*
G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006.
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs.LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; The Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its
infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly
and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.—The Constitution
provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the
rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in
Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts
decree a legal separation among the spouses.
Courts; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when
confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—This Court is not a
trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal.
Same; Same; It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts.—It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA
upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the
facts as determined by the lower courts. The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are con-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
77
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 77
Ong vs. Ong
trary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of
the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Same; Evidence; The Supreme Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of
the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of
observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.—The
Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of
witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that the
assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
Evidence; Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence and a witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony.—Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label
a witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a witness’ relationship to one of the
parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.
Family Code; Marriages; Abandonment; As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.—Also without
merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation
should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation
shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to
by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Same; Same; With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation.—We reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as
a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been
accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes
the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Renecio S. Espiritu, Jr. for petitioner.
Hermogenes S. Decano for private respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by
2
herein respondent, as well as the Resolution of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
2 Rollo, p. 46.
79
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 79
Ong vs. Ong
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have 3
three children:
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1)
4
of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging
that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
5
abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at
her like “putang ina mo,” “gago,” “tanga,” and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang
her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the
causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William
would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his
belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s decision to allow their
eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, “it is none of your
business”; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a
violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s
house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their
_______________
3 See Records, p. 1.
4 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of petitioner;
x x x
5 Records, p. 2.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
parents house in Dagupan; the following
6
day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits
that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. In
7
the
afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation of
plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to
submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division,
such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
8
SO ORDERED.”
The RTC found that:
“It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and
misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the
defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had
regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not
reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by the
defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and language were
heaped upon her.
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision).
7 Id., at p. 53 (RTC Decision).
8 Rollo, p. 56.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 81
Ong vs. Ong
The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until
December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years of her
marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of
love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff’s
memorandum, “it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon
the comforts of her home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause,
9
which is already beyond her endurance.”
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated
October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and
credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e.,
physical
10
violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately
proven.
As the CA explained:
“The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible. Dr.
Elinzano’s testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It
is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist
blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a “bump” or “bukol”
on her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her
sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does
not deviate from the doctor’s main testimony—that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands
of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the
so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart
from the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William] inflicted
repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly
abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in front of their customers
_______________
9 Id., at p. 55.
10 Id., at pp. 40-44.
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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
and employees, shouting words like, “gaga,” “putang ina mo,” “tanga,” and “you don’t know anything.”
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their
conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she
(Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness to the kind of relationship her
sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She observed that [William] has an
“explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent.” She cited several instances which proved
that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
x x x
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by
[William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained
nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an
affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister.
The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their
employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct. 11
The aggregate behavior of
[William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x”
12
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL
AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 40-42.
12 Id., at p. 46.
83
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 83
Ong vs. Ong
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED 13
PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest
control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties,
which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were
acquired during the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will
benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree
would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will
taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that
factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court
that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were
not sufficiently established; what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of
raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s favorite son; marriage
being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining
party must adduce clear and convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in
relying on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their
parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and
fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on
the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William expressed his
willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the
conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to
appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides
that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 8-9.
84
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its
infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds
should be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the
14
spouses.
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the
present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence
borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when
confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the
contention of William that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from
William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same to
Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the
companionship of William and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left
the conjugal
15
home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of
petitioner. 16
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, as well as a Memorandum
where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the
petition
17
for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by
abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the
conjugal properties were placed
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 9-24.
15 Id., at pp. 149-152.
16 Id., at pp. 157-169.
17 Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
x x x
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
x x x
Rollo, pp. 210-236.
85
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 85
Ong vs. Ong
in the administration of petitioner’s in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be issued in
18
her favor. 19
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the
20
facts as determined by the lower courts.
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant 21
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne
out by the records or are based on sub-
_______________
18 Id., at p. 221.
19 Id., at pp. 188-203.
20 Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 1.
21 Id.
86
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
22
stantial evidence. In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are
adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day
that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for
being negligent
23
of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when
William displayed violent temper 24
against Lucita and their children;
25
such as: when William
threw a steel chair at 26Lucita; threw chairs at their children; slapped Lucita
27
and utter
insulting words at her; use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; pinned Lucita
against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and
28
brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray; shouted at Lucita and threw a
directory at her, in front of Linda 29and the employees of their business, because he could not
find a draft letter on his table; got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin
prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and
shouted at 30
her “putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado” when she sided with
Charleston; and the December 31
9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to
leave the conjugal dwelling.
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the
first. As she related before the trial court:
_______________
22 Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406; 401 SCRA 391, 398 (2003).
23 TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32.
24 TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14.
25 Id., at p. 20.
26 Id., at p. 21.
27 Id., at p. 23.
28 TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5.
29 Id., at pp. 5-6.
30 Id., at pp. 7-8.
31 TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 87
Ong vs. Ong
“q You stated on cross examination that the injuries
you sustained on December 14, 1995 were the
most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the
very serious because before it is only on the arm
and black eye, but on this De-cember 14, I 32
suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.”
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the
33
said incidents.
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the
Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of
consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial
court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing
34
the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of
the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had
35
the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
In this case, the RTC noted that:
“[William]’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by him
could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family
laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may
be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial and 36credible witnesses. So with
Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.”
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of
their relationship with her. We do not
_______________
32 Id., at p. 21.
33 See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN, Kingston Ong, September 24, 1997, pp. 16-18.
34 Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333; 350 SCRA 414, 420 (2001).
35 Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 625; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March
10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 364.
36 Rollo, p. 56.
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Ong
agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s testimony as
37
biased and unworthy of credence and a witness’ relationship 38
to one of the parties does not
automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. Considering the detailed and
straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the
credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not
tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in
order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was
willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her
siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard
to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’
financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly
exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from
the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,
“...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts
of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already
39
beyond her endurance.”
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him
as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would
be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek
relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family,
a decree of legal separation should not be
_______________
37 Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at p. 334; p. 421.
38 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 196, 207.
39 Rollo, p. 55.
89
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 23, 2006 89
Ong vs. Ong
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation
shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment
referred
40
to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution 41
is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does
not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities 42
to protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as 43
well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the
presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of
the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
_______________
40 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
…
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
41 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180; 256 SCRA 158, 168-169 (1996).
42 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at p. 372.
43 Id., at p. 372.
90
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations. (Acebedo vs. Arquero, 399 SCRA
10 [2003])
Neither is Article 36 of the Family Code to be equated with legal separation, in which the
ground need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000])
