for Land,
84–85, 209–10; Dean, ‘‘The Brazilian Economy,’’ 690; Fausto, ‘‘Brazil,’’ 790–
94; Frank, ‘‘The Brazilian Far West,’’ 425, 431–32. For a brief suggestion that
the federal government did exercise considerable power in this period see
Williams, Culture Wars in Brazil, 3.
17 Fausto, ‘‘Brazil,’’ 792; Foweraker, Struggle for Land, 65, 210–16; Skidmore and
Smith, Modern Latin America, 42–47. I have explored in depth the issue of
expanding central state power during the Old Republic in ‘‘Bringing the
Countryside Back In’’ and in ‘‘Searching for a Lost Army.’’ For key works on
this topic for Brazil see Topik, ‘‘The State’s Contribution’’ and The Political
Economy of the Brazilian State; Font, Coffee, Contention, and Change; Saes, A for-
mação do estado; Frank, ‘‘The Brazilian Far West.’’ The most recent assertion
of the importance of central state power during the Old Republic is Perissi-
notto, ‘‘Estado, Capital Cafeeiro e Politica Tributaria.’’ Other key works on
the state and the expansion of state power include Abrams, ‘‘Notes on the
Difficulty of Studying the State’’; Corrigan and Sayer, The Great Arch; Sayer,
‘‘Everyday Forms of State Formation’’; Skocpol, ‘‘Bringing the State Back
In’’ and Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Tilley, Coercion, Capital, and European
States; Brewer, Sinews of Power; Skowronek, Building a New American State.
18 Lima and Hochman, ‘‘Condenado pela raça,’’ 25; see also 23–25, 30, 32. Peard,
Race, Place, and Medicine, 8–9. Skidmore, Brazil, 77–82. For more on nation
and state building as they relate to public health see Benchimol, Dos micróbios
aos mosquitos; Stepan, Beginnings of Brazilian Science and The Hour of Eugen-
ics; Carvalho, Os bestializados, chap. 4; Needell, ‘‘The Revolta Contra Vacina of
1904.’’ For an interesting discussion of nation and state building as they relate
to public health policies along the Texas-Mexico border see Stern, ‘‘Build-
ings, Boundaries, and Blood.’’
19 Lima and Hochman, ‘‘Condenada pela raça,’’ 23–36. For participant accounts
of the 1910s health expeditions to the Amazon see Cruz, Chagas, and Peixoto,
Sobre o saneamento da Amazônia.
20 ‘‘Transforming Enlisting Army Service,’’ 282; see also 250–252, 279–283, 476,
493.
21 Beattie, Tribute of Blood, 231; see also 228–37.
22 McCann, ‘‘The Nation in Arms.’’
23 Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 28, 31–32, 74; Langfur, ‘‘Myths of Pacification.’’
Indeed, on 18 November 1889 the provincial assembly of Mato Grosso, un-
aware of the declaration of the republic, passed a resolution congratulating
Emperor Pedro II on his birthday (Cavalcante and Rodrigues, Mato Grosso,
85–86).
24 Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 25, 30. ‘‘Carta, Affonso Penna ao Ruy Barbosa,
Belo Horizonte, 7 de outubro de 1906,’’ cr 1127.1 (16), crb. Rondon quoted in
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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166 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2
Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 73. cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados,
11–13.
25 Berthold, History, 4, 9, rg 259 e30, box 1, na. Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs for the Interdepartmental Committee, ‘‘Confidential Report: Inter-
American Communications,’’ Washington, D.C., 30 January 1942, p. 16, rg
259 e28, box 1, na. Barman, Citizen Emperor, 132. For an entertaining history
of the telegraph and for a useful comparison of the private development of
the telegraph in the United States as opposed to the state ownership of it in
Brazil, see Standage, Victorian Internet. For a further discussion of state-led
versus private development of infrastructure in the United States see Larson,
Internal Improvement. On the strategic importance of the telegraph in Brazil
see Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 10, 18, 80; and Bigio, Cândido Rondon, 5–8.
26 Brasil, Ministério de Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas, Relatório, 1907, 497–
98. Berthold, History, 4–16. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 27–31.
27 cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados, 11–13, 29. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por
um fio,’’ 74–78. Viveiros, Rondon conta a sua vida, 61–63, 91, 116–17.
28 cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados, 164–66. Bigio, Cândido Rondon,
5–8. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 74–78.
29 For more on Rondon and the Bororo see Langfur, ‘‘Myths of Pacification.’’
30 cltemta, Relatório à Directoria Geral, no date, 5–6, 11–14. Diário de Rondon,
1 de abril [de 1907], pp. 1,667–1,671, 010118.011, ar.
31 cltemta, Relatório à Directoria Geral, 6.
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2 * 167
plained that he was exploring headwaters the Portuguese had never visited
and that he was the first to survey and map most of these places. Indeed,
as head of the cltemta, Rondon commissioned a brief (forty-page) history
of Portuguese explorations of the area, as well as a subsequent history of
explorations from 1795 through 1921 (cltemta, ‘‘Explorações; vocabulários
de diversas tribus,’’ 1919?, spi-ac, filme 316, fot. 0751–92, mi; cltemta, un-
titled, spi-ac, filme 316, fot. 1,270–1,319, mi). Late in his life Rondon ex-
plained his claim of ‘‘discovering’’ the Juruena River thus: ‘‘I say discover be-
cause vague notions and indications were all that existed [about the river]’’
(quoted in Viveiros, Rondon conta a sua vida, 233; see also 401 for further ex-
amples of how Rondon specifically acknowledged Portuguese explorations
of the region). Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, espe-
cially chap. 7. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 116. See also Price, ‘‘Nambiquara
Society,’’ 4–24.
5 cltemta, Relatório à Diretoria Geral, 43–48. cltemta, Conferências, 1910, 17.
Diário de Rondon, 30 [de agosto de 1908], 010118.017, pp. 2,502–4; 21 [de
outubro de 1907], 010118.012, p. 1,978, ar.
6 Diário de Rondon, 20 [de outubro de 1907], 010118.012, pp. 1,968, 1,970, 1,973,
ar.
7 Diário de Rondon, 22 [de outubro de 1908], 010118.012, pp. 1,982–87, ar.
8 Diário de Rondon, 22 [de outubro de 1908], 010118.012, p. 1,984, ar.
cltemta, Relatório à Diretoria Geral, 58–59. cltemta, Conferências realizadas
em 1910, 26–27.
9 Diário de Rondon, 23 [de outubro de 1908], 010118.012, pp. 1,990–97, ar. See
also Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do dia no. 77, 24 de fevereiro
de 1908,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot. 800, mi.
10 cltemta, Relatório à Diretoria Geral, 58, 60. cltemta, Conferências realizadas
em 1910, 29. Diário de Rondon, 11 [de novembro de 1907], 010118.012, pp.
2,053–54, ar. Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do dia no. 27, 24
de fevereiro 1908,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot. 798–805, mi. Viveiros, Rondon conta
a sua vida, 234–42.
11 cltemta, ‘‘Relatório apresentado ao Directoria Geral dos Telégraphos pelo
General Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, 31 de Dezembro de 1926,’’ pp.
51–59, ar. O Jornal do Comércio (Manaus), 8 de abril de 1914. Ornig, My Last
Chance, 95–96.
12 Diário de Rondon, 21 [de maio de 1908], 010118.016, pp. 2,280–81; 6 [de junho
de 1908], 010118.016, pp. 2,305–6, ar. Capitão Alencarliense Fernandes da
Costa, ‘‘Relatório do 27° Distrito Telegráphico comprehendendo os annos
de 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, e o primeiro semestre do 1920 apresentado à
Chefia da Comissão,’’ pp. 4, 6, ar. cltemta, Relatório apresentado à Divisão
de Engenharia, 31–32. cltemta, Geologia, 29–33. Botelho de Magalhães, Im-
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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168 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2 * 169
170 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2 * 171
172 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2 * 173
174 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 2
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3 * 175
its upkeep, and due to the fact that it crosses a zone which is lacking com-
pletely in human and material resources’’ (Brasil, Ministério de Viação e
Obras Públicas, Relatório, 1919, 491). The phrase ‘‘electric buzz of progress’’
is from Cabo Merignac, ‘‘Linhas Telegráphicas Estratégicas de Matto Grosso
ao Amazonas,’’ O Pais, 2 de dezembro de 1911, reprinted in Brasil, Congresso
Nacional, Annaes da Câmara dos Deputados, 149. Within seven years more
than one-third of the original telegraph poles had to be replaced (Capi-
tão Alencarliense Fernandes da Costa, ‘‘Relatório do 27° Distrito Telegráfico
compreendendo o segundo semestre de 1920 e os anos de 1921 e 1922, apre-
sentado à Chefe da Comissão,’’ p. 21, ar).
176 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3 * 177
178 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3 * 179
de Rondon, 23, 24, 25 [de novembro de 1900], 010118.001, pp. 23–25, ar.
Botelho de Magalhães, Impressões, 237–38.
33 cltemta, ‘‘Relação dos inferiores, soldados, e soldados regionaes fallecidos
na Comissão Linhas Telegráphicas Estratégicas de Matto Grosso ao Amazo-
nas,’’ crcx3 filme 1, fot. 2536–45, mi. cltemta, ‘‘Relação dos officiaes falleci-
dos, 1907–1919,’’ crcx3, filme 1, fot. 2528–34, mi. For examples of the burial
of a soldier see Diário de Rondon, 18–19 [de fevereiro de 1901], 010118.001,
pp. 126–27; 10 [de junho de 1908], 010118.016, p. 2,314, ar. Elias dos Santos
Bigio claims that 295 men died while serving under Rondon (‘‘Linhas tele-
gráficas,’’ 42).
34 cltemta, ‘‘Relação dos officiaes fallecidos, 1907–1919,’’ crcx3-filme 1, fot.
2538–34, mi. cltemta, Serviço sanitário: Secção de Cáceres, 5, 23–25. ‘‘Carta,
Francisco Eduardo Rangel Torres ao Cel. Amilcar Armando Botelho de
Magalhães, 25 de novembro de 1952,’’ ar. Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon,
‘‘Ordem do dia, Cáceres, 22 de abril de 1908,’’ crcx 3-filme 1, fot. 2496, mi.
35 Viveiros, Rondon conta a sua vida, 109–13; the quote is on 109. Botelho de
Magalhães, Impressões, 39–42.
36 cnpi, ‘‘Fé de Ofício Rondon,’’ pp. 3–4, cnpi-ag, cx5, mi. Viveiros, Rondon
conta a sua vida, 109–13. Botelho de Magalhães, Impressões, 39–42.
37 The first quote is from McCann, ‘‘The Military,’’ 55. The second quote is from
McCann, ‘‘The Nation in Arms,’’ 219. Carvalho, ‘‘As forças armadas,’’ 191.
Commission officer Amilcar Botelho de Magalhães noted that he regularly
employed corporal punishment while serving as an officer in the Rondon
Commission. He once severely beat a cook at the Parecis station, in front
of assembled troops, for the chef’s failure to prepare lunch for the soldiers
(Botelho de Magalhães, Impressões, 47–50).
38 Diário de Rondon, 7 [de novembro de 1905], 010118.005, pp. 1,075–78, ar.
39 Diário de Rondon, 25 [de fevereiro de 1908], 010118.015, p. 2,202; 26 [de
fevereiro de 1908], 010118.015, pp. 2,204–5, ar. For another example of
drunken disorder in camp see Diário de Rondon, 3 [de janeiro de 1901],
010118.001, p. 74, ar. Early in his career Rondon actually distributed wine
and cachaça to his soldiers (Diário de Rondon, 2 [de dezembro de 1900],
010118.001, p. 22; 26 [de maio de 1903], 010118.001, pp. 444–45, ar). In Tapi-
rapuã in 1911 commission physician Dr. Francisco Eduardo Rangel Torres
shot and killed a soldier during a drunken brawl. The physician and a lieu-
tenant then tied the remaining drunken soldiers to a tree (‘‘Carta, Francisco
Eduardo Rangel Torres ao Cel. Amilcar Armando Botelho de Magalhães,’’ 12
de novembro de 1952, ar).
40 Diário de Rondon, 19 [de abril de 1901], 010118.002, pp. 255–57; 20 [de abril
de 1901], 010118.002, p. 258; 22 [de abril de 1901], 010118.002, pp. 260–62;
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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180 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 3
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4 * 181
182 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4 * 183
184 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4
195–96. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 82–83. Nachman, ‘‘Brazilian Positiv-
ism,’’ 115, 133–37, 145. Nachman estimates that in 1892 27 percent of the pro-
fessors at the Military Academy were Positivists. He never explains, however,
how he determined this, except to note that he included numerous individu-
als who were not members of the Positivist Church.
29 Teixeira Mendes, A atitude dos pozitivistas, 8. Costa, O positivismo, 74–75. For
more on Teixeira Mendes’s thoughts on militarism see the following pam-
phlets he authored: A política pozitiva; A República e o militarismo; Ainda o
militarismo; Ainda a República; A actual agitação militarista. I obtained these
pamphlets at the Positivist Church in Rio de Janeiro.
30 Teixeira Mendes, A atitude dos pozitivistas, 9. Teixeira Mendes, A actual agita-
ção, 1–2. Carvalho, ‘‘As forças armadas,’’ 210–11. Bigio, ‘‘Linhas telegráficas,’’
27–37.
31 Costa, O positivismo, 78–81, 83–85; the quotation from Teixeira Mendes is
on 85.
32 Carvalho, ‘‘As forças armadas,’’ 197. Teixeira Mendes, quoted in Costa, O posi-
tivismo, 76n.16. Teixeira Mendes, A República e o militarismo, 3–8. First Lieu-
tenant Severo dos Santos, quoted in A Rua (Rio de Janeiro), 18 de julho de
1916.
33 McCann, ‘‘The Military,’’ 56. Djalma Polli Coelho, quoted in Nachman, ‘‘Bra-
zilian Positivism,’’ 145–46. Carvalho, ‘‘As forças armadas,’’ 195–96.
34 Carvalho, A formação das almas, 133. General Tito Escobar, quoted in Car-
valho, ‘‘As forças armadas,’’ 196. General Tasso Fragosso claimed that ‘‘certain
officers who were comfortably located far from the dangers of front lines de-
nounced Benjamin Constant for his pacifist ideas’’ (quoted in Lins, História
de positivismo, 415). For more on Fragosso’s thoughts on officer opposition to
Positivists in the military see Lins, ‘‘A obra educativa,’’ 41. Nachman, ‘‘Bra-
zilian Positivism,’’ 54n.77.
35 C.L., ‘‘Microcosmo,’’ O País, 22 de outubro de 1913. ‘‘Do que se vai falar esta
semana,’’ Journal do Comércio, 29 de maio de 1911. A Rua, 28 de junho de 1917.
Lins, ‘‘A obra educativa,’’ 41. cltemta, Relatório à Diretoria Geral, 15.
36 Jornal do Comércio, 3 de novembro de 1911. ‘‘A Commissão Rondon: verdades
necessarias,’’ Jornal do Comércio, 30 de maio de 1911. Antonio Pimentel, ‘‘Ser-
viço de Proteção aos Índios,’’ Jornal do Brasil, 28 de novembro de 1912. This
article was part of a series Pimentel authored condemning Rondon.
37 Jornal do Comércio, 3 de novembro de 1911. Nachman, ‘‘Brazilian Positivism,’’
126. Lins, História do positivismo, 417. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 84. ‘‘A
Commissão Rondon: verdades necessárias,’’ Jornal do Comércio, 30 de maio
de 1911.
38 ‘‘A Commissão Rondon: verdades necessárias,’’ Jornal do Comércio, 30 de maio
de 1911.
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4 * 185
186 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4
n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5 * 187
Church, in all the lands of the world’’ (Diário de Rondon, sábado, 5 [de maio
de 1908], 010118.07, ar).
52 Diário de Rondon, 29 [de abril de 1908], 010118.015, ar. pp. 2254–56. ‘‘Tele-
grama, General Rondon à Senhora General Rondon, Guarapuava [Paraná],
29 de março de 1925,’’ spi-ac, filme 331, fot. 394, mi.
53 Mattos, ‘‘Curriculum vitae,’’ 5. Nachman, ‘‘Brazilian Positivism,’’ 133–37, 144–
47, 173. Carvalho, A formação das almas, 198–99, 217–18. McCann, ‘‘The Mili-
tary,’’ 59; see also n.13. The involvement of some cadets in the so-called Anti-
Vaccination Riot of 1904 led the army to close down the Military Academy
in Rio de Janeiro. In 1911 it reopened in the Rio suburb of Realengo largely
shorn of its Positivist character.
54 The single best examination of this latter phase of Rondon’s career is Freire,
‘‘Indigenismo.’’
188 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5
of only one term. For useful background information on the history of In-
dian policy in Brazil and on Indian–white relations in the Amazon see Wright
and Cunha, ‘‘Destruction, Resistance, and Transformation,’’ esp. 302–14,
345–73.
4 Teixeira Mendes, O sientismo, 1, 5. Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza, 4. Raimundo
Teixeira Mendes, ‘‘Igreja e Apostolado Positivista do Brasil,’’ Jornal do Comér-
cio, 22 de junho de 1913.
5 Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza, 11.
6 Teixeira Mendes, Ainda os indígenas, 8. Raimundo Teixeira Mendes, ‘‘Igreja
e Apostolado Positivista do Brasil,’’ Jornal do Comércio, 22 de junho de 1913.
Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza, 10–14. Teixeira Mendes, O sientismo, 3–4. Mércio
P. Gomes, Indians and Brazil, 75–76.
7 Teixeira Mendes, Ainda os indígenas, 7. José M. Gagliardi, O indígena, 176–77.
Ribeiro, A política, 17–18, 26. Mércio P. Gomes, Indians and Brazil, 117–19.
8 Texeira Mendes, Ainda os indígenas, 13; Texeira Mendes, A influência positi-
vista, 9. Ribeiro, A política, 26.
9 Castro, Os militares, 64. Teixeira Mendes, A influência positivista, 2. Raimundo
Teixeira Mendes, ‘‘Igreja e Apostolado Positivista do Brazil,’’ Journal do
Comércio, 22 de junho de 1913. Ribeiro, Os indíos, 160–61.
10 Botelho de Magalhães, A obra ciclópica, 22. ‘‘Carta, Ruyter Demaria Boiteux,
Diretor-secretário do Clube Positivista, ao Exmo. Sr. Presidente da República
Marechal Humberto Castelo Branco, 8 de Homero de 178 (5 de fevereiro de
1966),’’ spi-ac-filme 381, doc. 212, fot. 476, mi. Raimundo Teixeira Mendes,
‘‘Igreja e Apostalado Positivista do Brasil,’’ Jornal do Comércio, 22 de junho de
1913. Ribeiro, A política, 26.
11 Raimundo Teixeira Mendes, ‘‘Igreja e Apostalado Positivista do Brasil,’’ Jour-
nal do Comércio, 22 de junho de 1913.
12 Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza, 17. Teixeira Mendes, A influência positivista, 9.
Auguste Comte, quoted in Rondon, A etnografia, 10.
13 cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, xvi. For a
similar summary see Barbosa, O problema indígena, 19–20. Luis Bueno Horta
Barbosa was a Positivist, a friend and associate of Rondon, and served as
director of the spi.
14 cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, 4–5,
45–50, 167–80, 192–95, 204–8, 222–33, 249–53, 260–70. For more examples see
cltemta, Conferências realizadas em 1910, 7–112.
15 ‘‘Carta, Tenente-Coronel Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon ao Cidadão
Dr. Rodolpho Miranda, Ministro de Agricultura, Indústria, e Commércio,
Rio de Janeiro, 14 de março de 1910,’’ reprinted in Brasil, Ministério da Agri-
cultura, Indústria e Commércio, Relatório . . . 1910, 2: 8. This letter is also
reprinted in Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza.
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5 * 189
16 Ibid., 12–13. Referring to Comte as ‘‘Augusto’’ rather than ‘‘Auguste’’ was stan-
dard practice among Brazilian Positivists.
17 Ibid., 10. This is but one of many examples of how Rondon ‘‘taught’’ Positiv-
ism to public officials. See also ‘‘[hand-delivered letter?], Tenente-Coronel
Rondon [ao Ministro da Agricultura], 19 de maio de 1910,’’ reprinted in Bra-
sil, Ministério da Agricultura, Relatório . . . 1910, 2:37; Cândido Mariano da
Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ofícios de Sr. General Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon,
apresentando sugestões pedidios pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores, em
memorandam, 11 de abril de 1932,’’ spi-ag-cx13, doc.2, filme 1, fot. 3,423–32;
‘‘Carta (sem data [1937]) . . . ao Presidente Getúlio Vargas,’’ spi-ag-cx13,
doc. 12, filme 1, fot. 3,777–81; Rondon, ‘‘Carta . . . ao Sr. Dr. Manoel Neto
Campelo Junior, Ministro da Agricultura, Rio de Janeiro, 7 de junho de 1946,’’
spi-ac, doc. 145, filme 380, fot. 274–82, mi.
18 Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, no.15, 15 de agosto de
1912,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot.1,308, mi. Ten. Cel. Cândido Mariano da Silva
Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, no. 1, 1 de janeiro de 1912 [handwritten copy],’’
ar. For further examples see Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do
Dia, no.77, 24 de Fevereiro de 1908,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot. 800, mi; Cândido
Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, 7 de setembro de 1909,’’ reprinted
in cltemta, Relatório à Diretoria Geral, 253–54; Cândido Mariano da Silva
Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, no.1, 1 de janeiro de 1915,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot.
1,331–36, mi; Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, no. 2, 23
de maio de 1913,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot. 1,314–15, mi. In the latter ‘‘ordem’’
Rondon praises the efforts of two of his officers in establishing peaceful con-
tacts with members of the Nambikwara nation. In addition to speeches made
to troops on holidays, Rondon did the same at telegraph-station inaugura-
tions. See, for example, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia,
13 de junho de 1912,’’ reprinted in cltemta, Relatório apresentado à Divisão
de Engenharia, 28–29.
19 For recent works that examine the spi and not the Rondon telegraph com-
mission see Lima, Um grande cerco, and Gagliardi, O indígena. A recent study
of the Rondon Commission largely ignores Rondon’s Indian policy: Maciel,
‘‘A nação por um fio.’’ See also, Stauffer, ‘‘Origin and Establishment.’’
20 Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Ordem do Dia, no.?, 4 de novembro de
1910,’’ spi-ac, filme 326, fot. 1,265; ‘‘Carta ao Sr. Dr. Manoel Neto Campelo
Junior, Minístro da Agricultura, Rio de Janeiro, 7 de junho de 1946,’’ spi-ac,
filme 380, doc. 145, fot. 279, mi.
21 Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, ‘‘Instrucções para uso dos Inspectores do
Serviço de Proteção aos Indios e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionaes,
na primeira expedição destinada à instalação da séde da Inspectoria e à visita
geral às terras habituadas pelos indios, 31 de outubro de 1910,’’ spi-ac, filme
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380, fot. 673, 674, 675, mi. For praise of Rondon’s efforts to defend indigenous
landholdings see Ribeiro, Os índios, 131–35. For chilling descriptions of the
impact of real-estate booms on Indian lands see Garfield, Indigenous Struggle,
chap. 6; and Garfield, ‘‘Where the Earth Touches.’’
22 Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon(?), ‘‘Instrucções internas da Directoria
Geral do Serviço de Protecção aos Indios e Localização de Trabalhadores
Nacionaes, 14 de novembro de 1910,’’ spi-ac, filme 380, doc. 34, fot. 715, 719,
722, mi. Brasil, Ministério da Agricultura, Relatório . . . 1910, 1:56. The ‘‘in-
strucções’’ document is typewritten, with handwritten notations in the mar-
gins. The notations appear to be from Minister Miranda. Gagliardi, O indí-
gena, 190–92.
23 Brasil, Ministério da Agricultura, Relatório . . . 1911 (Rio de Janeiro: Officinas
da Directoria Geral de Estatísticas, 1911), 61.
24 ‘‘Telegrama, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon ao Sr. Dr. João Batista de
Lacerda, Director do Museu Nacional, 4 de fevereiro de 1909,’’ reprinted in
Journal do Comércio, 11 de fevereiro de 1909, p. 2.
25 cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados, 62. The report on this incident
is presented on pages 49–62.
26 Capitão Amilcar A. Botelho de Magalhães, ‘‘Os Indios do Matto Grosso: A
Missão Rondon.’’ Journal do Comércio, 25 de janeiro de 1919.
27 ‘‘Telegrama, Tenente-Coronel Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon ao Exmo.
Sr. Minístro da Agricultura, Friburgo, 25 de abril de 1910,’’ Reprinted in
Ministério da Agricultura, Relatório . . . 1910, 2:29.
28 ‘‘Telegrama, 1° Tenente Nicolau Bueno Horta Barbosa ao . . . Rondon’’ and
‘‘Telegrama, Tenente-Coronel Rondon ao Sr. Ministro da Agricultura, 20 de
junho de 1910,’’ reprinted in Ministério da Agricultura, Relatório . . . 1910,
2:38. For his part Nicolau Bueno Horta Barbosa complained that reports of
these attacks had appeared in the local press but that the governor had done
nothing to stop the violence.
29 ‘‘Não se matam mais indios impunemente!’’ A Noite, 18 de abril de 192[?],
spi-ac, filme 324, fot. 435, mi. A copy of this article is located in the clippings
file of the Rondon Commission, but the year has been cut away.
30 ‘‘Offício no. 384, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, General de Brigada, ao
Exm. Sr. Presidente do Estado de Matto Grosso, 14 de setembro de 1921,’’
reprinted in A Noite, 18 de abril de 192[?], spi-ac, filme 324, fot. 435, mi.
31 Amilcar A. Botelho de Magalhães, ‘‘Carta ao Redator d’A Noite,’’ A Noite, 28
de maio de 1916. Newspaper accounts of the Toledo affair were collected in
the Rondon Commission’s clippings files, but I have yet to locate any further
documentary evidence. Included in the file are the following newspaper ac-
counts: A Noite, 20 de novembro de 1915; A Rua, 5 de novembro de 1915; A
Noite, 21 de novembro de 1915; Correio da Manhã, 21 de novembro de 1915;
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5 * 191
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5 * 193
194 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5
patory democracy. Thus, after the creation of Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo
dictatorship, Rondon wrote to Vargas saying, ‘‘As . . . a proponent of a strong,
stable government able to avoid parliamentary maneuverings that are almost
always inspired by electoral campaigns, I applaud . . . the situation Your Ex-
cellency created with the coup d’état of 10 November 1937, which was of
great benefit to our country.’’ ‘‘Carta, Marechal Rondon ao Presidente Var-
gas [1937 or 38],’’ spi-ag-cx13, doc. 12, filme 1, fot.3,777, mi). For a study of
the government of the Positivist Júlio de Castilhos in the state of Rio Grande
do Sul (which emphasizes Positivist opposition to participatory democracy),
see Freitas, O homen que inventou.
60 Ramos, Indigenism, 18–19, 80. Garfield, Indigenous Struggle, 24. Lima, Um
grande cerco de paz, chap. 3, 203–4, 209–10.
61 Garfield, Indigenous Struggle, 43. Garfield, ‘‘ ‘Civilized but Discontent,’ ’’ 110.
Farage and Cunha, ‘‘Caracter da tutela,’’ 114. Ramos, Indigenism, 82–83, 95–97.
Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 73–74.
62 Ramos, Indigenism, 83. See also ‘‘História exemplar: de como índios orgul-
hosos passaram a integrar uma triba ainda maior-a dos excluidos,’’ Veja, 1 de
abril de 1988, p. 69.
63 Ribeiro, Os índios, 211–12. Garfield, Indigenous Struggle, 51, 124.
64 For an interesting assertion of Indian agency and resistance see Langfur,
‘‘Myths of Pacification.’’ In this article Langfur is much more critical of Ron-
don’s policies than I am, and indeed he sides with Lima’s interpretation of
Rondon and the spi. However, Langfur’s own information clearly demon-
strates that Rondon was much more respectful of indigenous rights than
were either the Salesian missionaries or local landowners (‘‘Myths of Paci-
fication,’’ 885–88, 893). Mércio P. Gomes, Indians and Brazil, x, 4, 78–79, 81.
Garfield, ‘‘ ‘All the Indians.’ ’’ Turner, ‘‘De cosmologia a história.’’ For an en-
gaging discussion of how Afro-Brazilians constructed and asserted their own
understandings of nationhood see Butler, Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won. For
an especially cogent discussion of agency in Africa see Larson, ‘‘ ‘Capacities
and Modes of Thinking.’ ’’ For a brief critique of Foucault’s concept of mod-
ern disciplinary power because it ignores resistance see Findlay, Imposing
Decency, 132–34. It bears noting that Polanco probably would also criticize
scholars such as Lima and Maciel for being ‘‘ethnicists’’ who ‘‘invert ethno-
centrism’’ and who, contrary ‘‘to the historical record, [posit] an unchanging
ethnic essence . . . as the necessary basis for the continuity of indigenous
societies’’ (Indigenous Peoples, 74). For a similar critique see Warren, Racial
Revolutions, 22–25. Garfield criticizes Lima for ‘‘perpetuat[ing] the view of
Indians as inconsequential actors in the making of their own history, over-
whelmed by the Brazilian leviathan’’ (‘‘ ‘Civilized but Discontent,’ ’’ 19). For
a critique of scholars who fail to see the environmental changes caused by
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 5 * 195
indigenes in the Amazon basin and who consider the Amazon to have been
unchanged until contact with Europeans, see Cleary, ‘‘Towards an Environ-
mental History.’’ These critiques also inform much of Mércio P. Gomes, Indi-
ans and Brazil, and Turner, ‘‘De cosmologia a história.’’
65 As Darcy Ribeiro notes, to implement successfully its program the spi would
had to have overcome the interests and power of local leaders, many of whom
benefited from access to indigenous lands and labor; this, he says, never hap-
pened (Os índios, 163–69, 396). For more on this theme of the limits of state
power but for a later period in Brazilian Indian–white relations, see Garfield,
Indigenous Struggle. For a critique of authors who stress the unlimited power
of the state see Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises, 13–16. For an extended
and fascinating meditation on the issue of state power see Scott, Seeing Like
a State.
66 Compare my assertion here with Langfur’s observation that for Rondon,
‘‘When Indians stood in the way of progress they would have to be incorpo-
rated into society as rapidly, if peacefully, as possible’’ (‘‘Myths of Pacifica-
tion,’’ 884). Egon Schaden, ‘‘O problema indígena,’’ 455.
67 Fernandes da Costa, ‘‘Relatório da Inspeccão Geral do Distrito [27°], 1920–
1921 apresentado À Chefia da Comissão, 19 de dezembro de 1921,’’ p. 34, ar.
68 ‘‘Serviço improfícuo,’’ O Matto Grosso, 10 de fevereiro de 1918.
69 ‘‘Serviço improfícuo,’’ A Cruz, 24 de março de 1918.
70 ‘‘Serviço improfícuo,’’ A Cruz, 14 de abril de 1918. ‘‘Serviço improfícuo,’’
O Matto Grosso, 10 de fevereiro de 1918. Jornal do Comércio, 30 de maio de 1911.
71 ‘‘Apedido,’’ A Cruz, 17 de março de 1918.
72 ‘‘Serviço improfícuo,’’ A Cruz, 14 de abril de 1918. Viveiros, Rondon conta sua
vida, 17–18. In letters to his wife Rondon sometimes signed his name as ‘‘seu
Pery,’’ in reference to the indigenous main character in José de Alencar’s
romantic novel O Guaraní. Examples of this can be found in the Arquivo Ron-
don.
73 Peard, ‘‘Tropical Disorders,’’ esp. pp. 25–26. Stepan, Hour of Eugenics. Lilia
Moritz Schwarcz offers a somewhat different view when she argues that by
1930 racism was no longer embraced officially in Brazil but was still a very
important component of popular culture (O espetáculo das raças, esp. 243–
50).
74 Skidmore, Black into White, 30. Mércio P. Gomes, Indians and Brazil, 107–10.
For a similar argument as to the need to consider the historical context of
treaties on race in Brazil, this time in regard to the work of Gilberto Freyre,
see Skidmore, ‘‘Raizes de Gilberto Freyre.’’
75 Romero, quoted in Skidmore, Black into White, 35. For more on Romero’s
thoughts on race and Indians see Dante Moreira Leite, O caráter nacional
brasileiro, 179–94.
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 4 * 197
beiro, ‘‘considered in their historical context the Positivist policies were the
most advanced of that era’’ (Os índios, 161).
89 Perry, From Time Immemorial. Readers are especially encouraged to com-
pare Rondon’s assimilation policies with the much more abusive policies in
Canada and the United States. Mércio P. Gomes likewise recognizes Ron-
don’s accomplishments given the context of the period and criticizes Lima
for failing to do so (Indians and Brazil, 78n.27, 123–24).
90 An exception to this generalization is Hal Langfur’s recent article. He writes,
‘‘The greatest harm caused by the [Rondon] telegraph project was that it
accelerated the incorporation of the frontier, attracting new settlers whose
foothold in the region was strengthened by improved communication and
access via the broad paths opened by Rondon’’ (‘‘Myths of Pacification,’’ 886).
Sheldon Davis also mentions the issue briefly in Victims, 4. For a general his-
tory of such environmental degradation in Brazil see Dean, With Broadax and
Firebrand.
91 ‘‘Carta, Tenente-Coronel Rondon ao Ministro da Agricultura, Rio de Janeiro,
14 de março de 1910,’’ reprinted in Teixeira Mendes, Em defeza, 24. Maciel, ‘‘A
nação por um fio,’’ 120. For other examples of the promotion of development
by Rondon and others see cltemta, ‘‘Documento no.5,’’ 1917, spi-ac, filme
327, fot. 1,575; ‘‘Carta, Amilcar Armando Botelho de Magalhães aos Srs. Mem-
bros da Commissão de Finanças da Câmara dos Deputados, 11 de novembro
de 1916,’’ spi-ac, filme 327, fot. 1,590, mi. Celso Castro notes the Positivist
faith in development and technology. Indeed, a hallmark of the Positivist
stage of social evolution was to be man’s domination of nature (Castro, Os
militares, 64).
92 ‘‘Relatório da inspecção feita de Diamantino a Vilhena e o Diário a partir da
cabeceira do Tamanduá até Calama do rio Madeira. Apresentado ao Cidadão
Coronel Cândido da Silva Rondon, Chefe da Commissão pelo 1° Tenente
Nicolau Bueno Horta Barbosa, 13 de janeiro de 1913,’’ in cltemta, Relatório
apresentado à Divisão de Engenharia, 233. cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos
dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, 221–22.
93 cltemta, Geologia, 12. Fernandes da Costa, ‘‘Relatório do 27° Distrito Tele-
gráphico Comprehendendo os annos 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919 e o primeiro
semestre do 1920 apresentado À Chefe da Comissão,’’ ar, 9–10. Roquette-
Pinto, Rondonia, 115.
94 ‘‘Relatório da inspecção feita de Diamantino a Vilhena e o Diário a partir de
cabeceira do Tamanduá até Calama do rio Madeira. Apresentado ao Cidadão
Coronel Cândido da Silva Rondon, Chefe da Comissão pelo 1° Tenente Nico-
lau Bueno Horta Barbosa,’’ Anexo N.V. in cltemta, Relatório apresentado
à Divisão de Engenharia, 2–5. A Rua (Rio de Janeiro), 10 de janeiro de 1917.
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 6 * 199
mention of the commission in the local press. The central office maintained a
clippings file that, over the years, filled several large volumes. A few volumes
of this clippings file have been microfilmed and are housed at the Museu do
Índio. Two other volumes, neither of which has been catalogued, are housed
at the Museu do Exército. For examples of front-page stories on Rondon and
the telegraph, each of which included photographs, see A Noite, 11 Novem-
ber 1913, and O Imparcial, 23 de maio de 1914. For an example of a multipart
feature article Botelho de Magalhães wrote for a newspaper in Porto Alegre
see ‘‘Em torno de Rondon,’’ Correio do Povo, 14 de maio de 1925, 26 de maio
de 1925, and 11 de junho de 1925.
3 cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados, 80. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’
especially chaps. 1 and 2. Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima focuses on the stra-
tegic side of telegraph construction in Um grande cerco de paz.
4 cltemta, Relatório dos trabalhos realizados, 8.
5 Ibid., 8–10, 15–16, 80, 118–19. cltemta, Relatório apresentado à Divisão de
Engenharia, 33. cltemta, ‘‘Relatório apresentado à Directoria Geral dos Tele-
graphos pelo General Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, 31 de dezembro de
1926,’’ pp. 59–69, ar. Lima, Um grande cerco de paz, 55, 62, 87, 101–12. Viveiros,
Rondon conta sua vida, 315, 435–36.
6 cltemta, Relatório apresentado à Divisão de Engenharia, 33. cltemta, ‘‘Rela-
tório apresentado à Directoria Geral dos Telégraphos pelo General Cândido
Mariano da Silva Rondon, 31 de dezembro de 1926,’’ pp. 2–4, 16–46, 69–72,
ar; the quote is on pp. 59–60. ‘‘Telegrama, Capitão Botelho de Magalhães,
Chefe do Escriptório Commissão Rondon, ao Exmo. Sr. Dr. Weneslau Braz,
digno Presidente da República, 29 de Novembro de 1916,’’ spi-ac, filme 327,
fot. 1,580; ‘‘Carta, Amilcar Armando Botelho de Magalhães aos Srs. Mem-
bros da Commissão de Finanças da Camara dos Deputados, 11 de Novembro
de 1916,’’ spi-ac, filme 327, fot. 1,587–1,590, mi.
7 cltemta, Conferências realizadas em 1910.
8 Jornal do Comércio, 6 de outubro de 1915, quoted in cltemta, Conferências
realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, v.
9 This section is based on cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de
outubro de 1915, v, xviii–xx, 3, 5–6, 8, 36, 39–40, 153–56, 159–61, 282–90. Correio
da Manhã, 6 de outubro de 1915. Jornal do Comércio, 7, 8, 9, and 10 de outubro
de 1915. Comércio da Tarde, 7 de outubro de 1915. O País, 9 de outubro de 1915.
Levi Grant Monroe, ‘‘Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, Distinguished Son
and Most Beloved Man of Brazil: History of His Life’s Work,’’ Brazilian Ameri-
can, 20 January 1923, pp. 5, 7–9, 31–32, 47–48, 50–52.
10 cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, 159–60,
41–42.
11 Correio da Manhã, 6 de outubro de 1915. Jornal do Comércio, 8, 9, and 10 de
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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202 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 6
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204 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 6
zilian public over the years’’ (51). For more on the competing images of the
Amazon as an earthly heaven or an earthly hell see Slater, Entangled Edens;
and Diacon, ‘‘From Green Hell.’’
43 Thielen et al., A ciência, 7, 117. For more on these expeditions see also Thielen
and Santos, Revisitando a Amazônia; and Stepan, Beginnings of Brazilian Sci-
ence. The original reports generated by the expeditions have been reprinted
in Cruz, Chagas, and Peixoto, Sobre o saneamento.
44 Oswaldo Cruz, quoted in Thielen, et.al., A ciência, 121. Carlos Chagas, ‘‘Notas
sobre,’’ 160–65; the quote appears on page 160. Chagas presented his lecture
on 17 October 1913 in the Palácio Monroe.
45 Thielen et.al., A ciência, 3. Hoehne, Índice bibliográfico, 5. cltemta, Serviço
Sanitário: Secção de Cáceres, 7. Nicolau Horta Barbosa, ‘‘Diário, 13 janeiro
1913,’’ ar. cltemta, Serviço Sanitário: Secção de Cáceres, 7. O País, 2 de outubro
de 1914.
46 cltemta, Relatório apresentado ao Chefe, 20. cltemta, Serviço Sanitário: Sec-
ção de Cáceres, 31–38. cltemta, Serviço sanitário: Relatório apresentado pelo
Capitão, 6.
47 cltemta, Geologia, 10. Brazil, Ministério da Viação, Departamento dos
Correiros e Telégrafos, ‘‘Relatório annual do 3° Distrito Telegráfico de Mato
Grosso apresentado à Diretoria Geral do Departamento pelo Capitão Alvízio
Ferreira, 1 de fevereiro de 1932,’’ ar. cltemta, Serviço Sanitário: Secção de
Cáceres, 6.
48 cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915,181–84.
Rondon, quoted in Botelho de Magalhães, Impressões, 103. See also Tanajura,
Serviço sanitário: Secção de Cáceres, 6, 23–25. Rondon did not mention this ill-
ness in his 1915 lectures (cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de
outubro de 1915, 161).
49 cltemta, Conferências realizadas nos dias 5, 7, e 9 de outubro de 1915, 41–42.
Jornal do Comércio, 19 July 1914.
50 This information is found in the printed tables ‘‘Relação das praças exami-
nadas e medicadas no destacamento do Rio de Janeiro no mez de maio de
1909’’ and ‘‘Relação das praças examinadas e medicadas no Porto de Tapira-
poan no mez de maio de 1909’’ (cltemta, Serviço sanitário: Secção de Cáceres,
no page number).
51 Botelho de Magalhães, Impressões, 35–36. cltemta, Serviço Sanitário: Secção
de Cáceres, 4. Dr. J. Cajazeira, quoted in O País, 2 de outubro de 1914.
52 cltemta, Relatório apresentado ao Chefe, 7. Dr. Francisco Moritz, ‘‘Relatório
da Expedição dos Campos de Commemoração de Floriano ao Rio Guaporé,
de 30 de setembro a 19 de dezembro de 1912, apresentado ao Sr. Coronel
Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon,’’ p.12, ar. ‘‘Instrucções para o serviço
sanitário das Secções do Norte e do Sul, 22 de maio de 1910,’’ in cltemta,
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n ot e s to c h a p t e r 7 * 205
Relatórios diversos, 110. See also Horta Barbosa, ‘‘Diário 13 janeiro 1913,’’ p. 10,
ar.
53 Hoehne, Índice bibliográfico, 5.
54 A Noite, 10 de janeiro de 1917. A Razão, 11 de janeiro de 1917. In addition, see
A Rua, 10, 13 de janeiro de 1917; A Gazeta de Notícias, 14 de janeiro de 1917;
and A Noite, 30 de janeiro de 1917.
55 A Rua, 13 de janeiro de 1917.
56 A Gazeta de Notícias, 14 de janeiro de 1917.
57 A Notícia, 30 de janeiro de 1917.
58 A Rua, 13 de janeiro de 1917.
59 Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 189–93.
60 In addition to Maciel, readers should consult Tacca’s ‘‘O índio ‘pacificado.’ ’’
See also his dissertation, ‘‘O abstrato.’’ Lima, Um grande cerco de paz.
61 These, and other articles and advertisements, are found in the volume of the
commission’s clippings collection that is housed in the ar.
62 Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio,’’ 215–16. O Estado de São Paulo, 11 de novembro
de 1915.
63 A Tribuna (Santos), 20 de novembro de 1915.
64 ‘‘Os sertões de Mato Grosso,’’ unidentified advertisement in the commis-
sion’s clippings collection, ar.
65 A Tribuna, 20 de novembro de 1915. To understand better the gendered ex-
pectations see Besse, Restructuring Patriarchy; Caulfield, In Defense of Honor.
66 O Estado de São Paulo, 6 de novembro de 1915. O Correiro Popular (Guaratin-
guetá, São Paulo), 2 de abril de 1916.
67 O Correio Popular, 2 de abril de 1916. ‘‘Carta, Frederico Ortis do Rego Barros,
inspector da Repartição dos Telegraphos, Alfenas, ao Illmo. Sr. redactor da
A Noite,’’ A Noite, 27 de julho de 1917.
68 Ramos, Indigenism, 5.
69 Lima, Um grande cerco de paz. Maciel, ‘‘A nação por um fio.’’ Tacca, ‘‘O índio
‘pacificado.’ ’’ In addition, for a more nuanced analysis of Rondon, but one
that nevertheless accepts many of the revisionists’ assumptions, see Langfur,
‘‘Myths of Pacification.’’
70 A recent and welcomed exception to this literature is Hal Langfur’s discus-
sion of Bororo resistance to Rondon’s incursions (‘‘Myths of Pacification’’).
206 * n ot e s to c h a p t e r 7
bibliography
Archives
Arquivo Rondon (ar), Museu do Exército (Forte de Copacabana), Rio de Janeiro.
(Note: this collection is not yet organized and catalogued. It includes a hand-
written copy of Rondon’s diary for the years 1901–1908. Rondon wrote this
copy himself, from the original, in the 1950s. This collection also includes
several lengthy unpublished reports, in addition to personal correspondence,
telegrams, maps, and two volumes of the commission’s newspaper-clipping
service.)
Casa Rui Barbosa (crb), Rio de Janeiro.
Museu do Índio, Sector de Documentação (mi), Rio de Janeiro.
United States National Archives (na), College Park, Maryland.
Newspapers
Correiro da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro)
Correiro do Povo (Porto Alegre)
Correiro Paulistano (São Paulo)
A Cruz (Cuiabá)
O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo)
Folha do Comércio (Campos, Rio de Janeiro)
Gazeta de Notícias (Rio de Janeiro)
O Imparcial (Rio de Janeiro)
O Jornal (Rio de Janeiro)
Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro)
Jornal do Comércio (Manaus)
Jornal do Comércio (Rio de Janeiro)
O Mato Grosso (Cuiabá)
New York Times
A Noite (Rio de Janeiro)
O País (Rio de Janeiro)
O Republicano (Cuiabá)
A Rua (Rio de Janeiro)
A Tarde (Rio de Janeiro)
A Tribuna (Rio de Janeiro)
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
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208 * b i b l i o g r a p h y
Official Publications
Brasil.
. Congresso Nacional. Annaes da Câmara dos Deputados, 1911. Vol. 9. (Rio
de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1912).
. Ministério da Agricultura, Conselho Nacional de Proteção aos Índios.
Catálogo geral das publicações da Comissão Rondon e do Conselho Nacional de
Proteção aos Índios. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional,
1950.
. Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Relatório apresentado ao
Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Ministro de Estado da
Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio, Rodolpho Nogueira da Rocha Miranda no ano
de 1910. Vols. 1 and 2. Rio de Janeiro: Oficinas da Diretoria de Estatísticas,
1910.
. Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Relatório apresentado ao
Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Ministro do Estado dos
Negócios da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio Dr. Pedro de Toledo no ano de 1911.
Vols. 1–3. Rio de Janeiro: Oficinas da Diretoria Geral de Estatísticas, 1911.
. Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Relatório apresentado
ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Ministro do Estado
dos Negócios da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio Dr. Pedro de Toledo no ano de
1912. Vols. 1 and 3. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1912.
. Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1907. Vol. 1.
Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907.
. Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1908. Vol. 1.
Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1908.
. Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1909. Vol. 1.
Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1909.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1910. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1910.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Pública. Relatório, 1911. Rio de Janeiro: Im-
prensa Nacional, 1911.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1912. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1912.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1913. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1913.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1916. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1916.
. Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Relatório, 1918. Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1918.
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
6952 Diacon / STRINGING TOGETHER A NATION / sheet 221 of 242
b i b l i o g r a p h y * 209
210 * b i b l i o g r a p h y
b i b l i o g r a p h y * 211
212 * b i b l i o g r a p h y
b i b l i o g r a p h y * 213
214 * b i b l i o g r a p h y
Font, Maurício. Coffee, Contention, and Change in the Making of Modern Brazil. Cam-
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Foweraker, Joe. The Struggle for Land: A Political Economy of the Pioneer Frontier.
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Freire, Carlos Augusto da Rocha. ‘‘Indigenismo e antropologia: o Conselho Na-
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University Press, 1994.
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Kraay, Henrik. Race, State and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil: Bahia
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Larson, Pier M. ‘‘ ‘Capacities and Modes of Thinking’: Intellectual Engagements
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Price, David. Before the Bulldozer: The Nambiquara Indians and the World Bank.
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2000.
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of Civilisation. London: Pluto Press, 1998.
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(enero–junio 2001): 39–60.
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mação Agrícola, 1962.
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Rocha, Arthenzia Weinmann. ‘‘Influência do Positivismo na ação indigenista de
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publicação no. 4 por R. G. Reidy and Ed. Murray. Rio de Janeiro: Typografia
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Nacional, 1946.
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40 e discursos do Dr. Ivan Lins e do General Rondon, pronunciados na Associação
Brasileira de Educação. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Militar, 1942.
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ner’s Sons, 1916.
Roquette-Pinto, Edgar. Rondônia. 4th ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editorial Na-
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in Chile, 1920–1950. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Saes, Décio. A formação do estado burguês no Brasil, 1888–1891. Rio de Janeiro: Paz
e Terra, 1990.
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222 * b i b l i o g r a p h y
b i b l i o g r a p h y * 223
index
agriculture, 11, 129, 132, 134–35, 137, 146 tégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas
Alves, Francisco de Paula Rodrigues, (cltemta). See Rondon Commis-
89 sion
Comte, Auguste, 80–91, 102–6, 114
bandeirantes, 112 conscription, 15, 54–55. See also sol-
Barbosa, Júlio Caetano Horta, 159 diers
Barbosa, Luis Bueno Horta, 89 Costa, Alencarliense Fernandes da,
Barbosa, Nicolau Bueno Horta, 65, 127 29, 64, 75, 76, 113, 121
bicho do pé, 61. See also soldiers Cruz, Oswaldo, 14, 63, 143. See also
Bonifácio, José. See Silva, José Bonifá- public-health service
cio de Andrade e Cuiabá–Santo Antonio telegraph line.
Bororo, 6, 17, 95. See also Indians See Rondon Commission
Botelho de Magalhães, Armando Cunha, Euclides da, 143
Amilcar, 73–74, 93–96, 103, 109–10,
131–36, 139, 146–49. See also Rondon development, economic, 11, 125–30,
Commission 132–38, 149. See also state, central
Botelho de Magalhães, Benjamin Con-
stant, 79, 82–93. See also Positivism expeditions: expedition of 1908, 23–
Brazil: size of, 9–10; travel time 25, 112, 140–41; expedition of 1909,
across, 9–11, 15, 32, 56 25–30, 64, 133, 145; expedition of
1907, 20–22. See also Rondon, Cân-
Cajazeira, José Antonio, 37–46, 144, dido Mariano da Silva; Rondon
146. See also Roosevelt-Rondon Commission
Expedition
Calama, 29 Fonseca, Hermes Rodrigues da, 134
Catholicism, 13, 82, 90, 95–98, 103. See
also Indians; Positivism; Rondon, Gobineau, Arthur de, 123
Cândido Mariano da Silva Gomes Carneiro, Antonio Ernesto, 113
Chagas, Carlos, 14, 63, 143. See also government, federal. See nation build-
public-health service ing; state, central
Cherrie, George, 34, 41, 44, 46. See also
Roosevelt-Rondon Expedition Hoehne, Frederico, 36, 147
Chibata Rebellion, 55–57 hookworm disease, 62. See also sol-
Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estra- diers
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
6952 Diacon / STRINGING TOGETHER A NATION / sheet 238 of 242
226 * i n d e x
Ihering, Herman von, 123–24 Nambikwara, 21–27, 53, 62, 71, 96,
Indian Protection Service, 30, 95, 112–13, 150. See also Indians
105–7, 115–29. See also Indians; National Council for the Protection
Rondon, Cândido Mariano da of Indians, 7, 159. See also Indians;
Silva Rondon, Cândido Mariano da Silva
Indians: assimilation of, 102–6, 113– nation building, 3–4, 11–12, 15–17,
29, 157; attacks against, 101–2, 26, 155–61; civic ritual as, 4, 23–25,
108–20, 124, 127; nation building 51, 61, 85–89, 106, 115; Positivism
and, 5, 13, 17, 87, 104–5, 115, 118, 120, and, 5, 82, 85–86; race and, 12–14,
123–24, 157, 160; poder tutelar and, 87, 104–6, 115–20, 123–24, 160. See
117–20; Rondon and, 4, 27, 87, 95– also Rondon, Cândido Mariano da
97, 101–30; Rondon Commission Silva; state, central
attack, 23–27, 53, 62, 71, 112–13
Ofaié, 108–9. See also Indians
Jacometti Matea, Domingos, 147–49
Paraguayan War, 3, 11, 15–16, 82, 91
Kayabi, 109. See also Indians Pareci, 21–22, 115, 121–22, 144. See also
Indians
Lemos, Miguel, 82–83, 84, 88–89. See Pena, Alfonso Augusto Moreira, 4, 14,
also Indians; Positivism 17
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 156 Positivism, 5, 7, 80–84, 114, 118, 157,
Lima, Antonio Carlos de Souza, 87, 160; Catholicism and, 5, 82, 90, 95–
116–24 98; criticism of, 90–99; Humanity
Lyra, João Salustiano de, 26, 30 and, 5, 81–82, 85, 91, 103; Indians
and, 87, 101–6, 114, 118, 121–23, 129;
Madeira-Mamoré Railroad, 74 militarism and, 5, 90–95; nation
malaria, 19, 29–31, 47, 57, 63–65, 144, building and, 5, 82, 85–89, 104, 118,
147–48. See also Rondon, Cândido 121; Positivist Church of Brazil and,
Mariano da Silva; soldiers 79, 81–84, 89, 93; technology and, 5,
Mato Grosso, 10, 17 87
Matos, Francisco Jaguaribe Gomes public-health service, 14, 143. See also
de, 94, 136 Chagas, Carlos; Cruz, Oswaldo
Military Academy (Rio de Janeiro), 7, public relations. See Rondon Commis-
90–91, 99 sion
Miller, Leo, 34. See also Roosevelt-
Rondon Expedition race. See Indians; nation building;
missionaries. See Catholicism Positivism
monarchy, Brazilian, 11, 13 radiotelegraphy, 5, 136–37, 156
Muller, Lauro, 32, 33, 36. See also Rangel, Alberto, 143
Roosevelt-Rondon Expedition Reis, Thomaz, 151
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
6952 Diacon / STRINGING TOGETHER A NATION / sheet 239 of 242
i n d e x * 227
228 * i n d e x
Diacon, Todd A.
p. cm.
f2537.r66d53 2004
981'.05'092—dc21 2003013452
Tseng 2003.12.9 07:11
~StormRG~