EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR
HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED GARCIA, Respondents.
Facts:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. RTC granted her petition and
continuously extended the TPO.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO). CA issued (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to
raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed
with jurisdiction to resolve the same. His MR was also denied
Issues:
I.
The court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that, the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
II.
The court of appeals seriously erred in not declaring R.A. No. 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials
Ruling:
I.
We disagree. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, contrary to the argument of the petitioner that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction
that is inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.
Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369 or
“Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of domestic violence against women and children. Moreover, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.
It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that,
“[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
II. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the “Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law” and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."
We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and
the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
